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Do Directors serving at the pleasure of a specific class of investor owe fiduciary duties to other classes of investors? Suppose a company has five directors. Two appointed by holders of common stock and three appointed by holders of preferred stock. Do the directors appointed by the preferred stockholders have a fiduciary responsibility to all of the shareholders or just the preferred shareholders? That is, can they act in the best interests of the preferred stockholder without regard to the interests of the common stockholders.	Do the directors appointed by the preferred stockholders have a fiduciary responsibility to all of the shareholders or just the preferred shareholders? That is, can they act in the best interests of the preferred stockholder without regard to the interests of the common stockholders. The duties of directors of corporations are usually set out of the statutes of the jurisdiction where the corporation is organized, and in some jurisdictions, such as the State of Delaware, there is a very significant ability of corporate organizers to very the obligations of directors by agreement in articles of incorporation and bylaws. This said, the overwhelming majority position would be that a director elected by a particular subset of shareholders would owe the same legal duties to the corporation as a director elected by all of the shareholders at large. In other words, they have a legal duty to act in good faith in the best interests of the corporation. Sometimes these duties are full fiduciary duties, and sometimes these duties established by statute include duties of care and duties of loyalty that are narrower than the fiduciary duties owed, for example, by a trustee to the beneficiaries of a trust. Generally speaking, directors owe their duties primarily to the corporation as an entity overall, and not to the shareholders generally, or to any subset of shareholders. But, there is case law that provides the owners or directors of a corporation who control the corporation are not allowed to take actions using their voting and control powers that "oppress" the minority owners of the corporation. These duties arise even at the shareholder levels, despite the fact that shareholders aren't normally seen as owing duties, fiduciary or otherwise, to anyone. For example, suppose that a corporation is an S-corporation in which corporate income is taxable to shareholders whether or not dividends are paid, in which the majority shareholder has other assets from which taxes on the corporation income attributed to the majority shareholder can be paid, but the minority shareholders do not have other assets from which taxes on the corporation income attributed to them can be paid. Case law in many states has held to if the majority shareholder exercising either shareholder voting level rights or director level powers declines to distribute dividends in order to put pressure on the minority shareholders to sell out at a discount in this situation, that this constitutes official oppression by the majority controlling shareholder and violates the common law legal duties of the majority shareholder to the minority shareholders. The remedies available in these situations also varies considerably. Of course, as a practical matter, directors elected by a particular constituency are expected to be conscious of the particular needs of the people who put them in office and act accordingly, and this is rarely actionable. But, this is, in part, a function of the fact that the majority of corporations conduct all of their business with the unanimous consent of the directors on a day to day basis. Typically, voting disputes that divide directors into different camps happen only episodically in connection with major transactions like a takeover or leveraged buyout or proxy fight, not in the day to day conduct of the business of the corporation which is almost always left in the hands of senior management, in practice, if not always in legal formal terms.	In business dealings, you would have a contract with a company, not with its owner. The new owner inherits both the assets and liabilities of the company. It's up to the buyer of the business to do due diligence before buying the company. The old owner may escape obligations to clients and suppliers once the sale of the business is complete, but the new owner could sue the old owner for fraud. (It may be possible to escape some liabilities by declaring bankruptcy, but that's not the situation you described. One unethical accounting trick that a company can use is to split the company into two corporations such that one branch inherits the liabilities, and it go defunct.)	Yes, the role of a Representative is largely to serve as a point of contact for supervisory authorities and data subjects. Much of this could be done by a person who just scans and forwards any incoming mail. In practice, the Representative should be a lawyer or at least a compliance professional in order to fulfil their role effectively, in particular when it comes to a lawsuit or administrative proceedings against the controller/processor. These would be carried out against the representative on behalf of the controller/processor. Regarding liability, recital 80 explicitly says: “The designated representative should be subject to enforcement proceedings in the event of non-compliance by the controller or processor.” This doesn't shield the controller/processor from liability, this just simplifies enforcement and ensures that judicial remedies are in fact available to data subjects. There is a much more imminent consequence for the choice of Representative: which data protection agency will serve as main supervisory authority. Non-EU controllers might prefer the convenience of an English-speaking authority, otherwise (expensive) translation could be needed. Consequently, Representatives based in Ireland are effectively the default choice. Many representatives do offer extra services, such as offering to serve as a Data Protection Officer. That would help justify the fees. Unfortunately, the conditions for appointing a representative and for appointing a DPO are somewhat different: per the letter of the law many controllers would need a Representative but not a DPO. A Representative is needed as soon as data processing is non-occasional, whereas a DPO would only be needed for processing on a large scale. I'll just add that many controllers forget about that and only think about getting a representative when appointing a DPO. Since the Representative aids enforcement, enforcing against a controller without a Representative is rather difficult, and I don't know of any fines for failing to appoint a Representative.	There is certainly precedent. This list of the 10 biggest class action lawsuits in the world indicates that 8 of the 10 were by investors against their own company. In any event your analysis is flawed. The people who initiate the class action may (probably are) no longer be investors because they sold their shares and realised their losses. Further a legacy investor who didn't buy on the basis of the company's wrongdoing would not be entitled to damages. Finally, an investor who bought at say $100 on the basis of false information (like the cars were legal when the company knew they weren't) and now hold shares worth $40 will wait many years (if ever) to make good their losses: a lawsuit will be quicker and more certain.	Directors don’t own companies - they manage them Shareholders own companies. So, if you are a director and die, the legal upshot is you are no longer a director and the company may need to replace you in accordance with its rules. If you are a shareholder, then, subject to any other contracts like a option for the company or other shareholders to buy the shares of a deceased shareholder, the shares will be distributed in accordance with your will or the laws of intestate succession if you don’t have a will. Whoever owns the shares with have the same rights as you did.	When you buy a company you acquire all its assets and liabilities If the vendor wishes to retain some assets they need to buy them from the company; before, at the time of, or after the sale. The value of a company is its assets less its liabilities plus the present value of its future cash flows all adjusted for risk. If the company owns a fleet of motor vehicles then their market value is part of the assets (and any finance on them is part of the liabilities). If the managing director wants to keep their company car then they need to have it transferred to them and it won’t factor into the valuation That said, its usually only public companies (or large private companies on the verge of going public) that are bought. Because private companies have variable levels of management skill, there could be contingent liabilities no one knows about and a new owner is unlikely to want to take these on. Private companies usually sell their assets (including the “business”) to insulate the new owner.	Acme is bound by Bob's actions so long as they were conducted with "apparent authority" from the perspective of Client C and involved his work duties, even if he carried them out contrary to company policy - unless Client C knew for a fact that Bob was violating company policy and didn't have authority within the company to do so when he was doing these things. Acme, directly, or Acme's insurance carrier, in a subrogation suit after it has settled the claim from Client C, could probably sue Bob, especially if he willfully violated company policy for the purpose of harming client C. This is rarely done, but ultimately Bob owes duties to Acme which he violated which probably give rise to liability, although proving that and collecting the judgment would both be difficult. If Bob had authority within the organization to deviate from company policy, however, which he would have a good cause to claim that he did, this would be a full defense to such a suit, since Bob was always acting as a disclosed agent of Acme. Client C probably cannot sue Bob directly, whether or not it sues Acme. In contract matters (which this would include) a disclosed agent is not responsible for the acts he carries out on behalf of his principal. For example, an employee who signs a promissory note on behalf of a company in an official capacity as a disclosed agent of the company isn't responsible for paying the note. This is different than the rule in tort cases where the principal and anyone whose actions personally caused the tort caused the problem is liable. For example, if the employee got into a car accident that was his fault while he was driving on the job for the company, both the company and the employee would be liable to the person who was hurt. The circumstances that you describe sound more like a breach of contract than they do like a tort, so Bob would probably not have any personal liability to Client C. Could Bob or Acme (or both) face any criminal liability? Unless Bob was the CEO or other senior officer of the company, Acme wouldn't face criminal liability, because he is too far down the chain of command to cause Acme the entity to have the requisite criminal intent. Realistically, failing to "verify that equipment rental invoices match delivery records before notifying the client to approve the invoices for payment" does not amount to a crime no matter who does it. This might be careless or a breach of contract, but it is not fraud or theft because it lack the necessary criminal intent. If Bob actively photoshopped equipment rental invoices with a specific intent to defraud Client C, he would probably be criminally liable for fraud, although even that isn't an open and shut case as it still basically involves failure to perform a contract according to its terms and a mere breach of contract is generally not a crime unless you intended not to perform it in the first place, when you entered into the contract.	The law related to the internal organization of corporations is a matter of state law. You cite the correct authority: The board of directors of a nonprofit corporation shall consist of one or more members. The number of directors shall be fixed by or in the manner provided in the bylaws. If not so fixed, the number of directors shall be the same as that stated in the articles or three if no number is so stated. 15 Pa. Stat. and Consol. Stat. Ann. § 5723 (West). The statement of the state attorney general is merely a suggestion. Although, in an entity with audited financial statements the audited financial reports must disclose that the organization lacks "adequate internal financial controls". But, non-profit entities such as charitable trusts or "corporations sole" (such as most legally distinct entities in the Roman Catholic Church) have only a single person with full control over everything that a Board of Directors does. The IRS likewise does not impose a minimum number of directors for a 501(c)(3) organization, or for any other kind of corporation. Nothing in the relevant statue requires that it have more than one, and many non-profits (e.g. probably a majority of churches) have only one director.
United States: Can an insurance company sell a policy that pays fines and costs incurred by the policyholder knowingly breaking the law? Is it legal in the United States for an insurance company to sell a policy that pays fines imposed on a person or corporation as a result of the policyholder knowingly breaking the law? An example of such a policy for individuals is DWI insurance: A motorist buys a policy that will pay fines, fees, a motor vehicle interlock, alcohol education classes, attorney costs in the event that the motorist is charged or convicted with driving while intoxicated? An example of such a policy for corporations is a policy that pays fines imposed on a company for violating environmental regulations in the event that they get caught. A factory is knowingly discharging emissions of a controlled pollutant at a level over the legal limit. They (and the insurer's underwriters) know they probably won't get caught, but if they do, the policy makes the softens the blow of getting caught. Are there laws in place in the United States that forbid this type of insurance policy, either at the federal level or at the state/local level?	Insurance is regulated at the state rather than the federal level in the United States, and the terms of individual insurance contracts also matter. Most states prohibit insurance of intentional unlawful acts as a matter of public policy, either under common law doctrines or under express statutes or regulations. The public policy is that no one should be insulated from liability for their own intentional acts. And, in insurance policies for individuals who are not employers, this is typically accomplished with an intentional acts exclusion in the language of the policy. (Negligent acts are almost always insurable. The status of acts that constitute gross negligence, willful and wanton conduct, reckless conduct, or bad faith conduct, varies somewhat from state to state.) But, the situation is muddier when the insured is an employer or an entity. It frequently is possible for an employer or entity to insure itself against unauthorized misconduct by employees or officers or directors who are breaching their duties to the employer or company, rather than carrying out the official policies of the company. Factories don't knowingly do anything. People in or connected to factories do things and know things. And, if a factory employee is cutting corners in violation of his job responsibilities and that hurts the company, that could be an insurable risk. But, if a factory employee is acting in accordance with the directions of the CEO and Board of Directors in causing the factory to emit waste violating the law, and if the people giving him orders known that this violates the law, then this is probably not an insurable loss of the company as a matter of public policy. Another complication involves the question of who is insured. The Town of Greenfield may be able to legally buy insurance that compensates it for the costs of having to deal with intentional environmental law violations by factories undertaken as a matter of corporate policy in the town, even though the corporation couldn't buy this insurance. Indeed, the Town could even impose a tax on the corporation that requires it to pay the premium on the Town's insurance policy. But, this wouldn't relieve the corporation of liability or violate public policy because the insurance company would have a right of "subrogation" to sue to owner of the factory to reimburse it for the full amount of any claims that it had to pay to the Town. This is true even if the corporation and the responsible individuals in the corporation are, in fact, judgment proof or bankrupt, so that the subrogation right is actually meaningless in fact. It is also probably legal for a company to "self-insure", i.e. to set aside reserves of its own money to pay for it violations of the law in the future without regard to intent, and to have administrators employed to process payment in those situations, because then it is not actually insulated from harm for its own wrongdoing. But, this is risky because a policy of condoning illegal conduct could subject the company to punitive damages and sanctions in addition to compensatory damages. It also matters what kind of harm the insurance policy pays for. It would not be illegal, in almost any state, to issue an insurance policy that pays for a criminal defense lawyer for someone who is accused of a crime. But, it would be illegal in almost every state to issue an insurance policy that pays for fines and court costs and restitution imposed as punishment for committing a crime. Paying for a criminal defense lawyer, or a bail bond, at a time when you are presumed innocent, is not a form of punishment and hence is an insurable expense.	Colorado statute 42-6-206 imposes disclosure requirements on the sale of vehicles with salvage titles. That you didn't know it was a salvage does not seem to be of concern to this particular statute. This means that you are potentially entitled to redress against the people who sold you the car as well, provided the sale occurred in Colorado and they failed to disclose it to you (i.e., you didn't just forget about it in the intervening years). Given the presence of a law specifically covering your circumstances, it may be worth consulting with a local attorney to see what your obligations are. There may be mitigating circumstances, but they are not currently obvious to me if they're there. (conventional wisdom in the industry is that all private sales are "as-is" with no implied warranty of merchantibility and no recourse for a buyer who doesn't do due diligence -- I was shocked to find a statute specifically protecting buyers of salvage vehicles)	This practice is known as "rescission". It is legal under 45 CFR §147.128 in some circumstances. The regulation says (a) A group health plan, or a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage, must not rescind coverage under the plan, or under the policy, certificate, or contract of insurance, with respect to an individual (including a group to which the individual belongs or family coverage in which the individual is included) once the individual is covered under the plan or coverage, unless the individual (or a person seeking coverage on behalf of the individual) performs an act, practice, or omission that constitutes fraud, or makes an intentional misrepresentation of material fact, as prohibited by the terms of the plan or coverage. The law also prohibits surprises: A group health plan, or a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage, must provide at least 30 days advance written notice to each participant (in the individual market, primary subscriber) who would be affected before coverage may be rescinded under this paragraph (a)(1), regardless of, in the case of group coverage, whether the coverage is insured or self-insured, or whether the rescission applies to an entire group or only to an individual within the group. (The rules of this paragraph (a)(1) apply regardless of any contestability period that may otherwise apply.) Note that the regulation pertains to insurance plans, and not employers. The employer may in good faith believe that you are stuck with the medical bills, but their opinion does not matter as far as this regulation goes. However, the employer also does not have the right to "declare" on behalf of the insurance company that your wife was covered. If you assume that she had coverage because the employer (mistakenly) said you did, but there was actually no coverage, then that is between you and the employer, or possibly you and the doctor. A prior question is whether she was actually covered in that past period. The contract between the insurance company and the employer might hypothetically state that only employees are covered, and may have accidentally submitted enrollment information with mistaken information ("X is an employee"). Since there was no intentional misrepresentation (we assume), coverage cannot be rescinded. Also note that rescission is retroactive cancelling, not prospective cancelling ("henceforth, you are not covered").	That's the entire point of a summary proceeding. You're allegedly found committing an offence, that isn't worth the court's time to hear but nevertheless requires some penalty. The only way to "unambiguously deny liability" is by requesting a hearing and denying liability in the notice of this. The court doesn't care what you say to everybody else, it cares what you say on its record. The reasoning is, if you're so sure you're not guilty of an offence, why haven't you sought to argue this in court? And if you weren't committing the offence, why did the informant serve the infringement notice in the first place? The act is not silent at all on this. If you don't request the hearing and serve such notice by the date required, you are liable to enforcement action - whether you deny liability out of court is irrelevant.	Probably not. This condition is what's known as a penalty clause, which is not universally allowed. This article discusses penalty clauses in EU law. In the English-Belgian variety, the clause is simply not enforceable. In the Dutch-French and German-Swiss models, such a clause might be enforceable, but the judge can adjust disproportionately high amounts – 250 times the normal price strikes me as disproportionately high. It isn't clear what amount the courts would deem to be reasonable and fair: but the infringer would have to request a reduction in the amount.	It's legal to sell your program if it doesn't infringe any law or anyone else's intellectual property. Examples of things that can get you into trouble: statutes: Some countries have export laws that forbid you to distribute certain types of encryption without proper export controls. patents: If you use a design or invention that is under patent protection you could be liable for infringing patent rights. trademark: If you improperly use a trademarked name you could be subject to damages. licensing: If you violate a license to which you have agreed you can be sued for damages. copyright: If you appear to have copied something without license you can be liable for damages. Just because: If someone wants to sue you, they can. Since there's no way to guarantee your business won't run into liability from infringement – or from some other failure – people normally conduct business through entities like LLCs that shield them from personal liability. Depending on their concerns and finances, they may also: Buy liability insurance Consult professionals like IP lawyers to: review their business and products in advance to look for and address glaring infringements, and/or correctly protect their IP using the tools mentioned above.	You have to pay the premium You are not buying insurance by the month - you are buying coverage for a year for which you making monthly payments. At law, your insurer has to pay out for a single claim that happens during that period - most insurance policies contain a reset clause that reinstates the cover after a claim but this only applies if the asset still exists. Insurance law started with insurance of wooden ships on intercontinental voyages where losses were usually total and this ‘accident of history’ informs modern insurance where losses are usually not total. Similarly, being able to cancel the insurance if you dispose of the asset is a creature of the contract and usual practice rather than a legal requirement. As for “mak[ing] it clear to me” - they did. It’s in the policy which you legally read and understood even if you didn’t actually read it.	It is legal for a dentist to bill you for services rendered. You have an obligation to pay the dentist (in exchange for services); the insurance company has an obligation to cover certain expenses of yours (in exchange for money); the dentist has an obligation to the insurance company to accept certain terms specified by the insurance company (in exchange for being listed as 'in-network'). Your recourse is to object to the insurance company, since they are the ones who have an obligation to you. The brute force approach would be to sue the insurance company for failing to cover something that they are (ostensibly) obligated to pay on your behalf, under the terms of your insurance contract. However, the chances are virtually non-existent that they are actually obligated to pay the dentist. You can call the insurance company in advance of the procedure and get a definite decision as to whether the service in question is covered, and if they say "Yes", then you are covered, otherwise you will know you are not, and can plan accordingly. The insurance company has some (minor) leverage over the dentist, if the dentist has breached his contract with the company. If a service provider egregiously breaks the terms of an agreement with the insurance company, the provider could be sued or at least dropped from the in-network list. This is, however, fairly theoretical. The insurance company statement "You should not be billed for this service" has no legal force, but it does weakly suggest that they blame the dentist somewhat (the alternative is to simply say "This service is not covered"). Your obligation to the dentist arises from the service provided plus the rarely-read clause in the financial agreement document that you signed at some point which says something like "We will submit claims to your insurance company, but you are ultimately responsible for any unpaid charges". It is highly unlikely that the dentist actually lied to you about the cost, especially it is unlikely that he said anything that could be construed as a promise that the insurance company would provide a particular level of coverage. For future reference, you either need to get a clear written statement from the service provider that they will accept whatever the insurance company allows you (i.e. their seat of the pants estimates are legally binding), or you need to get a clear written statement from the insurance company regarding what is and is not covered.
Repeatability of class action cases I suffered significant personal injury after taking the drug Seroquel for seven years. A class action lawsuit was settled against the drug maker, Astra Zeneca, in 2010. According to this article (https://www.natlawreview.com/article/us-supreme-court-limits-potential-repeat-class-actions), my understanding is that once a class action case is settled another similar class action suit cannot be brought forward. Is this correct? I was never a member of the original class action settlement. If this is correct, does it bar me from pursuing an individual lawsuit?	my understanding is that once a class action case is settled another similar class action suit cannot be brought forward. Is this correct? A settlement or judgment in a class action is binding against everyone in the class that didn't affirmatively opt out against the defendants in the lawsuit involving the same kind of wrongdoing by the defendants (e.g. a class action lawsuit over Seroquel wouldn't bar you from bringing a lawsuit over some different defective drug made by the same company). There is generally a deadline to opt out of a class action lawsuit which is shared with the public by publication and if you opt out before that date by filing a document with the court, you aren't bound by the class action settlement and can bring your own lawsuit instead. I was never a member of the original class action settlement. If this is correct, does it bar me from pursuing an individual lawsuit? The fact that you didn't receive settlement funds or have any communications with the class action plaintiff's firm doesn't mean that you weren't a member of the class covered by the class action. You need to read the definition of the members of the class in the class action lawsuit that was settled or resolved with a judgment. If you fit in that definition and didn't affirmatively opt out of the lawsuit by filing a document with the court, you cannot bring an individual lawsuit against the company. On the other hand, if you don't fit in the definition of people who were part of the class defined in the class action lawsuit, then you can bring an individual lawsuit if it is not time barred and assuming that there is still a solvent defendant to sue that is left. Nine or more years would be more than the statute of limitations in most states, and many companies go out of business or reorganize in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy after settling or losing at court in a class action lawsuit, however, which would bar an individual lawsuit. For example, maybe the class action lawsuit has a class defined as "people who took doses of the drug Seroquel manufactured in Chicago, Illinois by a subcontractor of Astra Zeneca from 2007 to 2010." But, you got your doses of the drug from a plant that manufactured it in New York City. You would not be part of the class and could bring your own lawsuit if the statute of limitations has not expired. Realistically, it sounds to me like you were probably within the definition of the class covered by the lawsuit, you didn't affirmatively opt out because you didn't learn about the lawsuit in time, you didn't receive any of the settlement funds for some reason even though you should have (most likely because you never learned of the settlement and thus didn't contact the court or the class action plaintiff's attorney), and the statute of limitations to bring an individual lawsuit against the drug company has probably expired. It wouldn't hurt to contact the class action plaintiff's law firm, however, to see if any settlement funds are still available to be paid from the settlement that was reached in 2010.	There have been cases in the UK where paying someone's legal bills was interpreted as joining their case. So when A with no money libels someone, and B with deep pockets pays A's lawyer, then B risks being held liable for damages if A gets convicted. So B should be very careful. Just giving you money is probably the safest. But attorney-client privilege is between attorney and client. I have been laid off twice with my company asking me to take an employment lawyer and paying for it. (Interestingly each time the bill was exactly the maximum amount the company was willing to pay :-) It would have been absurd if my company could demand information that is under attorney-client privilege just because they paid the bill. Why did two companies pay the lawyers bill? Because that way they ensure that the separation is without problems. The lawyer explained the settlement contract and what it meant exactly. They also checked that the contract didn’t contain anything unacceptable which the company would have fixed. So if I had tried to sue them later I would have no chance to win (but there was no reason to sue). Another reason not to sue was that the company offered I settlement that was very significantly more than was legally required, but if you sued them you would only get what you got in court - most likely less than you would get without suing. So basically they paid to make sure I would have no reason to sue them later.	A lawsuit is designed to put you in the position you were in before the sale happened. Since the company has already offered you a full refund, suing would achieve nothing except cost you fees; your time and frustration are not legally recompensable. It may be that some consumer-protection office can fine this company for misleading advertising; the case would turn on whether the mistake should have been noticed before customer support sent a false confirmation. If you want to start the process, you should make a formal complaint to your local trading standards/customer service office. You will get no reward except relief to your feelings.	Your question (when read with your follow-up comments) is somewhat complex, so I am going to make a few assumptions and break it down into several sub parts. Assumptions The conviction occurred in a state where the expungement statute allows you to tell employers that you were never arrested and convicted. When you say “public records websites” you’re asking about sites like atlaspublicrecords.com. That atlaspublicrecords.com is a US based company. They don’t list an address and the website used a private registration services, so can’t easily determine that they are US-based. Your questions and follow-up Considerations After I get it expunged, will it be removed from public records websites . . . . No. Websites like atlaspublicrecords.com do not link to actual public records. I searched a couple of common names and feel safe in assuming that it only collects and publishes the information—it does not actually link to court records. Nevertheless, it would not be available from the actual government agencies that keep those records. By getting your records expunged the convictions and arrest would no longer be available as public records that someone could request from the courthouse, police department, or whatever state agency does criminal history in your jurisdiction. do I have to show them proof of the expungement . . . . Yes, if you believe what the website claims. I can’t find a physical address for the website and don’t know if they are real or a scam, so understand that when you give them information about your expungement—or pay their silly fee, they might collect the money and do nothing. My opinion is that the company is shady and seems to operate in a gray area of the law that I will explain below. Options if they don’t remove the post: You could try to sue them for some type of secondary dignitary tort like defamation or false light. But these would have some significant legal hurdles. See G.D. v. Kenny, 15 A.3d 300 (N.J. 2011), where the New Jersey Supreme Court held that commenting on an expunged criminal records was not defamation or invasion of privacy because it was the truth. You could try to argue that they are a consumer reporting agency under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). If they're governed by the FCRA, you have some additional legal remedies (like civil penalties/fines) if they don't remove/clarify an expunged record. The Fair Credit Reporting Act applies to credit reporting agencies, like Experian & Equifax but also covers companies that compile and sell information for background checks. This includes criminal records. See the Federal Trade Commission’s Advisory Opinion to LeBlanc (06-09-98). But . . . this website is operating in a gray area that appears to comply with the law. The FCRA only applies to consumer reporting agencies, which are defined as: Any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) Because they’re not charging money or a fee to access the reports and they’re not a nonprofit cooperative, they probably do not meet the definition of a CRA. Bottom-line is that you're best option is to give them the expungement documents once you obtain them.	The Supreme Court does not handle hypotheticals. The court has interpreted Article III Section 2 Clause 1 of the Constitution, the Case or Controversy Clause as a limit on the powers of the judicial branch. The courts have jurisdiction over various types of cases and controversies but only those listed in the Constitution. This limits courts to hearing actual cases and prevents them from issuing advisory opinions. Additionally, in order to bring a case, the plaintiff must have standing to bring the suit. You can't sue the government just because you don't like a law (well, you can, your suit will just be dismissed because it lacks standing). You have to show That you have been, or will imminently be, injured (injury-in-fact) That there is a direct correlation between that injury and the law (causation) And that a favorable court decision will redress the injury (redressability) As a practical matter, the courts are already overwhelmed by the number of actual cases that come up and the Supreme Court can only hear a tiny fraction of the cases they are asked to hear. If they added the ability to hear hypothetical cases as well, the court could easily be overwhelmed by Senators and Representatives asking them to weigh in on every remotely controversial bill or amendment before Congress or interest groups bringing cases for speculative grievances.	Yes. A dispositive motion is a motion that can end the case. The most common are a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment. A motion for judgment on the pleadings is like a motion to dismiss but usually for plaintiffs arguing that even if everything in the answer to the complaint is true, that the plaintiff still wins as a matter of law. This tends to come up most often in limited jurisdiction courts with pro se parties who fill out and file their own answer on a court form, usually in response to a collection action or eviction, with stuff like "I can't afford to pay" or "my mother died and I need another few month since I used up my money for health care her final illness and for her funeral."	As many parties as have standing. The First Amendment protects the right to petition for redress of grievances, so any limitation on that right would be highly disfavored. When there's a rush of cases like this, though, there are a few option for dealing with them. For instance, a plaintiff may seek class certification, permitting him to stand in for similarly situated parties so they don't need to litigate themselves, or a court may consolidate the cases if they are sufficiently similar.	Nothing prevents firms from putting clauses like that in the disclaimer. If you're talking about goods (rather than services), much contract formation is governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, which 49 states have adopted (and which Louisiana has adopted part). However, the real question relates to whether that kind of language will be enforceable in court. A common way to attempt to avoid litigation is to insert a clause that requires arbitration of disputes (instead of litigation). The Supreme Court upheld the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), so this can be successful. Contracts that have class-action arbitration provisions are a little dicier, but in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Conception, 563 US 333 (2011) , the court held the FAA preempts state laws that disallow class arbitration.
Is there a procedure that takes place if it is determined (retroactively) that a law is impossible to implement to comply with it? What if it is determined retroactively that a law is literally impossible to implement or comply with? For example of something being impossible to implement, let's say the federal government passes a laws stating that the all government agencies must use a secure implementation of RSA for all government communications. 6 months later a cryptographer proves that all implementations of RSA are insecure, and it is impossible to create a secure one. Suddenly, government agencies realize it would be illegal for them use communication. This, however, would also be illegal since it prevents them from upholding other regulations. We will also say legislators did not write into either the law requiring RSA communication or the law requiring government agencies to do their duties what would happen in this scenario. As something that is impossible to comply with, let's say the federal government passes a law stating that parents must take their children once a year on February 1st to have their appendixes X-rayed by a CDC approved clinic to make sure they do not develop appendix cancer. However, the CDC publishes a metastudy one year on January 28th showing that child appendices are super sensitive to X-rays, and that it will drop the approval of any Clinic that offer this procedure. It now becomes impossible for parents to comply with that law, since by definition any clinic that offers that procedure will not be CDC approved. So, what happens in a case like this? Note my question is different from What if a law is literally impossible to follow? in that the fact that it was impossible to implement/comply with only become apparent afterwards. I think its reasonable to suppose that no court is going to impose penalties against someone for doing something impossible. My question is how would they go about answering the following questions: Do they enforce the spirit of the law, and if so, which one? For example, would the courts expect government agencies to use some other form of secure communication? If so, which ones could they use? Could it be another form of digital communication, or would a court expect them to use briefcases instead. Or would they expect agencies to use insecure RSA implementations. Or would they expect them to cease doing their duties that require communication since they can not comply with the RSA law. Would parents be expected to have their child's appendix checked some other way at a CDC approved clinic, like a blood sample? Or would they be permitted to get their child's appendix x-rayed at a non-CDC approved clinic? Or would the law that gets discarded be the law stating you can not threaten people, enabling parents to violently force the CDC to approve clinics that offer the procedure? Or does the law simply get discarded completely until the legislature passes a new version of it? And if so, if there are multiple laws that are individually obeyable, but can not be simultaneously obeyed, which is one is discarded? Now, I do not expect you all here to know the answers to these hypothetical questions, but what procedure would the government use, if any, to determine the answers to them. The problem is that different people might come to different conclusions about the best way to handle the situation, and these views would need to be reconciled for the sake of impartiality.	Normally, statutes don't crawl out of law books and enforce themselves. And, government officials have broad sovereign immunity for most of their activities, so in most cases the only remedy available if someone in the government doesn't enforce a law according to its terms is to seek an injunction ordering the government to carry out the law. Impossibility is a defense to an injunction request. Also, enforcement of many laws is vested entirely in the discretion of the executive branch and can't be compelled judicially at all. When compliance can be judicially compelled because someone has standing to do so and the language makes the action required by statute truly mandatory, short of demanding full compliance with the law, a judge can set deadlines for compliance (a recent example of that involved a judge ordering the federal government to reunite migrant parents and children who had been separated). In the absence of a court order, the attorney-general for the jurisdiction (or an assistant AG tasked with the job) and the chain of command managers responsible for the function and often aides on the chief executive's staff will come up with a compliance plan that is within the realm of the possible. If none of those approaches is workable, the chief executive or top aides to the chief executive will typically approach friendly members of the legislature to seek a legislative work around. A substantial share of the bills in Congress or a state legislature at any given time that almost never make headlines are bills addressing situations like these that come up from time to time, for example, when a statutory requirement that used to become workable, ceases to be due to unavailability of resources or some technical barrier. Most of these bills pass on a bipartisan basis as a matter of course without the general public even noticing it. Most large omnibus laws are followed a few months later by a technical corrections bill address problems discovered in trying to implement the law.	This has yet to be specifically decided in the federal courts. The Post Office can set "rules of conduct" for its facilities. Prohibiting photographing is plainly a restriction on one's First Amendment rights, and it is established beyond question that a government cannot issue / enforce a blanket prohibition of public photographing. Someone would have to take a case to court to determine whether this limitation on First Amendment rights passes the relevant level of judicial scrutiny. The rationale (as set forth by the USPS) is that such photographing may be "disruptive". One can perhaps analogize the right to film police with a new-found right to film post office, following from a right to public oversight over the government. DHS gives general guidance of its own (with a pile of redacted stuff), directing you to 41 CFR 102-74.420. Permission is thus required, until the courts find that to be an unconstitutional restriction (I would not expect there to be such a finding). But it is not unthinkable that the courts could at some point so rule. The YouTube aspect of the question is irrelevant: if you have the right, you have the right, and it doesn't derive from nor is it blocked by an intent to distribute on YouTube.	Federal and state laws do protect a variety of different types of personal information in particular contexts, but there isn't really any information that is necessarily personal and protected from disclosure in all contexts. For instance, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act generally protects a person's health records from unnecessary disclosure, and the Federal Education Rights and Privacy Act generally protects a student's educational records from unneccessary disclosure. But that doesn't mean that all of an American's health information is protected, or that all of the information that a hospital holds about an American is protected. The hospital can typically disclose the fact that it is treating a specific person, and if that person provides his health records to a government employer, that employer may be required to produce them in response to a request under the Ohio Public Records Act. But Facebook isn't a health-care provider, so it isn't required to protect medical records, and it isn't a school, so it isn't required to protect educational records. At the federal level, I don't know of any privacy laws that require it to maintain the privacy of its users' information, though it may be required to do so under state laws, or as a contractual matter because of its privacy policy. But that doesn't mean it has nothing to worry about. Like any business in the United States, it is prohibited from engaging in deceptive trade practices, so it can't make broad promises to protect users' privacy when it has no intention of honoring them. That's why it ended up paying $5 billion for privacy violations in the past and remains under court orders requiring it to better protect users' data. Further, Facebook has users all over the world, so it is required to comply with the international privacy regulations like GDPR that can be far more stringent.	CNBC's explanation is simply wrong. The law says that a vaccine manufacturer is immune from suit and liability under Federal and State law with respect to all claims for loss caused by, arising out of, relating to, or resulting from the administration to or the use by an individual of a covered countermeasure if a declaration under subsection (b) has been issued and there was a declaration under subsection (b). This immunity is not conditioned either way by being approved, indeed the declaration states To be a Covered Countermeasure, qualified pandemic or epidemic products or security countermeasures also must be approved or cleared under the FD&C Act; licensed under the PHS Act; or authorized for emergency use under Sections 564, 564A, or 564B of the FD&C Act The liability immunity is not perpetual, the declaration says: Liability immunity for Covered Countermeasures administered and used in accordance with the public health and medical response of the Authority Having Jurisdiction begins with a Declaration and lasts through (1) the final day the emergency Declaration is in effect, or (2) October 1, 2024, whichever occurs first. That doesn't mean that there can't be another declaration in the future. Immunity of a manufacturer to liability is not related to a patient being "covered". There are other ways in which a patient could be "covered". One of them is the Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program and the other is the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, which presently redirects you to CICP.	A statutory instrument that exceeds the limits of the enabling Act is void. For example, an Act that enables the executive to make regulations about companies would not support a regulation that purported to affect companies and partnerships. There are two controls in place: regulations must be tabled in Parliament and any MP can call for the regulation to be debated and voted down. anyone affected by the regulation can go to court to oppose it - there are lots of things they can argue including that the regulation overreaches its enabling Act.	Overview An executive order cannot make new law. However, most executive orders are based on powers granted by law to the President, or to some executive agency or department. Others are based on laws that come under the general power and duty of the President to "take care that the laws are executed" and announce some policy for how laws will be interpreted and enforced. Announced mandates In the case of the mask and vaccine mandates announced but not yet issued by the Biden administration, they apparently claim to exercise powers granted under various laws, particularly the Occupational Health and Safety Act. It is likely that once such regulations are formally issued they will be challenged by those opposed to such mandates. If they are upheld, (or are somehow not challenged and thus assumed to be valid) they will carry the force of the laws under which they are issued, and thus the Supremacy Clause will apply to those laws, and to the orders as ways to enforce those laws. Other Precedents The question says: Currently, the only precedent to enforce fines and vaccine mandates (at a state level) that I am aware of is a 1905 decision by the Supreme Court, Jacobson v. Massachusetts (197 US 11 (1905)), where it allowed Massachusetts to fine an individual for refusing to comply with vaccine mandates set by the state. This is not quite correct. Jacobson is the leading case on this issue, but there have been some others. In Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922) the US Supreme Court held that a local ordinance mandating vaccinations for school attendance did not violate federal constitutional rights, citing Jacobson and calling the matter settled law. Note that the ordinance in Zucht applied to both public and private schools without exception. In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) the Supreme Court opinion included (at 166) the statement that: Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state, as parens patriae, may restrict the parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor and in many other ways. Its authority is not nullified merely because the parent grounds his claim to control the child's course of conduct on religion or conscience. Thus, he cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself on religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death. People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243. The catalogue need not be lengthened. It is sufficient to show what indeed appellant hardly disputes, that the state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's welfare, and that this includes, to some extent, matters of conscience and religious conviction. (Emphasis added, footnotes omitted) Prince v. Massachusetts was a child labor case, not a vaccination case, and the above comment was technically obiter dictum (not binding precedent). But because of it Prince has several times been cited in later vaccination cases alongside Jacobson and to show that Jacobson is still good law. Note that Prince, like Jacobson and Zucht, was a case supporting state law against a 14th amendment challenge. Supremacy Clause An Executive Order that is not backed by any valid law would not be the "Supreme law of the land" under the supremacy clause, and might well be simply held invalid for lack of Presidential authority to issue it, depending on the subject of the order. But orders claiming to make law on the President's own authority are quite rare. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (the steel seizure case) invalidated such an order. In that case the President not only did not have the backing of a specific law, but failed to follow the procedures set out in a relevant law. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer the concurring opinion by Justice Jackson has proved influential in later cases and in later congressional drafting of laws. The key passage of that opinion starting at 343 U. S. 635 reads: Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress. We may well begin by a somewhat over-simplified grouping of practical situations in which a President may doubt, or others may challenge, his powers, and by distinguishing roughly the legal consequences of this factor of relativity. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty. If his act is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal Government, as an undivided whole, lacks power. A seizure executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least, as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables, rather than on abstract theories of law. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system. Into which of these classifications does this executive seizure of the steel industry fit? It is eliminated from the first by admission, for it is conceded that no congressional authorization exists for this seizure. That takes away also the support of the many precedents and declarations which were made in relation, and must be confined, to this category. Can it then be defended under flexible tests available to the second category? It seems clearly eliminated from that class, because Congress has not left seizure of private property an open field, but has covered it by three statutory policies inconsistent with this seizure ... Would a vaccine mandate or mask mandate that goes beyond any law passed by Congress fall into Jackson's "zone of twilight"? In the absence of a court ruling, no one can say.	Not in jurisdictions I am familiar with. A "Power of attorney" is a power to act as an attorney-in-fact, not to act as an attorney-at-law. A layperson practicing law for someone other than herself is usually the unauthorized practice of law and is illegal in most jurisdictions. It would be permissible if a jurisdiction carved out an exception for a particular kind of case, but they generally don't and are very unlikely to do so in a criminal case. For example, in Washington State "Limited Practice Officers" can assist people with one of a very limited set of civil legal forms that do not need modification. There may be some exceptions, but they would be more likely to occur before a matter becomes criminal. For example, the accountant who represents a taxpayer before the IRS, or the agent who files a form containing perjury to a federal agency like the post office or homeland security on your behalf. So it is very unlikely, but if it is important to you you can ask someone familiar with your kind of case in your jurisdiction.	Scenario 1. It doesn’t matter what it says. If it was not legally ratified, it is not legally in force. There is no absolutely no paradox at all. It is essentially just a draft amendment and would be thrown out if any attempt was made to enforce it and challenged.
Is a B2B blacklist legal We have a business client who is a non-payer and we've had enough. Is it legal to share details of this non-paying business to other businesses like mine? It wasn't mentioned anywhere in the contract that we'd share any info about them or the money owed etc.	Yes. This is legal. The only possible liability for a truthful and accurate disclosure of fact is a defamation action (in the absence of a privacy clause in the contract) and this is truthful so it would not violate anyone's legal rights. Credit reporting agencies routinely collect such information and court actions to collect unpaid debts are also a matter of public record. Credit reporting agencies in this business also have some additional obligations (such as the obligation to remove an entry after a period of time and an obligation to present rebuttal statements from the person affected). But, you should understand that merely publicly sharing truthful information about a factual matter is not really what a "blacklist" means. Normally, a blacklist includes an implied understanding that certain actions will be taken as a result of placement on the list rather than merely sharing information for what it is worth. An example of a law prohibiting a true blacklist from Colorado is the following: § 8-2-110. Unlawful to publish blacklist No corporation, company, or individual shall blacklist, or publish, or cause to be blacklisted or published any employee, mechanic, or laborer discharged by such corporation, company, or individual, with the intent and for the purpose of preventing such employee, mechanic, or laborer from engaging in or securing similar or other employment from any other corporation, company, or individual. Incidentally, I'm not convinced that the statute would be constitutional if enforced under modern First Amendment jurisprudence, although one U.S. District court case from 1971 did uphold its validity in the face of a somewhat different kind of challenge. Resident Participation, Inc. v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Colo. 1971).	Well, as always, the answer is "it depends". It isn't illegal per se. If both parties agree, it's good business. You get paid for the work of compiling the report. For example, let's say you leave and are no longer working for them, and they call you and say "hey, you know those security vulnerabilities you were talking about last year? Yeah, the boss finally decided to give it priority, but it seems we kept no notes in that meeting. Could you compile a report for us? I know you no longer work here, but we would pay you a little more than the normal contractor rate if you are interested". That's perfectly fine. Now, not disclosing them when you found them could be seen as a breach of contract, which implicitely includes the duty of loyalty. Keeping it a secret to cash in on later is certainly sleazy. The compiled report might, depending on state laws, your specific contract, and who can pay the better lawyer, end up as their's. You can only compile that report because you worked there and you got knowledge of those vulnerabilites only as a part of your job. And finally, even if you did compile a report and it is waterproof and it is yours exclusively, it very much depends on the "else". What if they just say "no thanks"? Selling that report to someone else is illegal. So you have exactly one legal buyer and that buyer knows it. Does not sound like a great bargaining position. If you approach them, it takes a lot of skill and maybe a bit of legal training to make sure it does come across as an offer of "good business". I think it would be easy to be misinterpreted as either blackmail or selling them knowledge they legally probably already own. So unless you are certain you can fit into that "good business" model of selling your work compiling a report, instead of selling the knowledge of their secrets, it might be safer to not do that. If they approach you, it should not be a problem, but if you approach them, it will be a mess, no matter how well you mean it.	The question does not say what reasons the other party gives for not paying, and so one cannot judge whether such reason is covered by the terms quoted in the question. In general a contract need not be highly specific if the intent is clear. However, any ambiguity will usually be resolved against the party who wrote the contract, so it is in that party's interest to be as clear and specific as possible. It is not clear from the quoted terms that they form a contract at all. No consideration is stated. Contractual provisions which deny all recourse are not always enforceable. They may be overruled by law or regulation, or by prior court decision or by an equitable decision. If there is a serious problem with the service provided, particularly in a consumer transaction, a court might reject a provision denying all refunds even if it is quite specific and clear. The question does not list the jurisdiction (country and, for federal countries, state or province). Laws on contracts and enforceable terms vary significantly in different jurisdictions. Without this a specific answer is not possible.	The line they'll rely on for GDPR compliance is the first part of that sentence - "If you agree to this during the order process", which suggests that there will be a separate request to opt in to marketing communications at some other time in the process. Check any order documents. There's likely to be a tick box or similar on at least one. If that implies opting out rather than opting in there may be grounds to argue with that under GDPR, but there's nothing in the quoted text that suggests a problem.	The section you quote as clearly saying a thing is not clearly saying the thing. However: you cannot pass on or resell any license keys seems to say a thing clearly. However, one could argue that it's the sharer of the account who is in the wrong, and not the person receiving and passing on the account. I'd say that that piece of the agreement, combined with this: must not... let other people get access to anything we've made in a way that is unfair or unreasonable says that, yes, they are out of bounds.	A business owner can normally refuse service for any reason unless anti-discrimination law, or some other specific law, applies. "Critic of the business" is not a protected class. Whether a business would act in such a way I cannot say if it would risk significant negative publicity. But I see no legal reason why they could not.	It is cl;early not legal to charge for an optional warranty without ever having gotten approval for it. The customer could simply ask for a refund on teh ground that this was an error, and take it to small claims if that was refused. I am sure it is legal to offer such an optional warranty and point out its (alleged) benefits. I do not know if consumer law forbids making this pitch multiple times in the same selling encounter.	When you license your IP (like a song) you can specify the terms and conditions of its use by the licensee, including revenue shares from any derived work. However, if, as your comment suggests, you grant an "informal" license, and later decide that you want to "firm things up" with a license having different terms, that's a matter you would have to either negotiate or litigate with your counterparty. If you want a common reference point for negotiation of this sort of license, you might have a look at compulsory license terms.
Requirement that members of the US Electoral College vote for candidates from two different states In Art. II, Sec. 1 of the US Constitution, what is the reasoning for the requirement that the Electors vote for two persons, "of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves."	There was concern during the drafting of the Constitution that many people would know only or primarily their local officials and political figures, and thus that many electors would vote only for people from their own state, leading to many candidates, none of whom would have anything close to a majority. The provision referred to was intended to avoid this, and encourage a more national election. In practice the problem has not happened. This is arguably one of the consequences of the prompt rise of national political parties, which was not foreseen by the authors of The Federalist Papers nor by many (if any) of those who wrote about the Constitution during the ratification debates. The Federalist #68 deals with the election of the President. It does not specifically mention this provision, but does say, while discussing the Electoral College: The process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office of President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications. Talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity, may alone suffice to elevate a man to the first honors in a single State; but it will require other talents, and a different kind of merit, to establish him in the esteem and confidence of the whole Union, or of so considerable a portion of it as would be necessary to make him a successful candidate for the distinguished office of President of the United States. The better choice and judgment of a national vs a mere state-wide electorate is a consistent theme though much of The Federalist, particularly the parts written by Madison.	"Law" is actually a very broad term, which encompasses statutes, rules, regulations, precedent and I'm sure some other things that I'm forgetting. The popular understanding of "law" is the statute, which involves Congress (at the federal level) or the legislature (and the state level). That is the kind of law that we say is "passed". At the federal level, some number of representatives or senators will introduce a bill into the House or Senate, and it is discussed in a relevant committee; if it is approved, it moves to debate by the whole House / Senate and if it passes it moves to the other house. Once it has passed both the House and Senate, it goes to the President where it may be signed, rejected, or ignored. If signed, it becomes "a law", if rejected (vetoed) it can become law anyhow if it gains a 2/3 majority vote in both houses. If the President ignores it ("pocket veto"), it becomes law in 10 days (Sunday is not a day), unless Congress is not in session. Oh, and, that's just the tip of the iceberg. At the state level, there is a similar process, with the further option of referenda and initiatives. In the former case, a particular law will have been passed by the legislature and then it is put to a popular vote for affirmation / overturning, and in the latter case a new law is proposed by the people (generally through a petitioning process) and then voted on by the populace. There is a fair amount of variation on how this works and what can be done, by state. A law can be repealed (withdrawn) by passing a law that repeals a given part of the existing law, and it can be re-written. The Supreme Court of the jurisdiction can also withdraw a (part of a) law if it is found to be unconstitutional. No foreign body can override US law, although if the US is bound by treaty (which necessarily involves another country) then we might have to do whatever that treaty says, because we approved the treaty. One limit on what we can be forced into by treaties is that a treaty cannot violate the constitution. The largest source of law in the US is actually not statutory, it is regulatory law, where a regulatory agency writes rules with the force of law (so really, it is law). In that case, there has to be a statutory basis, where at the federal level a law is passed empowering an agency to write rules, where the scope of the regulation is supposed to be related to the empowering statute in some manner. In that case, there is a vetting process, but basically no voting, just an announcement, some discussion, and eventually the rules are set. Analogous processes exist at the state level. We also have various county and city governmental bodies, where e.g. the city council can vote to create a law; or, they can empower an agency to write regulations. Yet another source of law is the Executive Order, where the president can decree that such and such will be the case (as long as it has something to do with what the executive branch does). These are somewhat limited in scope, but every president seems to like to test what that limit is. Governors get to do it too! And lastly, courts have an indirect power to make law, by ruling on how an existing law is to be interpreted (as well as ruling that a law or part of a law is unconstitutional).	I think your confusion stems from assuming there is a universal definition of "minor" across laws, jurisdictions, and rights. 18 is the age of majority for the purpose of voting (26th Amendment), the death penalty, labor law (although age 14 is the minimum age for employment), and many other laws. But, 21 is the age required to buy alcohol in all states (by their own choice in order to receive highway funding). Nothing requires the age of majority to be consistent across different sections of code or statute or between jurisdictions (except when constitutionally prescribed, like voting age, or minimum age for certain elected offices). There are many counties that prohibit purchase of alcohol at any age. The age of consent varies between 14 and 18 across US states. Age 65 is a threshold for certain tax credits. You need to be 25 in order to be a member of the US House of Representatives, 30 to be a Senator, 35 to be President. You are only protected from age discrimination if you are 40 or older. Here is a rough list of various age-based thresholds for various rights, privileges, or responsibilities in the US. (I havn't vetted this whole list, and some are clearly satire, but the ones I know about are consistent with my understanding.)	Any country can certainly decide who it should grant citizenship status to. There is no international rule that I know of requiring that the recipient be currently a resident of the country granting citizenship. Any country may issue passports to its citizens.	Yes, the Fourteenth Amendment makes a person born on U.S. soil a U.S. citizen at the moment of birth. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States. This is not a "loophole," because it is exactly what the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment were trying to achieve. There are narrow exceptions because of the "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" clause: The children of an ambassador are held to be subjects of the prince whom he represents, although born under the actual protection and in the dominions of a foreign prince. ... Thus the children of enemies, born in a place within the dominions of another sovereign, then occupied by them by conquest, are still aliens. Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbour, 28 U.S. 99, 155-56 (1830).	If a person A, speaking by telephone to an election official B in Georgia, attempts to influence that official to improperly alter an election result in a way that would constitute frauds or otherwise be a violation of Georgia law, then the person A has committed a crime in Georgia. There are various ways to commit a crime in a place without being physically present in that state. Since there is no question what was said on the telephone call in question (because it was recorded) the question to be determined would seem to be whether it constituted a crime under Georgia law, and whether the Georgia officials think it is worth prosecuting. It is true that a trial for a criminal accusation is normally held in the state where the crime was committed (or allegedly committed). But that need not be in a state where the person was ever physically present. If a person living in State C does business is state D, and is requires to file a tax return with the authorities in D, and it is alleged that the return was false, then the person is being accused of a crime in D, committed when the false return was received in D.	The Declaration of Independence is often cited (along with the Federalist Papers) when the court is attempting to justify a particular interpretation of The Constitution by looking at the intent of the drafters. For example, in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission 576 U.S. ____ (2015), in establishing that the people have ultimate sovereignty quoted the Declaration of Independence: Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed... Following that (after also quoting some text from the Constitution), Justice Ginsberg concludes: In this light, it would be perverse to interpret the term “Legislature” in the Elections Clause so as to exclude lawmaking by the people, particularly where such lawmaking is intended to check legislators’ ability to choose the district lines they run in... As a second example, Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges 576 U.S. ___ (2015), refers to the Declaration of Independence: This practice of constitutional revision by an unelected committee of nine, always accompanied (as it is today) by extravagant praise of liberty, robs the People of the most important liberty they asserted in the Declaration of Independence and won in the Revolution of 1776: the freedom to govern themselves.	In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), the US Supreme Court ruled unanimously that a similar provision in Maryland's constitution violated the First Amendment and could not be enforced. So presumably the North Carolina provision is similarly unconstitutional and unenforceable. It's not clear why it wasn't removed in 1971. I found references to a 2009 incident in which an avowed atheist named Cecil Bothwell was elected to the Asheville, NC city council. Opponents apparently threatened to mount a legal challenge to his eligibility under the Article VI provision. It's not clear if they actually tried to do so, but in any event, Bothwell served his full four-year term and was then re-elected for another.
Help interpretting Florida Statute and specifically Jurisdiction on the waters of the state Florida Vessel Statutes state: 327.58 Jurisdiction.—The safety regulations included under this chapter shall apply to all vessels, except as specifically excluded, operating upon the waters of this state. The definition of Operate: 327.02 Definitions - (33) “Operate” means to be in charge of, in command of, or in actual physical control of a vessel upon the waters of this state, to exercise control over or to have responsibility for a vessel’s navigation or safety while the vessel is underway upon the waters of this state, or to control or steer a vessel being towed by another vessel upon the waters of the state. Definition of "Underway": It seems to me, that they do not have jurisdiction, unless you are operating/underway and not while at anchor. If you are at anchor the jurisdiction would fall under the U.S. Coast Guard, as per: Am I missing something here? Or does the State of Florida not have jurisdiction, unless you are operating?	“... in charge of, in command of, or in actual physical control of a vessel ...” applies even if the vessel is stopped, at anchor or even if no one is on board (in which case it would be the last person in charge). Also, both Florida and the USA can have jurisdiction at the same time. Jurisdiction is not exclusive.	S88 Closing roads and public places: ...totally or partially prohibit or restrict public access, with or without vehicles, to any road or public place... S91(1)(a) Power to give directions: direct any person to stop any activity that may cause or substantially contribute to an emergency That is what "this Act otherwise provides"; S6 that you cited only works "unless": Unless this Act otherwise provides, this Act does not limit, is not in substitution for, and does not affect the functions, duties, or powers of any person under the provisions of any enactment or any rule of law. Also, from another angle, "functions, duties, or powers" are not the same thing as "rights": the Act does not limit the former (unless provides otherwise), but nowhere does it say it does not limit the latter.	The powers given to law enforcement professionals will be detailed in the relevant law that establishes them. I would suspect that the decision to cordon off an area would fall within the purview of the officer on the scene; the idea that a police officer would need to seek permission before cordoning off a motor vehicle accident or chemical spill is unworkable. I would also suspect that other emergency personnel (e.g. ambulance and fire-fighters) would have similar powers. However, such cordoning off would be a temporary measure and if it was maintained for an unreasonable period it would be open to challenge through an administrative or judicial process. If the police decided that a feature was a permanent hazard then they could seek a court order on the owner of the property to provide some measure to adequately protect the public, by either removing the hazard or providing some permanent barrier, under whatever laws seemed most appropriate.	You don't really "solve" a problem with IRAC. It is a rubric for summarizing cases and writing about how a legal issue was or should be resolved. As noted by @Putvi it stands for issue, rule, analysis and conclusion. It is common when writing a court opinion, or summarizing a case. For example, you first state the issue: Does the statute of frauds bar claims for promissory estoppel to establish who owns real property? Then to state the rule: Promissory estoppel can overcome the statute of frauds for many purposes, but not for purposes of lender liability or conveyances of real property. Then to provide analysis: Promissory estoppel has been used to substitute reliance for consideration and other formal requirements such as the requirement of a writing in many contexts, but the lender liability statute of frauds was enacted with a broader application than the traditional statute of frauds and the statute of frauds for conveyances of real property is definitional in nature since a conveyance of real property doesn't have a meaning in the absence of a deed or other instrument of conveyance. Since determining who owns real estate and not just who is obligated to transfer it in the future necessarily involves a conveyance, the exception to the promissory estoppel exception to the statute of frauds applies. Finally, you state the conclusion: Therefore, the statute of frauds bars claims for promissory estoppel to establish who owns real property. IRAC is a tool used for communicating legal concepts and conclusions, not for reaching those conclusions. Usually, the first stage of research is that you are presented with a fact pattern from which you have to "spot issues" and you may need to do legal research to use terminology that will be helpful and accurate to determine what the exact issue you want to resolve is and what the legal rule that applies to the case is. This often involves significant analysis prior to stating the rule or defining the issue. Also, it isn't uncommon in adversary practice to start with a conclusion, and see if you can find a way to describe the issue, rule and analysis that will lead to that conclusion. It would also be common to ask a junior attorney or law clerk to IRAC a large pile of cases to allow the senior attorney to focus in on which ones matter more quickly.	in japan operation of an unmanned airborne vehicle, aka UAV, aka Drone, inside a city might be legal, if a special license is obtained: Drones may not be flown in the following manners without special permission from the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism: 150 meters (492 feet) above ground level; near airports; above densely inhabited areas, as defined by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. This means in reverse, that you could have such a special license, but that license needs to be obtained for each operation 10 days prior, may only be done in daytime and within line of sight between drone and operator. However, city centers are densily inhabited areas, so the default is banned. However, in the countryside, flying a UAV does not require a special license, as long as the general other rules are followed (150 m above ground, 30 meters of any obstacle, daytime only, line of sight, etc). Among the requirements is also a total ban on alcohol at the control. As a result, the operation as depicted is not lawful under the ordinary laws as they operate in our world, unless the drone operator has special permit.	In case there is no way of knowing, thus no way to sue, would this seem like a loophole that practically abolishes the 4th amendment ? The 4th amendment only means that the officer needs a probable cause/reasonable suspicion to detain you. It absolutely does not mean that he has to tell you what that is. In fact, not telling you what the probable cause is is often a part of the officer's job because, if you are indeed a perpetrator, letting you know what the suspicions are could make you do things that would allow you to escape justice. There is certainly always a way to sue i.e. file a lawsuit, for which you do not need to know what the probable cause was. Instead, you contend that there was not any. And from this point the officer has to tell the court what it was, if any. If he fails to provide one, you win and get redressed for harassment — this is how your 4th amendment rights work. If he does provide a good probable cause, you lose because in this case you either: actually did something suspicious and knew there was a probable cause; OR jumped to the conclusion that the officer harassed you when he was simply doing his job.	united-states First of all, I would not say that any police organization "rules over": any area, unless serious corruption is being implied. The usual term is "has jurisdiction" meaning that they may enforce the law, make arrests, and generally act as police. The rules are going to vary by state, and not all states even have all of these types of law enforcement organizations. But here are some ways in which they often work: A Sheriff is generally a county official, and may have jurisdiction anywhere in the county. If so, so will all the officers under the sheriff, who my all or mostly be Deputy Sheriffs. (This term is very old, going back to "shire reeve", the chief administrative officer or bailiff for a shire, or county, in England, prior to the year 1000, and on through to the modern era.) In many states the Sheriff has authority except in incorporated cities within the county. The Sheriff often supplies court officials or bailiffs, and also runs the county jail. This post tends to be more important in the western part of the US. City police generally have jurisdiction within the boundaries of a city. They may be a tiny or huge organization, depending on the size of the city. State level law enforcement may or may not be able to supersede them, county level often cannot. The state police, often known as "state troopers" have jurisdiction through the state. In some states they mostly do highway patrol and traffic enforcement on state highways. In some states they provide primary law enforcement for all areas not part of a municipality with its own police. They may provide backup and resources for small police departments not equipped to handle major crimes, particularly villages and towns that do not have the status of cities. Or that may be handled by the Sheriff's office. Many states have a Division of Investigation, sort of a state-level version of the FBI. This is sometimes administratively part of the State Police, sometimes not, but even when it is it is in practice a separate organization. It can and does investigate serious crimes anywhere in the sate, and often handles matters where the conduct of the local police is or might be in question. It may be called by different names in different states. This organization can and does take over cases from local police and sheriff's offices. They may also run central crime labs with facilities more advances than local police departments have, to whcih evidence may be sent for testing from local departments or sheriff's offices.	You are asking a different question The title to the earlier question -- "Do the police have a civil duty to do their job" -- is slightly misleading. The question is not whether the policy have an abstract "civil" duty to enforce the law, but whether they have a specific "constitutional" duty to do so. If they do have such a specific duty, then, as they OP says, they could "be sued for not doing their job." As ohwilleke explains thoroughly, the answer to this question is "no." The Supreme Court has consistently held there is no constitutional right to police enforcement of the law. In particular, the SCt has held that police aren't violating the 14th Amendment when they don't "do their job." According to the Court, someone who is hurt when the police don't enforce the law, is not deprived of "life, liberty or property without due process of law." This in turn means that the people who are hurt can't sue the police under §1983, which allows people to sue state or local officials who violate their constitutional rights. As you point out, the Nevada statute clearly requires officers to make an arrest in some cases. However, this requirement is not absolute; the statute also creates an exception to the requirement: a peace officer shall, unless mitigating circumstances exist, arrest a person when the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has...committed a battery upon his or her spouse.. The statute goes on to explicitly exempt the officer and her department from liability if she decides not to make an arrest: Nothing in this section shall be construed to impose liability upon a peace officer or his or her employer for a determination made in good faith by the peace officer not to arrest a person pursuant to this section. Thus, the statute sends mixed signals to police officers. On the one hand, it requires them to make arrests in some domestic violence cases; on the other hand, it says they are not liable if they ignore this requirement. Taken together, the Nevada statute and the SCt's decisions mean people who are hurt if police don't make an arrest under 171.137 cannot sue the police under either state or federal law.
Can the law be used to falsify science? This may seem very off topic, but sadly it isn't. There is currently a prominent flat earther in the UK who has decided to write a paper to be peer reviewed, which would turn science on its head in the education system. He even crowd funded over £2000 to pay for his course to do this: https://www.gofundme.com/fe-in-the-education-system Given that knowledge gained through the scientific method by definition must be falsifiable, what can this man possibly gain from doing this? Would any law review group take this even remotely seriously?	A legal paper published in a peer reviewed journal is not science. Universities have faculties of Law and Science because they are not the same thing. while both disciplines use the terms ‘evidence’, ‘fact’ and ‘proof’ they do not mean the same thing. Notwithstanding, the law has already disproved science - see the Catholic Church v Galileo and the Heliocentric model of the Solar System. Yet NASA still uses it to send spacecraft to Pluto - possibly because engineering is neither science nor law.	For Mr. Petersen, the questions in general should have been elementary. The fact he did not know them is actually quite deplorable. To your questions specifically: Should Mr. Petersen, as a Juris Doctor, know of those things in his sleep? This is the wrong question. The question is: should an individual who has accepted a nomination to serve as a federal judge on the U.S. District Court know of those things in his/her sleep? The answer is unequivocally yes. One could almost argue - one would likely be scoffed at, but one could - that an appointment to a higher court, the U.S. Circuit, could get away not knowing those things 'in his/her sleep,' because appeals courts would not deal with, e.g., abstention doctrines or whether to admit expert scientific testimony, as often as a trial court does. Simply put, lawyers should at least have heard of those things (he looked/sounded absolutely dumbfounded at the words that were being said to him), litigators should know them, and federal trial court judges absolutely need to know those things to do the job. Is his excuse valid when he says that he has no background in the field(s) (he mentioned litigation once) the terms are corresponding to? If he was just some lawyer talking to some guy at a bar, sure, totally valid. If someone is a corporate M&A or project finance attorney, sure, don't expect him to win any trial court vocabulary contests. However, when sitting before a panel of U.S. Senators carrying out their Constitutional duties of "advice and consent" on presidential appointments, not knowing those things can, should, and indeed did end in complete humiliation for the person ignorant enough to try and go through with that. I'm sure his hearing was scheduled some time in advance. The fact he obviously made zero attempt to know anything is actually insulting to everyone involved. For context, I wrote a motion in limine at my first internship. If I live to be 1,000 and never step foot in a court room, I'll still be able to say more about a motion in limine than "I would probably not be able to give you a good definition right here at the table."	The question actually asked, "what legal theories would support or harm...", is somewhat unclear. But what the questioner seems to be asking is, basically, what would happen if you tried it? The answer, it seems to me, is pretty straightforward. In the hypothetical case, you have been publishing a notice for years, saying "I have not been served with a subpoena." You then get served with a subpoena that includes a gag order. The gag order, presumably, includes wording prohibiting you from revealing the existence of the subpoena. You then cease publication of the warrant canary. By doing so, you have revealed the existence of the subpoena, and you are in violation of the gag order. You will be subject to whatever penalties you would be subject to if you violated it in some other way; for example, by publishing a notice that said, "Hey! We got a subpoena! It's a secret!" The distinction between revealing the existence of the subpoena by action, rather than by inaction, is a false one. It's exactly the kind of cutesy legal formality that non-lawyers love to rely on, but real judges ignore. If you tell someone: "Hey, you know John Smith's three sons, Joe, Ted, and Bill? Joe and Ted are good people; they have never molested any children. As for Bill--well, I don't have anything to say about Bill." If Bill is not a child molester, you have defamed him, and you are not going to convince a judge otherwise. The EFF link you link to tries to claim it'll "work" because courts are reluctant to enforce speech. Even if that were true, that might mean your canary would be effective in the sense of giving the public notice of the subpoena. That doesn't mean you wouldn't be liable for giving the public notice. For example: I put up a billboard saying "Bill Smith is a pedophile." Even if the court can't force me to add the word "not", that doesn't mean the billboard isn't defamatory. Realistically, though, courts compel speech all the time. Court-ordered apologies, disclosures, and notices are not unusual. And if ever a court would be inclined to compel speech, it would be in a situation like this one, where a company intentionally set out to get around a gag order with this kind of convoluted sea-lawyering.	Yes. This is infringement. This infringement might be excused by a "fair use" defense but it probably isn't. At a very small scale tailor to a very specific educational program, for example, for just members of a thirty person English class that they are currently taking, it might qualify as educational fair use. But I get the impression that the contemplated translation project is far more ambitious than that. The underlying content of the events reported in the news are not protected by copyright, but the language used to report those events and any translations of that language, is protected. The only reliable way to solve it is to get permission to do so from the holder of the copyright of the source of the new reports you are translating.	Yes, there is legal precedent against this that would only apply to a government employee. First, let's discuss the private sector. In this case, you are a private employee that comes to your place of work and accuses you of "stealing the cookies from the cookie jar" which is a serious criminal offense. They wish to talk and your boss is in the room. You plead the 5th, but your boss says you're fired if you don't talk to the cops. This is legal because you still have the right to refuse to talk, you just lose your job. A private employer has the right to free association, and wants nothing to do with cookie thieves, alleged or actual. However, in the government employ, your boss is an agent of the government. This same situation is different because the government pays the boss and the agent... so in essence the government is saying talk or be fired. This is unconstitutional as the government cannot retalitate against you for your refusal to talk. Generally, in order to talk to you, the investigator would need either a signed Garrity Statement or a Signed Kalkines Statement. The former is a statement saying that they are investigating a wrong doing but you cannot lose your job if you refuse to speak to the investigators, where as Kalkines says you must talk but you are granted immunity for your part in the wrong doing, so long as you make truthful statements. For more on this, check this legal blog. There is also the matter that a false accusation (and let me be clear... this is academic, I'm not saying the accusation in the real life topic is false, nor am I saying that the defense is false... we're merely discussing a possibility) is made to your employer and they do not offer the job on the basis of the accusation alone, this is grounds for defamation actions... and in certain jurisdictions, it's criminal defamation, so there could be jail time. It's interesting you mentioned teachers, because this happens alot. Kids do know that there are certain things that get a teacher fired quickly, so teachers do get the occasional false accusation of sexual assault (I know one teacher who has had multiple accusations over the course of her career). One of the few good things I can say about the Teachers Union is they cover the legal defense of accused teachers. The accusations do get the teacher removed from the class for sometime, but they don't lose their jobs over this matter. It's followed up but the accusation doesn't immediately lead to the teacher getting fired..	If the purported guarantor can prove the facts stated then they are not a guarantor You can rely on the signature and the onus of proving it isn’t theirs on the balance of probabilities rests on the guarantor. However, if they can do that, then they never agreed to be guarantor and you’re out of luck.	It looks to me as if "money laundering" is a misunderstanding; though any organization has a duty to prevent this, charities have no special responsibilties. However, charity law does in general terms prevent a charity from giving money to a cause that does not further the charity's aims. The Charity Commission's guidance says "Charities can only spend their money on projects or activities that support the aims stated in their governing document" (and although it goes on to outline exceptions, you still need to obtain the Commission's agreement to return a gift from a source you find objectionable, for example). The rationale is that people gave money to the University to further the cause of education; the researchers have no right to divert that money to Shelter (or another charity like the Roman Catholic Church) without the giver's consent. My experienced but non-expert view is that these payments would be a breach of the law, though they would probably be treated as a de minimis exception; you can't blame the University's legal team for insisting they should not be made.	I virtually never see "without prejudice" used in anything but court documents, unless the writer does not know what he's saying. A typical example would be when a person sues someone, but brings the case in the wrong court. The judge would dismiss the case without prejudice, meaning that the plaintiff could refile somewhere else. In contrast, if the person filed in the correct court, but the judge ruled that the plaintiff had done nothing wrong, the judge would then dismiss the case with prejudice. I believe I have on some occasions seen the phrase used in legal correspondence, perhaps noting, for example, that a party was willing to settle his sexual harassment claim for X amount of money without prejudice to their claims for some unrelated issue. In either event, "without prejudice" is typically referring to the ongoing ability to litigate a claim. I'm not entirely clear on how you're envisioning it being used as e-mail boilerplate, but I can't see any reason to do so. If you did, that would not have any effect on the e-mail's admissibility. EDIT: One other note, because I hadn't looked at it before. The LinkedIn article to which you linked and the comments on it are basically nonsense. Legal advice from a graduate of the "School of Life" is about as valuable as life advice from a graduate of a school of law.
I bought an apartment on plan and it doesn't seems to respect the acoustic standards. What can I do? I bought in 2015 an apartment on plan (Belgium). In the specifications it was mentioned that the belgian acoustic standard of 2008 "NBN S 01-400-1" would be respected. I received the keys in November 2017. Since then, I hear a lot of neighbors from below, whatever the room, to varying degrees. The noises that I hear can be of all kinds: words, music, shocks, sound of a powered switch, noise of a roller blind operated, sound of flowing water, sound of a washing machine, ... In particular the noises of the roller blind and switches are as if they came from the same room. I woke up several times startled, thinking there was someone in the room. I am forced to sleep with ear plugs. Neighbors are co-location students, who can sometimes return on weekdays at 2,3,4h in the morning ... I do not think the apartment meets the standard in force. I interviewed several other residents of the building, none complained of acoustics problems, including the neighbor below who claims to never hear me, and the neighbor upstairs. I is strange because i'm a DJ and ususally mix techno music at high level 2 hours per week. I contacted the developer, who came to see, and who tried to minimize the problem. After several exchanges, I managed to convince him to organize an acoustic audit, which he would pay if he were to prove positive, otherwise I would pay if it turned out to be negative. The promoter chose the expert (who had already worked for them) The report turned out negative, at the limit of the norm. In hindsight I admit to having made a mistake, I should've hired an independent expert at my expense. I posted a 1 star review on Google Maps, and the developer then contacted me, by phone, to remove it in exchange of half the price of the audit (500€). I refused by email, saying that I wanted a solution to the acoustic problem. In the meantime, I still have sound problems, and I do not know what to do. I'm asking for your help. I hesitate to ask a counter expertise because the first has already cost me more than 1000 €. Even if it would be positive, what are my options? The developer may not find the source of the problem? And if so, maybe the work will be too important or will depend on the goodwill of the neighbor? And if the developer pays me an amount in compensation, wouldn't recognizing this acoustic problem make the good unsalable? If I do not do anything and decide to sell, should I give a copy of the first acoustic audit to the buyer, as it is negative ? If this buyer asks me questions about sound insulation, what should be my answers?	Compliance with acoustic standards does not necessarily mean that you will not hear noise from your neighbors. You have an expert opinion stating that the building complies. It is possible that the expert is wrong - the only way to find out is to have a different expert do their own analysis. This will cost you money and they will either agree with the first expert that it does comply or they won't. If they agree you will at least have the satisfaction of knowing that the developer did what they promised in their contract. You will have to come up with your own solutions as to how to deal with the fact that you find it too noisy. In these circumstances, this is an issue with you, not the apartment. If they don't agree then you have a basis for commencing legal action (in accordance with the dispute resolution clauses of your contract). How that will turn out will depend on which evidence the court/arbitrator/whatever prefers. If you succeed you may get compensation or remedial works (if these are possible) done. If you lose you will likely be paying some hefty legal fees. In the meantime, I would be very careful about what you say about the developer or the complex publicly. If you say things that are not true then you could be sued for defamation. The developer has already indicated that they are not happy with what you are saying - this doesn't mean it is defamatory but the developer may be willing to go to court to find out if it is, are you? If you sell the apartment you are not generally obliged to reveal anything to the buyer but you must answer questions they put truthfully. If they ask about sound insulation you can truthfully answer that it complies with NBN S 01-400-1. You are not required to disclose your personal opinion that its too noisy.	The Rent Ordinance para (e) explicitly precludes that possibility: Any waiver by a tenant of rights under this Chapter 37 shall be void as contrary to public policy. If he attempts to enforce such a clause or in any way dislodge you from the unit, he is liable for a substantial penalty. The legality of a rebate scheme is not clear, but probably would also be deemed illegal, because there already exists provision for buyout, which has specific restrictions. For the rest of the week, tenant buyouts are subject to these provisions. The problem is that the horse may have left the barn. The landlord has to have provided you with a Pre-Buyout Disclosure Form (which is to be signed and filed) before any negotiation / discussion with the tenant. Since we're talking about obeying the law, it has to occur to the landlord that there is a buyout option, and then he has to give you and file the disclosure form before he opens his mouth. He also has to know what the requirements of a buyout agreement will be in the future. Starting on Monday, the law regarding buyouts changes (it doesn't clearly make an agreement impossible, but it's a reminder that the law can be changed). In terms of legally-enforceable agreements, you could agree to a buyout in the far future, but the agreement might not be enforceable under future law. For example, the disclosure form requires new information to be provided, so if he doesn't do that, the disclosure is invalid (the preamble to the amendment points out that the change in law was directed at legal actions that were considered to violate the spirit of the law). Hence a buyout for two years in the future is legally risky.	If the landlord gave you a key, and you can not give it back to him he has every right to charge you for correcting the oversight. I put to you that if you can't provide it back to him, he can't be certain that it has not fallen into the wrong hands, and he would be prudent to change the lock - and indeed, he may not even have another copy of the key in which case he really does not have a lot of alternatives. If you look at the section on "Claims for Damages or Loss" pdf there is a section B - Damage which confirms that Loss includes less tangible impacts including "loss of a service or facility provided under the tenancy agreement" Section C of the same document goes on to assert that "The purpose of compensation is to put the person who suffered the damage or loss in the same position as if the damage or loss had not occurred". There is arguably a question of the amount of loss suffered, and they can't sting you for punitive damages, but they can charge you a reasonable amount to get a new key cut (or possibly to replace the lock) - but that was not your question, and would probably arise if the amount he charges was unreasonable in the circumstance. Depending on if he has already taken action - and if not, how much the bill would be - promptly remedying the breach by finding and returning the key or equivalent action might save you some money.	As someone who acts for both landlords and tenants I would say that I have never seen exclusions for personal injury or death in a commercial lease. I would recommend that you have the whole lease reviewed by a solicitor dealing in commercial property, particularly as, as has been stated in another reply, exclusion of liability for personal injury or death is prohibited by UCTA. This would suggest there may be other provisions which, if not prohibited, are unreasonable and you should be aware of the commitments you are taking on prior to signing This pure speculation, but the fact that those clauses would not be in a standard lease precedent does make me wonder if the landlord has done a DIY job and produced a lease from the internet suitable for another jurisdiction.	Not going to hold up. Dutch Supreme Court confirmed 2012-09-21 in LJN BW6135 that arbitration is still covered by the the right to an independent judge, as established in Golder v UK, ECHR 1975-02-21, nr. 4451/70. Stack Exchange can't decide the rules themselves. (The Dutch case confirms that sector-wide arbitration is in fact legal, with regard to a standard arbitration clause commonly used in the Dutch building sector. The arbiter was found to be independent in that case precisely because they weren't picked by the builder involved.) The GDPR is only indirectly relevant, but the fact that it's mentioned does mean that there is an indisputable intent to provide services to EU consumers. (See section 23 of the GDPR, or its national equivalents). As such, you can't hide behind a US business address. If you intend to do business in the EU, it's under EU laws - all of them. You can't say that only the GDPR applies, and not other rules. I'm having a bit of a problem finding a source, but I'm fairly confident that consumers have the right to sue at their own, local court, overruling the default of suing in the court where the counterparty is located. Finally, I have the right under national law (Dutch: BW 6:236 start and sub-n) to strike the arbitration clause up to 30 days after the conflict arises, and demand a court decision. That's not 30 days after I accept the "Public Network Terms", that's 30 days after the arbitration is invoked. Dutch law explicitly allows arbitration abroad, and arbiters may apply foreign law, but as written the arbitration clause has no legal basis in the Netherlands, and any arbitration resolution would therefore not be considered valid. You may wonder if it matters to Stack Exchange that the arbitration decision would not hold in the EU. Well, consider a clause like Indemnification, which demands the user indemnifies Stack Exchange. That's a pretty empty demand if it's not enforceable.	I spent a few years working in and around the Energy industry - including a stint working at a supplier, I'm no longer there so unfortunately I no longer have access to the email chains I had discussing this with legal. The consensus at the time was that a "traditional" i.e. non-half-hourly (NHH), non-smart meter reading itself was not considered personal data - they are conceptually tied to a metering point (which may or may not be a physical meter), not to an individual and don't represent an individual's energy consumption (the granularity of the reading is insufficient to tell anything about the usage profile) But this information, while all around the implementation of GDPR it was a couple of years back and to be honest it was bugging me that I might be out-of-date on the current practices so I reached out to a former colleague who was the Data Protection Officer at the supplier I worked at to try and get a more up-to-date take. He's since moved on but was there until recently so has more experience with the topic since GDPR actually went into effect. I asked him whether a) estimated opening reads were considered "personal data" and b) what would happen with a request to change one under article 16 and he had this to say, I've translated industry-speak in square brackets: a) for NHH ["Non Half Hourly" - meters that are read ad-hoc, essentially all non-smart domestic meters will be this] an estimated reading wasn't personal data automatically until the billing flag was set in CRM and those would be the only ones we'd include on an SAR [Subject Access Request], any others are internal data not personal. HH ["Half Hourly" - meters for higher consumption users, typically larger business premises are billed on increments for each half hour so have readings for each] and remote [smart meter] readings are always personal for domestic and microb [micro-businesses are a certain class of non-domestic energy customer see condition 7A] b) erm no! we'd only change it if the value in CRM didn't match the value in the D10 [industry Data Flow used to transmit meter reads] for some reason. if they match it's an accurate representation of what we estimate the reading to be so it's just a vanilla billing dispute not a data protection issue so i'd have punted it to [name of person who was head of metering] From that it would sound as though the estimated read would count as personal data - so long as it's being used for billing purposes, but that doesn't mean they have to accept your read in it's stead. It all comes down to accuracy - GDPR requires that personal data be "accurate" but provides no definition as to what "accurate" means (which makes sense since you can't give a one-size-fits-all answer that isn't an encyclopedia) and while The Electricity Directive 2019 confirms the need for accuracy in billing again it doesn't tell us what that means. The implementation is left to member state regulators. In the UK this is OFGEM and all opening meter readings are validated through third parties (so you don't end up with the foxes guarding the hen house!) and are calculated using the following formula: Last validated reading for the meter point <= supplied reading <= (expected daily usage x number of days since last validated reading x 2.5) where "expected daily usage" is obtained from a database maintained by the regulator - it's calculated off meter type, property type, property use, previous validated reads etc. So if the customer provides a reading that falls outside the above the supplier can (and in practice invariably will) reject it as being inaccurate. Now this is why the when a meter reading is provided matters - reads you provide are always assumed to be the read on the day you give them. With opening reads there's some leeway, I can't remember the official rule on how much but usually they give you up to the next estimated read is generated but more on that later. Now if the reading you're trying to submit is a "now" reading and it's failed the validation criteria and you aren't happy with the rejection you can force the issue by demanding the supplier come read the meter. You don't say how long has passed since the opening read - more than the week from what you've said so presumably at least a month (guessing you've had at least your first bill). Now if they are saying the opening read was X (based on the estimated usage) and you're it should have been X + Y and the current reading is X + Y + Z you want to pay your actual usage Z not Y + Z. What you need to do is dispute the opening read, which you're entitled to do, arguably GDPR of Article 16 gives you this right, but on it's own it's a weak argument. There's established means by which an estimated read's "accuracy" is determined and assuming they followed that they're going to just tell you that as far as they are concerned it is accurate. Any challenge to that accuracy is going to have to be done within the legal/regulatory frameworks for assessing accuracy, that's what they're there for, if they won't accept your reading escalate that to the regulator - and as soon as you can. OFGEM for example allow disputing of opening reads for 12 months - it doesn't have to be resolved within that 12 months it just has to be lodged with them within that time. If you try and use the GDPR angle to pursue this IMHO it's going to muddy the waters and not help you get what you need - pursue this on billing accuracy.	My questions are, where does this put me legally and what are my options? . . . Also, if I want to keep the tenants, how should I proceed? And if I don't want to keep them, do I have that option? Your Rights With Respect To The Tenants If the agency is telling the truth and the agreement made with the agent was for four tenants but their records and document only listed three by accident, you probably can't insist on additional rent or evicting the fourth tenant because if your agent does something on your behalf, that is binding on you just as much as if you had signed them up personally in that manner. This is true even if the agent didn't actually have the authority to rent the place to four people based upon your communications with the agent, because the agent has "apparent authority" to bind you in your agent's dealings with the prospective tenants. You probably have the right to insist that the fourth tenant sign the lease to conform to the actual agreement that was reached (four tenants in exchange for the rent stated in the lease). If the fourth tenant refuses to do so, that would be a repudiation of the lease/contract and would prevent him from claiming that he is a valid tenant of the property pursuant to the agreement reached with landlord through his agent. If the fourth tenant refused to sign, you could therefore insist that the fourth tenant pay additional rent or be evicted if you wanted to. On the other hand, if the agent is not accurately relating the facts, and there was never any agreement to have more than three tenants (as your communications with them and the written lease suggest), then you would have the right to evict the fourth tenant or insist on additional rent from that tenant. But, it might be hard to prove that the agent is not being accurate because it sounds like the agent and the tenants will testify consistently with each other and there were probably no other witnesses to the discussions between them. The Fourth Tenant Might Have Liability Anyway Also, at common law, you could sue the fourth person for unpaid rent during the period that the tenant was actually there anyway, since the fourth tenant was in "privity of estate" with you. (If someone actually signs the lease then they are in "privity of contract" with you.) England abolished the doctrine of privity of estate in most circumstances for residential tenancies in 1995. But, it is possible that this fact pattern is one of the situations in which the privity of estate doctrine remains in force since the 1995 reforms largely apply to assignments of leases by people who are tenants on the original lease, rather than occupants of a rented property who never signed a lease and never received a formal assignment. I don't have the legal research tools to confirm that accurately. But, none of the U.K. Landlord and Tenant Acts currently in force that I could locate addressed that issue, so the common law rule may still apply in this situation. If the doctrine of privity of estate does allow a suit against the fourth tenant based on occupancy without signing a lease, the incentive to even try to get the fourth tenant to sign a lease is very small indeed - you get no benefit at all from it other than slightly easier proof in an unpaid rent collection lawsuit if the agent's story is believed. If it doesn't the considerations earlier in this answer still apply. Practical Considerations All of this being said, there is also a practical consideration to consider. It you try to kick out the fourth tenant or impose additional rent on the fourth tenant, if the fourth tenant refuses to sign the lease, or if you believe that the original agreement did not include the fourth tenant, you still have to weigh the pros and cons of bringing an eviction or unpaid rent lawsuit. The lawsuit will cost you money (requiring you to advance money even if you are awarded attorneys' fees which may be impossible to collect from the tenants). You won't get your attorneys' fees for the lawsuit if you lose and will also have to pay their attorneys' fees if you lose. Tenants whom you are suing are unlikely to be cooperative on any other matter upon which you want their cooperation, and may bad mouth you, for example, in online consumer reviews. Unlike a typical eviction where the rent is not paid, it is very likely that the eviction will be contested, and if it is, the court could order the fourth tenant to sign the lease, but provide you with no other remedy if the court believes the story put forward by the tenant and the agent. If you don't sue, you won't incur attorneys' fees, you can still evict everyone if the rent isn't paid, you can still try to collect unpaid rent from three other people, and you are much less likely to have a dispute with or non-cooperation from the tenants. The only benefit you get from having a fourth person on the lease if that was the original deal (or if you can't prove that it wasn't the original deal) is that you have one more person you can sue for back rent if the rent isn't paid. If I decide to break my agreement with the agency, do I have grounds to do that? Terminating The Agent Often you can terminate an agreement with an agency without cause. If the agency agreement says that you can, you are free to do so and probably should because at a minimum they are sloppy and poor communicators. Generally speaking, even if you can't terminate the agreement without cause, you can terminate the agreement for cause, and the contradiction between their prior communications with you and their current communications with you probably constitute good cause to terminate the agreement both if they are telling the truth not, and if they are not accurately recounting the facts now. But, to be clear, terminating the agent won't affect the rights of the tenant. Suing The Agent If you clearly do lose money because the three tenants on the lease don't pay rent and for example, you get a judgment against them which can't be collected due to bankruptcy or them moving abroad to a place where it is not economical to collect a money judgment from them, or just not having any assets or income (or some combination thereof), and it turns out that the law does not allow you to sue the fourth tenant, and the fourth tenant was not judgment proof, you would probably have a right to sue the agent for the lost rent caused by the agent's negligence in failing to get all four tenants to sign the lease. But, the cost of proving that in a typical case would not be worth the money since this would be much harder to prove than simply proving that someone signed a lease agreeing to pay rent and didn't pay rent as agreed. If the agent didn't agree to pay for your losses voluntarily it might not be worth the time, trouble and risk of not prevailing in that lawsuit to pursue, even if you could get attorneys' fees for your suit against the agent if you won (which you probably could in England). The risks of doing that include paying the agent's attorneys' fees is you lose.	There don't appear to be any Santa Clara-specific laws on the matter, so California law (including this) would govern this situation. A landlord generally has an obligation to maintain the premise in habitable condition (can't stick you with the bill for repairing the water main), and has to fulfill the obligations of the lease (if the lease says that a working washing machine is part of the premise, the landlord has to fix it if it breaks). An AC is not part of what makes a unit "habitable" in the legal sense. You should have to scrutinize exactly what the lease says about the AC, but saying that it is provided "as is" indicates that the landlord is disclaiming any obligation to fix it if it breaks. You are allowed to use it, but if it breaks, he won't fix it. The fact that he has no obligation to fix it does not relieve you of your duty to care for his property (irrespective of the fact that it was abandoned by a prior tenant – there's a notification procedure regarding abandoned real property, which I assume the landlord followed so it is his AC). Your obligation to compensate the landlord for damaging his property is not triggered by his legal obligation to maintain the property, it is triggered by the fact that it is his property. So you are legally on the hook: under §1929, "The hirer of a thing must repair all deteriorations or injuries thereto occasioned by his want of ordinary care". However, the size of the hook is not clear: the cost of replacement or repair could be vastly higher than the actual value of the unit. There is a legal concept of "unjust enrichment" that could be applicable, if the landlord plans to bill you $500 for a new AC which he got for free, but you'd probably need to hire a lawyer to make a solid legal argument in court.
I bought a house with my mother she is not paying her half of the mortgage I bought a house with my mother and both of our names are on the mortgage and she is not now paying her portion and we are almost a month behind. What can I do?	Between your mother and you the bank does not care where the payments come from. If they do not get them, they can sue you, or your mother or (most likely) both of you and they will chase whichever of you has the most money and ultimately repossess the house to satisfy the debt. What matters between you is the contract or deed that you signed with your mother where you documented that you would each pay half of the mortgage. Unfortunately, agreements between family members are presumed not to be contracts. That is, the courts will not get involved to decide how much each of you owe - you have to sort that out for yourselves. A signed agreement will usually overcome that presumption. Other evidence may overcome the presumption - for example, evidence that you split the payments 50/50 for some period of time. Talk to your mother. And a lawyer.	Usually I would think one answer to a question is enough. But since your edits have transformed a reasonable procedural question into what appears to be a rant about unfairness of the sort which any bankruptcy court has heard hundreds of times before, I will give another piece of advice: Focus on one thing at a time. The judge at the hearing of the application will be deciding (if your question is accurate) the single point whether a house should be sold. The submission "There is an application to annul the bankruptcy to be heard on XXX; if it succeeds this application is a waste of money and if it fails there will still be time for this application before the time limit, so you should adjourn till YYY" is a reasonable one that he will take into account. Saying "The bankruptcy order should never have been made; it was a mistake by my accountants and HMRC, and a High Court Judge joined in the conspiracy" will get you precisely nowhere. Even if the judge believed you rather than the written evidence, it has no bearing on the point he is being asked to decide. More generally; besides casting your arguments into proper shape, there is another good reason to consult a professional, namely that he can tell you when to give up. The courts are bound by laws and regulations; however unfair you may think the result, at some point it is necessary to accept the reality rather than wasting time and money making points that the law cares nothing about. (And no, I see no point discussing this further in comments. This answer can be upvoted if you think it helpful or downvoted if you think it "not useful"; it isn't something to argue against.)	Read the terms It’s quite likely that, if you took this to court, the employer would be liable to pay your daughter interest on the underpayment and possibly be fined by the state for failing to follow the law. The terms probably are offering to pay the back pay with no interest and your daughter agreeing to confidentiality about the breach. Probably - I haven’t read them. In other words, they’re asking her to sign a contract saying she gets $XXX now, and can’t make any further claims against them. Such releases are commonplace when setting a dispute and there’s probably nothing underhanded going on. Probably - I haven’t read them. Because minors can void contracts if they are not in their interest, they want you, as her legal guardian, to also sign so that can’t happen. A relatively prudent precaution on their part. The alternative is to not sign the document and they presumably won’t pay. It will then be up to you whether to sue them which will cost you money, possibly more than you will get if you win. As to whether there is a dispute: they want your signature, you don’t want to sign - that’s a dispute. Any admissions they have made in their settlement offer are almost surely without prejudice, meaning they are inadmissible in court. If you want to sue, you would have to prove the underpayment without relying on their admissions. As stated above, maybe there is no underpayment. Only you and your daughter can decide if this is a good deal.	This is going to depend very much on exactly what is in writing. Note that your father could, if he chose, directly leave both the house and the IRA to his partner. If you become the homeowner after your father's death, and the "3-year right to use" and the cost sharing provisions are not in writing, then neither is legally binding. You and the partner may choose to honor your father's wishes, but if he does not put them in the will or another legal document, neither of you is bound. The question says: I cannot evict her if needed, as she is a senior citizen, living in my home, with no lease. I do not know of any jurisdiction in which there is a general ban on evicting a senior citizen in all cases. There will be some restrictions no doubt, but they will depend on the local laws. And of course you may not wish to exercise all the legal rights you may have. You would ultimately, have the right as homeowner to evict the partner. I don't what procedures would need to be followed legally -- that will depend on the specific jurisdiction, which the question does not list. As the homeowner, you would be legally responsible for maintaining and paying taxes and other expenses on the house. The partner would be either your tenant or your guest. Once you have title (and that will take some time after your father's death, in all probability) if the "right to use" was never put in writing, you could ask the partner to sign a lease. The terms could be whatever the two of you choose to agree on. If she becomes a tenant under such a lease, she has both legal rights and legal responsibilities, and each of you has the protection of a clear agreement. You would be wise to consult a lawyer to learn exactly what the local law does and does not permit. Your father might well be wise to put his wishes more clearly in writing while he still can.	This would be pointless and wouldn't work. Eviction due to defaulting on rent requires the landlord to give 3 business days notice, in writing. This must include a method by which the tenant can settle their debt. Either the landlord would be forced to accept a payment or this would not be valid. Source Additionally, in this case, there is nothing stopping you physically handing an envelope of cash to the landlord as they live upstairs. However, there is no reason for your landlord to do this. If your landlord hates you that much it would be far easier for them to simply give you 60 days notice and terminate your tenancy that way.	she immediately stated that I need to provide 60 days notice She is wrong. See Minnesota statute 504B.135(a). Absent any agreement that supersedes the statute, the landlord cannot unilaterally stretch the notice period to 60 days. Is it legal for a landlord to say my rent is due 5 days earlier than we had verbally agreed? Is it legal for a landlord to do this right after I tell them that I am planning on moving out? No. The lanlord cannot unilaterally alter the implied contract that exists between you two, including the pattern of you paying rent on the 6th of the month. To prove in court that this was indeed the pattern, it suffices to show the receipts your landlord has the statutory obligation to provide to you immediately upon making each one of your payments. See 504B.118. The landlord is just "making sure" you will not recommend her to other prospective tenants.	The statute provides that "No lease or other rental agreement shall impose any interest or penalty for failure to pay rent until thirty days after such rent shall have been due." Mass. Gen. Law ch. 186 § 15B(1)(a)(iii). It would seem that if the rent is fully paid before the thirty days are up, there is no longer a "failure to pay rent" and so no late fee to be paid. I have searched and have found no caselaw providing a different interpretation of the issue, but I am not a lawyer and this, of course, is not legal advice.	Am I at fault? Can I get my security deposit back from Landlord? The landlord is wrong, and he should reimburse you the totality of the security deposit. Clauses #1 and #16 would entitle the landlord to deduct from your security deposit only the portion of the 7-day period that is not already covered in the payment you made for 1st week's rent, which according to clause #1 starts on Sunday July 29. If I understand correctly, you signed the contract (and paid) on July 27, and then gave your 7-day notice on July 28. Since you paid an additional amount for Saturday July 28, then your 1st week's rent payment actually covers the entire 7-day period of your notice. Therefore, the landlord should reimburse you the entire security deposit. The contract nowhere indicates that the count of [post-notice] 7 days starts after the current rent-week elapses. But even if it did contain language in that sense, the dates you mention render that hypothetical clause void. Lastly, clause #16 refers to giving a written notice, which is what you did by sending him the text he obviously read and understood. Therefore, his statement that "you did not provide proper notice of moving out" clearly is false. What should I do? If the landlord insists to retain the security deposit, your option is to file a complaint in Small Claims court (I don't know whether this has a different name in PA). Depending on PA procedural law, you and the landlord might be cited for mediation prior to being assigned a court date. A process in small claims court is pretty straight-forward, but only you can determine whether the hassle of attending mediation and court hearing is worth. If anything, it (1) certainly gives you some [minimal] exposure to litigation, and (2) teaches the landlord to abide by the very rules he drafted in the contract. 8/30/2018: Edited to address OP's follow-up question of whether section 250.512 of the Landlord and Tenant Act precludes recovery of security deposit (see comments) After analyzing the statute you found, Pennsylvania courts have still held that a tenant's failure to provide a new address does not preclude recovery of the security deposit. See Adamsky v. Picknick, 412 Pa.Super.Ct. 544, 549 (1992): we find the lack of notice argument is tenuous at best since appellant's reason for withholding the deposit was not because he did not have appellees' new address, rather, he withheld it because he maintained there were damages for which he should be compensated. That conclusion is squarely applicable to your situation. The landlord's only pretext for withholding your deposit is his inaccurate statement that "you did not provide proper notice of moving out", and for that matter he refers to nothing else than the rental agreement. The rental agreement nowhere requires you to provide your new address. One decision that does not constitute legal precedent but still might help persuading Small Claims court in your situation is Back v. Taylor, 19 D. & C. 3d 606, 609 (1980). After citing section 250.512(e) of the Landlord and Tenant Act, the court states: That section sets forth certain guidelines as to when tenants can obtain double recovery. Defendants have only sought recovery of the deposit and therefore, the above cited section does not apply. (emphasis in original) Unless you were pursuing double recovery (see item (c) of the statute), it would be very questionable --to say the least-- why a [Small Claims] court should decide your dispute any differently than in Back. Another non-precedential decision analyzing the same statute is Shoemaker v. Henry, 35 D. & C. 206, 209 (1984). Also in the context of double damages, the court stated: We cannot believe the only purpose [to require a tenant to provide his new address] was a negative one, that is, to cancel a right to double damages for failure to comply. A more rational explanation is that its purpose was to provide a landlord with an address to which the damage list could be sent. (brackets added) The statute apparently was enacted well before the prevalence of electronic communications. If your landlord has any way to send you a "damage list" (as it seems to be the case insofar as he replied to your text), then the rationale in Shoemaker should apply in your situation. If you are not even pursuing double recovery, then it would be unavailing for the landlord to cling to the language in item (e) of that statute. Therefore, you are definitely entitled to your deposit even if you did not provide to the landlord a new address. It is up to you whether you want to go for double damages, in which case the decision in Shoemaker might or might not be persuasive in Small Claims court. Beyond that, the Adamsky opinion constitutes legal precedent which favors your position.
US Constitution - Art. 1 Section 7 Why the duplicative language at the end of Art. 1. Sec. 7 as to the process for presenting and vetoing legislation in the last two paragraphs? Article 1, Section 7: 1: All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills. 2: Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law. 3: Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.	Because an "Order, Resolution, or Vote" is not the same as a Bill, and does not become a law. Thus the procedure for presentation, leading to signing, pocket acceptance, veto, or pocket veto, does not apply to Orders, Resolutions, or Votes. Therefore it is repeated to indicate that it applies to those legislative acts also. A "Vote", in the sense used here is a legislative decision or action that is neither a Bill nor a resolution. For example, the decision on when to adjourn to, that is, when Congress will come back into session after an adornment, is a Vote. A "Bill" is a proposed law. If it is passed by Congress and not vetoed, or if any veto is overridden, it becomes a law. Other legislative actions do not become laws, but otherwise go through much the same procedure. Note that some legislative actions do notneed the "Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives". For example, when the House votes on a new Speaker, it is a vote of the House only, and neither the Senate nor the President has a say.	Separation of powers means that the judiciary can't pass laws or executive orders. It doesn't mean that the judiciary can't interfere with their passage and enforcement. Quite the opposite -- the checks and balances inherent in the system ensure that the judiciary can interfere in some cases. One of the checks is the concept of judicial review: the courts' power to review each branch's actions for compliance with the constitution -- and more importantly, to strike down actions that are unconstitutional. When a court strikes down part of a law, though, they aren't writing a new law, or even repealing a law. They are overturning parts of the existing law -- basically declaring the unconstitutional parts of it void, to be treated as if they didn't exist. In India's constitution, Article 13 provides the main basis for this power. Article 13.(2) (in Part III) states: (2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. This article, aside from making it clear that laws passed by the State can be void, also gives the Supreme Court the inroads it needs to do the overturning. The catch is, the Court can not overturn most laws passed by Parliament, just the ones that Part III can be construed to prohibit. (While the judiciary is not explicitly named, it's the only branch that can officially say whether or not a law is constitutional. It'd be a conflict of interest anyway for Parliament to do it. Parliament, in passing the law, presumably wanted it to be enforced, and thus has an interest in avoiding too much scrutiny.) So the Court can already declare an unconstitutional law void, because it already is...and that's before we even get to Article 142. Let's take a look at the article anyway: (1) The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe. (2) Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by Parliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respects the whole of the territory of India, have all and every power to make any order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person, the discovery or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself. Note that (2) explicitly grants the power to issue subpoenas, contempt citations, etc. So we can't claim that's what (1) was intended for, and have to ask what it means. The Court decided that the article gives it the power to order the government not to violate your rights, as such an order is "necessary for doing complete justice". And as the final arbiter of the meaning of the very text that defines it into existence, it has that prerogative. And due process is one of the rights protected. Article 21 (also in Part III): No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. "Procedure established by law" is a much weaker phrase than "due process", and technically meant that anything that the government scribbled into law was good enough. But case law has all but removed the distinction. (See Maneka Gandhi vs Union Of India.) Basically, any procedure for depriving someone of life or liberty must be just, fair, and reasonable. (Otherwise a law declaring you a criminal, to be arrested on sight, would be constitutional.) "Someone filed a complaint" simply wasn't gonna fly.	Yes, explicitly. It even laid out the procedure and method (i.e. on equal footing) of these new states. Specifically, Article IV, Section 3, the "Admissions Clause": New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress. Note that many of the things in your quoted section are forbidden to the States, but are explicitly granted to the Federal Government (in various sections). So it's not "this shall not be done", but rather "the individual states shall not do these things; Federal Government shall be the only one to do these things if they can, as else where they may be banned from doing so".	The law you cite says that the Secretary shall furnish such committee with any return or return information specified in such request That includes specific individual returns. That it was intended to include such returns is made clear by the provisions restricting identifiable individual data to executive session. Whether this ought to be the law might well be debated. Whether the House ought to use this law as a way to get at Trump's returns could also be debated. Those are matters of politics, or perhaps ethics, not law. Whether some other provision of law overrides this provision in this case is pretty clearly going to be argued in court, and we will see what the decision is. I won't try to predict it here.	First, the clearly redundant phrase is “applicable laws” - these apply to everything. Second, some acts, particularly consumer protection or sale of goods acts imply provisions into a contract, create obligations that sit beside the contract or create equitable remedies. Many of these can be limited or excluded but this needs to be done explicitly. Third, in legal writing, clarity is preferred to brevity - nice if you can get both but if not, be clear rather than brief. Fourth, the contract is not the document. The document is a record of the “meeting of the minds” that formed the contract. In the event of a dispute, it may be useful to know that particular laws were specifically considered by the parties. Fifth, in legal writing, just as all writing, some people are better than others.	While the Supreme Courts of Germany, Honduras, India and Italy have asserted such authority, the U.S. Supreme Court's justiciable decisions about a U.S. Constitutional Amendment are generally limited to a determination of whether the amendment was lawfully adopted pursuant to Article V of the U.S. Constitution, which states: The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate. Usually, U.S. Supreme Court litigation over a constitutional amendment would be over whether the process of Article V has been conformed to in a particular case (which has been litigated in several prior cases). The U.S. Supreme Court has held, however, in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), that even some procedural issues are political questions for Congress to resolve that are non-justiciable, in part because the mode of ratification is expressly delegated to Congress in Article V. As the summary of Coleman at the link above explains: In an opinion by Chief Justice Hughes, the Court held that the Kansas legislators had standing to sue, but found that two of the plaintiffs’ claims raised political questions that could only be resolved by Congress. With respect to the whether the Kansas legislature’s previous rejection of the Child Labor Amendment precluded its subsequent ratification, the Court stated that this “should be regarded as a political question pertaining to the political departments, with the ultimate authority in the Congress in the exercise of its control over the promulgation of the amendment.” But, with respect to the language in bold in the quoted language of Article V above, the U.S. Supreme Court could determine that a constitutional amendment is unconstitutional. This narrow ground, however, is the sole basis upon which it may do so.	In an instant run-off, there are multiple rounds of voting (two, in this case). In the first round, everyone voted for their preferred candidate. In the second round, Jane's voters still vote for Jane, Joe's voters still vote for Joe, and John's voters vote for either Jane or Joe depending on their preferences. So everyone gets a vote in every round. To make an argument against this, you'd have to explain why this "instant system" is unconstitutional while conventional run-off elections, in which everyone votes again on a later day, are constitutional. (Some states use this system if no candidate meets a 50% threshold; for example, the special Senate election in Mississippi recently ended with a run-off.) The only real distinction between these two systems is that Jane's and Joe's voters can't change their minds between the two rounds of voting. So-called "jungle primaries" used in California and Washington effectively work on the same two-round structure, and have been found to be constitutional. If you want some legal precedent, in 2009 the Minnesota Supreme Court specifically refuted this argument in Minnesota Voters Alliance v. City of Minneapolis (bolding mine): The central premise of appellants' unequal weighting argument is that in the second round, first-choice votes cast for continuing candidates were exhausted in the first round and have no further opportunity to affect the election. Appellants claim that, in contrast, voters who cast their first-choice vote for the eliminated candidate get a second chance to influence the election by having their second-choice votes, for a different candidate, counted in the second round. Appellants assert that the same is true in subsequent rounds—voters for continuing candidates have exhausted their ability to affect the election, while voters who had selected the next eliminated candidate get yet another opportunity, as their next choice is counted. Like the district court, we reject the central premise of appellants' unequal weighting argument: that the vote for a continuing candidate is exhausted in the first round in which it is exercised and then is not counted and is of no effect in subsequent rounds. On the contrary, the vote for a continuing candidate is carried forward and counted again in the next round. Just because the vote is not counted for a different candidate in the new round (as is the vote originally cast for an eliminated candidate), does not mean that the ballot was exhausted, that the vote for the continuing candidate is not counted in the subsequent rounds, or that the voter has lost the ability to affect the outcome of the election. See Stephenson v. Ann Arbor Bd. of Canvassers, No. 75-10166 AW (Mich.Cir.Ct. Nov. 1975) (rejecting a claim that an IRV system for election of mayor gave more weight to votes of some voters than others because those who voted for an eliminated candidate had their second choice counted while the second choice of voters whose candidate remained in the race were not counted). Indeed, it is only because votes for continuing candidates are carried forward and combined with subsequent-choice votes of voters for eliminated candidates that any candidate can eventually win. Moreover, this aspect of the IRV methodology is directly analogous to the pattern of voting in a primary/general election system. In a nonpartisan primary election, each voter's vote counts in determining which two candidates survive to reach the general election. In essence, those primary votes are the voters' first-choice ranking of the candidates. As a result of the primary, all but the top two candidates are eliminated. Then, in the general election, voters who voted for candidates eliminated in the primary are allowed to cast another ballot, which necessarily will be for a different candidate-presumably, their second choice. This is no different than the counting of the second-choice votes of voters for eliminated candidates in instant runoff voting. At the same time, in the general election, voters who voted in the primary for either of the two surviving candidates are allowed to vote again, and they are most likely to vote again for their choice in the primary (unless, perhaps, they were voting strategically in the primary and did not vote for their actual first choice in an effort to advance a weaker opponent for their first choice to the general election). This is the equivalent of the continuing effect of the first-choice votes for continuing candidates in instant runoff. A vote in the general election still counts and affects the election, even though it is for the same candidate selected in the primary. Appellants attempt to distinguish the primary/general election system on the basis that those elections are separate, independent events, but the effect in terms of the counting of votes is the same.	Such an order, like all other orders and decisions, is voted on at a conference of justices. Normally all 9 are present and vote, unless one or more is recused. But if one or more happens to be absent, those present vote. A majority of those present an voting is enough for such an order. Dissents from such orders are quite unusual, but any justice may file one if s/he so elects. Reasons for such orders are not normally provided. The usual standard is that such relief is only granted if A) one party will be irreparably harmed by delay, and B) that party has a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the merits when the matter is finally decided. Presumably a majority of the Justices did not feel that this standard was met. Beyond that, no one can say.
Can I defend myself from excessive police force? Hypothetical situation: Say the police are chasing me. I get tackled after which I go limp and stop resisting. Subsequently the officer starts throwing elbows to my face. I'm not sure why he's hitting me (...maybe he or his partner got hurt in the chase, or the adrenaline is still pumping, etc.) I don't fear for my life: it's not like he has gone rogue, threatened to kill me, or drawn his gun. However, I do fear for my well-being. Can I defend myself?	There is a good amount of case law addressing this question going back two centuries. Legally, as soon as you are subject to "excessive force," you are allowed to defend yourself as you would against any assault, even if that force is being used in the course of an otherwise lawful arrest. Furthermore, in some states you are still allowed to resist unlawful arrest. Unfortunately, the matter is no longer as clear as it used to be. (There is a lot of material on this subject; just search for resisting unlawful arrest.) For example, police reflexively invoke a virtual safe harbor by shouting, "Stop resisting!" while battering arrest subjects. Video evidence has uncovered a plethora of examples in which this was done to subjects who were not only not resisting, but even later determined to have been incapable of resisting. If you intend to defend yourself against police, even when justified by law, you need to realize that the system is stacked against you. Police carry the means of escalating to lethal force. So, for example, if you are being beaten but you are potentially able to physically overpower and restrain an officer, you will likely then be met with baton blows or tasers. Since a baton is a deadly weapon, you would be (in theory) justified in shooting an officer attacking you with one. But as soon as any officer shouts "gun!" you will be shot, and most likely killed. Police seem to be given the benefit of the doubt by prosecutors and grand juries when they claim, "I feared for my life." You (even if you survive) will likely have any such claim subject to a full criminal trial. So even though you can legally defend yourself against excessive police force, these days you will almost certainly be unable to in practice.	I think it would depend on how a jury viewed the "challenge" to her audience. The general rule for self-defense in Texas is that the person needs to reasonably believe that force is immediately necessary to protect herself from someone else's use of force. I think a jury would find it reasonable to believe that someone forcefully attempting to steal your gun was planning to use it against you. More importantly, the law generally presumes that that belief is reasonable if the person is being robbed, assuming that she isn't otherwise engaged in criminal activity. Since openly carrying an AR-15 is -- as far as I know -- legal in Texas, I think she'd probably be fine. But: The law also says that the use of force is not justified when a person consents to the other person's use of force, or if the person has provoked the other person. So now you have the question of whether the student's challenge constitutes a provocation or consent to the use of force. I think you can make a decent argument for provocation, which means that "the defendant did some act or used some words intended to and calculated to bring on the difficulty in order to have a pretext for inflicting injury." Neal v. State, No. 12-14-00158-CR, 2016 WL 1446138, at 11 (Tex. App. Apr. 13, 2016). You might also make out a decent argument for consent, which doesn't necessarily seem to require that the parties exactly spell out the rules of engagement, just that there is some kind of agreement between the two parties. In one case, for instance, a defendant tried to argue that a fight had gone beyond the rules because one party used a chokehold and knocked the other out. But the court said that the only actual rule agreed to was that there would be no weapons used. Padilla v. State, No. 03-07-00513-CR, 2008 WL 5423139, at 2 (Tex. App. Dec. 31, 2008). That makes me think that as long as there's consent to some kind of fight, you don't necessarily need rules, though you do need to abide by them if you agree to them. So what's the scope of consent in this case? If we say that she's agreed to the use of force by challenging people to take something from her, and she hasn't said how you can do it, can you do it by any means you choose? I don't think a court would let someone shoot her to get it, but maybe they would be allowed to pry it out of her hands. So all of that is a long way of saying that this is a tricky question, and that any decision would probably depend a lot on the specific facts of who she was talking to, what exactly she was saying, how she was carrying the gun, and so on.	I assume this took place in Washington state. There are a number of self-defense provisions in Washington law. The first, RCW 9A.16.110, is primarily about reimbursements for prosecutions of acts of self-defense, but includes an applicable limit on prosecution: No person in the state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting by any reasonable means necessary, himself or herself, his or her family, or his or her real or personal property, or for coming to the aid of another who is in imminent danger of or the victim of assault, robbery, kidnapping, arson, burglary, rape, murder, or any other violent crime as defined in RCW 9.94A.030. This provision is relevant, since executing a prisoner on death row is not a crime (the state Supreme Court recently struck down the death penalty, so I assume this took place before that ruling). RCW 9A.16.020 states the more classic law on justified use of force, saying The use, attempt, or offer to use force upon or toward the person of another is not unlawful in the following cases:...(3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary; Statutory law does not define offense against his or her person. Grabbing a person and strapping them down for some harmful purpose would normally constitute battery under the common law, but in this instance it is privileged, so it is not an offense against the person). RCW 9A.16.030 says that Homicide is excusable when committed by accident or misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means, without criminal negligence, or without any unlawful intent. The person is under court order to be executed, and it is not lawful to resist that order. The guard, however, RCW 9A.16.040, may use deadly force pursuant to the legal mandate to carry out the court orde ((1)(b)"to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty").	Maybe. In many but not all situations, the police have a certain latitude in how they charge an incident. In many but not all socieities, speeding is seen as less morally repugnant than, say, theft or tax evasion. "Can happen to anyone, oops," the excuse goes. So a credible expression of remorse might cause the police officer to issue a caution or verbal warning instead of a ticket. Unless you are in a place where there is a grossly antagonistic relationship between the police and the citizens, or where the police department relies on fines for funding.	So first things first, whether or not Stand Your Ground is in play, the burden of proof is always on the State to prove any crime did happen and any defense does not. Another thing that I think you confused in your question is it seems apparent that you think Stand Your Ground is Self Defense. This is not true. In the United States, self-defense is always a legal right for a victim of a potential crime, regardless of if your state has Stand Your Ground or Duty to Flee laws. Self-Defense typically can include justifiable homicide as you are not privy to the intent of the bad actor. Under Duty To Flee laws, you cannot claim self defense if you could reasonably get away from a criminal action safely... if given the choice between fight or flight, you must flee the scene. Stand Your Ground contradicts this and says that if you are in a public place and a criminal is trying to make you a victim, you have every right to defend yourself without any duty to remove yourself from the situation first... basically at this point, you can make either choice and not worry about losing justifiable Homicide. Making a criminal arrest of a Stand Your Ground claimant at the seen is not necessarily required. While the claim may be disputed, in the case of firearms, using an illegally owned weapon is typically ground for arrest regardless... (probably not in cases where the illegal gun was introduced to the scene by the dead criminal... and the victim picked it up in a scuffle... though this requires some measure of sorting out). Legal Fire Arms are very well documented and the fire arm in question will be confiscated as evidence. If it is found that it was not a justifiable homicide, the person in question is probably at the address tied to the gun. Now, again, Stand Your Ground only applies to steps needed for Self-Defense, it is not self-defense itself. Self-Defense authorizes only the amount of force needed to safely resolve the situation, up to and including leathal force, but it does not require you to kill the perpetrator in every instance it is invoked. For example, if merely pointing a gun at a perpetrator is enough to stop the crime, you do not get to pull the trigger. That flips it back into homicide. Similarly, if I pull my gun and the guy advances anyway, I may fire and if the guy is on the ground and out cold (thus, no longer a threat), I don't get to walk up, and put a second bullet between his eyes, execution style. This too is murder. As a bit of anecdotal evidence, when I was living in Florida, I worked for a man who just recently purchased a firearm for self-defense (in the home only) and he said that when he was filling out paperwork with the police, the cop looking over his paperwork said, "Now remember, if you have to use that, shoot to kill. It's less paperwork for us." Now, I wasn't there when to cop said it, I don't know what his tone was. I took it as the cop being a little funny, but maybe a little inappropriate. I cannot speak to how much that is indicitive of FL Police culture. It was hearsay on my part... I just thouht it was funny and... demonstrates the attitude towards self-defense. Essentially, by the time cops arrive at the scene, they HARD PART is over... they merely have to collect evidence and take witness statements. If the shooter is cooperating and his story checks out, it will look very bad if they detain a crime victim who defended himself. It's just bad PR. Ultimately, his job is to collect all evidence, not determine if the case should go to trial. As I mentioned, the gun was legally owned in the specific case, and more than likely the CCTV tape is collected, but not yet viewed. Hindsight may be 20/20 but at the time, I do not think it's fair to say that the cop knew this might not be such a clear cut case. In such cases, the cop may not make an arrest because there is not any crime that he can charge the man with and he is cooperating. And keep in mind that in the heat of the moment for the shooter, he may not even realize he did something that might break his self-defense case. Cops can detain a person claiming Stand Your Ground for just about any legitimate reason, even suspicion of homicide that the detainee will claim is self-defense.	I suspect that you would not be convicted in the present case, because the jury would be sympathetic to the plight of the person being dragged out and unsympathetic to the behavior of the draggers. However, we should set aside the emotional elements of a jury trial and focus on legal principles. The basic question is whether a person has the right to use force to defend against an unlawful battery: "a person is privileged to use such force as reasonably appears necessary to defend him or herself against an apparent threat of unlawful and immediate violence from another". This right to defense also extends to defense of others. But it has to appear to be to unlawful, which is to say, you have to reasonably believe that the force used against the victim is unlawful. If a couple of thugs try to drag a person away, then an observer probably has a reasonable belief that this is an unlawful battery. But if a couple of police officers are observed dragging a person away (arresting him), apparently acting officially, the force used (up to a point) is apparently lawful and would not constitute battery of the victim. For defensive force against police to be lawful, the forced used by the police must be excessive. The outcome then depends on what a reasonable person would conclude (this is where the jury or judge makes a rather subjective decision). If a reasonable person would conclude that the assailants are acting lawfully in arresting the person, then a higher bar must be clear to justifiably use force in defense of others. Wearing a jacket that says "Police" favors the "appears lawful" side (though if you happened to know for a fact that the person wearing the jacket is not a police officer, then the "police exception" would not be applicable). In the relevant case, the facts point to the appearance of a lawful arrest (even if were to turn out to be judged unlawful). In the case that this is an apparent arrest, it would have to be the case that a reasonable person would find the force used to be excessive. Generally speaking, force used by officers is held to be reasonable, except in some cases where it is not. See for example the matter of Eric Garner, where the officers involved were not indicted. On the third hand, in this case, it might matter what the actual legal status of the "officers" is (they are not Chicago police).	In all common law countries, this would be the tort of battery (thus, illegal). The police might lawfully lay hands on the person, under certain conditions. First, the police would have to be legally arresting the person; second, the person would have to be (unlawfully) resisting that arrest. If the person acts in a way that a police officer "has reason to believe to be so mentally ill as to be incapable of taking care of himself", he may arrest the person (Mental Health Act 1987 art. 23). Part III (art. 20 ff) provides the legal background for the second path for arrest, via involuntary commitment. Under the circumstances you describe, a court would have to first order the person taken into custody (leading to an arrest, and possibly being subdued). The police would not be authorized to administer a sedative, so they would have to use physical restraint (handcuffs, hammer-lock and so on). The process is either initiated by a psychiatric professional, or by a relative (art. 20), then the court determines whether the person is to be so detained.	In addition to the general considerations of (1) who is allowed to use non-deadly physical force to maintain order in a shop (which I think that one could do if "deputized" by the property owner or to protect the property of another as well), and (2) the use of non-deadly physical force to make a citizen's arrest (which many of these scenarios would justify as the disorder would be a crime if committed by an adult), (3) I suspect that there is also some point at which a bystander may intervene to prevent harms associated with an unsupervised minor being at large and in need of supervision. Generally speaking, intervention with the minimum reasonable non-deadly physical force to prevent property damage, or an assault, or a threat, is going to be permissible. As to the third reason: for a mentally normal ten-year-old that might be a stretch; for a four-year-old or a clearly impaired older child it might not. One could approach the child, say, "where's your mom or dad", "do you have a babysitter or sibling around?", "what is your name?", or "are you lost?" and detain the child until a satisfactory answer is provided or a suitable authority arrives, to prevent the problem of a child being lost, abducted or hurt by the child's own actions. It would be quite hard for a parent, guardian or babysitter to complain about this kind of conduct when the child was unsupervised and is released as soon as you confirm that this really is a responsible adult or older minor who is responsible for the child. It would be important in doing so to not secret away or isolate the child, to try to determine the location of the child's caretaker, to refrain from doing anything that would harm the child, and to seek assistance from an authority within a reasonable time. Typically, if no caretaker appeared, a cop would come and the cop would oversee the situation until a social worker could come. For example, Colorado has the following statute that would apply once a cop arrived (omitting lengthy provisions that apply to newborn children): § 19-3-401. Taking children into custody (1) A child may be taken into temporary custody by a law enforcement officer without order of the court: (a) When the child is abandoned, lost, or seriously endangered in such child's surroundings or seriously endangers others and immediate removal appears to be necessary for such child's protection or the protection of others; (b) When there are reasonable grounds to believe that such child has run away or escaped from such child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian and the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian has not made a report to a law enforcement agency that the child has run away from home; . . . (1.3) A child shall be taken into temporary custody by a law enforcement officer without order of the court when there are reasonable grounds to believe the child has run away from the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian and the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian has made a report to a law enforcement agency that the child has run away from home. (1.5) An emergency exists and a child is seriously endangered as described in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section whenever the safety or well-being of a child is immediately at issue and there is no other reasonable way to protect the child without removing the child from the child's home. If such an emergency exists, a child shall be removed from such child's home and placed in protective custody regardless of whether reasonable efforts to preserve the family have been made. (2) The taking of a child into temporary custody under this section shall not be deemed an arrest, nor shall it constitute a police record. A child is considered neglected or dependent under circumstances including the following (provisions related to drug or alcohol abuse by parents omitted): § 19-3-102. Neglected or dependent child (1) A child is neglected or dependent if: (a) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian has abandoned the child or has subjected him or her to mistreatment or abuse or a parent, guardian, or legal custodian has suffered or allowed another to mistreat or abuse the child without taking lawful means to stop such mistreatment or abuse and prevent it from recurring; (b) The child lacks proper parental care through the actions or omissions of the parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (c) The child's environment is injurious to his or her welfare; (d) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian fails or refuses to provide the child with proper or necessary subsistence, education, medical care, or any other care necessary for his or her health, guidance, or well-being; (e) The child is homeless, without proper care, or not domiciled with his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian through no fault of such parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (f) The child has run away from home or is otherwise beyond the control of his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian; I don't have easily at hand legal authority authorizing a third-party who is not a law enforcement officer to take custody of a dependent or neglected child until a law enforcement officer arrives, but I strongly suspect from the context that this is allowed either under common law, or a statute that I have not located, or some legal fiction (e.g., that the citizen is implicitly deputized by the law enforcement officer after the fact), or simply as a matter of custom and ordinary practice not codified in any authoritative legal source.
How does SE's arbitration clause hold up under the GDPR? Today the new Terms of Service of Stack Exchange have been released, sparking a lot of unrest about its arbitration clause; see the comments and answers on the linked meta above, and also this question. Does the GDPR prevent Stack Exchange from using the arbitration clause against EU citizens? In the sense that when there's a massive data leak and a large class-action suit will be filed, can EU citizens do that collectively, as opposed to going through arbitration for each separate user? The below is no longer applicable, since on the 10th of May electronic opt-out was made available. Related to this it states that the opt-out currently is a physical letter send to Stack Exchange (how they'd tie that letter to my SO account is a bit vague for me, as I can type any odd user page on my letter, not only my own), but this comment suggests that under GDPR there should be a digital opt-out for digital services. Does that mean that the entire clause is invalid (or however that goes in law), when there is no digital opt-out currently available?	Not going to hold up. Dutch Supreme Court confirmed 2012-09-21 in LJN BW6135 that arbitration is still covered by the the right to an independent judge, as established in Golder v UK, ECHR 1975-02-21, nr. 4451/70. Stack Exchange can't decide the rules themselves. (The Dutch case confirms that sector-wide arbitration is in fact legal, with regard to a standard arbitration clause commonly used in the Dutch building sector. The arbiter was found to be independent in that case precisely because they weren't picked by the builder involved.) The GDPR is only indirectly relevant, but the fact that it's mentioned does mean that there is an indisputable intent to provide services to EU consumers. (See section 23 of the GDPR, or its national equivalents). As such, you can't hide behind a US business address. If you intend to do business in the EU, it's under EU laws - all of them. You can't say that only the GDPR applies, and not other rules. I'm having a bit of a problem finding a source, but I'm fairly confident that consumers have the right to sue at their own, local court, overruling the default of suing in the court where the counterparty is located. Finally, I have the right under national law (Dutch: BW 6:236 start and sub-n) to strike the arbitration clause up to 30 days after the conflict arises, and demand a court decision. That's not 30 days after I accept the "Public Network Terms", that's 30 days after the arbitration is invoked. Dutch law explicitly allows arbitration abroad, and arbiters may apply foreign law, but as written the arbitration clause has no legal basis in the Netherlands, and any arbitration resolution would therefore not be considered valid. You may wonder if it matters to Stack Exchange that the arbitration decision would not hold in the EU. Well, consider a clause like Indemnification, which demands the user indemnifies Stack Exchange. That's a pretty empty demand if it's not enforceable.	The material scope of the GDPR (Article 2) is limited to the processing of personal data (including mere storage) by automated means or as part of a filing system. The question of whether your activity falls within this scope hinges on what you actually do with the data once you take possession of it. You have mentioned saving the contact information of people you have met at conferences, which could refer to simply retaining it for later use, or to the technological process of storing data in a computer. The former, if not done in any structured way (a filing system) would not fall within the scope of the GDPR. The latter, even if poorly executed, such as a photo stored on a business smartphone or a text document thrown onto your workstation's desktop, would always fall within scope as computerised data is processed "by automated means". When the contact information you receive identifies a specific person, as distinct from just a corporate switchboard number and company name for example, it is personal data. When you get that personal data from the person it identifies (data subject), and you're otherwise in scope, Article 13 is invoked, requiring you to provide a list of information, "at the time when personal data are obtained", unless "the data subject already has the information." This is known as the right to be informed. The requirements differ when personal data are not obtained directly from the data subject. I would argue it is unreasonable to be expected to provide the information to the data subject over a cup of coffee or in a quick business card exchange, but if you start entering it into a spreadsheet or your CRM, you need to provide the required information, which may be as simple as a follow-up email thanking them for their time and letting them know you'll keep their contact details on file, along with a link to your organisation's privacy policy, assuming it covers this use, or if not, a specific privacy notice. You will of course be required to comply with other requirements such as the principles of data minimisation and identify a lawful basis, maintain adequate security by implementing technical and organisational measures, hold contracts with any third parties who process personal data on your behalf, and have a process for upholding data subject rights and responding to requests to exercise them - among others - but you should already be doing that for your other processing activities unless exempt. Additional information Edits have been made as clarifications and questions were forthcoming. Email marketing You need to consider the applicable country's implementation of Directive 2002/58/EC as amended ("ePrivacy Directive"). For example, in the UK you could send such messages without consent to contacts at incorporated companies or public sector bodies, but would have required consent for sole traders, private individuals, or partners in an unincorporated partnership. In Ireland, you have an exemption to consent for existing customers who were offered the opportunity to opt out when their email address was collected, but must use the email address for marketing within 12 months. Each EU country will have a different implementation of the Directive. In the Netherlands, Article 17 of the Telecommunications Act implements Directive 2003/58/EC and thus provisions for direct marketing by email. Processing by automated means Processing by automated means refers to processing of personal data in electronic, rather than manual form. All electronic processing is within the material scope of the GDPR, while only manual processing that forms or is intended to form part of a filing system is. Recital 15: The protection of natural persons should apply to the processing of personal data by automated means, as well as to manual processing, if the personal data are contained or are intended to be contained in a filing system. Art. 4(2): ‘processing’ means any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means ICO guidance What is personal data?: The GDPR covers the processing of personal data in two ways: personal data processed wholly or partly by automated means (that is, information in electronic form); and personal data processed in a non-automated manner which forms part of, or is intended to form part of, a ‘filing system’ (that is, manual information in a filing system).	EU Member State Data Protection Authorities ("DPAs") have fined foreign legal entities (pursuant to Articles 58(2)(i) and 83 GDPR and further national provisions), however it is not publicly documented whether the specific situation you described has occured. Even if such situation would arise, I would think that it is unlikely that DPAs imposing administrative fines could enforce their (fine imposing) decisions outside the EU, even if the decision in question was confirmed by a court. For instance, in the Netherlands there is not a strong legal basis for the (mutual) recognition and enforcement of foreign administrative decisions. I could imagine that the same applies to other EU Member States. However, please note (possible) civil liability Your question seems to refer to enforcement of the GDPR under instruments of administrative / public law. Please note however that the GDPR can also be enforced by private individuals and organizations, e.g. through tortious liability claims. See for example Amsterdam District Court 2 september 2019, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2019:6490 for a situation (albeit purely national), in which the Court awarded damages for a GDPR breach to a data subject. Possibly, a similar case could be brought against an entity outside the EU that processes data of EU data subjects, contingent upon the outcome of certain questions of International Private Law. With regard to civil damages, there is an extensive international legal framework that covers the cross-border enforcement of rewards for civil damages. Likely, such rewards for damages could more easily be enforced outside the EU. However, I must note that such (private) cross-border enforcement of the GDPR has not happened in practice (yet) either (as far as I know). (Please note that this answer assumes (per the question) that the GDPR is applicable and only deals with the question of the territorial aspects of subsequent enforcement. See about the territorial scope of the GDPR: What is the legal mechanism by which the GDPR might apply to a business with no presence in the EU?).	In my opinion, this should be enough. The GDPR regulation is general - it does not attempt to address these issues directly, precisely for the reasons we see here: You can never predict how the technology will develop. When interpreting the GDPR, we must keep the intended goal in mind. What is the purpose of the "right to erasure"? To prevent anyone from further processing the personal data. If you "crypto-shred" it, it can't be processed anymore, not even theoretically. The encryptec file cannot be used to identify the subject, therefore it is not even personal data anymore. In case it can be decrypted in the future... Well, that is just a speculation. The courts can go to great lengths in interpreting what personal data is (dynamic IP address is considered personal data, since it can be linked to a person by the police with a court order), but i am pretty sure that "it can be theoretically possible in some distant future" is beyond the limit. As for the second question, I am not aware of any applicable case-law, but I guess that current security and technological standards will be used to assess the delay. You have a right to protect your data, the subject has a right to erase them. Those rights must be balanced, neither fully overrules the other. The delay should be short enough so the right to erasure is effective, and it should not extremely long compared to other (economically viable) backup solutions available, in line with current industrial standards.	Not Allowed Under the GDPR The suggested method does not seem to comply with the GDPR, and would not be lawful for a Data Controller that is subject to the GDPR. Specific Provisions Let's consider some specific provisions of the GDPR: Article 4 Article 4 paragraph (11) states: "consent" of the data subject means any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her; If the choice is "obscure" then it is not clear, and legal consent has not been given. Article 7 Article 7 paragraph 3 reads: The data subject shall have the right to withdraw his or her consent at any time. The withdrawal of consent shall not affect the lawfulness of processing based on consent before its withdrawal. Prior to giving consent, the data subject shall be informed thereof. It shall be as easy to withdraw as to give consent. It does not appear in the situation described that the data subject has been clearly informed that consent is being given. Recital 42 Recital 42 reads in relevant part: In accordance with Council Directive 93/13/EEC a declaration of consent pre-formulated by the controller should be provided in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language and it should not contain unfair terms. ... Consent should not be regarded as freely given if the data subject has no genuine or free choice or is unable to refuse or withdraw consent without detriment. The specified means do not seem to comply with R42 Recital 32 Recital 32 reads: Consent should be given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her, such as by a written statement, including by electronic means, or an oral statement. This could include ticking a box when visiting an internet website, choosing technical settings for information society services or another statement or conduct which clearly indicates in this context the data subject’s acceptance of the proposed processing of his or her personal data. Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent. ... If the data subject’s consent is to be given following a request by electronic means, the request must be clear, concise and not unnecessarily disruptive to the use of the service for which it is provided. The format in the question seems to rely on inactivity as a way of giving consent, and is surely not clear.	You premise is correct. The processor is someone that processes data on your behalf, and since the GDPR definition of processing is extremely broad, that is about every third party subcontractor that you use for data processing, including various cloud providers. I'm afraid it will soon become a huge mess with a gazillion contracts to sign. I disagree. Yes, the GDPR says that a contract between the controller and processor must exist, but Article 28 of the GDPR does not say anything about how the controller shall document these instructions. Basically, in cases like the one you describe where John Doe relies on a web agency for having a contact form on the web, there will be a standardized (by the web agency) service agreement between the John Doe (controller) and the web agency (processor). There is nothing stopping the parties from agreeing that this service agreement that John Doe accepted as part of the onboarding procedure is also the DPA as required by the GDPR. Putting something like the following in the service agreement would do it: The parties agree that this Service Agreement between You (controller) and Us (processor) set out Your complete and final instructions to Us in relation to the processing of Personal Data and that processing outside the scope of these instructions (if any) shall require prior written agreement between You and Us. You also agree that We may engage Sub-processors to process Personal Data on Your behalf. The Sub-processors currently engaged by Us and authorized by You are listed in Annex A. I think we will se a lot of amendments in service contracts as the GDPR gets better understood, but I don't really see a flood of DPAs in addition to these amended service contracts.	This is all outlined at Terms of Service - Stack Exchange When you ask a question, and/or comment on or answer a question, or otherwise participate on an SE site, you license your content to SE. You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license. In turn, (emphasis mine) Subscriber acknowledges that Stack Exchange has no control over, and no duty to take any action regarding: which users gains access to the Network; which Content Subscriber accesses via the Network; what effects the Content may have on Subscriber; how Subscriber may interpret or use the Content; or what actions Subscriber may take as a result of having been exposed to the Content. Much of the Content of the Network is provided by and is the responsibility of the user or subscriber who posted the Content. Stack Exchange does not monitor the Content of the Network and takes no responsibility for such Content. Subscriber releases Stack Exchange from all liability for Subscriber having acquired or not acquired Content through the Network. ... This doesn't mean someone can't sue you anyway, notwithstanding that disclaimer. Anyone can sue anyone in civil court. That's the way the system works. Someone could track you down and sue you for the (bad) advice you gave that cooked their Macbook, even though they got that advice on SE and SE states that SE is not responsible for any damages resulting from the use of the information. The TOS of all SE site(s) shows that anyone who uses SE sites is bound by this click-through agreement, even if they didn't read it. And that should suffice in a court if it gets that far. It should suffice for any attorney thinking of taking the case of someone who wants to sue you. Again, someone could sue you; but chances are really great that it will never go very far due to the legal nature of SE and your contributions. This SE site - Law SE - has more of a specialized TOS, as practicing law without a license is illegal, and giving legal information as a layperson (or even as an attorney, of which there are some who particpiate here) needs special terms; see the sidebar for this disclaimer and link: Law Stack Exchange is for educational purposes only and is not a substitute for individualized advice from a qualified legal practitioner. Communications on Law Stack Exchange are not privileged communications and do not create an attorney-client relationship. General Disclaimer - Law Stack Exchange So, if you do get sued by someone who cooked their Macbook by following your bad advice, you can ask about the lawsuit here on Law SE. But, unless your question is about general legal procedures, terms, case law, etc. (as outlined at What topics can I ask about here? - Law SE), your question will be closed because this site is not for giving specific legal advice in specific legal situations, especially active lawsuits. You will be advised to talk to an attorney.	I'd rather not, but this might be compliant if you make sure that the personal data under your responsibility remains secure and protected even if it is processed abroad. Since the UK has left the EU, it is sometimes necessary to distinguish between implications of the EU GDPR and the UK GDPR. These are functionally equivalent, but in the matter of international data transfers the practical details have diverged. In my answer that you cited, I argued that any website processes personal data, and is thus potentially in-scope for the GDPR. If you cause another organization to process this personal data outside of the UK, you are performing an international data transfer (called “restricted transfer” in UK guidance). For example, such non-UK processing occurs if you use cloud services that run outside of the UK. The UK ICO has guidance on international data transfers. As in an EU GDPR context, you can only perform the transfer if the data remains suitably protected, or one of the exceptions applies. The data remains suitably protected if the target country was attested and “adequate” level of data protection, or if you have implemented appropriate safeguards. As of 2022, the list of countries considered adequate is generally equivalent to the EU list of adequacy decisions. Notably, the US is no longer on that list after the Schrems II decision that invalidated the Privacy Shield Agreement. Since this decision was made before Exit Day, it also applies in the UK. This leaves “appropriate safeguards” for UK→US restricted transfers. In the linked ICO page, read the section Is the restricted transfer covered by appropriate safeguards?. In brief, you will need to perform a Transfer Impact Assessment, and sign Standard Contractual Clauses with the US data importer. In a Transfer Impact Assessment (TIA), you check that the data remains protected despite the transfer into a country without an adequate level of data protection. There is no official guidance on conducting a TIA, but the IAPP has a template and the EU EDPB has recommendations on supplemental measures to protect data transfers, which might reduce the risk and affect a TIA in your favor. It's worth noting that the EDPB recommendations were written in the wake of the Schrems II ruling, and can be summarized as “compliance is impossible when using US-based cloud services”. But this is your assessment, and TBH it seems the UK is a bit more relaxed than the EU in this regard. The Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs) are a pre-formulated contract that binds the foreign data importer to handle the data properly. In essence, this translates relevant aspects of the UK GDPR into contract law. Many service providers already provide a Data Processing Agreement that includes SCCs by reference, but you'll have to make sure that these contracts have been entered in a legally binding manner. Sometimes these apply automatically as part of the terms of service, sometimes you need to explicitly sign these documents. But SCCs are one detail where UK GDPR compliance and EU GDPR compliance diverges a bit. The old EU SCC templates from 2004/2010 can no longer be used and have been replaced. For compliance with the EU GDPR, the new 2021 SCCs must be used. For compliance with the UK GDPR, you have two options. You can either use the 2022 International Data Transfer Agreement (IDTA), or you can use the 2021 EU SCCs along with the 2022 UK International Data Transfer Addendum which modifies the EU SCCs in some details. Don't want to deal with TIAs and SCCs? Switch to a hosting provider that only processes the personal data under your control in the UK, or in a country with an adequacy decision (e.g. EU, Canada, Israel).
Is it legal to use old software illegally? In this question, I'm talking about the unsupported or discontinued software or the old versions of programs that are no available to buy on their official websites as there is already newer versions (e.g. MS Office 2007). I would like to crack those programs to be able to use them without buying them (which was illegal). Is that okay according to the US law?	Is it legal to do something illegal? No. Those programs are still under copyright and will be for many, many decades to come (for Office 2007 copyright expires 1 January 2127). You can only use them in the way the copyright owner allows which usually includes paying for a license. The owner of a copyright may not want to licence/sell it anymore: that is their right. If the licences they have sold are transferable you may be able to buy one second-hand.	There are two common approaches. The first approach is simply to let copyright law apply. Under the default terms, the IT provider has no rights to copy your software. Running software is allowed, of course, and not a problem that you need to deal with vis-a-vis the IT provider. You still can sue them if they copy your software, even in the absence of a contract. That is the chief function of copyright, after all! The second approach is to allow the customer to subcontract third parties to act on behalf of them, while acknowledging that such subcontracting does not dissolve them from any responsibilities towards you. In other words, if the 3rd party would do something unauthorized, you have a claim towards the customer and they have a distinct but related claim towards their IT supplier.	Forget about copyright or EULAs. In the UK this would be illegal under the Computer Misuse Act (1998) and you could be jailed for up to a year - specifically Unauthorised access to computer material. (1)A person is guilty of an offence if— (a)he causes a computer to perform any function with intent to secure access to any program or data held in any computer, or to enable any such access to be secured; (b)the access he intends to secure, or to enable to be secured, is unauthorised; and (c)he knows at the time when he causes the computer to perform the function that that is the case. This law has been applied even to simply altering parameters in a GET request to a website, so it is incredibly broad. Other jurisdictions have similar wording, so be aware!	Yes, it does. Using the downloaded content, whether it was scraped or individually downloaded one file at a time, for research or for commercial purposes would violate that TOS provision (unless some other provision contradicts it, or you obtain specific permission). The site owner could sue you for such a violation, should the owner become aware of it. I do not think it would be likely to be a criminal offense, depending on the jurisdiction.	The agreement linked in the question seems to be or to purport to be, for a non-final, non-production version of the board. I have seen such agreements used, both for hardware and software, used when beta-test versions of products are being distributed to those who agree to do such testing, often in exchange for a reduced price on the final product, or an early look. I have also seen similar language used when an evaluation version of a product is provided free, or at a much reduced price. In such a use, it would be a reasonable contract, it seem to me, and I see no reason why if it were agreed to by both parties in such a situation, it would not be binding. Often such agreements also include a non-disclosure aspect, but this one does not seem to do so. I cannot see how such an agreement could be made applicable automatically, without both parties having chosen to agree to it, and indicated this by signing, clicking, or in some other positive way. I doubt that it could be made automatically applicable, on an "by using this product you agree" basis. I don't know of any physical consumer product, or appliance, sold with such an agreement in ordinary commerce. I am not sure what would happen if a manufacturer wanted to require all purchasers to sign such an agreement. I don't know if it would be binding. I would think that the purchaser's rights under the First Sale doctrice, could be modified by a valid contract agreed to by the purchaser. I do not think that they could simply be revoked by a contract of adhesion, which the purchaser had no choice to decline before making the purchase. As the OP says this was not signed or agreed to in any way, I can't see how it binds the OP.	There is also the part that says "except as expressly permitted by law". In the USA, you are allowed to run the software. This means the operating system making the copy that transfers the software from your hard drive to the RAM of the computer, and all necessary changes there. And this includes modifications to relocate the software, or to protect it against certain attacks by hackers, and I'm confident that Apple checked that it includes translating x86 machine code to ARM machine code and store the translated copy together with the original. Similar things have been done already around 2000 or so, and no software manufacturer has ever complained.	The only issue relevant to your age is the (ir)revocability of the license. GPLv3 purports to be an irrevocable license. To be really irrevocable, the license would need to grant certain rights in exchange for something of value, that is, you need a license that passes muster as a contract. Copyright licenses are typically treated as contracts, but it is not clearly established in law that licenses are contracts or are not contracts. Out of the goodness of your heart, you can grant permission to use your property, but you can also withdraw that permission. If you have a contract granting perpetual permission to use your property in exchange for something of value, then you can't later withdraw that permission. In the case of Jacobsen v. Kratzer, the sides advances opposing theories that the license was a "bare license" vs. was a contract. (The matter was ultimately settled out of court). This article puts together the legal factors surrounding the notion of license as contract, see p. 21 ff, and esp. §IV for arguments that licenses should be contracts, to be fully enforceable. A contract for non-essentials formed with a minor is not enforceable, until you are 18. You could therefore revoke the license, until you are 18. Anyone who uses the software does so at their peril. However, if the license is not a contract, no existing legal doctrine (in the US) whereby the permission is irrevocable. In other words, yes you can, at their peril. The whole license-as-contract issue is very complicated, and I'm only focusing on the revocability issue. There is a separate question whether one can sue a user for both copyright infringement and breach of contract. The case of Artifex v. Hancom, see also this analysis, found that (in the particular case), plaintiff can pursue the matter as both infringement and contract breach.	Disclaimer: I'm from the US and don't claim to know German or Turkish law. So let me discuss some general principles here, but details may well be different in Germany and Turkey. You're mixing together three very different things: trademark, copyright, and patent. Copyright protects the expression of an idea, in this case, the exact computer code, images, etc. If you didn't copy his code, the chance that you would coincidentally write identical code is remote. The fact that you both have a line of code that says x=x+1 wouldn't give him any grounds for a lawsuit. He'd have to show substantial portions of the code were identical. If you didn't deliberately copy his code, this isn't going to happen. Barring some extraordinary and unbelievable coincidence, you can't violate copyright accidentally. Trademark protects names and symbols used to identify a company or a product. If you decided to call your software company "Microsoft", then that other Microsoft could sue you for trademark infringement. Likewise if you copied somebody else's logo or other distinctive graphics. This is very different from copyright. It is quite possible to violate someone's trademark accidentally. Especially if he gave his company or product a rather generic name. Like if someone called his product, say, "Password Manager", someone else might make a product with the same name without ever having heard of the original. Ditto if he has some simple logo or other graphics. If you did accidentally duplicate a name or graphic elements, well, in the US a court would likely order you to change your name or graphics and that would be the end of it, unless you refused, in which case you'd end up in court. US Courts have ruled that very generic names have limited trademark protection. An example I saw recently was "Main Street Auto Repair". A court said that the owner of that name could prevent someone else from opening a shop in the same town with the same name, but he couldn't sue someone in another town who happened to use the same name. This is why, by the way, companies often use made-up words for their product names. In your case, this should be a trivial issue. If he is claiming trademark to the look of the main menu screen, just change the colors or move some buttons around. If it actually went to court, you should be able to argue that the similarity was accidental and when you were informed you promptly changed it, and that should be the end of it. Depending, I guess, on how hard-nosed the judge is, etc. Patents are different still. A patent gives the owner the exclusive right to use an invention or process for a specified period of time. It doesn't matter if you invented the same thing entirely independently. Whoever filed the patent first has exclusive rights. There have been cases where an inventor lost out to someone with a similar invention because he submitted his patent application one day later. If this other person has patents that you are infringing, you are pretty much out of luck.
Do I have any options if Chase has closed my account citing payment from fraudulent sources? A few weeks ago I received a $125 Chase QuickPay from someone on the site localbitcoins.com. Turns out the payment was marked fraudulent, and my account was frozen, whether it was because the user was charging-back or his credentials were stolen I do not know. I knew that on my end the payment was legitimate so I sat down with my branch manager on multiple occasions over two weeks and discussed the situation and we were working on it, submitting documents, etc. After a long (and possibly non-existent) investigation Chase first told me when I called to check up on things this morning that my account was unfrozen but I needed to set up a new online profile. When I went to the bank a couple of hours later to do this and they called to set up a new online account they were informed that contrary to what I heard earlier my account was being closed and that was that. The reason they gave is that I was receiving QuickPays from fraudulent sources (even though this one was one of many previously received QuickPays). So I have two of questions: Is the bank required to give me the results of the investigation? (They refused when I asked on the phone at the branch.) Do I have any options/recourse to stop them from closing the account?	Both of your question are creatures of contract. Their disclosures when you set up the account (or potentially amended disclosures or terms they've mailed to you subsequently) control both of these questions. They don't have to share the results of their internal investigation against you (they do have to give you proof that the deposit/transfer was fraudulent), but that does not give you access to their internal investigative process or its findings. They cannot shut down your account based on protected reasons (race, class, gender, religion, etc.), but the can certainly close an account pursuant to their operating procedures, their rules, terms and conditions or disclosures - all of which you agreed to (implicitly or explicitly) when opening the account. There is likely nothing you can do about either of these issues, unless the contract you formed with them by opening the account gives you that right, which would appear in their terms of service, disclosures, etc., and these almost always protect their right to do most anything when it comes to protecting the overall best interest of the corporate entity.	In the worst case if they shut shop, then how might I go about getting my money back? It is unlikely that you can. A SAFE is not a loan (and for that matter isn't even a share in the company) and doesn't create an enforceable contractual right to get your money back. If you make an equity investment and the company loses money and goes out of business, you lose everything you invested. If the promoter made false representations that induced you to invest, or actively concealed material facts about the investment, you might be able to sue the promoter for securities fraud under federal regulation 10b-5, or under a state securities law, or under a common law fraud theory. You could also sue to issuer of the investment (i.e. the company) but that would usually be futile because the company is broke and hence judgment proof. State or federal securities regulators or a local district attorney or state attorney-general might pursue the case in lieu of a private civil action by you, but getting them to take action is often quite difficult. But, if your investment wasn't induced by fraud and instead the management of the company simply made bad decisions that caused the company to fail, you have no remedy. The investment was for a SAFE (Simple Agreement for Future Equity). I have the signed SAFE with me. This is a very unusual way for a QoZ to be structured, which adds to the sense that this may have been a shady venture.	When a platform has the right to kick you out as they deem fit, without any evidence why they did it, does that change if you have a paid? It depends on the purpose of payment and the terms & conditions it triggers. Your description reflects that payment entitles the user to have no ads "and stuff" (?). Payment does not necessarily entitle the user to continued access, diligence from customer service, or other features. Without fully knowing the platform's terms & conditions regarding payment it is impossible to identify what obligations (other than not displaying advertisements) your payment creates on the platform. The information you provide here is insufficient for assessing whether you have a viable claim such as fraud or breach of contract. On the other hand, the platform's apparent arbitrariness and lack of response might support a finding of unfair or deceptive practices if the platform does not honor or proportionally reimburse your payment. Many jurisdictions have legislation prohibiting practices which are unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable (example: MCL 445.903). Oftentimes statutory law establishes an agency in charge of addressing customers' complaints.	It seems that your friend is taking part in a multi-level marketing scheme. However, this does not necessarily exclude a pyramid or snow ball scheme. Both can be illegal in Germany and Switzerland under the respective unfair business practices codes, because the systems do not rely on the sales of goods and services, but on the continuous recruitment of further sales persons. To clarify whether your friend's system is illegal, you could report the scheme to the competent watchdogs. In Germany the "Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs" in Bad Homburg is recommendable. As the company is operating from Switzerland, German law not be applicable without more. Therefore also contacting the Swiss authorities may be advisable. This seems to be the "Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft SECO" in Bern.	Let me be sure that I understand the situation. You set up an account with Big Company, which uses BigCo as a trademark. You want email about that account to reach you with a unique address, so you set up '[email protected]" and gave that as your email when setting up tha account. You don't plan to use that address for any purpose but communications from BigCo to you and from you to them. (Of course these aren't the actual names.) Have I understood the situation correctly? It seems that you ar not using 'BigCo" in trade, nor are you likely to be confused with an official representative of BigCo, so you are not infringing their trademark. However, someone using such an email more generally could perhaps be so confuse, so BigCo has a somewhat legitimate concern, as they cannot know the very limited use you plan to make of this address. The only way that the could force you not to use such an email address would be via a court order as part of a suit for trademark infringement, whcih under the circumstances I doubt they would get. However, unless they have some sort of contract with you to the contrary, they can control who registers on their site. and could refuse to register you using an email address that includes their name or alias. Convincing them to accept your registration, even though it does no harm to them, will almost surely be more trouble than it is worth. Give them "[email protected]" or something else that is not their name, but will suggest their name enough that you will know who it is. This will serve your purpose fully, and avoid a long argument with people who are reading from a script (once you get past the automated process, if you can even do that). This is all assuming that I have understood the situation correctly. I am also largely assuming US law, since you didn't mention a jurisdiction. (EDIT: UK law should not be very different on these points.)	The fact that the terms and conditions do not mention the word "disable" is significant, but not in the way you seem to think. You state: "...the merchant's T&C which does not explicitly allow the merchant to charge a fee for a disabled account". However, this doesn't mean that the merchant needs to explicitly state that they may. What it actually means is that the merchant does not recognize the term "disable" in the context of terminating the service contract. (Did they use stop, terminate, delete, eliminate, fall into disuse, log off, etc. or any other similar expressions?) You haven't defined what "disable" means, but perhaps it is more like a "pause" in service for which payment is still required? (Like having the post office hold your mail vs terminating all deliveries.) What you need to do is to read the section of the T&Cs that deals with terminating service and payment, understand what is required, and execute the procedures they describe. Whatever words they use, do that. If you have done all the steps and can prove it then you have a case against them, otherwise you are arguing semantics and interpretation... As to the title question, it does not appear that any "law" has been broken, this is just a contractual misunderstanding. P.S. This is the reason why I always set up payments through my bank to "push" money to vendors rather than authorizing them to "pull" money from me. When I am done I notify them and stop paying. I don't need to ask them to please stop taking it from me.	Yes You have a contract and, while I don't know what it says, its a fair bet that not making payments the contract requires you to make would be a breach of that contract. This would allow the other party to sue you for the unpaid fees as well as interest on them and the consts of collection (collection agency fees, legal fees etc.). In addition they can report you as a defaulter (which you would be) to any and all credit reporting agencies which would wreck your ability to get credit in the future. If the do sue you and succeed (as the probably would) they can seize your assets to sell them to recover their debt - since the time-share appears to have limited value they would probably seize your savings or your car instead. You need to read the contract to find out how you can end it legally.	You have a contract - they have fulfilled their obligation (they paid you), if you do not fulfil their obligation (not to post it online) then you are in breach of the contract. Your obligation continues even if you gift the money back to them. If you breach the contract then they can sue you for the damage that they suffer. Presumably this would be damage to their reputation and for a public figure this could run into millions of dollars. In demanding additional money from them beyond what you are legally entitled to you are, at least, flirting with the crime of extortion/blackmail. This would not be a matter for them to sue you for, it would be a matter for the DA to prosecute if they chose to make a complaint. There doesn't seem to be a defamation issue here because you are not stating anything that isn't true. Now, the extent of the agreement appears to prohibit you posting it on the internet, however, the spirit of the agreement is that you will keep the information secret in all respects - that is likely how a court would look at it. Of course, if someone does steal the information from you then you haven't broken the agreement but you would probably have to prove that it was stolen when they sue you.
Throwing tomatoes at a poster of a politician As a form of protest, imagine: Printing a poster of a politician's face Placing it on a wall (with permission of the wall's owner) in a generally public space Handing out tomatoes to be thrown at the poster. What legal troubles can arise? EDIT: The jurisdiction is Canada, particularly Ontario. My apologies for not thinking of this detail.	If you contain and clean up the mess and don’t create a public nuisance, you’re good to go.	Yes, barring any statutory prohibitions against such a rule. I would be very surprised if any existed. They don't exist in any jurisdiction I'm familiar with. Look up the local by-laws to be sure.	If Tratatoria has anti-discrimination laws, or provisions in its constitution forbidding discrimination, the Minister's actions might be illegal under them. But if it does not, or if it does not enforce whatever laws it may have, there is no international authority that can enforce any rule against discrimination. People and groups in other countries could denounce such actions as biased and discriminatory, if they chose. There is no legal standard for such announcements. This might bring pressure on Tratatoria. But that would be a diplomatic and political matter, not a legal one. There really is no effective international law on discrimination unless it amounts to genocide, and even then it is essentially a matter of diplomatic pressure or potentially war to enforce regime change, not a true legal process.	We may soon have a more definitive answer. A Grand Junction, Colorado newspaper is suing a politician for calling it "fake news", and the resolution of that case and the hypothetical that you propose would turn on the same legal principle. It is highly unlikely that such a lawsuit would prevail, because "fake news" probably doesn't constitute libel per se, because the comment could be construed as hyperbole or as a statement of opinion (neither of which are actionable), and even potentially, because a "speech and debate clause" defense under the state constitution might apply (depending upon the context in which the statement was made by the politician). The context of the particular tweet cited generally defines specified organizations as "the FAKE NEWS media" rather than accusing them of any particular instance of making a false statement, so it is probably an opinion or hyperbole. But, if the statement were made knowing it was false or with reckless disregard as to truth or falsity, and if the term "fake news" in the context in which it was used could be legitimately construed the imply a statement of fact which is not true, it wouldn't be impossible for the lawsuit to succeed, and depending upon the context of the statement, it could have such an implication. A suit against Trump could also implicate Presidential immunity doctrines which are more robust than immunity doctrines for other public officials, particularly if the "fake news" comment could be construed as part of the official duties of the President (for which there is absolute immunity) as opposed to his unofficial duties. The immunity question is a closer one than the question on the merits of defamation law about which there is much more case law to flesh out what is and isn't covered.	I don't know of any legal reason to care whether people consider reverse graffiti to be graffiti, since graffiti is not itself a legal concept. The act when done without permission is, however, trespassing, which is against the law. Painting a building is legal, if done with permission; painting a building in a pattern is legal, if done with permission. Strangely enough, cleaning a building without permission, whether entirely of selectively in a pattern, is illegal. There are in fact specific laws about defacing property, so the illegality of the act does not rely solely on trespass laws. The NYC law is here, the California law is here, and there are many similar laws. In Washington, illegality arises from a more general prohibition against causing physical damage, which is defined here, and boils down to "costs money to fix". These laws are not limited to "applying opaque material to a surface".	A person that fails to comply with a copyright licence does not have a licence to use the copyrighted material. The owner of the copyright can take all the normal actions for copyright violation including seeking an injunction to stop the breach and/or suing for damages. Additionally, if the breach constitutes criminal activity, then the state can enforce those sanctions. However, suing a Chinese company in a Chinese court is generally a hiding to nothing. I won't say the Chinese legal system is biased towards its citizens but I wont say it isn't either. However, a case can be brought in any jurisdiction where the breach occurs (e.g. the USA) and enforcement action can be taken against any assets located in that jurisdiction.	It is illegal to threaten to report a person for violating the law (it is illegal to threaten a person). There are laws in California that limit official cooperation with ICE investigations, therefore the police will not arrest a person for being an illegal immigrant. This is basically a limit on use of state and local resources, and the state has the power to control its purse strings. The state has no power to mandate that individuals not report a suspected or imagined violation of federal law to federal authorities, and there is no California law purporting to have that power.	It is probably illegal in all of the jurisdictions in the US where a fetus is legally declared to be a person and where the murder statutes are written to not explicitly exclude abortion: that is, in no jurisdictions. No law existing or proposed for Georgia specifically addresses "travel for the purpose of getting an abortion". The underlying theory behind the claim (advocated by some Georgia attorneys) is that a person may be open to a conspiracy charge for taking a woman to another state to get an abortion, which would be a crime if committed in Georgia. If a conspiracy exists in Georgia to do something illegal (in Georgia), that is a violation of OCGA 16-4-8 ("when he together with one or more persons conspires to commit any crime and any one or more of such persons does any overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy"). The substantially same law exists in Washington, and most if not all other states. The theory is apparently that "conspire to commit a crime" means something like "conspire to perform an act which would be a crime if performed in in this jurisdiction", e.g. "purchase marijuana, or take a job at certain payday loan companies". No state has successfully claimed extraterritorial jurisdiction, where a Georgia resident can be prosecuted in Georgia for a legal act carried out in another state, so this theory is a bit of a stretch.
Can the US Government assert copyright on a government work internationally? From what I understand, large swaths of US Government works are considered "public domain", but this unrestricted status applies only within the United States, For this question I am assuming the work is unambiguously a US Federal Government work that would otherwise be public domain to someone within the US. Can the US Government claim copyright to this work internationally? and optionally: Has there ever been an instance of the US Government defending the copyright of such a work internationally?	According to CENDI, yes the US government is able to claim copyright on works internationally. The law in question which makes US government works public domain in the US (17 U.S. Code § 105) only does so within the confines of US copyright. Since copyright protection is on a per-country basis, there's no reason that the US government couldn't assert IP rights under foreign copyright law (though I didn't go looking for an example). While the Berne Convention generally requires countries to provide foreign works the same protection as domestic works, I can think of two general reasons why US government works wouldn't fall under copyright protection in some countries: The country simply doesn't apply copyright protection to any government works (don't know how common this is). The country applies the rule of the shorter term. If they do, they aren't required to provide a longer term of protection than the country of origin does (which is nil in this case).	Copyright exists whether they make that statement or not. Giving such notice informs the public that the work is copyrighted, who owns it, and when it was published. If the work is infringed, the defendant will not be able to use an innocent infringement defense. There's nothing special about using the domain name, as it's probably the name or DBA of the business that owns the domain.	Exactly the same way it works over all other content There are no special classes of copyright, there’s just copyright. What a user of a service may do with copyright materials will be spelled out in the licence. If there is no licence, then they are left with fair use/fair dealing.	"Public domain" refers to things in principle copyrightable but where protection has lapsed, been repudiated, or is a statutory exception (such as government works). A website is not "in the public domain". The idea that a website is "public property" is (cough) mistaken. There are basically two ways in which a web interaction could be illegal. The first regards whether accessing another person's computer is illegally accessing a computer, which is a crime. Authorization essentially comes down to "permission": if the owner permits me to access the computer, I am authorized. Putting stuff out there on a web server is an open-ended grant of permission to look at a web page. That simply means that if I create a web page (with a bunch of links or not), I am granting you permission to interact with my computer to that extent. It does not create permission to hack into a password-protected subdirectory. An ordinary web crawler automates what a clicking human does. Copyright law is also relevant, in that the stuff I put on my webpage is not to be copied without permission. Any webpage access necessarily involves automatic copying from machine to machine: in putting stuff out there for the world to see, I am saying that the world can do that level of automatic copying that arises from normal html-and-click interactions. It does not mean that you can download and do stuff with my copyrighted content (i.e., it is not an abandonment of copyright: I did not put that stuff in the public domain). Putting a web page out there in an unrestricted fashion means that you've given a certain level of permission to "copy" (at least in the automatic server-to-browser viewing sense). I may want to impose conditions on peoples' access to my stuff, so I can impose terms on such material. For instance, I may require users to agree to certain conditions before accessing the CoolStuff subdirectory. Users then have to jump through a minor hoop and agree to those terms. In that case, my permission is conditional, and if you violate the terms of that agreement, I may be able to sue you for copyright infringement. It could then be a violation of my terms of service (TOS) if I say "you may not crawl my website" (in less vague language). A TOS gets its legal power from copyright law, because every webpage interaction involves copying (I assume that technical point is obvious), and copying can only be done with permission. You may technologically overcome my weak click-through technology so that the bot just says "sure whatever" and proceeds to illegally use my web page: I can sue you now for copyright infringement. The robot-specific methods of meta-tags and robots.txt have no legal force. Although there is a way to say "no you may not," which is tailored to automated access, the meaning and enforcement of these devices has not yet reached the law. If my page uses NOFOLLOW and your program doesn't know or care, you (your program) do not (yet) have a duty to understand, detect and respect that tag. Prior registration is also not a legal requirement, and very many pages that are on the master crawl list get there from being linked to by someone else's web page. Again, there is at present no legal requirement of pre-registration (and there is no effective mechanism for verifying that the site owner has registered the site). Archiving and especially re-displaying someone's content is, on the other hand, not legal. It would be plainly copyright infringement if you were to scoop up someone else's webpage and host it. You can analyze their material and somehow associate it with some search terms, and display a link to that page, but you cannot copy and republish their material. You can put very short snippets out there taken from a web page, under the "fair use" doctrine, but you can't wholesale republish a webpage. (It should be noted that the archive.org is an internationally recognized library, and libraries have extra statutory powers to archive).	A proof can be protected by copyright. The underlying facts of math cannot. But if one has copied details of the order of the proof, or of the selection of theorems to use, and if several other choices would have been possible, then the new proof may constitute a trivially modified copy, or a derivative work, and in either case making of it might be copyright infringement. However, making and distributing a copy, even with no changes at all, for purposes of comment and criticism, might be fair use in the US, fair dealing in the UK or some other parts of the Commonwealth, or fall under an exception to copyright in other countries (these generally vary significantly by country). This is usually a very fact-driven question.	Copyright always is global When you make a new work, you gain copyright everywhere the Berne convention on copyright was signed, to the degree that country provides. That's in all but about 10 countries, among them Iran, Kongo and Somalia. Now, the runtime of copyright is determined by two things: either the death of the author, in case it is with a natural person, or the publication of the company. Public Domain? The plates Your plates are well over 120 years old and were most likely company-made. As a result, we have to look back... So let's see... oh, actually it's easy: they were published before 1927. That means they are automatically public domain. Even if they were unpublished, and without known author, they're out of copyright: they were created before 1902, so they are automatically in Public Domain. Photographies of Plates? A photograph of the plates creates its own copyright, akin to a translation of a text. However, it is more narrow. Depending on the artistic choices of the photographs, and who made the digital copy, copyright might or might not apply. If copyright applies, then only in the artistic choices of the photographer, e.g. specific lighting or how the pieces are mounted, a text belonging to the picture... Anything that adds to the original work has its own copyright. As a reasonably safe example: the library of Congress and its employees would not hold copyright in a digital copy, as they are US government actors. Those copies are Public Domain. It looks entirely different in museums: the MET catalog is copyrighted, despite the items in it being at times thousands of years old. Those pictures are contextualized in the catalog of the collection with notes and such. The MET has a copyright on the collection and its texts. But... as long as the photos are just mere reproductions with no artistic input no new copyright was created.	That depends very much on the particular countries involved. Some countries do not have a system of copyright registration at all. Of those that do, the benefits vary. In the united-states, one cannot sue for infringement at all unless the copyright is first registered. One cannot obtain statutory damages, or legal fees as damages, unless the work is registered before the infringement starts, or no later than three months after publication. So if one thinks it is plausible that one will sue for infringement in a US court, it is a good idea to register early. In other countries, the benefits may be different and the value of registration not so clear. Note that a plaintiff (usually the copyright owner or claimant) can normally choose what jurisdiction to file an infringement suit in. Suit can usually be brought in any country where the work has been published or distributed. So one can limit registration to countries where one is likely to bring a suit.	It would seem that your song is a derived work. You took the original work and found words that sound the same. If the original work had used different words, your work would have ended up differently. So you have a derived work. Same as making a translation; if the original was different, then the translation would be different, so the translation is a derived work. I was asked "How is this not straight up infringement". But it is. Not only copying is an exclusive right of the copyright holder, but also the creation of derivative works.
Why would someone get a fine when using a disabled parking space when the disabled person is not in the car? An article in LA Times about someone parking on a disabled parking space without the disabled person being in the car: (...) I saw a woman pull into a disabled parking space and begin to exit her car. Two men in plain clothes flashed badges as they approached the car. One of them asked to see the registration slip that went with the disabled placard that hung from the driver’s rearview mirror. It turned out that the placard was in the name of her son, but he wasn’t in the car. So the officers confiscated the placard, which her son will have to reapply for, and wrote her a citation. I have a hard time understanding how one can get a citation for this? My wife is disabled (in France, so the laws may vary) and I sometimes park, alone, in the disabled spot in order to bring her to the car (or wait for her to come). The disabled parking space is there to help disabled people, when they arrive to the place, but also when they leave from it. Both do not always happen in sequence (I can drop someone off, or wait for someone to get to the car). I would be ideally interested in a French (or EU) perspective (but still keeping it open as the article is from the US)	There isn't any indication in that news story that the disabled son was anywhere nearby. I agree the situation you describe sounds like a legitimate use of the placard, but it seems in this situation, the placard was being used in a manner totally unrelated to the transport of a disabled person. My guess is that the cops cited her because the son wasn't in the car, and was not inside the establishment at which she parked. California code has this to say: A person to whom a disabled person placard has been issued may permit another person to use the placard only while in the presence or reasonable proximity of the disabled person for the purpose of transporting the disabled person. So as long as the disabled person is within a "reasonable proximity", and the placard is being used to transport them, they do not have to be inside the car to make using the placard legitimate. In this case, the woman was just transporting herself and using the placard anyway, which is illegal.	The statute in question is section 26708 (13)(B): A vehicle equipped with a video event recorder shall have a notice posted in a visible location which states that a passenger's conversation may be recorded. It doesn't require it be visible to all passengers and doesn't make any provision for visually impaired passengers. I am not licenced to practice in California but know of no cases clarifying how "visible" the notice needs to be. I wouldn't suggest trying to hide the notice, though.	UK seat belt law is here. What you were doing is illegal and carries a fine of £500. As to your specific questions: How illegal is this? It is not a criminal offence in any way. What is the possibility of me getting caught? If a police officer notices you will almost certainly be booked. What is the possibility of being noticed? Depends where you are. If I'm caught what fines and / or penalties can I expect? £500 What's the absolute worst that could happen as a consequence of my actions? You could crash and your passengers could die, you would then go to jail for dangerous driving occasioning death. Having 2 people in a seat belt is extremely hazardous - it would be far safer (but still illegal) to have one person in the seat belt and the other one unrestrained. Could it be possible for me to get away with a warning? No Could I get my licence revoked? (:/) Seat belts offences do not carry a points penalty so, of itself, it would not lead to loss of your licence.	Let me give you a simple, even if rather silly example: You take me to a civil court. You tell the judge "gnasher regularly parks his blue car in front of my home, and the color blue violates my sense of beauty. Judge, make him stop it. " A question of fact would be: Is my car actually blue? Not green, or red? And do I actually park my car in front of your home, and do so regularly? A question of law would be: Am I allowed by law to park my car in front of your home, even when my car has a color that you don't like? If this goes to a civil court, the judge would look at it and probably say: "Even if all the facts that 'Gimme the 401' claimed are true, as a matter of law there would be no case for gnasher to answer, since these actions would be permitted by law". If the judge decided that it is illegal to park cars in offensive colours in front of someone else's home as a matter of law, the court would then have to decide the facts: Whether what you claimed is actually the truth. (And while this example is silly, there have been people claiming that the neighbour's use of WiFi interfered with their health. And by law it is illegal to interfere with someone's health, so the facts would have to be examined).	Generally, if someone asks you to leave their property you have to leave. Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public. It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category. As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. The Social Service Administrator is almost certainly an agent of the controlling entity that owns the property. Thus their demand that you leave the premises is enforceable, unless you have a non-revokable right to be in that space. As user Justaguy points out there are some exceptions. Most notably, police can some times enter a property uninvited or against the owner's wishes (such as under emergency circumstances or with a warrant).	Theft is of course illegal in all US states, and pretty much every other jurisdiction. In the US that is a matter of state law, not federal. It could be reported to the local police, but it might be hard to prove. Both landlord/tenant law and privacy law are largely matters of state law in the US, not federal law. Such laws vary a good deal in different states. In many states a landlord is allowed to enter the rented premises, usually on "reasonable" notice, or without notice if there is an emergency. If the landlord actually lives in another part of the house, and simply rents a room to the tenant, the landlord may be able to enter the room more freely than if it was a separate apartment or house. In many cases where there is a written lease or rental agreement, it will specify under what conditions the landlord or landlord's agent may enter, and how much notice is required. What does the lease in the current case say about that?	You are not reading a law book here and you should not interpret a driving test so literally. It's quite clear that the question implies you should follow all of their instructions regarding how to proceed through traffic. Sometimes those instructions do involve "breaking laws" such as driving on the wrong side of the road or proceeding through a traffic signal that was not turned off. The B option clearly does not mean they have the power to disobey all laws in existence, only those concerning traffic as evidenced by the examples given. You are not Sheldon Cooper and you should know how to interpret a vague question correctly. You are also not a gopher, and you can correctly deduce that crashing into another car or driving off the cliff into the water is not in your best interests, and that calling the police to report someone abusing their position is probably a good idea. If you're concerned by the wording, try contacting the California DMV to have them clarify the wording.	You are not obliged to say anything to a police officer during a traffic stop, in fact you are generally better off staying silent. This is your Fifth Amendment right to silence. The only exception to this is that the officer could ask for your name and you are obliged to give it under Arizona Laws 13-2412, but the answer to that is language-independent and is usually already answered with your driver's license in a traffic stop. If you did choose to communicate only in German, this may have the effect of frustrating the officer's investigation but if you only make truthful statements in German it is unlikely to be obstruction of their investigation. Arizona Laws 13-2409 is I believe the relevant section (emphasis mine): A person who knowingly attempts by means of bribery, misrepresentation, intimidation or force or threats of force to obstruct, delay or prevent the communication of information or testimony relating to a violation of any criminal statute to a peace officer, magistrate, prosecutor or grand jury or who knowingly injures another in his person or property on account of the giving by the latter or by any other person of any such information or testimony to a peace officer, magistrate, prosecutor or grand jury is guilty of a class 5 felony, except that it is a class 3 felony if the person commits the offense with the intent to promote, further or assist a criminal street gang. In general, a law that required you to give answers to a police officer during an investigation in English if you understand English and have waived your right to silence would violate your First Amendment right to free speech (as it is in effect "forced speech"). However, you would need to be careful not to tell the police officer that you do not understand English if that is not true, as it could be misrepresentation. Police officer training likely includes instructions for detaining someone that cannot understand them and the police can detain you and wait for an interpreter to continue their investigation if they determine that is necessary. You may actually be shooting yourself in the foot by doing this, because the time it takes for them to get an interpreter likely extends the amount of time the detainment can last while remaining "reasonable," so you may be waiting by the side of the road longer than you would have if you had simply told the officer that you were invoking your right to silence and followed the officer's instructions without speaking. As an aside, as more people are educated on their rights via the Internet and understand why they should always invoke their right to silence when detained, police officers will get more used to people they pull over immediately and politely telling them that they are going to invoke their right to silence. I doubt most police officers will hold it against you as long as you are otherwise cooperative and don't yell at them or berate them.
Driver's liability for friend passenger's losses in an accident Alice and Bob are friends. One day they decide to go on a road trip in Bob's car. It has started freezing and the road may be icy. Bob drives below the speed limit and applies some extra care that he thinks is adequate, but his experience in driving on icy roads is by no means broad/extensive. In particular, he does not know that bridges freeze first, and signs saying that are missing — they are just not common there. The car enters a bridge, loses control and rolls over. Because the two wear seat belts, the car is rigid and they are very lucky they manage to escape the car — shaken but with only minor or no injures. However, Alice's jacket is damaged. Also she is concerned that she might have been injured, so she visits a doctor for checkup. The doctor finds nothing requiring medical care. The police investigates the incident and issues Written Traffic Warning to Bob, alleging him of Careless Driving. No charges are laid. Alice attempts to claim the costs of the doctor checkup and the jacket. Will she succeed? Jurisdiction: New Zealand, but also interested in any others.	Barring any specific statute the relevant law is the tort of negligence. To succeed Alice must prove Bob: had a duty to Alice, breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of the harm to Alice, and Alice was, in fact, harmed or damaged. She will probably succeed on 1, 3 and 4 where she will struggle is with 2. It seems that Bob did everything a reasonable person could do to avoid the accident. The only possible hope is that not knowing that bridges freeze first might be something a qualified NZ driver should know and that he breached his duty by not knowing if that is something the judge considers reasonable. The traffic warning is irrelevant and untested (and untestable) hearsay and should be excluded from evidence.	"No fault" is a term of art in this case. In a "no fault" insurance regime, such as the one in place in Utah, minor car accidents are covered by the insurance company of the person who suffers the damage, and not by the person who is at fault in the accident. Utah's "No-Fault" Insurance System Utah is a "no-fault" car insurance state. This means that when a car accident occurs, the people injured in the crash turn to their own insurance coverage first (and sometimes exclusively), filing what is known as a "first-party" claim. This insurance is required to pay at least $3,000 in Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits, regardless of who was at fault for the accident. For minor accidents, that may be the extent of the process -- an injured person receiving a settlement from their own car insurance carrier. Because Utah is a no-fault state, its laws limit the situations in which people injured in car accidents can step outside the no-fault rules and file a liability claim or lawsuit seeking compensation from others who may have caused the accident. Before filing a lawsuit after a car accident in Utah, an injured person must first have incurred $3,000 in medical expenses stemming from the accident, or must have suffered certain kinds of serious injuries as a result of the accident. In Utah, the kinds of injuries that qualify under this "injury threshold" are: - permament disability - permanent impairment - permanent disfigurement, or - dismemberment Without knowing more details about the damages suffered and the terms of the respective policies, it is hard to determine if your claim is or is not beyond the threshold where private lawsuits are allowed. It could be that property damage is not covered by "no fault" at all, or that it could be covered by "no fault" but that you have waived that coverage. If this is a case where private lawsuits are allowed, someone who is injured would hire a private personal injury lawyer, unaffiliated with their insurance company, to sue the person at fault in the accident to recover the damages not covered by your no fault coverage due to the other driver's fault. This would not be the responsibility of your insurance company, unless you have uninsured motorist coverage and the other driver was uninsured, which does not seem to be the case. In non-no fault states and in cases in a no fault state where a lawsuit is allowed, your insurance company (after paying any PIP benefits) would not be involved and cannot help you sue the other driver. If you sue the other driver, the other driver's insurance company will hire a lawyer to defend him and would have authority to settle the case up to the policy limits of the other driver's insurance policy. The insurance company has a duty to affirmatively help you obtain the rights you are entitled to under your policy and if they fail to do so this is called a "bad faith breach of insurance contract". But, they are not obligated to help you with respect to harm not covered by your policy.	I can't speak directly to South African law. I am an American (but not a lawyer). Much of the relevant American law is derived from English common law, and I will assume for the purposes of this answer that this is true for South African law as well. In this example, you lent a car to a friend, and from the sound of it, primarily for the friend's benefit. (If it had been an "exchange of favors," and s/he let you use a beach house in return, a different "standard of care" would apply.) Because of this fact, your friend owes you a high standard of care for your car. Even "ordinary" wear and tear would be too much. Basically, your friend was responsible for the car's "upkeep," and was supposed to return it to you in as nearly the "original" condition as possible. Not having done so, s/he could be liable to you for getting you a "new" car of the same make, or at least a car that was no older, and had no more miles that yours had, when you lent it.	You certainly can't legally steal anything, ever. If it is legal, it is not stealing. In particular, if it is your property, it isn't stealing. The question is really, "is it your property"? This will be jurisdiction dependant. I am familiar with England and Wales, and other common law jurisdictions may be similar. The fact you co-signed for the car definitely does not make it your property. It just means that out of the goodness of your heart, you agreed to reduce the finance company's risk by promising to pay if your ex-friend didn't. In E&W, I don't think it is possible to register a car jointly, but there is a long page explaining that the registered keeper is not necessarily the owner of the car. My guess is that the car probably does not belong to you, so if you take it you will probably end up with a conviction for theft.	Can an employer be required to provide an escort from office to vehicle? No, at least, not on the theory articulated in the question. I can imagine some circumstances where it is conceivable that there might be a duty arising from some other source, like an OSHA regulation applied to a firing range business, or an express contract with the employee (some employers provide an escort as a matter of right in the evenings or at other high risk times, as an employee benefit, especially college and university employers, in part, because they have worker's compensation liability while an employee is still on a large campus, in part because it helps attract employees who may feel vulnerable, and in part because of an attitude that the employer wants its employees to be safe at dangerous times of day and this shows that the employer cares about them), or a court injunction related to a labor-management dispute where the employee is a scab. There is no such employer duty, but an employer does have strict liability in almost every case (there are some minor exceptions for very small employers and criminal conduct by an employee who is injured when the criminal conduct is clearly outside the scope of duty of the employee) for injuries and death in the course of employment from any cause whatsoever pretty much (including criminal actions of third-parties) which is generally fully insured by worker's compensation insurance. The exact details of when someone ceases to be at work for worker's compensation/employer liability is buried in case law and regulations (for overtime and minimum wage purposes, the standard is "portal to portal" but workers compensation/employer liability need not be identical, although once you are clearly no longer on the employer's premises and commuting after a day's work is done or before a day's work starts, you are clearly not covered). But, any place where there is employer liability at all, it would be worker's compensation covered. Usually, if the employer is required to have worker's compensation but doesn't, the employer likewise has strict liability for the same harms, but the damages that may be awarded are not limited to those that worker's compensation policies would cover. This leaves the employee with at risk travel between the office and the vehicle. It seems reasonable as well that as the employer prohibits the employees self defence, they would be responsible for the employees defence between office and some safe location (i.e. vehicle). This theory pretty much always loses. An employee walking in an ordinary, non-wartime environment without a firearm is not "at risk" in a meaningful sense, any more than someone who didn't choose to carry a firearm who goes about their daily life (or is prohibited from carrying one due to past conduct such as a felony or a domestic violence protection order or a domestic violence misdemeanor or a condition of parole, probation or bond pending criminal charges). Also, the employee is not being prohibited from engaging in any kind of self-defense or protective action whatsoever (or from asserting self-defense rights if a firearm is carried contrary to an employer rule) just from carrying a firearm at that particular moment (on pain of losing a job, not forfeiting a legal affirmative defense under criminal statutes), which is one of many means by which a person can protect themselves from crimes.	depending on the Jurisdiction, you actually were in violation of law! In germany it is a misdemeanor to drive with the high beams on in such a fashion that it blinds or dazzles other road traffic, such as traffic from the front. It is also a traffic violation to drive with front lights that don't properly illuminate the street - such as a broken one. In the worst case, improper illumination voids the validity of the safety certificate (TÜV) and thus you may not drive the car at all on public streets until you have repaired the defect. Not having a valid TÜV can mean you are also not insured! In the US: YES, a stop is most likely legal In the united-states, Terry v Ohio is the governing case. It prescribes that, to initiate contact with a car and detain it on the street curb, reasonable suspicion is enough. What could be reasonable suspicion for the police? In the case presented, 'The high beams are on constantly to hide non-functioning/sufficient normal light' would be the very first thing that comes to my mind, so there very likely is reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop. Ot of course 'The high beams are suitable to dazzle me for a split second, and thus the driver endangered traffic'. Endangering traffic can actually be a felony in some cases. Or just 'They shone their brights into my eyes and violated the High Beam statute' - which is actually the most likely case. As a result, while a broken headlight is not reasonable suspicion to search a car, them and high beams might qualify to make a stop reasonable, especially if at first just a verbal warning not to dazzle oncoming drivers was intended by police. Only if the local law is worded in a peculiarity, that might invalidate a stop. And you might be in violation of law here too! california High Beams can be a traffic violation within 500 feet of oncoming traffic and 300 when trailing another car, if they are not so aimed that the glaring rays are not projected into the eyes of the oncoming driver. florida Under Florida Law, it is also a noncriminal traffic infraction to drive with the high lights on in such a way that it blinds traffic within 500 feet of them oncoming and 300 if you are behind them. Again, the test is that the beams are only ok if they are so aimed that the glaring rays are not projected into the eyes of the oncoming driver. new-jersey Here comes a possible source for your quote: New Jersey has a similar high beams law, but also a recent case. The judgment from the New Jersey Surpreme Court is only valid in New Jersey. According to it a high beam violation has to be witnessed by the officer themselves to justify a "terry stop". If you dazzle a moving police cruiser they may stop you. If you dazzle the moving car in front of them, they may stop you. But if you beam your high beams at a stopped car or no car at all, then the police can't stop you. HELD:The trial court and Appellate Division properly concluded that the motor-vehicle stop violated the Federal and State Constitutions. The language of the high-beam statute, N.J.S.A.39:3-60, is unambiguous; drivers are required to dim their high beams only when approaching an oncoming vehicle. Neither a car parked on a perpendicular street nor an on-foot police officer count as an oncoming vehicle. The judgment of the Appellate Division upholding the trial court s suppression of the evidence is affirmed. Had the officer, in that case, operated the car while being on the same road, the stop would have been constitutional. But he was on foot in a crossing street. texas Wait, actually the quote stems from Texas. However, it has nothing to do with high beams but additional lights such as "Angel Eyes". Texas too has a High Beam Statute, which just like other states, bans blinding oncoming traffic: (c) A person who operates a vehicle on a roadway or shoulder shall select a distribution of light or composite beam that is aimed and emits light sufficient to reveal a person or vehicle at a safe distance ahead of the vehicle, except that: (1) an operator approaching an oncoming vehicle within 500 feet shall select: (B) a distribution aimed so that no part of the high-intensity portion of the lamp projects into the eyes of an approaching vehicle operator; and Even in Texas, blinding the police cruiser would thus be enough to stop the car, at least for a verbal warning and lecture. Common courtesy While it might not be against the law to dazzle someone everywhere, it actually does impact the other drivers: there have been crashes induced by traffic running high beams and blinding oncoming traffic, which then ran off the road or into other cars. In some countries, if they catch you for causing a crash that way, you are in for negligence. As a result, it actually is common courtesy in Europe to dim off your high beams when you notice oncoming traffic, and, if you don't run high beams yourself but notice high beams oncoming to flash them up for a brief moment so you get noticed.	As an academic matter, the US system has struggled with this, and law professors spend their lives debating it. As a realistic matter, I'd bet that company in your example gets nailed. On the theory, the issue here is but-for cause. Civil liability requires that the jury find it more likely than not, or over 50% likely, that but-for D's actions, P's injuries would not have occurred. Your hypo puts it at exactly 50, and tie goes to the defendant, so in this case even the theory is clear. But, say you change it a little bit to make it more like 65 or 70%. Now, you're getting into the territory of the classic blue bus case. A man is hit by a blue bus. Two companies in town own blue busses, and one company owns 90% of them. Can he recover against that company with no other evidence? The black letter answer is no, that naked statistical evidence doesn't cut it. The rationale is that if it were the other way, anytime someone got hit by a blue bus, that company would automatically have to pay out unless they had some evidence to disprove their liability. The burden of proof has been shifted, violating a fundamental tenet of our legal system. But, this doctrine obviously poses an issue for plaintiffs like yours. It's one thing to say that someone hit by a bus needs to have more evidence. Theoretically, they could go out and get it: they could find the bus routes and schedules, examine where they were, and show that X company had a bus going by there at that time. They can also canvas for witnesses. It's much harder when, as your excellent hypo touches on, the science is so complicated. One controversial solution that has been debated a lot recently is market-share liability, but that doesn't seem pertinent here because you have mentioned another company. On the legal realist side. As far as I can tell the system usually finds a way to hold the company responsible. One example is the tobacco litigation. My understanding is the science couldn't definitively prove that smoking caused cancer, but it could prove that it raised the risk significantly. Here's some information on that https://www.tortmuseum.org/the-tobacco-cases/ from the American Museum of Tort Law, which, yes, is a real thing.	If I were a federal prosecutor (which I'm emphatically not), I might try to charge you under 18 USC § 32 (a) (5): a) Whoever willfully— [...] (5) interferes with or disables, with intent to endanger the safety of any person or with a reckless disregard for the safety of human life, anyone engaged in the authorized operation of such aircraft or any air navigation facility aiding in the navigation of any such aircraft; [...] shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years or both. Since you clearly know, or believe, that this has the potential to interfere with piloting, which would obviously be a serious danger to people on board the aircraft, I'd argue you would be acting with "reckless disregard for the safety of human life." If your conduct results in anybody's death, then life imprisonment and/or the death penalty are also on the table, under 18 USC § 34.
Self defense during execution Let's say someone has been sentenced to death and is about to be killed by lethal injection. While they are being brought into the execution room, they manage to escape the grip of the prison guards and try to escape. A short fight ensues during which a guard gets killed before the prisoner gets tazed and secured to the floor. Was that killing legal? Is violence only considered self defense if it was used to protect oneself from illegal harm and not if that harm was mandated by justice? Do you have to accept death if you are sentenced to death or can you defend your life? What if it later turns out, that you were wrongfully convicted or the execution would have been illegal due to some technicality: Can the killing of the prison guard be considered self defense now?	I assume this took place in Washington state. There are a number of self-defense provisions in Washington law. The first, RCW 9A.16.110, is primarily about reimbursements for prosecutions of acts of self-defense, but includes an applicable limit on prosecution: No person in the state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting by any reasonable means necessary, himself or herself, his or her family, or his or her real or personal property, or for coming to the aid of another who is in imminent danger of or the victim of assault, robbery, kidnapping, arson, burglary, rape, murder, or any other violent crime as defined in RCW 9.94A.030. This provision is relevant, since executing a prisoner on death row is not a crime (the state Supreme Court recently struck down the death penalty, so I assume this took place before that ruling). RCW 9A.16.020 states the more classic law on justified use of force, saying The use, attempt, or offer to use force upon or toward the person of another is not unlawful in the following cases:...(3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary; Statutory law does not define offense against his or her person. Grabbing a person and strapping them down for some harmful purpose would normally constitute battery under the common law, but in this instance it is privileged, so it is not an offense against the person). RCW 9A.16.030 says that Homicide is excusable when committed by accident or misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means, without criminal negligence, or without any unlawful intent. The person is under court order to be executed, and it is not lawful to resist that order. The guard, however, RCW 9A.16.040, may use deadly force pursuant to the legal mandate to carry out the court orde ((1)(b)"to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty").	In the US, only a few states allow conjugal visits by prisoners: California, Connecticut, New York and Washington. Details of implementation for Washington are here (it is called "Extended Family Visiting"). There are various limitations, for example you can't have committed homocide within the last 5 years, you can't be on death row, and so on. Although they don't explicitly say you can have sex, you can, and they have (a small sample of) contraceptive and STD-preventing technology for prisoners to avail themselves of. If you fail to take advantage of contraceptives, then yes it is possible. There is no provision pertaining specifically to mass murder.	Edits added below to outline Florida's laws based on OP's comment Jurisdiction does matter but here is a general answer regarding "stand your ground" laws. States that have so-called "stand your ground laws" each have their own language concerning the law. "Stand your ground laws" are often misunderstood but, generally, just mean that a person has no duty to retreat when using deadly physical force for purposes of self-defense or the defense of others. Your examples are more akin to "castle doctrine" laws which I touch on below. Note that all of these laws vary by jurisdiction. I've provided partial examples from Arizona, New York and California. Using deadly physical force for purposes of self-defense or defense of others is complex law and even a complete example from any particular jurisdiction will not be able to cover all circumstances. Each case will be determined by a judge or jury based on the facts of that particular case. Arizona's "stand your ground" statute, as an example, states: B. A person has no duty to retreat before threatening or using deadly physical force pursuant to this section if the person is in a place where the person may legally be and is not engaged in an unlawful act. "Stand your ground" simply means that a person doesn't have to first attempt to retreat before resorting to the use of deadly force. Arizona's statute regarding justification for self-defense states (emphasis mine): A. Except as provided in subsection B of this section, a person is justified in threatening or using physical force against another when and to the extent a reasonable person would believe that physical force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful physical force. B. The threat or use of physical force against another is not justified: In response to verbal provocation alone; or To resist an arrest that the person knows or should know is being made by a peace officer or by a person acting in a peace officer's presence and at his direction, whether the arrest is lawful or unlawful, unless the physical force used by the peace officer exceeds that allowed by law; or If the person provoked the other's use or attempted use of unlawful physical force, unless: (a) The person withdraws from the encounter or clearly communicates to the other his intent to do so reasonably believing he cannot safely withdraw from the encounter; and (b) The other nevertheless continues or attempts to use unlawful physical force against the person. Note the phrase, "extent a reasonable person." This means that the actions of a person using deadly force will be measured against what a "reasonable person" would do in similar circumstances. Some states have a duty to retreat, particularly when in a public place, before using deadly force. New York, as an example, has a "duty to retreat" before using deadly force except in specific circumstances (emphasis mine): A person may not use deadly physical force upon another person under circumstances specified in subdivision one unless: (a) The actor reasonably believes that such other person is using or about to use deadly physical force. Even in such case, however, the actor may not use deadly physical force if he or she knows that with complete personal safety, to oneself and others he or she may avoid the necessity of so doing by retreating; except that the actor is under no duty to retreat if he or she is: (i) in his or her dwelling and not the initial aggressor; or (ii) a police officer or peace officer or a person assisting a police officer or a peace officer at the latter`s direction, acting pursuant to section 35.30; or (b) He or she reasonably believes that such other person is committing or attempting to commit a kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible criminal sexual act or robbery; or (c) He or she reasonably believes that such other person is committing or attempting to commit a burglary, and the circumstances are such that the use of deadly physical force is authorized by subdivision three of section 35.20. Castle Doctrine Laws typically refer to what one may do in their own home when it comes to the use of deadly force. Some states have extended the "castle doctrine" to include personal automobiles as well. California's "castle doctrine" statute, as an example, states that if one is in their own home and someone "unlawfully and forcibly" enters the home one can presume that the person in his or her residence "held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily injury": Any person using force intended or likely to cause death or great bodily injury within his or her residence shall be presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily injury to self, family, or a member of the household when that force is used against another person, not a member of the family or household, who unlawfully and forcibly enters or has unlawfully and forcibly entered the residence and the person using the force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred. As used in this section, great bodily injury means a significant or substantial physical injury. In California's statute both the resident and the person using force to gain entry have to know or have reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred. If a person simply entered an unlocked home then the resident would have to have some other reasonable reason to believe that they were in imminent peril of death or great bodily injury. Wikipedia has a reasonable entry on the adoption of "stand your ground" and "castle doctrine" statutes and gives a state-by-state breakdown of both. Note that these laws have seen a lot of change recently and any particular entry for a state may not be accurate. Florida's self-defense laws Florida's "Use or threatened use of force in defense of person" states: 776.012 Use or threatened use of force in defense of person.— (1) A person is justified in using or threatening to use force, except deadly force, against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other’s imminent use of unlawful force. A person who uses or threatens to use force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat before using or threatening to use such force. (2) A person is justified in using or threatening to use deadly force if he or she reasonably believes that using or threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony. A person who uses or threatens to use deadly force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground if the person using or threatening to use the deadly force is not engaged in a criminal activity and is in a place where he or she has a right to be. Florida outlines the cases where use, or threatened use, of force is justified. Notice that in the law Florida specifically states that the person threatened does not have a duty to retreat. Florida also specifically states that a person has a "right to stand his or her ground" if the person is in a place where he or she has a right to be and is not engaged in criminal activity. Florida statute also specifically outlines the right to use self-defense within one's home and vehicle. Florida has a "castle doctrine" similar to what was outlined above and similar in nature to New York's and California's laws: The person against whom the defensive force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle, or if that person had removed or was attempting to remove another against that person’s will from the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle; Florida has a longer list of exemptions related to who may have used force to enter a home including ownership interest in the property or vehicle, children and grandchildren, the person who engaged defensive force was involved in criminal activity and law enforcement officers. Florida's Justifiable Use Of Force is chapter 776 discusses when force can be used. There was an attempt by the Florida legislature in 2019 to change the standard by which use of force could be justified from "reasonably believes" force is necessary to "a reasonably cautious and prudent person in the same circumstances would objectively believe" force was necessary. The bill was withdrawn in May, 2019.	There are numerous what-ifs. Society’s moral values and thus laws may change. Or the unlikely death of your wife makes this question moot. (Let’s hope not.) Yes, failure to render assistance is punishable under § 323c Ⅰ StGB. Everyone can commit this crime (Allgemeindelikt). However, this section concerns accidents, contingencies or other unplanned adverse events. In your specific case there is no element of “surprise” though, quite the contrary. Your wife does not even need to be aware of the circumstances; the assessment “is there an accident” is made objectively. Having said that, unfortunately there’s a difference of opinion how courts judge (case law) and how “legal scientists” (at law school) think. Ultimately it depends on what evidence investigators find. Frankly, § 323c Ⅰ StGB is a “minor issue” here. You can get at most “just” a one-year-sentence. And there’s the option to consider one’s own spouse’s death as poena naturalis, thus refrain from imposing any penalty because the grieving widow “won’t learn anything” from that, § 60 1 StGB←§ 153b StPO. I’d worry more about §§ 211 ff. (murder, manslaughter, etc.): To kill someone means, a) any short‑term shortening of lifetime through action, or b) in the case of § 13 StGB, any failure to potentially prolong the lifetime. § 13 StGB, Garantenstellung, also applies to spouses, cf. § 1353 Ⅰ 2 BGB. It could be argued that failure to take, say, a loaded firearm away from you constitutes manslaughter. Or, worse, maybe you’re particularly wealthy and she’ll inherit your assets. This could be construed as greed, an aggravating circumstance. At any rate it’s necessary that the omitted action makes a difference, i. e. prevents or at least inhibits the crime’s success (your death). At some point, with terminally-ill patients, you might say “he’ll die tomorrow anyway”. Then your wife could attend your suicide. Finally, for a legally airtight plan I’d seriously consider to change the jurisdiction though, e. g. by going to Switzerland. Everything happening here is subject to German criminal law, § 3 StGB. PS: Marriage can be viewed as a kind of contract. In principle you are completely free in formulating its terms. However, you cannot make provisions concerning termination of life (nichtdisponibles Rechtsgut).	There are problems with the claims. In summary: someone that in Sweden acts to defend themselves while "in peril" when subjected to — or are in imminent risk of — a criminal attack, will not the convicted, unless the act is "blatantly unjustifiable". Context We have a problem here in Sweden with people being ill-informed about the right to self-defence, and this is compounded by people with opinions spreading myths about it. Often these myths err on the side of claiming you have less rights than you really have. So, two things before we go on... The characters may have been unreliable. Do not ever assume that just because a character says something in a work of fiction, that the character is meant to know what they are talking about. And even if they are meant to know what they are talking about... The author may have been unreliable, and done their homework poorly. Keep this in mind... That said, the right to self-defence is not infinite. The law According to the Swedish Criminal Code (Brottsbalk, 1962:700), Chapter 3, §§ 1-2 and 6... If you intentionally kill someone, you get convicted of "murder" If you intentionally kill someone, but there were mitigating circumstances, you get convicted of "manslaughter" If you act in reckless disregard for the risk your actions are causing, and this leads to the death of someone, you get convicted of "causing the death of another", or what we here can call "reckless killing" And Swedish Criminal Code (Brottsbalk, 1962:700), Chapter 24, § 1 states that an act performed in "peril" shall only lead to a conviction if the act was "blatantly unjustifiable". "Peril" is enumerated to exist in cases of... A commenced or imminent criminal attack on person or property A person has gained or trying to gain unauthorized access to a room, house, yard or ship A person refuses to leave a domicile after being told to If — when caught red-handed — a person uses violence or threats of violence to resist stolen property from being retaken When judging whether an act is "blatantly unjustifiable", the prosecutor must look at... the nature of the attack that caused the peril the significance of that which the attack was aimed at (such as a human life) other significant circumstances That last bit is interesting because it takes human psychology into consideration, and let the defendant's assessment of the peril be the standard by which the act is judged. The claim Let us start with the easy bit first... "if she killed the intruder, under Swedish law, she could very well be charged with manslaughter, and possibly murder if it could be proved that she placed the golf clubs around the house ahead of time." Murder? No. According to the Swedish Criminal Code (Brottsbalk, 1962:700), Chapter 3, §§ 1-2, a person that kills an intruder in their home could at the most be charged with manslaughter, because there are mitigating circumstances, i.e. the person felt threatened and there was a home invasion in progress. In order for this to become murder, she would more or less have to have invited the assailant or in any other way drawn them in with the intent to kill them. Yes, she prepared to defend herself or a potential intrusion, but without knowing for certain that the assailant would come at certain time or at least a certain day, any kind of premeditation towards killing is more or less impossible to prove. With this, murder is off the table. That claim is simply wrong. Whether it is the author or the character that is erring, I cannot say. So, manslaughter then, or the even lesser degree, called "causing the death of another", or reckless killing. Manslaughter would come up of she — when whacking them with the club — did so with the intent of killing them. The operative word here being intent. The prosecutor has to prove that intent. Sure, we can dream up scenarios where this is the case; the classic reason for why people do get convicted even acting in peril is when they keep harming the assailant after the danger has passed. But — again — just preparing for a potential intrusion is not enough to prove that intent. Finally, reckless killing. This is where such cases usually ends up. And — again — this usually happens because the defendant did something when the danger has obviously passed; the criminal attack was no longer imminent but passed. Conclusion Unless the protagonist in question had set up lethal traps; unless they had foreknowledge of an attack; unless they invited the assailant in with the intent to kill them; unless they fend off the attack and gets themselves into a perfectly safe situation and then proceeds to beat the assailant to death; and unless all of this can be proved, then it cannot become murder. Manslaughter or reckless killing, yes, there will be an investigation for that, but from the description of the situation — the protagonist fearing the assailant is dangerous and means them harm — preparing a home defence with strategically placed golf clubs does not in any way preclude the prosecution being dismissed as justifiable self-defence. Only(!) if the home invasion was obviously harmless, and/or the protagonist keeps harming the assailant after the home invasion has been staved off / neutralised, can a conviction for manslaughter or reckless killing become a possibility. Summary Yes, in Sweden a prosecutor will look at the case when you kill someone. But — no — in the situation described, a home invasion by someone perceived as wanting to cause harm, this is very unlikely to become "murder", for lack of premeditation. The remaining possible charges — manslaughter or reckless killing — will only result in a conviction if the situation was obviously and provably harmless in the eyes of the defendant, and they still killed the assailant.	Killing people is not illegal Killing people in certain circumstances (e.g. murder, manslaughter, negligent driving occasioning death) is illegal but killing people when you have a lawful reason to do so isn't. Military drone pilots acting under legitimate military authority and complying with the rules of engagement for the particular armed conflict are legally allowed to kill people. Whether they should be allowed to do so is a political and philosophical question, not a legal one. Of course, a drone pilot acting without legal authority to murder someone can be charged with murder.	Amber Guyger was convicted of murder under Texas Penal Code section 19.02: A person commits the offense of murder if the person 1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual or 2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits and act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual. The Texas mistake-of-fact defense is codified at Penal Code section 8.02: It is a defense to prosecution that the actor through mistake formed a reasonable belief about a matter of fact if his mistaken belief negated the kind of culpability required for commission of the offense. To assert a mistake of fact defense, then, you need to demonstrate that you reasonably believed something that changes whether or not you met the mens rea requirement of intentionally or knowingly causing a death/serious bodily injury. An example would be firing a gun at what you reasonably thought was a corpse, or a mannequin, or Superman. In any of those circumstances, you would not have intended or known that you were going to cause someone's death. If you reasonably believed your gun was unloaded, you would not have known you were going to kill someone if you pulled the trigger. In Guyger's case, Whether she was in her apartment or someone else's, she still knew that putting two bullets in a man eating ice cream would cause his death or serious bodily harm. In the Guyger case, the defendant claimed she was mistaken about what apartment she was in, but that doesn't change whether she had the intent to kill Mr. Jean. That mistake does implicate the Texas "Castle doctrine" statute, Penal Code section 9.32: A person is justified in using deadly force against another ... when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary ... to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force. ... The actor's belief ... that the deadly force was immediately necessary ... is presumed to be reasonable if the actor ... knew or had reason to believe that the person against whom the deadly force was used ... unlawfully and with force entered ... the actor's occupied habitation If her mistake was reasonable, that would give her reason to believe Mr. Jean had unlawfully and with force entered her home, making it presumptively reasonable that she used deadly force. But the mistake of fact defense only looks at mistakes that change whether you committed the offense, not whether an affirmative defense is available to you, so it doesn't really change whether the defense is available. Nonetheless, it's generally accepted that a person can use self-defense doctrines like this even when they're mistaken about whether they're in danger. The question for the jury in those cases is whether the defendant's mistake was reasonable. Because the jury convicted her, it necessarily did not believe that she had made a reasonable mistake.	The general rule is that using force in self-defense is justified if the person using the force reasonably believes it immediately is necessary to prevent the unlawful use of force against themselves or a third party. Deadly force is not generally justified except in response to a reasonable fear of deadly force, or to prevent certain violent crimes (like rape, kidnapping, robbery, etc.) Force is not justified in retaliation. In some states, if you're not at home (or maybe even then), you also have a duty to retreat before you can use deadly force in self-defense. So, for your specific questions: If they hit you once but aren't continuing to hit you, it's illegal to hit them back. You can only use force to defend yourself, not to get even. If someone gets in your face without touching you, you might be allowed to use force, but it depends on the circumstances. You don't have to wait for someone to hit you, but you can't sucker-punch someone because you want more space in a mosh pit. Your use of force needs to be something you reasonably believe to be necessary to stop/prevent their unlawful use of force. It also needs to be proportional to the force you're defending against; you can meet deadly force with deadly force, but shooting someone to stop them from slapping you is murder. Likewise, no one's going to believe that you really thought you had to beat the crap out of someone in order to stop them from slapping you, or that it's in any way proportionate to what they did. Deadly force is not allowed in defense of a person unless you reasonably think deadly force is needed to prevent the unlawful use of deadly force, or to prevent one of a few crimes being committed against them. Depending on the state, it might be presumptively justified if the person is trying to forcibly break into your occupied house, car, or place of business, but that's state-dependent.
Does the "a well regulated militia" part of the 2nd Amendment apply only to militias? I'm currently debating the topic of gun control with a few people I know personally, and someone in the debate brought up the "a well regulated militia" part of the 2nd Amendment, saying that it's equivalent to governmental gun control. I argued that it applies to militias only though. Am I correct in assuming this, or does the "well regulated" part apply to gun ownership in general?	TL;DR: It's controversial, but it looks like it also protects the rights for the individual. A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. While the exact explanation is a matter of opinion, it reads like it's a subject, a reason and a right to the subject. Your question is essentially whether or not the subject is a group, an individual or both. The definition of "Militia" can be multiple things though, due to the age of the 2nd Amendment it changed over time and wasn't very exact to begin with. "the Militia ... civilians primarily, soldiers on occasion." "the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense." "And further, that ordinarily when called for service these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time." In a militia, the character of the laborer, artificer, or tradesman, predominates over that of a soldier." "the militia system ... implied the general obligation of all adult male inhabitants to possess arms." . This site explains it quite well in my opinion. "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." The first two phrases are related to each other. The fact that the third phrase is separated from the verbal phrase by a comma indicates that the verbal phrase has more than the third phrase as its subject. The abbreviated grammatical construction actually renders the meaning of the Second Amendment as: "Neither a well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, nor the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall be infringed." So what does the Supreme Court think about the explanation? Current Supreme Court case law defines the Second Amendment (second part) as protecting from infringement by the federal and state governments, the right of the individual to keep and to bear a weapon which is part of the ordinary military equipment or which use could contribute to the common defense. Three cases are cited: U.S. v. Planned Parenthood v Casey (120 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1992)) U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez (108 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1990)) U.S. v. Miller (83 L. Ed. 1207 (1939)) According to the SAF the Justice Department includes individuals to be protected by the 2nd Amendment. The Justice Department’s enlightened interpretation of the Second Amendment as an individual right was hailed today by the firearms civil rights organization that has supported a key Texas case that led to a federal appeals court ruling upholding the individual rights concept. And: “Today’s constitutional scholars, including Prof. Laurence Tribe, confirm that the Second Amendment is an individual right,” LaCourse continued. “For years, our own Justice Department has been deaf and blind to such scholarship, and the Fifth Circuit ruling forced the government to face the facts. Solicitor General Olson and Attorney General John Ashcroft deserve credit for their courageous reversal of four decades of constitutional denial.” While the above is biased, it does state the opinion of non-trivial parties.	Usually these words refer to whether something (e.g. a law or government action) is or is not in accordance with the Constitution, including its amendments, as currently interpreted by US courts including the Supreme Court. So in view of Chaplinsky, the Constitution (as interpreted) does not protect "fighting words", and therefore a law that forbids "fighting words" is constitutional. As phoog points out in the comments, the word can also be used to refer to whether something is in accordance with the Constitution, as the speaker thinks it ought to be interpreted. So somebody might say that a certain law or action is (un)constitutional, even if a court has not considered it, if their own personal interpretation of the Constitution is (or isn't) consistent with it. Or, if a court has struck it down (or upheld it) but the speaker thinks they erred in doing so.	The US Constitution (broadly) does three things: It defines how the government should operate It places certain powers in the hands of certain individuals (branches of government, federal government vs states, etc.) It restricts the actions and powers of government (originally the federal government, and thought the 14th amendment, the states, and through them, municipal governments). The main thing is that there is a distinction between a governmental organization (which is effectively a portion of the government) and an organization that is funded in whole or in part by the government (The difference being if the government controls the organization or appoints (some of) it's leads, such as the FBI or Federal Reserve). Generally, the latter is not bound by the Constitution; however, it may be bound by laws or grant stipulations. Elaborating on your three questions: Free Speech: Constitutionally, no one but the government is restricted from moderating someone else's speech. There may, however, be legal repercussions, but not constitutional issues. Discrimination on protected characteristics: This is not forbidden by the Constitution, at least not in the way it is is meant colloquially. The Constitution only prohibits discrimination in access to voting, and then only for race, color, sex, and prior servitude. However, such discrimination is illegal, due to laws, such as the Civil Rights Act. A non-governmental organization that receives funds from the government constitutionally is no different than one that does not. Legally, there may be differences.	You could almost define a country as, "an entity that can defend itself against invasions." Non-sovereign entities are indeed generally prohibited from deploying lethal autonomous defense systems like booby-traps. But governments and state-like actors, as a matter of practice, choose their own rules. laws-of-war and international-law are not like "regular" law: When it comes down to it, states only follow international conventions and treaties to the extent that they consider it to be in their own interest to do so. If you start mining your property, you will probably be forced to stop by local law enforcement. If a warlord starts mining his borders, he's going to get away with it until someone with more power convinces or forces him to stop. Was it "illegal" for Turkey to shoot down a Russian military aircraft? One could cite all sorts of laws and conventions to answer that question. But in practice the consequences of that act are limited to whatever Turkey allows, or to what Russia and its allies can impose on Turkey.	The legal definition you are probably looking for is machinegun rather than automatic weapon. It can be found in 26 U.S. Code § 5845, which in relevant part says: The term “machinegun” means any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger. The term shall also include the frame or receiver of any such weapon, any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun, and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the control of a person. Historical notes; TLDR The core of this definition dates back to the 1934 National Firearms Act (NFA) . The legislative history of that act includes testimony of Karl. T. Fredrick in front of the house ways and means committee. Mr. Fredrick, then president of the National Rifle Association (NRA), had devoted years to the study of earlier firearms legislation. He criticized earlier legislative attempts to define machine guns, calling them wholly inadequate. The earlier legislative definition was: "Machine gun", as used in this Act, means any firearm which shoots automatically more than twelve shots without reloading. Mr. Fredrick expressed several concerns with this definition, particularly with regard to the phrase more than twelve shots without reloading. His propoed language was substantially broader: A machine gun or submachine gun, as used in this act, means any firearm by whatever name known, loaded or unloaded, which shoots automatically more than one shot without manually reloading, by a single function of the trigger. Note that neither of the later two quotes is current. Thus the core of the definition used today, was in fact provided by an officer of the National Rifle Association, but that definition has been changed in the process of clarifying and codifying the law.	It could probably be argued that a bullet intentionally shot from a gun is abandoned property, and thus the shooter has no claim to its return. In addition, such a bullet might be evidence of a crime, to be seized by law enforcement, although that would not affect its ultimate ownership, at least not in the US. Intent matters in such cases. A person who shoots a gun probably does not reasonably expect to retain possession and control of the bullet, whatever may have been shot at. Well, someone shooting at a properly controlled target for practice on his or her own property probably retains ownership of the bullet.	Yes The US constitution is in the public domain. Anyone may publish a version of it, including an altered version. No US law forbidding publication of an altered version would itself be constitutional -- the First Amendment would prevent such a law. However, if an altered version were sold under such conditions that a customer might reasonably believe it to be an unaltered version, that might be false advertising, or perhaps fraud, because the seller would be deceiving the customer as to what the product is.	Here is a list of language-regulating bodies. There is none for English, but they exist for Spanish (Real Academia Española), French (Académie française) and Swahil (Baraza la Kiswahili la Taifa for Tanzania, Chama cha Kiswahili cha Taifa for Kenya). No language regulator addresses the issues which arise in the interaction between natural language and the needs of legal interpretation. Instead, these bodies generally strive to maintain the historical "purity" of the language. Rather than "define" a word like "sandwich", they decide whether to outlaw (or disparage) the word because it comes from English. The vast majority of language-related problems in law which arise in common-law countries pertains to characteristics of common law and the practice of establishing precedent. There are philosophical conflicts, for example between those to adhere to the text versus those who try to discern original intent. If we had an official agency that precisely defined what a "weapon" is, we would still have the struggle over interpretive philosophies which renders moot any rulings from the national language regulator. In the US, part of the problem of word-definition is the widespread practice of localized redefinition in statutes – the laws that say "In this subsection, 'weapon' has the meaning defined in 18 U.S. Code §920" (fictitious: §921 defines "firearm" undefined "weapon"). Tracking the scope of definition and range of variation of a word within a body of codified law is very difficult. The rule in common law is that words that are not statutorily defined are given their "ordinary" meaning. There is no authoritative resource for "ordinary meaning" in English (there is no such thing as "the" dictionary). In the US, it would require a constitutional amendment to immutably impose a particular dictionary standard for deriving word meaning (e.g. Webster's Fourth New International Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged, forthcoming) and there would be ensuing political protests. A legally precise definition of "repair" would be very difficult to understand, and would require hiring a lawyer in order to engage in the activity of "repairing broken windows", from a legally-safe perspective. And that is just word meaning. Ambiguity in sentence-meaning cannot be resolved by listing the sentences.
How to pressure college covering-up incompetent professor? I received a grade I deem unsatisfactory for the quality of work I completed, due to lateness penalties. The course instructor was partly responsible; he has never responded to several of my assignment inquiries. His non-response added several extra hours to my work, prompting lateness on said assignments - enough to lower the letter grade. Furthermore, the professor has given zero feedback on any of my essay or research project submissions in this course of 'Engineering Ethics', only grades - and has remained 2-3 weeks avg. behind on grading. I filed a complaint along a grade appeal to the Department Chair, describing said concerns, and proposing a resolution in form of raising the letter-grade (from which I am 0.2% away) - after failing to find a resolution with the professor. The chair denied the appeal. I forwarded the matter to the Dean of Students, who referred to the Vice Provost. The response from all of them, in a nutshell, was "Policy was followed." None of them made any response to the complaint - which was detailed, and comprised majority of my letters. This was hardly a surprise. This said, there's zero intent on behalf of the administration to bulge on this matter. The only college official I'm yet to contact is the Provost - who I doubt will respond any different unless I shift gears. That policy was followed in grading is true, but overlooks the fact that my grade suffered directly from the professor's negligence - unsure how to press on this point further (or pursue others). Short of a lawsuit, what approach is advisable to increase the odds of winning the grade raise? Additional info: It's a state university. Professor is a "Faculty Lecturer", untenured. ' - the institution is ridden with incompetence: professors often lack basic understanding of course material, lab manuals are filled with faulty and ill-grammared instructions, outdated website, and a 'sheep'-like student culture that takes any sh*t from professors (hence the lack of accountability). Worth noting, I called out the chair directly in my letter to the Dean, accusing "complicity with academic negligence" - and stated, "unless [college] is willing to risk being exposed as a scam institution, it should focus less on doing cover-ups and instead address the problem."	The first step is to file a formal complaint against the instructor. When your university-internal avenues have been exhausted, you would then need to hire an attorney to sue the university. There is virtually no chance that you will succeed with a lawsuit. If the university had failed to follow its own procedures, or had egregiously violated your rights, you might win such a suit, but the chances of that having happened are virtually zero. The essential problem is that there is no specific contractual right for you to receive an particular outcome in a class (based on my knowledge of rules & regs in various universities). For example, you might reasonably want to have written comments on assignments given within a week: but there is no rule guaranteeing that you will ever get written comments. (You need to look at the university rules to see what is an actual rule, as opposed to a "goal" for an academic unit). Since there is no such rule, the chairman has limited authority to penalize the instructor (he might for example decide to not assign that class to Prof. X in the future). The chair would not have the authority to raise your grade under the circumstances. As far as the courts are concerned, the university's judgment and resolution of the matter are final, unless they simply failed to respect your rights (exhibited racial prejudice, refused to follow their own procedures). In certain contexts, professorial negligence could be legally actionable, but that would only be, for example, if an EE professor physically harmed a student by negligently confusing milliamps and mega-amps. His (non)action is not negligent in the legal sense.	I'd imagine that testimony from the defendant is rare enough that in the majority of cases, prosecutors do not meaningfully prepare for a cross examination. To the extent they do, I'd expect the preparation is similar to that for basically any other witness. So I wouldn't expect complicated flowcharts, because the general rule at trial is that you only ask questions whose answers are both known and helpful. So if I need to place the defendant at the OK Corral at 3 p.m., I'm only going to ask him where he was at 3 p.m. if I have evidence showing that fact is true -- maybe he gave a written statement to the sheriff, maybe he posed for a daguerrotype, whatever. I expect him to deny it, so I don't ask the question unless I have evidence more convincing than his denial. In this way, a defendant -- like any hostile witness -- is used less to provide any facts of their own, but rather as an involuntary narrator of my own story, authenticating evidence and validating the facts consistent with my theory of the case.	You're going to an administrative hearing overseen by an "Impartial Hearing Officer" (IHO). Your goal should be to present your case in as clear, concise, and compelling a manner as possible. If there are guidelines for the hearing then abide by those. Ideally, the IHO will be a real lawyer or judge, in which case they will likely be concerned with giving everyone a chance to advance their position and then efficiently achieving a resolution of the issue that appears most impartial and is least upsetting to everyone involved. Often, however, you will find the IHO is a bureaucrat who enjoys making up and enforcing procedural rules. In which case all you can do is ask, "What are the rules?" and do your best to follow them (or just start working on your appeal now). For example, if the IHO wants to make the hearing "court-like," then you could read your state's Code of Civil Procedure. But if you bring a copy and when the IHO says X point out the CCP says Y, then all you will have accomplished is to irritate the IHO: He'll either grudgingly allow Y, or declare that in his hearing it's X. That will not help you achieve your goal. Re-reading your question: It sounds like you're trying to make up rules for yourself. Remember that you are not a lawyer, and the hearing is not a court of law. If you assert evidence it should be accepted based on what a "reasonable person" would believe. You don't have to establish a forensic chain of custody. So tell your story, and if there's an email that documents it more compellingly – e.g., because you're recounting events from two years ago – then note that you're reading what you wrote two years ago as opposed to stating what you remember now, because that bolsters the credibility of your testimony. If there's evidence in an Email from B, and A knows something about those matters, you should be allowed to ask A about the substance informed by the Email, even if A can't address the writing or sending of that particular message. (But remember: Never ask a hostile party a question if you don't already know what their answer should be!) If you really want to prepare, find someone to play devil's advocate, and present your case to them. That's a good way to find and correct things that hurt or distract from your case.	"Mathematician" is not a legally regulated term, so there are no laws that would prohibit me from calling myself a mathematician (I am not one). I do know a tiny bit about number theory, set theory, formal language theory and logic, but mostly I know about African languages. If I have no shame, I can legally call myself a mathematician. My employing institution has no policy that regulates self-appellation. In fact it is very common for people to self-mislabel in the fashion that you describe. Many people claim to be "linguists" when they are actually "English teachers" or are "translators". However, if I were to claim to have a PhD from the Department of Mathematics at Yale University, that would be a false statement of fact, and potentially internally-actionable by the institution. My actual mathematician colleagues cannot sue me for damages (they have not been objectively harmed), but an institution could sack me for material misrepresentation of credentials (for which reason they might actually demand a copy of said credential). It is possible that a materially false statement of credential could be actionable as fraud, though I can't come up with a plausible scenario at the moment.	There are not enough facts to draw a conclusion First, it’s not clear that the document you signed amounts to a contract. For example, what consideration did the school give you in return for the permission you gave them? Providing you with an education doesn’t count - they were legally obliged to do that already. If it is a contract then whether and how it can be revoked would depend on the terms of that contract witch I’m guessing you don’t have a copy of. Notwithstanding, as a minor, you have the right to void the contract until a reasonable time after you turn 18. Even if it is now many years since that happened, it might be reasonable since you only just discovered the website. If it isn’t a contract, then it would be revocable at any time. Practicalities Make a fuss and they may take the photos down even if they are not obliged to. They presumably have plenty of photos of kids who aren’t you and aren’t complaining and if you make it so it’s easier to change the website than to deal with you, thy’ll change the website. I suspect their inertia is because they once paid a web developer to create the site, it has never since been updated, they don’t know how to do it, and they don’t want to have to pay someone to find out. Otherwise, why would they have photos of ex-students rather than current students? If so, an offer by you to cover the costs, might solve your problem.	Most Likely Yes to both. It really depends on the nature of your agreement, oral agreements are as legally binding as written ones, but as a matter of evidence in court written contracts are of course better. So looking at your agreement: did you agree to pay the full amount, in return for a place to study? Or did you specifically agree to pay on a rolling basis, where you pay for however long you actually study? I would believe that you had agreed to the first type of agreement, since that is what most study contracts are. And if that's the case: You pay to be allowed to attend, whether you actually attend or not isn't important. And even if you pay on a rolling basis, I would think in a lawsuit the court would find that - judging on previous payments - you'd have agreed to pay on a per semester basis, meaning that the incomplete semester would round up and you would still have to pay for it. I would lean yes to the 2nd question (but im not sure so anyone with more info please chime in). This answer can be more useful if you be specific about the terms and conditions of your study	Being disabled has nothing to do with it. If he is harassing students then after there is a complaint and investigation, then he can be banned from campus, and arrested for trespassing if he returns. But there would have to be a formal complaint made to the authorities first.	The matter is not clear-cut (and the university lawyers are presumably relying on that fact). The bold part and following overstates the situation, especially the unconstrained "publishing anything" edict. You can publish whatever you want that the university doesn't have a legal interest in. The clause that says "If you have co-authors or co-researchers you must ask their permission before publishing, and include their names" is true, and defines a limit on their control. If you don't have co-authors, it's none of their legal business. (There can be issues regarding publishing an affiliation, so let's put that on hold). They can, however, prohibit you from claiming an affiliation with Pod U, unless you submit your works to some internal vetting organization. This requirement should, however, be stated somewhere perhaps in the rules of the graduate school (not just the student handbook); or the other legally-enforceable rules. You should also pay attention to the exact words that they use. You must ask permission to publish work done with a co-author (that's a fact: it's a standard requirement in universities). It is important to be sure that the information you publish is correct (clearly that is not in dispute). They are allowed to ask you to get X's approval. The First Amendment does not prohibit them from urging you to follow a course of action.
Must an American company comply with Australian surveillance law? So there is a law called Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 that was recently made law in Australia. From what I have heard about it, it allows the government to demand that you break security if requested. So what if your company provides end to end encryption (e.g. Whatsapp), is based in America, and just ignores the Australian court order? What can Australia do to you if you keep your money outside of Australia?	Yes, if ... ... they are a ‘designated communications provider’ conducting ‘ eligible activities’ under s317C. Your example, Whatsapp is one under item 4. If they refuse to comply they can be subject to financial penalties. If they refuse to pay the fines they can have their assets that are subject to Australian jurisdiction seized - this includes money in accounts held by third parties like MasterCard, Visa and PayPall. The could also seek to have orders and judgement debts given by Australian courts executed by US courts. They would be successful unless the judgement violated US law - the first and fourth amendments spring to mind.	Why would the EU expect that any of its laws would apply to my business? It doesn't. Unless you choose to do business in the EU (which is possible, thanks to the wonders of the World Wide Web). Then, and only then, do you have to comply with EU law, including the GDPR. From a comment by @BenCollins: I'm talking about non-EU online retail that does allow Europeans (particularly those not actually in the EU at the time of the transaction) to place orders. Basically, GDPR Article 3 says that the GDPR applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union The phrase "in the union" is clearly open to interpretation, but according to the website Security Now, Dr. Michèle Finck says this: Most people seem to agree that the relevant criterion is whether you're based in the EU at the moment data is collected - citizen or not (my emphasis). While Michèle Finck is a well-respected legal scholar, she is not an authoritative legal source, so we need to wait for to case-law to nail this. For what it is worth, (not much I am afraid) I think it would be against common sense to define the territorial scope so broad that brick and mortar stores in the USA risks to be prosecuted in Europe if they sold goods or services to European tourists. However, what most US based businesses that chooses to be open to business for orders that are placed by natural persons who are in the [European] Union need to know that there is this: According to European law, the GDRP does apply to them when they conduct such business. From a comment by @BenCollins: I question the notions that (a) there is a basis by which the law would apply The legal basis is European law, in particular GDPR Article 3. and (b) that it has any enforcement mechanisms outside the EU. As for enforcement, I think a good answer has already been provided by Dale M. but for completeness: The USA has treaties with EU that mean that after a legal case has been decided in a court of law in the EU, it can request that the USA enforce the judgement (typically by collecting the fine the USA-based business incurred when conducting business in Europe). To make this answer more general, here are a breakdown of the the regulation of territorial scope of the GDPR for businesses that are not located in the EU: The scope is clearly spelled out in Article 3, and if you're not "a controller or a processor in the Union", you are only subject to the GDPR if your processing activities are related to: a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union. US based companies that engage in business practices that are illegal in Europe know about this, and has already taking steps to protect themselves from the being prosecuted in Europe under the GDPR by using firewalls to block access to their services from the EU. The bottom line is that if you: have no presence in Europe, and don't offer goods or services to people who are in the Union, and you don't collect personal data about European natural persons, then the GDPR does not apply to you. If at least one of the above applies then you need to follow the GDPR if you do not want to be prosecuted in the EU.	Your VPN scenario is why you have to show the banner to everyone. If you somehow knew beyond any doubt that someone was not in the EU, then you would not have to show a banner, but because you can't verify that, you should always show the banner. Doing so also protects against accidentally violating a similar law in another country; the GDPR is the best-known privacy law, but it is far from the only one. It's good practice to ask for people's permission before collecting their information anyway.	A statutory instrument that exceeds the limits of the enabling Act is void. For example, an Act that enables the executive to make regulations about companies would not support a regulation that purported to affect companies and partnerships. There are two controls in place: regulations must be tabled in Parliament and any MP can call for the regulation to be debated and voted down. anyone affected by the regulation can go to court to oppose it - there are lots of things they can argue including that the regulation overreaches its enabling Act.	There is no constitutional requirement that Congress provide copyright protection in the US. Congress could, if it so chooses, repeal Title 17 of the US Code, and afford no copyright protection whatsoever. Given that the US has protected copyright from its earliest days, that copyright protection in English law dates to the 1600s, that almost every nation currently has a Law protecting copyright, and that such protection is a requirement of membership in the World Trade organization (WTO) I find it highly unlikely that such a change in the law will be made in the foreseeable future. But Congress does have the power to abolish copyright in the US.	No, it's not legal. The General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) apply given that you are in the UK (regardless of where the Data Processor is based). The UK GDPR is slightly modified due to Brexit, but the same principles apply. The only plausible legal basis for this actions would be that you consent to it, and you're entitled to withdraw that consent at any time. Some may claim that Article 6.1(b) applies, i.e. that it's necessary to send marketing email in order to fulfil the contract, but GDPR is clear that bundling such consent into a contract for service simply to permit the data processor additional actions isn't allowed, as I'll demonstrate. UK GDPR requires that consent to use your personal information (in this case, your email address) for the stated purpose be freely given. Consent to use your information for direct marketing is not freely given if it's inseparable from the consent to use it for some other service, as per para 43: Consent is presumed not to be freely given if it does not allow separate consent to be given to different personal data processing operations despite it being appropriate in the individual case, or if the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is dependent on the consent despite such consent not being necessary for such performance. And Article 7.4 backs this up with When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract. The intent of Article 6.1(b) is that only the processing required for the service you have bought is allowed (e.g. if you supply your address for delivery of stuff you've bought, the data processor can use that address to send you the stuff, but is not allowed to add a contract term that allows them to send you unwanted stuff). Examples of emails that Article 6.1(b) would allow (in my assessment) include things such as notification of upcoming downtime, or a reminder that subscriptions are due, but not unsolicited advertisements for other products. There's a grey area that's open to interpretation, where adverts are piggybacked onto actual service messages.	It's not legal The terms that you agree when you enter a contract can only be changed if: the contract provides for variation of its terms and then, only in accordance with that procedure. This may allow unilateral changes - these are common in ongoing relationships like telephone and ISP contracts but it appears from the Kickstarter page that this was not the case here. the parties agree to vary the contract either by deed or by another contract. If by deed then the law of making deeds must be followed, if by contract then the laws of contract must be followed. You mention "around $70AUD" which leads me to guess that you are in Australia. If you were there when you entered the contract then the Australian Consumer Law will apply to the transaction and, more generally, to William Painter since they explicitly "do business in" Australia because they ship there. It is illegal to make misleading and deceptive claims under the ACL and the fines can be huge. Perhaps a note pointing this out to them and letting them know that if they waive their fees in you case(s), you wont feel the need to report them to the ACCC.	The main problem is that there is no court with authority to hear this case outside of China. It may be futile to sue in US courts, since China will not enforce US judgments. You can sue a Chinese company in Chinese court, under their Civil Procedure Law, but this pertains to contract breach. The question is whether there is any law under which the government of China can be sued for negligence – it is unlikely that that is possible (perhaps there is an expert in Chinese law here who can address that issue). This lawsuit is filed in US courts. It is based on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Supposing that this lawsuit is successful in US courts, then the question is what enforcement actions are possible. Since the defendants are various governments and government agencies in China, execution of the judgment would have to be against those defendants – you can't seize the assets of every person with some connection to China. But given the nature of the Chinese government, it is possible that US courts could find that the assets of Chinese companies are effectively government assets. The short answer is, in fact a lawsuit has been filed, and I expect more. I also don't expect them to succeed in the long run.
How do I challenge a public transport fine when I was never there at the time? And suspect a scam Today I received a message in my postbox regarding an unpaid fee for not showing a valid ticket on public transport. The address and name are correct in the message. However: I use what they call "die Umweltskarte" - a monthly ticket I never been asked for any tickets by anyone. I never had an experience of showing my ticket to controllers. There is a street name, the date and the time where the so-called "violation" happened. On that date, I never traveled anywhere using public transport and I am always at home during the time stated. So I am pretty sure that I did not do anything remotely close to what the claim states. A brief search tells me "just pay, you will have more trouble opposing them". Especially since I live alone and nobody can prove that I was in fact at home, that I never travel to that street and that I never used public transport that day or never had issues with controllers. Can I at least require them to provide evidence I did it? If so, what can I request? The message states that the collector agency, "infoscore Forderungsmanagement GmbH" was requested by "S-Bahn Berlin GmbH". They also "warn" that I will be fined more should I not pay the fine of around 150 euro. I have found an "EBE Nr." in the form. BVG (Berlin public transport) has a portal dedicated to fines, including an English version. There it is possible to enter the "EBE Number" to object. The number in the form starts with 506230 - so I suspect it is not real. What can I do about checking whether it is a valid fine?	There are several plausible possibilities. This is a scam and isn't actually from the public transit authorities, in which case paying them hasn't helped you, and has contributed to this being a problem in the future for others. The payment information may have some subtle differences from the correct information and may actually go to the fraudster. The EBE number discrepancy makes this the most likely scenario in my opinion. There was a technical error. Maybe someone with a name similar to your was really cited, but due to a typo, your name was entered instead and the street address and corrected name were entered via some sort of autocorrect function. Somebody got lucky and avoided the ticket that should have gone to them. Maybe somebody went into the wrong field in the ticket entry system which could also explain the EBE number error. Someone has stolen your identity (perhaps a refugee) and is going around with a fake ID using your name and address. This doesn't explain the EBE number discrepancy, however. I've also heard of cases in some big cities where two people have the same name and birthdate and are constantly getting tickets meant for the other person but don't discover this fact for many years. Maybe someone like that recently moved into your town. This also doesn't explain the EBE number error. The bottom line is that even though it would perhaps be cheaper and less time consuming in the short run to just pay the fine, I would not recommend doing that in this case. In scenario 1, you really have a moral civic duty to take a little extra effort to identify a fraudster who is preying on lots of people in your community. In scenario 2, you again, have something of a moral civic duty to help the transit system get this problem fixed, and who knows, it might be a technical problem that is prone to recur and if you don't address it the first time, people will assume that your "confession" of fault by paying the first ticket undermines your credibility if it happens again. In scenarios 3 and 4, the problem is likely to recur and so you have an interest beyond this transaction in sorting out the situation. While your bare assertions that this didn't happen might fall on somewhat deaf ears as potentially self-serving, when corroborated by the fact that you have a monthly pass, I think that the likelihood that you would be found to be credible and beat the ticket is great in your case. Germany is less corrupt in bureaucratic matters like this than most countries on Earth. If this is a scenario 1 situation, the legitimate transit agency wouldn't even have a record of the existence of a ticket in the system, so you could be reassured that you would be at no risk if you didn't pay it. Given the EBE number problem, it is quite possible that even if you did try to pay it and it was simply a human data entry problem or something (or maybe your ex or a high school bully you defied and forgot about is now a transit cop and trying to inflict revenge) that you might not get proper credit for it anyway, so talking to a person at the agency is probably necessary anyway. So, my advice would be to talk to a human being in their office, ideally by telephone (without using the ticket to determine the proper telephone number as the number on the ticket would be a scam in scenario 1), but in person, if necessary, to get to the bottom of this. If this didn't work, I would write a letter or email with a copy of the ticket enclosed. If this falls on deaf ears, I would even consider making a police report of a suspected fraud, or even enlisting a local newspaper reporter or television news reporter in pursuing this situation because it is odd and would resonate with the general public. All of this will be a pain and won't necessary make narrow economic sense, but we don't always have a choice about when duty calls to fix a problem or what problem that will end up being.	What do I do? Contact the police, and henceforth make sure that all your interactions with the business owner are in writing. That evidence will facilitate the police investigation in this fact-intensive matter. Can I actually be arrested? Yes, you are at risk of getting arrested regardless of whether you eventually prove the business owner is the one who broke the law. Hence the importance of contacting the police before it proceeds on the basis of his fraudulent accusations. The business owner has committed crimes including --but not limited to-- forgery, larceny, and attempted extortion (People v. Ramos, 34 Misc.3d 914, 920 (2012) and Matter of Spargo, 68 A.D.3d 1242 (2009) reflect that also the attempt of extortion leads to being charges and convicted, respectively). The timing of events could be indicative of the extent to which the business owner's criminal conduct was premeditated. For instance, it is unclear whose idea was keep the vehicle in his company's name notwithstanding that you had not acquired the company yet. If it was his idea, this will tend to weaken his denials of mens rea (given his subsequent course of action). Likewise, it is unclear what dissuaded you from purchasing the business. You need to assess whether he lured you in order to get your money for the car, and thereafter cause you to change your mind about the business.	This is an internet transaction Internet transactions can be reversed within 14 days after delivery of physical goods without the need to state reasons in germany. That is "Rücktritt vom Kaufvertrag". However, you are needed to send back the product and might be required to pay the shipping fees, depending on the original contract. This is a materially flawed product You ordered a book with text A. You got text B. That is a material flaw and you can demand the correction of such a material flaw (Mangel) at the expense of the seller, including any postage. However, if the text was provided by you or the original order form is indicating text B instead of A, the mistake is on you.	Possibly The game company has almost certainly excluded liability under the contract you entered. There may be some consumer protection that you have that they cannot exclude - I don’t know enough about German law to meaningfully comment. Notwithstanding, if you were to initiate legal action against the, as yet, unknown wrongdoer, you could subpoena the relevant records from the game company with a court order. No matter what privacy or other protections the other person has, the game company must obey the order or be in contempt. Without such an order the game company is right that they can’t disclose details of other users. As a practical matter, it will cost several hundred € to initiate legal action and several thousand to pursue it to the end. And you might lose. A better response is to treat the lost €80 as a relatively cheap life lesson - many people lose a lot more learning to recognise scams.	State law may provide for criminal prosecution for vandalism, which could result in a fine or even imprisonment. The state can prosecute you, private individuals cannot. Fines imposed by a private organization are only enforceable through contracts, where damages could be recovered, but penalties cannot be assessed. ("Late fees" are in the class of "liquidated damages", where the agreement says what the late fee is – they don't just make up a number). Ga. Code § 44-3-223 does require you to "comply with all lawful provisions of the property owners' association instrument", but if it isn't in the instrument, you do not have to comply.	These documents constitute personal data and - in principle - you, as the subject, have the right to get a copy of them by issuing a "subject access request". The controller shall provide a copy of the personal data undergoing processing. For any further copies requested by the data subject, the controller may charge a reasonable fee based on administrative costs. Where the data subject makes the request by electronic means, and unless otherwise requested by the data subject, the information shall be provided in a commonly used electronic form. (Art. 15 (3) GDPR) GDPR applies to controllers of any kind, including government organisations. The subject access request can usually be a simple email. The ICO has a template for this: https://ico.org.uk/your-data-matters/your-right-of-access/ (but keep it simple, you can literally just ask for "all personal data" they have on you; no need to speculate on what kind of data they may have). The subject access request is sent to the actual controller, but if you don't get a response to your request after 30 days, you can file a complaint with the supervisory authority (see here for Germany; note that federal institutions are supervised by the BFDI, not the data protection authorities of the Länder). Also note that you may have to go through some trouble to be properly authenticated by the controller. They do need to be certain that you are the data subject. There are also reasons why a controller can refuse to provide some or all of the information (e.g. if your request is clearly excessive or unfounded, if it's impossible to comply without violating another data subject's rights), but I would be surprised if any of those applied in your case. Your rights can also be restricted depending on the legal basis for processing. This includes rights that are illogical as well as some that provide special protection for processors: You can't object to processing based on consent (but you can revoke your consent), fulfilment of contract (but you can cancel your contract), a legal obligation on the part of the processor, or a vital interest (but you still have the right to erasure) Your right to portability and right to erasure does not apply if processing is based on a legal obligation or a public task (justice, parliamentary or government functions, statutory functions etc.) your right to portability also doesn't apply if processing is based on vital interest (e.g to protect someone's life) or legitimate interest of the processor. It is possible that processing all or some of your data was based on the performance of a public task, in which case they will refuse your request.	The exact situation depends on where you are. If you are in Washington state, what you get (but did not realize) is a notice to appear in court. By not paying the fine or showing up to court, you could be subject to RCW 46.64.025, so that the department of licensing is notified. You have 15 days to respond to the notice. We assume that you are a resident, because if you are a non-resident (and not resident of another state with a reciprocal agreement), they would have required you to pay a bond at the time of the ticket (though that isn't possible with automated infraction-detection). When the Dept. of Licensing gets the notice of the unpaid ticket, they may suspend or revoke your license. At this point, you will have received notice that your license was suspended (unless you changed your address and mail isn't forwarded, in which case you have a different problem, that you're supposed to apprise DOL of your current address, and didn't do so). At that point (after they send the letter), you have 15 days to respond. One response is to pay the ticket plus the added fines, or, you can request an administrative review (to appeal the suspension). The point of going to court to plead your case would presumably be to modify the judgment against you, for instance to reduce or eliminate the added fine. You would then need to give a good reason for not being punished: RCW 46.64.025 already has you covered, because the suspension process starts with willfully failing to appear. You would then need to show that your failure to appear was not willful. It does not legally matter whether you are a foreigner or have problems understanding the language. Speeding tickets usually say pretty clearly that you must pay the ticket within a specified time frame, or appear in court, but people don't always read tickets. It is entirely plausible that one's grasp of the language is low enough that there really was a misunderstanding. If you can provide credible evidence that your failure was not willful, by law you would only be liable for the ticket. In other states and countries, the situation could be somewhat or quite different (e.g. Norwegian traffic laws are stricter). In New Mexico, it is more serious to fail to appear. NM Statute 66-8-126 states that "It is a misdemeanor for any person to violate his written promise to appear in court, given to an officer upon issuance of a uniform traffic citation, regardless of the disposition of the charge for which the citation was issued". Your license can/will be suspended (it is not clear whether suspension is automatic), but additionally since failure to appear is a misdemeanor, you can be arrested. Unlike Washington law, there is no willfullness requirement for such a penalty. Given the criminal nature of failure to appear, a traffic attorney would need to suggest an appropriate belated response.	If you are in the habit of paying people just because they ask you to, then I say you owe me $500 - if you want to pay I'll send you my wire transfer details. This is a facetious way of making a very simple point: You don't owe people money just because they say you do. If someone claims to be owed money by you, the legal onus is for them to prove both their legal entitlement and the amount. Normally, people agree that they owe money and that's enough, however, if the debtor disputes the debt then the creditor has to prove that it is owed: the debtor does not have to prove that it isn't. Their legal basis must come from either a contract or the tort of trespass. For the former they must prove that a contract exists and that you breached a term of it. For the latter they must prove that you committed the tort. In both cases, they are only entitled to recover their costs (including loss of profit) that your actions caused. As they are not a government they have no right to punish you with a fine: if they are asking for more than damages then this is a penalty and void. I am unaware of the consumer protection laws in Canada but presuming they are similar to Australia - a disputed debt is not a debt. It only becomes a debt when the dispute is resolved, usually by agreement or a court. Only actual debts can have enforcement action taken including such things as being pursued by a collection agency or being recorded by a credit reporting agency. In short: this is a scam. In 2012 I went through a similar process. This is the letter I sent: We are the registered operator of motor vehicle XXXXX and have received your letter dated 6/6/2012 for payment of car parking penalty number XXXXX that you allege we incurred on 6/4/2011. To the extent that we entered into a contract with you, which is denied, please take this letter to constitute a written appeal in accordance with the appeal process described on your website and/or in your documentation. We dispute incurring the alleged debt and we dispute entering into any contract with you. We will defend any action brought against us. You must cease all efforts to collect this alleged debt whilst it remains in dispute, in compliance with National, ACCC and NSW laws and guidelines. Except as specifically outlined herein, we are requesting that you cease all contact with us about the alleged debt. Any further contact should be strictly in conformity with the ACCC Debt Collection Guidelines (refer http://tinyurl.com/parking-01). Your contact with us should be limited to: acknowledging our letter and providing us with any documentation that we have requested informing us that you have ceased collection efforts on the alleged debt stating that you are taking a specific action in relation to the debt such as commencing court proceedings (note that you can only threaten court proceedings if you intend to start them otherwise you are in breach of the guidelines - refer page 33 "you must not threaten legal action if the start of proceedings is not possible, or not under consideration, or you do not have instructions to start proceedings"). You must also advise any debt collectors or lawyers you have collecting this debt to stop. If you or your agents continue to attempt to collect this alleged debt, we will complain in writing to the ACCC, to NSW Fair Trading, and to the car park owner (and if we receive a further letter from your lawyers, we will complain to the Legal Services Commissioner in the lawyer's home state). Please send us within 7 days: Confirmation of whether or not you still hold us responsible for this alleged debt. If you still hold us responsible, we require you to properly articulate the facts and matters on which your claim is based. Please forward us the following particulars: A copy of the contract we are alleged to have entered into. Photographs of any signs that need to be read in conjunction with the alleged contract. Details of the actual offence you are claiming. e.g. failure to buy ticket, expired ticket, parking in no-standing etc. As well as the usual particulars of date, time, precise location with the car park and other facts and matters giving rise to the alleged breach of agreement. An itemised breakdown of the debt you are claiming and details on how it was calculated. Show separately legal costs, court costs, administration costs, costs associated with identifying us as the car owner, patrolling costs and a breakdown of any other costs not already mentioned. Pursuant to the Privacy Act, a copy of all photos you have of our car and/or us. Indicate the date each photo was taken and the name of the person who took the photo. And forward us any other data that you hold on us that the Privacy Act requires you to disclose. The basis on which you allege that we ware a party to the agreement alleged to exist; Proof that the alleged debt was incurred by us. The name(s) of any lawyers or solicitors who received payments pursuant to any clause in your terms and conditions. Please show the amounts and dates on which these costs were incurred, and the dates when these payments were made. Please itemise the work that such lawyers or solicitors performed for you, and indicate which clause in your terms and conditions allows you to hold us liable for such payments. A copy of any agreement that the car parking company has with the owner of the car park which covers the handling of disputes and appeals. Indicate the amount of money the car park company would have been paid had we entered into the alleged agreement with it, and if the alleged terms and conditions had been followed to the company's satisfaction. (In other words, how much money do you normally receive for a car to park in your car park for the period of time we are alleged to have parked there for). The contact name, postal address, and phone number of each of the following: the car park owner, the car park manager, and the car park operator. A copy of your Appeal handing procedure. As well as setting out what factors are taken into account, state who is the judge or arbitrator and whether they are independent and any other relevant factors to the Appeal. In addition, please give us disclosure of any arguments being put by yourselves on this matter in the Appeal so that we might reply to any new issues which are raised. If you decide to dismiss our appeal, please send us the full reasoning in relation to each of the specific points raised in our letter. The name and address of the person you allege was driving our car at the time you allege our car was parked in your car park. If you are alleging an agent authorised by us was driving our car, please confirm this in your response and forward us a copy of the agency agreement, along with the name and address of the agent. We put you on notice that should you continue this claim, we will issue an application, seeking orders that: Any request for a statutory declaration or request from you to prove in anyway that we do not owe this debt is misleading or deceptive conduct, because you are not a government agency and that the burden of proof rests with you as the person who claims the alleged debt. The amount claimed pursuant to the alleged contract amounts to a penalty and therefore void at common law. Alternatively, the amount claimed is claimed pursuant to a consumer contract within the meaning of the Australian Consumer Law and that the amount claimed is an unfair term within the meaning of section 23 of the ACL and, accordingly, is void. Finally, this debt remains in dispute until we advise you in writing that we owe this debt. I received one further piece of correspondence which didn't address any of the things I asked for and which I ignored and that was the end of the matter.
Could US President use the Secret Service to gain entry into the Capitol Building for the SOTU address? If US President was to go to the U.S. Capitol Building for the State of the Union Address, and he was met at the door by the U.S. Capitol Building security personnel with orders to deny him entry, could he order the Secret Service to arrest these security personnel and then proceed to enter into the Capitol Building? Although this scenario is very unlikely to occur, would the President have the Constitutional authority to do so since he is the Commander-in-Chief? Moreover, since he is the Commander-in-Chief, would the U.S. Capitol Building security personnel have to obey his orders to stand down since he is the Commander-in-Chief, or do they only have to follow the orders of the Speaker of the House?	The US President is Commander-in-chief of the US military. The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States; (from Article II section 2) That does not make the president the direct boss of every federal employee. The Congressional Sergeants-at-arms, in particular (and their assistants) are employed by, and responsible to, Congress, not the President. The Secret Service is part of the Department of Homeland Security (formerly part of the Treasury Department, until 2002) which is part of the Executive branch, but I am sure the President cannot order them to arrest someone who has not committed any crime. If such a thing were pushed to a direct confrontation, I have no idea where it would go, I hope we do not find out. Article I Section 8 grants Congress the power (among a number of others): To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings That seems to say the ultimately Congress controls the District, and sets the rules there. There is also the provision in Article I section two that: The House of Representatives shall choose their speaker and other officers; which would include the Sargent-at-Arms, I think. Article I section five says: Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two thirds, expel a member. which again seems to grant control over the situation to the individual houses of Congress. Article I section 6 says: The Senators and Representatives shall receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law, and paid out of the treasury of the United States. They shall in all cases, except treason, felony and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other place. which again puts Congress out of the direct control of the President.	There is no such law. The US Constitution provides that: The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; (Article II section 2) The congress shall have the power (Article I section 8) ... To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress; These powers were used to create the military very early in the history of the United States, and the US Army and US Navy have existed ever since. Other branches of the military were created later.	Once a person is sworn in as POTUS, there are only two legal mechanisms for involuntary removal of that person from the office: Article II Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution provides only that: The President ... shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. The 25th Amendment was passed to establish clear procedures of official succession. Its Section 4 also provides an elaborate mechanism whereby "the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide" can precipitate a process that would allow Congress, within 21 days, to transfer the office to the Vice President. Otherwise, there is no contemplation in the law of a "backsies" mechanism for removing a person from the office because "it should have gone to someone else." (The idea that a person who was in the designated line of succession, but in the wrong order, was sworn into office does not seem nearly as problematic as other events that have happened in real history. For example, in the 2000 Presidential Election it was conceivable – and some people probably maintain in fact – that the "loser" of the election would be sworn into office. The U.S. Supreme Court settled the legal questions before the inauguration. However, the realization at the time was that any legal challenges or decisions after that date would be moot, because "election error" is not a cause to remove a sitting U.S. President.) The question of a previous President reappearing, and his successor refusing to cede the office, takes us to the height of speculation. In this case I would merely note that I can find no law pertaining to Presidential Transition in which an outgoing President is "stripped of authority" or "removed from office." Rather, the acting POTUS is effectively the most recent person sworn to the office, and not removed from it.	He will be thrown out of office (the "except in case of impeachment" clause means the president cannot immunize a person against impeachment); because he was pardoned by POTUS, he will not be charged of the crime that he was pardoned for – the prosecution does not get a chance to argue anything. They might however prosecute him for some other offense not covered by the pardon (if POTUS forgets a sweeping statement like "any and all crimes related to X"). I don't think a prosecutor is likely to try to argue that the Constitution means "the president cannot pardon a person who has been impeached".	That remains to be determined. This article (100 Tex. L. Rev. 56 (2021)) discusses the possibility. To start, the Constitution does not directly say that a sitting president cannot be prosecuted. The lack of an express presidential immunity and the fact that an attempt by Madison to create such an immunity is an indication of "original intent". The view that an incumbent president cannot be indicted, prosecuted, convicted or punished is a policy stance set forth by the Dept. of justice, but is not constitutional law. Alito in Trump v. Vance points to some apparently negative consequences of allowing indictment of a sitting president, but this was in a dissenting opinion. Practical considerations of policy might argue for not prosecuting a sitting president, but the Constitution itself does not expressly forbid it. As we know from numerous SCOTUS rulings, the court is also capable of finding implicit support for a rule in the Constitution. For example theimpeachment provisions do not demand or even hint that impeachment must precede trial and punishment. An argument that prosecution would "incapacitate" the president is met with the fact that there is a provision for replacing an incapacitated POTUS with VPOTUS as acting president. The idea that a trial interferes with a person's ability to do their job (or that they can't adequately participate in their defense if they are doing their job) has not actually prevented ordinary people with jobs from being prosecuted for their crimes.	He's not a judge in a courtroom with all the power of a federal judge. He's temporary presiding officer of the Senate, in charge of enforcing Senate rules. The Senate calendar is under control of the majority leader who passed the rules of how the trial would be run. If the rules don't say "must adjourn for the day by X o'clock" then Roberts would not be allowed to do so on his own, he needs a Senator to ask for adjournment and then get consent from the rest of the Senate.	The Twenty Second Amendment is quite clear on this: No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice In your question, the President has been elected twice - unless of course the President was actually the Vice President (or elsewhere in the line of succession) at the start of the first term, in which case theres other limits: and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the President more than once. So, someone who has held the office of President after being elevated to it rather than elected to it, but served no more than 1 year 364 days of that first term, could possibly, by the wording of the Twenty Second Amendment, be eligible to resign within their second term and stand again but only once more.	The question has no definitive resolution other than the authorities cited and some other related authorities such as the protocol rules of the Secretary of State for diplomatic purposes and the Presidential succession statute. It has never been litigated any reasonable interpretations of the the constitution and relevant law could be argued. There is also some case law under the appointments clause regarding which departments count as principal departments. There is a broad consensus regarding the existence of 15 principal departments of the United States government and which departments those 15 departments are in practice. I would say that the majority view is that the highest ranking person in each department is the principal officer of that department (which is provided for by statute in the event of vacancies) but there is also an argument that only the Congressional ratified and Presidentially nominated Secretary of a department (and the Attorney General in the Justice Department similarly appointed) count. In the event of a dispute, either Congress or a court could resolve the issue depending upon how the issues ended up being presented for a decision. If asked, the White House Counsel would render a formal opinion that would be binding upon all members of the Executive Branch. Triller novel writer Tom Clancy has explored some of the scenarios as have other writers in the same genre, but since the 25th Amendment has never been invoked in this manner, there is no definitive answer or even a non-judicial precedent to provide us with guidance on the question.
Can a company forbid an employee to exercise his common law right to self defence? If a company has a "no violence" policy could that override a person's common law right to self defence?	Some kinds of companies (e.g. freight shipping companies and banks) often do have those policies. The real issue is not whether those policies are permitted, but what the consequences are for breaking them. The fact that a company forbids its employees from exercising a legal right doesn't mean that the employee ceases to have that legal right. It simply means that if the employee exercises that legal right, then the employee has breached the contract and may suffer the consequences for breaching that contract. Violations of those policies are grounds for termination from employment, and this would probably not be void as a matter of public policy. For an employee at will this is really pretty meaningless, although it could conceivably affect unemployment benefit eligibility. But, for a unionized or civil service employee who can only be fired for cause, this is a big deal. But, in theory, a company policy does not impact the tort liability or the criminal liability of the individual engaging in legally privileged self-defense to anyone. This is because two people can't contractually change their legal duties to third parties with whom they are not in privity (i.e. with whom they do not have a contractual relationship). And two people also can't contractually change the terms of a country's penal laws. The policy may be a defense of the company from vicarious liability for the employee's use of force in violation of the policy that gives rise to civil liability for the employee because the grounds for authorizing self-defense were not present. If the employee using force did so wrongfully and was sued for negligence rather than battery, the existence of the company policy might also go to the issue of whether the employee was acting negligently since a reasonable person in the employee's shoes might have been less likely to wrongfully use force in purported self-defense if there was such a policy than if there was not such a policy (and instead there might arguably have been a legal fiduciary duty as an agent to protect the property and workers of the principal in the absence of the policy).	There is a general defence to any crime called self defense. If you commit a crime, but the reason you commit it is because you are acting in self defense, or the defense of another, then you will not be found guilty of that crime. For example, if you kill someone, but the court believes you are acting in self defense, then you will not be found guilty of murder (or manslaughter). This defense extends to other crimes too, and trespassing would be included in this. Acting in the defense of another person has the same effect as acting in self defense. Just note that you would have to prove that it was reasonable for you to be acting in the way you did. Usually this means that the crime you committed was proportional or necessary to prevent the crime that would have occurred, and if self defense is involved, that it was necessary to do what you had to do to prevent harm to you or another.	Actually, neither the council nor a private owner are responsible for illegal actions by unauthorised people on their property. This is obvious: if an intruder enters your property and, while there, shoots someone you cannot be held responsible. However ... Since you have made them aware that there are intruders on their property acting illegally and causing a nuisance to the neighbours and they have done nothing they are quite likely negligent, even recklessly negligent. Rather than sue them, consult a lawyer and get them to write a letter that if they do not take action by X date you are going to sue them.	Its just free enterprise, right? Well ... except when there is a law that says its not allowed. I am unfamiliar with Indian law but the relevant law in Australia is the Trade Practices Act which deals with this under the category of Misuse of Market Power. In a nutshell: A business with a substantial degree of power in a market is not allowed to use this power for the purpose of eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor or to prevent a business from entering into a market. By preferring their products over a competitor's in their search engine they are "... eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor ...".	They can’t But they aren’t This is the law (as amended). Section 9 contains the penalties. In any event the police don’t fine people they issue an infringement notice which is an allegation of an offense - police can issue these even if they reasonably believe they took place - they are entitled to be wrong. The person given the notice can admit the offense by paying the fine or contest the allegation by going to court.	There are no cases interpreting the Second Amendment to have that meaning at this time. Even when regulations on corporate gun dealers are held unconstitutional, this holding, thus far, has always been because the regulations burden the rights of natural persons who own guns to bear arms. But, while corporations do not have the right themselves, they do have standing to bring suit regarding regulations of their corporations that burden the Second Amendment rights of their customers in a way that allegedly violated the right.	This article surveys the law, as of 2014. The answer is "yes or no, depending on which circuit". In US v. Chafin 423 F. App’x 342, the court decided that although the Second Amendment protects an individual's right to bear arms, it does not necessarily give rise to a corresponding right to sell a firearm drawing an analogy to US v. 12 200-Foot Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123 "the protected right to possess obscene material in the privacy of one's home does not give rise to a correlative right to have someone sell or give it to others". Likewise the 9th weighs in, in Montana Shooting Sports Association v. Holder, 727 F.3d 975: Heller said nothing about extending Second Amendment protection to firearm manufacturers or dealers. If anything, Heller recognized that firearms manufacturers and dealers are properly subject to regulation Contrarily, in the Northern Illinois district in Illinois Association of Firearms Retailers v. City of Chicago, the court finds in response to a ban on the sale of firearms in the city that. the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense under the Second Amendment. This right must also include the right to acquire a firearm...the ordinances are declared unconstitutional The same court in Kole v. Village of Norridge determined that the would-be operator of a gun store, thus has derivative standing to assert the subsidiary right to acquire arms on behalf of his customers both decisions relying on Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, where the city sought indirect means to encumber the exercise 2nd of Amendment rights (banning shooting ranges). The final answer will have to be made by SCOTUS, and so far there is nothing on the docket that could decide the matter. Instead, the question will be answered based on level of scrutiny for firearms regulations and whether " the government can establish that the challenged law regulates activity falling outside the scope of the right as originally understood"; and if it is not outside the scope of the 2nd Amendment, "then there must be a second inquiry into the strength of the government’s justification for restricting or regulating the exercise of Second Amendment rights".	None, if the intention is merely trespassing, unlike burglary which requires intent to steal, commit criminal damage, or inflict grevious bodily harm or if the building is a protected site - neither of which isn't evident from the question. Note, for both offences, the actus reus is entry - there is no requirement for any form of "breaking" Further to ohwilleke's comment, unless the lock is damaged or destroyed etc, then there is no offence of criminal damage
Since when is CAN bus mandatory for new vehicles? The CAN bus Wikipedia page states that: CAN bus is one of five protocols used in the on-board diagnostics (OBD)-II vehicle diagnostics standard. The OBD-II standard has been mandatory for all cars and light trucks sold in the United States since 1996, and the EOBD standard has been mandatory for all petrol vehicles sold in the European Union since 2001 and all diesel vehicles since 2004. The OBD Wikipedia page further states that: 2001: The European Union makes EOBD mandatory for all gasoline (petrol) vehicles sold in the European Union, starting in MY2001 (see European emission standards Directive 98/69/EC). 2003: The European Union makes EOBD mandatory for all diesel vehicles sold in the European Union 2008: All cars sold in the United States are required to use the ISO 15765-4 signaling standard (a variant of the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus). Except the 2008 date these quotes primarily talk about the OBD/EOBD. How is the OBD and CAN exactly related? Is CAN a mandatory protocol for OBD-II/EOBD? In case it was I see a conflict in the 1996 and 2008 dates for United States... My final question is simple - are there certain dates since which all cars sold in particular markets have to use CAN bus for the internal communication between car's electronics? The reason I am asking this is I want to reverse engineer the signaling from various vehicle sensors (steering angle sensor etc.). If I knew something like "all European cars since 2004 use CAN for the internal communications between electronic parts" that would help me a lot. EDIT: Obviously the CAN bus is somehow mandatory since 2008 in the US at least. However, I do not know to a what degree in detail - usually there are CAN bus pin-outs on the OBD-II connector. However, there may be multiple CAN buses present within a single vehicle - one for critical functions like ABS, ESP etc. and another for infotainment like radio etc. I wonder if any of these buses has to be connected to the OBD pin-out...	Good timing: I just got a new OBD II scanner yesterday. Since this might hit a wider audience, I'll take a foundation-first approach. Your vehicle is comprised of things like brakes, ABS, fuel injection, gear box. Nowadays, these parts are operated by electronic controllers. The physical path by which the controllers receive and transmit electronic signals is called a bus. (It performs the same function as the internal bus in your computer, which connects the CPU, memory, etc.) CAN is simply a protocol for how information travels on the bus. So it does all the things you'd imagine a protocol does (boring things like dictating message formats be 64 bits and exciting things like determining priority). Protocols are defined by standards. Prior to widespread implementation of CAN, there were other standards (four, I believe) used by various manufacturers. CAN is widespread, but it's important to note that it's only standard on lighter vehicles. 40 CFR 86.005-17(h)(3) Beginning with the 2008 model year and beyond, ISO 15765-4.3:2001 “Road Vehicles-Diagnostics on Controller Area Network (CAN)—Part 4: Requirements for emission-related systems”, (December 14, 2001) shall be the only acceptable protocol used for standardized on-board to off-board communications for vehicles below 8500 pounds. The statute goes on to discuss other standards for heavier vehicles. What's unique about CAN? It's faster, but more importantly, it's a protocol that doesn't require a central computer. All the controllers get all the messages. It's kind of like having a bunch of people in a room yelling things out: everyone hears everything. And that's what you want in a car. However, the messages have to be interpreted by the controllers themselves, and that requires a separate "higher-layer" protocol. Electronic components need CAN to function, and if you have a car with electronic components, you need CAN in order to make it run. On the other hand, a vehicle can run without OBD--it's just a nice secondary feature to help diagnose system performance (and problems). It obtains access to component information like speed, RPM, fuel trim, etc. Likewise, that pesky "check engine" light gets activated by a diagnostic code. CAN is not mandatory for OBD. OBD is designed to use a number of different standards, and CAN is one of those (remember, light vehicles makes beginning with 2008 use CAN, but OBD is in use in other types of vehicles, too). At it's heart, OBD II is just another protocol: it specifies message format and the connector's pinout. In the best teaching document I've seen on the CAN vs. OBD subject, Michael Wen mentions you can often deduce which signaling protocol is in use by looking at the pins in the connector (remember, CAN should be standard for light vehicles after 2008, but you might see one of the other four formats in older vehicles). How do OBD and CAN work together? OBD sends messages over the CAN bus (that is, the vehicle bus with the CAN protocol). OBD basically queries components by sending specially formatted messages via the CAN bus. The components respond via the CAN bus. That information goes either to a warning light on the dashboard or to a diagnostic scanner attached to the connector.	No, selling a car "as-is" is not a valid reason for not having a smog certificate. According to the DMV here, the smog certificate must have been done within 90 days of the sale. The exceptions are: The transfer occurs between a spouse, domestic partner, sibling, child, parent, grandparent, or grandchild. A biennial smog certification was submitted to DMV within 90 days prior to the vehicle transfer date (a vehicle inspection report may be required for proof of certification). There are a few other exceptions based on the type/year of the car like gasoline-powered and older than 1975 or electric-powered.	No. Such a marking is equivalent to a solid double yellow line, and passing is not permitted. These raised pavement markers are known as Botts' dots and are commonly used in California together with, or instead of, painted lines. A line of evenly spaced dots is meant to signify a solid line. Since here there is a double line of dots, it is a solid double yellow line. If passing were allowed, you would see a single yellow dashed line, which would be indicated with dots by a group of 3-4 evenly spaced dots, then a longer gap, and repeating. California Vehicle Code section 21460 provides as follows: (a) If double parallel solid yellow lines are in place, a person driving a vehicle shall not drive to the left of the lines, except as permitted in this section. [...] (e) Raised pavement markers may be used to simulate painted lines described in this section if the markers are placed in accordance with standards established by the Department of Transportation. The relevant standards are found in the California Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD). On page 655, Detail 23, you can see a diagram showing exactly this configuration of dots and stating that it is an alternative to a solid double yellow line. It appears that current policy is to phase out the use of Botts' dots, so this question may become moot in the future.	Is there any sources of information where extraction of data from a closed source application and provided to a data subject is further defined? No, the GDPR is based on "general principles" and does not concern itself with implementation details for such matters. It's possible there's EU case law on this, but I can't find any. Am I within my rights to insist on this, even if to comply they would have to do some software development? Yes you can demand it, but they don't have to comply with your demand. The information only has to be provided in a "concise, intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language." and they only have to provide the information electronically where "reasonably practical" to do so, and they only have to take "reasonable steps" to do all this per Section 52 of the Data Protection Act 2018 which implements GDPR into UK law. You can complain to the Information Commissioner's Office, and they will decide if Section 52 has been complied with or not. 52 Form of provision of information etc (1) The controller must take reasonable steps to ensure that any information that is required by this Chapter to be provided to the data subject is provided in a concise, intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language. (2) Subject to subsection (3), the information may be provided in any form, including electronic form. (3) Where information is provided in response to a request by the data subject under [the Right of access by the data subject], the controller must provide the information in the same form as the request where it is practicable to do so.	There are multiple questions on different areas of law, but I will answer purely on any criminal liability arising by the drivers concerned and leave the question(s) on civil liability to others. The general rule to avoid creating unsafe situations appears to be in the Royal Decree of 1 December 1975, at Article 7, which states (via English translation): 7.2 Users must behave on public roads in such a way that they do not cause any inconvenience or danger to other users, including the staff working for the maintenance of the road and the equipment bordering it, the surveillance services and priority vehicles. Here are some specific regulations/offences relating to the railway crossing incident: Under Article 4 of the 30 September 2005 Decree: It is forbidden to stop or park a vehicle on level crossings. Carol may have committed an offence under Chapter 2, Article 2 of the 1975 Decree: It is forbidden to stop a vehicle or park it in any place where it is obviously likely to constitute a danger for other road users or to obstruct them unnecessarily... Dave may have committed an offence under Article 20 of the 1975 Decree: 20.2. The user approaching a level crossing must be extra careful to avoid any accident: when the level crossing is not equipped with barriers or traffic light signals or when these signals do not work, the user can only enter it after making sure that no vehicle on rails is approaching. ... 20.4. The driver cannot enter a level crossing if the traffic congestion is such that he would in all likelihood be immobilized on this crossing.	I feel that a person, not the subject of arrest, should be protected by the 4th amendment if they choose to remain in their vehicle, even if “ordered” to exit the vehicle by an officer. The intuition is fine, but is basically incorrect. I’m most interested to know: How would a driver (1) Politely (2) determine if a given instruction to exit the vehicle must be complied with, and (3) decline the instruction without giving the officer “cause” or otherwise damaging a potential case? From a practical perspective the only workable response is to comply. There are times when this is done without a reasonable suspicion (or in some cases probable cause) or other legal basis, but it is pretty much impossible for you to dispute this one the spot. Most of the time, the officer will have the legal authority to order you to leave the vehicle. If they order you to exit the vehicle despite not having the legal authority to do so, the right course of action is to comply and then to file a complaint with the agency employing the officer or to bring a civil lawsuit against the officer. There are good answers to a basically duplicate question at How can you tell if you have to follow a police officer's instructions?	Using two states as examples: In California, emergency vehicle operators are exempt from pretty much the entirety of the rules of the road (VC 21055). They can pass you on the right if they want to. Department policy might say no, but that depends on department policy and the details of their emergency vehicle operation course. However, California law requires all drivers to pull to the right when an emergency vehicle approaches (VC 21806). Even though an ambulance driver legally could pass you on the right, you are required to pull right. According to the BLM's emergency response policy for fire personnel in California, this means passing on the right is heavily disfavored: the emergency vehicle operator doesn't know that the driver (who is clearly not paying much attention) won't suddenly notice them and comply with the vehicle code, cutting them off or running into them. Other policies/things which seem to reflect policies say similar things, and all make it clear that operators need to be careful that the car they're passing won't drive into them. In Maryland, the law is a bit different. Section 21-405 of the Maryland Code obligates drivers to move to the edge of the roadway. This means either edge, so on a divided highway you might pull left. On a non-divided road, you obviously pull right. In this case, the vehicle may end up passing you on the right, but again: they are going to be careful about it, and would rather you get out of their way so they don't have to worry that you'll suddenly see them and drive into them.	It depends on the laws of the jurisdiction. In Washington, speed limits are implemented via Chapter 46.61 RCW, the very first section of which states: The provisions of this chapter relating to the operation of vehicles refer exclusively to the operation of vehicles upon highways except: (1) Where a different place is specifically referred to in a given section. (2) The provisions of RCW 46.52.010 through 46.52.090, 46.61.500 through 46.61.525, and 46.61.5249 shall apply upon highways and elsewhere throughout the state We then turn to the question of what a "vehicle" is (this is the discussion of a number of legal treatises). Title 46 is about motor vehicles, but still you should look at the definition, if any, of "vehicle". We have two definitions of vehicle in RCW 46.04.670. Definition 1 says that "Vehicle" includes every device capable of being moved upon a public highway and in, upon, or by which any persons or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a public highway, including bicycles Definition 2 omits the italicized bicycle inclusion, and explicitly excludes A bicycle, for the purposes of chapter 46.12, 46.16A, or 46.70 RCW, or for RCW 82.12.045((.)) This is a bit of a mess arising from legislative screwup, which should be resolved by appeal to RCW 1.12.025. The explicit-exclusion sections are about registration, dealers and taxes, and not speed limits. The latter version was recently reaffirmed effective July 23, 2023. The courts could therefore be somewhat inclined to not apply speed limits to bicycles, because bicycles were recently removed from the set of explicit vehicles. But as notes in the Eskridge's extensive discussion of a hypothetical ban on vehicles in Lafayette Park, there are multiple principles for interpreting laws, and "legislative intent to assure safety" would be one prominent consideration, in case the wording of the law is not crystal clear – as it is not, in this case.
Can a search based on evidence obtained illegally be a legal search? I was watching a TV programme last night and the main characters broke into a building to look for something however they didn't find anything. While receiving a dressing-down for their actions from a parent the main characters said 'we were going to tell the police if we found anything.' The parent, who is an attorney, said 'nothing you found would have been admissible anyway.' This didn't ring true to me. It lead me to the question I have. If the police are provided with information that was obtained during the commission of a criminal act by another party, would a search based on this information be admissible as evidence? For the purposes of the question, please assume that all other steps by the police are followed scrupulously. I'm tagging this as United States because that's where the programme was set but I'm interested in an England and Wales perspective too because that's where I'm from.	Yes and no. There are numerous cases where criminals, upon breaking in to somewhere, find evidence of a worse crime and notify authorities. This will provide reasonable suspicion enough for entering the scene. Generally, in testimony, Statements against Interest are more believable because a burgler wouldn't admit to breaking and entering if he had a way to explain why he was there in the first place. (Example: Alice breaks into a Warehouse and sees a mutilated body and blood everywhere. Alice immediately stops her theiving ways and calls 911 to let them know about the scene. Whether or not Alice stays, a dead body is enough probable cause to secure the crime scene without warrant. Its in Alice's interests to stay and help as there is trace of her at the scene and she would be pegged as a suspected murderer. If she's picked up and admits to calling the cops, it's good, but staying and helping out after the call will likely get her off on the charges related to the murder.). It could also work if they are persuing one crime and discover evidence of a second unrelated crime. (i.e. Alice robs the factory and gets away. The Factory Foreman calls the cops to investigate the crime scene, which at this point, does not need a warrant. While investigating, the Cops find security footage that Bob, the night guard, killed Chuck, a late night worker, removed his body, and cleaned the scene, all before Alice broke into the factory. The outcome of the case being made against Alice does not affect their need to prosecute Bob, as they obtained that evidence while looking for Alice in a valid investigation, not Bob, thus it is legal). Under these situations a crime that leads to a separate valid crime involving a different party is admissible. There are two possible reasons that the attorney might think this: Fruit of the Poisonous Tree: This is the obvious element... the kids committed a crime with the hopes that the cops would use the evidence found by them in their commission of a crime to get the real bad guys. The attorney parent thinks this is stupid because the kids broke in specifically to do this and thus any evidence is now tossed out of court. This isn't usually the case in how this scenario will play. Generally the cops are more than happy to look at evidence obtained by criminals that points to another crime. In fact, this is how a lot of gang enforcement units and drug enforcement units operate... pick up a small fish and cut a deal for evidence against a bigger fish (turning state's in the criminal lingo, as the witness is becoming State's Evidence to another crime). As long as it's given to the cops as part of legitament evidence seeking, the cops can follow the leads where ever they... er... lead... Chain of Custody: This is probably, if properly thinking, what the attorney parent is thinking that's a bit more probable. Lets say these kids found a dead body with a sword in it and take the sword to the police... this could get dicey as the kids have contaminated the evidence in possible ways that the killer's lawyer could get thrown out. One thing CSI doesn't always show (though there are a few episodes where it comes up, but not many) is that when something is taken in as evidence, it is carefully documented, sealed, and tagged with a check in/check out list. Every time the seal is broken, the person breaking the seal notes the time, date, and reason and when does, reseals it with a new seal, and signs the time and date of the seal again. This is so at trial, the attorneys know exactly who opened up the evidence, what they did, and what possible contaminants were introduced. You even have to sign into a crime scene before you go up to the yellow tape. A good defense lawyer would call into question any evidence from anything the kids handled to get the evidence tossed (i.e. Your honor, these Meddling Kids handled the sword without following the chain of evidence. They even let their dog handle it. They had already harrassed my client earlier today by insunuating that he was involved with a hoaxed paranormal activity to scare people away from the factory. Since they claim they found the sword, but did document it at the scene, we don't know anything about it prior to the police's chain of custody. I motion that the evidence be dismissed.) If this is successful, anything from the sword is now no longer admissible as if the sword had never been found (including blood of the victim on the blade and finger prints of the suspect on the hilt)... in effect the evidence was prossessed as best the police could but the veracity of the story of it's discovery is too questionable to be considered. The defense does not have to be right, he just has to show there could be another explanation for the sword and the evidence linking his client to the crime committed by it. In short, without specific details, the attorney parent could be right or could be wrong, or more humorously, right, but for the wrong reasons. Edit: U.S. only. See other answers for other jurisdictions.	Nobody can say exactly what happens. I would assume that everyone in the house would be considered a witness. They might ask your friend "did you ever see your roommate carrying computers, monitors etc. into your apartment"; something like that would be likely. It's highly unlikely that she would be treated as a suspect since she doesn't work where things have been stolen. If the police comes with a search warrant, I would expect that the search warrant would extend to the roommate's room and all shared areas, like the kitchen, a common living room and so on. It's unlikely that a search warrant would allow searching your friend's room. She might want to move anything that she doesn't want the police to see (like private photo albums) into her own room. She should definitely move anything that she doesn't want the police to see (like drugs, goods that she stole, illegal weapons) into her own room. And obviously they can search your room without warrant and without your permission; they are not allowed to, but unless you have a locked steel door, they can. That would be a violation of your privacy, and any results of the search couldn't be used as evidence against you , but I think they could be used as evidence against your friend.	Police can lie However, in the United States they have to read you your Miranda warning (most other democratic countries have similar warnings): You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions. You have the right to have a lawyer with you during questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any questioning if you wish. If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop answering at any time. They have told you everything they are required to tell you - effectively “we are not on your side.” After that, they can lie their asses off. Of course, they wouldn’t ask you for a DNA sample - they’d ask you if you’d like a glass of water. Then they’ll take the DNA from that.	There is a relevant law, Title 18 section 907 which states that "A person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he possesses any instrument of crime with intent to employ it criminally". So possession of lock picks is not a crime per se. In Com. v. Gendrachi 389 A.2d 604 we are reminded that "intent need not be directly proved, but may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the incident out of which the charges arise". The accused was busted in mildly suspicious circumstances at 5:20 am in the dead of winter, urinating. The court notes that "There is no evidence that appellant's hands were on the door or that he made an attempt to extract the tools from his pocket and apply them to the door. In fact, there is no act or statement by appellant that would lead one to infer that he intended to use the tools at that time", and that "appellant is a certified locksmith and it is not unreasonable to find the tools of his trade in his pocket, especially when he is wearing his work attire". Note that this is on appeal: he was convicted initially. The point is that there is a lot of slop in cashing out the legal concept of "intent". Pennsylvania does not, apparently, have any specific laws that refer to lock picks. It does have a statute that addresses having criminal tools, which are defined as (including) "Anything used for criminal purposes and possessed by the actor under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for lawful uses it may have". Mr. Gendrachi had those very tools, and the appeals court did not say anything to suggest that the tools were not "criminal tools" (and in FN 5 they actually point out that the Commonwealth cannot say that the tools were weapons, a ludicrous proposition never raised by anyone – so by failing to deny that lock picks are criminal tools, they are adoptively admitting that they are criminal tools). Thus I conclude that there is a law in PA, that lock picks are burglary tools, and that the government would have to prove intent to use criminally.	It seems generally uncontroversial that in examining a witness at trial, a lawyer may not ask questions implying that the witness has engaged in some wrongdoing, unless the lawyer has some basis for asking those questions. This is not true. A lawyer is allowed to guess and ask such a question, although if it assumes a fact not in evidence it could be objected to for lack of foundation. For example, the opposing counsel could object if the lawyer asked, "After you drank twelve beers at BigTown Sports Bar, isn't it true that you got into a car and drove away?", because there would be no evidence in the record at that point that he drank twelve beers at BigTown Sports Bar. For instance, in the absence of any evidence indicating that alcohol was involved, I would imagine that a plaintiff's lawyer in an accident case could not cross-examine a defendant with leading questions suggesting that he had been drunk at the time of the crash. Sure he could. He could ask, "Isn't it true that you were drunk at the time of the crash?" There is nothing objectionable about that question. If the answer was "no", however, and the lawyer had nothing else to back up that suggestion, the question might not help the case, but the question is proper. Sometimes a lawyer just has a hunch and goes with it, and sometimes the hunch is right. Is this rule codified in a rule of evidence or is it just rooted in the courts' ideas of decorum and propriety? I can see how it might implicate the Rules of Professional Conduct, but that wouldn't seem to provide a remedy to a party who was prejudiced by such behavior. I'm more interested here with civil cases than criminal, where a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights might be complicate the question. It isn't codified because such a rule does not exist. There are some special rules that apply to prosecutors, who are ethically required to bring criminal cases only when they believe that the cases are supported by probable cause. But, that rule applies at the case level and not at the question by question level. Lawyers are also prohibited, especially in criminal cases, from making statements asserting personal knowledge of the credibility of a defendant or witness. This is because this transforms the lawyer from an advocate to a credibility witness. But, the lawyer can ask a judge or jury to find that someone is not credible in closing argument based upon X, Y and Z evidence presented at trial.	From the German lawyer association ("Deutscher Anwaltverein") one can find the following (Google-translation): In the case of a purely preventive identity check, the officers are initially only allowed to determine the identity of the respondent. This means that you can ask for your name, date and place of birth, home address and nationality and have your ID shown - by the way, as a German citizen you don't have to always have your ID with you. "You don't have to answer any questions beyond that," says lawyer Robert Hotstegs from the German Lawyers' Association (DAV). Of course, police officers often try to gather more information with emphatically casual questions. "Well, where do we come from" or: "And where are we going now?" Are typical examples. The police are not allowed to insist on an answer. Anyone who, as a respondent, is voluntarily too willing to provide information can harm themselves and possibly even give rise to concrete suspicions. So they are allowed to ask such things, but you don't need to answer everything. How to handle such situations, again according to the link above: “I recommend answering the survey as briefly and politely as possible. This has a de-escalating effect and helps to end the unpleasant situation as quickly as possible, ”says Attorney Hotstegs. However, you should always answer the questions about yourself. Because if the police cannot determine the identity of a person or only with great effort, they may take further measures to determine the identity. This includes taking it to the police station and, under certain circumstances, a search. Otherwise, these measures are not permitted without a specific reason.	Huge difference between a car and a house. For example, at least in Pennsylvania no warrant is required to search a vehicle on public roads. In other states there are so many easy pretexts that you practically have little protection from a full vehicle search (although the pretext will have to withstand strict scrutiny if evidence found in a search is used to charge you with a crime). Your house, on the other hand, still enjoys very strong fourth-amendment protections: One of my favorite U.S. Supreme Court cases on the subject is Florida v. Jardines, in which SCOTUS ruled that even approaching the front door with a drug-sniffing dog without a warrant constituted an illegal search. (The majority opinion is worth reading for its illumination of current law on this question.)	We need to assume that the stop was legal (not a high hurdle to clear), that is, there was some reason to stop you. Even so, following Utah v. Strieff, police don't actually have to have a reasonable suspicion to stop you and if in the course of an ID check they discover that you have a warrant out for your arrest, the arrest is still legal. So if the police stop you, RCW 46.61.020(1) says: It is unlawful for any person while operating or in charge of any vehicle to refuse when requested by a police officer to give his or her name and address and the name and address of the owner of such vehicle, or for such person to give a false name and address, and it is likewise unlawful for any such person to refuse or neglect to stop when signaled to stop by any police officer or to refuse upon demand of such police officer to produce his or her certificate of license registration of such vehicle, his or her insurance identification card, or his or her vehicle driver's license or to refuse to permit such officer to take any such license, card, or certificate for the purpose of examination thereof or to refuse to permit the examination of any equipment of such vehicle or the weighing of such vehicle or to refuse or neglect to produce the certificate of license registration of such vehicle, insurance card, or his or her vehicle driver's license when requested by any court. Any police officer shall on request produce evidence of his or her authorization as such. There is no law that says "you have to provide ID only if accused of a crime", or "police can pull you over only if you are suspected of a crime". Various traffic infractions will get you pulled over but are not crimes; random sobriety checks are legal. However, note that the requirement to provide ID applies to the operator. There is no law requiring citizens to carry identification papers (but there is a law requiring a vehicle operator to carry a specific form of ID). In some states there are "stop and identify" laws which allow police to demand ID from a person suspected of a crime, but Washington does not have such a law.
Are artificially generated personal data covered by the GDPR? According to Article 2(1) GDPR: ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; In my country, Poland, we have a national identification number called PESEL. It has 11 digits which encode date of birth, sex, ordinal number and one checksum digit. All combinations can be easily generated on todays computers. Article 87 GDPR states that: Member States may further determine the specific conditions for the processing of a national identification number or any other identifier of general application. In that case the national identification number or any other identifier of general application shall be used only under appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of the data subject pursuant to this Regulation. if I generate all 1,826,210,000 PESEL number combinations, do I become the holder of the personal database of all Polish people and (if I am a company) do the obligations arising from the GDPR begin to apply to me?	Generating a list of all possible numbers doesn't sound like it would constitute personal data any more than listing all dates for the last hundred years as a "possible date of birth" would. However, the moment anyone linked even one of the numbers with any other personal data - for example a name - they would be bound by GDPR and would need to show a Lawful Basis for processing the data. [If you linked your own name you could presumably argue Consent, but anyone else's would need to have an associated Lawful Basis.]	Technically, yes, GDPR might apply. Filming other people does involve the processing of personal data, and GDPR will apply unless this is for “purely personal or household purposes”. But exactly that will be the case for most holiday snapshots or short clips for your personal social media. As far as I understand, you do not have to worry about purely personal activities. Even if GDPR would apply, this doesn't mean it would be illegal. It means you'd need a “legal basis”, such as a “legitimate interest”. If there are just a couple of people in the background of a video, it's possible that their rights might weigh less important than your interest in shooting the video – but that would need a case by case analysis. Your legitimate interest would almost certainly prevail if you need to record a crime to which you are victim. Regardless of GDPR concerns, note that this is just a small aspect of legal concerns. Instead, also consider personality rights copyright (if art or architectural works are visible) / freedom of panorama customs and reasonable expectations of other people These issues will depend largely on the specific country or area you are travelling to. Europe is not homogenous in its perception of privacy issues. For example, consider the issue of dashcams in a car. These are considered to be quite normal in some European countries, but effectively illegal in others.	There is nothing in the GDPR requiring you to collect individual personally identifiable information. If the website has no need, and the website owner no desire, to collect such information, there is no requirement to do so. The GDPR requires that if such information is collected, that there is a lawful basis, and that it be handled appropriately and stored securely, and deleted when there is no longer a need to retain it, or on a proper request. If no such information is collected in the first place, all the rules about how to handle it do not apply. It is possible that some law of an individual country in the EU might mandate collection of some particular information, but I have not heard of any such requirement.	Your analysis so far seems correct. You must comply with all applicable laws. The GDPR's Art 6(1)(c) legal basis clarifies that having to provide personal data is no excuse: that legal obligation is all the legal basis you need for sharing the personal data in accordance with your obligations. However, that legal basis doesn't generally excuse you from your other data controller obligations. For example, you should still inform the data subjects about the processing as per Art 13(3).	See Art. 17(2) GDPR: Where the controller has made the personal data public and is obliged pursuant to paragraph 1 to erase the personal data, the controller, taking account of available technology and the cost of implementation, shall take reasonable steps, including technical measures, to inform controllers which are processing the personal data that the data subject has requested the erasure by such controllers of any links to, or copy or replication of, those personal data. So the controller must tell all other controllers (like google) to delete the data. The privacy policy must include the fact that data is made public.	Your confusion might be caused by the fact that even with a contract, only the data necessary for that contract is covered under the GDPR. So yes, while there might be an "execution of contract" under the T&C, this would only cover necessary data. That means you can't ask arbitrary signup data under the guise of a contract. If you need to deliver a physical product, you can store a physical address. If it's an online service, you can store an email address or similar handle. But you can't mix the two. A physical address is unnecessary for the execution of a contract that's not physical in nature. Now, you mention "consent". Under GDPR, this is a distinct justification besides "execution of contract". You might have consent to store a physical address in addition to an online address, e.g. if you offer a customer to physically mail a password request form. This consent is additional to the contract. Also note that the bit above only covers the lawful reasons for the processing of personal data (article 6). You also have to obey the other GDPR rules, e.g. fully inform the user, make sure that consent is freely given, etc.	If the website's processing of your personal data is within the scope of the GDPR, then you have a qualified right to request the erasure of your personal data. It is relevant whether: the website operates within the EU; the website is operated by a company established in an EU country; the website aims to sell goods or services to people in the EU; or the website is routinely processing the personal data of people in the EU (including non-citizens). Furthermore, it is relevant whether your posts: contain one or more identifiers from which you could be personally identified, directly or indirectly, including by only the administrators or owners of the website; and by their content, directly reveal information relating to you. For example, let's say you posted on a forum saying that "I am a keen supporter of socialism", and your personal email address was used to sign up to the website, then you would have revealed information about your political beliefs, which by reference to a username, the website owners could use to uniquely identify you by your email address. You would not necessarily have to have used your name. If, for example, you posted something factual, like, "The Porsche 911 GT2 RS MR recorded the fastest lap time for a road-legal sports car on the Nürburgring," then it is only personal as long as it is associated with an identifier through which you could be identified. As such, the removal of the relationship could easily anonymise the post. A data controller has an obligation to provide means by which the data subject can exercise the rights guaranteed under Chapter 3 of the GDPR. Article 17 grants the right to "erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay" where the grounds under Art. 17 lit. 1 (a) to (f) are met. It may be relevant what the lawful basis of processing personal data was in the first place, such as in determining whether you can withdraw consent (i.e. you cannot withdraw consent if consent was not given), or in determining whether there is a right to object under Article 21 lit. 1. Derogations permissible under local implementing laws may provide for other exemptions or requirements to the right to erasure, so it is also important to determine the country of jurisdiction.	Yes When personal data is processed in the context of an EU/EEA/UK establishment (for example, by a company with offices in the UK), then all these processing activities must fully comply with the GDPR, regardless of where the data subjects are located. For the UK GDPR: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the United Kingdom, regardless of whether the processing takes place in the United Kingdom or not. For the EU GDPR: The GDPR applies to: a company or entity which processes personal data as part of the activities of one of its branches established in the EU, regardless of where the data is processed; or …
Company makes confidential CV publicly available and searchable. Legal recourse? A friend of mine was looking for a job last August. She sent CVs for various positions. Now, months later, somebody told her that if he Googles her name, her CV pops up. She tried it herself and sure enough, the first result is her CV in PDF format, from the website of one of the companies she contacted. The link is in a wp-content/2018/08 format, which means it was uploaded on their website, but it’s freely available for anyone to search and download it. My question is: does she have any ground for legal action? Is such action worth the effort in terms of compensation? The location is Cyprus, covered by EU and GDPR laws.	She could refer this to the Cyrpriot Commissioner for Personal Data Protection, but I would try contacting the company first and telling them to remove her Personal Data from the public website - or delete it completely. If they don't give a satisfactory response, mention the CPDP. This could lead to the data being removed within a few days, while an official complaint is likely to take longer. She may have grounds for legal action which would result in the company being compelled to take down the data (or to close the website), but if your friend is thinking in terms of compensation, what compensation would she seek? If she can demonstrate and quantify financial losses that occurred specifically because of this disclosure there might be a possibility, but I suspect that would be difficult to prove.	It depends on the state. In some states the Secretary of State holds the records for business entities and in others, such as Arizona, it's an organization known as the Arizona Corporation Commission. Regardless of the state's organization that keeps the information, one of the pieces of information you will find when you look at a company's records is the "registered agent", "resident agent" or "statutory agent." The agent, whether a person or a representative corporation, must be located within the state where business is conducted. That agent is who or what gets served with papers for a lawsuit. Here's a good explanation at legalzoom. A personal example that may help: I am an owner in a business that does business in Louisiana and Arizona. Our LLC is registered in Louisiana and is registered as a "foreign corporation" in Arizona. However, we are required to have a registered agent in each state. We pay a company to act as our registered agent in each state and the registered agent has a physical address in each state in which we are registered. If someone wants to sue my company then they can look up the name of my company in either state and will find my registered agent along with the registered agent's physical address. Service to the registered agent counts as service to my company. The agent will forward to me any service which is made to them. EDIT: if you don't known the name of the entity, i.e., the name on the door of the business does not represent the name of the company, then you need to find the "doing business as," or DBA record of the company. I don't know what state you're in but all the states in which I've done business maintain a "Doing Business As" system that can be searched. I guess it's possible that you're in a state that doesn't maintain DBA filings or require them. Typically, you can search either way - search by owner or search by the DBA name. Some states, such as Arizona, record DBA names at the county level. I've seen some states allow searching by address also.	Any processing of personal data needs a legal basis, for example necessity for some contract or legitimate interest. If no other legal basis allows the processing, you need to acquire consent. Consent must be freely given. If something is gated behind consent without that consent being really necessary, this might coerce users and they would not be able to consent freely. The GDPR does not have a hard ban on this, but it explicitly calls out that this case must be considered when determining whether consent is valid. So what your company is trying to do is in a dark grey area. Not necessarily wrong, but likely so. Consent could be made free if users have an actual choice. For example, some online newspaper sites had success with a “pay or consent” wall. (Success in the sense that some data protection authorities allowed this). In your case, this could mean that users either consent to extra data collection, or that they buy some reasonably priced premium mode. But none of this is for you to decide. You can voice your doubts that the software would be compliant. You could also ask if the Data Protection Impact Assessment document for this proposed processing is available (creating such an assessment is likely mandatory in this case). But in the end, it is the company's obligation to be compliant, and this responsibility is largely shouldered by the company's data protection officer (to whom you can turn with further questions).	My interpretation of the GDPR when it comes to a contact form is as long as your privacy notice states that what data you collect in the contact form and what legal basis that data is used for you are fine. Someone submitting a contact form in my opinion is their consent to reply back to them regarding the data in which they have submitted. Another good clause to have in your privacy policy is to basically state if the user submits information about another natural person that they have consent from that natural person for that data and what it would be used for. The internet is the internet. People have been trolling it for years. People have also submitted false information for years. The best a business can do is simply outline what their site does, what data is collected and what it will be used for. That along with what legal basis it’s processed for and following it makes you GDPR compliant in that regard. As to withdrawing consent and the rights given by the GDPR that’s all specific to what infustructure a business has in place. As a developer I know the headaches of the GDPR. Most of it resides in the fact data is not centralized and thus can’t easily be retrieved, modified, or removed. Once you’ve tackled that aspect providing the user their rights under GDPR isn’t to far off.	The COVID restrictions are new enough that there are few court decisions on how to interpret them. There are frequent requests for court injunctions seeking temporary relief. Some pass, some are denied. The website might accuse locations listed there of breaking the restrictions. Making such an accusation in public sounds like a very bad idea, especially if there is no solid documentation. But the aggrieved party would be any location falsely listed. The site may or may not be hosted in Germany. If it is not, it becomes a really interesting question which law applies. You might inform the authorities, but beyond that, forget it.	Publishing government records is pretty classic First Amendment-protected activity. Keeping in mind that one can find a lawyer to sue for anything, I think that person would likely be operating well within the law. One thing in particular that I'd recommend staying aware of is how one might attempt to monetize this endeavor. There have been a lot of sites publishing arrest records, court records, and mugshots, and then charging people to have them removed to keep them from popping up in a Google search for those people's names. That is -- rightly -- regarded as sketchy behavior; while several states have passed laws prohibiting that business model, I don't believe any such law exists in Washington State at this point.	The employee must, during and after employment, without limitation in time, observe a duty of confidentiality regarding [...] the Company's internal affairs such as business plans, profitability, pricing, employees, methods, processes, routines, code and the like as well as other information that the Company typically wants to keep secret The pure information that the company had at some time a security problem with their product is internal knowledge you only gained through working there. By what is written here, you are indeed prohibited from speaking about it. If it were public knowledge, you could point to a press release and say "I did that, that was me fixing the problem". That would work. Because it doesn't share anything that isn't public anyway. But you cannot share things the company wants to keep secret. Finding out whether that contract is legally enforcable in your country and juristiction is the job of a real lawyer, but just as written, they are right. You signed a contract to not do that, not talk about it an certainly not publish it on the internet. So you should not do that, unless a good lawyer you trust tells you otherwise. That said, "I found a security flaw" is about as impressive as "I found a dollar on the floor". Maybe you can talk about your knowledge to prevent something like it happening. That says nothing about whether or not it happened in your old company, and for me as an employer it is much more valuable to have you on board with structured knowledge you can apply, than with your memories of being lucky once.	Law enforcement activities are out of scope of the GDPR, though there is a similar right to access in section 45 of the Data Protection Act 2018. Access to police bodycam footage can be denied or restricted on various grounds, including to protect the rights and freedoms of others. A separate right to access information held by public authorities is part of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, but it exempts the applicant's own personal data and refers to the DPA 2018 for further restrictions of this right – FOIA is just a fallback in case access is not regulated otherwise. If necessary to protect the rights and freedoms of party A, the footage released to B could be redacted in order to protect A. However, since A and B were both present the footage would not disclose information that B didn't already have. Therefore, redaction might not be appropriate. Given that there is no clear legal guidance and that all of this is context-dependent, I'd expect this to come down to the internal policies of the police department handling the access request. I see no grounds that would require A to be alerted when footage is released to B. A could also make a request to access their data, and should receive information about “the recipients or categories of recipients to whom the personal data has been disclosed”, but this might be limited to protect B.
Interpretation of EU legislation The European Union has 24 official languages, and EU legislation is published in all of them. How does the court resolve inconsistencies in interpretation that might arise because of mistranslations, or because of different connotations that a word might have in one language but not another?	See this working paper by Silvia Ferreri for an excellent write-up of this issue. The key point is that because each linguistic version of legislation is equally authentic, none can be taken as the authentic version. The court then resolves this by applying two principles: comparing the linguistic versions and giving deference to legislative intent. This is necessarily a case-by-case analysis. The paper calls attention to Case C‑445/09 arising from the Netherlands, where 9 different linguistic versions are compared and shows that the straightforward Dutch reading of the legislation in question isn't compatible with the other linguistic versions or legislative intent. In paragraph 25, the decision also contains a concise summary of the general principle of interpreting laws in multiple languages: According to settled case-law, the need for uniform application and, accordingly, for uniform interpretation of an EU measure makes it impossible to consider one version of the text in isolation, but requires that it be interpreted on the basis of both the real intention of its author and the aim which the latter seeks to achieve, in the light, in particular, of the versions in all languages (see, inter alia, Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] ECR 419, paragraph 3; Joined Cases C‑261/08 and C‑348/08 Zurita García and Choque Cabrera [2009] ECR I‑10143, paragraph 54; and Case C‑473/08 Eulitz [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 22).	What Do England And Wales Share Legally? Why are they so closely associated with each other as to have just one tag on the site, but Northern Ireland and Scotland each seem to be their own worlds? Most laws of general applicability, such as criminal law, and private law (i.e. the law governing the interactions of private parties like property law, contract law, landlord-tenant law, employment law, etc.) are enacted by the National Parliament at Westminster (or effective as part of a shared English common law of case precedents) and shared by England and Wales which have a uniform integrated court system. In contrast, Scotland and Northern Ireland have greater autonomy to enact laws of general application because more authority has been devolved to those regional governments than to the National Assembly of Wales. They also have their own court systems. Historic Causes Wales was basically fully integrated into England starting in the 1200s and subsequently restored some autonomy. Scotland never lost its high level of autonomy and was initially joined to England only by virtue of having the same monarch, rather than being the same country. The United Kingdom was formed first by the personal union of monarchs from 1603 (under King James VI of Scotland a.k.a. King James I of England) followed by a federal style merger of governments approved by the Scottish and English parliaments in 1706-1707, rather than by conquest and it has much more government autonomy in generally applicable legislation and its judicial system than Wales does, and more than Ireland had when it was ruled by England. On the other hand, Scottish sentiment towards independence was not exactly unanimous in support of staying with the U.K. in the last referendum in 2014 when 44.7% of votes cast were for independence with 84.6% voter turnout (including voters as young as age 16). Northern Ireland's story is a bit more complicated as Ireland had a legal status similar to Wales from a similar medieval era, but this was complicated by the Irish independence struggle ultimately leading to the creation of the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The fine line and complexity of the situation in Northern Ireland is illustrated by this map, and strong autonomy was necessary to allow it to maintain the fragile Protestant-Roman Catholic balance in a divided society there: Each of the components of the United Kingdom has a separate and historically determined status that is not exactly parallel to any of the others. England has no national assembly of its own, sufficing to use the national parliament for its laws despite the fact that some seats in that parliament that govern it are selected in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Likewise, before the U.S. gained independence, different parts of the U.S. had distinct relationships to the U.K., as did the various colonial possessions of the U.K. (e.g. India, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Kenya, Tanzania, Hong Kong). The U.K. is an exemplary example of the philosophy that consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds. To pluck out just one more random example of the English tendency, "Scotland Yard", the national police force headquarters in the City of Westminster within the City of Greater London in England, has jurisdiction over England and Wales, but not over Scotland. Legal Distinctions Between England And Wales To provide a few other examples in addition to the example of language related laws noted by @WeatherVane (noted on my recent visit to England and Wales) and to embellish on that point a little further, the Welsh language is resurgent in Wales where it is a mandatory subject in public schools (often in the North with Welsh as the primary language of instruction) with about 30% of the population (more than 800,000 people) who either speak it as a first language (which is common among the very old and among young people in Northern Wales) by people who are mostly bilingual with English (but may reach for an English word or two now and then) or as a fluent second language. The Anglican Church is the established church in England, but not in Wales where it was disestablished in 1916. The legal implications of this are subtle, but not non-existent. Government agencies are not required to hoist the British flag with primacy over the Welsh flag, and indeed, the British flag is rarely seen there. Primary and secondary education are administered separately in England and Wales with attendant laws on issues like truancy, dress codes, financial arrangements, testing, and certain holidays. This distinction primarily exists to facilitate Welsh language instruction, which is the primary language of instruction in some schools, and a secondary language in others. More generally, the manner in which many government services (e.g. public housing) is administered, and in which tax dollars are expended is not precisely the same between England and Wales. Certain laws regulating immigrants (related to immigrant financial security and leases to immigrants, more or less) differ between England and Wales, although this is a temporary matter and the long term plan is for these laws to be integrated across the United Kingdom. The Welsh Senedd (a.k.a. National Assembly for Wales, i.e. the regional parliament) has some independent legislative power, although honestly, the scope of its legislation is typically closer to what you might see in a U.S. home rule city or a school board, than in a U.S. state government. In particular: The 20 areas of responsibility devolved to the National Assembly for Wales (and within which Welsh ministers exercise executive functions) are: Agriculture, fisheries, forestry and rural development Ancient monuments and historical buildings Culture Economic development Education and training Environment Fire and rescue services and promotion of fire safety Food Health and social services Highways and transport Housing Local government National Assembly for Wales Public administration Social welfare Sport and recreation Tourism Town and country planning Water and flood defences Welsh language I suspect, but do not know, that land use regulation and occupational and business licensing in Wales is less favorable to big businesses and franchises, based upon the fact that such businesses are far more common in England than in Wales, even controlling for places that are similar in population density. But this could be due to historic or economic factors.	An Act is what's called Primary Legislation, where as Regulations are Secondary Legislation. An Act of Parliament is a law that both Houses of Parliament have agreed to and which has received Royal Assent. These Acts may include provisions for secondary legislation which is law created by ministers (or other bodies) under powers given to them by the Act. The UK's Legislation website says this: 'Primary legislation' is the term used to describe the main laws passed by the legislative bodies of the UK e.g. Acts of the UK Parliament, Scottish Parliament, Welsh Parliament and Northern Ireland Assembly. It also includes Acts passed by historical parliaments, other primary legislation for Northern Ireland and Church of England Measures (legislation for the established church in England passed by the General Synod of the Church of England). These types of legislation are sometimes referred to as 'statutes' and the term 'the statute book' refers to the whole of the statute law currently in force. Whereas: 'Secondary legislation' (also called 'subordinate legislation') is delegated legislation made by a person or body under authority contained in primary legislation. Typically, powers to make secondary legislation may be conferred on ministers, on the Crown, or on public bodies. For example, the Office of Communications (OFCOM) is given such powers by the Communications Act 2003. The main types of secondary legislation are Statutory Instruments, Statutory Rules and Orders, Church Instruments. There are three main types of UK Statutory Instrument: 'Orders', 'Regulations', 'Rules'. However, there is no limit imposed on the descriptions that may be given to Statutory Instruments. Other examples include 'Scheme', 'Direction' and 'Declaration'. Different types of instruments serve different functions, but they all have the same legislative force. Prior to 1948, when the Statutory Instruments Act 1946 came into force, the equivalent instruments were known as 'Statutory Rules and Orders'. For example, Part 2A of the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984 allows for the making of secondary legislation regulations such as (the now revoked) The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (Self-Isolation) (England) Regulations 2020 Secondary Legislation is still subject to Parliamentary scrutiny as it must be approved (the affirmative process) or not rejected (the negative process - and the one applicable to the majority of SI) by Parliament.	Regulations - Yes, Acts of Parliament - very rarely In in the united-kingdom diagrams are found in regulations, for example legislation dealing with roadside symbols. There are two kinds of legislation in the UK: Acts of Parliament and Statutory Instruments (normally called Regulations). The procedure by which an Act of Parliament is passed is that it has to be approved by both Houses of the legislature and then receive Royal Assent (Royal Assent is a formality). The procedure in each House is that the main debates occur at the Committee Stage when amendments are proposed and voted on. At the next stage (Third Reading) the House votes again on whether to approve the Bill in its amended form. Statutory Instruments (Regulations) are issued by the government (executive) and are known as delegated legislation because the government only has power to issue a regulation if an Act (called the parent Act) gives it power to do so. As you would expect there are safeguards. First of all the courts can declare invalid (ultra vires) any regulation whose terms go outside the limits of the power delegated by the Parent Act. Sometime the parent Act will provide that Regulations issued by the government under delegated powers become law without further involvement of Parliament but sometimes an Act will provide for some limited further Parliamentary scrutiny. This can be either by the Positive Resolution (the regulation will not become law until Parliament approve it) or by the Negative Resolution procedure (the regulation will become law unless Parliament passes a resolution annulling it). A key point, in the context of the question, is that neither the Positive nor the Negative Resolution procedure allows Parliament to amend the regulation - Parliament only has a binary choice to approve or disapprove. Of course if they disapprove then the government can issue a new amended regulation which then goes through the same process but the Positive/Negative resolution procedure does not allow Parliament itself to amend any regulation. I think this explains why diagrams which are sometimes found in regulations are rarely found in Acts. Constitutional proprieties require any Bill to be amendable and any member of the legislature can propose a amendment. If the Bill included diagrams then there would be huge practical problems because any member who wanted to amend a diagram would have to produce his own amended diagram which he might not be able to do/might not have time to do before parliamentary deadlines. So constitutional proprieties would normally mean that in practice Bills must be solely words. Regulations however cannot be amended by Parliament (see above) so such considerations do not prevent regulations from containing diagrams. Having said that normally Bills will only contain words, there is this example of an Act which includes a diagram of a symbol. That symbol, however, is defined in an international convention so in practice no parliamentarian would want to amend it. I know of no examples in the UK where a Bill (as distinct from regulations) contains an image which a member of the legislature might want to propose an amendment to.	This is very common in all sorts of legal documents, not just the United States Code. Another familiar example where this is seen is on checks. It serves as a sort of "redundancy check", to help catch errors where either the words or the numerals could have been incorrectly transcribed. Of course, one could ask why similar redundancy isn't used to avoid errors in other contexts; there doesn't seem to be a good answer for this besides "tradition". Some people feel the practice is obsolete and should be abandoned, e.g. https://www.butlersnow.com/2020/04/five-5-reasons-to-stop-writing-numbers-like-this/.	When? There are basically several times to look at when you want to look at the text, and then in what language. The Codex Iustinianus itself is part of the Corpus iuris civilis and contained only laws given by the previous emperors, while other older laws were in the Digesta/Pandecta and the Novellae contained any new imperial laws after 534. The whole CICiv, was given an introductory text right from inception: When it was compiled, back around 528, one of the books of the CICiv was the Institutiones Iustiniani, which was the prescribed legal education basis - the study book for the aspiring lawyers of his time. It contained how to practice law and cases that were to be discussed. On this basis, a glossa marginalis commentary has survived in Turin, which was made from a copy of the Institutiones. The commentary is dated to be contemporary to the CICiv and was made by adding comments around the real text, making researchers believe this was a work by a teacher, so he could answer or explain parts of the text, or reference earlier parts of the book easier. Around the 7th century, the Pandekta/Digesta were pretty much forgotten in big parts. In the middle ages, it took about till late 1000s, early 1100s, to re-compile the CICiv, when Irnerius of Bologna did manage to collect a sizeable portion of it by rediscovering the Littera Florentina and added to this collection by referencing earlier glossae. The Florentina alone is more than 900 pages long, and his littera vulgata/bologniensis (a german edition's Bibliography an Italian edition's bibliography), a new commentary on the re-compiled laws, including large parts of the Digesta. This book became the new introduction and teaching text about the CICiv and leading teaching bok for all lawyers in Europe at that time. This text is, what defined the roman tradition of law In the 19th century, legal scholars that studied a lot of the CICiv and argued along those lines - a style predominantly Existant in Germany - were known as Pandectists. One of the more central books of them was the Lehrbuch der Pandeketen by Karl Ludwig Arndts von Arnesberg (Stuttgart 1877). The praxis that developed in these circles greatly did influence the style of how the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch BGB was organized and written, and this systematic was exported. Later, books such as Paul Koschaker: Europa und das römische Recht (4th edition Munich 1966) did recept the whole roman legal body, giving the CiCiv a very thorough look, and how it influenced the modern Code Civil and Germanic tradition of law, while Franz Wieacker: Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der deutschen Entwicklung (2nd Edition, Göttingen 1967) did look at the Pandectists and how they were influenced by the CICiv. As more scholarly works I want to point to three that were referenced in the notes of the page when my ancient history Professor mentioned Roman Law being "verklauselt, kompliziert und voller sonderfälle" (~complicated and with many exceptions) in passing. A Short History of Roman Law by Olga Tellegen-Couperus (1993) does spare the last 8 pages on the CiCiv. The more thorough Herbert Felix Jolowicz; Barry Nicholas: Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law (Cambridge 1967) does spare the last chapters on the CICiv. Adolf Berger, Adolf: Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law (The American Journal of Philology 1953) is taken still one of the main shorthands and (sometimes outdated) bibliographies under historians. Large parts of the Latin CICiv (as #12) can be accessed in "the Roman Law Library" by the Grenoble University, together with edition scans.	Independent Thought vs Union Of India (2017) apparently states the law of India, presently, and the answer is, 18. India being a common law country, the Supreme Court has the power to interpret the law when the statutory language might suggest something else. The issue is that marital intercourse is often an exception to rape laws (India does not recognize rape between husband and wife). The court ruled that "sexual intercourse with a girl below 18 years of age is rape regardless of whether she is married or not". The court found the legal distinction between married girls and unmarried girls to be unnecessary and artificial, discriminatory, and not in the best interest of the girl child. They leave untouched the lack of application of rape law to married couples over 18. This extends legal prohibitions beyond what is stated in POCSO, a law discussed in para 37 ff of the ruling. One can detect in degree of dissatisfaction on the court's part with the legislature's failure to reach the conclusion that they announce.	The court's job is to resolve the dispute. The parties are in court specifically because there isn't agreement on what the terms of the contract were or even if there is a contract at all. If one of the parties contends that there is no contract then the court will have to determine if there is or isn't. Even if both parties agree there is a contract the court will need to satisfy itself that there is. This is a jurisdictional matter; in the absence of a contract the court can't make a ruling. Having decided there is a contract, there is something about the contract they don't agree on - if they agree then why are they in court? Each party will state their position on the dispute and provide evidence that supports that position. The court will decide based on the evidence and on the balance of probabilities which version is more correct. It is a given that the parties are in dispute about the exact terms of the contract, whether this was because of an initial misunderstanding, someone didn't read it or someone saw an opportunity to screw someone else doesn't matter. The court will decide what it thinks the parties thought (or should have thought) at the time on the basis of the evidence and the law.
Could the USA force all porn sites onto .xxx domain? I've been working on various methods to block content from my home network and realizing all the holes in my schemes. But it occurred to me that it would be pretty simple if all the porn was on .xxx because then I could just force all network traffic on my network to use my DNS server never serve out the name for something that resolves to .xxx (I know this doesn't solve the "safe search" problem, but one thing at a time) But I was talking with my wife about it and we were wondering if or why it might be a non-starter to lobby my Congressperson to do that. It doesn't seem to me that the tld is tantamount to free speech, you can't get a .edu or .gov tld if you aren't associated with those orgs, couldn't you be forced to have a .xxx tld if you are associated with certain organizations?	Can you unambiguously, legally, and conclusively determine what is and is not a "porn site"? I'm sure many are easy... but what about that "Swimsuit modeling" site, or the "Artistic Nudes" site featuring classic French Renaissance paintings? There will always be a grey area. What makes a "site" in a legal sense? Consider all the blog sites filled with user generated content: If just a few pages out of tens-of-thousands are hardcore, indisputable porn, would you require the entire domain to be classified XXX, even if 99% of its content is completely innocent? Who would enforce this? Are you proposing an "Internet Police" force to review all new domain names and their content before they get approved? That is called "Prior Restraint on Free Speech", and is established law. Suppose a site does get approved, then immediately changes the content of their pages from Cooking Recipes to hard-core porn. Who is going to review and approve every update to every website, when sites are updated constantly?! Maybe you're proposing that any individual who finds porn on a .ORG site has the right to sue for damages? This would likely clog the courts with endless vigilante lawsuits about what content belongs on which domain. This is a flat out horrible, poorly thought out idea.	It could be. Accessing any web page is subject to whatever the terms of use are for the page, and if those terms state that the page may only be accessed from within the US, then accessing the page from outside the US is a violation of the TOS (hence use is infringing): see 2.4(h) of the Netflix EULA. There are EU rules that override such terms, within the EU. The usual way to circumvent technological location-restrictions (where the web page says "I'm sorry, I can't let you do that") is to use a VPN and pretend to be somewhere else. Use of a VPN is not per se illegal in most countries (there are exceptions), but using it to circumvent geo-blocking may be. Again returning to the point that the TOS may itself say "No you may not", the interesting question is what to conclude if there is no such statement, for example I did not see anything in the PBS TOS that restricts access to the US (I didn't look very deeply). Terms of service can't be secret: you can't be held to following rules that you cannot reasonably know of. If you attempt to access a page that uses un-announced geo-blocking technology and it informs you that you can't use the page because of your location, then you have effectively been put on notice that there is a rule. If you happen to be using a VPN and access an un-announced, (reasonably) undetectable geo-blocked site, that would not be a breach of the terms (because you have not been put on notice that location is a term of use).	http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/dk/dk091en.pdf is the Copyright Law in English for Denmark. You should probably try to find a Danish version to ensure the translation is accurate. Chapter 2 lists the exemptions from the general rule that you need the copyright owner's permission to use their IP. Unfortunately, the usage you have made does not meet the requirements for private use (s12): digital copies may only be shared among the members of one household, placing them on the web extends beyond your household. It may meet the requirements of educational use (s13) providing that your school has met the requirements for Extended Collective Use (s50). For photographs, this seems unlikely, such arrangements are usually limited to songs and television works. Under Chapter 6b, you are permitted to use "orphaned works", however, this requires that you have made a diligent search for the owners and have been unable to either identify or locate them. Copyright violation is subject to both penal sanctions (fines and in egregious violations imprisonment) (s76) and damages (s83). TL;DR Yes, you could be sued. Yes, the copyright holder would probably be successful. No, it is extremely unlikely they would bother.	As far as I can tell, no appeals court has had to decide whether "the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol, or any predecessor or successor protocols to such protocol" includes UDP for the purposes of 16 CFR §312. I will argue that UDP is included. From King v. Burwell (internal citations removed): when deciding whether the language is plain, we must read the words in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme. 16 CFR §312, in conjunction with 15 USC §6501-6505, implements the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998. The FTC is directed in 15 USC §6502(b) to promulgate regulations that (emphasis mine): require the operator of any website or online service directed to children [...] to provide notice of what information is collected [...] and to obtain verifiable parental consent The FTC drafted 16 CFR §312 to that end. To treat UDP as exempt would mean that the FTC has not fulfilled their duty under 15 USC §6502(b). So, given the context of the overall statutory scheme, it is reasonable to conclude that the FTC intended 16 CFR §312 to include UDP. However, even without the above line of reasoning, if the FTC were to attempt enforcement of 16 CFR §312 as if it included UDP, that interpretation would be controlling. The FTC would be afforded Auer deference by the court. They wrote the regulation; they know what it means. From Auer v. Robbins 519 U.S. 452 (1997): Because the salary basis test is a creature of the Secretary's own regulations, his interpretation of it is, under our jurisprudence, controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. And from Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. 325 U.S. 410 (1945): Since this involves an interpretation of an administrative regulation, a court must necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regulation if the meaning of the words used is in doubt. The intention of Congress or the principles of the Constitution in some situations may be relevant in the first instance in choosing between various constructions. But the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. Again, given the context of the overall statutory scheme, such an interpretation of the regulation by the FTC wouldn't be plainly erroneous.	Under 47 U.S. Code § 230(e)(1), Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110 (relating to sexual exploitation of children) of title 18, or any other Federal criminal statute. Section 230 exists to protect site operators from civil lawsuits and overzealous state/local prosecutors (there's now also an exception for prostitution and sex trafficking, but that didn't exist back in 2013). It doesn't protect site operators from federal criminal prosecution. For that, the same rules apply to site operators as apply to everyone else. Ulbricht knew and intended Silk Road to operate as a drug trafficking site, so he was criminally liable for operating it as one.	Due to competition/antitrust laws it can be illegal, more so if the search engine is dominant in the market. This has actually been realized in the EU where they fined Google €2.42 billion for abusing their market dominance and favouring their own Google Shopping service in search results. For further information, that fine has been specifically addressed on this site. In the US, this has not yet come to such a dramatic penalty, but there have been investigations. The FTC has investigated similar search results manipulation among other antitrust issues, but ultimately decided not to file a lawsuit as the changes to the search algorithms "could be plausibly justified as innovations that improved Google’s product." Following this inaction, as of November 2017, the state of Missouri is also investigating Google on the same issue. I'm not certain if manipulating search results on its own is illegal, but with market dominance (like what Google has), it certainly is.	Hacking a website to take it down is not effective; the target can simply regain control of their machine or restart the service somewhere else. The objective of the FBI is to make arrests and obtain convictions, not play whack-a-mole. When the FBI targets a website and its operators there are a number of approaches that it can use, depending on the circumstances. For clear-web sites one simple approach is just to seize the domain name. When you type badsite.com into a web browser a system called DNS looks up the name in a distributed database and from that gets an IP address. The DNS database is managed by a number of national and international authorities, and most national authoritities will cooperate with legal requests from the FBI, possibly routed through INTERPOL or via a Mutual Legal Assistance treaty. Of course there are some countries that won't cooperate, and this on its own doesn't help the FBI to arrest anyone. The FBI can use an IP address to find out where the physical servers are located. If that is in the US then they can simply go and seize those servers as evidence, or use a subpoena. If it is outside the US then its back to INTERPOL or Mutual Legal Assistance. Servers on the "dark net" use TOR to bounce the packets around the Net a few times. This hides the IP addresses of both servers and clients, so the challenge for the FBI is to find out what the IP address of the target machine is. Once they have that they can proceed as normal. Getting the IP address generally means hacking the target machine via TOR, and then finding the IP address once inside. If the DNS and servers are hosted in a country that won't play ball with the FBI, well that is just too bad. The FBI can carry on investigating of course, and if someone running the website ever travels to a country where the FBI can get them arrested then they will do so.	There is no law pertaining to top level domains, defining "appropriateness". Instead, some organization is an administrator, and there is an understanding as to what the purpose of the domain is, but this is not legally enforceable. The TLDs com, org, net are open to anyone, whereas edu is limited in the US to accredited post-secondary institutions, however some non-educational commercial enterprises were grandfathered in. Insofar as registering a com-domain website does not entail "an intent to make profit" and registering an org-domain website does not entail "an intent to not make a profit", there is no deception w.r.t. internet users. One would of course have to be truthful in registering the domain. Public Interest Registry, the administrator for org, does not even purport that businesses registered under org should be "nonprofit".
Someone used my bank account to do online fraud A while ago I was contacted by an old friend who wished to borrow my bank account to do online transactions, which has online banking enabled, while theirs is not. They want to confirm payments before sending the digital goods, so the plan is: whenever a payment is made, I told them and transfer the money, then they release the goods. I agreed and there were several payments, which I promptly transferred to them as soon as I received them. All of this happens in just one day, and no payment made and no further contact, until a few weeks then, my account got frozen. It turned out that they seem were advertising selling tickets in Instagram, in which they provided my account number and told buyers to send the money there. The tickets were never sent, and the day after the money was sent the Instagram account was deleted. This was the day after I was contacted, so it matched out. This 'friend' denied the connection with the seller account. The complication was that I've never met in-person with them. I can prove the chat requesting the borrowing, via Messenger and Whatsapp. What should I do? Can I be prosecuted if the victim of the fraud reported this to the police? What are my options? This happened in Indonesia, but I'm interested if this happens in other countries.	I can’t speak for Indonesia but if you did this in Australia you would be a criminal. You either committed fraud or are an accessory to fraud. You would probably be considered an accessory at and after the fact which means you are subject to the same maximum penalty as if you had committed the fraud yourself - 10 years in jail. In addition, you are liable to repay the money taken, jointly and severally with your ‘friend’. However, if they can only find you, you cannot recover from your ‘friend’ as you were engaged in a joint criminal enterprise. Scams such as you describe are distressingly common and many people fall for them. As such, assuming the court accepted your story (because you might actually be the fraudster and have just made it up) you would be unlikely to get close to the full sentence and if you caught the judge on a good day, might even escape jail. If you are lucky, the jury might acquit, even though, on the facts, they shouldn’t - juries do what juries do. If you’re really lucky the police might decide not to prosecute.	I reported this to my bank as soon as I found out, and Chase said that the money would be reimbursed once they completed their investigation (within 10 business days). Chase was likely indicating that the money will be reimbursed within 10 business days of completing their investigation; not 10 business days from the date you told the that someone forged checks on your account. This would make sense when you think about it, as they need to make sure that you were not complicit in the crime (you would be surprised how many people have had someone cash multiple checks from their account only to split the money with them and file a claim for fraudulent transfer/forgery). Further, checks are a negotiable instrument, unlike a credit/debit card, where specific protections exist pursuant to its terms and conditions of use. You have a duty to keep a negotiable instrument safe, and while most banks will reimburse you if it can be established that you had no involvement and you were not grossly negligent in the keeping of the instruments, it is a different animal in and of itself. It has now been 13 business days, and I have checked on the status twice and was told both times that there had been no status update, and they were unable to provide an updated ETA. Unless your bank indicated in the disclosures of the checking account application and acceptance documentation that in the event of a stolen check you will be reimbursed in X amount of days, they have the absolute right to complete their investigation before reimbursing any funds to your account. It's a fairly large amount of money, and I need to get it back as soon as possible. I'm trying to figure out if I have legal footing here. Does the law protect me from this type of fraud? And if so, does it require the bank to respond within any particular timeframe? Federal banking regulations provide broad protections to consumers when it comes to fraud involving credit/debit cards, as these are easily stolen from all sorts of means. That said, checks do not carry the same protections, although oftentimes some. National banks may be required to reimburse customers for forged checks. However, based on individual circumstances, the bank can investigate to determine if the customer is entitled to a reimbursement. There is not duty to reimburse until the investigation is complete. This is why I think you've potentially misconstrued what they said about how long it would take. They cannot promise a time certain when they don't know how long the investigation will take. Whether the bank is liable for the customer's loss depends on the specific circumstances of the case. Generally, a bank is liable for accepting a check that has been forged, altered, or improperly endorsed. However, if the bank can prove two things — that it accepted the check in good faith and exercised ordinary care and diligence in handling the transaction — it may not be liable. If your actions — the way the check or checkbook was handled, issued, completed, or made payable — contributed to the making of the forgery, you may be at least partially liable. Generally, the bank will require you to complete an affidavit. It may also request that you file a police report. ** Addition: I forgot to mention that if the checks were not "cashed" (i.e. filled out to cash or cashed in person), but rather were presented to a 3rd party for payment in receipt of goods or services, you are also going to need to contact those individuals or businesses (their name is on the check) and alert them to the fraud, and allow them to contact their banks, lest you will be assessed fees by them for insufficient funds if your bank later takes the money back as a result of the investigation. Also, in the event the checks were recreated rather than stolen, or if you don't know exactly how many were stolen, you are going to need to close your account while you wait for the investigation to bear fruit (hopefully), and open a new account, as you now have a duty to account for any and all checks stolen at that event (so, if you know a book is out there and 10 checks have cleared you know there are 15 remaining that the bank is not going to cover if you don't take steps to protect yourself). One would think they've asked you this and have already done something to prevent further checks from coming in, but if not, you need to get on it. Also, you may want to hire your own investigator if you have the funds to do so. While stolen cards are often strangers, stolen checks (unless it's one washed check) is nearly always someone you know.	You didn't consent to being ripped off. You did however fail to grasp the terms under which you were permitted to park on their property, and you failed to pursue an alternative (such as looking for change; using a credit card). It is possible that you should have known that this was a no-change-given machine, since one can often see that there is no mechanism on these machines whereby you can actually get change. However, if you have clear proof that you owed $6 and you paid $10, then 4 of those dollars are properly yours, and there is a reasonable chance that you could prevail in a suit against them. There is even a greater chance that they would refund the difference, just as a sensible business practice. "Exact change" is legal and can even be the law, especially in government-run transportation systems.	You are conflating the crime against the state of possession stolen goods with the common law tort against the owner for conversion. To your questions: How would this proceed? It seems like it would be very difficult to prove (short of getting public surveillance footage) that I even bought the item. If you read the second paragraph of the page you linked it says: In many jurisdictions, if an individual has accepted possession of goods or property and knew they were stolen, then the individual is typically charged ... If the individual did not know the goods were stolen, then the goods are returned to the owner and the individual is not prosecuted. Proof of the crime involves a "beyond reasonable doubt" standard of evidence of both the fact that you have the goods and that you knew they were stolen. If you become aware that they were stolen (e.g. the police tell you) and try to keep them then you have just committed the crime. Proof of the tort requires a "balance of probabilities" standard of evidence that you have the goods and that they belong to someone else; your knowledge that they were stolen is immaterial. In the first instance, the police would probably knock on your door, tell you why they were there and ask if the version of the story they have from the thief is essentially true. What happens next depends on your response: "Yes, I knew it was stolen; you better arrest me and I will plead guilty." This will play out as you expect. "Yes, I didn't know it was stolen, I will go and get it for you." You return the goods, give a statement and may have to act as a witness in the prosecution of the thief. You are down $1,000 but are now older and wiser. "No, I have no idea what you are talking about." Well, you have now committed the crime of hindering a police investigation and have also committed the crime of possessing stolen goods - you can no longer claim that you didn't know the goods were stolen; the police have told you they are. What happens next depends on if the police believe you or the thief. Surely they couldn't/wouldn't get a warrant to search my house? Want to bet? They certainly have enough to get a search warrant if they want one (probably). Whether they seek one probably depends on the value of the goods, how busy they are and how much you pissed them off. Could I be prosecuted if I didn't know it was stolen? Not if you return it as soon as practicable after being made aware that they were. The scam This seems like a lot of work for a very small return - spend your time worrying about things that are more likely to happen. Good Title All of this is tied up with the concept of good title. Basically, you cannot gain good title to property from someone who does not have good title themselves; if you buy goods from a thief you do not own them. For example, if A has good title to the goods, B steals them and sells them to C who sells them to D then A still owns them and can demand their return from D, D could demand the return of their money from C and C could do likewise with B but as far as A is concerned it doesn't matter that C & B have lost money; that is simply too bad for them.	There are answers between black and white. One might honestly believe to be owed €360, and demand that money in a lawyers' letter, and be prepared to write that demand off if the other party does not comply. Going to court has an uncertain outcome even if one is objectively right, and it will take effort and money. As you describe the events, it looks like an intimidation attempt, but the other side will have their narrative as well. Regarding the phone and mail communications, this could be harassment or an attempt to reach a pre-trial settlement. Again, it depends on details. If you feel harassed, talk to a lawyer.	There is no law against a person creating and distributing such a poster, to the best of my knowledge. However such a poster pretty clearly implies that the person shown is guilty of a crime, or at least strongly suspected. If the store somehow made an error, pulling the image of a person who did not use the stolen card or there is some other error, the person pictured might well suffer a significant loss of reputation, and might sue for defamation. Damages could possibly be significant. Such suits have, I believe, happened when surveillance photos were posted but there later proved to have been an error. Mary might wish to double check how sure the store is that the photos are of the person who actually used the stolen card.	I can't tell you there's nothing to worry about, but this sounds like a scam - possibly an attempt at blackmail. They may be looking to acquire your domain, or subsequent communication might ask for money for it all to go away. A local lawyer would be able to advise you far better than The Bloke On The Internet. Mention to them : That you were not responsible for the prohibited content That you removed the content as soon as was reasonably possible That you can provide details of the person you believe to be responsible (and, ideally evidence to show who posted the content, when it was posted, and when you deleted it) The lawyer may advise you to contact the local police. Tell them the same. It sounds like you are the victim here, and not the perpetrator.	All of this is illegal. You do not give a jurisdiction so I will use NSW, Australia as an example but many countries' laws have similar effect. Australian Consumer Law prohibits misleading and deceptive conduct: It is illegal for a business to engage in conduct that misleads or deceives or is likely to mislead or deceive consumers or other businesses. It doesn't matter that what you have said is strictly speaking factual - the way it has been said is likely to mislead or deceive. However, what you are proposing goes further and IMO crosses the line into fraud (s192E of the Crimes Act): 192E Fraud (1) A person who, by any deception, dishonestly: (b) obtains any financial advantage or causes any financial disadvantage, is guilty of the offence of fraud. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years. (2) A person’s obtaining of property belonging to another may be dishonest even if the person is willing to pay for the property. In addition to the illegality, stealing other people's money is morally wrong by any reasonable standards of morality.
Would I be violating terms of service if I asked for permission but got no reply? I created a Python API wrapper for a service, which I want to release as an open source python package if possible but not necessarily, the main issue is that I have a small python project where I need to use their API, not too many requests, if I could release it, that's better. The company is in my country, Lebanon The company's terms of service forbid me from doing so, but they don't offer a python wrapper in the first place. The company has two founders, one left and one works at google, I tweeted the first, sent a LinkedIn message to the second, asking for permission got no reply. The company has two email addresses, I sent emails to both addresses got no reply. If the worst case scenario is them blocking my IP address, that's fine, but I wonder if they would be able to pursue legal actions against me even though I went above and beyond trying to ask for their permission without being able to reach them. Am I still violating their terms of service?\ For example if you use Google translate API for free, you are also violating their TOS, they only block your IP if they detect a large number of API requests and never sue the writer of the library, you could find many free Google translate libraries.	No. You need to actively be given permission for you to have permission. If they don't reply you don't have permission and are violating their ToS.	IANAL, just a programmer with an interest in legal rules. Due to the very permissive nature of the MIT license, no, it does not appear that anything illegal has been done. Specifically, the section to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software (emphasis mine) grants everyone the right to modify your code and share those modifications, provided one includes the license. Since this person has included your license (including your copyright notice), they have followed the conditions of the license and are able to share your stuff. Legally. Ethically, I still think its ****. This might be a good starting point in selecting a license (note the Modification column). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_free_and_open-source_software_licenses The CC-BY-SA license family, as mentioned by Ron Beyer in comments is on this list, for example. TL;DR: You unfortunately granted a more permissive license than what you wanted/needed to. This was a BadThing(TM), analogous to giving too broad of access rights to a method or class. Determine your desired permissions, then select a license that matches what you'd like to grant.	See https://stackoverflow.com/legal/terms-of-service and https://law.stackexchange.com/help/licensing. As with most social media sites, your contribution of content does not transfer ownership of any copyright in the content; rather, you grant to the platform a non-exclusive license. Because the license is not exclusive, you can grant similar or different licenses to other parties, which generally happens when you post the same content on other sites. (Of course, you can only grant licenses when you own the copyright or have a license that allows you to grant a further license, so posting content created by others can be complicated; this seems to be beyond the scope of the question, though, so I mention it only in passing.) To answer with respect to a specific site, of course, you have to look at the site's terms of service.	There are a number of misconceptions here. GDPR does not generally impose blanket bans, but things get dicey if you're using data in a way that is not strictly necessary. Consent (freely given opt-in) is a way to continue nevertheless. A website without ads, tracking, or potentially tracking embedded content can probably work without having to ask for consent. Under the GDPR, every processing of personal data needs a purpose. This purpose must be covered by a legal basis. Some processing might be legally mandated or required by a contract with the data subject. It's also possible to base processing on a legitimate interest, but this requires a balancing test that also considers the data subject's rights and interests. As a last resort, consent can be an appropriate legal basis, but this comes with additional restrictions. Once you have a clear purpose that is covered by a legal basis, you can process the minimum data necessary to achieve the purpose. Sometimes, laws prescribe a particular legal basis. This is the case for cookies. You can use cookies (and similar technologies that access information on the end user's device) as strictly necessary to provide a service explicitly requested by the user. If you go beyond that, the ePrivacy Directive says you must obtain consent first. So for example, session cookies, shopping carts, or cookies that remember a “dark mode” preference are all perfectly fine because they are strictly necessary for something the user is trying to do. Also, you can use cookies to remember if the user gave or declined consent. On the other hand, analytics or tracking cookies are not necessary and require consent. If a website embeds third party content, this discloses personal data such as IP addresses to the third party. This disclosure requires a legal basis, most likely consent. There is case law about this regarding Facebook Like buttons on a page (→ Fashion ID case) but the same principle can be generalized to embedded Tweets or Youtube videos, images, or JavaScript files. A common way to handle this is to replace the embedded content with a placeholder, and to only load the embed once the user gives consent. But not all other domains or services are “third party” in the sense of the GDPR. When you engage a company to act as a data processor on your behalf, they are contractually bound to only use the data as instructed by you, and not for their own purposes. The GDPR allows you to outsource processing activities such as serving web content, as long as you have a suitable contract in place. Such “data processing agreements” are common for hosting providers or CDNs. When consent is to be used as a legal basis, it's important to consider the various conditions that the GDPR imposes (see Art 7 GDPR). The core principle is that consent must be freely given. You cannot make access to a site conditional on consent, so a naïve cookie wall or captive portal will be non-compliant. It's fine to force a choice, but “no” MUST be valid and possible. That consent is freely given also means that you must provide enough context for the user to make an informed decision, that the user must give consent through an unambiguous, affirmative action (consent is never the default), and that consent must be specific for a particular purpose (you can't bundle unrelated purposes). That is why modern consent management tools have multiple layers of information and allow the user to give consent for individual purposes (e.g. yes to analytics but no to ad personalization). In your particular context, you could proceed as follows: Figure out what kind of external content you're currently including. Can you enter into a data processing agreement with the external providers? If so, sign that. Can you host the content locally? This can be an easy solution except for video streams. Careful: copyright concerns might make this impossible. Can you replace the content with placeholders that only load if and when the user gives consent? That way, the rest of your site remains accessible without annoying consent walls. If the third party content is an unavoidable and essential part of your page, use an interstitial to inform the user of the risks before they proceed.	The second paragraph is an invitation for people who don't want to follow the terms of the GPL (e.g. who want to incorporate it into a larger closed-source work, or make closed-source modifications) to contact XXX for a less onerous (but more expensive) license. That would require that XXX have full rights to the software, that they did not for instance incorporate others' GPLed code. It would be a stretch to read the second paragraph as attempting to limit the first paragraph, particularly given the "please".	You have the right to request anything you want, but there is a very limited set of things that you can have a legal expectation of them doing. The service provider has no obligation to block a user. You can likewise request a report, and from a pirate site I would expect no response. There is no legal requirement that a pirate site block an offending user after a certain number of offenses. There is no direct way to compel a pirate site to ban a user. Indirectly you might accomplish that end if you take legal action against the site, which causes them to ban a user in order to protect themselves If a DMCA request was not "proper" (the correct legal form) they will not perform a takedown, and may not inform you that they won't. Make sure your takedown request is legally correct and actually delivered to the correct person. If they still ignore your request, they will have lost the "safe harbor" provisions, and you can theoretically sue them. Since the pirate site presumably only hosts a link to elsewhere, their making public such a link is not itself copyright infringement, so you need to be going after the ISPs who manage the actual host sites. The pirate site might still be a contributor to infringement, along MGM v. Grokster lines. A standard defense against infringement would be "We had no idea", and ignoring DMCA takedown notices is clear proof that they did have an idea. That's basically what DMCA takedown is about: saying what it takes to use the "We had no idea" defense.	It is not clear from your question whether you intend to make use of the Yelp API to display Yelp ratings on your own website. You ask: So is my idea fair use of these websites data or is not because of the TOS? The ToS is not for Yelp data, it is for the Yelp API. The ToS will only apply to you if you agree to it. However, if you agree to the ToS for the API, fair use is irrelevant. The ToS is a legally binding contract that trumps fair use. You also brings up Google's display of Yelp stars. This display is not based on the Google using the Yelp API, but on Yelp opting in on a mechansim created by Google called Rich Snippets. Returning to Yelp ToS, it is clear that its purpose is permit re-use of their "ratings, reviews, photos" etc. by to promote your own Yelp-rated business. Also what they clearly do not allow you do do, is to build a competitor to Yelp. Since your planned restaurant rating site would compete with Yelp, you will not be able to use the Yelp API to get the data. What if you didn't use the Yelp API, but simply scraped their site - would fair use apply? What constitutes fair use in borderline cases such as yours is mainly decided by case law. Case law differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. My general impression is that it is not fair use if the use is commercial in nature (i.e. you create something intended to directly compete with the site you scrape the data from) and your product or service does not communicate something new and different from the original or expands its utility. As always: If you want specific advice, hire a lawyer.	You Own The Code To answer your question on whether or not it is copyright infringement: Yes, you do own the rights to the written code but posting it on Github gives Github the right to store, archive, parse, and display Your Content, and make incidental copies, as necessary to provide the Service, including improving the Service over time. This license includes the right to do things like copy it to our database and make backups; show it to you and other users; parse it into a search index or otherwise analyze it on our servers; share it with other users; and perform it. To simply put it, no matter what license you use, you give GitHub the right to host your code and to use your code to improve their products and features. This license does not grant GitHub the right to sell Your Content. It also does not grant GitHub the right to otherwise distribute or use Your Content outside of our provision of the Service, except that as part of the right to archive your Content. So with respect to code that’s already on GitHub, I think the answer to the question of copyright infringement is fairly straightforward. Things aren’t quite as clear-cut in a scenario where Copilot is trained on code that is hosted outside of GitHub. In that situation, the copyright infringement question would hinge largely on the concept of fair use. If Copilot is being trained on code outside of GitHub, we accept that at least some of what they’re looking at is copyrightable work. So, the question then becomes if it’s fair use. Now, you ultimately can’t conclude definitively that something is fair use until you go to court and a judge agrees with your assessment. But I think there’s a strong case to be made that Copilot’s use of code is very transformative, a point which would favor the fair use argument. There is precedent for this sort of situation. Take the case of Google Books, for example. Google scanned millions of books, provided people who were doing research with the ability to search the book, and provided the user a small snippet of the text that the user was searching for in the book itself. The court did in fact find that was fair use. The use was very transformative. It allowed people to search millions of books. It didn’t substitute for the book itself. It didn’t really take away anything from the copyright holders; in fact, it made it easier for readers to access the work and actually opened a broader market for book authors. And, it was a huge value add on top of the copyrighted corpus. In the latter scenario, a lot depends on the thoroughness and the length of Copilot’s suggestions. The more complex and lengthy the suggestion, the more likely it has some sort of copyrightable expression. If a suggestion is short enough, the fact that it repeats something in someone else’s code may not make it copyrightable expression. There’s also the question of whether what’s being produced is actually a copy of what’s in the corpus. That’s a little unclear right now. GitHub reports that Copilot is mostly producing brand-new material, only regurgitating copies of learned code 0.1% of the time. But, we have seen certain examples online of the suggestions and those suggestions include fairly large amounts of code and code that clearly is being copied because it even includes comments from the original source code.
Meaning of "apart from this section" Reading Crown Proceedings Act 1950 I came across a use of the phrase "apart from this section" which I can't make much sense of: 14 Method of making Crown a party to proceedings (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and any other Act, civil proceedings under this Act by the Crown may be instituted by— (a) the appropriate government department in its own name if the department has power to sue apart from this section; (2) Subject to the provisions of this Act and any other Act, civil proceedings under this Act against the Crown shall be instituted against— (a) the appropriate government department in its own name if the department may be sued apart from this section; What is the purpose/meaning of the bold phrase in there? Would the provisions have a different meaning if that phrase was omitted? So far my interpretation is that the cited provisions only apply if any piece of legislation other than this section provides that the government department can sue/be sued. That said, the government department would not be able to sue/be sued just by virtue of section 14 unless other statute allowed so. But the thing is: section 14 on its own does not grant any government department the ability to sue/be sued. Therefore such ability can only be granted by another piece of legislation. Why would then "apart from this section" be necessary there?	I take that to mean that section 14 alone should not be construed to give a department the power to sue under sub section (1), nor the ability to be sued under sub section (2). Rather, if some other law, or some other section of that law confers such a power or ability, section 14 indicates how the power should be used, that is, gives the proper procedure. But if no such other law is in effect, section 14 alone won't do. If the law has simply said: civil proceedings under this Act by the Crown may be instituted by (a) the appropriate government department in its own That might have been construed to grant such powers to every "appropriate " department, which apparently was not desired.	The clause refers to what might be a lawsuit, which can be adjudicated in appropriate government courts (cf. the choice of law clause), but instead would be submitted to an arbitrator. The contract will spell out the details. An offence is a punishable criminal act, which is outside the scope of civil suits. In US law, the government prosecutes the wrong-doer, not e.g. one of the parties to the contract (if for example the vendor ships an illegal substance to a customer). The same goes for a "breach of law", depending of course what you mean by breach of law. A breach of contract could not be pursued in court, given a mandatory arbitration clause. The fact that the two parties are in different countries does not nullify a mandatory arbitration clause, at least between the US and the UK.	Does this create precedent? NO This was a Crown Court case, only the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal can set precedent which it did with similar circumstances in R v Hill 1989	A summary is here: see for example Section 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: 'in all the courts of the United States, the parties may plead and manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of counsel'. In the same vein, Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269 held that "an accused, in the exercise of a free and intelligent choice and with the considered approval of the court, may waive trial by jury, and so, likewise, may waive his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel". In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 it is held that this extends (via the 14th) to state courts. As to the expression "practice law", maybe the meaning of this expression is taken to be self-evident, though clearly it is not. Statutes that prohibit that act for non-lawyers generally specify things such as "for another person" or "holds himself out as entitled to practice law".	As a linguist who reads laws for a hobby, I would say that "and" legally means what it was intended to mean. There are often interpretive statutes which say that "and" can be read as "or" or vice versa, when necessary (as in ORC 1.02 "And" may be read "or," and "or" may be read "and" if the sense requires it. Delaware doesn't have that as a rule, but it is a rule employed by courts "as required". One approach to interpretation is to discern intent from surrounding text, so we would look at the whole code. The general context is the rule that "A building or land shall be used only for the following purposes". Following Article XXVII of the code, other uses could be permitted because "§115-32. Special use exceptions may be permitted by the Board of Adjustment and in accordance with the provisions of Article XXVII of this chapter and may include...". That section ends with "C:Other special use exceptions as follows", and includes "Private garages for more than four automobiles and with floor area of more than 900 square feet in a residential district". From the list of things enumerated in §115-32, there is no coherent pattern – some things are in the list of special exceptions, some things are in this list, some not. So the "surrounding text" approach doesn't help in this case. Scrutiny of legislative debate is sometimes invoked, especially at the federal level, but there is negligible chance that there is any such evidence here. The almost-final approach is to spell out the competing interpretations, and see if anything jumps out as ridiculous (because it is assumed that lawmakers do not pass ridiculous laws). The two interpretations are "both must be true", versus "one must be true". Since the general rule is that you can go ahead unless it is restricted, then with the "both" interpretation, you need a special exception permit if you simultaneously plan to have more than 4 automobiles (which means, 5+, so 4 is allowed) and floor area greater than 900 sf. Thus if you plan for only 4 cars, or can fit the 5 cars into 900 sf, then you would not require a permit (on the "both" interpretation). Which btw is the literal interpretation of "and". This is not an absurd scenario (using a generous 10'x18' space, which I derived from parking slot regulations in Danbury CT). So it is reasonable to think they meant "both". The "either of these" interpretation says that they are being even more restrictive – you need permission to have a 5+ car garage (regardless of size), and you need permission to have a garage larger than 800 sf (even if there were only 1 car in it). This seems a bit specific since there isn't generally a size restriction on structures in the code – except that playhouses are limited to 150 sf. and can't be tall enough for an adult to stand up. Since the literal meaning of "and" is "both at once", and since no facts about the code say otherwise (i.e. that interpretation does not result in an absurd nullification of some other provision), an objective court should interpret this rule to mean "both at once", thus the government imposes the fewest restrictions on your property. No way to know what they will do.	No. The Fourteenth Amendment says: nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; The Supreme Court has determined that this clause incorporates much of the Bill of Rights. The logic is mildly tortured, but it's basically that "due process of law" means "due process of a law that is compatible with the fundamental rights of a free society." This logic is known as "substantive due process," because it reads in to "due process of law" requirements about what those laws can do (as opposed to procedural due process, which is about the actual procedures being used). It's pretty settled that the Bill of Rights, after the 14th Amendment, should apply to the states. There's another possible way to get there: the 14th Amendment says "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States," which Justice Thomas recently thought meant that the Second Amendment applies to the states in a concurring opinion. But as of now, substantive due process is the standard logic for it. Virtually all of the Bill of Rights is incorporated against the states. There are a couple things which aren't (like juries in lawsuits, and grand juries), but the Establisment Clause is incorporated (see Everson v. Board of Education, 330 US 1).	Are there any underlying reasons behind the nonsensical structure of U.S.C. titles? Is it simply a case of "This is how it's been for awhile, don't fix what isn't broken." or is there more to it than that? First of all, the United States Code is generally not designed to be used by non-lawyers. Second, one of the main ways to research case law interpreting a statute is by doing a boolean search on the code section of that statute. Every time you change a title or section number, you impair the ability of people doing legal research (both judges and lawyers) to find previous case law interpreting the meaning of the statute. Third, you make it much harder to determine when the substance of the provision was originally enacted (e.g. if you want legislative history or to determine which of two conflicting statutory provisions was enacted first) since an annotated statute will often show when the current section was enacted but will not explain what it was derived from. Fourth, the location of a statute within the context of other statutory sections often informs its meaning. Machine gun may have one definition in two or three laws, and a different one in two or three other laws, and there may be yet other laws where machine gun is an undefined term. Moving a statutory section from one part of the code to another could influence the default definition that one uses for an undefined term changing substantive law. Fifth, usually a new codification will also involve some drafting standards, for example, to add gender neutrality or to avoid notoriously ambiguous constructions (like 250 word sentences). But, it isn't at all uncommon for very slight changes like the position of a comma or the formatting of a section with multiple indents, to result in a change of the likely meaning of a somewhat ambiguous statute and it is pretty much impossible to know a priori when a statutory section is ambiguous until you are confronted with a fact pattern that makes the ambiguity in that context clear. This isn't confined to obscure laws of little importance. For example, the question of whether Obamacare applied in states that hadn't set up their own exchanges hinged on these kinds of issues. None of this is to say that you should never recodify the statutes. But, a basically aesthetic motivation that mostly matters to people who make up a tiny portion of the main users of the product (non-lawyers) that poses multiple threats to how statutes will be located using legal research tools, and how it will be interpreted once located, means that reorganizing statutes is not something to be done lightly. In short, there are a lot of serious, substantive costs that can accompany a recodification of a law. As a result, re-codification is most often done only as part of an overall omnibus reform of an area of law on the merits where the interest in being able to track prior interpretive caselaw and determine the original meaning of a statute enacted long ago is at its lowest. Barring the even more ridiculous case of Congress repealing everything and passing the exact same laws again, just under different Titles/Chapters/etc, This is not so ridiculous. Most states have done exactly that one or two times in their history (sometimes more for older states). Also, many newly admitted to the union states also do something similar. For example, the basic template for the statutes in Colorado was the statutes of the state of Illinois. Basically, the first time around, somebody started with an Illinois statute book, eliminated Illinois specific laws and laws that they didn't like, rearranged them and adopted them as the original statutes of the State of Colorado (it may have actually been version 2.0 after a stopgap set of statutes, I don't recall which). Also, most states completely repeal and readopt all of their statutes in codified form on the recommendation of the codifier to a legislative committee, to reflect the acts passed in the previous session, every year. This doesn't involve overhauls really, but in principle is a complete repeal and reenactment. While the federal government has never overhauled the entire U.S. Code in this manner, it has been done at the level of individual titles of the U.S. Code. For example, the most recent major reorganization and overhaul of the structure of the Internal Revenue Code (Title 26) was in 1986. The copyright laws were overhauled in the late 1970s. Both of those accompanied major substantive changes in those areas of law. Another major recodification of many parts of the U.S. Code took place following 9-11 in connection with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, which reorganized both the bureaucracy and the associated U.S. Code language associated with dozens of federal agencies. would it be possible for Congress to arbitrarily merge, combine, and delete Titles, and to rearrange the location of laws, definitions, etc? Are there laws/regulations governing this? Yes. Congress can do so any time it wants by passing a bill (it would be the longest bill ever - dozens of volumes long) doing so, and getting the President to sign it. The legislative process would be exactly the same as any other bill.	Contra proferentem However, it's a principle that is rarely applied in practice since it's at the end of a long line of judicial reasoning that gets applied first. Ambiguity in contract provisions are usually resolved by the golden rule: Determine the ordinary and natural meaning of the words used Consider the context of the contract including its purpose, any "recitals" or "background" clauses and other relevant provisions If the ordinary and natural meaning is inconsistent with the context or gives rise to absurdities, modify the meaning as appropriate. In the vast majority of case, this approach will give a meaning the court adopts without needing to invoke the contra proferentem rule. However, in the minority of cases where the rule is applied it works like this. The ambiguity should be interpreted against: the party who prepared the contract (particularly for standard form contracts offered on a "take it or leave it" basis) the party seeking to rely on the ambiguous position (e.g. the beneficiary of a guarantee, indemnity, limitation or exclusion provision). Finally, contra proferentem may not apply because: it can be specifically excluded in the contract (which most drafters do) where the provision has been the subject of back-and-forth amendments by the parties it can be impossible to say that only one of the parties drafted it.
Is there a term denoting definitions that are contrary to a term's plain meaning? Legislation sometimes defines a term so that it is contradictory to its plain meaning, or contradictory to the term's meaning in another context. For example, 52 USC 30121 defines "foreign national" to exclude permanent resident aliens despite the fact that such a person does not have US nationality, and the Schengen Borders Code defines "third-country national" to exclude, among others, "third-country nationals who are members of the family of a Union citizen exercising his or her right to free movement to whom Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council applies." As a hypothetical example, consider a definition of "grape" that excludes concord grapes. Is there a term that describes such a definition? I am thinking of calling it a "self-contradictory" definition, but that doesn't seem quite right.	Most of your examples don't seem to be so much self-contradictory, as limited to a subset of the obvious meaning for purposes of a particular law. When a term has a specific meaning within a particular field or context, it is often called a "term of art". For example "Fair use" is a term of art in US Copyright law, and "Under color of law" is a term of art in US civil rights law. "Standing" is a term of art in most common-law jurisdictions. But a term of art is usually somewhat broadly understood, and is not limited to one particular law or section of law. I would just call such a thing a "specially defined term" or just say "Q as defined for purposes of the XYZ law".	The law doesn't distinguish between two Christians with divergent beliefs, or between an atheist and a Christian (obviously with divergent beliefs). The law simply does not care what religion you have, or whether you have one. The law just says "follow the law!". The complication is that part of the First Amendment which says that the law is to be neutral as to religion also has what's known as the "Free Exercise Clause", the part that says "or prohibiting the free exercise thereof", which has been taken to refer to actions undertaken because of that belief. There have been various rulings on the conflict between religious doctrine and laws requiring or prohibiting certain actions (mandatory flag salutes, conscription, religious pamphleting). When a law conflicts with a fundamental right such as a right protected by the First Amendment, such a law is allowed only in narrow circumstances (known as strict scrutiny). It is up to Congress to state what kinds of First Amendment-based exceptions there are to laws. In a case involving the draft, SCOTUS held in US v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 that The test of religious belief within the meaning of the exemption in § 6(j) is whether it is a sincere and meaningful belief occupying in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualified for the exemption This view underlies the current regulation on employment and religious discrimination in 29 CFR 1605.1 that In most cases whether or not a practice or belief is religious is not at issue. However, in those cases in which the issue does exist, the Commission will define religious practices to include moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views. The question that EEOC or the courts would have to answer is, what fundamental life belief is being violated by compelling a certain action? Forcing Muslims to eat pork violates a fundamental belief of Muslims. Prohibiting Muslim employers from discriminating against pork-eaters does not violate those beliefs, because there is no fundamental life belief held by Muslims that it is a mortal sin to hire pork eaters. In this case, Ann is at a disadvantage because she can't maintain that being forced to hire Christine violates a fundamental belief of hers (it's like refusing to hire pork-eaters). If Christine was obnoxious in espousing her viewpoint in a manner that reflected badly on Ann's business, Ann can fire Christine. Ann might, on those same grounds, refuse to hire Christine if there was a well-justified belief that such damage to her business will result (you don't have to wait until your business is destroyed). The (implied) fact on Christine's resume is not sufficient evidence that Christine will cause a problem for Ann's business. Instead, it is a plain instance of religious discrimination, which is prohibited by law.	What is the meaning of notwithstanding in this context? The clause that starts with "notwithstanding" narrows down the levels of studies that are eligible for payment by the Trustee(s). In other words, for purposes of payment of benefits, "education" can be interpreted only as "undergraduate and graduate study", and thus it overrides --only pursuant to that clause-- the wide encompassing notion of "education" as defined in paragraph 5(b). The clause implies that any other levels of studies, such as "elementary or high schools", are not eligible for payment by the Trustee(s). The inclusion of "notwithstanding" seems intended to reflect the awareness of apparent discrepancy of the definitions of "education", and to consequently clarify the intent that paragraph 5(b) be regarded as the appropriate definition of "education" for everything except the matter of payments.	A law which punishes a specific person – a "bill of attainder" – is unconstitutional. Private laws, which benefit an individual, are legal. An example is Private Law 112-1, which says Notwithstanding any other provision of law, for the purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.), Sopuruchi Chukwueke shall be deemed to have been lawfully admitted to, and remained in, the United States, and shall be eligible for adjustment of status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence under section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1255) upon filing an application for such adjustment of status. Nothing prevents such a bill from being made law, where the benefit is a grant of citizenship. Of course, it has to be signed by the president, or else congress must override his veto.	When you are in another country, you are subject to their laws - you may be arrested and go through the due process as defined by that countries laws. This potentially means anything from a fine, to incarceration or deportation or even execution, depending on the local countries laws. A good example is the caning of American citizen Michael Fay in 1994 by the Singapore authorities, as a judicial punishment for vandalism, or the case of Swiss citizen Oliver Fricker, who was also caned in 2010 for vandalism.	Insofar as those treaties don't bind the US, the notion of "violating" such laws is moot. Hoda Muthana is, under Yemeni law, a Yemeni citizen (it is immaterial whether she has ever "accepted" or exploited it), and as such stripping her of US citizenship would not leave her stateless. In the case of Hoda Muthana, the action is based on the legal argument that she was not ever a citizen, based on the premise that her father was a foreign diplomat. Under US law, children born to foreign diplomats in the US are not birthright citizens, following US v. Wong Kim Ark. Birthright citizenship cannot be revoked. However, a person can renounce their citizenship, via certain acts, including taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof, after having attained the age of eighteen years;or (3) entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state if (A) such armed forces are engaged in hostilities against the United States, or (B) such persons serve as a commissioned or non-commissioned officer The defense argument would presumably be that ISIS is not a foreign state (despite their own claims to the contrary) so her affiliation with ISIS does not qualify. There are grounds for denaturalization, including falsifying or concealing relevant facts pertaining to naturalization, refusing to testify before Congress, or joining a subversive organization including Al Qaeda within 5 years of naturalization.	In the US it is not a crime to be in the country illegally. As a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain in the United States. Arizona v US So it's illegal, you get a state induced consequence (deportation) but it doesn't make you a criminal e.g. you don't go to jail for it. I have no idea if that's what's going on over there but it's a plausible explanation.	Isn’t this discrimination since nationals do not have to apply? Yes it is discrimination. But that does not make it illegal. In fact discrimination is in general legal unless it is based on some characteristic which is specifically forbidden as a basis for discrimination (e.g. race). And in general, all of the countries in the world allow and enforce discrimination based on nationality; for example non-nationals will not be able to run for Head of State (and additional restrictions may apply). The EU members allowing similar rights to the citizens of other EU countries is the exception, not the rule, and once the UK stops being bound by EU treaties it can impose its own legal system on non-nationals. And while EU treaties give lots of rights to EU member-countries citizens, they still allow for discrimination based on nationality (for example you cannot run for Prime Minister or MP of Spain as a foreign EU resident). Isn’t the UK Government breaking the law? This could go against EU treaties, but the point is that the UK will no longer need to comply with them. is the UK Government responsible for the harm and distress caused to the individual health and mental wellbeing? No, the UK Government is not responsible if you do not like its laws to the point that it affects your health. Is there any ground for challenging this scheme legality in court? Unlikely. In any case it will not be because you are frightened by it, any challenge would be in the grounds that the government actions act against some other UK law. For example, if the decision to make such a list was made by the Executive but it contradicts some law approved by the Parliament. If this list does not contradict any law, then there are no grounds for challenging it. Would there a breach of my human rights if I was not to apply for settle status and then subsequentially got deported (taken away from my children, home, business, etc.)? How about if I was refused, re-entry or access to public services (NHS for example)? If you do not apply you will not have any evidence that you were settled, and the government could legitimately believe that you are irregularly in the country and try to expel you; you probably would have an opportunity to prove that you were settled even if you were not in the list but that could be way slower, more expensive, riskier and stressful than just registering now. Get this clear: that settled person list is to help you to show that you were a UK resident before Brexit and to give you the protections that are being negotiated between the UK and the EU for expatriates. Probably you could choose not to enlist, but it would work against you.
GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) - crypto-shredding or regular delete? The introduction of the GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) in May 2018 for all businesses targeting EU citizens raises questions regarding the Art. 17 right to erasure, also known as the right to be forgotten. The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay and the controller shall have the obligation to erase personal data without undue delay I think it is reasonable to say that deleting all data (backup included) is not feasible without delay. What about backups that go beyond the subject realm (e.g. database backups, disk backups, ...)? One idea to solve a part of the problem would be to crypto-shred data. So when a subject asks to erase him/her personal data, we simply erase the encryption key. That would render all data unusable. However, data encrypted with what is considered a strong encryption method might not be strong anymore in a not-so-distant future (e.g. quantum computing, new algorithms, or a weakness found in the encryption mechanism). So here are my questions: Is crypto-shredding considered a valid erasure method? What storage mediums are affected by the so-called undue delay?	In my opinion, this should be enough. The GDPR regulation is general - it does not attempt to address these issues directly, precisely for the reasons we see here: You can never predict how the technology will develop. When interpreting the GDPR, we must keep the intended goal in mind. What is the purpose of the "right to erasure"? To prevent anyone from further processing the personal data. If you "crypto-shred" it, it can't be processed anymore, not even theoretically. The encryptec file cannot be used to identify the subject, therefore it is not even personal data anymore. In case it can be decrypted in the future... Well, that is just a speculation. The courts can go to great lengths in interpreting what personal data is (dynamic IP address is considered personal data, since it can be linked to a person by the police with a court order), but i am pretty sure that "it can be theoretically possible in some distant future" is beyond the limit. As for the second question, I am not aware of any applicable case-law, but I guess that current security and technological standards will be used to assess the delay. You have a right to protect your data, the subject has a right to erase them. Those rights must be balanced, neither fully overrules the other. The delay should be short enough so the right to erasure is effective, and it should not extremely long compared to other (economically viable) backup solutions available, in line with current industrial standards.	Congrats, you've done well to minimize your processing of personal data. But I think you're still processing personal data, and are subject to the GDPR. Serving a website necessarily involves processing an IP address. This IP address will typically be personal data. While you are not storing the IP address, the GDPR's definition of “processing” extends beyond storage and pretty much covers doing anything with that IP address. As far as I know this is not an entirely settled matter, but it's better to err on the side of caution and to assume that you are in fact performing a processing activity. Even a static web page can easily lead to additional relevant processing of personal data, for example if the HTML embeds resources from third party domains. Since your website is clearly targeted at the public, it does not fall under the GDPR's exception for “purely personal or household” purposes. So I think you do need a (minimal) privacy notice that contains at least the items mentioned in Art 13 GDPR. The main reason why some people try to avoid posting a privacy notice is because it must disclose your identity and contact details. But in Germany, that information has to be provided anyway due to the Impressumspflicht. As part of your GDPR compliance obligations, you must protect how data is processed by others on your behalf. A hosting provider will typically act as your data processor. For this to be legal, you need a contract / data processing agreement that fulfills the conditions in Art 28 GDPR. This contract binds the data processor to only use the data as instructed by you, and not for their own purposes. European hosting providers sometimes include the necessary terms in their terms of service / AGB, but you should check to make sure. Netcup expects you to accept their data processing amendment in your account settings. In the hypothetical case that you were not processing any personal data at all, the GDPR would not apply and it wouldn't require you to post a privacy notice. Other laws might still have information obligations, notably the German TMG and TTDSG.	Backups and archived data are included within the scope of GDPR, simply because: (a) The scope of which data the regulation applies to is defined as: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system. (GDPR, Article 2(1): Material Scope, page 32) and (b) the exclusions listed in Article 2(2) do not mention anything about backups/archives (also on page 32). The new rules for most organisations will mean they need to review and possibly change how they operate their backup/restore procedures so that risks of data breach are managed and significantly reduced to a level which follows the data protection principles in Article 5(1) and so they can demonstrate compliance as required by Article 5(2): 1.Personal data shall be: (a) processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject (‘lawfulness, fairness and transparency’); (b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes; further processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes shall, in accordance with Article 89(1), not be considered to be incompatible with the initial purposes (‘purpose limitation’); (c) adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed (‘data minimisation’); (d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that personal data that are inaccurate, having regard to the purposes for which they are processed, are erased or rectified without delay (‘accuracy’); (e) kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the personal data are processed; personal data may be stored for longer periods insofar as the personal data will be processed solely for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes in accordance with Article 89(1) subject to implementation of the appropriate technical and organisational measures required by this Regulation in order to safeguard the rights and freedoms of the data subject (‘storage limitation’); (f) processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical or organisational measures (‘integrity and confidentiality’). 2.The controller shall be responsible for, and be able to demonstrate compliance with, paragraph 1 (‘accountability’). (GDPR, Article 5: Principles relating to processing of personal data, pages 35-36) Some practical tips to help with GDPR compliance: Rather than backing up everything in bulk as whole systems, organisations may find it easiest to separate systems backups and personal data backups so that systems backups can be kept for much longer retention periods than might be allowed/justifiable for the personal data. For larger organisations that have much more complex backup arrangements, much higher capacity backups and tape systems with archives that are kept offline, they may need to create a new backup strategy that will support the legal requirements of GDPR for ensuring 'erased' records are not retained any longer than necessary, and that older backups are replaced by newer backups so that stale/outdated personal data is not retained and rectified/amended records take effect in backups without delay. Organisations that have become used to keeping backups of everything forever will need to modify their practices and culture in order to comply with the 'what is necessary' and 'no longer than necessary' requirements by implementing a backup strategy that has defined retention periods for specific data sets or records as appropriate. If a stored backup is in a form which makes it very difficult to modify (e.g. a single record within a large database which spans numerous backup tapes) contained records which a data subject has requested be erased, then it may be considered reasonable if these records are erased upon every subsequent restore prior to processing of the data, until such time these records are not included in the backups. You'll need to keep a record of anyone that requests to be forgotten, and remember to follow-up to complete erasure at the appropriate dates if it can't be done immediately, and when the data is destroyed the data subject needs to be informed: The controller shall provide information on action taken on a request under Articles 15 to 22 to the data subject without undue delay and in any event within one month of receipt of the request. That period may be extended by two further months where necessary, taking into account the complexity and number of the requests. The controller shall inform the data subject of any such extension within one month of receipt of the request, together with the reasons for the delay. Where the data subject makes the request by electronic form means, the information shall be provided by electronic means where possible, unless otherwise requested by the data subject. If the controller does not take action on the request of the data subject, the controller shall inform the data subject without delay and at the latest within one month of receipt of the request of the reasons for not taking action and on the possibility of lodging a complaint with a supervisory authority and seeking a judicial remedy. (GDPR, Article 12(3-4): Transparent information, communication and modalities for the exercise of the rights of the data subject, page 40) Additionally to complicate things further, if any third party processors ('recipients') have had access to their data, you need to inform them too: The controller shall communicate any rectification or erasure of personal data or restriction of processing carried out in accordance with Article 16, Article 17(1) and Article 18 to each recipient to whom the personal data have been disclosed, unless this proves impossible or involves disproportionate effort. The controller shall inform the data subject about those recipients if the data subject requests it. (GDPR, Article 19: Notification obligation regarding rectification or erasure of personal data or restriction of processing, page 45) In the event of a breach you may still need to notify data subjects that have requested to be forgotten! Obviously the backups would still need to be encrypted and subject to suitable protections, see Article 32 - Security of Processing (pages 51-52).	The Art 15 GDPR Right to Access is pretty absolute, the Art 17 Right to Erasure not so much. Whether you can successfully request erasure of your personal data will depend on the purpose and legal basis for that processing. Short decision schema to check if erasure should be granted: no, if any of the Art 17(3) exception applies yes, if the data is no longer necessary for the purposes for which it is being processed (Art 17(1)(a)) yes, if the legal basis was Art 6(1)(a) consent (Art 17(1)(b)) if the data is being processed pursuant to a legitimate interest, yes, if the data subject successfully objected to the processing (Art 17(1(c)) yes, if the data is being processed for direct marketing purposes (Art 21(2)) yes, if the data subject objects on grounds relating to their particular situation, unless those grounds are overridden by a compelling legitimate interest For example, CCTV recordings on private property are often stored for some time for a legitimate interest to deter crime and to be able to investigate criminal acts if they should occur. A data subject could object to the recording, but would likely be unsuccessful: it doesn't make sense to let individuals opt-out from security measures, otherwise bad actors could use this to destroy evidence. Thus, the objection and consequently the request for erasure should be denied.	[I'm not so well-versed on US and Russian law, thus I will limit my answer to EU law.] Your specific use of a user identifier, as I understood from your question, can be classified as personal data, so in your case, the GDPR seems to apply. This means that you need to have a) legitimate purposes to process that personal data (e.g. crash reporting) and b) a legal justification for each purpose of processing: it could be based on consent or another legitimate purpose (inc. your own legitimate interests). Consent might not be the best option for you, but it's up to you to decide. In any case, you need to assess the risks to the data subjects (your users) before you decide. How likely is it that you will get breached, and what potential harm will that cause to your users? These are some guidelines; my recommendation is that you read the law and the guidelines by the Article 29 Working Group and European Data Protection Board, or hire some good experts on this. There is no easy answer, or one size fits all solution. The GDPR isn't so hard to understand or implement, but it does require some change in mindset. With the new law, processing personal data carries a higher risk of penalties, so you should do it only when it's absolutely necessary, and with respect to the rights of your users.	The GDPR does not mandate specific features, but that any processing is lawful and transparent etc. So what would be the purpose of storing a revision history? Once that is clear you can work out an appropriate legal basis (e.g. a legitimate interest) and then figure out which data subject rights apply. For example, let's assume that there is a security interest in keeping a revision history, so that (a) mistaken edits can be rolled back, and (b) the user can be notified of possibly unauthorized changes. This would be a legitimate interest primarily of the account holder, secondarily of you as the system operator. Of course, such security requirements have to be proportional, but I'd see that as given when there's a payment method on file. You are required to apply appropriate safety measures and to apply the data minimization principle. E.g. is it necessary to store this revision history for all eternity? No, one or two months will likely be sufficient. Who should have access to this data? If the purpose is to defend against unauthorized access, it could make sense to only give out this data on request, and otherwise only make it available to support and security staff. Now we can discuss how this interfaces with rectification or deletion. That the user is able to rectify their data themselves is very good. However, that doesn't imply a prohibition on keeping a revision history: the revision history indicates what data was stored at what point in time, and is by definition correct. This assumes that you are not using the revision history for any other purposes. When the legal basis is a legitimate interest, a request for erasure has to be preceded by (or implies) an objection (opt-out) to further processing. The objection must weighed against the legitimate interest: the objection can be denied when there are overriding grounds to continue processing. This might be the case for a security purpose: if someone with unauthorized access can just erase their traces, the purpose cannot be achieved. But perhaps the user could opt out when they create their account? Or opt-out later, but with some delay to still achieve the security purpose at the time of opt-out? In any case, erasure is required when the data is no longer necessary for its purpose – this ties back to picking an appropriate retention period, as discussed above. So it's not really possible to provide a general answer, and it really depends on the specific purpose you are trying to achieve.	Artice §12(5) GDPR limits the right to access: Information provided under Articles 13 and 14 and any communication and any actions taken under Articles 15 to 22 and 34 shall be provided free of charge. Where requests from a data subject are manifestly unfounded or excessive, in particular because of their repetitive character, the controller may either: (a) charge a reasonable fee taking into account the administrative costs of providing the information or communication or taking the action requested; or (b) refuse to act on the request. The controller shall bear the burden of demonstrating the manifestly unfounded or excessive character of the request. A request to request the filing that you acted on their request is already excessive, repeated and frequent requests could be acted upon by taking the not-acting steps or sending an invoice before any action is taken. Also, very frequent requests with overlapping times might be answered jointly. It would be good to inform the customer in the last answer granted for free, how often they requested information and that any further answer might incur such and such fees for compiling the information.	What many people miss in relation to GDPR is the other five lawful bases for processing - there's a lot of discussion about consent, but this is only one lawful basis of six. The full list from Article 6 : Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies: (a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes; (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person; (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Arguable bases would include performance of a contract or public interest, though there's also room to argue whether legitimate interests of the controller are, or are not, overriden by the subject's fundamental rights and freedoms. The short answer is it's not just about consent, and press and social media sites are likely to have covered themselves with their contract or with a public interest argument.
GDPR Legislation and user invites by email I want to understand what the implications are for user emails with the onset of GDPR. It's a bit of a strange question but here is the scenario. We run a Software as a Service platform when a user can invite other users to a team. They do this by email, at which point we have a user's "personal information" in the form of their email and we have issued them an email invite. We have to keep the email address on record for a period of time, say 7 days, for that invite to be accepted at which point we delete it if no action has been taken. I understand the restrictions on me in terms of not marketing to this email address etc. I want to understand if I am even allowed to send the invite email in the first place. That is to say, if someone hasn't explicitly given me their email address, am I allowed to use it. Logic would indicate that this should be fine as it really makes the user experience of inviting people very poor, however, the question has been asked by a member of my team and so I thought I'd seek some clarity.	I'm not entirely sure why you have to store the data of the invited user? You can simply hash the email address. Hashes are meaningless without the original input so that would allow you to store the data. Sending email means that you're processing personal data. In your use case it would fall under Art 6 (f): Legitimate Interest. (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. I do advice you to also follow these guidelines in the submission of the email: https://sendgrid.com/docs/Classroom/Deliver/Address_Lists/peer_initiated_email_invitation_requirements.html	StackExchange is a processor under GDPR because it processes the data you provide it when you sign up and input personal information. It's determined by an analysis of what function(s) the business is performing. If you are merely processing the data but don't have control over it (e.g. another business is using your software to do something with data that it is providing you) then you are likely to be a data processor. Conversely, if you control the data, you are likely to be a data controller. It is possible to be both a data controller and a data processor at the same time. That specific link in your post goes on to state: Our business customers may qualify as controllers when they purchase certain of our products and services. We act as processors on behalf of such Customers. This is referring to the Teams product that StackExchange offers or whatever the "internal company-only question and answer site" product they offer is called.	An app(lication program) is software run on the end-users machine. That does not fall under the GDPR. Any processing (including storage) you do on user data has to be compliant with the GDPR. Allows a user to authenticate via e.g. Facebook and stores some basic data (optional) Authentication via Facebook leaves GDPR compliance to Facebook (AFAIK). It would be a good idea to provide alternative authentication methods, such as Google and an "own account" user name and password so that the user doesn't have to share information with a multinational company in order to use your service. The "basic data" will need to be processed according to the GDPR. As long as the "optional" part is "opt in" (i.e. the user needs to at least click on something) then this means you have permission to process that data. Providing this "basic data" as a JSON or CSV file should meet data portability requirements. Allows a user to upload a GPX file (a route or some other activity) Stores the above file to Google's database Allows the user to analyze that file. Since the user is actively choosing to upload each file you have permission to do this. You should make it clear in your privacy policy that the data will be held by Google. Doing so should not be a problem as Google has set up the legal framework to do this under the GDPR. You don't have to store the information encrypted, but you should use encryption (e.g. HTTPS) for any data transmission. Allowing the user to analyse the file is not an issue; either the user is doing it on their own machine (GDPR irrelevant) or you are doing it under user instruction (meaning you have consent). Since the user has uploaded GPX files they already have data portability on those files. You should tell your users that while you will employ best endeavours you don't promise to keep their files accessible and they should maintain their own private copies. That way if your entire database gets corrupted they can't blame you for loss of data. Finally, make sure there is a "Close my account and delete all my data" option.	If the lawyer has legitimate concerns, his first port of call would be the ICO https://ico.org.uk/. Before the ICO will take his complaint further he'll have had write to you expressing his concerns and received a written response that presumably he is unhappy with, and wants to take the issue further. Most companies have a data compliance team who will have policies and procedures to log breaches like this and decide what course of action to take in response. Not every breach needs to be brought to the attention of the ICO, and they have a handy self assessment tool to see if you should report the breach. https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/report-a-breach/ In your situation, I don't think this constitutes a serious breach which will require investigating. It's simply an admin error. If it is unlikely to pose a risk to any of the individuals they will say something like: You should keep an internal record of the breach as detailed in Article 33 (5) of the GDPR, including what happened, the effects of the breach and remedial actions taken. The definition of risk according to the ICO is: "This risk exists when the breach may lead to physical, material or non-material damage for the individuals whose data have been breached". So in this case I'd assume a simple apology (Bcc'd :) ) and a record of what happened, how it happened, and the action taken to prevent it happening again should suffice.	This might be based on a misunderstanding of the GDPR. The GDPR applies under three circumstances: Art 3(1): you (the data controller) are established/live in the EU. Art 3(2)(a): you offer goods or services to people in the EU. Art 3(2)(b): you monitor behaviour of people who are physically in the EU. What is not a factor: what citizenship your site visitors have (see Recital 14). whether your site can be accessed from the EU (see Recital 23). The crucial part is what “offering of goods or services” means. The EDPB has issued official guidelines on the interpretation of this targeting criterion (guidelines 03/2018 on the territorial scope of the GDPR). Some important notes: The offer of goods or services does not have to involve any compensation. Gratis access to a website can also be a service. GDPR applies when targeting people currently in the EU. US tourists in the EU are protected, EU tourists in the US are not. The moment of offering the service matters. E.g. a US person using an US service cannot claim GDPR protection against the US service while travelling to the EU. Instead of looking at the users of the service, we should look at the target market of the service: if the service doesn't cater to people in the EU, GDPR doesn't apply. The essential question is whether the provider of the service “envisages” offering services to people in the EU. Does the service provider intend for EU data subjects to use the service? The guidelines assemble a non-exhaustive list of indications from case law, in particular the Pammer and Alpenhof case. An excerpt of indications that GDPR might apply: the EU or member states are mentioned in the offer of services the website has marketing targetted at an EU audience the activity at issue is of international nature, e.g. tourism mentioning special contact details for the EU market using a top-level domain name associated with the EU or member states travel instructions when visiting from the EU mentions of an international clientele including people/companies from the EU use of a language or currency other than yours offering delivery of goods to the EU So whether GDPR applies would depend on the subject matter of your website, and on whether you intend to participate in the EU market (even if only online, even if your service is gratis). If GDPR were to apply, then blocking people from the EU would be questionable. It might also be illegal, but not on GDPR grounds. If GDPR does not apply, then blocking people from the EU is already unnecessary. However, geoblocking would be a very strong indication that you don't intend to offer your services to people in the EU. There is no good case law on whether geoblocking is necessary or sufficient. I assume that geoblocking is sufficient (even if it can be easily circumvented e.g. with a VPN), but that it's not necessary in the first place. You could also re-emphasize that you're not targeting the EU market when considering the above indications. E.g. a web shop might clarify that they only ship to North America, but not internationally. Again: your targeting of your website is the crucial factor, not the origin of your visitors. So even if there is an occasional EU visitor, that doesn't mean you have to comply with GDPR.	IP addresses are personal data. That means you need a legal basis to process them, but not necessarily consent from the user. That IP addresses should be treated as personal data in most contexts is clear, regardless of whether you can associate the IP address with a user ID. That you make such an association affirms that both the IP address and user ID are personal data in your context though. As the answers in the questions you linked indicate, there are alternative legal bases to consent. The GDPR offers a choice of six legal bases (Art 6(1) lit a–f). In most cases, you would instead rely on a “legitimate interest” for logging. But it's not enough to claim that you have a legitimate interest. You must have a clear purpose for which such logs would be necessary, and you would then have to weigh this legitimate interest against the interests, rights, and freedoms of the affected data subjects. If such logs are necessary for security and anti-abuse purposes, your legitimate interest test is likely to prevail. However, you must limit retention of the logged data and the included information to what is actually necessary. For example, keeping user IDs in there might not be necessary. If the association of IP addresses and user IDs is not necessary for a legitimate interest, then you would indeed need consent. Discussion on why IP addresses are personal data. You see many answers and opinions that IP addresses might not be personal data. Some of these are technically correct, but most are misinformed or outdated. I know only a single well-informed person that still disagrees. For everyone else such as the EU Commission, IP addresses are clearly personal data. Under the GDPR, personal data is any information that relates to an (indirectly) identifiable natural person. In the context of log files we can assume that the entries usually “relate” to a person, namely the person making the request. The exception would be requests triggered by automated systems. The more interesting question is whether the person to which the log entry relates is identifiable. While the GDPR does provide further guidance on the concept of identification in Recital 26, it does not provide clear unambiguous criteria. Thus, there is lots of debate about what that precisely means. One approach is to sidestep that debate and and notice that the GDPR's definition of personal data explicitly notes that a person might be identified “in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier” (Art 4(1)). Another but otherwise unrelated part of the GDPR mentions “internet protocol addresses, cookie identifiers or other identifiers such as radio frequency identification tags” as examples of online identifiers (Recital 30). We can also look more deeply into Recital 26 and see that “singling out” already counts as identification. We can use the IP address to single out one person's log entries from the set of log entries, so this could be interpreted as meaning that any stable user ID renders the data personal data – and an IP address is sufficiently stable in this context. Another part of Recital 26 says that we must consider “all the means reasonably likely to be used” for identification, even if this involves additional information from third parties. This phrasing is virtually identical to the GDPR's predecessor, the EU Data Protection Directive. On the basis of that DPD, the EU's top court (ECJ/CJEU) was asked to rule on the question whether dynamic IP addresses are personal data (the Breyer case, C‑582/14, judgement from 2016-10-19). It said yes. “It did not say yes”, some people will object. And they are technically correct. When someone rents an internet connection from an ISP, the ISP will have logs that connect the user's real-world identity to the IP address they were assigned at a time. You don't have access to the ISP's logs. But, if that user violated your rights (e.g. a cyberattack or copyright infringement), then you could (depending on civil vs criminal matters) report this to the appropriate authorities or to petition the court and they would have the right to order the ISP to disclose this information. The CJEU said that if this chain (you → authorities → ISP → user identity) is grounded in law, then the IP address would be identifiable. But whether there are suitable laws to compel the ISP to disclose this data would be up to national laws, and the CJEU doesn't concern itself with that. Spoiler: such laws are pretty common. To summarize typical objections: The IP address doesn't relate to a person: Can be a valid objection, but is not typically the case for user-facing web services. The Recital 30 argument is not valid because it's about profiling, not identification, and it only says that IP addresses may be used for profiling, not that they are always identifying: Technically correct, but I think that Recital 30 merely expresses the implied understanding that of course an IP address is an online identifier and permits identification by itself. “Singling out” does not apply because SOME_REASON: Indeed, this is an ill-defined term with no case law to guide us. However, regulators such as the EDPB and their predecessor WP29 routinely use “singling out” to mean being able to distinguish one person's data from other people's data. An IP address lets us do that. The Breyer judgement is not applicable because the defendant in that case was the German state, and the state has other legal means than ordinary website operators: Nothing in that case was specific to the website operator being a state or other authority. If the website operator can contact the appropriate authority and if they have the right to order the ISP to disclose the relevant data, then the IP address is identifiable. The CJEU didn't say “yes” in Breyer, it said “if”. So I'll take that as a “no”: The CJEU concerns itself with the interpretation of EU law, not with national laws. Specifically in the Breyer case, lower courts confirmed that German law has the necessary means. In other EU member states, further checks would be necessary but it would surprise me if there wouldn't be equivalent subpoena powers. If the ISP doesn't have the data, then the IP addresses are anonymous: Indeed, the CJEU scenario collapses if there is no additional data to be linked with the IP address. However: The CJEU used this scenario as an example to show that IP addresses can be identifiable. If that particular scenario fails, there could be other scenarios that still allow identification. The question of whether IP addresses are identifiable had of course been the subject of wider debate at the time. That the GDPR explicitly mentions IP addresses can be seen as a reaction to this debate. Thus, in a sense, the Breyer case is moot. It is still useful as an explanation of how broad “reasonably likely means” must be interpreted.	The obligation to notify the supervisory authority (CNIL in your case) no longer exists. It was part of the previous regulatory framework, but it is not part of GDPR (which takes affect tomorrow). If you use CCTV that may monitor employees (i.e. they sometimes enter the HQ to consult with the owner), your obligations under the GDPR is basically to inform the employees that the CCTV cameras are there. I.e. Data subjects are entitled to understand when their personal data is being processed, covering the transparency aspect of processing. The use of CCTV must be communicated via signage which indicates the areas covered and instructions for further information.	The GDPR has a fairly broad concept of personal data: any information that relates to an identifiable person. This is far more than directly identifiable information! The concept of identifiability is further explained in Recital 26: To determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly. So indirectly linkable information can still be personal data. In your example, that ID can be easily re-identified with a particular person if you know who the secretary was between 2012 and 2014. It is quite likely that there are members in the club with this knowledge, or that this information can be gained from public sources like newspaper reports. Thus, you should assume that your member IDs are at most pseudonyms, but not anonymous. They are likely still personal data. However, it doesn't necessarily follow that you would have to erase everything. Art 17 comes with lots of caveats and exceptions. For example, if you are processing this personal data under a legitimate interest, and someone requests erasure, you might have overriding grounds to continue processing anyway. E.g. such a legitimate interest could involve security or auditability purposes. There might also be such a legitimate interest for keeping some history for the club, but there would have to be a decision based on the individual circumstances. Furthermore, you can of course retain data e.g. due to a legal obligation, or when this information is necessary for the establishment of or defence against legal claims. I understand your desire to keep some data around. Instead of asking “do I have to delete this?” it might be more productive to consider “under which legal basis can I keep this?”. I think you might have a legitimate interest, but you'd have to carry out a balancing test between the various interests and rights. A really problematic approach would be to hold on to de-identified data in the belief that it no longer were personal data. Such a belief is usually mistaken. True anonymization that meets the GDPR's definition is really hard, in particular because you would also have to prevent indirect identification, also by other actors than yourself. There are theoretical models that can help with anonymization, e.g. with k-anonymization methods you'd ensure that there are no unique records in the DB. But this can be tricky to apply correctly, so I'd recommend to only treat aggregate statistics as truly anonymous. In 2012, the ICO has published an anonymization code of practice (PDF). It is no longer up to date with the current legal environment (in particular since the GDPR has expanded the concept of identifiability), but it provides a good overview of both the difficulties of preventing re-identification and an overview of potential solutions.
GDPR - Right to erasure - Conflicting laws I'm reading up on EU's GDPR in relation to an anonymization product I am working on. The one section that has raised a few questions is article 17 - The right to erasure, or more popularly referred to as "Forget me". My assumption is that the functionality will have to consist of a mix of deletion of records and anonymization. Especially where there are transactional data that cannot be deleted or for that sake cannot be legally deleted. Another assumption about the procedures is that the end-user will have to be notified in advance about the "Forget me" job with a date and time. It would be impossible to notify after the job has been done, because then you would need the information that has just been erased. Of course if the customer calls at the date given then customer service would have no records of this customer and would not be able to search by any information given. Accountability? In this respect what about all logs of work done? Emails sent would necessarily have the mail-to address stored. I believe there is a conflict of laws, you are legally bound to keep log of messages since it documents work done, but on the other hand you cannot know who this person is. You could anonymize the email address, but then again what about the content of the communication? Backups? Does the law also mean that backups will have to "Forget"? That would be very impractical with write-once or streaming type media. How about backups prior to 2018? Backups may legally have to be stored for 10 years, but some would want to store them even longer.	Great question - I work for a London based company who use a large amount of location data. The process for deletion of data is not as simple as it first sounds. We recently had a deep dive with our legal team and as a result actually created a product to process deletions. Personal data from users/customer is carried for lots of reasons, not just marketing. What if you're asked to delete data that is needed to bill customers, information that may be relevant to a legal case or information that needs by law to be retained for the purposes of audit? GDPR does not make it illegal to carry personal information, it simply needs you to justify why you are keeping the information - inform the named person about this and provide them with a timescale for deletion. For example if you are required by law to store a record of emails to document the work done, but the user asks you to delete that information. You would be entitled to keep that information but only for the purposes of maintaining that audit trail. You would delete all associated customer data that was unnecessary such as CRM info, payment details etc.. but could keep the audit trail. The proper way to respond to the user's deletion request would be "your data will be kept in a secure server for the purposes of maintaining an audit trail for x amount of time. Once this time has elapsed it will be deleted. If you are unhappy with our use of this data please contact our data officer". GDPR isn't designed to catch you out - if you have a legitimate reason to keep that information then you are entitled to. The law was designed to stop marketers and advertisers hoarding huge amounts of information, as well as undermine Google/Facebook's duopoly on our personal information.	Not going to hold up. Dutch Supreme Court confirmed 2012-09-21 in LJN BW6135 that arbitration is still covered by the the right to an independent judge, as established in Golder v UK, ECHR 1975-02-21, nr. 4451/70. Stack Exchange can't decide the rules themselves. (The Dutch case confirms that sector-wide arbitration is in fact legal, with regard to a standard arbitration clause commonly used in the Dutch building sector. The arbiter was found to be independent in that case precisely because they weren't picked by the builder involved.) The GDPR is only indirectly relevant, but the fact that it's mentioned does mean that there is an indisputable intent to provide services to EU consumers. (See section 23 of the GDPR, or its national equivalents). As such, you can't hide behind a US business address. If you intend to do business in the EU, it's under EU laws - all of them. You can't say that only the GDPR applies, and not other rules. I'm having a bit of a problem finding a source, but I'm fairly confident that consumers have the right to sue at their own, local court, overruling the default of suing in the court where the counterparty is located. Finally, I have the right under national law (Dutch: BW 6:236 start and sub-n) to strike the arbitration clause up to 30 days after the conflict arises, and demand a court decision. That's not 30 days after I accept the "Public Network Terms", that's 30 days after the arbitration is invoked. Dutch law explicitly allows arbitration abroad, and arbiters may apply foreign law, but as written the arbitration clause has no legal basis in the Netherlands, and any arbitration resolution would therefore not be considered valid. You may wonder if it matters to Stack Exchange that the arbitration decision would not hold in the EU. Well, consider a clause like Indemnification, which demands the user indemnifies Stack Exchange. That's a pretty empty demand if it's not enforceable.	The GDPR actually does require you to follow DNT in Article 21: In the context of the use of information society services, and notwithstanding Directive 2002/58/EC, the data subject may exercise his or her right to object by automated means using technical specifications. I think this is quite explicit.	Is the their username alone, without any attached profile (like their email address or real Name) still considered personal data that has to be deleted? For something to be ‘personal data’ it must information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person. An identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly. In other words: If the natural person can be indirectly identified from the username, it is personal data. If he cannot, it is not personal data. This obviously depends on the circumstances. If the user used something very similar to his real name, or his email address or uses the same nickname on a lot of different systems, then it probably is personal data. If it is an unique pseudonym that is not used elsewhere, it is less likely. If you want to make sure you comply with the right to erasure, you may want to scrub your wiki database, replacing all the username of the deleted user with "anonymous" (or something like that). If you want to be able to treat these as separate users, your scrubbing process may use unique anonymous identifiers ("anon-1", "anon-2", and so on).	The data processor is not responsible for complying with the GDPR. You are ultimately responsible, since you are the data controller. The data processor is merely required to assist you, but it's unclear what that means in the presented scenario. Per Art 28(3)(e) GDPR, the DPA must require the data processor to provide reasonable assistance: That contract or other legal act shall stipulate, in particular, that the processor: […] taking into account the nature of the processing, assists the controller by appropriate technical and organisational measures, insofar as this is possible, for the fulfilment of the controller’s obligation to respond to requests for exercising the data subject’s rights laid down in Chapter III; However, per Art 28(1) you can only engage processors that you deem sufficient to protect the data subject's rights: the controller shall use only processors providing sufficient guarantees to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures in such a manner that processing will meet the requirements of this Regulation and ensure the protection of the rights of the data subject. Here, it seems that your company failed to ensure that the processor provides the features you need for compliance. Many companies claim to be GDPR-compliant, but that doesn't mean that your use of their services will be GDPR-compliant as well. Depending on how the Art 28(3)(e) requirement was implemented in the DPA you may have a right to assistance even if the processor doesn't implement necessary features in their software, but enforcing this contract could require a lawsuit in a foreign jurisdiction (but that's par for the course for international B2B contracts). It is worth noting that the GDPR right to erasure doesn't always apply. In a processing activity where no erasure right is likely to arise, it would be perfectly fine to use a data processor that doesn't offer any possibility for erasure. Similarly, it can sometimes be legal to use technologies like Blockchain or Git that make erasure difficult or impossible. However, it is the responsibility of the data controller to analyze the impact of such a choice up front, before commencing the processing activities. In some cases, this could require a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA). Note that transfers of personal data into the US are illegal or at least questionable in the wake of the 2020 Schrems II ruling. The Privacy Shield is no longer a legal basis for such transfers. Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs) are technically allowed, but only “on condition that enforceable data subject rights and effective legal remedies for data subjects are available” (cf Art 46). The ECJ's judgement calls this into question. This could be a further incentive to migrate to a more GDPR-compliant service.	The GDPR doesn't generally distinguish public from non-public personal data. If you have a good reason to contact the professor, do send them an email. GDPR does not prevent this. If you're sending this email for “purely personal or household purposes”, then GDPR doesn't apply anyway. There are rules in the ePrivacy Directive against unsolicited emails, but these specifically relate to emails for direct marketing purposes. A company is not allowed to send out spam marketing, regardless of whether they obtained the email address from a public data source. Companies can send email marketing to their own existing customers, or to people who have given consent. Consent is defined in a fairly restrictive way (as a specific, informed, freely given, and unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes), so that mere publication of an email address cannot be interpreted as consent to receive marketing from a particular company.	Why is a business allowed to refuse a customer? Because also freedom of contract is a right. Except for discrimination on the basis of protected categories, a person or entity is entitled to discretion on whether or with whom to do business and enter contracts. The last sentence in your post reflects a misconception of "completely different set of values and laws" between the USA and members of the EU. Clearly there are many differences, but a comparison of the Wikipedia link you posted and, for instance, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 reflects an overlap of protected categories in the laws of the Netherlands and of the US, such as religion, sex, race, or national origin/nationality. One would need persuasive evidence to support a finding of unlawful discrimination in the two examples you have experienced. Assuming the bank responded to your GDPR inquiry truthfully, the bank's refusal to open an account might have stemmed from profiling or decision-making that (1) does not precisely require specific data about you, and/or (2) uses information the bank does not need to log for purposes of compliance with the GDPR. Note that the GDPR does not outlaw algorithmic decision-making. Since legislation in the EU (as in the US) portrays an approach of market economy, both bank and landlord are entitled to made decisions on the basis of their inner policies for risk management. The policies might be unclear to you, but that does not necessarily mean they contravene principles of equal opportunity.	Note that the answer to most of your questions has nothing to do with the GDPR specifically, but has to do with the legal force that an EU Regulation has. Here's a related answer on EU Regulations vs. Directives. That said, here are my answers to your specific questions: So member states can define a different age, even though the GDPR says that it should be 16. But is this an exception? Yes. Are there any other exceptions? Yes. Scanning the Regulation for instances of "Member State" is a good way to find them. In my opinion, the biggest area of the GDPR where Member States have influence is Article 6, "Lawfulness of Processing". In some circumstances, it allows Member States to specify what could be considered a lawful basis for processing. Must these exceptions be explicitly stated in the GDPR? Yes. As a Regulation, exceptions must be explicitly stated in order to be permissible because Member States have no authority to overrule EU law. I'd like to understand to what extent the GDPR must be followed by member states, and to what extent it could be amended in national laws. "Amended" is a fuzzy term. It can mean adding, changing, or removing from the law. Unless otherwise specified, Member States could not change or remove provisions, but there could very well be additions consistent with the GDPR. Some Member States dispute this statement when it comes to constitutional issues.
Isn't "upskirting" illegal in the UK? Why? According to this article https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/video/2018/jun/15/upskirting-happened-to-me-and-now-im-changing-the-law-video "upskirting" is not illegal in the UK. That sounds unbelievable in my ears. Can someone confirm this claim? Also, why isn't this considered sexual assault or something like that? Taking of someone's clothes in a sexual way, without the camera, must be a crime, mustn't it? So why is it not a crime to take a photo of the "act"?	It is illegal in Scotland. There is currently no law specifically against it in the rest of the UK. If you find this is unbelievable, yes it is. There are attempts now to change the laws. PS. There are no photos taken "of the act". Taking the photo is the act. The pervs use a selfy stick or just get down on the floor to take photos, or take photos on stairs. PPS. News on Jan 16th 2019: "A new law will now be introduced in the next couple of months. It could mean that perpetrators might face up to two years in prison and are added to the sex offenders register."	I don't know of any legal reason to care whether people consider reverse graffiti to be graffiti, since graffiti is not itself a legal concept. The act when done without permission is, however, trespassing, which is against the law. Painting a building is legal, if done with permission; painting a building in a pattern is legal, if done with permission. Strangely enough, cleaning a building without permission, whether entirely of selectively in a pattern, is illegal. There are in fact specific laws about defacing property, so the illegality of the act does not rely solely on trespass laws. The NYC law is here, the California law is here, and there are many similar laws. In Washington, illegality arises from a more general prohibition against causing physical damage, which is defined here, and boils down to "costs money to fix". These laws are not limited to "applying opaque material to a surface".	england-and-wales Is this illegal? YES, NO, MAYBE Context is everything, and it depends on whether this was just playful (for want of a much better word) or sexual touching. Assuming that the "grandma" is actually her grandmother, the likely offence - if there is one at all - would be sexual activity with a child family member contrary to s.25 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003: A person (A) [i.e. grandma] commits an offence if — (a) [s]he intentionally touches another person (B) [i.e. the child], (b) the touching is sexual, (c) the relation of A to B is within section 27 [which includes grandparents], ... (e) — ... (ii) B is under 13. Touching is defined at s.79(8): (8) Touching includes touching — (a) with any part of the body, ... (c) through anything [e.g. panties] ... Sexual is defined at s.78 as: penetration, touching or any other activity is sexual if a reasonable person would consider that — (a) whatever its circumstances or any person’s purpose in relation to it, it is because of its nature sexual, or (b) because of its nature it may be sexual and because of its circumstances or the purpose of any person in relation to it (or both) it is sexual. A key point to prove is whether s.25(1)(b) is met or not, so again: context is everything. Is it legal only for women to do? NO - Both males and females (over the age of criminal responsibility of 10) can commit any sexual offence apart from rape which is purely male-specific for anatomical reasons.	You are right that this is probably a private space; you are wrong in thinking it is your private space; it isn't. The space belongs to your employer and they can do whatever they want with their space unless there is a law that says they can't. As to what type of "hidden surveillance" is allowed that depends on your particular circumstances including what state and federal laws apply and the employment contract you are covered by. As a starting point, if this was happening in Australia then: If you gave permission, all would be legal If you did not give permission: it would be illegal to record anything taking place across a public telecommunications system (i.e. phone tapping) it would be legal for anyone to make an audio recording (not phone tapping) of any conversation to which they were a party it would be legal to make a video recording without sound.	"Revenge" is not a legal concept. If you injure someone other than in self defence or for another legal reason than you are committing assault. Hence dangerous booby traps for trespassers are illegal, so anything that might cause injury, however minor, is definitely out. That includes itching powder. However I would make an analogy with anti-climb paint. This allows you to use a paint that damages clothing provided you put up warning signs. So if you were to leave a parcel coated with anti-climb paint or containing a bag of paint or glitter rigged to spill it over the person opening it then that would be legal as long as there was a warning that tampering may cause property damage. (Note "spill", not "squirt" or "splash": anything ejecting paint or glitter under pressure might get it in someone's eyes, causing injury). So your friend could put a notice up saying that unauthorised tampering with parcels could cause damage to property and then put out parcels that might do exactly that. Your friend could also put a GPS tracker in a parcel to try to find out where they are going. Update Here is someone who did this. The BBC story does not mention any legal issues for him. A former Nasa [sic] engineer spent six months building a glitter bomb trap to trick thieves after some parcels were stolen from his doorstep. The device, hidden in an Apple Homepod box, used four smartphones, a circuit board and 1lb (453g) of glitter. Mark Rober, who is now a Youtuber, caught the original thieves on his home security camera. [...] The former Nasa engineer said: "If anyone was going to make a revenge bait package and over-engineer the crap out of it, it was going to be me."	If I were a DA (District Attorney) looking out "stamp out" statutory rape, I would make the rounds of the hospitals, identify women who gave birth, or were impregnated when underaged, and go from there. But few, if any DAs, do this. No, you wouldn't. First, you have neither the time nor the budget to do this. Second hospitals are not public property, you would need a warrant which the court won't give you because you don't have probable cause to believe a crime has or is being committed. As a DA, I would of course, follow up on any complaints lodged by the victim, or even by her/his parents. And maybe I would prosecute a case where people were "caught in the act, or there were nude pictures, etc. May even an especially egregious PDA (public display of affection). No, you wouldn't. You would follow up on complaints to the extent that you have the time, budget and manpower to do so and you would prosecute cases where you believe that you have a reasonable prospect of getting a conviction and where prosecution is, in your opinion, in the public interest. In the real world, that means where the police hand you a brief of evidence that is a lay-down misere and (for statutory rape) where there is a real power imbalance between the perpetrator and the victim - giving 2 willing 15 year old kids the label of 'sex offender' for life is probably not in the public interest. But suppose there were no complaints or smoking guns. Could someone investigate based on something like a teenager "holding hands" with someone much older? To make the question objective, what has historically caused DAs to prosecute people outside of the above parameters? With some exceptions, it is not the role of the DA to initiate or conduct investigations of criminal actions - that is the role of law enforcement officers, usually for this particular crime, police officers. Notwithstanding, the general rule in western, liberal democracies (which the United States, with a certain generosity of spirit, can still be considered) is that citizens are allowed to get on with their lives without day-to-day interference from the state. That is, law enforcement officers do not 'go fishing' for crimes, they investigate crimes that they have a probable cause to believe have actually happened, either because they themselves saw it happen or someone has reported it to them as having happened. The term for having a law enforcement officer following you around waiting for you to break the law is 'harassment' and may itself be illegal. A law enforcement officer can initiate an investigation based on anything but as no law enforcement agency has unlimited resources, they tend to follow only those investigations that might lead somewhere. For example, it has been known for parents to hold the hands of their children and even to publicly display affection towards them and parents are often "much older" then their children - this would not generally be grounds for initiating a statutory rape investigation.	It's illegal if the intent is to deceive. Under S50(1) of the Police Act 1996: Any person who with intent to deceive impersonates a member of a police force or special constable, or makes any statement or does any act calculated falsely to suggest that he is such a member or constable, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or to both. Their intent would need to be proven. It will be fact-specific; in some cases far easier to prove than in others. The criminal justice system is overburdened and underfunded so it is no surprise that these trolling videos are given no priority whatsoever. Further complicating the matter is the need to correctly identify the individual to prosecute. Doing so would require a fair amount of police time, time that could perhaps be spent on more urgent priorities given the relative lack of harm these videos are doing compared to more serious crimes. However, in this video (Would You Help a Police Officer Having An Asthma Attack?) an S50(2) offence would seem to have been committed by the actor wearing the police clothing: Any person who, not being a constable, wears any article of police uniform in circumstances where it gives him an appearance so nearly resembling that of a member of a police force as to be calculated to deceive shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale. It does appear that both offences are being committed in these various videos, and the only reason people aren't being prosecuted is practical: there are more serious crimes to focus on, and the police would need to identify who exactly committed this crime--given these all happened at least two years ago, it would be challenging to say the least. They also seem to commit the separate crime of wasting police time, for example by approaching cops in the street and falsely confessing to crimes. Under S5(2) of the Criminal Law Act 1967, wasting police time is a criminal offence. Bringing proceedings in court requires the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) since those proceedings could have a chilling effect on the propensity of the public to report genuine matters to the police in the future. It is likely that while "wasteful employment" of police time was caused by these people, so committing the offence, it is likely viewed simply as "part and parcel" of the job and the officer likely didn't spend any time at all investigating the confessions (depending on their nature). Of course, even if the officer did spend time investigating the false confessions, the DPP would need to give their consent so unless the person has a demonstrated history of doing this (that would stand up in court) or the time wasted was of a particularly serious nature (e.g. the man who falsely claimed to be the Yorkshire Ripper), it seems unlikely consent would be granted.	I'll preface this by saying I live in Australia where the lowest jurisdiction that can make an act a criminal offence is the state; local governments simply do not have that power here, Question 1: If I understand this right you have a law that you do not enforce that carries moderate sanctions and you are asking that a law that you do not enforce with greater sanctions will be a greater deterrent? Well ... no (see here). If you want to stop the behavior you have to enforce the sanctions that you have in a fair and impartial way. I would suggest that you make it very clear that starting in early September the laws will be enforced - that gives people fair warning. Then, each weekend in September you bring in enough police (State Troopers?) to enforce the law. Its not going to take many $250 fines to make people stop. Question 2: No comment. Question 3: No comment. Question 4: Sounds like a good way of getting the city sued for negligence; just because people are breaking the law does not make it legal to hurt them. If you are serious then fencing the entire area may be worthwhile but the area would still need to be policed.
Is this privacy statement from a solicitors in line with GDPR? I'm in the process of buying a house and have paid for a survey to be done on the property. I have received a contract from the solicitor who will be conducting the survey for me and will provide me with a report of the findings. I found something interesting in regards to how they will use my personal information. The contract states: We will use the personal information you provided to us: - To supply the report to you - to process any payment for the report; and - If you agree to this during the order process, to give you information about similar products that we provide, but you may stop receiving this at any time by contacting us. My question is focusing on the third bullet point. It's hard to decipher because I don't think the sentence makes sense anyway (copied exactly how the letter says), and it's possible there is a typo in there, but it sounds like they are saying I will have to opt out of their marketing, rather than opting in like the new GDPR law states. At the back there is also a check list of things you agree to, such as I have read and understood the guide, understood that I cannot cancel my contract after the 'cooling period', and "I agree to the privacy terms stated above". There is no mention of marketing. Would that mean that I am agreeing to marketing, as per the third bullet point? There is no tick box for "I do not wish to be added to your marketing". Should I contact the company and request a new contract? I am in the UK.	The line they'll rely on for GDPR compliance is the first part of that sentence - "If you agree to this during the order process", which suggests that there will be a separate request to opt in to marketing communications at some other time in the process. Check any order documents. There's likely to be a tick box or similar on at least one. If that implies opting out rather than opting in there may be grounds to argue with that under GDPR, but there's nothing in the quoted text that suggests a problem.	I think this shows a misunderstanding of the meaning of the GDPR. A data subject has the right to demand information, correction, deletion etc. about some of their data held by some institutions, depending on the legal basis for the data processing. One John Smith does not have the right to see the data of any other data subject named John Smith, and he cannot even demand to know if there are other John Smiths in the database. The data controller has to make reasonable steps to ensure that an individual who seeks account information is in fact the individual who is the data subject. In the case of an email, that's usually easy -- if John Smith can access the mail account [email protected], one can assume that he is the John Smith who opened the account. If not, then not. If the data controller has the birthplace and birthdate in their records, they can possibly match that against some government-issue identity document, too, but why would they have that data?	No, a company cannot suspend your GDPR rights – contracts can't override the law. Your rights as a data subject apply as long as your personal data is being processed. However, there is no requirement in the GDPR that they fulfill your data subject rights through a self-service mechanism like a “download my data” button. They can require you to use another support channel. (But Google offers infamously bad support.) In some cases, the service may legitimately decide that they cannot give you access to the data, for example if they believe that you are not the actual data subject (e.g. if they think that you hacked the account). The right to access must not adversely affect other people (Art 15(4)). If they have doubts about your identity, they can require further information to verify you (Art 12(6)). If your requests are excessive or unfounded (if you are spamming them), they can also turn down the requests (Art 12(5)).	To do so I used some images and Gifs which may be under copyright but since I don't earn money for myself and there is no company backing me I was hoping that there is some protection for private persons like me who just want to showcase the project. Sorry. If your website is public facing (i.e. not password protected and available only to family and close friends), you need to follow copyright law. There is no exception to copyright just because a project is run by an individual for non-commercial purposes. I am also insecure about the GDPR regulations since I give users the ability to create an account and try it out. Your profile says you're in the EU. Then you need to comply with the GDPR. Is there any way to protect me against greedy lawyers and companies? Could I write something like: "This website is a peace of art" and save myself with arguments like "artistic freedom" or "free speech"? Nope. A controversial website run by Peter Sunde had at one point a "free speech" disclaimer (similar to the one you propose) posted. However, Sunde did never use this defense in court: Finnish court slaps Peter Sunde with €350k fine. If he had shown up in court, I am pretty sure the court would have told him that such a disclaimer has no legal merit. The only protection that will make you completely safe is to adhere to the law.	The GDPR only require explicit (hard) consent if you use the cookie to store personal data. Given the conditions you cite, the data you store is not personal data, so this cookie does not require consent. In theory, someone having access to both session cookie and "analytics cookie" could relate the two, but that is highly non-trivial. You may have to do DPIA to demonstrate that this is non-trivial, or that you have mitigation in place to mitigate staff abusing such access. But provided things are as you say, the "analytics" cookie does not require consent.	Overview As described, only the last of these seems to be compliant ways of obtaining consent, and indeed even that is not fully compliant, although features not described might make it so. However, if there is a lawful basis for processing PI other than consent, under GDPR article 6, then there is no need to obtain consent at all, and doing so in an improper way is irrelevant. However storage of or access to local information (such as cookies) requires consent unless such storage or access is "strictly necessary" for providing a service which the user has requested. Relevant GDPR Provisions GDPR article 6 lists six possible lawful bases for processing personal data. These are, in summery: (a) consent; (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract or to takwe steps requested by the Data Subject; (c) necessary for compliance with a legal obligation; (d) to protect the vital interests of the data subject or another person (e) or the performance of a task carried out in the public interest (f) legitimate interests of the Controller The other provisions cited here apply only to PI for which the lawful basis is consent. GDPR article 7 reads: (2) If the data subject’s consent is given in the context of a written declaration which also concerns other matters, the request for consent shall be presented in a manner which is clearly distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language. Any part of such a declaration which constitutes an infringement of this Regulation shall not be binding. (3) The data subject shall have the right to withdraw his or her consent at any time. The withdrawal of consent shall not affect the lawfulness of processing based on consent before its withdrawal. Prior to giving consent, the data subject shall be informed thereof. It shall be as easy to withdraw as to give consent. When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract. GDPR Recital 32 reads: Consent should be given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her, such as by a written statement, including by electronic means, or an oral statement. This could include ticking a box when visiting an internet website, choosing technical settings for information society services or another statement or conduct which clearly indicates in this context the data subject’s acceptance of the proposed processing of his or her personal data. Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent. Consent should cover all processing activities carried out for the same purpose or purposes. When the processing has multiple purposes, consent should be given for all of them. If the data subject’s consent is to be given following a request by electronic means, the request must be clear, concise and not unnecessarily disruptive to the use of the service for which it is provided. GDPR Recital 42 reads: ... in particular in the context of a written declaration on another matter, safeguards should ensure that the data subject is aware of the fact that and the extent to which consent is given. In accordance with Council Directive 93/13/EEC a declaration of consent pre-formulated by the controller should be provided in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language and it should not contain unfair terms. For consent to be informed, the data subject should be aware at least of the identity of the controller and the purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended. Consent should not be regarded as freely given if the data subject has no genuine or free choice or is unable to refuse or withdraw consent without detriment. GDPR Recital 43 reads: ... Consent is presumed not to be freely given if it does not allow separate consent to be given to different personal data processing operations despite it being appropriate in the individual case, or if the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is dependent on the consent despite such consent not being necessary for such performance. Analysis I will review each of the scenarios in the question in turn. Scenario 1: not allowing [a user] to use the site until the user clicks Accept. No options, just an "Accept" button. This does not constitute freely given consent, because: The giving of consent is not "clearly distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language" (Art 7(2)). There appears to be no way to withdraw consent (Art 7(3)). It appears that the provision of a service (use of the site) is conditional on consent not needed for that service (Art 7(3)). Consent is not informed and unambiguous (Recital 32). The use has not been informed of the extent to which consent is given (Recital 42). The subject has not been made aware of purposes of the processing (Recital 42). the data subject has no genuine or free choice (Recital 42). There is no provision for separate consent to be given to different personal data processing operations. (Recital 43). Scenario 2: A banner stating that "By browsing the site you accept the conditions". Just an "x" to close the banner. Using the site is allowed while the banner is displayed. This does not constitute freely given consent, because: Consent was not "given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s agreement to the processing of personal data" (Art 7(2)). The giving of consent is not "clearly distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language" (Art 7(2)). There appears to be no way to withdraw consent (Art 7(3)). Consent is not informed and unambiguous (Recital 32). The use has not been informed of the extent to which consent is given (Recital 42). The subject has not been made aware of purposes of the processing (Recital 42). the data subject has no genuine or free choice (Recital 42). There is no provision for separate consent to be given to different personal data processing operations. (Recital 43). Scenario 3: A banner with an "Accept" (and possibly "Reject") button. No other options. Site navigation is allowed while the banner is displaying. This does not constitute freely given consent, because: The giving of consent is not "clearly distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language" (Art 7(2)). There appears to be no way to withdraw consent (Art 7(3)). Consent is not informed and unambiguous (Recital 32). The use has not been informed of the extent to which consent is given (Recital 42). The subject has not been made aware of purposes of the processing (Recital 42). There is no provision for separate consent to be given to different personal data processing operations. (Recital 43). Scenario 4: A banner with an "Accept", "Reject" and also a "Settings" options where the user can fine tune the way his data is being used by the site. This might constitute freely given consent, provided that: a document is displayed or linked to that describes the kinds of PI that will be processed, and the purposes of the processing; There is some easy and obvious manner to withdraw consent, and to change the individual choices on what to consent to, after the banner has closed, or on any subsequent visit to the site; The consent section of the settings dialog must be clearly distinguished from other sections that do not deal with consent; Just where the lines must be drawn between "different personal data processing operations" which each requires the possibility of separate consent is not yet fully clear. And again, if the site or service does not store or otherwise process PI, or has a lawful basis for doing so other than consent, and does not store or access local information, it need not obtain consent at all, and the question of what constitutes freely given consent becomes irrelevant. Of course many sites do depend on consent as the lawful basis for much of their activity.	There are a few different grounds under which PII can be handled. Perhaps the most discussed at the moment of GDRP introduction is consent, because of the wave of consent-seeking. But there are a number of other grounds. "Necessary for contract execution" is a trivial one, to deliver a pizza you'll need an address. The relevant ground for sanctions lists is also pretty obvious in hindsight, you may process PII in order to comply with legal obligations. Note that this is still an integral part of the GDPR, not an exception to the GDPR. That means you need to apply all the basic GDPR rules. You need to explicitly store where you got the PII from, for which purpose, and you need to document how you're using it. Note that this might be hard - why do you need to store this data? Why can't you just check the list as the moment it's relevant? The GDPR for a large part depends on you justifying your actions, not just in hindsight but already up front.	Doing this is OK according to the GDPR and other European laws. The relevant bit is GDPRs rules for Lawfulness of processing, and in particular Article 6 (1)b, which says that it is legal to do this if processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; In your particular case, signing up for using your app is "entering into a contract" and it is the data subject who has requested to use your app that is subject to this processing.
“color of authority” Matt Whitaker vs inventor with complaint When now Acting US Attorney General Matt Whitaker was on the board of directors of a company that acted as an agent for inventors, he sent a letter to a complainant inventor client, warning of possible legal consequences if the inventor persisted. Since Whitaker stated(correctly) in the letter that he was a former US prosecutor, could he have been guilty of a crime involving “color of authority?	'Color of authority', specifically 'color of law', refers to a person who holds government power and acts in a way that is unlawful using that governmental authority to assert (implicitly or explicitly) that the action is lawful. There is no way that someone who identifies themselves as a former government officer can be doing that.	Short version: No, no one has even been prosecuted. Does the perjury clause apply to all the information in the notification, or only the statement that the complaining party is authorised to act etc. ? This seems to be answerable by the plain text of the statute that you quoted: A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. There doesn't seem to be any remotely grammatical way to read "under penalty of perjury" as modifying anything in the first part of the sentence (i.e, the statement or the information in the notification). The closest we could come would be reading "A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury" as saying that the information is both accurate and under penalty of perjury. Even if we ignore the fact that that would add a stray comma (as comma errors are not uncommon), that still leaves us with "that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly in-fringed" after an additional comma. This would need a conjunction (such as "and") that is not there in order for it to read at all correctly. On the other hand, it is perfectly grammatical to read it as: A statement: that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. This would mean that only the statement that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the copyright holder is made under penalty of perjury. Thus, the "statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized" described in § 512(c)(3)(a)(v) and referenced in your second question is not made under penalty of perjury. I couldn't find any case law regarding this, though, which brings us to the second question: Has anyone ever actually been convicted of perjury as a result of sending a DMCA notice that lied about the "good faith belief" in the infringing nature of the target material? As far as I can tell, no one has ever even been criminally prosecuted for sending false DMCA notices, let alone convicted. In fact, as far as I can tell, no one has ever been prosecuted for false copyright claims under any other laws, either. It's a bit difficult to find an authoritative reference stating something has never happened, and the best I found was the Wikipedia article on Copyfraud, which cites Fishman, Stephen. The Public Domain, Nolo (2006), pp. 24–29 for the proposition that (presumably as of 2006), "[n]o company has ever been prosecuted for violating" a related law on false claims of copyright. Obviously, that's not a great source, due to the date, not having access to the original text, and the fact that it's not quite the same law. I also tried quite a number of search terms on Google and found no criminal prosecutions there, either. There have, however, been civil suits regarding such bad-faith misrepresentations: Automattic, owners of Wordpress.com, have filed at least two. In at least one of those, a lack of such a good-faith claim by the defendant was in fact found by the court: Similarly, here, the Court finds that Defendant knowingly misrepresented that Hotham violated his copyright because Defendant could not have reasonably believed that the Press Release he sent to Hotham was protected under copyright. Moreover, there can be no dispute that Defendant knew, and indeed, specifically intended, that the takedown notice would result in the disabling of Hotham's article. This resulted in the court finding the defendant liable for damages under § 512(f) for the time and money that the plaintiffs spent dealing with the results of the fraudulent DMCA takedown notice. Neither the court nor the plaintiffs mention perjury at any point other than quoting the takedown notice (unsurprising, though, given that it's a civil suit).	As mentioned in a comment by @Dancrumb, the exact policies of each local police department will be different, and there are thousands of them. There is a relevant requirement at the Federal level according the Department of Justice, but it is not clear to me to what extent this applies to peers and not just supervisors: An officer who purposefully allows a fellow officer to violate a victim's Constitutional rights may be prosecuted for failure to intervene to stop the Constitutional violation. To prosecute such an officer, the government must show that the defendant officer was aware of the Constitutional violation, had an opportunity to intervene, and chose not to do so. This charge is often appropriate for supervisory officers who observe uses of excessive force without stopping them, or who actively encourage uses of excessive force but do not directly participate in them.	Was/is it permissible for judges in the US to talk ex-parte like that? No. Ex parte interactions of that sort are not allowed. See, for instance, Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, 2020-Ohio-732 (Dec. 18, 2020) and Maze v. Judicial Conduct Commission, 2019-SC-0691-RR (Dec. 17, 2020). An example of less recent decision but with a reporter citation number is Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Bozeman, 302 So.3d 1217 (2020). For situations of imminent risk of irreparable harm, procedural law provides for ex parte motions and ex parte petitions, such as this granted petition for Personal Protection Order. See M[ichigan]CR 3.7003(G). But the scenarios you depict fall short of the necessity for which ex parte provisions are intended. do the above scenes in the movies essentially portray judicial misconduct? Yes. A judge's house is inappropriate for communicating, let alone ex parte, his ruling (I am not knowledgeable of the films but my understanding of your description is that that judge made the ruling on the application). As for The Untouchables, any evidence of jurors' & judges' conflict of interest and likely bias has to be filed in court and comply with procedural law so that all parties have an opportunity to litigate the matter.	The accusation would be the crime of securities fraud ("insider trading" is legally meaningless), under 15 USC 78j(b). There is a bit more elaboration in 17 CFR 240.10b5-1. That law prohibits using "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in" in connection with a securities transaction. Under 15 USC 78ff, violation of the law can result in a fine of up to $5 million and 20 years, thus it is a crime. As a crime, the standard of proof required is must higher than it in for a civil forfeiture (which can be as low as "reasonable suspicion"). In the US, and pursuant to the Due Process clause, that requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that is (from in re Winship), "proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged". The statute itself does not state the elements that must be proven to secure a conviction, but they can be discerned based on jury instructions (which are circuit-specific). The 9th Circuit instruction is here. You can see that there are 4 specific allegations that have to be chosen between, and the prosecutor has to have at least alleged one of those prohibited acts (so that the jury can decide if the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did that thing). The evidence you have presented could constitute "reasonable suspicion", but not "proof beyond a reasonable doubt". If we had a different standard of proof in criminal trials, where it was sufficient to just suspect based on a small bit of evidence that a person may have done something prohibited, then the conclusion could be different. Or, if you had stronger evidence surrounding the sale, your argument might carry a bit more weight. In other words, criminal prosecution is based on quite a lot of specific and objective evidence about what happened. An example of the kind of evidence and allegations required to get the ball rolling can be seen here; for "insider trading" specifically, look here (this case is based on an FBI investigation, where an agent will presumably testify to hearing the defendant state a plan to violate the law).	I am not aware of any cases with a fact pattern at all like this in which there has been an injunction against an individual publicizing accusations against a company. In each of the cases Bosley Medical Institute, Inc. v. Kremer; Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse; TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433, 435 (5th Cir. 2004); Cleary Bldg. Corp. v. David A. Dame, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1265 (D. Colo. 2009)' Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 585 (2d Cir.2000) an individual put up a "gripe sit usign teh trademark of the company or something close to it, as a URL. Courts held this was not trademark infringement adn ther was no reason to enjoin such sites. More recently "companySucks.com" sites have been created to host complaints about {company}. Atempts to shut these downishe bottom." using trademark law have largely been unsucceaful. See this page for more on this. The first amendment makes it hard to shut down such sites, as they are on "matters of public concern" the "actual malice" rule makes defamation cases tough.	Despite the lengthy background, the only question seems to be: Can a police officer lie about a consequence of a traffic violation they charge you with? As a matter of constitutional law in the United States, that answer is generally "yes." States can impose more limitations if they like. Only a small minority of states actually do so. Incidentally, an attorney, such as a deputy district attorney, is not allowed to lie about the consequences of a traffic violation, or anything else (even in extreme circumstances like a hostage situation). This violates the rules of professional conduct applicable to all attorneys. This sounds like a classic "driving while black" situation and is probably involves unconstitutional discrimination by a government official, although proving that in an individual case is virtually impossible.	In the USA, you must be found guilty "beyond reasonable doubt". As you describe it, I'd say there is an unreasonable suspicion of guilt, not guilt beyond reasonable doubt. If the magician killed three people that way, then three unexplainable deaths following three spells might get him convicted. A jury might say that even though there is no way to explain how the killing worked, the correlation might be enough to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
GDPR - Confirm company terms and conditions by button click This May the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) will be applied across the EU. I read somewhere that users have to always 'opt-in' after this law is effective. Since I'm concerned about conversion for a website, is it OK to let users confirm by using a button? For example, like Mailchimp does:	The basic requirements for the effectiveness of valid legal consent are defined in Article 7 of the GDPR and specified further in Recital 32. There is no form requirement for the consent, so using a button is not a problem. However, I do not think the MailChimp-button you reproduce as an example is good enough. It asks for a blanket consent to stuff that is buried in MailChimp's “Anti-spam Policy & Terms of Use”. But according to the GDPR, what the data subject consent to can’t be buried in the ToU – it must spelled out in clear, plain language. Requests must be granular, asking for separate consent for separate types of processing. “When the processing has multiple purposes, consent should be given for all of them” (Recital 32). Blanket consent, as used by MailChimp, is not allowed. The other clear requirement from the GDPR is that opt-in is mandatory. Pre-ticked and opt-out buttons are explicitly banned: “Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent” (Recital 32). ‘No’ must become your data default, but if the user chooses to opt-in by clicking a button, this is valid consent. The MailChimp-button complies witrh this. The GDPR also requires you to keep a records of the consents given (so make that part of the user profile), and to withdraw consent at any time – so you make make provisions for that as well in your implementation of consent.	You are responsible for what data is being processed by your website. When you embed third party components on your website (e.g. iframes, scripts), you are at least jointly responsible with the third party providing these components. You are only responsible for what happens on the website (i.e. what processing is under your control), not for what the third party provider does with collected data on their services. However, note that information will be transferred to Google's servers regardless of whether the visitor has a Google account! The Fashion ID case is relevant case law establishing and explaining these points. Since you are (jointly) responsible, you need a legal basis for collecting personal data through the tracking snippet and sharing it with the third party (here Google). For example, the legal basis could be a legitimate interest, or could be consent. A legitimate interest requires that you balance this interests against the interests, rights, and freedoms of the data subject (the site visitor). If the data subject wouldn't reasonably expect this tracking, you cannot rely on a legitimate interest. Consent can always work, except that it is a freely given, informed opt-in – likely unsuitable for conversion tracking. Which legal basis to use is primarily your responsibility. You argue that the tracking snippet does not collect personal data. However, this argument is not well supported. Under the GDPR, personal data does not only include directly identifying information such as an email address, but also any information “relating” to an identifiable person. Identification includes the ability to single out someone, e.g. by a browser fingerprint. For purposes of conversion tracking, Google will clearly try to collect data that allows the visitor to be singled out, thus collecting personal data. Furthermore, specific kinds of information are regulated by the ePrivacy directive. This includes “traffic data” and “information stored on a terminal device”, regardless of whether this information is personal data under the GDPR. Under ePrivacy, such information can only be used as strictly necessary to provide the service requested by the user (and conversion tracking is not strictly necessary), or when the user gives their consent. Depending on what information is collected by the tracking snippet and on whether you are subject to ePrivacy, you would have to collect consent anyway. There is also the issue that Google Ads is an US-based service, and transferring data to the US is largely illegal since the 2020 Schrems II ruling. The US do not provide an adequate level of data protection, so that transfers would require additional safeguards. Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs) for Controller to Controller transfers are not sufficient by itself. Of course those extra safeguards are effectively impossible to implement and no one is doing this correctly, but it's worth considering that there is additional legal risk. Explicit consent can provide a legal basis for transfers even to a country with inadequate protections, but that mechanism is intended for occasional transfers. In conclusion: you have wrongly concluded that no personal data would be involved you are jointly responsible with Google for whatever data is processed by the conversion tracking snippet you need a legal basis for sharing this data with Google legitimate interest may be sufficient, depending on what data is involved (consider ePrivacy) and depending on the result of your legitimate interest balancing test alternatively, you may require every visitors consent to track their conversions – unlikely to result in good data additionally, such use of Google Ads may run into issues around international transfers due to the Schrems II ruling this kind of stuff is difficult, and no one is really doing this correctly :/	If you are not processing the personal information of EU citizens yourselves then you are unlikely to be classed as data processors under GDPR (check Article 3: Territorial Scope, p.32-33). If you were to operate a Software-as-a-Sevice (SaaS) solution then you would be a data controller/processor (or both) and GDPR would certainly apply if you have EU citizens as customers/users. While I can't see any reference to software vendors in the GDPR text, as a software vendor it would be in your interest to ensure your products meet the criteria set out in Article 25 (Data Protection by design and by default, p.48) in order to help your customers to comply, such as: Implement appropriate technical measures, such as pseudonymisation, which are designed to implement data-protection principles, such as data minimisation, in an effective manner and to integrate the necessary safeguards into the processing in order to meet the requirements of this Regulation and protect the rights of data subjects. Implement appropriate technical measures for ensuring that, by default, only personal data which are necessary for each specific purpose of the processing are processed. That obligation applies to the amount of personal data collected, the extent of their processing, the period of their storage and their accessibility. In particular, such measures shall ensure that by default personal data are not made accessible without the individual's intervention to an indefinite number of natural persons. These along with similar organisational measures are the responsibility of the data controller, but unless your software helps them to comply they may be forced to consider alternative solutions which reduce their overall risk. If your software already has a number of such controls in place it may be worth putting a white-paper or similar communication together which can inform your customers of how your software helps them to comply. There does not appear to be any direct liability to the software vendor through GDPR. If a data breach is the result of a design flaw or implementation bug in the software and your customer gets fined as a result, they may be likely to pursue you on grounds of the software not being fit-for-purpose and lacking the appropriate technical controls required to ensure data privacy. In this event, your defence will rely upon records of designing and implementing controls, records of software testing and remediation, and having in place suitable procedures to ensure security patches can be quickly deployed to your customers when required. Further clarification as requested: If your organisation doesn't process the personal data, doesn't have any third parties process it on your behalf (includes hosting companies) or have any access to it ever, then you're neither a controller or processor. However, if your customers ever send you personal data or grant you temporary access to personal data as part of troubleshooting issues with your software, then you would be a processor in this context and would need an appropriate contract in place and would need to ensure the appropriate technical and organisational controls are implemented to comply with GDPR and reduce risk of a personal data breach. Additionally, if international data transfers take place as part of this (e.g. sending/accessing files over the Internet) you would need to ensure your organisation is able to provide an equivalent level of protection for the rights of the data subjects - for example if you are in the U.S. you would likely need to voluntarily join up to the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield or use the EU's Model Contract Clauses within your contracts in order for it to be legal for EU-based businesses to use you as a data processor. For more information about international transfers read the EU's Data Transfers outside the EU page. Ref: GDPR	Yes, a site may check for a cookie indicating past consent before prompting for consent to read and store cookies When people speak of the "Cookie law" they usually mean the ePrivacy Directive, (ePD) more formally the Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive 2002/58/EC. The full text of the directive is here First of all, being a directive and not a regulation, the ePD is not itself legally binding. Instead it instructs the legislatures of member states to implement it, which they generally have done. So the actual binding law is the law of a particular country, which could vary from the wording of the directive. However, in this case, my understanding is that the implementations do not vary significantly. An updated and revised ePrivacy Regulation (ePR) has been proposed, which would replace the ePD and complement the GDPR. But there has been dispute over the proposed terms of the ePR, and it has not yet been passed. Article 5 section (3) of the ePD reads: Member States shall ensure that the use of electronic communications networks to store information or to gain access to information stored in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user is only allowed on condition that the subscriber or user concerned is provided with clear and comprehensive information in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC, inter alia about the purposes of the processing, and is offered the right to refuse such processing by the data controller. This shall not prevent any technical storage or access for the sole purpose of carrying out or facilitating the transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network, or as strictly necessary in order to provide an information society service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user. Notice that this covers both writing (storing) and reading (gaining access to) cookies and other information stored on a user's device. Cookies ar one form of such locally stored information (LSI). Note that the GDPR, which replaces Directive 95/46/EC, is used to define "consent" in the ePD. In general, one must have consent to read or store, and consent must be sought only when the user has been given "clear and comprehensive information ... about the purpose" of the stored information. The relevant exception for this question is that information (including cookies) which is "strictly necessary" to provide a service specifically requested by the user. Here the user has requested access to the web site, and may have previously agreed to accept cookies. The site must prompt for consent if the user has not previously consented (and the site will store cookies not strictly needed), and should not if the user has. Therefore, it is strictly necessary to check for and read if present a cookie indicating that such consent has previously been granted. If such a cookie is not found, no consent has been granted. Strictly required LSI should not have a dual purpose where one purpose is not strictly needed. For example, an "I accept cookies" cookie should not also be used for tracking. That should be done (if at all) with a separate cookie, and only after consent is received. Note that there should be an easily found and easily used method or link on the site (preferably on each page of the site) to review the purposes of stored or accessed LSI, and to withdraw previous consent. If consent is withdrawn, the cookie indicating that consent has been granted should be erased, as should any cookies or other LSI not strictly needed to provide the services requested by the user. Keep in mind that the legal distinction is not between cookies that contain "technical" information and those that do not. That is not relevant. Nor is the distinction between cookies that might be used to identify a person and those that do not. The legal distinction is between cookies (or other LSI) that are strictly needed to provide the services requested by the user, and all other LSI. Strictly needed LSI does not require consent, all other LSI does. For example, a random string, used to determine the number of unique visitors, but not linked to any identifying info about the user, does not help to identify an individual user. But it is not strictly needed, so it can only be stored with consent. Data that are associated with an identifiable natural person (human being, not a firm or organization), are governed by the GDPR (where it applies). There must be a lawful basis for processing such data, which includes reading them from LSI, and storing them. Consent is one of the six possible bases for such processing, but consent need not be obtained if another lawful basis applies. When consent is the basis, it must be easily withdrawn by the user. Note that this applies to all data (PI) that is associated with a person, not just data that can readily be used to identify the person (PII). Note that other workflows are also lawful. For one example, if a site is a strictly membership site, it could prompt for a login before reading or storing any LSI, and then read previous preferences stored on the server by that user to determine whether consent for cookies has been granted. Conclusion A cookie indicating that consent to access and store cookies hs previously been given by a particular user can lawfully be read before a user is prompted for consent, under the ePD and its implementing laws.	The law of each country where you offer the app for download applies, and you have to consider: Privacy Policy (GDPR in EU, CCPA in California, APPI in Japan, LGPD in Brasil, and more - check each country to be on the safe side) Disclaimer versus AGB/Terms and Conditions (e.g. Germany), not required but recommended Impressum (Germany, Switzerland, Austria) Value Added Tax (VAT) which is taken care of e.g. by Google Play for most countries but not all (e.g. not for Japan) in case the app is not free Consumer Protection Law - applicable (and different) everywhere There might be more, but these are the important ones I am aware of.	The goal of the GDPR is to ensure a single market for personal data processing throughout the EU. Since all EU/EEA member states now have equivalent levels of data protection, it doesn't matter in which member state data is stored or processed. Member states cannot generally limit this single market via national laws. Furthermore, secure processing may be possible outside of the EU/EEA as discussed in Chapter 5 of the GDPR. Some countries such as Japan have been asserted an adequate level of data protection so that no special safety measures are necessary. For other countries, a transfer of personal data may be possible under so-called Standard Contractual Clauses which detail the responsibilities of the data exporter/importer. However, the recent Schrems II ruling has invalidated the (partial) adequacy decision for the United States, and has strongly hinted that SCCs only work if the parties are actually able to honor their responsibilities under the SCC (which is not the case with some surveillance laws). Data protection is likely not ensured for processing in the US or by US-controlled companies (even if the processing usually takes place within the EU). Given the sensitivity of health data, this means you should likely avoid using the typical public cloud providers (regardless of availability region). Depending on where your company is based, you might also be disqualified as a data processor by EU data controllers. So the GDPR has no data residency requirements that limit the processing/storage to Germany, but some data residency requirements to keep the data in the EU. However, there may be non-GDPR obligations that mandate how the data can be processed, but I'm not familiar with those (the German regulatory landscape for tele-health is very uneven, differs between German states, but is also improving a lot recently). Since you're processing health data, you should pay special attention to Art 9(3) GDPR which is expanded in German law by §22 BDSG to list a catalogue of possible safety measures you should consider, but none of them are related to data residency. §78 BDSG has further details on transfers into non-EU countries, such as emphasizing that human rights must be guaranteed in the target country.	The conditions for lawfulness of processing are spelled out in Article 6 of the GDPR. As for it being legal for website operators to log the IP-addresses of visitors, this is covered by the following paragraph (also pointed out by phoog in a comment). The paragraph says it is legal to process personal data if processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. (my emphasis) You are not the only web site that logs IP addresses for the purpose of security. Every web site I've ever worked on - from those controlled by large corporations to tiny NGOs - do this. This security practice will not be impacted by the GDPR (if it were, I am sure we would have heard about it by now). there is the EU cookie law too If your website are going to be accessible to European citizens and not only accessible by your friends and familiy, you have to comply with the EU cookie directive of 2002 (a exemption for "personal websites" does not exist).	The consent presented in the question is a text-book example on how to not secure consent under the GDPR. The GDPR requires concent to be explicit, specific, freely given, and informed. This particular privacy policy does not measure up to any of these requirements. The GDPR goes to great lengths to regulate consent. For instance, in Article 7 (2) is says: Any part of such a declaration [of consent] which constitutes an infringement of this Regulation shall not be binding. So if the consent obtained is not explicit, specific, freely given, and informed, and the company relies on consent to ensure lawfulness of processing, it is breaking the law (and may be fined under the GDPR). The big problem with this privacy policy is this sentence: Your continued access to or use of any of the Services shall be deemed your acceptance of the Privacy Policy. As you've noted, the GDPR requires consent to be explicit. What "explicit" means is spelled out in Recital 32, which (among other things) says: Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent. And Recital 32 goes on state that consent must be specific: When the processing has multiple purposes, consent should be given for all of them. The full privacy policy lists 16 different purposes for which personal data is collected, but do not seek specific consent for any of them. Consent under GDPR must also be freely given. Recital 42 says (among other things): Consent should not be regarded as freely given if the data subject has no genuine or free choice or is unable to refuse or withdraw consent without detriment. Here the company states that continued use of the service "shall be deemed your acceptance". The only way the data subject can refuse consent is to not use the service, which is to the detriment of the data subject. This also makes the consent invalid. Finally, the GDPR also requires consent to be informed. What this means is spelled out in Recital 42, which (among other things say): For consent to be informed, the data subject should be aware at least [...] the purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended. Here the data subject is supposed to consent to some unknown, future change which may be to allow different purposes of the processing. This also invalidates the consent.
GDPR - Is consent really necessary for contact form? I am looking for an answer that is supported by the GDPR, so please try to quote GDPR parts as you answer. The internet is on fire (developers especially) now that the GDPR is on strength. There are some doubts from my perspective which I would like to clear out with the discussions that arise from this questions. Do we need a user's consent when being contacted by a contact form? Many (almost all to be exact) lawyers advise companies to seek consent from the user on the contact form. This sounds ridiculous, as what happens when the user sends you a direct email (without using contact form) with a bunch of his personal data (which you, as a business, did not ask from the user)? How could you know what data the user might send? He might even send the data on purpose and sue your company for not having included in the privacy policy that your business is processing the data that the user has sent. How does this make sense? Isn't the action of voluntarily sending an email to anyone a direct consent (you are aware that you sent the email from your own email address and you yourself have decided to reveal some or all of your personal data to the person/business you are sending an email to)? Managing consent If the answer to the first question is "YES", that how do we manage the consents? Consents must be fully manageable so the user can withdraw it at any time. So, do we store each and every email in a database? Storing it in an Excel table would not be a wise way according to the GDPR, as you literally cannot protect Excel worksheet from being read (yes, for all those around who think that protecting the workbook with a password is enough, no it is not, there are hundreds of tools that will crack the password and open the workbook). And then again, GDPR is not meant to drive the business to its own doom. It is not meant to harden that way that the business does its own core business, but it is meant to protect the data of the subjects. I suppose the information above is enough for a start of good discussion as to whether the user's consent should be asked when filling out a contact form.	My interpretation of the GDPR when it comes to a contact form is as long as your privacy notice states that what data you collect in the contact form and what legal basis that data is used for you are fine. Someone submitting a contact form in my opinion is their consent to reply back to them regarding the data in which they have submitted. Another good clause to have in your privacy policy is to basically state if the user submits information about another natural person that they have consent from that natural person for that data and what it would be used for. The internet is the internet. People have been trolling it for years. People have also submitted false information for years. The best a business can do is simply outline what their site does, what data is collected and what it will be used for. That along with what legal basis it’s processed for and following it makes you GDPR compliant in that regard. As to withdrawing consent and the rights given by the GDPR that’s all specific to what infustructure a business has in place. As a developer I know the headaches of the GDPR. Most of it resides in the fact data is not centralized and thus can’t easily be retrieved, modified, or removed. Once you’ve tackled that aspect providing the user their rights under GDPR isn’t to far off.	Let's assume that I created a mobile app for iPhone that is tracking rides on a bike [...] So the app is processing that data in the way I programmed it but I as a person do not have access to that data. I assume in such case I am not the data controller according to GDPR because I do not have access to that data is that correct? Yes, as far as I can see that is correct. The GDPR defines a data controller as someone who "determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data" - you just provide a tool, you don't control for what purposes your customers use their ride data. This is also discussed in this question: How does the GDPR apply to software developed by one company and used by another? What if additionally to that I will program my app for example in such way that it will sometimes send current GPS coordinate to an online service controlled by external company such as Apple [...] But still my app would send this data directly to Apple server so I will still not have any access to that data. Does this change anything and does GDPR now apply to me? Yes, and yes. In that case, you are telling Apple to process data for you, so you would become the data controller (because you "determine[s] the purposes and means of the processing of personal data"), and Apple is a data processor for you. That means also the usual mechanisms kick in - you need to inform your users about this processing, you need to make sure Apple plays by the rules, etc. etc. I also do not know if Apple save this request on their servers or if they just automatically convert received gps coordinates to a name and return the answer without saving the request. This is exactly the kind of situation the GDPR is meant to address. Under GDPR, saying "I do not know what X does with the data" is not an option. This is something many companies tried in the past, that is why GDPR explicitly assigns responsibility to the data controller (i.e., you). As explained in a EU document, What is a data controller or a data processor?: The duties of the processor towards the controller must be specified in a contract or another legal act. For example, the contract must indicate what happens to the personal data once the contract is terminated. A typical activity of processors is offering IT solutions, including cloud storage. [...] So, no, you cannot just say "I do not know if Apple saves this request". Instead, you must make a contract with Apple which says whether (and how, and for how long...) they save the request, and you must inform your users about this in your privacy policy. And if Apple refuse to make such a contract with you, you must find a different company to work with.	First take a look at Article 13(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC Article 13 Unsolicited communications The use of automated calling systems without human intervention (automatic calling machines), facsimile machines (fax) or electronic mail for the purposes of direct marketing may only be allowed in respect of subscribers who have given their prior consent. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, where a natural or legal person obtains from its customers their electronic contact details for electronic mail, in the context of the sale of a product or a service, in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC, the same natural or legal person may use these electronic contact details for direct marketing of its own similar products or services provided that customers clearly and distinctly are given the opportunity to object, free of charge and in an easy manner, to such use of electronic contact details when they are collected and on the occasion of each message in case the customer has not initially refused such use. Note that this is a Directive, so it is not directly binding, but each EU member state has created it's own laws containing this. I also quoted paragraph 2 for completeness, but based on your description, it does not apply. Article 95 GDPR explicitly specifies it does not change any obligations from Directive 2002/58/EC. So it looks very clear to me the situation you describe is not legal. Article 14 GDPR allows you to request all information regarding this, which included information how they have exactly obtained your name and email address.	Congrats, you've done well to minimize your processing of personal data. But I think you're still processing personal data, and are subject to the GDPR. Serving a website necessarily involves processing an IP address. This IP address will typically be personal data. While you are not storing the IP address, the GDPR's definition of “processing” extends beyond storage and pretty much covers doing anything with that IP address. As far as I know this is not an entirely settled matter, but it's better to err on the side of caution and to assume that you are in fact performing a processing activity. Even a static web page can easily lead to additional relevant processing of personal data, for example if the HTML embeds resources from third party domains. Since your website is clearly targeted at the public, it does not fall under the GDPR's exception for “purely personal or household” purposes. So I think you do need a (minimal) privacy notice that contains at least the items mentioned in Art 13 GDPR. The main reason why some people try to avoid posting a privacy notice is because it must disclose your identity and contact details. But in Germany, that information has to be provided anyway due to the Impressumspflicht. As part of your GDPR compliance obligations, you must protect how data is processed by others on your behalf. A hosting provider will typically act as your data processor. For this to be legal, you need a contract / data processing agreement that fulfills the conditions in Art 28 GDPR. This contract binds the data processor to only use the data as instructed by you, and not for their own purposes. European hosting providers sometimes include the necessary terms in their terms of service / AGB, but you should check to make sure. Netcup expects you to accept their data processing amendment in your account settings. In the hypothetical case that you were not processing any personal data at all, the GDPR would not apply and it wouldn't require you to post a privacy notice. Other laws might still have information obligations, notably the German TMG and TTDSG.	It is absolutely not the case that Providers are not allowed to keep PII without consent. Article 6 of the GDPR identifies six possible lawful bases for processing personal information. These are: (a) the data subject has given consent ... (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person; (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Point (f) of the first subparagraph shall not apply to processing carried out by public authorities in the performance of their tasks. If a person requests services from an online service provider, basis (b) will apply, at least to some information. If there is evidence of criminal activity, basis (c) may well apply, as it also will for much routine record keeping. Any in many such cases, basis (e) or (f) will also apply. In short, article 6 does not create a "haven for online criminals/hackers". In a comment on another answer the OP writes: The offender has the right to not be identifiable and he can't be denied this right That is simply not correct. Nothing in the GDPR says anything of the sort. It is true that consent may not be forced, but if a user requests a service that service may require the user to identify him- or herself. For example, one cannot order physical goods without giving a name and a shipping address. And the provider may retain PI and even PII when it has a "legitimate interest" in doing so, although if challenged it must justify that legitimate interest.	The site would combine the data in novel ways, which is processing the data. Processing personal data which is publicly available is still processing personal data. You would have to take GDPR into account. That does not mean the processing is forbidden, but you need a legal basis for doing it. In many ways, having the informed consent is the easiest legal basis, but there are others. The data subject would have the right to demand information about the data you hold, and to demand the correction of wrong data. There is not necessarily a right to demand deletion, but if consent is withdrawn and you have no other basis for data processing, you have to delete. Note also that the consent basis would mean you have to actively contact the people whose consent you seek before the processing starts, and document how you do it. That makes pay-per-request models difficult. But consider that the news media can process some data about some people without the consent of the subjects of their activities. They just need to balance privacy and other legitimate interests all the time.	No, it's not legal. The General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) apply given that you are in the UK (regardless of where the Data Processor is based). The UK GDPR is slightly modified due to Brexit, but the same principles apply. The only plausible legal basis for this actions would be that you consent to it, and you're entitled to withdraw that consent at any time. Some may claim that Article 6.1(b) applies, i.e. that it's necessary to send marketing email in order to fulfil the contract, but GDPR is clear that bundling such consent into a contract for service simply to permit the data processor additional actions isn't allowed, as I'll demonstrate. UK GDPR requires that consent to use your personal information (in this case, your email address) for the stated purpose be freely given. Consent to use your information for direct marketing is not freely given if it's inseparable from the consent to use it for some other service, as per para 43: Consent is presumed not to be freely given if it does not allow separate consent to be given to different personal data processing operations despite it being appropriate in the individual case, or if the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is dependent on the consent despite such consent not being necessary for such performance. And Article 7.4 backs this up with When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract. The intent of Article 6.1(b) is that only the processing required for the service you have bought is allowed (e.g. if you supply your address for delivery of stuff you've bought, the data processor can use that address to send you the stuff, but is not allowed to add a contract term that allows them to send you unwanted stuff). Examples of emails that Article 6.1(b) would allow (in my assessment) include things such as notification of upcoming downtime, or a reminder that subscriptions are due, but not unsolicited advertisements for other products. There's a grey area that's open to interpretation, where adverts are piggybacked onto actual service messages.	Article 4(11) says: ‘consent’ of the data subject means any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her; Recital 32 says (my emphasis): Consent should be given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her, such as by a written statement, including by electronic means, or an oral statement.2 This could include ticking a box when visiting an internet website, choosing technical settings for information society services or another statement or conduct which clearly indicates in this context the data subject’s acceptance of the proposed processing of his or her personal data.3 Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent. ... At the time of writing, the most recent guidance on consent from the European Data Board says: The use of pre-ticked opt-in boxes is invalid under the GDPR
How does the "well regulated militia" clause affect laws? The second amendment to the US Constitution states: A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. What, if anything, about the law(s) in the US would be different if the italicized text had been omitted?	The operative clause is constrained to interpretations that are consistent with the prefatory clause. "But apart from that clarifying function, a prefatory clause does not limit or expand the scope of the operative clause." DC v Heller 554 U.S. 570 (2008) The majority in Heller, after interpreting the operative clause "return[ed] to the prefatory clause to ensure that [their] reading of the operative clause is consistent with the announced purpose." In their case, since their interpretation of the operative clause was consistent with the announced purpose in the prefatory clause, the prefatory clause may seem to have no effect. However, they make the point that other interpretations of the operative clause can be ruled out by cross-checking against the announced purpose from the prefatory clause: "petitioners’ interpretation does not even achieve the narrower purpose that prompted codification of the right." The court writes that if the petitioners had their way, only state-organized militias would be the beneficiary of the 2nd Amendment protections. However, the majority does not read the prefatory clause this narrowly. "[If] the organized militia is the sole institutional beneficiary of the Second Amendment’s guarantee — it does not assure the existence of a “citizens’ militia” as a safeguard against tyranny." The majority reads the prefatory clause to refer to a "citizens' militia": "the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense".	There is no constitutional provision specifically allowing the President to dismiss a state Governor for any reason. There is no constitutional provision specifically allowing the President to dissolve a state legislature. The US Federal Constitution requires the President to "take care that the laws be executed". Several relevant laws are contained in 10 U.S. Code Chapter 13 - INSURRECTION. Section 251 (renumbered from 240a) provides that: Whenever there is an insurrection in any State against its government, the President may, upon the request of its legislature or of its governor if the legislature cannot be convened, call into Federal service such of the militia of the other States, in the number requested by that State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to suppress the insurrection. Section 252 provides that: Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion. Section 253 provides that: The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it— (1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or (2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws. In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution. Section 254 provides that: Whenever the President considers it necessary to use the militia or the armed forces under this chapter, he shall, by proclamation, immediately order the insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their abodes within a limited time. Sections 251-254 of 10 USC in their current form all date from 1956, but are directly derived from the Insurrection Act of 1807. Under these laws the President has the right and duty to "take such measures as he considers necessary" to suppress any rebellion, which would include any proclaimed secession, including "using the militia or the armed forces" or any other available and effective methods. According to the Wikipedia article (linked above, citations omitted) the Insurrection Act: has been invoked throughout American history. In the 19th century, it was invoked during conflicts with Native Americans. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, it was invoked during labor conflicts. Later in the 20th century, it was used to enforce federally mandated desegregation, with Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy invoking the Act in opposition to the affected states' political leaders to enforce court-ordered desegregation. More recently, governors have requested and received support following looting in the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo in 1989 and during the 1992 Los Angeles riots. In addition 18 USC Chapter 115 deals with related issues, making rebellion, insurrection, or conspiracy to rebel crimes. Section 2383 provides that: Whoever incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof, or gives aid or comfort thereto, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States. Section 2384 provides that: If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof, they shall each be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both. Under these various laws the President has power to use whatever means are required, including military force, to suppress and end any rebellion or insurrection, and arrest the perpetrators thereof. Anyone convicted by a court of insurrection is thereafter barred from elected office, federal ore state. The precedent of President Lincoln's actions at the start of the US Civil War is clear. However, the prospect of any current declaration of secession seems remote. Presumably a state could leave the US with consent of Congress, although this has never occurred and there is no specific Constitutional provision allowing it. Congress could pass further laws dealing with any actual or threatened secession, but the laws already existing seem sufficient, they give the President wide power to act in such cases. It was established by the US Supreme Court in Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869) that secession is not legal, even if enacted by a state legislature, and specifically that the purported secession of Texas in 1861 did not legally remove it from the Union. No later court case or law has contradicted this, to the best of my knowledge.	Dale M's answer is not supported at all by history, or any mode of constitutional interpretation. I also don't find it likely. I'd say that if a duly ratified amendment said as much, that would be the law. It is certainly correct that the court could try to narrow the meaning. It's also possible to simply not follow the Constitution (as we do with state immunity and the 11th amendment). But to assume that would be done here is just speculating blindly. Of course, this question doesn't warrant much more attention than blind speculation, so my comment is not a very offensive accusation. As a few counter points, we have radically change the form of our government many times within the current constitution. Reconstruction, The New Deal and so on, all represented huge changes. Most importantly, the 17th amendment can easily be viewed as more radical than the question's proposed amendment. It completely flipped the political system upside down, orienting power in the people and the federal government, and treating the states as some weird intermediary: but we now see it as a relatively boring enactment. Certainly we could come to see the formal abolishment of the amendment process similarly, especially if it were (which it would need to be) accompanied with a new found comfort with non-textual interpretation to effectively "amend" through interpretation, i.e. If the textualists lost badly this amendment would seem like a relatively natural way of announcing their demise. Remember that Scalia's whole point, is that strict originalism (not saying he was actually so strict himself) would democratize by forcing change through the amendment process. If we rejected that notion (as deceptive, for example) we could (as in its not completely ridiculous to imagine) announce that rejection with the proposed amendment.	It is quite likely that a constitutional amendment was (and is) not needed to ban alcohol. For example, if the Controlled Substances Act is constitutional (and I have no reason to believe it isn't) then alcohol could be added to it tomorrow and it could be removed the day after tomorrow. Right there is the reason that you choose to use a constitutional amendment - it is as hard to reverse as it was to enact; it needs another constitutional ammendment.	Only in California. The First Amendment provides a student essentially no protection from discipline by a private university. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (2019) ("The text and original meaning of those Amendments, as well as this Court's longstanding precedents, establish that the Free Speech Clause prohibits only governmental abridgment of speech. The Free Speech Clause does not prohibit private abridgment of speech."); Vaynberg v. Seton Hall Univ., No. CIV.A. 09-4999 FSH, 2010 WL 4510904, at *5 (D.N.J. Oct. 26, 2010) ("In order for the First Amendment to apply, the challenged conduct must be deemed 'state action.' Seton Hall is a private, Catholic university. ... Because there is no evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Seton Hall's conduct relevant to this lawsuit was “state action,” Seton Hall is entitled to summary judgment.") Some states, however, have passed laws requiring private schools to provide some of the protections of the First Amendment. The most robust of these is California's Leonard Law, which essentially requires private schools to adhere to the First Amendment. Other states also recognize some measure of free-speech rights for students at private institutions. For instance, both the Pennsylvania and New Jersey supreme courts have held that their state constitutions' free-speech clauses (which, unlike the First Amendment, say nothing about the government) protected peaceful protesters who distributed leaflets on the campuses of private colleges.	It is not necessary for a combatant to actually carry arms to become a legitimate target. An uniformed mechanic carrying a screwdriver at an airbase is a combatant, entitled to the protections of the conventions but also a valid target. Of course a civilian commander-in-chief does not wear insignia, but he is presumably recognizable. Civilian targets can be attacked according to the tests of military necessity and proportionality. It can be legal to attack a bridge even if it was built by and for civilians, it can be legal to attack a factory producing arms, it can be legal to attack a power plant also serving a barracks. Taking out a key command-and-control node sounds like miliary necessity to me, but surely there would be lawyers for either viewpoint.	Is it a correct inference that the right "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects" extends to even a private corporation? No. It's not even a correct inference that it extends by its own terms to state and local governments. In Barron v. Baltimore (1833), the Supreme Court held that the Bill of Rights was enacted as part of the federal constitution and only restricts the exercise of the federal government's authority. State and local governments are instead bound by the Fourteenth Amendment, which says that No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Over the years, the courts have held that state action that deprives someone of fundamental rights deprives them of life, liberty, or property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Wolf v. Colorado (1949), the Supreme Court held that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a fundamental right, so state action violating it is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Most of the Bill of Rights has been held to be "fundamental," and people routinely say "the state violated the Fourth Amendment" instead of "the state violated the Fourteenth Amendment by conducting an unreasonable search of the sort that would violate the Fourth Amendment if conducted by the federal government." Courts will say "the Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth." But the point is that the Fourth Amendment itself is not applicable to anyone except the federal government. The Fourteenth Amendment, by its terms, only restricts the states. The Fourth Amendment only restricts the federal government. With rare exceptions, neither applies to private entities.	Edits added below to outline Florida's laws based on OP's comment Jurisdiction does matter but here is a general answer regarding "stand your ground" laws. States that have so-called "stand your ground laws" each have their own language concerning the law. "Stand your ground laws" are often misunderstood but, generally, just mean that a person has no duty to retreat when using deadly physical force for purposes of self-defense or the defense of others. Your examples are more akin to "castle doctrine" laws which I touch on below. Note that all of these laws vary by jurisdiction. I've provided partial examples from Arizona, New York and California. Using deadly physical force for purposes of self-defense or defense of others is complex law and even a complete example from any particular jurisdiction will not be able to cover all circumstances. Each case will be determined by a judge or jury based on the facts of that particular case. Arizona's "stand your ground" statute, as an example, states: B. A person has no duty to retreat before threatening or using deadly physical force pursuant to this section if the person is in a place where the person may legally be and is not engaged in an unlawful act. "Stand your ground" simply means that a person doesn't have to first attempt to retreat before resorting to the use of deadly force. Arizona's statute regarding justification for self-defense states (emphasis mine): A. Except as provided in subsection B of this section, a person is justified in threatening or using physical force against another when and to the extent a reasonable person would believe that physical force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful physical force. B. The threat or use of physical force against another is not justified: In response to verbal provocation alone; or To resist an arrest that the person knows or should know is being made by a peace officer or by a person acting in a peace officer's presence and at his direction, whether the arrest is lawful or unlawful, unless the physical force used by the peace officer exceeds that allowed by law; or If the person provoked the other's use or attempted use of unlawful physical force, unless: (a) The person withdraws from the encounter or clearly communicates to the other his intent to do so reasonably believing he cannot safely withdraw from the encounter; and (b) The other nevertheless continues or attempts to use unlawful physical force against the person. Note the phrase, "extent a reasonable person." This means that the actions of a person using deadly force will be measured against what a "reasonable person" would do in similar circumstances. Some states have a duty to retreat, particularly when in a public place, before using deadly force. New York, as an example, has a "duty to retreat" before using deadly force except in specific circumstances (emphasis mine): A person may not use deadly physical force upon another person under circumstances specified in subdivision one unless: (a) The actor reasonably believes that such other person is using or about to use deadly physical force. Even in such case, however, the actor may not use deadly physical force if he or she knows that with complete personal safety, to oneself and others he or she may avoid the necessity of so doing by retreating; except that the actor is under no duty to retreat if he or she is: (i) in his or her dwelling and not the initial aggressor; or (ii) a police officer or peace officer or a person assisting a police officer or a peace officer at the latter`s direction, acting pursuant to section 35.30; or (b) He or she reasonably believes that such other person is committing or attempting to commit a kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible criminal sexual act or robbery; or (c) He or she reasonably believes that such other person is committing or attempting to commit a burglary, and the circumstances are such that the use of deadly physical force is authorized by subdivision three of section 35.20. Castle Doctrine Laws typically refer to what one may do in their own home when it comes to the use of deadly force. Some states have extended the "castle doctrine" to include personal automobiles as well. California's "castle doctrine" statute, as an example, states that if one is in their own home and someone "unlawfully and forcibly" enters the home one can presume that the person in his or her residence "held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily injury": Any person using force intended or likely to cause death or great bodily injury within his or her residence shall be presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily injury to self, family, or a member of the household when that force is used against another person, not a member of the family or household, who unlawfully and forcibly enters or has unlawfully and forcibly entered the residence and the person using the force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred. As used in this section, great bodily injury means a significant or substantial physical injury. In California's statute both the resident and the person using force to gain entry have to know or have reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred. If a person simply entered an unlocked home then the resident would have to have some other reasonable reason to believe that they were in imminent peril of death or great bodily injury. Wikipedia has a reasonable entry on the adoption of "stand your ground" and "castle doctrine" statutes and gives a state-by-state breakdown of both. Note that these laws have seen a lot of change recently and any particular entry for a state may not be accurate. Florida's self-defense laws Florida's "Use or threatened use of force in defense of person" states: 776.012 Use or threatened use of force in defense of person.— (1) A person is justified in using or threatening to use force, except deadly force, against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other’s imminent use of unlawful force. A person who uses or threatens to use force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat before using or threatening to use such force. (2) A person is justified in using or threatening to use deadly force if he or she reasonably believes that using or threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony. A person who uses or threatens to use deadly force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground if the person using or threatening to use the deadly force is not engaged in a criminal activity and is in a place where he or she has a right to be. Florida outlines the cases where use, or threatened use, of force is justified. Notice that in the law Florida specifically states that the person threatened does not have a duty to retreat. Florida also specifically states that a person has a "right to stand his or her ground" if the person is in a place where he or she has a right to be and is not engaged in criminal activity. Florida statute also specifically outlines the right to use self-defense within one's home and vehicle. Florida has a "castle doctrine" similar to what was outlined above and similar in nature to New York's and California's laws: The person against whom the defensive force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle, or if that person had removed or was attempting to remove another against that person’s will from the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle; Florida has a longer list of exemptions related to who may have used force to enter a home including ownership interest in the property or vehicle, children and grandchildren, the person who engaged defensive force was involved in criminal activity and law enforcement officers. Florida's Justifiable Use Of Force is chapter 776 discusses when force can be used. There was an attempt by the Florida legislature in 2019 to change the standard by which use of force could be justified from "reasonably believes" force is necessary to "a reasonably cautious and prudent person in the same circumstances would objectively believe" force was necessary. The bill was withdrawn in May, 2019.
Protecting IP of video subject I have several projects and inventions the development of which I would like to chronicle on YouTube, however I'm also aware of the risks in doing so as anyone viewing the videos would be able to steal the concepts shown before any formal patent is filed. Ideally I'd like to release most of my work under some sort of open source license that allows non-commercial and educational use. My question isn't about what license would cover this, but rather: What license, if any, could I release the videos under that would immediately protect their subject/contents? I can find many licenses that protect the videos themselves, but none that cover the subjects shown in the video. I would imagine something along those lines exists, as the videos themselves would also serve as proof of original development. I've tried finding information on this myself but can't quite seem to find exactly what I'm looking for, I hope someone here may be able to help me.	No license can create patent protection for the subject of your videos. Licenses apply to the copyright that is inherently created when you create the video. Patents can only be obtained by applying for them through patent offices. Your video would act as prior art if anyone (including yourself, with some exceptions) later tries to apply for patent protection of any of the inventions shown in the video. For you, the US (and a few other countries) offers a 1 year grace period following your public disclosure, during which you are still allowed to file a patent application on the inventions without the video counting as prior art; in most other countries, the video would immediately disqualify you from protecting the subject inventions, unless you file a patent application before publishing the video.	The government's position is that material in the patent documents is generally in the public domain See Public Domain Copyright Trademark & Patent Information Schedule: As part of the terms of granting the patent to the inventor, patents are published into the public domain. And slightly more specific, see Terms of Use for USPTO websites: Patents: Subject to limited exceptions reflected in 37 CFR 1.71(d) & (e) and 1.84(s), the text and drawings of a patent are typically not subject to copyright restrictions. 1.71(d) allows for the patent author to specifically indicate that some of the material is protected by copyright. But that position has not actually been tested in courts However, there is no actual statute explicitly exempting material in the patent documents from copyright nor any case law holding that in the absence of a notice, the material in fact becomes public domain. See Alderucci, "The surprising consequences of exempting patents from copyright protection (2016), at p. 13 and footnote 62.	Exactly the same way it works over all other content There are no special classes of copyright, there’s just copyright. What a user of a service may do with copyright materials will be spelled out in the licence. If there is no licence, then they are left with fair use/fair dealing.	The terms transfer IP rights only for the New IP, meaning that Customer would own the new stuff. Developer will still own their old stuff, but Customer will have the right to use the old stuff, depending on the license terms. If the license is as in your link, then it is forever (but this is a stub, so I assume that the license will be more specific and possibly restrictive). You retain all your rights to old stuff, customer will not pay royalties for the old stuff, and they can transfer or extend the license, or part of the license, to others.	From your question(s), as well as your various comments, I understand you to have two general inquiries: 1. Is there any infringement of copyright laws if you use things like the titles of books, games, apps, names, address (and any other number of things) which you will then put into datasets that will be licensed for proprietary commercial purposes? You may freely put titles, names of people, places or things into datasets without fear that you are infringing on copyright or any other laws. That is clear. Copyright law does not protect names, titles, short phrases or expressions. Even if a name, title, or short phrase is novel or distinctive it cannot be protected by copyright. So, there is no point in discussing the doctrine of fair use in this context, because Fair Use is a defense, or a legal safe harbor that is merely an exception to copyright infringement allowing people to use a copyrighted works under specific circumstances. As I understand your intended endeavor, you will not be infringing on any copyrights to the extent that you are merely using factual data, like names of copyrighted things for the purpose of creating a dataset or an application to help access it. This is why I say you need not concern yourself with the test for Fair Use with regard to this issue. The Copyright Office states clearly, despite what people may think, that there are no exclusive rights in brief combinations of words such as: • Names of products or services • Names of businesses, organizations, or groups (including the names of performing groups) • Pseudonyms of individuals (including pen or stage names) • Titles of works • Catchwords, catchphrases, mottoes, slogans, or short advertising expressions • Listings of ingredients, as in recipes, labels, or formulas. When a recipe or formula is accompanied by an explanation or directions, the text directions may be copyrightable, but the recipe or formula itself remains uncopyrightable. Hence, these things are not registrable under a copyright. While something may be potentially attached to or included in copyrighted material, is not in and of itself subject to the protections of these laws. If it (whatever it is) cannot be registered for a copyright, it is not copyrightable. Because copyright registration/notices have been optional since 1989, when the U.S. attached itself to the Berne Convention, whereby copyright protection is automatic as soon as a work is “fixed in a tangible medium of expression” (written down, recorded, painted, etc.) it’s protected. No notice is required. Registration only becomes required for litigation or enforcement purposes. But this is really extraneous to your inquiry anyway, as far as it applies to the actual data. When you get into copying whole databases for your purpose, that analysis is different. 2. You want to "scrub" the internet for information that you intend to put into your proprietary datasets and use for commercial purposes, some or most of which is already in a database or some organized form, and you want to know if there is some sort of copyright or duty owned to the person who originally databased the materials? Since ideas, procedures, principles, discoveries, and devices are all specifically excluded from copyright protection, if you want to compile this type of information from the internet for the purpose of creating datasets, or searchable databases, this is permissible. That said, there are protections for existing databases under copyright law, provided under the concept of a "compilation copyright". A compilation copyright protects the collection and creative assembling of data or other materials. Compilation copyrights protect the collection and assembling of data or other materials, such that databases are generally protected by copyright law as compilations. Under the Copyright Act, a compilation is defined as a "collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship." 17. U.S.C. § 101. The preexisting materials or data may be protected by copyright since the selections of materials and the form they take in an existing database may be original enough to be subject to a copyright. However, the data itself is merely information and is not protectable. The Copyright Act specifically states that the copyright in a compilation extends only to the compilation itself, and not to the underlying materials or data. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b). As a result, "compilation copyrights" can't be used to place protection upon those things that are otherwise not protectable. In the case of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a compilation work such as a database must contain a minimum level of creativity in order to be protectable under the Copyright Act. Feist makes clear that even a copyright protected database does not hold the right to prevent an individual from extracting factual data from the database (so long as you're not copying the entire database as a whole). If you take an already compiled and copyrighted dataset in its entirety, you must obtain a license for its use. However, if you are merely amassing great amounts of data to then put into your own dataset, that you are free to do. The big issue will be (and you seem to realize this) where you will amass this data from. Some websites have specific licenses in place that say you cannot use or rework their content. However, many times these websites simply throw these license requirements out there for users to see, despite the fact that they may not be (and some would argue) are not enforceable. The courts have heard arguments that "contracts" (the end-user licenses) that protect databases and information on websites is beyond the protection available through copyright law should be "preempted" by the Copyright Act itself. The preemption argument goes like this: Federal law controlling something that is subject to interstate commerce or use, should be controlled by the federal laws. So,since the federal government has enacted the Copyright Act to govern any protections to any original works, states should be (arguably are) prohibited from having contradictory laws. Because of the ability of a federal statute to preempt state law, and the fact that the Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. § 301 sets forth specific preemptions, no state may create rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights provided under the Act. It is this concept of preemption that prevents copyright protection from varying depending upon the state where a work of authorship is created. Arguably, the same is true for the internet, and supposed contractual relationship created through licenses that dictates how non-copyrightable material may be used. In the case of ProCD, Incorporated v. Matthew Zeidenberg and Silken Mountain Web Services, Inc. the court examined whether an end-user of a CD ROM phone database was subject to the license, when they extracted a large portion of the database and made it available over the Internet. The database was almost the same as the type of data in the Feist case-The lower court rejected all copyright claims and found that the shrinkwrap license that controlled the end user's right to use the data was both unenforceable (as a shrink wrap license) and preempted by the Copyright Act. As a result, there was no relief available to the creator of the phone database and the end-user was free to extract the data and use it as he saw fit. However, on appeal this decision was reversed (7th circuit). The appellate court did acknowledge that the database (on the CD) was not original enough to be protected by copyright (finding no copyright infringement by the end-user); However, they did find the end-user was breach of contract, since the shrink-wrap license prohibited the end-user's conduct. What this tells us is that these licenses (on websites) may or may not be enforceable. While the 7th Circuit found a contract right pursuant to the license, despite the preemption argument, another appellate court that is more liberal may find otherwise. Also, this was a disk, not the internet, which is the "wild west" of information, largely unregulated and unlitigated as it pertains to the legality and enforceability of (some) regulations that do exist. License agreements for site use on the internet are everywhere. If you take a database from some site that has a license saying you cannot take their work and add to it, or whatever, and you do add it to other databases that are not licensed and then make your own dataset - chances are you are NOT going to be infringing on anyone's copyright. That said, you may be in breach of contract (the license) if they find out about it, and sue you (using it doesn't put you in breach; only getting sued and having a court determine you're in breach puts you in breach. It may be a distinction worth contemplation, but that is up to you). The safest, bet would be to get a license from them to rework the materials. If the material is generic enough, and will be changed enough, that you are creating your own new (copyrightable) work - I'm not sure how they would know you "scrubbed the data in contravention of their license agreement ( I have NO CLUE if there is coding or metadata attached to it such that it's identifiable in that way. I have not tech background and do not endorse taking what's not yours). But if they can and do know, they could cause problems for you. Lastly, I will just say that the internet is littered with sites that claim copyrights, or impose unenforceable licenses on material that is ripe for public use. Just because it says it's theirs does not make it so. The inverse is also true. Just because a site does not claim copyright to something, does not mean it is in the public domain. I would recommend either sticking to public domain/use sites for your scrubbing endeavors, or seeking permissions from the sites who impose licensing requirements. Short of that, I would recommend (as I already have) seeking an formal legal opinion to say that you are not imposing on anyone's copyrights (this could only be done once you showed an attorney every place you took material from, as well as what the material is), and that the licenses from sites with generalized information that may try to limit use, are unenforceable. I would do this before you invest a lot of time or money into something that is largely based on the accumulation of other peoples work product. I wish there was an answer certain, but there just isn't without seeing everything in the end.	On the face of it, transcripts are derivative work covered by copyright (even if automagically generated). You are allowed to use them if the use is fair use or if you comply with YouTube's terms of service.	Interesting that they don't give a source and also don't link to anywhere (such as Wikimedia commons). So I assume that content is google's own. So generally speaking: No, when no license is provided, that means you can't use whatever it is in a project of yours (whether commercially or not), because the "default", when nothing is specified, is that no license is given. So unless you find a license that grants you a permission on google's own content, these sounds can't be used freely.	As for the subject matter (what can be protected), amplitude, frequency, harmonic pattern, duration etc. are all physical facts, and there is no protection for physical facts. The basic requirement is that the thing protected must be "creative". Once you have a creative composition (assuming it is a composition, where infringement is harder to establish), the question arises whether a particular other composition infringes, or is an independent creation deserving its own protection. Again, the law does not deal in technical acoustic properties, and "similarity" is dealt with in an essentially subjective manner. The find of fact, who is an ordinary observer, has to weight all of the evidence and decide whether there is substantial similarity (or striking similarity) which could be evidence of infringement (substantial similarity is not against the law, copyright infringement is). Both parties to the litigation will present testimony supporting their contention and refuting the others' contention. At some point, one side is likely to introduce expert testimony to the effect that there are only so many possible melodies, which if persuasive can overcome a feeling that two compositions are rather similar. The law only addresses the logic of that judgment, and not the scientific facts. For example, in the case of Testa v. Janssen, the legal premise is set doen that "proof of direct access is unnecessary where striking similarities between two works are present". HOw then do you know if there are striking similarities? To prove that similarities are striking, plaintiffs must demonstrate that "such similarities are of a kind that can only be explained by copying, rather than by coincidence, independent creation, or prior common source." Stratchborneo v. Arc Music Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1393, 1403 (S.D.N.Y.1973) citing a previous ruling on that point. Ultimately, the courts cannot not dictate a scientific procedure for making that determination.
Is following the flow of traffic a valid speeding defence in Texas? As per the summary at http://www.mit.edu/~jfc/laws.html, Texas is one of the three states where there are no absolute speed limits -- a speed in excess of a posted limit is prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable and prudent and that the speed is unlawful (Texas Sec. 545.352). So, what if you were going with the flow of the traffic? Is that a valid defense that you were driving at a reasonable speed? What if you mentioned to the officer once stopped that you were simply going with the flow of the traffic, and he didn't really seem to object? What if the speed limit was 70, the flow of the traffic in your lane was 75 to 80, the citation received was listed for 80, but the officer claims that he has gotten you on his radar at 85? Could it be argued that in such instance the actual speed limit was supposed to have been at least 75 (as per the 85th percentile speed), and thus going 80 (as per the ticket) is less than the 10 miles over the limit, which is what the minimum charge an officer claimed he could give a citation for? Would this be a valid defense in Texas, overthrowing the citation?	Texas and California are actually what are called Presumed Speeding states, unlike most others which are Absolute Speeding states. (There is a little known third category called Basic, but this is uncommon). In a presumed speeding state, a speed-limit violation offers someone in your shoes far more flexibility in building your defense than the more common absolute state. In states that use this presumed system, such as California and Texas, it is not illegal to drive over the posted limit as long as you are driving safely and this can be established. For example, if you are driving 50 mph in a 40-mph zone, you are "presumed" to be speeding, yes. However, despite this prima facie evidence (meaning "on its face") of speed in excess of the posted limit, if you can show you were driving safely you may be able to mount a pretty decent defense. Just because you got a ticket is not prima facie evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that you were speeding. You are presumed innocent. If they prove you were speeding this is all they need to make their case, unless you rebut it. But there is a lot of room to rebut this presumption – and that is if they prove it. They must (as with all criminal cases) prove you did what you are accused of beyond a reasonable doubt – the highest standard of proof in the U.S. So, if everyone was going 80 MPH in a 70MPH zone, you would argue that the road was (I'm assuming) dry, unmarred, you were traveling in heavy enough traffic that to slow your speed to the posted limit would actually be less safe than traveling with the flow of traffic. You can talk about the state of your vehicle (repair, handling, etc.), how you stayed in one lane, and you can describe your skill at driving – especially if you have no other tickets and you have been driving for a long time. If you were weaving in and out of traffic, riding someone's bumper, if it was pouring rain, the road was bumpy or under construction, or if you admitted speeding (if you did this you can still rebut with a showing of safe driving, but ignore all info regarding challenging radar or other means of determining speed), or if any other evidence exists that the officer would testify to that shows you were not driving safely, this will not be successful. A successful example of a speeding defense in Texas: on a clear, dry morning with no other cars on a wide, straight road, a man is pulled over for being clocked going 50 mph in a 40 MPH zone. He had a perfect record and had been driving 22 years. He was driving a 2-year-old car. He convinced a judge that this was driving safely given those conditions and was acquitted. That's because facts presented were sufficient to "rebut the presumption" that by going over the posted limit he was driving at an unsafe speed. NOTE: Never bring up your driving record unless it is spotless. Unless you are a habitual offender it cannot be used against you or be brought into evidence at all, unless you open the door. You can also mount a defense based on the radar detection device, if one was used. You can seek records as to when the calibration fork was last checked, when the last time it was professionally calibrated (rather than self calibrated). You can ask, in a leading way (only if you know) how close the car behind and in front of you were (you don't want to be too close to the car in front of you, however if the cars were tightly grouped it is more likely the radar detector could have read another vehicle): e.g., "Isn't it true that the car behind me was only 1.5 car lengths behind me?" Only do this if you know, but if you can get the officer to admit that the car behind you was close, that can be used to rebut the radar detection and goes to the argument that driving slower would have been dangerous and you were driving safely with the flow of traffic. You should be prepared to put on an entire trial if you fight the ticket. In Texas, I believe speeding is considered a Class C criminal offense (rather than a civil offense as in most absolute states); hence, they have to build the prima facie case against you and prove it beyond reasonable doubt. If you can afford one, get a good traffic violation attorney. Always choose a jury in this type of case. Everyone speeds a little and you are far more likely to be acquitted by a jury than a judge. You should also ask to have the case assigned to the county seat; request this in writing ASAP. If you are trying the case, be prepared to go after the officer. Note any distinguishing marks on your car (if any), recall what you wore, what time of day, the lighting, all that. Even go back to the scene at the same day and time and take video showing the flow of traffic, (hopefully) the straightness of the road, etc. Cross-examine him on all facts with confidence and in a leading manner. Always ask for the calibration reports and you will get all evidence against you in discovery. This thing about 10mph being the minimum they can give a ticket for: ignore that, it's rubbish! It's meant to get you to admit to him that "you were only going 8 or 9 over." Also, that whole percentile argument is not relevant and will not work at all. You must show that you were driving safely given all the facts and circumstances to rebut the presumption that you were driving unsafely by speeding. It is worth fighting as you will also incur surcharges, increased insurance rates, and points on your license that are cumulative and stay for 3 years – a certain amount of which gets you suspended if you get (or have) more violations.	Traffic offenses, which are generally class C misdemeanors in Texas, and more generally, pretty much any offense for which you are required to appear in person at the court in Texas (which can result in issuance of a warrant for your arrest if you fail to appear) will generally be subject to the right to trial by jury in Texas. Note that this is not a U.S. constitutional requirement unless one can be incarcerated for six months or more for the offense, so, in all other cases, the right to a jury trial in traffic cases is a right that arises solely under the State of Texas Constitution and by state statute and state court rules. But, generally speaking, a parking violation in Texas in punishable with an administrative citation for which only a small fine is authorized, in which there is no right to a jury trial. See, e.g., this regulation governing parking violations on the property of the state capitol in Austin. More pertinent to the question, in particular, this also appears to be the case in the City of Houston (see also here). This process is governed by Texas Transportation Code §§ 682.001 to 682.011. This makes parking violations under municipal ordinances civil offenses punishable by civil fines imposed in administrative hearings before a "hearing officer" (i.e. a parking court judge). Failure to attend the hearing confesses liability but is not otherwise wrongful. An unpaid fine is enforced by a lawsuit rather than a criminal charge. The U.S. Constitution's 7th Amendment does not confer a right to a trial by jury in civil matters which is strictly a function of state law. And, while the Texas Right to a Jury Trial under Article 1, Section 15 of the Texas Constitution is very broad, it does not include reviews of administrative decisions, which are what parking hearings and appeals of them to a municipal court are classified as being.	Texas law on parking offenses is Ch. 682 of the Transportation code. After you work through the sections on creating ordinances and having a hearing, we get to enforcement in §682.010 – you have been ordered, at the hearing, to pay a fine. Enforcement can be by (1) impounding the vehicle if the offender has committed three or more vehicle parking or stopping offenses in a calendar year; (2) placing a device on the vehicle that prohibits movement of the motor vehicle; (3) imposing an additional fine if the original fine is not paid within a specified time; (4) denying issuance of or revoking a parking or operating permit, as applicable; or (5) filing an action to collect the fine, cost, or fee in a court of competent jurisdiction. (b) An action to collect a fine, cost, or fee under Subsection (a)(5) must be brought: (1) in the name of the municipality served by the hearing officer; and (2) in a county in which all or part of that municipality is located. The first 4 options do not require further legal process, they just do it (small claims court cannot order seizure of a vehicle). To get money from you, they have to go to court, and it can be any court in that county. The Houston ordinance does not add anything beyond saying what kind of parking is forbidden and what the fine is. Texas law doesn't go beyond saying "court of competent jurisdiction". Small claims court functions to make a basic legal determination that a party owes money, but that determination has already been made in the case of a traffic fine. Enforcement would be obtained through justice court.	In general, yes, police could do this. I am not aware of any US state or locality which requires an officer to execute a stop as soon as a traffic violation is observed. Whether the police would act in such a way is another question, but in some areas maximizing citation revenue is a high priority, so police in such areas might act in such a way. If police think a person's actions are "suspicious" and think that the person might be involved in some crime more serious than a traffic violation, it would be common procedure to follow without making a stop or arrest to get a better idea of what the person was doing. Many police I have encountered seem seriously concerned to stop someone driving in what they consider an unsafe way as quickly as possible, and so stop violators promptly, but I don't say that motivates all police all the time.	You are not reading a law book here and you should not interpret a driving test so literally. It's quite clear that the question implies you should follow all of their instructions regarding how to proceed through traffic. Sometimes those instructions do involve "breaking laws" such as driving on the wrong side of the road or proceeding through a traffic signal that was not turned off. The B option clearly does not mean they have the power to disobey all laws in existence, only those concerning traffic as evidenced by the examples given. You are not Sheldon Cooper and you should know how to interpret a vague question correctly. You are also not a gopher, and you can correctly deduce that crashing into another car or driving off the cliff into the water is not in your best interests, and that calling the police to report someone abusing their position is probably a good idea. If you're concerned by the wording, try contacting the California DMV to have them clarify the wording.	IMO this is a perfectly reasonable question, amenable to a common law analysis: (1) indicates that A has committed the tort of false imprisonment (Restatement of Torts, 2d, §35). Because of 2-4, we can see that A intends to confine B (though vide infra). The confinement is complete (§36), this being a single aisle plane although the same would be true if this was a 5-aisle plane. A has no authority to confine B (§ 41) and is not otherwise privileged, and is accomplished with a physical barrier (§38). B knows that he has been confined (§42). B is "privileged to use any means of self-defense to protect himself against confinement which he is privileged to use to protect himself against a harmful or offensive contact or other bodily harm" (§68). B uses reasonable and minimal force not likely or intended to cause death or serious bodily harm (§63), force which is privileged and thus protects B from being subject to liability (§10). A commits the tort of battery (and a second round of false imprisonment) by taking B down (§13). A is not privileged to use force in self-defense. There is no reasonable belief that B will spontaneously turn on A and use further, unprivileged force – A is simply punishing B for his minimal use of force in self defense, so A's final act is not privileged. There is a related but distinct scenario that adds a material fact, which could change the analysis: C calls out "Excuse me, my flight flight leaves in 15 minutes, may I pass?" whereby A allows C to step ahead of him in the queue. A has no obligation to let anyone jump the queue, but may consent to inconsequential contact which might constitute battery. It is reasonable to conclude that there is apparent consent (§50) given to anyone (§52) when A makes way ("making way" is a publicly-available fact, but "for C to pass" is a private fact of A's state of mind which B cannot reasonably infer: except, B has heard the "May I pass?" request). So the analysis really hinges on how to interpret 2 and 4. Coupled with 6, we (jurors) have a preponderance of evidence showing that A intended to confine B, and battered him when his confinement failed.	The Ct. driver's manual p. 44 says that "Solid yellow lines may be crossed to make a left turn to or from an alley, private road, driveway, or street", and also "A double solid white line prohibits lane changing" (turning left is not the same as lane changing). In Washington, there is a fine of $136 for crossing a double white line, but this is related to the hyper-limited access pay lanes on the freeway. I have not found anything in the Connecticut code that indicates an analogous absolute prohibition against crossing a double white. In lieu of a statutory prohibition, you may succeed in arguing that it was a legal turn, as long as the turn was in compliance with the rest of the law, e.g. you signalled, you yielded right of way (which essentially means he was driving so fast that he appeared after you started to turn). His speed may be contributing negligence that prevents you from being liable, so it just depends.	I'll preface this by saying I live in Australia where the lowest jurisdiction that can make an act a criminal offence is the state; local governments simply do not have that power here, Question 1: If I understand this right you have a law that you do not enforce that carries moderate sanctions and you are asking that a law that you do not enforce with greater sanctions will be a greater deterrent? Well ... no (see here). If you want to stop the behavior you have to enforce the sanctions that you have in a fair and impartial way. I would suggest that you make it very clear that starting in early September the laws will be enforced - that gives people fair warning. Then, each weekend in September you bring in enough police (State Troopers?) to enforce the law. Its not going to take many $250 fines to make people stop. Question 2: No comment. Question 3: No comment. Question 4: Sounds like a good way of getting the city sued for negligence; just because people are breaking the law does not make it legal to hurt them. If you are serious then fencing the entire area may be worthwhile but the area would still need to be policed.
Can the Developer of a Program be penalized if it is used illegally? If a developer writes a program, for example a password cracker or a code decipher, and it is used illegally, will the developer or the user get punished? A password cracker could be used, for example, if you forgot your email password, and that is perfectly legal. But you could also use the password cracker to hack into someone else's account. Same deal for a code decipher (it could be used legally or illegally.) So my question is: if a user uses a program illegally, is the user or the developer punished? Is there something a developer can do (like put a user agreement that states you should not use it illegally?)	The simple answer is yes. There's a famous case that illustrates this: A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (2001). A number of record companies successfully sued Napster for infringing their various intellectual property rights. Essentially, the finding came down to the fact that: Napster's program (of the same name) allows for the exchange of copyrighted material, and Napster had actual knowledge that specific infringing material was available using its system, and that it did not remote the material (by blocking access to the system or otherwise). Napster did not police the index of files that they maintained, and so were liable for vicarious infringement. The longer answer to your question is it depends. Based on the Napster precedent, it seems it would depend (at least) on whether: the program may have legitimate uses you are aware that it can be used for illegal purpose you have a means of monitoring the activity you have a means of restricting use of the program you financially benefit from the activities of the users Many developers will include some warning about using the software only for legal purposes. I don't think such a warning has ever been tested, and even if it were, it's unlikely to make a difference if the clear purpose of the software is to perform illegal acts.	If you do, can you build/run it without being bound by said license? No, you cannot. Because there is no way to "build/run" it without making a copy. You copy the sourcecode, before you can run your compiler. That is the copy you are making, not copying the file that results from this process. A valid question might be, are you bound by the license? Well, that is up for lawyers and a court to decide, but in all countries I know, copyright is automatic for anything worth copying. And the copyright holder can grant licenses to people to allow things. So arguing you are not bound by a specific license would mean you would argue that you are bound by the legal default, which in most countries is "You cannot copy that. At all. Unless you have explicit permission". That argument would sound like "I stole all 10, because the offer of buy-one-get-one-free was not legally binding". Maybe it wasn't. But that doesn't mean you get to do something unrelated illegal instead. Now, there are many exceptions for "personal use". You can sing any song in the shower. I would assume you can compile any program there, too. You just cannot use that program for anything worthwhile, the same way you cannot record your song in the shower and sell it.	This sounds a bit far-fetched. There are laws against circumventing copy protection measures (DRM) but not against aimbotting (to the best of my knowledge). Thus, you cannot reasonably believe that a click-assist functionality would be used to break laws. It could definitely be used to break private contracts such as an EULA, but you are not a party to that contract and are not bound by its terms. Of course, when you use such click-assist tech in an online game, you might be breaking your contract with the game vendor or server provider. But this doesn't imply that a click-assist would be forbidden outside of that context. Note that assistive technologies sometimes have exceptions from laws, e.g. a permission to circumvent DRM if necessary for accessibility. In the US, the Librarian of Congress adopts exceptions for a duration of three years. While none of the current exceptions match your specific scenario involving video-games, it can be permissible to break DRM on e-books or videos for certain accessibility enhancements.	The first thing that people need to do is to quit over thinking it. That being said, I'm going to see if I can tackle your problems one by one, before summarizing and providing my own opinion: Many users don't care if their code is copied. I'm like that. I left a couple comments on Shog9's post that read this: Good point: Licensing does not prevent careless or malicious use. I'm surprised about how many people are thinking that this license will let them steal their code, because it's already happening right now. I don't want to sound pessimistic, but when thousands of people break a license/law/contract, it's a bit of a lost cause. You're not significantly damaged in a direct way, so honestly, let it go. All I want is to make sure that no one can come up to me if something of mine screwed something on there side. Aside from that, I don't care about people who don't attribute me: chances are, they have no moral sanity, and I will appreciate the people who do, and help me out. As it is, I'm 16, I share what I know with a good heart, and in a well-spirited manner, and at the end of the day, knowing that I was able to help someone out makes my day. I don't mind if my code is copied. I know that people will copy my code whether I like it or not, but I also know that there will be people in the world who will say "thanks", and will try to attribute me where possible. I feel good about that. That being said, I don't care. But the person who uses my code does. The license that affects all Stack Exchange posts are licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution Share-Alike license, or CC BY-SA. Code contributions don't fit well with this. This excellent post on Open Source explains why it's discouraged for code. What these people want is a code-friendly license, so that they can stay in the clear when it comes to copyright issues. The next thing they want, is for someone to come after them over some licensing issue. You may think that people are good, but you never know the world around you. They can be evil. For other users, they don't mind their code being copied to another post, as long as there is a link to the post and a mention of the original author. Most people post with good intention. There's not that much of an issue from a legal perspective either: The license allows people to copy and paste into answers of their own, and since the license remains the same, there's no issue to get into. The license allows it, and contributors kind of have to acknowledge it. I don't think anyone cares what happens to code that is less than 3-4 lines at least. I can probably agree. Such code probably wouldn't be eligible for copyright anyway, since it's so trivial. Many jurisdictions have a "Threshold of Originality," which means that simple things can't be under copyright. Stack Exchange does not probably want people to own the code they submit. For example, Stack Exchange has (and probably wishes to retain) the right to keep even deleted posts in the visibility of the high rep users (even if the author is against it). Wait what? You may be right that it is in Stack Exchange's interest to host content. After all, they get hits, which helps them as a business. It is illegal for companies to host illegal content. If somebody sees objectionable, copyrighted content hosted on Stack Exchange that they would like removed, then they need to file a DMCA Takedown Request. This is also why moderators, like myself, cannot process legal requests. The reason why Stack Exchange doesn't act themselves, even if they see something that is copyrighted and objectionable, is because it's a form of liability. When YouTube began removing copyrighted content themselves, they received a wave of lawsuits (If you remove some, you need to remove all. Why didn't you remove mine? being the argument). The plaintiff's won those, and when YouTube did nothing, they weren't liable at all. If a user wants to have their content taken down, it's tricky. You need to look at the Terms of Service for Stack Exchange: (quoting Section 3) You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange When Stack Exchanges gets your content, you grant them an irrevocable license to your contribution. This is pretty standard across a lot of sites: it's just a way to secure data and stay in the clear of licensing issues. At the same time, it doesn't seem fair for SE to acquire complete ownership of the content. The user must still have the final say, if the content is to be used for purposes not already agreed upon in the licence. They don't. What users have done is that they have provided a license of their content to Stack Exchange. This is done, again, through their Terms of Service: You grant Stack Exchange the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to use, copy, cache, publish, display, distribute, modify, create derivative works and store such Subscriber Content and to allow others to do so in any medium now known or hereinafter developed (“Content License”) in order to provide the Services, even if such Subscriber Content has been contributed and subsequently removed by You. The user grants a license to their content to Stack Exchange, but they do not assign or relinquish copyright. The code still belongs to them. It's important not to conflate the user contribution policy, with copyright assignment. You are still free to add an additional license to your content (known as dual or multi-licensing), and have a copy for your own use. Stack Exchange will always host a copy licensed under the CC BY-SA license. Stack Exchange can expect a high level of decorum and respect for laws from its users. At the same time, it cannot expect redundant attributions anywhere and everywhere, because one of its main aims is to not waste the users' time. Not only Stack Exchange expects it, but many copyright laws in various jurisdictions require it too. There's a concept known in many jurisdictions known as moral rights. These are rights that are irrevocable, whether you like it or not. Generally, these include attributions, disclaimer of liability, and other rights as well. Even if your work is in the public domain, you still retain these moral rights. If memory serves me right, the right to be attributed is revokable under United States copyright law. Therefore, attribution becomes more a courtesy, when the right is revoked. Licenses such as CC BY, and CC BY-SA still require attribution as a part of their licensing terms. What defines attribution is generally up to the person who uses the content. If memory serves right again, one can not demand how to attribute. There should be a clear-cut way to determine what is code and what isn't. The code formatting indicators on SE may not be adequate because some users simply use backticks, or 4-space indented text for other not-so-codey text. Personally, I feel like making the entirety of a post under both the Creative Commons license and whatever proposed code license they use is the best option, and allow people to use moral judgement to determine the most appropriate license. The concern comes about people who lack such judgment. I bet these same people don't follow the existing license anyway - and are a lost cause. We made it through! There will always be debate on the license of choice. Some people want the GPL, a license that's apparently closer to the status quo of Creative Commons license (I disagree that it's a good match), while other's want permissive licenses, such as the MIT or the Apache licenses. I'd prefer the permissive type, since it allows use in closed-source applications, and grant more rights (i.e. less restrictions) to the people that use them. I'm not going to right much because my hands are tired, but I'm sure if you've got more questions about the open source licenses themselves, you can probably ask on Open Source Stack Exchange.	There are a few ways that this could be illegal, but barring those, there is nothing per se illegal in doing what you describe. It could be a TOS/contact/licence violation to sniff the traffic: Use third-party software that intercepts, collects, reads, or "mines" information generated or stored by the Battle.net Client or the Game(s) The protocol could be protected by patent. (U.S. Patent 5,883,893) The use of the reverse engineered protocol could be illegal (fraudulently connecting to a company's server while posing as an authorized client).	Plagiarism is an academic concept, not a legal one. The issue you are concerned about is copyright infringement. A work based off of another copyrighted work is a derivative work. This requires permission of the copyright holder. Simply listing your source and saying "no crime intended" does not help. However, recipes are generally not copyrightable (at least in the UK/US). This is because they are a list of ingredients and instructions which is not sufficient for a creative work. The presentation of the recipe can be copyrighted, as can any descriptive text surrounding it. If you're just taking the actual recipe, making a better recipe from it, and presenting that recipe in a better way, you should be fine.	Hacking into a computer owned by someone else and accessing the data stored on it without permission is a misdemeanor according to StGB 202a (de\|en). But only if it's successful. So a failed attempt isn't a misdemeanor yet. When you notice that someone might have committed a criminal offence (regardless of whether you are a victim or just a witness), then the usual procedure is to report it to the police. If they consider the crime serious enough to investigate, then they will request the identity from the ISP. But the copyright lawsuits which are filed in bulk by law firms working with media companies are not crime reports. They are civil lawsuits. A civil lawsuit is when someone had a tangible damage because of something someone else did, and now they want money in compensation. When there is no damage, then there is nothing to sue for. So when you want a judge to file an injunction to force an ISP to give them the identity of one of their users, then you would first have to explain to them how much financial damage you had because of that person and that this is enough damage to make it worth everyone's time. That might be quite challenging for nothing but a failed SSH login attempt. But it might be possible if a single person made so many login attempts that it incurred you non-negligible bandwidth cost or even caused a denial-of-service.	I see no reason to doubt your conclusion; since it's not allowed by the license it's forbidden by copyright. As you figured it, you gain the right to use these tools by obtaining one of those 3 Visual Studio licenses. A Visual Studio Code license is free, so it makes business sense that it doesn't include a license for Microsoft C++ Build Tools. I.e. you can't claim it's an "obvious oversight", as there's a justifiable business reason.
Can creating a web scraper be illegal? Let me start with specifying that I'm not asking about the act of web scraping itself, neither the use of the data obtained through that method. What I'm asking exactly in simple terms: Can I be sued for developing a web scraper that targets a specific site and publishing its source code online? EDIT: About the duplicate suggestion - while answers there were helpful, I find the question too general for my case...	When the question is "Can I be sued for..." there can't ever be a really useful answer, because anyone can be sued for just about anything. The suit may be tossed as pointless early in the process, but it can be filed. That said, could there be a valid ground of suit against a developer for creating a scraper? Possibly. Scraping a site could be against the site's TOS. It could be largely a way of committing copyright infringement. It could be unlawful in some other way. For most sites, scraping is not unlawful. Google does it all the time. If there is no legitimate use for the scraper, or very nearly none, so that any user is likely to be acting maliciously and unlawfully, and if the developer knows this, or any reasonable developer should know this, then the developer could possibly be found liable for the illegitimate actions of those who use the scarper. If there is a legit use for the scraper, or the developer would plausibly think that there is, then such development is not illegal, and a successful suit against the developer is unlikely.	...due to the international registration of multiple domains to generate ad revenue by recycling stories across sock puppet networks, giving the impression of multiple, independent companies. None of that is illegal on its face. Internet domains are freely registerable by anyone, anywhere (with the exception of some laws in some nations that restrict such Internet-related activity), and registered privately or publicly, and websites can be hosted anywhere. Writing articles and "spinning" and copying articles (even if that writing is sales gibberish in broken English) among the same copyright owner is legal, and using the same design and layout for a network of sites is legal. The formation of multiple, related companies and shell companies to give the impression that companies are separate and independent is legal (again, with the exception of some business and corporate laws in some nations that restrict such activity). These are all common business practices. Some business practices may appear to be unethical - trying to fool customers in order to make money and get clicks and sell ads. And what you may be feeling is that such activity is unethical. And that's OK. But feeling that they are unethical doesn't make the practices illegal. Many common activities that are considered to be unethical are illegal; but not all. Buyer beware. One way some of that activity may be illegal is if those articles are factually incorrect and promote quack medical treatments, are financial scams requiring payments, are gambling sites or promote other clearly illegal things. But then you get into the complexity of exactly how they are illegal, which jurisdictions are involved, and on and on.	Yes. This is infringement. This infringement might be excused by a "fair use" defense but it probably isn't. At a very small scale tailor to a very specific educational program, for example, for just members of a thirty person English class that they are currently taking, it might qualify as educational fair use. But I get the impression that the contemplated translation project is far more ambitious than that. The underlying content of the events reported in the news are not protected by copyright, but the language used to report those events and any translations of that language, is protected. The only reliable way to solve it is to get permission to do so from the holder of the copyright of the source of the new reports you are translating.	Please Note: This was written before the title change of this question and may no longer be applicable According to the Harvard website: In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 499 US 340 (1991) the United States Supreme Court held that copyright does not extend to a mere compilation of facts. In this case, it was a telephone directory much the same as the one in ProCD v. Zeidenberg 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). Furthermore, the Court also ruled that something more than simple "sweat of the brow" labor was required before copyright protection would ensue, with some modicum of authorial originality necessary. Accordingly, it was held in Feist that copyright did not extend to a telephone directory, no matter how laborious a task its compilation was. The decision in ProCD v. Zeidenberg 86 F. 3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) is highly significant, therefore, in that it permits copyright or quasi-copyright protection to be extended to non-copyrightable material through the use of contract. One would have to consider each meta tag independently. For example, the "description" tag could by copyrightable since it is written for more than just the 'facts', such as a subtle advert for the site that is more than an objective description. However the 'og:type' would not be copyrightable since it would just be considered a fact. Now, if you are using it on another website and sourcing it properly, you could probably use it under "Fair Use" Uses That Are Generally Fair Uses Subject to some general limitations discussed later in this article, the following types of uses are usually deemed fair uses: Criticism and comment -- for example, quoting or excerpting a work in a review or criticism for purposes of illustration or comment. News reporting -- for example, summarizing an address or article, with brief quotations, in a news report. Research and scholarship -- for example, quoting a short passage in a scholarly, scientific, or technical work for illustration or clarification of the author's observations. Nonprofit educational uses -- for example, photocopying of limited portions of written works by teachers for classroom use. Parody -- that is, a work that ridicules another, usually well-known, work by imitating it in a comic way. A copyright would exist on the image. One would have to know what license currently applies to the image to know for sure, however, the "Fair Use" to copyright would still apply. With Fair Use, the entity type that uses the image is important. There is much more leniency when a non-profit uses copyrighted information than when the information is used in commercial activity. (With, of course, more exceptions.)	It would be illegal because only you are allowed to view the comic you purchased. Creating a copy of your comic (e.g photcopying, scanning etc) is not allowed, and showing others a copy of your comic is also not allowed	Sure, you can. But if you, from the US, contract with and pay someone outside the US and then use the results of that effort - the reverse-engineered code, either directly in violation of copyright or to find workarounds - within the US, you may not be culpable in a criminal sense (depending on different jurisdictions and trade/IP agreements), but you certainly would be liable in a civil sense. If the US based software developer (I assume a US-based software company, as you said "outside the US") tracks you down, they can open a civil action against you for any damages they want to claim, including theft of IP, loss of profits, EULA violations, and on and on, because you posses and are using reverse engineered code. How much money do you have to lose?	First I should point out that the Google question is about a different situation, the "snippet" issue where a tiny part of a web page is redistributed, where the issue of resolved in the US by appeal to the "fair use" defense. The proposed scenario as written here is broader since it would go beyond a couple of lines, and goes up to the limit of copy an entire web page. That is copyright infringement, with or without an associated link. Copyright protection is not just about attribution, it is about control. If you can limit your copying appropriately, you may survive under a fair use analysis; but you need to hire a lawyer with experience in copyright litigation to vet your notions of what is "a small amount" etc.	The purpose of the button is not to put liability on you, but to shield the website from liability. The website does not want you looking up information about drugs, deciding that a particular drug is right for you, causing yourself harm and then blaming the website. You may have acted unlawfully but you would have no liability because no injury (financial or otherwise) has been caused to the website. Clicking the button is an assertion that one is a medical professional. This is a false statement, so the website could sue you for the tort of deceit, but there is no injury, which is one of the elements of deceit. The website would not even get nominal damages. The button may also constitute a contract. In exchange for access to a website, you warrant that you are a medical professional. You are not, which is a breach of the contract. However, the damages are nil. Conceivably, if you passed the information on to someone else who misused it, there may be some injury to the website, and then you would have to compensate the website for that injury under one or both of the heads of liability described above. In terms of criminal liability, it is rarely an offence to make a false statement to a private body without some other aggravating element. For example, in Australia, it is an offence to make a false statement for financial gain, or to make a false statement to a government official (regardless of whether there is financial gain etc). But simply making a false statement is not by itself a crime. You may breach a computer law. The United States Computer Fraud and Abuse Act is pretty broad. Obtaining information from a computer without authority is an offence: 18 USC s 1030(a)(2)(C). The only exception is if the web server is in the same state as you and somehow nobody from outside the state can access it: see definition of 'protected computer' in 18 USC s 1030(e)(2).
Why are legal motions so formal in language? I just received a motion from my spouse which begins: NOW COMES Petitioner, XYZ, by and through her attorney, ABC, and Petitions this Court to Enter an Order directing the parties to... I have two questions: Why the highly formalized language of "Now comes..."? Why the seemingly random capitalization? Is there any deeper meaning to this for the courts? This is a state court system Circuit Court in the US handling Domestic Relations	Why the highly formalized language of "Now comes..."? "NOW COMES" is traditional ("Comes Now" is actually more common even though it is even more formal and awkward), a bit like "WHEREAS" in contracts. Modern legal writing disfavors this wording in the first sentence of a legal document and I usually omit it unless I know that the judge is very old fashioned. These days, when a lawyer is in front of a court in person, the lawyers starts to speak about something by saying "May it please the court" (another traditional phase emphasizing deference to the fact that the judge can throw you in jail if you are rude without a trial in a courtroom). But, people used to say, "NOW COMES" instead and that phrase stuck in written form. Why the seemingly random capitalization? The capitalization is not completely correct in your example. Some people have the bad habit of capitalizing every word that they think is important, which is not proper in English. (For what it is worth, in German, all nouns are capitalized.) Petitioner should be capitalized because it is being used as a proper noun in lieu of someone's name. Court should be capitalized here because the rule is that the word Court is capitalized when you are talking about the court that you are in, but in lower case when you are talking about another court's rulings. Enter was improperly capitalized. Petitions is improperly capitalized. (In general, probably as a residual of the fact that English is a Germanic language, verbs are almost never capitalized unless they are defined terms or are the first word in a sentence.) Order is capitalized when it refers to a particular order that already exists, but should be in lower case here when it is referring to an order that is being requested in the future.	These questions are typically left to the discretion of the judge in whose courtroom the presentation is happening. It is very common to see these types of devices in trial courts, but they are much less common in appellate courts, and I doubt you'd ever see one in the United States Supreme Court, where the arguments are essentially limited to oral presentations.	Generally speaking, ex parte communications with a judge (i.e. communications to which all parties to a case are not notified) are prohibited, both by law and as a matter of judicial and attorney ethics, subject to some narrow exceptions (e.g. applications for arrest warrants prior to the arrest warrant being carried out). Generally speaking, communications with the court (which is to say with judges or their subordinates) are made a matter of public record, and if the communication is about a particular case, all attorneys in the case must be given notice of it (if someone is not represented by an attorney, the notice goes to the defendant rather than their non-existent attorney). The attorney may then communicate the communication to their client, and generally speaking should communicate it to the client. I don't see anything in the question that suggests that this proposed communication would fall outside the general rule. But, the question isn't very specific and I wouldn't rule out the possibility that an exception might apply in a case with very unusual facts. Also, usually, a request to reconsider a sentence has to be made by a formal motion filed by the prosecutor or the defendant. Generally speaking, a third-party cannot file that motion unilaterally. A third-party or victim would usually only have input into the decision through the prosecutor's office. Third parties and victims are not generally permitted to file motions to reconsider sentences that have been imposed even in states with "victim's rights" statutes, but can publicly provide input to the court before a sentence is imposed, usually at the behest of either the prosecutor or the defendant. Furthermore, generally a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to not have a sentence made more severe after being sentenced the first time around. Reconsideration of a sentence once it is imposed may only be in the direction of leniency. Once a sentence is imposed, it can't be reconsidered to be made more harsh.	The common law is permissive That is to say that, in a common law jurisdiction, the law is about what you must not do rather than about what you must do. Now, particular statutes may be phrased as requiring certain actions but, if you read them the “common law way” to coin a phrase, they are really imposing sanctions for doing the prohibited thing that falls outside those parameters. Since there is no legal prohibition on using multiple names (simultaneously or sequentially) you are free to do so. Now, there are common law prohibitions of, for example, fraud or tax evasion. So, if you use different names for the purpose of doing those prohibited things, then that is illegal but it is the specific criminality that is sanctioned, not the use of the alias in perpetrating it. The UK has a law that makes it a crime to not register the birth of a child. It also imposes some (and by most country’s standards, very few) restrictions on the name a child can be registered under. But there is no legal obligation on the child or their parents to use the registered name in any particular circumstances. There may be difficulties (amounting to impossibility in some cases) in obtaining a passport, opening a bank account, or claiming social security under a non-registered name but that is due to the necessity to identify the individual for which the name serves as a proxy. However, outside the requirements of specific statutes or administrative procedures, the common law position is that your name is what people call you and you identify as your name. The second part is important - I have been called dickhead on many occasions but I do not consider it to be my name. The UK has a patronymic tradition for surnames so, usually, on marriage, the female adopts the surname of the male and that, through the marriage certificate, becomes her registered name. However, it is extremely common for women to continue to use their original (and now not registered) name in their professional life and her new name in her private life. This can be problematic. My wife, has on server all occasions been refused permission to board a plane because the ticket (booked by others) was in her maiden name - a name for which she has no official identification. However, that’s a procedural problem - she didn’t do anything illegal.	This Question Is Tricker Than It Seems One of the things about being a non-expert in a field is that it is very difficult to know in advance what is a hard question and what is an easy question. Some questions that seem like they should have simple, straight forward answers are actually very hard to answer. Some questions that seem like they should be very difficult and have involved tricky answers are actually very easy. Without an in depth understanding of the field, you just can't know in advance. It turns out that this particular question is a quite hard question to answer. So, rather than really providing a clear answer, I will explain what about this question makes it hard to answer in this answer. Even this incomplete and ultimately inconclusive answer will require far, far more words (2,078 to be exact), than were necessary to pose the question (94 words). Essentially, the core difficulty is that there are several different principles of law that apply to this fact pattern, each of which, individually have specific things that have to be proved to establish that some legal consequence will follow (which in turn are often themselves intrinsically indefinite), and each of which has exceptions that could also be proved if specific things happen. In part, this is because, while the fact pattern set forth is not freakishly unforeseeable, it is also not a fact pattern that was contemplated when any of the individual legal principles that are implicated were conceived. Likewise, the interaction of these different legal principles in one fact pattern wasn't contemplated and there is probably no one clear controlling case precedent on point that involved this fact pattern. What the law does in cases like these (which come up all the time in real life) is to break down each legal theory individually and analyze it, possibly spread over multiple distinct court cases in different courts in front of different judges. I'll try to unpack the issues (dispensing with U.K. legal terminology in some cases, since I'm only trying to provide a sense of why this is complicated and not to provide a definitive answer to how it is resolved under U.K. law). Possible Claims, Charges, and Defenses; Traffic, Civil, and Criminal It is a crime to threaten someone with weapon or in another way that puts someone at risk of imminent harm. Depending upon the weapon and other circumstances, mere possession of the weapon might be a crime in the U.K. Someone who has been threatened with weapon or in another way that puts them at risk of imminent harm can be a civil lawsuit for money damages against the person making the threat which was called "assault" in historical common law. Someone who has been threatened by another can seek a restraining order/protective order directing that person to stay away from them in the courts in a civil action. Hitting someone else's car is a traffic violation, unless a defense to the traffic violation is present and proven. Hitting someone else's car with a statutorily mandated level of intent is a crime, unless a justification for the crime is present and proven. The person whose car was hit could credibly argue that hitting the door was a mistake, not because the door was hit, but because the driver intended to kill them and missed, so an attempted homicide charge could raised in a criminal proceeding. The person whose car was hit could argue that there was an intend to put them in imminent risk of harm providing a basis for a civil lawsuit for money damages for common law assault. Someone whose car is hit by another car through negligence or recklessly or intentionally can bring one or more claims in a civil lawsuit against the person who car hit their car for money damages. The standard of care for negligence is established by how a reasonable person would act under the circumstances. Self-defense is a possible defense to traffic offenses, criminal charges and civil liability related to harming another's property if the conditions for self-defense apply, which include a risk of imminent harm to oneself, another, or one's property, and if the action taken in self-defense is reasonably proportional under the circumstances as evaluated by a reasonable person in response to the threat. But, if the response of the person making the threat with the weapon was as a result of actions in which the person threatened with the weapon was the true aggressor, then the privilege of self-defense would be forfeited. In real life, good attorneys for the parties could almost certainly solicit and call attention to additional facts not mentioned in the question that would further muddy the waters and raise additional claims, charges, and defenses to claims beyond the ten listed above. I could analyze each of these issues on the facts in depth as best I could with references to statutes and case law (under a body of law other than U.K. law anyway), which would take a few lengthy and heavily researched paragraphs each that would take a fair amount of time each to prepare, but I won't. A full analysis would help you weigh the odds a little better, and if I was a lawyer of a party in this situation, I would do that since every little edge counts in litigation and negotiations of settlements. But even if I did that, it would still leave a lot of uncertainty regarding the final resolution of these questions on the merits. Decision-Making Regarding Bringing Claims The traffic and criminal charges would be brought or not brought largely in the discretion of the Crown attorney or some other government official. It is most likely that a government official making that decision is doing so because the offense was referred to them by the police officer who responded to the scene, or a police officer who received an informal complaint (as opposed to a civil court filing) from one of the parties, or through a complaint delivered directly to the prosecuting authority by an alleged victim. A prosecutor doesn't have to bring claims just because someone asks them to, and doesn't have to bring all possible claims even if some are pursued. The parties themselves would decide whether or not to bring civil claims against each other. Whoever is sued first would make the decision in the context of knowing that they will be a party to a civil lawsuit whether or not they bring civil claims of their own. Possible Forums The traffic offense would probably be resolved in one court. The criminal charges against the person making the threats would be resolved in another court. The criminal charges against the person who hit the car door would be resolved probably in the same court but in a different case, possibly with a different judge. The civil claims would be resolved in yet another court, probably with a different judge, although probably in a single case with the first person to make it to court as the Plaintiff and the other party as a Defendant bringing counterclaims against the Plaintiff. The civil claims might also involve other parties (e.g. the owner of the vehicles in question if not identical to the persons driving the cars at the time of the incidents). Issue Preclusion Some final decisions on the merits in some cases would resolve the outcome of other cases as a matter of law, other final determinations in some cases would not be binding on the other cases as a matter of law because burdens of proof are different, or the legal issue evaluated is not identical, or because other rules (like a rule against a traffic court decision resulting in a binding determination on civil liability for negligence) would apply. The exact rules are rather arcane and there are quite a few permutations of how it come up, but it is important to be aware that these kinds of rules are out there, exist, and would have to be analyzed by the parties as a matter of litigation tactics. Even The "Legal Issues" Are Fact Intensive Inquiries Almost all of the legal theories implicated above involve broad legal standards in which a lot of the substantive question of what is or is not legal is delegated to the finder of fact in a manner that cannot be reviewed on appeal. For example, in a negligence case related to damage to an automobile, even if there is a videotape and there is 100% agreement on precisely what happened, whether that conduct constitutes "negligence" that breaches the duty of care owed by a reasonable person to the general public to protect them from harm, is legally considered a "question of fact" to be determined by a judge on a case by case basis, rather than a "question of law" which will always have the same outcome and is subject to review by an appellate court if the judge gets it wrong. A similar "reasonable person" standard which must be resolved with a highly fact intensive inquiry that could be resolved more than one way by two different judges or juries hearing precisely the same facts and finding the same witnesses and evidence to be credible in exactly the same way, with both upheld on appeal, applies to the self-defense legal theory. This self-defense issue could also conceivably, based upon the order in which cases were tried and their resolution, be resolved one way in a criminal case and a different way in a civil case between the parties. In the same vein, when a threat is imminent is a highly subjective determination that could be resolved in a "legally correct" way that is not subject to being overturned on appeal on precisely the same facts, with precisely the same determinations as to credibility and weight of the evidence, by two different judges or juries. Again, the substantive question of whether particular conduct is or is not illegal is a "question of fact" that can't be resolved in the absence of a trial on the merits in a particular case before a particular finder of fact. Bottom Line The facts provided in the question aren't sufficiently detailed to provide a definitely correct answer to this question. Indeed, the nature of the facts is such that even an perfectly detailed factual statement regarding what happened might not be enough to definitively determine who has civil liability to whom, and to determine what charges each defendant is guilty of. Different judges and jurors could reasonably come to different legally correct conclusions in a case like this one when faced with precisely the same facts and resolving all issues of credibility and the weight of the evidence in precisely the same way. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that the same facts would be analyzed with respect to different legal theory analysis in different forums by different people, when there is not, as a general rule (although there is in some cases) any mechanism for compelling those decisions to be made consistently on outcome determinative evaluations of the same facts regarding what was reasonable for the parties to do under the circumstances. The notion that a judge is just an umpire, and that every competent judge acting in good faith will always resolve a case presenting the same facts in the same way is a myth. This simply isn't true, even in the U.K. where the judiciary is (as a consequence of how the system for appointment and retention of judges is designed) not nearly as partisan and politicized as it is in the United States. The outcomes of even fairly simple cases in many cases, like the one in this question, are intrinsically and irreducibly uncertain in common law legal systems. The range of possible outcomes from a best case scenario to a worst case scenario, for each party in this fact pattern, is very wide. A desire to tame the myriad uncertainties involved for all parties, and the desire to avoid multiple time consuming and uncertain court proceedings arising out of the same incident, is one of the reasons that it is very common for civil lawsuits to settle out of court without a trial, and for criminal cases to be resolved by an agreement of the prosecution and the defense (sometimes reached even before charges are filed).	Such an order, like all other orders and decisions, is voted on at a conference of justices. Normally all 9 are present and vote, unless one or more is recused. But if one or more happens to be absent, those present vote. A majority of those present an voting is enough for such an order. Dissents from such orders are quite unusual, but any justice may file one if s/he so elects. Reasons for such orders are not normally provided. The usual standard is that such relief is only granted if A) one party will be irreparably harmed by delay, and B) that party has a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the merits when the matter is finally decided. Presumably a majority of the Justices did not feel that this standard was met. Beyond that, no one can say.	Prior to that act, civil procedure in federal courts was non-uniform (historical overview). The main problem seems to be that courts were supposed to conform to the procedure of the state in which the court is located (as mandated by the Conformity Act of 1872). The "has to" reason is that SCOTUS at the time did not feel that it was authorized by the Constitution to write its own rules when Congress could have done so, see Wright & Miller Federal Practice and Procedure. The root problems seems to be the Process Acts of 1789 and 1792, which in the latter case did not allow courts to set rules for actions at law, and in the former case required courts to apply rules in effect when the state joined the Union (regardless of how the rules changed subsequently).	Yes An American would spell it as “your honor,” but yes, this is how we refer to all judges. This is simply a custom that shows respect. There is no law or concrete fact I could cite that requires this; it is more of a “tradition.” But I have seen plenty of court proceedings (mostly on TV), and I can confirm that all judges, ranging from small claims court to the Supreme Court, are called “Your honor.” (The chief justice of the Supreme Court is sometimes addressed as “Chief Justice.”) Googling articles about courtroom etiquette also mostly leads to people who agree with this. Apparently, there are some countries where it is customary to say “my honor,” or even something else altogether. Sometimes people from these countries immigrate to the US and continue using their local terminology in a US court. Although every judge is different, my perception is that most judges try to be inclusive of other cultures, and if whatever term they use is intended as a sign of respect, most judges will usually just interpret it as it was intended.
Can my non-EU wife be deported from France for a visa refusal? I am a UK national. Can my non-EU wife be deported when we both live in France and I am a worker paying taxes, holding a French driving licence, a Carte Vital, self employed and also have a French contract job for the next 3 years?	Yes, but only under very limited circumstances that would not be applicable to most people. Under directive 2004/38/EC, your wife can be deported only if she is a threat to public safety, health, or policy. This is particularly a consequence of Articles 3 (section 1) and 7 (sections 1 and 2). Provisions concerning expulsion are found in Chapter VI. Another possibility that could lead to her expulsion is a finding by the French government that your marriage is not genuine, or was undertaken as a marriage of convenience (Article 35).	Claiming to be independent is probably not a crime: the family that say they have set up the Principality of Sealand have never been prosecuted (though that may have something to do with the difficulty of arresting them). It does not, however, excuse a British subject from the ordinary duties of paying taxes and the like; anyone in a more accessible (and more clearly British) part of the country would be subject to the normal forms of law enforcement, including imprisonment for contempt of court if they refused to obey court orders. Despite the more eccentric theories of the 'sovereign citizen' movement (who do exist in the UK), the fact that somebody living in Britain is subject to British laws is not open to negotiation. Resisting this law enforcement by force would not be a good idea: as well as the fact that the Government has access to bigger and better armed forces than you do, it would probably render you guilty of treason. The Treason Act 1351 (as amended and translated) makes it illegal to "levy war against our lord the King in his realm, or be adherent to the King's enemies in his realm, giving to them aid and comfort in the realm, or elsewhere"; the good news is that the death penalty for treason was abolished in 1998 (some time after that for murder).	The green card should always be at hand Yeah, he can't do that. He needs a green card in his possession anytime he's not on private property. Obviously for instance leaving it in the gym locker while you're at the gym is ok, but no, you can't dash off to the grocery store without it, on the logic that it's "just in town". Just like I can't make a milk run without my driver's license. So this idea of dashing off on a 400 mile adventure, is Right Out. He should have absolutely refused to travel without the documents in hand. If they say "get off the property or we'll call the cops", then tell the cops "I can't leave without my passport/green card" which the cops will back up, because they know the law and they know how trafficking works. The right to strut around the USA without any ID at all is reserved for US citizens only, and even that is being stripped away by ever-changing laws. Those documents are someone else's property The Green Card is the property of the USA and is not hers to steal. The passport is the property of the Philippine government and is not hers to steal. She didn't take your stuff, she took theirs. So she is guilty of a Federal crime, and the long arm of Philippine law may have an "opinion" on the matter also. Of course, most people don't think of it that way. They think your ID is your property so they think they're only messing with you. I would absolutely, positively report theft of the passport to the Philippine consulate. (Or rather, just report a missing passport, and be free about explaining the circumstances). One might hope that a phone call to consular staff might scare her straight, and get her to send it along. Most likely the green card would be in there also. Or, he could pay the fees to have a replacement passport issued. However the important one is the Green Card, since that establishes your right to be in the USA. On that one, you must consult an immigration lawyer and find out what you need to do. You certainly can get replacement green cards (not cheap), but admitting you don't have yours could cause you problems. People often seize documents for a reason And what makes me think that is, the uncle is a grown adult and the daughter's elder, and I thought that meant something in the Philippines. He is supposed to be more adult and more responsible. As such, he should be responsible for his own documents. Yet, this seems to be in the daughter's hands; this raises red flags. Maybe what she did was a harmless prank. But usually, taking an immigrant's documents is done for an entirely evil reason. Either they are forcing them into indentured servitude (also called "trafficking") - so if he is now in a situation where he is being extorted to do work in a worse situation or worse wage than he'd take willingly, then he is a trafficking victim, and the taking documents is part of the plot. The US has some legal protections for trafficking victims. Or they are "setting him up" for failure in some other way - for instance, out of idle malice, the niece might be planning to call immigration and report him as being illegal, hoping he'd be found with no green card, and deported for not having it.	First, let's be clear. Under the relevant Australian law, this person is an Australian citizen, This is for two reasons. First, because he or she is descended from someone who was born in Australia in the time period from January 26, 1949 to August 19, 1986 (or who was a British subject born in Australia prior to January 26, 1949), and second, because a child born in Australia after 19 August 1986 (and who is not otherwise an Australian citizen) and who lives in Australia, automatically acquires Australian citizenship on his or her 10th birthday, if the child has not been granted or otherwise acquired Australian citizenship in the meantime. This occurs automatically (by operation of law), and applies irrespective of the immigration status of the child or his/her parents. So, the question is not one of status as an Australian citizen, but of proof of status as an Australian citizen. This individual is not truly stateless. Also, even if the parents (contrafactually) were stateless rather than being Australian citizens, which they were, children born in Australia whose parents are stateless and not entitled to any other country's citizenship may in some circumstances apply for and be granted Australian citizenship. One of the reasons that Australia allows this rule is that in order to deport someone you have to know that the person deported is a citizen of the country to which the person is deported. If you are a stateless person in Australia (as this person is not, but someone might suspect them of being), you can be denied rights the flow from citizenship, rather than merely from being a person or being a resident. But, you can't deport a stateless person because you have no place to deport them to. Related to this fact is that Australia is a party to the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961), a multilateral international treaty. In respect of contracting states: "Stateless birth" on their territory attracts the grant of their nationality (article 1). Otherwise stateless persons may take the nationality of the place of their birth or of the place where they were found (in the case of a foundling), otherwise they may take the nationality of one of their parents (in each case possibly subject to a qualifying period of residence in that State) (article 2). A stateless person has some time beyond attaining adulthood to seek to claim the benefit of the Convention. That time is always at least three years from the age of eighteen (article 1(5)). Transfer of territory between states must occur in a manner that avoids the occurrence of statelessness for persons residing in the territory transferred. When a State acquires territory, the inhabitants of that territory presumptively acquire the nationality of that State (article 10). Persons otherwise stateless shall be able to take the nationality of one of their parents (possibly subject to a period of prior residence not more than three years) (article 4). Absent circumstances of fraudulent application or disloyalty toward the contracting state, deprivations and renunciations of citizenship shall only take effect where a person has or subsequently obtains another nationality in replacement (article 8). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) will issue travel documents evidencing nationality to persons, otherwise stateless, having a claim of nationality under the convention. Birth on a sea vessel or aircraft may attract the nationality of the flag of that vessel or craft (article 3). Disloyal or certain criminal conduct may limit an individual's ability to avail the benefit of the Convention (article 8). The benefit of the Convention may be claimed by guardians on behalf of children (article 1(1)). States may impose a period of residence qualification for granting nationality to persons who may be otherwise stateless. That period is a maximum five years immediately prior to application and maximum of ten years overall (article 1(2)). There is also the question of proof. What suffices as proof sufficient for an immigration and nationality official varies, and there are probably presumptions that would be relevant. The fact that you are currently resident in Australia, that you have no recollection of living anywhere else or being told that you live anywhere else, your own testimony under oath regarding your place of birth and ancestry, any documentation that exists of you being in Australia in the past, and the fact that you speak English in an Australian accent fluently and speak no other language, would also be evidence of your citizenship or might trigger a presumption in favor of assuming that you are a citizen unless proven otherwise. The government can also change its processes to fit special circumstances. For example, during the Vietnam War in which the United States was involved, a significant number of children were born to U.S. soldier fathers and Vietnamese mothers in Vietnam. Ordinarily, under U.S. law, it is necessary to establish that a particular person who is a U.S. citizen was your father. But, in the aftermaths of these births, there was a period of time at least, when anyone born in Vietnam to a Vietnamese mother, who was racially part-Vietnamese and part either European or African in ancestry, was presumed based upon appearance alone to be a child of a U.S. citizen present in Vietnam in connection with the war effort and granted citizenship by birth, with their place of birth and mixed race alone sufficing to establish their citizenship. It wouldn't be hard to imagine Australia adopting such a rule in the case that you describe. Also, even if such a per se rule were not adopted, usually the ultimate test in a proceeding to establish citizenship is proof by a preponderance of the evidence that it is more likely than not that this person is an Australian citizen, and that standard could probably be met by any official who was not intentionally inclined to bear ill will to this person or their group. Competent legal representation and expert testimony would likely help the person to establish their citizenship.	I assume that the loan was legal, in light of rule changes pertaining to non-borrowing spouses. If so, there is really no recourse other than to repay the loan. This article explains the current options / restrictions in an understandable manner, but of course it is too late to do anything about it. If there was actually fraud or coercion in the loan, or if the elder party was mentally incompetent, there might be some legal recourse, but we don't have any evidence of fraud, coercion or incompetence here.	Any country can certainly decide who it should grant citizenship status to. There is no international rule that I know of requiring that the recipient be currently a resident of the country granting citizenship. Any country may issue passports to its citizens.	What should and shouldn't happen isn't going to do a damn thing about your passport situation. Your passport isn't being 'held', it's in processing at a place that is currently not operational due to an unprecedented virus outbreak. No one is acting like a criminal or treating you like one, you are just unlucky. If your situation is that dire, you have no choice but to get a temporary passport. I seriously doubt an Indian court is going to side with you on this one. Just because the passport office is legally allowed to operate, doesn't mean that they are actually able to. If, for example, COVID-19 hit enough of their workforce, they won't have enough people to operate properly and they'll have no choice but to close. And no, '2 or 3 people' is not enough to operate such a large scale, sensitive operation with high security requirements, even just to return passports .	For a definite answer, Bob should ask his tax advisor. German freelance status ("Freiberufler") is a bit difficult to navigate, because legally speaking, this status can only be applied to contract work that requires a university degree, everything else is a regular business ("Gewerbe") that is taxed differently and requires you to join the chamber of commerce. This has become a bit murky as there are freelance software developers without a degree (who should be careful about using the word "engineer") and the tax office seems to accept that, but I'm not entirely sure they are as lenient towards entertainers (which YT would fall under). The way I understand the Blue Card FAQ, freelancing is not allowed for Blue Card holders, I'd consider that the bigger problem (but that's an immigration issue, not a tax issue).
Can the majority party/coalition in UK Parliament remove the PM and vote in a new one without calling for total new nationwide elections? Curious American here. You may have heard we have our own troubles on this side of the pond. From widely reported news, I understand that Parliament voted overwhelmingly against the PM's plan for Brexit, but then had a no confidence vote that did not pass. If it had, it would have triggered snap elections. Reports suggested the MPs in her party did not vote no confidence because then in the snap election their seat would be at risk. Could they vote her out as PM and vote in a different PM? In other words, keep the composition of Parliament the same until the next fixed election but change their leader sooner.	You have to distinguish between the Tory party and the UK parliament. The UK parliament just had a vote of no confidence against Theresa May and lost. Had they won, parliament would have had to come up with a different government (for example the same government except for a different PM, or a government formed by the current opposition) that would have a majority to rule, or there would be new elections. The Tory party could legally do lots of things, but they are bound by their party rules. They had a vote of no confidence against Theresa May maybe a month or so ago, and she won. According to the Tory party rules, there cannot be another such vote for one year, so right now and for the next eleven months, they can't replace her. If that vote a month ago had not happened, they could. But that is all not because of some law, but because of the rules this party set for itself.	The details published in The Guardian today offer a little (but not much) hope that Competition & Markets Authority will force airlines to refund you. I live in a tier 4 area but was due to fly to Scotland on Wednesday. Can I get a refund? The airlines are only obliged to refund customers if they cancel the flight. The fact you cannot travel by law makes no difference as key workers will still expect to travel and therefore flights are still available. Ryanair is offering those in lockdown and unable to travel between now and Christmas Eve a fee-free switch to a new flight – but only until 15 March 2021. British Airways is offering vouchers to those who decide they no longer wish to travel. EasyJet customers are being offered refunds if the new restrictions mean it would be illegal to take a flight. However, if your airline is refusing a refund, rebooking option or voucher, it is worth notifying the airline that you cannot travel because of the restrictions and that you would like a refund or voucher. This is because the Competition and Markets Authority is investigating whether airlines should be forced to reimburse those in this position. You could find you receive a payout later.	Such an order, like all other orders and decisions, is voted on at a conference of justices. Normally all 9 are present and vote, unless one or more is recused. But if one or more happens to be absent, those present vote. A majority of those present an voting is enough for such an order. Dissents from such orders are quite unusual, but any justice may file one if s/he so elects. Reasons for such orders are not normally provided. The usual standard is that such relief is only granted if A) one party will be irreparably harmed by delay, and B) that party has a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the merits when the matter is finally decided. Presumably a majority of the Justices did not feel that this standard was met. Beyond that, no one can say.	There is no money being offered or given to the voter. There is a long-running traditional bipartisan expenditure in Pennsylvania known variously as street money and get out the vote money that is legally used to reimburse volunteers for expenses to drive voters to the polls. The second article linked asserts this is a first amendment protected right. This seems in line with such historical expenditures.	If the Kenya legislature passes such a law, they can impose such a requirement on Kenyans who want to create such social media groups. Note that this is a license from the Kenyan government, not a copyright or trademark license. In effect, it is a tax on running a social media group, along with various regulations. I have no idea if this bill is at all likely to pass. If it does pass, it might be hard to enforce, as it would probably require cooperation from Facebook and other social media platforms, and the companies which run those platforms are not located in Kenya, and might not cooperate.	Separation of powers means that the judiciary can't pass laws or executive orders. It doesn't mean that the judiciary can't interfere with their passage and enforcement. Quite the opposite -- the checks and balances inherent in the system ensure that the judiciary can interfere in some cases. One of the checks is the concept of judicial review: the courts' power to review each branch's actions for compliance with the constitution -- and more importantly, to strike down actions that are unconstitutional. When a court strikes down part of a law, though, they aren't writing a new law, or even repealing a law. They are overturning parts of the existing law -- basically declaring the unconstitutional parts of it void, to be treated as if they didn't exist. In India's constitution, Article 13 provides the main basis for this power. Article 13.(2) (in Part III) states: (2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. This article, aside from making it clear that laws passed by the State can be void, also gives the Supreme Court the inroads it needs to do the overturning. The catch is, the Court can not overturn most laws passed by Parliament, just the ones that Part III can be construed to prohibit. (While the judiciary is not explicitly named, it's the only branch that can officially say whether or not a law is constitutional. It'd be a conflict of interest anyway for Parliament to do it. Parliament, in passing the law, presumably wanted it to be enforced, and thus has an interest in avoiding too much scrutiny.) So the Court can already declare an unconstitutional law void, because it already is...and that's before we even get to Article 142. Let's take a look at the article anyway: (1) The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe. (2) Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by Parliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respects the whole of the territory of India, have all and every power to make any order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person, the discovery or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself. Note that (2) explicitly grants the power to issue subpoenas, contempt citations, etc. So we can't claim that's what (1) was intended for, and have to ask what it means. The Court decided that the article gives it the power to order the government not to violate your rights, as such an order is "necessary for doing complete justice". And as the final arbiter of the meaning of the very text that defines it into existence, it has that prerogative. And due process is one of the rights protected. Article 21 (also in Part III): No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. "Procedure established by law" is a much weaker phrase than "due process", and technically meant that anything that the government scribbled into law was good enough. But case law has all but removed the distinction. (See Maneka Gandhi vs Union Of India.) Basically, any procedure for depriving someone of life or liberty must be just, fair, and reasonable. (Otherwise a law declaring you a criminal, to be arrested on sight, would be constitutional.) "Someone filed a complaint" simply wasn't gonna fly.	Not successfully It is not required that a person knows they are dealing with an agent of the principal rather than the principal directly - an agent speaks with the principal’s voice. Robert has consented to allow Elizabeth to act as his agent. It actually doesn’t matter if he consented before she acted or afterwards, he has agreed to be bound by Elizabeth’s actions. Rachel & Jared have agreed to enter the lease and indicated as much by signing the document. It doesn’t matter who signed it for the landlord or even if it was signed - leases have to be in writing but there is no common law rule that they need to be signed.	Article 75 says that It devolves upon the Storting: (a) to enact and repeal laws; to impose taxes, dues, customs and other public charges, which shall not, however, remain operative beyond 31 December of the succeeding year, unless they are expressly renewed by a new Storting Article 97 says that "No law must be given retroactive effect" . The combined effect of these provisions is that any changes in the law effected this year could apply to tax years after 2020 but not including 2019. So the law as written supports your understanding. Skatteetatten seems to agree since the rules are listed as covering 2019.
Can landlord backbill 4.5 years worth of utilities that were never billed to us bimonthly as directed in the lease? (RSO rental) My landlord has back-billed me for 4.5 years of water utilities and are saying I owe them money. The lease does state that the tenant pays for water (split as a percentage with the adjacent duplex unit), however, it also explicitly states that this utility would be billed to the tenants every two months. We have never received a single bill from them regarding this utility, nor have we received any notification of violating our lease. They have failed to bill us and are charging it as a lump sum. I asked them why they never billed us, when they did send the percentage bill to the adjacent unit, and all they said was theyre "not sure" and may have "overlooked it". They are desperate to get me to move out since it is a rent-controlled unit and I feel like they have done this to cause issues and force me to default on rent. Is this a legal practice? Does the "billing every two months" in the lease have any hold on this issue if they breached their own lease? We honestly forgot about this utility on our end because our other utilities are on autopay, and without receiving any bills, it was out of sight out of mind. Is there anything we can do?	Can landlord backbill 4.5 years worth of utilities that were never billed to us bimonthly as directed in the lease? Yes, since the bimonthly billing issue appears to be within the LA statute of limitations for claims of breach of contract: 10 years (see here). But you might want to check the actual legislative language of the statute referred therein and the prior or consecutive ones --all pertaining to statutes of limitations-- so as to ascertain the accuracy of information in the first link (navigating through the bunch of LA two- or three-line statutes for this and that gets annoying). They are desperate to get me to move out since it is a rent-controlled unit and I feel like they have done this to cause issues and force me to default on rent. Is this a legal practice? I am not knowledgeable of state legislation particular to rent-controlled units, but I highly doubt it is lawful for them to proceed that way. Other details you describe reflect that the company has been --or is being-- malicious or grossly negligent. If so, strictly speaking, the company's conduct (1) ought to weaken its position or merits in trying to force you out, and (2) tends to contravene the contract law covenant of good faith and fair dealing (see below). If your lease mentions any statutes regarding rent-controlled units, you may want to search for case law at leagle.com to see how the statutes are applied. Without knowing the terms of your lease, I think your priority should at all times be the rent itself so as to avoid eviction. Does the "billing every two months" in the lease have any hold on this issue if they breached their own lease? Maybe not. The repeated, yet sole, failure to send you the bimonthly billings falls short of landlord's breach of contract. For your argument on breach of contract to prevail, you would have to prove that the landlord knowingly/deliberately let the water bills pile up prior to demanding you to pay everything at once. That would prove that the landlord is not meeting the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is prerequisite in contract law.	Absent any new agreement with the tenant, a purchase is normally subject to any existing lease, so you would be renting to the existing tenant until that lease expires, under its original terms, with you having all the rights and duties under it that the previous owner had. In effect, by signing the purchase agreement, you accepted a version of the original lease with your name in place of the former owner's, but with no other changes. You are entitled to the same rent that the previous owner was entitled to, and must make any repairs or perform any services that the previous owner was required to do.	The person responsible for the leak pays This is a general principle that if your stuff causes harm, you are responsible for it as well of the costs of doing what’s necessary to stop it. This might or might not be you. Assuming the water is normal “splash” that is making its way into the unit below then it will be the person who is responsible for maintaining the waterproofing in your bathroom - that might be you or it might be the common property owner, you would need to check your by-laws. Of course, this assumes your building is new enough to have waterproofing - older buildings just relied on the tiling. If so, this is almost certainly your responsibility. If instead, it’s a leak from a pipe or fixture, then the owner of that is responsible. That could be you or the building owner or even your downstairs neighbour. Again, check your by-laws. Edit The OP has indicated they are a tenant, not the owner. In this case, it’s nothing to do with you unless your lease says you are responsible for building maintenance or you have been negligent. Residential leases almost never do the former and, unless you did something stupid, like allowing the bath to overflow or having water balloon fights, you probably haven’t been negligent. Refer the matter to your landlord and ask your neighbour to direct all future correspondence to them.	The wording of the original lease and the renewal form are vital here. The Texas Property code, Title 8, chapter 92 is the relevant state law for residential tenancies. It neither forbids nor guarantees a right of renewal. That is left up to the lease agreement. However, it does require a landlord to provide a tenant with a copy of any signed lease promptly. Specifically Sec. 92.024. LANDLORD'S DUTY TO PROVIDE COPY OF LEASE provides that: (a) Not later than the third business day after the date the lease is signed by each party to the lease, a landlord shall provide at least one complete copy of the lease to at least one tenant who is a party to the lease. ... c) A landlord's failure to provide a complete copy of the lease as described by Subsection (a) or (b) does not invalidate the lease or, subject to Subsection (d), prevent the landlord from prosecuting or defending a legal action or proceeding to enforce the lease. (d) A landlord may not continue to prosecute and a court shall abate an action to enforce the lease, other than an action for nonpayment of rent, only until the landlord provides to a tenant a complete copy of the lease if the tenant submits to the court evidence in a plea in abatement or otherwise that the landlord failed to comply with Subsection (a) or (b). (e) A landlord may comply with this section by providing to a tenant a complete copy of the lease: (1) in a paper format; (2) in an electronic format if requested by the tenant; or (3) by e-mail if the parties have communicated by e-mail regarding the lease. Sec. 92.003 provides that: (a) In a lawsuit by a tenant under either a written or oral lease for a dwelling or in a suit to enforce a legal obligation of the owner as landlord of the dwelling, the owner's agent for service of process is determined according to this section. (b) If written notice of the name and business street address of the company that manages the dwelling has been given to the tenant, the management company is the owner's sole agent for service of process. (c) If Subsection (b) does not apply, the owner's management company, on-premise manager, or rent collector serving the dwelling is the owner's authorized agent for service of process unless the owner's name and business street address have been furnished in writing to the tenant. Dallas municipal law prohibits retaliating against a tenant who complains about improper conditions or requests maintenance, but says nothing about lease renewals. Under ordinary contract law, an offer and acceptance makes a contract, unless the parties have previously agreed otherwise. Moreover, demonstrable practice can make or confirm a contract. If the tenant has paid rent for either March or April in reliance on the renewal agreement, and at the specified renewal rate, and that rent has been accepted, that may well constitute ratification (and thus execution) of the renewed lease. This is if the new lease would hav started before the April rent was due. So the tenant may well have the right to enforce the terms specified in the February renewal form. However, this will depend on what those terms are, and also what renewal provisions, if any, were in the original lease. It might be a good idea to send a letter to the landlord and manager, saying that the renewal form that you signed constitutes an acceptance of their offer, and thus a binding contract, and asking for a signed copy as per section 92.024, mentioning the section number. If it were me, I would send such a letter by both email and USPS certified mail, to both the manager and the landlord, if I had both addresses. I would keep a copy of any communications, and make them all in writing from now on (email is writing, legally). In any case the tenant would be wise to continue to pay rent on time in the amount specified on the renewal form, by some traceable means such as a check, money order, or credit card. I would be sure to use a method the original lease listed as acceptable, or that had been used in the past, except for cash. If I used a check, I would write "payment in full for rent of {address} for {month}" on the back The tenant would be wise to consult a local lawyer who specializes in tenant's cases, there seem to be quite a few. There is a local housing crisis center. It offers regular (twice a month) legal clinics with volunteer lawyers, and can be reached at 214-828-4244 or [email protected]. Such a center might be able to recommend local lawyers. Often an initial consultation with a lawyer on such a matter is free or at a low charge. It would probably be a good idea for the tenant to take some action fairly promptly. 15 U.S. Code Chapter 96 (the federal e-sign act) (section 7001) provides that: (a) In general -- Notwithstanding any statute, regulation, or other rule of law (other than this subchapter and subchapter II), with respect to any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce— (1) a signature, contract, or other record relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form; and (2) a contract relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because an electronic signature or electronic record was used in its formation. Also the UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT (1999), which has been adopted by Texas, allows but does not require the use of electronic signatures. Thus the tenant;s email response ought to be a vald means of forming a contract.	From the time that the lease expired and you remained with permission, you had a shorter period of obligation and protection. I assume that the lease ended long ago, and you've been living there month to month. Assuming that we can read "two rental periods" as "two whole months" (if there is something else in the lease that indicates this, such as a rent due-date), then we can interpret the notice requirement as saying that you must give notice before the first of the month 2 months before the intended end of tenancy – that is one meaning of the lease. Another meaning is that you can give notice 58 days in advance. The lease has an ambiguity as to what the notice requirement is. Since you did not write the lease, and they did (well, someone, whose obligations they inherited, did), the ambiguity is construed against the party to wrote it. In the present circumstance, because you want to leave soon, you would not be held to the notice requirement that favors the landlord. It's entirely non-obvious why such wording would be used. In 504B.135, the statutes say (a) A tenancy at will may be terminated by either party by giving notice in writing. The time of the notice must be at least as long as the interval between the time rent is due or three months, whichever is less. (b) If a tenant neglects or refuses to pay rent due on a tenancy at will, the landlord may terminate the tenancy by giving the tenant 14 days notice to quit in writing. Once you're past the end of the lease, you are a tenant at will, by the definitions section: "Tenancy at will" means a tenancy in which the tenant holds possession by permission of the landlord but without a fixed ending date. Assuming that you pay rent at the first of the month, then the lesser of a whole calendar month and three months is, obviously, a whole calendar month. The stuff at the end of the statute that you cite – "The notice must be in writing and direct the tenant's attention" – is addressed to the landlord's notice to tenant, where he says "Your tenancy will not auto-renew". This applies to leases of 2 months or longer, not recycled 1 month leases, and requires the landlord to give the tenant appropriate notice (it does not define the tenant's notice requirement).	Yes, they seem to have broken the law. In California, notice must be given for an eviction. This can be a 30/60/90 day notice with no reason needed (typically because the landlord wants the property for something else) or a 3 day notice with cause- the most typical being not paying the rent. Note that COVID exceptions exist, though I don't believe they apply to you. Even after that time, a landlord cannot physically remove a tenant or attempt to drive them out through the destruction/removal of property, locking them out, or cutting off utilities. They are liable for damages suffered as well as penalties. There are lawful procedures in place for this. The removal and destruction of your belongings could constitute either larceny or vandalism. Either way, by unlawfully removing your possessions, they are liable for the damages caused.	Unless there is a unilateral change clause in your CURRENTLY effective lease, then no they cannot change the terms until the NEW lease becomes effective. Your question, however, is not entirely clear. You seem to be asking: "My current least charges me $X/month for a pet and the new lease, starting on 1/1/2023, charges my $Y/month for a pet." In that case it's perfectly OK since it's a new lease that replaces the old one and it's entirely up to you to either agree to it or find another place to live. Ohio also has prohibited rent control and rent stabilization state-wide (Ohio Revised Code, sec. 5321.20).	Bizarrely, it depends on where you live in Kentucky. There is a law, the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (KRS 383.500 to 383.705) which states limits on residential leases (otherwise, the matter would be governed by the terms of the contract and common law). The state didn't enact those laws as enforceable in the state, it "made them available" for cities, counties and urban-county governments to adopt unmodified (or not). So it depends in part on whether your locale adopted the law. Assuming it did, in the definitions, (13)"Security deposit" means an escrow payment made to the landlord under the rental agreement for the purpose of securing the landlord against financial loss due to damage to the premises occasioned by the tenant's occupancy other than ordinary wear and tear. (emphasis added) That would mean that they can't take the cost of carpet cleaning, painting etc. out of your security deposit. §383.595 (again, if applicable) states the obligations of the landlord, so he must Maintain in good and safe working order and condition all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air-conditioning, and other facilities and appliances, including elevators, supplied or required to be supplied by him So it depends on whether the URLTA was enacted in your jurisdiction. This page indicates where that is the law, and also urges you to read the lease.
if a politician blocks a constituent on Facebook, is it a breach of the constituent's first amendment rights? Our local mayor in Lafayette Colorado, Christine Berg, just resigned to "spend more time with family". Then, a couple of days later, I notice that she's being sued by a constituent for blocking him from her Facebook page. I suspect these two events are related. The constituent claims that blocking him [from trolling] her Facebook page was a breach of his first amendment rights. The details of the complaint can be found here: https://www.scribd.com/document/397680254/Complaint-filed-by-Cliff-Willmeng-against-Lafayette-Mayor-Christine-Berg#from_embed This 21-page legal document references other cases and argues for compensation for "emotional pain, [...], mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, medical bills, [...]", amongst other things. I'm an ex-pat and have no background in law. I feel that the mayor is a genuinely good person and this is a bit absurd, i.e. if there was a law against barratry in Colorado, a lawsuit for blocking someone on Facebook should qualify. Does anyone have a view on whether a political figure can be sued for blocking a follower on Facebook?	You'll note that Maryland governor Larry Hogan was sued and ended up settling over Facebook deleted comments and blocks. And a judge ruled that Trump can't block comments on Twitter. So it seems there's an evolving consensus that politicians can't simply block or delete social media comments for differing viewpoints.	Trump was an officer of the government, and Twitter wasn't. The First Amendment forbids the government and its agents from viewpoint discrimination, but private companies are not bound by it and can discriminate as much as they please. (There was a question as to whether such discrimination might affect whether the company enjoys a shield from liability under 47 USC 230, but even so they have the right to block and censor as they wish if they are willing to risk that liability.)	Overview The cop is basically wrong. Sexual harassment is not the only kind of harassment recognized by U.S. law. The question and the cop's answer to it, assume that simply asking certain questions is illegal or not illegal, but it isn't that straight forward. Words communicated verbally are part of the analysis, but not the entire analysis. It all depends upon context and the character of the communication. None of these questions are per se (i.e. always) illegal to ask in the abstract, although a good lawyer would advise a client that it is rarely prudent to ask them because, together with other facts, they could give rise to civil or criminal liability. In this regard, he is correct that two of the three questions aren't necessarily unlawful, but he is incorrect when he assumes that the third one, which would suggest that there might be sexual harassment present, is always unlawful. But, any of these three questions could be a part of a pattern of conduct that constitutes illegal harassment, and each of these three questions suggest an intent that one would often expect to be a part of a larger pattern of harassing conduct. So, he is incorrect when he suggests that non-sexual forms of harassment are definitely legal. Also, there are really at least three kinds of illegal harassment that need to be analyzed separately, one in the context of state and federal laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of protected classes, one in the context of the common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress arising under state law, and the third under a state's general criminal laws. In addition, certain kinds of harassment can provide a basis for the issuance of a restraining order or protection order under state law. A particular course of harassing conduct may be governed by only one of these kinds of laws, by some but not all of these kinds of laws, or by all of these kinds of laws, depending upon the nature of the conduct and the laws of the state that are at issue. In cases where the relevant law is state law, rather than federal law, the applicable laws may, and frequently do, differ in important details from state to state. I describe the most common provisions of state law that apply, using the state of Colorado, which is the primary place where I practice law, for some specific examples. But, while some important details (particularly with regard to criminal liability) differ from state to state, the broad outlines of the relevant state laws are usually fairly similar in the vast majority of U.S. states. Harassment That Is A Form Of Discrimination The Nature Of The Liability One kind, is a subset of discriminatory conduct in the context of a relationship such as employment, or operating a "public accommodation" (such as a restaurant open to the public), or carrying out governmental functions, in which there is a legal duty not to discriminate on a particular basis. This is implicated in the second and third questions. In both of these cases, harassment as a form of employment discrimination arises from the same statute. Neither that statute nor regulations interpreting it, at the time that sexual harassment claims were first recognized by the courts, specifically delineate an offense of sexual harassment or other kinds of harassment separate and distinct from employment discrimination generally. Subsequently, the case law, regulations interpreting the statute promulgated by the EEOC, and to a less extent some statutes (especially at the state and local level), have spelled out sexual harassment as a distinct type of discrimination on the basis of sex in employment with its own set of specific legal elements of the claim that must be established which differ somewhat from other employment discrimination claims. Why Isn't This A Free Speech Violation? One of the reasons that this can be prohibited, notwithstanding the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, is that in the employment and public accommodations cases, this involves commercial speech, the regulation of which is subject to less rigorous review than non-commercial speech, as a matter of United States constitutional law. In the case of governmental speech, this regulation is directly authorized (and arguably required) by the 14th Amendment requiring government to provide people with equal protection of the laws, which was enacted after the First Amendment. Also the First Amendment generally limits the power of government to regulate the speech of others, not its own speech. Discrimination On The Basis Of Sex In the context of an employer-employee relationship, a man (or woman) asking a woman "How big are your breasts?", could be interpreted as sexual harassment, which is a kind of employment discrimination on the prohibited basis of sex, and if violated, gives rise to the right of the EEOC or the woman to whom the question is directed, and possibly even to the all of the women in that workplace to bring a civil action for employment discrimination seeking money damages. While the expectation is that this sort of harassment happens from superior to subordinate that is not necessarily the case and it can occur between peers or from subordinate to superior. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the EEOC) defines sexual harassment as follows: Sexual Harassment It is unlawful to harass a person (an applicant or employee) because of that person’s sex. Harassment can include “sexual harassment” or unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical harassment of a sexual nature. Harassment does not have to be of a sexual nature, however, and can include offensive remarks about a person’s sex. For example, it is illegal to harass a woman by making offensive comments about women in general. Both victim and the harasser can be either a woman or a man, and the victim and harasser can be the same sex. Although the law doesn’t prohibit simple teasing, offhand comments, or isolated incidents that are not very serious, harassment is illegal when it is so frequent or severe that it creates a hostile or offensive work environment or when it results in an adverse employment decision (such as the victim being fired or demoted). The harasser can be the victim's supervisor, a supervisor in another area, a co-worker, or someone who is not an employee of the employer, such as a client or customer. Discrimination On The Basis Of National Origin Similarly, in the context of an employer or prospective employer asking an employee or prospective employee who is apparently a foreign-born man, "What country are you from?", this could be interpreted as evidence of employment discrimination on the prohibited basis of national origin, which, if it was occurring could give rise to the right of the EEOC or the man to whom the question is directed, and possibly even to the all of the foreign born people in that workplace to bring a civil action for employment discrimination seeking money damages. General Considerations Regarding Harassment As A Form Of Discrimination In each of these cases, the damages could be related to the direct economic harm associated with not being hired or promoted, for example, or could arise from the largely non-economic harm suffered from harassing conduct itself. Also, in each of these cases, simply asking the question is not harassment. The asking of the question must be part of a pattern of conduct that together has the effect of constituting harassment taken as a whole, and must involve some sort of improper motive on the part of the employer. An employer asking "how big are your breasts?" for purpose of ordering uniforms for a woman isn't engaged in harassment, nor is an employer asking "what country are you from?" for the purpose of determining if the employee has knowledge that would allow the employer to better serve a customer in a particular country. Harassment as a form of employment discrimination is not generally a crime, it is merely tortious conduct prohibited by law. Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress The Common Law Tort Courts in the United States have the power to established when conduct gives rise to a claim for money damages against another person which is developed through case law precedents extending back for centuries into the laws of England, so long as this is not in conflict with a statute. One such claim that is recognize by U.S. courts in most states is a tort (i.e. civil wrong) known as "intentional infliction of emotional distress." In the case of asking a (very short) guy "How tall are you?", except to the extent that the short statute was such that it amounted to a disability protected by the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) (which would be unusual but not inconceivable), this would not be a protected class and so it could not constitute harassment in the sense of a subtype of employment discrimination. But, that is not the end of the analysis in the case of the short employee. The law also recognizes a tort (i.e. a right to sue someone for a civil wrong) that is sometimes called "intentional infliction of emotional distress" and sometimes called "outrageous conduct" that is not infrequently invoked in an employer-employee context. Wikipedia at the link above summarizes this tort as follows: Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED; sometimes called the tort of outrage) is a common law tort that allows individuals to recover for severe emotional distress caused by another individual who intentionally or recklessly inflicted emotional distress by behaving in an "extreme and outrageous" way. Some courts and commentators have substituted mental for emotional, but the tort is the same. In the United States, the common law tort most often tracks the language of the Restatement of Torts (Second) Section 46 (1965), which states: One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm. This tort cannot, however, be used to shut down offensive statements and parodies. Per the same Wikipedia entry: The U.S. Supreme Court case Hustler v. Falwell involved an IIED claim brought by the evangelist Jerry Falwell against the publisher of Hustler Magazine for a parody ad that described Falwell as having lost his virginity to his mother in an outhouse. The Court ruled that the First Amendment protected such parodies of public figures from civil liability. Unlike harassment as a form of discrimination, this tort is not limited to any particular protected class of persons, or to a particular specified kind of relationship between the perpetrator and the victim. But, the threshold of conduct which qualifies as "extreme and outrageous" needs to be both much more egregious and much more directly targeted at a particular individual. Basically, the conduct complained of must amount to either effective bullying, or to a malicious prank (there is considerable overlap between these kinds of conduct). An Example Of Conduct Held To Be Actionable Outrageous Conduct An example of conduct that was held sufficiently extreme and outrageous to give rise to tort liability if established at trial was this case: In January 1978, Zalnis contracted with defendant Thoroughbred Datsun for the purchase of a 1978 Datsun automobile. She took possession of the car on that day, and paid the balance of the purchase price two days later. Zalnis dealt directly with Linnie Cade, a salesperson employed by Thoroughbred Datsun. Defendant Trosper, President of Thoroughbred Datsun, approved the transaction based on representations by Cade which were later determined to be based upon erroneous calculations. When Trosper discovered several days later that Cade had sold the car at a loss of approximately $1,000, he instructed Cade and the sales manager to make good the loss by either demanding more money from Zalnis, retrieving the car, or repaying the difference out of Cade's salary. Cade refused to follow any of Trosper's alternative instructions, but another sales employee, defendant Anthony, telephoned Zalnis and told her to return her car to the dealership because it was being recalled. When Zalnis arrived at Thoroughbred Datsun, she refused to give up possession of her car without a work order explaining the need for the recall. Nevertheless, her car was taken from her. During the next few hours, Zalnis alleges that Anthony called her a “French whore,” followed her throughout the showroom, told her they were keeping her automobile, yelled, screamed, used abusive language, grabbed her by the arm in a threatening manner, and continually threatened and intimidated her when she attempted to secure the return of her automobile by telling her to “shut up.” During this period, Zalnis telephoned her attorney, who then telephoned Trosper and eventually obtained the return of her car. During their conversation, Trosper told the attorney that Zalnis had “been sleeping with that nigger salesman and that's the only reason she got the deal she got.” Trosper had known Zalnis for many years, and had told Cade and the sales manager that she was crazy and she had watched her husband kill himself. Zalnis v. Thoroughbred Datsun Car Co., 645 P.2d 292, 293 (Colo. App. 1982). The analysis that lead the Court to reach this conclusion was as follows (most citations omitted): The defendants argue that their actions here were no more than “mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, and other trivialities.” However, the defendants did not merely threaten and insult Zalnis; they took away her car and repeatedly harassed her. Conduct, otherwise permissible, may become extreme and outrageous if it is an abuse by the actor of a position in which he has actual or apparent authority over the other, or the power to affect the other's interests. The conduct here is not a mere insistence on rights in a permissible manner. Rather, the defendants' recall of the car was to avoid a bad bargain, and accordingly, the conduct was not privileged. [S]ee Enright v. Groves, 39 Colo.App. 39, 560 P.2d 851 (1977). Defendants assert that their actions must be judged by the impact they would have on an ordinary person with ordinary sensibilities. We disagree. The outrageous character of the conduct may arise from the actor's knowledge that the other is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress by reason of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity. In Enright, supra, outrageous conduct was found where a police officer effecting an illegal arrest grabbed and twisted the plaintiff's arm even after she told him her arm was easily dislocated. In the instant case, plaintiff was peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress because she had witnessed her husband's suicide, and Trosper and Anthony knew about her susceptibility. Here, as in Enright, the defendants' knowledge exacerbated the conduct. There is outrageous conduct where the actor desires to inflict severe emotional distress or knows that such distress is certain or substantially certain. Here, Zalnis has sufficiently alleged that Trosper and Anthony acted with the intent to bully her into giving up her car. In view of their knowledge of her emotional susceptibility, they could be considered to have acted intentionally or recklessly in causing her severe emotional distress. The defendants argue that we should observe a distinction between a single outrageous occurrence and an outrageous course of conduct. While it is true that “the courts are more likely to find outrageous conduct in a series of incidents or a ‘course of conduct’ than in a single incident,” it is the totality of conduct that must be evaluated to determine whether outrageous conduct has occurred. Zalnis v. Thoroughbred Datsun Car Co., 645 P.2d 292, 294 (Colo. App. 1982) Harassment That Is Criminal Conduct General Considerations Another form of harassment is harassment that constitutes criminal conduct. In these cases, the existence or absence of protected class status is irrelevant (or only goes to the sentence that is appropriate for a violation, rather than guilt or innocence), and the formal character of the relationship between the people (e.g. as employer-employee, merchant-customer, government employee-citizen) is secondary. Instead, in these cases, the existence or absence of harassment hinges on the character and subtextual message of the question in the context of the larger interaction. Exactly what is defined to be criminal harassment varies from state to state, but the key point is that the subtext of the message must either be (1) something that is outright prohibited, for example, when the superficially non-threatening question, in light of the tone used, body language, and the physical context where it takes place is an implied threat to harm someone, or (2) must be part of an overall context of conduct including the question, and a manner of communication which is calculated to distress, annoy, or disturb a person, to an extent that exceeds communication of an idea they may be inherently distressing in a civil, calm and non-combative manner, and would in fact disturb a reasonable person. In the latter case signs that it may be criminal harassment include yelling at a person, bombarding them over and over again with the statement in a way that it can't be avoided verging upon stalking, and being part of a large context of discussion showing specific animus against the individual target of the communication. The Example Of Colorado's Criminal Harassment Statute For example, Colorado's criminal harassment statute reads as follows: (1) A person commits harassment if, with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person, he or she: (a) Strikes, shoves, kicks, or otherwise touches a person or subjects him to physical contact; or (b) In a public place directs obscene language or makes an obscene gesture to or at another person; or (c) Follows a person in or about a public place; or (e) Directly or indirectly initiates communication with a person or directs language toward another person, anonymously or otherwise, by telephone, telephone network, data network, text message, instant message, computer, computer network, computer system, or other interactive electronic medium in a manner intended to harass or threaten bodily injury or property damage, or makes any comment, request, suggestion, or proposal by telephone, computer, computer network, computer system, or other interactive electronic medium that is obscene; or (f) Makes a telephone call or causes a telephone to ring repeatedly, whether or not a conversation ensues, with no purpose of legitimate conversation; or (g) Makes repeated communications at inconvenient hours that invade the privacy of another and interfere in the use and enjoyment of another's home or private residence or other private property; or (h) Repeatedly insults, taunts, challenges, or makes communications in offensively coarse language to, another in a manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly response. (1.5) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires, “obscene” means a patently offensive description of ultimate sexual acts or solicitation to commit ultimate sexual acts, whether or not said ultimate sexual acts are normal or perverted, actual or simulated, including masturbation, cunnilingus, fellatio, anilingus, or excretory functions. (2) Harassment pursuant to subsection (1) of this section is a class 3 misdemeanor; except that harassment is a class 1 misdemeanor if the offender commits harassment pursuant to subsection (1) of this section with the intent to intimidate or harass another person because of that person's actual or perceived race; color; religion; ancestry; national origin; physical or mental disability, as defined in section 18-9-121(5)(a); or sexual orientation, as defined in section 18-9-121(5)(b). (3) Any act prohibited by paragraph (e) of subsection (1) of this section may be deemed to have occurred or to have been committed at the place at which the telephone call, electronic mail, or other electronic communication was either made or received.... (7) Paragraph (e) of subsection (1) of this section shall be known and may be cited as “Kiana Arellano's Law”. (8) This section is not intended to infringe upon any right guaranteed to any person by the first amendment to the United States constitution or to prevent the expression of any religious, political, or philosophical views. Colorado Revised Statutes § 18-9-111 (emphasis added). The case of the harassment of Kiana Arellano, after whom the statute was named, is discussed in an article in the Denver Post, and sheds some light on the kind of conduct that legislators where attempting to punish when they passed the law. It was a case of severe cyber bullying that caused this person to attempt to commit suicide. Restraining Orders And Protection Orders Both tort remedies and criminal sanctions for harassment punish a perpetrator and/or compensate a victim of harassment after it has happened. In many case, the law also allows a court to enter orders known as restraining orders or protection orders directing someone who has engaged in harassing conduct to cease doing so. States differ considerably in defining exactly what kinds of harassing conduct can provide a basis for entry of a restraining order or protection order against an individual directing that person to cease having contact with or harassing the individual protected by the order. The most common fact patterns in which restraining orders or protection orders are entered for harassment (which is not the only kind of conduct that can provide basis for an order like that) involve (1) a former romantic partner harassing his or her ex, (2) a person who had engaged in elder abuse harassing the elderly person who had been abused, (3) a criminal defendant harassing potential witnesses in a case, and (4) a "fan" (often, in part, because they don't really understand the difference between entertainment performances and reality), or a "hater" (often, as part of a larger political agenda intended to bully opponents into compliance) harassing a celebrity, politician, or adult entertainer. Harassment that justifies issuance of a restraining order or protection order, like the harassment that can justify a common law intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, must typically be very extreme and pose an imminent threat to the protected person's safety, emotional well being, the judicial process, or the ability of the protected person to live an ordinary daily life. There must also generally be some reasons to think that the harassing conduct will continue if the court does not act. As in the case of other legal remedies for harassment, harassment in a restraining order or protective order context usually involves consideration of the context of a pattern of conduct over time, even though it can be based on a single very extreme incident. Every state provides that someone who violates a court order like this one may be held in contempt of court, which can result in incarceration or a fine, after a hearing is held in which someone (usually the victim's attorney) acts as prosecutor against the person who violated the order in a quasi-criminal proceeding within the main civil or criminal lawsuit in which the order was obtained. Some states make violation of a court order like this one a criminal offense as well, that can be enforced by law enforcement prior to a hearing if there is probable cause to believe that it was violated.	Owing to the First Amendment, in the United States your recourse would be limited to civil action based on violations of terms of service (meaning that "the authorities" are not going to knock on their doors to tell them to behave). This is not "spam" (which could be regulated) as the term is generally understood. It is annoying, but probably does not constitute threatening or child porn. It might involve violation of an anti-impersonation law such as this one from Texas, if the offender uses the persona of a real person as opposed to a fictitious person). That law, moreover, does not criminalize simple annoying. Prosecution may be possible in the UK.	Is there any legal precedent for suing a city to amend or terminate an agreement due to fiscal nonfeasance? There is not really any legal precedent for prevailing in such a lawsuit. Obviously, of course, the detailed facts and circumstances matter. If a state statute prescribed other terms, for example, and expressly gives someone standing to enforce the statute, then that is another matter. In many states, standing to enforce violations of municipal laws governing their finances and contracts is vested by statute or the state constitution in the state attorney general. Is there any legal recourse for a resident who believes their city is committing financial nonfeasance? Probably not. Certainly not in court. Usually, individual citizens or taxpayers do not have standing to bring suit related to acts which affect all citizens or taxpayers equally or proportionately, but do not constitute an individualized injury to the particular taxpayer. Municipal governments have broad discretion to enter into contracts with other municipalities on rates that they deem fit which do not have to approximate cost or be profit maximizing. Some states and cities allow citizens to petition to have legislation that has been adopted (agreements are generally adopted by city ordinance) to be placed on the ballot for a vote if a sufficient number of people vote on it within a sufficient time of the ordinance or law being passed (this is called a "referendum power"). But, most do not. Otherwise, your sole recourse is to get a majority elected to city council and a new mayor, to change the policy when the agreement expires. wouldn't the city have to prove that there IS a benefit to the city? No. Assuming for sake of argument that someone suing the city had standing to sue, the burden of proof is always on the person bringing the lawsuit. Ordinances are presumed valid unless this is disproven beyond a reasonable doubt. For example: It is an axiom of our judicial system that legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional. Parties attacking their validity carry a heavy burden of proof: invalidity must be established clearly and beyond a reasonable doubt People v. Beaver, 549 P.2d 1315, 1316 (Colo. 1976) The constitutional test in the face of an equal protection challenge (assuming for sake of argument that there was standing) would be a "rational basis test" and there would be a rational basis for (1) saying that the city benefit from its neighbor not having adequate fire protection which could spread to them, (2) on the basis that the marginal cost might be low, and (3) on the basis that the municipality probably has a legal duty to aid a neighboring municipality if it has the ability to do so in the absence of an agreement without necessarily having a right to compensation under a doctrine called mutual aid when the proper conditions are met (sometimes formalized by agreements and/or governed by state statutes such as the Tennessee's Mutual Aid and Emergency and Disaster Assistance Agreement Act of 2004, Tennessee Code Annotated § 58–8–101, et seq.,). The rational basis test is met if you can describe some rational reason why the law might make sense for the city to pass (which is not expressly prohibited by law or a constitutional right), even if the rational reason is not empirically correct, and even if the rational reason wasn't the actual reason for passing the law. This ordinance would almost certainly pass the rational basis test. In general, a disagreement over the price term of an agreement being too high or too low almost always fails. A municipality is not obligated to negotiate a "fair market value" or "fair" price for services that it provides to other municipalities.	The answer is as simple as the fact that the President of the US is a civilian and citizen, and keeps his/her full rights to free speech and free press as guaranteed under the First Amendment. The military necessity exception is a somewhat surprising exception to the general proposition that you have a protected right to express any viewpoint whatsoever, but also is not relevant to POTUS who is not subject to UCMJ. Just as a plain old citizen has the unfettered right to express ridiculous and fundamentally dangerous ideas, news media have the unfettered right to express ridiculous and fundamentally dangerous ideas, as do politicians including POTUS. Plain old citizens can be "punished" for their views by shunning, news media can be "punished" by customers unsubscribing, and politicians can be "punished" for their views by being voted out of office, or not being voted in. That is the only legal limit on expression of viewpoint possible in the US.	It is any law protecting me from the people that distrubute a video of me falling the stairs and shared without my permision? No. Your permission is not necessary for distributing or watching that video. The recording was from your workplace, where your entitlement to privacy is quite limited unlike few settings such as (1) your attorney's office in the course of obtaining legal advice for which the disclosure was needed, or (2) your home. Even if such an entitlement existed, your decision to share that recording with the person who was with you generally constitutes a waiver of your right to privacy regarding that incident. The waiver would apply even if California had some legislation akin to the EU's GDPR. Your description nowhere indicates that that person had a statutory or equitable duty of confidentiality. It is also highly doubtful that you would wish to block the distribution of the video if people instead of mocking you expressed something pleasant or encouraging to you. people who I don't even know their names come to me to comment about the video and joke about not falling again. That is not unlawful in and of itself. Since the matter does not involve a protected category such as sex, race, religion, or disability, pursuing a claim of hostile work environment would be quite a stretch. It would also be futile because any relief would not cover outsiders who watch the video and feel like joking about it. The notion of harassment entails a pattern of conduct (meaning that a person engages twice or more in that conduct) that causes a reasonable person to feel annoyed or concerned for his safety. Even if someone engages makes a few jokes that cause you to get annoyed, any petition for restraining orders seems unlikely to succeed. Sooner rather than later, the jokes will get old and people will move on.	Ballot photos Anti-ballot-photo laws may not be constitutional. Two of them have been struck down for violating the 1st Amendment. Rideout v Gardner Case 1:14-cv-00489-PB Indiana Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Inc., d/b/a American Civil Liberties Union of Indiana v. Indiana Secretary of State, et al., Case 1:15-cv-1356-SEB-DML California's has been amended by the legislature to allow disclosure of a filled-in ballot as long as it isn't part of violating some other law (like vote buying). Open container laws Open-container laws have never been held to be unconstitutional. These are state laws, and states have broad freedom to legislate as long as they don't violate their constitution or elements of the Federal Constitution that have been incorporated by the 14th Amendment. My guess is that they would be upheld because they would pass rational basis review: they are rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Here is an example of an open-container law surviving a constitutional challenge. State are encouraged to pass open-container laws by 23 USC 154. If a state does not have an open container law, they receive less federal highway funding. This kind of condition was upheld by South Dakota v. Dole.
Could I have my rotting corpse displayed in a long term art exhibit? Would my family face significant legal restrictions in trying to fulfill my last wish? My body would be on private property in Kentucky.	No. Only specified means of disposition of bodies are allowed by law in Kentucky and this is not one of them. The statute that applies once the body comes into the possession of a coroner is here. The statute that applies when a death appears to involve suspicious circumstances is here. Dispositions of a body that constitute the crime of "desecration of a dead body" crimes in Kentucky are described here. But, the the scenario in the question, while not within any of the clear exceptions to that particular crime, is also not clearly within the definition of that crime. Instead, it would probably be a violation of state funeral home regulations, which are mostly civil rather than criminal offenses. A subtle point is that certain transformations of a dead body such as cremation and certain kinds of treatments (such as plasticizing) that can cause a body to cease to rot also have the effect of causing the dead body to no longer count as a dead body legally for purposes of laws regulating the disposal of dead bodies. Kentucky law does not expressly authorize something quite similar to the original post which is the Tibetan Buddhist and Parsi (a.k.a. Zoroastrian) religious practice of "sky burial". But, the free exercise clause of the freedom of religion granted by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and incorporated against the states via the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (a federal statute), may either render this state prohibition unconstitutional or pre-empt it under federal law, because religious practices have greater legal protections than artistic practices. This would be a close call because sky burial can present public health risks that overcome first amendment freedom of religion rights.	It is probably illegal in all of the jurisdictions in the US where a fetus is legally declared to be a person and where the murder statutes are written to not explicitly exclude abortion: that is, in no jurisdictions. No law existing or proposed for Georgia specifically addresses "travel for the purpose of getting an abortion". The underlying theory behind the claim (advocated by some Georgia attorneys) is that a person may be open to a conspiracy charge for taking a woman to another state to get an abortion, which would be a crime if committed in Georgia. If a conspiracy exists in Georgia to do something illegal (in Georgia), that is a violation of OCGA 16-4-8 ("when he together with one or more persons conspires to commit any crime and any one or more of such persons does any overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy"). The substantially same law exists in Washington, and most if not all other states. The theory is apparently that "conspire to commit a crime" means something like "conspire to perform an act which would be a crime if performed in in this jurisdiction", e.g. "purchase marijuana, or take a job at certain payday loan companies". No state has successfully claimed extraterritorial jurisdiction, where a Georgia resident can be prosecuted in Georgia for a legal act carried out in another state, so this theory is a bit of a stretch.	Conditions stated in a will should be objectively verifiable, to avoid later ligation of the "yes he is / no he isn't" type. In this case, it would appear that your concern is over the beneficiary not actually being competent to take care of themselves. The courts often have to make that judgment, when a party seeks conservatorship over an adult. So it seems that the situation you are addressing can be summarized by saying "has not been found legally incompetent". You should discuss with your attorney what the exact wording ought to be, and also whether that describes your actual intents. For example, the description of disqualification probably should not include execution of a temporary power of attorney for a specific purpose, nor would it include a DNR order. Hiring an attorney who knows the terminology would steer clear of vague or mistaken terms.	Based on some quick searching, this would likely be a wrongful death action. I have to pick a state, so I'll pick Nevada. The first question is what damages could be. I don't know offhand what is typical in wrongful death suits, but this appears to be beyond mere negligence: there was a hit and run involved. I have no trouble believing the claim would reach at least six figures. This is important, because federal diversity jurisdiction only includes lawsuits with over $75,000 at stake. Now, Santa Claus's citizenship matters; if he were stateless it'd be an issue, but he is a citizen of Canada. That means that federal court has diversity jurisdiction: because the lawsuit is between a citizen of one state on one side and a foreign citizen on the other (no state has citizens on both sides of the lawsuit), and meets Congress's extra requirements (enough money at stake), it can be in federal court. The way diversity jurisdiction works is that the plaintiff can file in federal court, but if they choose to file in Nevada court then the defendant can remove the case to federal court. Either party can get it into federal court. Conventional wisdom is that federal court is more defendant-friendly than state court on state law claims. It is likely that if Grandpa files the case in any court in Nevada, the case will end up in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. But suppose it is in state court? Most states don't have separate "county court" and "state court" systems; county courts are a thing, but they're a specialized thing and the serious stuff is not in those. A six-figure wrongful death claim won't go in Nevada's equivalent of small claims court. It'd go in Nevada district court, if it's in state courts. But what about other courts? Grandma was walking home, so it can be assumed she was a Nevada resident. Assuming Grandpa lived with her (which is rather likely), so is he. They then can't sue in any US state other than Nevada without being laughed out of court -- a lawsuit needs to have something to do with where you're suing. The other option is Canada, but such a suit is unlikely.	Doing something to a dead body that would kill it if it were a living person is not murder, manslaughter, or any form of homicide in any country that I know of. It may be a crime to mutilate a corpse, or some similar provision. It may also be attempted murder. For example, in the US state of Oklahoma, section §21-1161.1 provides: A. It is unlawful for any person to knowingly and willfully desecrate a human corpse for any purpose of: Tampering with the evidence of a crime; Camouflaging the death of human being; Disposing of a dead body; Impeding or prohibiting the detection, investigation or prosecution of a crime; Altering, inhibiting or concealing the identification of a dead body, a crime victim, or a criminal offender; or Disrupting, prohibiting or interfering with any law enforcement agency or the Office of the State Medical Examiner in detecting, investigating, examining, determining, identifying or processing a dead body, cause of death, the scene where a dead body is found, or any forensic examination or investigation relating to a dead body or a crime. B. Upon conviction, the violator of any provision of this section shall be guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment in the custody of the Department of Corrections for a term not more than seven (7) years, by a fine not exceeding Eight Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00), or by both such fine and imprisonment. In addition, if the person thought that the dead body was a living person, and tried to kill that person. There may be a charge of attempted murder on which a conviction might be possible. See "attempted murder" of a dead man? for details. In general, if property (such as a cell phone) has been stole from a person, that person my reclaim such property, and doing so is not theft. However, a person is not in most jurisdictions permitted to enter someone else's property, to break and enter, or to assault a suspected thief in order to recover property. A person who actually observes a theft (or other serious crime) is in many jurisdictions allowed to pursue the thief/criminal and use reasonable non-deadly force to stop and detain the thief pending the arrival of law enforcement, who should be promptly summoned. The details vary widely from place to place. The use of deadly force, such as a gun, is generally not permitted, except in proper self-defense, but again the details vary widely.	No. I'm going to assume we're talking about the US, where being convicted of a crime requires proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus, our hypothetical friend has NOT committed murder. Nor has he committed manslaughter (as this too requires that somebody die) or attempted murder or manslaughter (as that requires an intent that the person should die). If it could be proven that the person our hypothetical scumbag ran over died as a result of being run over, our hypothetical scumbag would likely have committed negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter; however, as these imply a lack of intent, they lack "attempted" versions (see People v. Hernandez, http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/court-of-appeals/1980/76-813.html though state laws differ and some may be weird). In short, he has not committed any flavor of murder or manslaughter. So, what other enterprising charge or legal proceeding might we be able to level against him? I'm sure one exists. I'll edit it in once I find it. Civil suit for wrongful death Normally, our hypothetical scumbag would find himself on the receiving end of a wrongful death lawsuit. This would require that he (1) owed the dead man a duty of care (which he clearly did; all motorists are obliged to exhibit reasonable care in operating their motor vehicles) and that he (2) breached that duty (which he presumably did), but also that (3) this failure caused the death of the guy he ran over (which you have stipulated that we cannot "even guess," which precludes a "preponderance of the evidence" (the standard for civil matters)) and that (4) that person's death has caused actual, quantifiable damages to the plaintiff (which it can't as "nobody knows him"). Reckless driving charge In most states, our hypothetical scumbag's behavior meets the threshold for reckless driving. For example, in VA law: [In reckless driving cases, e]ither the driver is believed to have driven recklessly in a manner that threatened people or property, to have driven 20 miles per hour or more in excess of the speed limit, or to have exceeded 80 miles per hour, no matter the speed limit. http://manassascriminalattorney.com/2015/10/can-reckless-driving-in-virginia-be-a-felony-charge/ In some states, this may be felony reckless driving; in others, it may be a mere misdemeanor. Misc links https://www.virginia-criminallawyer.com/homicide-laws-virginia-code.html http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/proving-wrongful-death-civil-case.html A forum discussion that (thank heaven) cited its sources: http://www.top-law-schools.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=155412	Certainly, "Tortious interference" comes to mind. While it's a difficult one to prove, there are typically 6 elements: The existence of a contractual relationship or beneficial business relationship between two parties (possible problem here). Knowledge of that relationship by a third party. Intent of the third party to induce a party to the relationship to breach the relationship. (or refuse to enter one). Lack of any privilege on the part of the third party to induce such a breach. (no right to do so via some other aspect of law). The contractual relationship is breached. (the normally-accessible-to-anyone transaction is prevented). Damage to the party against whom the breach occurs The only real "stretch" here is that Tortious Interference is written for cases where you already have an existing business relationship or contract in place. You're talking about a situation where a vendor normally proffers its service to any member of the public, and you'd argue there's an implied contract that they do business with any comer. In real estate particularly, it gets a lot more complicated because of Fair Housing laws. The apartment could get in big trouble being caught refusing to do business with someone, if the reason for the refusal was sourced in something related to race, creed, religion, sexual orientation and a bunch of other no-no's. Even if that's not your motive, if they (plural: victim and attorney) can convince a judge or jury that it is your motive, you and the apartment could owe them a lot of money. Fun fact: conspiracy to commit a Federal crime is a felony, even if the crime isn't. Regardless... I think if you are paying the vendor to snub the customer, courts would find that to be a perverse and unjustifiable behavior, and would see harm in that, especially if it was part of a pattern of behavior that constituted harassment. They would tend to assume the worst motives unless you could show other motives. I suspect they could even get a restraining order blocking you from interfering in their business relationships anywhere. You would also be subject to discovery, and would be compelled to disclose anywhere else you interfered, and pretty much anything they want to ask you. You can't refuse to answer ... unless ... your answer would incriminate you of a crime. But that's the kiss of death in a civil trial, because the jury hears that, and infers you are a crook. Game over lol.	Yes, this is illegal. If by "across the state" you mean some distance away but in the same state then the exact law will depend on which state you are in, but as a rule any "conversion" of property to the use of another counts as theft. In this case your aunt has "converted" the property to the use of your Nan (funny legal phrase). The fact that the people doing this are your relatives makes no difference. (When asking about the law here you should always say which state you are in.) Although theft is a crime, you could also start a civil case to get your property back without involving the police. The details depend on where you are, but try googling "(your state) small claims court". Many states have a process for collecting low-value debts or other property without needing lawyers. You need to have a firm conversation with your aunt about this. Tell her that you want your property back, and don't back down. Also call your Nan and explain this to her as well; she may not have realised that she is in possession of stolen property, which is usually a separate crime. If you want more advice on how to get your property back without starting a family row then you might ask on the Interpersonal Skills SE, but it might be better to start with "When are you planning to return my property?" and leave "You are a thief" as a last resort. Edit: As Eric Nolan points out in the comments, you may be a minor. If you are under 18 then your aunt has authority over you that she wouldn't have if you were older. For instance, if she is concerned about your use of video games impacting school-work then confiscating your console and putting it out of your reach would be perfectly legal.
What principal of law allows the US federal government to demand that people work without pay? Certain US federal employees are required to work without pay in the event of a government shutdown (i.e. budgetary incompetence). If you are classified as an an essential employee, you must work with no idea of when you will get paid. How can this be legal? Why is it not a criminal offense as a sort of temporary enslavement?	Employees are only required to work in the sense that refusal to report can result in discipline (like reprimand or firing) and forfeit of whatever money you would have earned had you shown up. This is exactly the same way federal employees (or most employees, for that matter) are always required to work. The fact that they're not being paid on time has nothing to do with whether it's slavery. That's because pay has nothing to do with slavery. Slavery is forced labor and/or ownership of people, and civilian federal employees are just as free to quit as they normally are. Military personnel can't freely quit, but they can never freely quit. Nothing relevant has changed for either group. Not paying employees is potentially a violation of labor law, and the government in fact lost a lawsuit after the last shutdown for violating the FLSA. If that happens this time too, they'll have to pay damages.	The federal law, 18 USC 597, states that Whoever makes or offers to make an expenditure to any person, either to vote or withhold his vote, or to vote for or against any candidate; and whoever solicits, accepts, or receives any such expenditure in consideration of his vote or the withholding of his vote shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if the violation was willful, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. It is not required that the prosecution prove that the recipient voted at all. You just have to make a payment or offer of payment, and you just have to agree to vote or not vote in exchange for that payment. These laws are entirely enforceable.	Lawyers may break confidentiality with client permission. You can also break your own confidentiality and talk to the prosecutor yourself. The prosecutor's response is up to the prosecutor; however, they tend to not be super excited about giving immunity to a witness for the defense if they might want to prosecute the witness later (and courts often are fine with that), so the more they suspect about your true role the less likely they are to grant it. No. If the feds later find truly independent evidence (they have the burden of showing it's truly independent), they can prosecute. Some states give transactional immunity to witnesses (you can't be prosecuted for crimes you testified about for any reason), but the Fifth Amendment doesn't require it and at least the feds aren't bound by state transactional immunity. It's hard to prosecute, but is possible if prosecutors play their cards right. Yes, it does allow civil liability. There is no right against self-incrimination in civil matters, only criminal liability. If the forced testimony leads to a lawsuit that bankrupts you, too bad.	Your interpretation seems to be correct. A furloughed employee is defined by Acas to be one who is "temporarily sent home because there's no work". This could in principle be through unpaid leave. The Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme is a government scheme to compensate employers for the wage bills of their staff during the furlough, so that the furloughed staff can continue to receive some income. An employee would have no direct dealings with the scheme and would continue to be paid via their employer. Your company seems to be offering to match the terms offered to employees under the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme of 80% of salary, presumably out of their own funds. A kind gesture, it seems!	In general, under the common law, a contract cannot validly require a person to commit or abet a crime. Thus if an NDA requires one to lie about or actively cover up a crime, it is void (in that aspect, at least). But there is, in most cases, no affirmative duty to report a crime, except for certain individuals in particular situations. Thus an NDA that simply requires silence may be valid. There have been many Federal and state laws passed to protect so-called "whistleblowers" (people who draw attention to criminal or improper actions of which they have confidential knowledge. Many of these are listed and described in the Wikipedia article "Whistleblower protection in the United States" Exactly what protection is offered varies widely. Many of these deal with public employees or government contractors, not private employees. In the case of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) the US Supreme Court held that statements made in the course of a person's position as a public employee, rather than as a private citizen, have no First Amendment protection against employer discipline. Whether a private employee will be protected against retaliation or the penalties listed in an NDA depends on the area of the alleged violation, and the specific facts of the case. One would be wise to consult a lawyer knowledgeable in this specific field before relying on such protections.	It is mandatory for the employer to provide sufficient restrooms (“cabinets d'aisance”), as per article R4228-10. Other provisions regulate evacuation, ventilation, heating, disabled access, etc. There is no provision regarding when employees are permitted to use the restrooms. There can't be a single rule that works for every profession: some jobs don't let you leave your post whenever you like (e.g. machine operator, driver, guard, teacher, etc.). The most common dispute regarding restroom use is whether employees should be paid during that time. Some employers want to count restroom use as unpaid pause time. Strictly speaking, that's legal: an employee who is in a restroom is not at the employer's disposal, therefore this doesn't count as work time. However enforcing this is often logistically difficult and wildly unpopular, so in practice it's only done in places where employees must clock out to reach a restroom. I could only find one case with actual jurisprudence. In 1995, an industrial butchering company (Bigard) decided to limit restroom breaks to three fixed times a day. This was, as you might expect, unpopular; the employees went on strike, and eventually the labor court struck down this measure. That's a precedent, but it doesn't seem to have made its way to the appellate court. Your case is also slightly different in that the restrooms would only be inaccessible for an hour, which is shorter than in the Bigard case. So legally speaking, it isn't clear who will win. You'll have a better chance of success by banking on the unpopularity of the measure. Talk with your colleagues and your representatives and shop stewards. Point out that employees who are trying to hold it in are unlikely to be at the top of their productivity.	united-states The Thirteenth Amendment forbids slavery and involuntary servitude except as punishment for a crime. This means that, outside of unique situations like the military, an employer cannot keep you as an employee against your will. Any contract that denies you the right to quit your job is illegal. A contract might require a reasonable notice period or something along those lines, but it cannot bind you to work for the company for as long as the company wants. While you can sign an employment contract without it being involuntary servitude, the Thirteenth Amendment is also generally read to mean that your employer can only sue you for money if you refuse to work. A US court cannot order you to work for an employer and threaten to hold you in contempt of court if you refuse. This doctrine predates the end of slavery, but the Thirteenth Amendment is among the reasons now cited to justify it.	No The intent of the proposed bill is to codify existing case law. You are an employee now and you will be an employee then. You are an employee now because a) you are not free from the company's control and direction or b) the work you are doing is the company's main business. If you read the bill you will find out that c) involves "an independently established trade, occupation, or business" so your business qualifies for this but you need to qualify for all three factors to be an independent contractor.
Re-Releasing, Re-Naming and Re-Writing Open Source GNU V3 Licensed software MAIN QUESTION SUMMARY: Can someone with real world experience, who has actually Modified, Re-Wrote, Re-Released and Re-Named Open Source GNU V3 Licensed software; please share their experience on the subject? Background: I have been working on and debugging a plugin (for an OpenSource CMS system) for 4 years (about 500 hr per year) in order to make it work perfectly. The plugin is licensed as: GNU General Public License version 3 [or later] The plugin clearly states: free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify Over that time the following things have happened: The plugin developers have not supported the plugin very well or fast enough (in my opinion) I have added major new functionality to the Plugin using "extensions" I have patched the plugin repeatedly, for example: Upgraded from PHP 5.4 => 7.0 => 7.2 (cleaned up errors, rewrites, removed lazy code like faulty output buffering and is_array checks - ect...) Updated JS to modern web standards (Select2 3.5.3 => 4.0.2, jQuery 3.3, ect...) Continually added notes into the @package declaration and changelog Maintained and eventually modified the core plugin so much that its hardly even the same plugin anymore. (only 88 of 595 files are original plus 62 new files) To conclude: the natural process of maintaining, debugging and enhancing has produced this 'different new thing'. Therefore: I am considering the following approach (because I do not want to confuse people, this plugin accomplished the same goal but is no longer the same software) Just rename the plugin Honor the original developers by stating that this new plugin is "Based on the classic" Keep the original License intact but in a separate .txt file Keep the authors names listed as "Based on the work of" Add a new GNU LICENSE declaration Explain all modifications in a changelog RE-RELEASE and RE-DISTRIBUTE the plugin under its new name Go into the forum area where the original Plugin was distributed (where people are complaining) and tell them "hey, I had the same problems, so I rewrote this plugin get it here for free, cheers" I now have the following questions and concerns: Is this acceptable and legal use of the GNU License? [I assume yes] Is this considered FauxPas or inappropriate? [I assume no] Should I not even mention the original name of the plugin? [unsure] Is keeping the authors names intact considered correct? [I assume yes] What is an honorable, noble and respectful way to handle naming? [want a professional opinion] How exactly does "Re-releasing GNU software after rewriting or heavy modification" work? [I assume I just rename it and write a declaration that explains the history of the code] Is there anyone with direct and specific experience in this exact same area that can share on the topic? Should the original plugin developers "rise from the dead" and see what I have done- should I be concerned? (I imagine its 50/50, they either see it and say good job carry the torch, or they may become irate) IMPORTANT NOTE: some of the "extensions" for that plugin were not free, users had to pay to download them. I modified, maintained, updated and patches several of those as well. This explains some of my concerns here, there may be money involved on those extensions. These paid extensions also are listed as GNU, version 2 or later An example: I remember when Joomla was Mambo... I feel that this situation might be similar? Research and notes: I have examined the following, which helped me formulate some of my assumed answers. https://opensource.org/licenses https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.en.html http://www.gnu.org/licenses/ https://odino.org/the-5-golden-rules-when-writing-open-source-software/ https://opensource.guide/legal/ https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-faq.html https://stackoverflow.com/questions/9493786/gnu-gpl-license-terms-open-source-softwares (Re-)formatting and displaying of software licenses/privacy policy/impressum Can you use only the name/brand of GNU open source software? Law and open-source project Thank you for your consideration in this matter.	I'm assuming that you are not seeking to change the license, and so it will remain GPLv3. As long as you've built on the original software, that license still applies. You also need to keep the previous copyright notices, including the names of the original people. Assuming that, everything you're doing is legal, which is what's on topic here. There is some etiquette around forks (which is what you're doing), which would be on topic at the Open Source Stack Exchange. I'm puzzled by your desire to have a different license text. You can't change the license from GPLv3, so that has to stay the same. (If the original has GPLv3 "or, at your option, any later version", you can drop the any other version text if you like.)	There is no loophole because a work released in object code form only — without the Corresponding Source — is not released under GPLv3, even if you say it is. GPLv3 only requires them to also provide whatever source came with it False. Providing the Corresponding Source is compulsory (§6 as pointed by @cHao). If they do not have access to it, it means the work has not been released under GPLv3.	I haven't used the extension, but here are the concerns I would have: Does RECAP detect and handle documents filed under seal? Under some circumstances, IIRC, Pacer gives certain attorneys access to documents sealed from the general public. If you access these sealed documents through PACER and thereby submit them to the RECAP public repository, you have violated the Court order sealing the documents and might well be found in contempt. It is not unheard of for a Court to order a document replaced by a corrected version; this is most common when a document was inadvertently filed with information not redacted that should have been. As long as nobody but the parties and their lawyers have accessed it, this can prevent that information from being public. If you log on to PACER and see your client's personal information...you can no longer keep it private by asking the Court for that remedy, because you just submitted it to a public repository. Enjoy your malpractice suit. Does the use of RECAP constitute a waiver of work product protection? Under some (admittedly limited) circumstances, your use of PACER might constitute attorney work product, which would ordinarily be protected from disclosure in a manner similar to a privilege. Revealing your research pattern to a third party could waive that protection.	I cannot speak for civil law systems (Germany) but in Common Law (UK, USA) systems the law looks at substance rather than form. So: Am I allowed to undo the word-wrapping of all the texts and unindent them, as well as performing a new word-wrap on them? Yes Do I have to make sure that it is readable for everyone on every device, and do I have to make sure that accessibility interfaces are used (e.g. for blind persons, which aren't even the target group of my software)? If they are licences (rather than contracts) they must simply be available; this does not mean universally available. Do I have to make sure, that if my application wouldn't even start correctly on a device, that the user is able to start the application in an impossible, absurd, magic or religious way to ensure that he can read the legal texts or is it enough to state it on the website then? It depends if you want the licences to be enforceable by you on the users or if you are simply complying with your disclosure obligations. See What if the user disagreed with the Terms of Service, but still registered on a website?. Do I have to make sure that the rendering of the licenses/privacy policy/impressum is performant (e.g. text rendering and refresh after scrolling takes less than a second)? I already have to include two external libraries with my software to display the texts, otherwise it would not be possible to display texts at all. No - make them wait if you want.	Why do you think Oracle have not been protecting their trade mark? Using a trade mark to describe the product (“Written in JavaScript”, “Seeking JavaScript developer”) is not an infringement and the trade mark owner is under no obligation to, indeed, cannot stop this. Where they are required to defend their trade mark is when it is being used in such a way that there is the risk of confusion that the goods or services could be confused with the trade mark owner’s goods or services. Further, they are not required to defend all breaches, only enough to show that they are actively doing so. Also it is not important that the trade mark be associated with the trade mark’s owner. Do you know who owns the trade mark “Ben & Jerry’s”?	There is language, but not a mechanism, covering this. Section 3(a)(3) of version 4 licenses says If requested by the Licensor, You must remove any of the information required by Section 3(a)(1)(A) to the extent reasonably practicable. If you become aware of a person using your material and attributing you, and you want the attribution removed, you would accordingly notify them (somehow), and they are required to remove the offending material. The removable informations includes: i. identification of the creator(s) of the Licensed Material and any others designated to receive attribution, in any reasonable manner requested by the Licensor (including by pseudonym if designated); ii. a copyright notice; iii. a notice that refers to this Public License; iv. a notice that refers to the disclaimer of warranties; v. a URI or hyperlink to the Licensed Material to the extent reasonably practicable;	I'll clarify my understanding of your hypothetical. X authors a comment. StackExchange publishes that comment, under a CC BY-SA 3.0 license, properly attributed to the original author Y edits that comment. StackExchange continues to publish the comment, still under a CC BY-SA 3.0 license, properly attributing the original author, X, but does not give any attribution to Y for their contributions In this scenario, Stack Exchange is properly respecting the license agreement with X. X is still given attribution, and the comment is still CC BY-SA licensed, and it indicates "if changes were made". StackExchange has no duty to X to display who made the changes. Stack Exchange may be failing Y, by not giving them any attribution for their edit. However, edits to a comment are often so minor that they are not copyrightable (deletions, copyediting, link fixing, etc.). If the contribution isn't even copyrightable, it doesn't matter that Y isn't given attribution. Y certainly isn't infringing X's copyright. X is given the required attribution.	I don't think so. While JSON stands for "JavaScript Object Notation", it doesn't say that. So the term "JSON" isn't infringing on a trademark for "JavaScript". To sue somebody because of an alleged trademark infringement, one needs to prove that the offender abused a trade name of the suing company in a way to make the public believe the offending company was related to the suing company. Nobody is even trying that by just using a file format. The file structure itself was developed as an open standard, so they can't claim any rights on that. I have not heard about a company claiming rights in file structures recently, because the data is considered the property of the user, not of the company that wrote the program it was created with. And users are often no longer accepting file formats that can only be read by a specific (expensive) application from a particular company. They want to be flexible to change their vendor and keep the data.
What happens to copyright owned by a defunct publisher company? I'm especially interested in books that do not have any commercial value (i.e. the cost of publishing is much higher than any foreseeable return). I know that the answer may vary depending on country.	Unless the work has entered the public domain (after the copyright expires, or if a copyright notice or renewal was omitted when these were required, or in other ways) there is always an owner of the copyright. If the copyright was retained by the author, who has died, than the author's heir(s) own it. (If there are no other heirs, it becomes the property of the state. This is known as escheating.) If the author has sold or assigned the copyright (say to a publisher) then the buyer or assignee owns it. If the owner is a business that has ceased to operate, but has not sold the copyright, then the shareholders or proprietor has the right to sell or license it (technically the business still owns it). If the business goes through legal bankruptcy, the copyright would be sold, possibly as a part of "and all its other assets and good will", or else would escheat to the state. It can be hard to find the copyright to a work long unpublished. The original author may have died, and the author's heirs may be hard to track. The copyright may have been sold, and the sale may not have been properly recorded. In the US, the Copyright Office maintains records that try to identify the copyright owner of all registered copyrights. The office will search these, for a fee, but there is not always a correct or useful answer. Under current US law, if one cannot find the correct owner of a copyright, and secure permission to use it, one is simply out of luck (except for musing, where a compulsory license is available for some uses at a government-specified fee). Any use is then infringement (unless it is a fair use) and the owner could always turn up and sue. The term "orphan works" has been applied to works whose copyright owner is unknown and hard to find. The same term is also applied to works whose copyright holder is known, but which are long out of print and unlikely to be reprinted, particularly when there is no paying market for them. In the US, there have been several proposals for dealing with "orphan works" by granting a compulsory licensee for them, or by declaring them to be in the public domain, or by taxing them and declaring them to be PD if he tax goes unpaid. None of these have been passed into law in the US, nor have similar proposals been made law in any other country that I know of. (declaring Orphan works PD might cause a problem under the Berne Convention.) To be honest, as there is little economic value in orphan works, no one will spend much money or energy in lobbying for such a law, and the industries that make their money via copyright (music and film in particular) are often suspicious of and automatically oppose anything that weakens copyright in any way, or seems to. In any case, no such law has yet passed. (Edit I now learn that Canada and the EU have laws giving access to orphan works under some circumstances, and other countries may have such laws.) It is true that the owner of the copyright on an orphan work may well be unlikely to sue for infringement of that copyright. The owner may not even know that s/he owns the copyright. But a user could never by fully safe, because the owner (or a new owner after a transfer) could always choose to sue for any continuing infringement, and any past one if the statute of limitations has not run out. This answer is largely based on knowledge of US law, but I believe that this situation is basically the same in most countries.	Your title and your question are totally different. If someone pirates a book, makes printed copies, and sells them for profit, that's the point where it switches from plain copyright infringement to being criminal copyright infringement. Which means jail instead of paying damages is possible. If you buy one of these printed copies, not knowing that they have been created illegally, and not being willfully ignorant that the printed copies were created illegal, then you didn't commit copyright infringement yourself. Since you are asking the question, it's obvious that you now know that there was copyright infringement, and buying any more copies would be encouraging copyright infringement with no excuses for you. You can be sued for damages. It is unlikely to happen since suing takes likely more effort than getting any damages from you is worth. The correct thing to do is ask the seller for your money back and destroy the copies. If they don't refund your money you can inform the copyright holder.	We cannot and will not try to answer "what should i do?" questions here. Nothing in the linked page makes me think that the views expressed in the previous question here are any less correct. They certainly have not changed the law on copyright. The linked page is an open forum. Many of the posts o9n that thread express ill-informed and incorrect views of how copyright works, and what it protects. Several google searchs find no trace of the suit described in the thread. Note that in US law no copyright claim may be heard in a small claims court, except for the federal copyright office's small claims tribunal. I am not sure if the same is true in Canada, but it might be that the suit was simply dismissed on such a basis. In any case small claims cases do not establish legal precedents in Canada or the US. Of course it is true that anyone can sue over almost anything, even when there is no valid legal basis for the suit. If the suit had been won by the claimant, or even settled that would be larger grounds for worry. A person seriously worried over publishing a book such as that described in the question might do well to consult a lawyer with relevant expertise. A single consultation plus an opinion letter might not cost very much. But 17 USC 102 (b) is very clear that copyright never protects facts, as are the copyright laws of other countries. Note that reports of the events of sports matches are not protected by copyright, although expressive language and analysis may be. 17 USC 102 (b) reads: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. Article 2 paragraph (8) of the Berne Copyright Convention provides that: (8) The protection of this Convention shall not apply to news of the day or to miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press information. There seems little room for copyright protection of the moves of chess games.	Basically, statement 3 above is correct. The owner of the copyright in a work may release that work unmder different, even incompatible, licenses, as many times as s/he chooses to do. None of these releases cancels or invalidates any other. A person who obtains a work from a site where it is listed under a particular license, may rely on that license grant. The owner may (if the site allows) modify the license or remove the posted work, but this does not invalidate the license granted to those who obtained the work before any modification or removal. An incorrect or incomplete copyright notice does not, under current law. invalidate the copyright, and to the best of my understanding will not invalidate either of the license mentioen in the question.	Any adapted work derived from a work used under a CC-BY-SA licnese must be distributed, if at all, under a compatible license. The question is whether a large work incorporating a much smaller work is said to be "based on" that work. The CC-BY-SA 4.0 legal text does not use "include" or "incorporate" or any similar term to define an adapted work, instead it says: Adapted Material means material subject to Copyright and Similar Rights that is derived from or based upon the Licensed Material and in which the Licensed Material is translated, altered, arranged, transformed, or otherwise modified in a manner requiring permission under the Copyright and Similar Rights held by the Licensor. For purposes of this Public License, where the Licensed Material is a musical work, performance, or sound recording, Adapted Material is always produced where the Licensed Material is synched in timed relation with a moving image. If including a single work makes your book Adapted Materiel, than you must either release the book under the same license, or else not rely on the CC license. I am not at all sure if such use would make the book Adapted Materiel. If the content could be quoted (perhaps only in part) based on fair use or fair dealing or a similar theory, you would not be relaying on the license. But whether such use is legitimate is always a very fact-bound question, which will depend on various specific facts. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? for a summary of US fair use principles. If the materiel you want to use would not qualify under fair use (or whatever similar principle applies in your jurisdiction), and the book would be considered Adapted Material, then you would have to omit it or put the book under the CC license. I see in The CC case law page the statement that: The atlas was a compilation not a derivative work, so did not need to be licensed under the SA term, Which might apply to your book. If it does, you would not need to place the book under a CC license. Update: On reading CC's detailed wiki page on Drauglis v. Kappa Map Group, LLC I find the statement that Use of a whole work is suggestive of a "compilation" rather than a derivative work subject to the ND/SA terms. attributed to the US District court (DC district) that decided this case in 2014. If that decision were followed, it would seem that the book would not be considered a derivative work and while proper attribution must be provided, and the applicable license must be indicated, the book itself need not be released under CC-BY-SA.	Let’s work it through Is the work copyright? Yes. Are you making a copy or a derivative work? Yes. Do you have permission? No. At this point, it is prima facie copyright violation. However, various copyright laws have defences for breach. You don’t say where you are but as the USA is the most permissive in this regard we’ll use the USA. If it’s not legal there, it’s not legal anywhere. If it is legal there, it’s still likely to be not legal everywhere else. is it fair use? Almost certainly not. Wizards of the Coast (the copyright owner) already do this. While this service is free for creatures from the Monster Manual, it does drive traffic to their web site where they sell stuff. They also licence (presumably for money) others to do the same. Your usage would negatively affect the copyright owners market. This counts against fair use. Because it’s already being done, your work has virtually nil transformative value. This counts against fair use. You are copying a substantial part of the work. This counts against fair use. You are not using it commercially but neither is it for educational use. This is unlikely to matter. On balance: not fair use. TL;DR This is copyright violation.	I don't see how. Remember that a license is a contract where the author gives permission to copy (modify, redistribute, remix, etc) a copyrighted work, provided that the licensee fulfills the stated conditions. If the license is not in effect, then we revert to the default situation under copyright law, which is that the potential licensee has no rights to copy the work. (Not counting particular instances of copying which are permitted under fair use and similar exceptions - I presume that's not what you have in mind, or the whole question is moot.) In this case, the conditions include that the licensee must credit the author under their chosen pseudonym. The licensee can't get out of that obligation simply because they find it distasteful or objectionable for whatever reason. If they don't want to do it, then they should not accept the license in the first place, and so refrain from copying the work. (Of course, if the author is offering the CC license in hopes of encouraging reuse of the work, then this may not be a desirable outcome for the author, so they might want to think twice about their choice of pseudonym.) Even if the author's pseudonym were something that would actually be illegal to quote (say, because it is obscene), I don't think it lets the licensee off the hook. A contract with illegal terms is void, so legally it is as if there is no license at all, and we revert to the default in which there is no right to copy. A question was raised in comments about the word "reasonable". I don't know of case law where this has been tested, so I can only speculate: The context suggests that "reasonable" is intended to refer to the means of attribution (for instance, where the attribution should appear in a piece of source code or documentation), not to the pseudonym. There's a legal principle that the specific governs over the general, and the requirement to credit the author by a particular pseudonym is clearly more specific than the general requirement of "reasonableness". It seems clear that the author, who is the one offering these terms, didn't intend for the general term "reasonable" to render meaningless their request for the use of a specific pseudonym; if they had, why would they have bothered to put it in? On the flip side, there's the principle of contra proferentem, that ambiguities in a contract should be resolved in the favor of the party that didn't draft it - here, the licensee. But it's hard to argue that this is really ambiguous; it seems quite clear what the author wants. Of course, the author can circumvent the whole issue, if they're worried, by licensing the work instead under a modified version of the CC license in which the word "reasonable" is removed. After all, there is nothing particular magical about CC's language: the contract is whatever the author and the licensee agree to, and they're just using the pre-written CC license as a convenience to streamline their negotiations.	Yes, if the book was published in 1913, the copyright has expired. You can freely scan it in and publish it. But note you have NO copyright to the material. You didn't write it. Copyright law gives rights to the AUTHOR of a work. It doesn't matter how much effort you went to scanning it in and formatting it. Nothing in copyright law says that that gives you any rights. If you add anything creative of your own, you would own the copyright to the new material. Like if you drew new illustrations and added them to the book. Or if you included your own commentary. Or you added explanatory footnotes. That still wouldn't give you rights to the original text, but you would own the new material. But in the same vein, if the book was originally published in 1913, but the copy you have includes material added by a later editor, that later material might still be protected by copyright. Just a side thought, it occurs to me that if I was going to republish a public domain book, a good idea would be to add footnotes. If my footnotes appear on almost every page, then no one else could just take my electronic files and sell them himself. He'd have to go through page by page and purge out all the footnotes. Make it hard for someone to "borrow" your work and you might scare them off.
Expert trying to blame me for an accident First off, this is happening in France (although any advice is welcome). Last December, as I was driving home on my motorbike, a car suddenly changed lanes and cut me off. Despite trying my best to avoid the collision, the accident occurred leading to the bike being severely damaged and me having a few bruises. Fast forward 2-3 weeks during the Christmas holiday, I get a call from the expert sent by the insurance company. This guy is supposed to determine whether the bike can be fixed or not. Long story short, he tells me the damage on the bike leads him to say I was performing a wheelie when the accident happened and that I am thus responsible for it. At this point, it might be worth saying that the road the accident happened on is very crowded and that a wheelie is not even practicable (if we set aside the fact that I can't even perform one). Also, the expert was evidently not present during the accident and only speculates on the circumstances. Of course, I explained that his expertise is erroneous but he kept saying that I am the one responsible for the accident. I have a couple witnesses in addition to the other driver saying orally she was at fault. Now I have discussed a lot with fellow bikers and it is pretty obvious the expert either is incompetent or simply lies to put the blame on me. My question is: can I actually sue the expert for his wrong (and very questionable) expertise? Don't get me wrong. I'm not into legal proceedings but I gave the expert many opportunities to revisit his (obviously wrong) assessment. His statement to the insurance company has been directly damaging (I have expenses that won't be covered by the insurance because of his nonsense) and I don't want such an incompetent (dishonest?) person being allowed to harm others. This is not a question to know if I am accountable for the accident.	No, you cannot sue the expert for his errors. You can sue the insurance company for failing to pay out per the insurance contract. They will then introduce the expert's report as evidence, and you will contradict it with the following evidence: your two witnesses your testimony that the other driver admitted responsibility (this is normally an exception to hearsay rules - but beware, courts are unwilling to treat saying "I'm sorry" as admitting responsibility). your testimony that the conditions made wheelies impossible your testimony that you cannot perform wheelies anyway.	Barring any specific statute the relevant law is the tort of negligence. To succeed Alice must prove Bob: had a duty to Alice, breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of the harm to Alice, and Alice was, in fact, harmed or damaged. She will probably succeed on 1, 3 and 4 where she will struggle is with 2. It seems that Bob did everything a reasonable person could do to avoid the accident. The only possible hope is that not knowing that bridges freeze first might be something a qualified NZ driver should know and that he breached his duty by not knowing if that is something the judge considers reasonable. The traffic warning is irrelevant and untested (and untestable) hearsay and should be excluded from evidence.	Under Canadian law, causing the death of human being is homicide. If the homicide is "culpable", it is an offense (crime). In the described scenario, it might be culpable homicide if the death was due to "criminal negligence". That would be the case if in doing a thing, the person "shows wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons". We've now reached the end of what statutory law has to say about the question. Court cases take us a bit further in understanding criminal negligence. The wisdom of the courts is distilled to ts essence in jury instructions, which say The Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's conduct showed a marked departure from the conduct of a reasonable person in the circumstances; and that a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have foreseen that this conduct posed a risk of bodily harm. R. v. Tutton is an example: the court finds that The phrase "wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons" signifies more than gross negligence in the objective sense. It requires some degree of awareness or advertence to the threat to the lives or safety of others or alternatively a wilful blindness to that threat which is culpable in light of the gravity of the risk assumed. Ultimately, though, the fact-finder must evaluate the behavior against a highly subjective standard as to "what a reasonable man would do". I cannot imagine a scenario where shoving a person realistically could lead to them falling into traffic and getting killed but there the shoving was ordinary horseplay. Pushing a person in the direction of oncoming traffic is abnormal behavior that shows shocking disregard for the probable harm caused to another. But perhaps there is some innocent scenario where this was really just a tragic outcome. So the answer is, it could be culpable homicide, or not, depending on the facts. To be classed as murder (rather than manslaughter) the person has to intend to cause death (§229), which is missing from this scenario.	You have been told that the other person's insurance may not be valid. Why it may not doesn't really matter, perhaps the other person didn't pay premiums or lied on an application. So the situation is much the same as if the other person is uninsured or under insured. Your p[olicy must cover things. And your policy has a deductible. So you have to pay the deductable amount. That is what a deductible is, the amount that you must pay before your policy coverage kicks in. The lower it is, the higher your premium is. You don't have any choice about that. Depending on your jurisdiction, you may be able to sue the other person involved in the accident, and get that person to pay. Your insurance company might do this for you, but if they won't you would have to hire a lawyer yourself to do that. Such a lawyer could get all the details of your case, and advise you of your options.	40km/h There is no ambiguity. The speed limit on the through road is clear and the speed limit on the side road is irrelevant. The fact that Bob may be legitimately unaware that this is the speed limit doesn’t matter either. If you want to ask if Bob has a defence if issued with an infringement notice, please feel free to post a new question.	2201.4 Upon a roadway so designated for one-way traffic, a vehicle shall be driven only in the direction designated at all or such times as shall be indicated by official traffic control devices. I'm failing to see the "... except when pulling over for the police" subclause. Equally there is no "... unless you think you should" subclause. If you choose to have a hearing the evidence will show unambiguously that you drove the wrong way in a one way street and you will testify as to your reasons for doing so. For you to avoid the violation you would need to convince the examiner that a) you are telling the truth and b) that your mindset is in any way relevant. Unless the officer clearly directed you to pull into that spot, the decision to do so appears to be yours. I'd pay the fine if it was me.	I have already contacted a lawyer and paid all the money I had and they didn't help me resolve anything, the guy just talked to me for a little bit. He essentially just took my $600 and no action was made. He said the best thing to do would be to wait it out because the contracts were never fulfilled by them and they can't claim my inventions etc if I am an independent contractor. To me it just sounded like a bunch of BS and not a real solution to this. You paid $600 for expert advice which told you to do nothing. You think the advice is bullshit and intend to go full steam ahead against the advice given. I'd say it is very likely that the lawyer is a better expert than you, so you should follow his advice. You are in a hole, you were told to stop digging, and you intend to continue digging. Don't. There are times where doing nothing is the best advice. In this case, you intend to accuse someone of breach of contract. That has a good chance of landing you in court. A company cannot afford to ignore such a statement. You claim the contract is void and you want to cancel it - but you can't cancel a void contract. It's void. Listen to your lawyer.	The State of California is not responsible for injuries committed by private citizens Sorry to hear about your friend. Jamal may have a case (although the scope is narrow and timeframes are strict and tight) if someone employed by the state didn't do what they should have done. There is a whole raft of rules and regulations surrounding child welfare and Jamal would need to demonstrate exactly what they did that they shouldn't have done or what they should have done that they didn't do to have any basis for a claim. You will note that there is an obligation to make assessments -if they didn't make an assessment, they might be liable; if they made the wrong assessment, they aren't. Contested child welfare cases are difficult - caseworkers and social worlkers are presented with a lot of contradictory information and outright lies and the law accepts that if they make a good faith attempt to do their job, they haven't done anything wrong even if they make the wrong call. As for the court "assuming" anything, that is simply not true. The court would have heard the evidence (contested and contradictory no doubt) and made a judgement based on that evidence. It may have been the objectively wrong judgement but it was a perfectly legal one. In any event, you can't sue the court for a wrong judgement, you can only appeal it to a higher court subject to the time limits and your ability to pay. As a practical matter, child protection services are generally chronically underfunded, understaffed and overworked as are the courts that deal with such cases. A typical caseworker might have to deal with 50-100 cases similar to your friend every week - that gives them 5-15 minutes to (partially) read the file and try to decide what's best for the child. Sad to say, your friend is one of the lucky ones - came out the other end with a good relationship with one of his parents, isn't dead, isn't a drug addict and isn't homeless. And no, you can't sue the state for things being the way they are: that's what the voters want because if it isn't they'd elect politicians who would change it.
Can a party argue they did not know a contract was changed before signing it? This is a follow up to the question Can I cross out parts of a contract before signing it? If a contract is given to someone and they modify it before signing, and the other party doesn't notice the modification until much latter (after both parties had full-filled/been full-filling their contractual obligations) would the part that had been modified be enforceable? For example, if a manager emailed an prospective employee a contract containing the pay rate of $20/hr, if the prospective employee crossed out $20/hr and replaced it with $25/hr, then went to work and gave the manager the contract which he failed to carefully read, continued working for a few months, would the employee be entitled to $20/hr? Since some contracts don't required a signature, what would count as the manager accepting the offer? I guess if it could some how be proven that the manager new the employee expected $25/hr and allowed him to continue work?	if a manager emailed an prospective employee a contract containing the pay rate of $20/hr, if the prospective employee crossed out $20/hr and replaced it with $25/hr, then went to work and gave the manager the contract which he failed to carefully read, continued working for a few months, would the employee be entitled to $20/hr? A party ought to timely alert or notify the other counterparty about any disagreements or proposed changes. This is especially recommendable when evidence suggests that the counterparty's expectation that the party only would sign the contract was reasonable. In the example you outline, the employee's unilateral alteration of the compensation/rate in the contract seems unlikely to favor the employee's position. That is because typically employer and employee negotiate compensation prior to formalizing their agreement. In that case, the employee would need stronger evidence with which to overcome the employer's credible argument that he did not knowingly accept the altered rate.	Does it matter whether employer is company or individual? No. Must certain amount of notice be given? Yes - the notice period maybe specified in the contract but even if it isn't there are statutory notice periods that apply depending on length of employment etc. So if the following criteria are met they are legally classed as an employee they have worked for the employer for at least a month Then certain minimums apply: If they have worked for the employer for: 1 month to 2 years – statutory notice is 1 week 2 to 12 years – statutory notice is 1 week for each full year they have worked 12 years or more – statutory notice is 12 weeks A notice period in the contract (i.e. "contractual notice") can exceed the statutory minimums but it can't reduce them. What other requirements are there that must be followed? This is pretty broad and I don't really want to reproduce everything here but the ACAS page on dismissals covers the basics. Can notice be dispensed if the task is of an urgent nature and employee must be replaced as a matter of urgency? Dismissal without notice is possible in cases of Gross Misconduct but that is about what the employee has done - nothing to do with the urgency of replacing them. However, if both parties agree a notice period can end early: The employee can ask if they can leave before their notice period ends. They should get agreement from their employer in writing. If the employee does not get agreement to leave early they could be in breach of contract. If the employee leaves early, the employer only has to pay them for the time that they’ve worked. If an employer wants them gone immediately they can do that if it's either in the contract but they still have to pay them for the notice period. They can also offer payment in lieu of notice if it's not in the contract but it's then up to the employee if they agree.	I had a contract with a company, but that company changed its name. Is my contract still enforceable? Yes, because what matters is the entity itself. A contract is not stricken merely because one or more parties changed names or labels.	Preface and Caveats The question doesn't specify where this happened. I am providing an outline of the way that most U.S. states would handle this situation, if the fats are as they are much more likely to be and not as claimed in the question probably due to a misunderstanding of the underlying transaction. I identify areas where state laws most often vary and don't describe those areas of the law in detail since that is impossible without knowing where this happens. This is a matter of state law and varies from state to state, although most U.S. states are quite similar until you get to the fine details. Atypical language in the contract between the contractor and the client could also lead to a different conclusion. I don't know how this would be resolved in a non-U.S. jurisdiction. Background: The Structure Of A Typical Construction Loan Financed Construction Project In business and contractual disputes you can only understand the answer if you understand the underlying business transaction, which the question itself doesn't spell out very fully. The fact pattern identified in the question is so unusual that I strongly suspect that there is a misunderstanding of the facts, or an inadvertent misstatement in the language used in the question due to sloppy writing that flows from not appreciating the importance of some key facts. The transaction was almost surely structures more or less as follows (for background, I'm presenting a more general very of this kind of transaction rather than the simple one with no subcontractors or material suppliers involved, because this context helps someone understand why the laws are written the way that they are written.) Usually, the client owns real property, takes out a construction loan from a bank secured by the real estate, and hires a general contractor. The client will usually make some down payment to the general contractor who will take care of paying the subcontractors and material suppliers, and will pay the balance of the amount due to the general contractor through proceeds of the construction loan disbursed by the bank which are drawn as the work is done and payment is earned. Typically, each drawn cycle, which is often monthly for a smaller project and weekly, biweekly or semimonthly in a larger project, materials suppliers and subcontractors submit invoices and lien waivers to the general contractor based upon the work done. If the work is complete, a complete lien waiver is submitted, if he work in only partially finished, a partial lien waiver is submitted. The general contractor substantively reviews the invoices based upon a physical review of the construction site and a review of the subcontract. If there are problems it is rejected and must be resubmitted by the material supplier or subcontractor. If it is approved, the general contractor attaches that invoice as a supporting document to a draw request for the draw cycle summarizing all validly submitted invoices from material suppliers, subcontractors and itself, and also attaching a partial lien waiver from the general contractor. Then, the general contractor submits that draw request to a bank officer handling the construction loan as an agent of the property owner-client, and also a client representative for approval. The bank officer and client representative make a much less probing review of the draw request, looking only for obvious irregularities or suspicious amounts, and if everything is in order, they approve the request. Then, the bank write a check in the draw amount approved to the general contractor. The general contractor then disburses the invoiced amounts to the materials materials suppliers and subcontractors and pays itself the amounts that it has earned. Sometimes, however, the general contractor gets a valid invoice from a material supplier or subcontractor, and receives funds from the client in the form of a downpayment or a loan draw, but doesn't pay the subcontractor or material supplier with those funds. Also, sometimes, the general contractor does work that it is entitled to be paid for or incurs an obligation to a material supplier or subcontractor, but the client doesn't pay or the bank doesn't disburse the funds requested even though the request is valid. When a general contractor, material supplier or subcontractor doesn't get paid for work that is actually done at a particular piece of real estate, the law gives the firm that wasn't paid for its work on that particular piece of real estate what is called a mechanic's lien encumbering that piece of real estate. The details of how a firm with a mechanic's lien gives notice to the world of its rights, the priorities of lien's vis-a-vis each other, and the way that mechanic's liens are enforced varies significantly from state to state. But typically the notice must be given very promptly and not long after notice of non-payment is given, a lawsuit to foreclose on the real estate encumbered by the lien is commenced. An unpaid material supplier or subcontractor, in addition to its lien rights, can also sue the general contractor for breach of contract, and sometimes also for misappropriation of disbursements from the client or the bank. An unpaid general contractor, in addition to its lien rights, can also sue the owner of the property for breach of contract. The Facts In The Question and Analysis The first paragraph of the question tells us what went wrong. The client paid an employee of the general contractor (probably a project manager) instead of the firm the employee worked for (basically embezzling the money by deceiving the client into thinking that the employee was authorized to receive a payment to the employee's firm on its behalf when that wasn't the case), and the firm of the employee who was paid now wants to get paid. This happens and lawsuits usually follows when it does. But exactly what happens next depends upon the facts in the next to paragraphs. The next two paragraphs of the question, however, are probably confused and incorrect. The next two paragraphs say: Two weeks later, the client received a letter from the contractor's lender asking the client for money owed to the contractor, saying that if it was not paid, the client could be double charged. Does the client owe the contractor's lender? What probably actually happened is that the finance office of the contractor submitted a draw request to the bank officer in charge of the client's construction loan with the bank, and also gave a notice of the draw request to the client. The client tells the bank officer not to approve the draw request because the client has already paid the draw request directly to the employee of the contractor (probably the project manager) without the knowledge of the firm the employee worked for. What Happens Next If The Facts Are As I Believe Them To Be? When this happens, the finance officer at the contractor firm talks to the client figures out what happens and then talks to the employee to whom the payment was made. If the employee promptly turns over the funds the the contractor firm, the finance officers at the contractor firm scolds the employee for screwing up the system and the client for making a payment to the wrong person and there is no harm, no foul, and the matter is over. But if the employee who took the client's money doesn't turn over the money which the client can prove to the contractor firm that he paid to the employee, several things are likely to happen. Non-Lawsuit Actions: The client will direct the bank not to pay the draw request. The employee who took the money from the client is fired (no big deal, he was probably long gone). The contractor firm and/or the client will often, but not always, report to the police that the employee embezzled the funds from the client, and if the police find it credible, will issue an arrest warrant. The main reason not to do so is that the facts are uncertain enough that the police and prosecutor don't want to touch it (e.g. the client paid the employee in cash and didn't get a receipt, or the employee when asked says that the payment was made but was a "tip" or was payment for something unrelated), or the client and/or the contractor firm don't want to harm their reputations by making public the fact that there was a theft on this job. Three lawsuits could be brought, although, in practice, these might be consolidated as claims against different parties and cross-claims between defendants, in a lawsuit brought by the contractor, or in some other configuration. The contractor firm sues the employee who took the money for converting money from a client intended for it (probably both as a tort and as a breach of fiduciary duty by an agent of the construction firm). The contractor firm sues the client for breach of contract. The question is about the liability of the client in this second lawsuit. The client might also bring a counterclaim against the contractor for negligent supervision of its employee if the employee did indeed abscond with the money and the facts support that counterclaim. If the client prevailed on that counterclaim, the judgment on the counterclaim for negligent supervision (e.g. if the contractor knew that the employee had a history of doing things like this and didn't warn the client) would be setoff against the breach of contract judgment, rather than being a defense to the breach of contract claim. The client sues the employee for fraud, conversion or theft. What Are The Rights Of The Parties In These Lawsuits? In the second lawsuit, the client has breached the contract. The contract said to pay the firm, the client paid someone else, and so the obligation under the contract was not satisfied. The disputes in the lawsuit between the contracting firm and the client will be over whether the employee had apparent authority to accept the funds as an agent of he contracting firm, over whether the payment that the client says was made to the employee was made at all, and over the purpose of the payment if a payment was made to the employee but the employee claims that it was a "tip" or a payment for something else (e.g. the employee also had a catering side hustle and the employee says it was for catering services). The issue of whether the client made the payment at all may be hard to prove if the payment was made in cash and the employee didn't provide a receipt and will come down to the credibility of the client and employee's testimony at trial. if the payment was made with a check or credit card, bank records will make it an open and shut case on that issue that will probably not be disputed at trial. If the facts reveal that the employee had apparent authority to accept the funds from the client for the contractor firm and that the payment was for work on the project and not something else, then the the payment made by the client to the employee satisfies the client's duty under the contract even if the employee wasn't actually authorized to receive the funds for the contractor firm. So, the client wins and the contractor firm's sole remedy is to sue its employee for misappropriating the client's funds. On the the other hand, if the employee did not have apparent authority to accept the funds from the client, or the payment was for something other than work on the project, or the client fails to prove that the payment was ever made, then the client owes the money to the contracting firm and must pay the contracting firm for the amount due (plus interest, litigation costs and possibly attorneys' fees depending on the terms of the contract). The client may pay that obligation out of separate funds of the client's own, or may authorize a the bank officer to make a draw on the construction loan to pay the amount owed. The construction loan bank of the client wouldn't sue the client or demand payment from the client for the amount that should have been paid to the contractor firm but was instead paid to the employee. It didn't pay money to someone it shouldn't have paid it to unless the client authorized the bank to do so. And, the bank won't pay the contractor without the client/borrower's say so. If the client authorized a draw payment from the construction loan to the employee rather than the contractor firm, the client still owes the bank for what it paid to the employee at the direction of the client (in addition to all other draws on the project), although the client may have a suit against the bank officer for negligence in administering the loan by failing to flag that the payee was wrong (which might lose but isn't a sure loss). The amount owed to the contractor firm proceeds under the analysis set forth above. What If The Facts Are Right? If, improbably, the facts as stating in the question are actually what happened, the client will owe or not owe the contractor money under the same analysis as above. But the client will not have liability to any company that the contractor got a loan from (which would not encumber the client's real estate), since the client has no contractual relationship with the contractor's lender. Post-Script On Double Payment Prevention Laws The question hinges on the unfairness of the client having to possibly pay twice for the same construction work. In some situations, where the general contractor firm is at fault for causing the double payment to happen, the law protects the client from double payment, even though those laws don't apply here. I explain why these laws don't apply below. Basically, the client has to eat the double payment when the double payment occurs because the client screwed up though no fault of the general contractor and the general contractor doesn't benefit from the double payment. Some states have laws designed to prevent property owners, often only residential property owners having work performed on their own residences, from having to double pay for work done in some circumstances. But these laws usually only apply when the client pays the general contractor firm as the client is supposed to, satisfying his contractual obligation, and the general contractor doesn't pay the subcontractor, causing the subcontractor to sue the general contractor for breach of contract and the owner to enforce the subcontractor's mechanic's lien. In those situations, the double payment prevention law eliminates the subcontractor's mechanic's lien rights when the client pays the general contractor in full, and the subcontractor is left only with a lawsuit against the general contractor who didn't pass on the client's or the client's bank's payment to the general contractor for the subcontractor's share of work to the subcontractor. In this case, the double payment laws usually wouldn't apply because the legal issue here is whether the client paid the contractor, or was deceived by the employee into paying someone other than the contractor in an act of conversion/embezzlement/fraud.	What if somebody copies your signature on a contract that says you can't sue them? what can the judge do to stop this paradox? I will assume that by "copying the signature" you mean "without the person's consent". In that case, the contract is void and consequently unenforceable. However, it would need to be proved that the person whose signature was unlawfully used did not intend to be a party to that contract. For a contract to be valid, the parties must have knowingly and willfully entered it, whether it is via a document or through their subsequent conduct/actions. False pretenses, identity theft, and akin offenses preclude these two essential requirements of any contract. Moreover, if the person who forged the signature is a party to the contract, then that unlawful act clearly contradicts the prerequisite "covenant of good faith and fair dealing" that is presumed in contracts. The remedies or actionability available to a person whose signature has been forged depend on the laws of each jurisdiction.	You are probably an employee Answer these questions: Can you say “no” when the University offers you work? Or vice-versa, can they say “no” when you want to work? Can you subcontract the work? That is, can you hire someone to do what the University hired you to do? Do you control how and when you work? For example, when you break University rules are you subject to University discipline or is this treated as a breach of contract? Do you provide your own tools and equipment? Can you make a profit or loss (if you get paid by the hour the answer is “no”)? Do you take out your own public liability and/or professional indemnity insurance? If the answers to most of these questions are “no”, you’re an employee.	should you tell the third party to sign it using the standards of the U.S.? In most cases signing a contract is not subject to country-specific standards. All that matters is that it can be ascertained from the contract who the parties are as well as and their willful, informed formation of that contract. It is more typical for a contract to specify that it is governed by the laws of country X and/or jurisdiction Y. That places on the counterparty(-ies) the burden of ensuring that they know the legal framework that underlies the contract at issue. Lastly, note that a party entering a contract is "by definition" not a third party. At most, a third party might sign a contract in a witness capacity, not than in the capacity that implicates rights and duties pursuant to that contract.	It depends How good is your (legal) English? For example, do you know the legal difference between "will", "shall" and "must"? Or, the difference between "employee", "subcontractor" and "worker"? Or the difference between "bankruptcy", "insolvency" and an "act of bankruptcy"? Contingency What are you going to put in your dispute resolution clause? Do you prefer mediation, arbitration or litigation? Will it be a one size fits all or will it be escalating? What happens if one of you dies? Or emigrates? Or divorces? Or is convicted of a crime? A financial crime? A violent crime? A sexual crime? Or what if such is just alleged but not proven? What happens if the company ceases to exist? Or is sued? Or is acquired by someone else? Or by one of you? Who is responsible for insuring the subject matter of the contract (if anyone)? To what value? If the person who should doesn't can the other person effect the insurance and claim the premium as a debt due and payable? Not all of these will be relevant to your contract. Familiarity How familiar are you with this sort of contract? Is this something you do all the time or is this a one off? For example, I am happy to enter a construction contract without legal advice because that's my business and has been for many years - I know my risks and how to manage them, inside and outside the contract. However, when I set up shareholder's agreements, wills and business continuation insurance with my partners, we went to a lawyer. What is your relationship with the other person i.e. how much do you know and trust them? Stakes If the contract is not very important (which is something that varies with the participants, for some people a million dollar contract is not important for others a $5 one is), so that if, by screwing up, you are OK if you lose everything you've staked then write it yourself. Alternatively, if the contract is vitally important to you and your heirs and assignees unto the 6th generation, I'd get a lawyer to write it - its pretty cheap insurance. How long the contract lasts will be a factor in this - a contract that exposes you to risk for 3 months is different than one that does so for 25 years. Basically, its a risk reward calculation. TL;DR Contracts only matter when relationships break down. If you reach for the contract then you can expect that the other party will be playing for keeps and that contract is your only defense against the worst they can do. If you are happy with your skills in mitigating against a cashed-up opponent who wants to see you go down no matter the cost then draft it yourself.
How long can one be detained without a court hearing? A journalist was detained in the US on January 13. According to CBS, Ricardo J. Bascuas, a professor at the University of Miami School of Law says she should have been granted a court appearance by now. How long can one be detained without a court hearing?	The linked news story says that the journalist was detailed as a material witness. according to 18 USC § 3144 If it appears from an affidavit filed by a party that the testimony of a person is material in a criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena, a judicial officer may order the arrest of the person ... Release of a material witness may be delayed for a reasonable period of time until the deposition of the witness can be taken pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. No specific time seems to be specified for which detention is allowed. What a court would consider "reasonable" would no doubt depend on the specific circumstances.	Can someone be arrested for not being ‘nice’ to police? Yes. The arrest may later be declared unlawful, and the cop could later be disciplined by his boss, but if a cop wants to arrest you now for any reason they just can. Seems weird and an abuse of power to me. The available means of dealing with abuse of power have never been in excess. Could they win such a case? Yes. So could your friend. It depends on many many factors.	The constitutional provision quoted in the question has been interpreted to require that a jury trial be available to a person accused of crime by the US Federal Government. Then accused is free to waive this right, and be tried by a judge only if s/he so chooses. The accuse is also free to waive the right to a trial altogether, and plead guilty (or "no contest" which waives a trail without an admission of guilt). The provision could reasonably be interpreted to require that if there is a trial, it be by jury. But I don't see how it could reasonably be read to require trials in all cases, and forbid guilty pleas.	The general concept is reporter's privilege, which is a protection against being compelled to testify about confidential information. There is no clear national statute or ruling in the US, but most states have enacted shield laws. Since these are state laws, they vary considerably. It had been thought that the First Amendment protected reporters from having to reveal sources, but in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, it was held that The First Amendment does not relieve a newspaper reporter of the obligation that all citizens have to respond to a grand jury subpoena and answer questions relevant to a criminal investigation That 1972 decision is the sum of what SCOTUS has to say about the topic. States then enacted various protections for reporters against compelled testimony. There are specific law requiring certain individuals to report suspected crimes, whereby doctors and teachers have to report certain suspicions or facts when they encounter them in the course of their work. As a subcase of mandatory reporting, in 18 states, everyone is required to report child abuse (but not in California). There are no mandatory reporting requirements for reporters apart from the limited universal requirement pertaining to child abuse. There are widespread laws against aiding and abetting, so if a reporter drove the getaway car, they would be in trouble – almost certainly not applicable to typical cases of investigative journalism. Some states have a law about failure to report a felony, so in Texas, it is a Class A misdemeanor to fail to report. However, the duty is somewhat narrowly limited to one who observes the commission of a felony under circumstances in which a reasonable person would believe that an offense had been committed in which serious bodily injury or death may have resulted Witnessing murder would be covered by this. Ohio has a stronger law, which creates a duty to report any felony. From what I can tell, California does not have such a law. [ADDENDUM] The Reporter's Committee for Freedom of the Press makes available a by-state compendium of legal sources, with case law for all sorts of situations.	Legally, they cannot just nab you. The usual (?) option is that authorities in the US request extradition pursuant to the US-Mexico extradition treaty via the Department of Justice, and if the paperwork is in order, this can result in a Provisional Arrest Warrant (and arrest) in Mexico, which will be carried out by the Mexican federal police. This is true whether or not you go to the US consulate. After a hearing in the Mexican courts you might be extradited (or not, but DoJ presumably doesn't proceed with cases that they will lose). Extradition is not possible for every offense, so you would have to look at the offenses listed in the treaty, and whatever the Arizona warrant is about. You can't be extradited for parking tickets, you can be extradited for murder: whatever it is, it has to be a crime in both places, and has to be subject to a minimum one year imprisonment. Also, if you are a Mexican citizen as well, you cannot be extradited unless the Mexican authorities agree to (whereas there is no choice if you are only a US citizen). An alternative is deportation, which would overcome limitations related to extradition, but it's not clear what the requirements for deportation from Mexico are (typically illegal presence, unclear whether Mexican authorities can or would try an end-run around official extradition procedure). Although consulates enjoy a degree of immunity from local law, a consulate in Mexico is still Mexican territory, subject to Mexican law. If you are in the consulate, Mexican authorities cannot enter without permission to arrest you. They also cannot arrest you without a warrant (see Art. 16 of the Mexican constitution). Consular staff also cannot arrest you (if you are not caught flagrante delicto). Nor are they authorized to execute a US warrant in Mexico (thus they have to go through the process of judicial review to send you back to the US, and why a Mexican warrant is required). See this Q&A, relevant to the status of embassies: what is relevant to us is that both the US and Mexico operate under the rule of law, so the issues surrounding Syrian refugees in the Syrian embassy do not arise here.	Legally you face no problem. The section 66A of the Indian IT Act, which used to be previously misused for penalizing anyone who dared insult a politician, has been struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of India. But the police could still detain you for 48 hours (legally) without giving any grounds; they are required to do that, but the police are seldom held accountable. The supporters of the said politician can vandalize your home and office without fear of legal action. I am not a lawyer. Whatever is posted above is my opinion and data that I believe to be true to the best of my knowledge and resources available to me. Please contact a lawyer for professional advice.	Extradition is a special procedure that is tightly governed by statute - currently the Extradition Act 2003. That Act provides that, for extradition from England (as opposed to Scotland, etc.) to the United States (an example of a Category 2 Territory), an initial hearing is to take place before "the appropriate judge". This is, per s.139(1)(a), a designated "District Judge (Magistrates' Courts)". A DJMC sits in a magistrates' court, and is a professional judge as opposed to a layperson like an ordinary Justice of the Peace. The hearing is meant to resemble summary proceedings in the magistrates' court, but it has its own special rules. Those include a special appeals procedure which is different from the ordinary way that criminal cases can be appealed. Some things that could normally happen in a magistrates' court cannot happen here, such as varying an order at a later date (see R (Mann) v Westminster Magistrates Court [2010] EWHC 48 (Admin)). The way that this is phrased means that the jurisdiction is not conferred on the magistrates' court (which happens to have a DJ sitting in it), but on the DJMC themselves. The Criminal Procedure Rules 2014, Rule 17.2(a) are careful to say that when they say "magistrates' court" in this context, they are talking about the court that the judge has convened for the purposes of the Extradition Act. These rules are only applicable because the Act specifically provides for them in its s.210; they don't come in automatically as they would for criminal proceedings in a magistrates' court, because this is a special process with its own law, as expounded in the Explanatory Notes to the rules. In the Assange case, the DJMC was Vanessa Baraitser, including at Woolwich and the Old Bailey. The proceedings were under the Extradition Act as explained above. The court chose to sit in various buildings, other than Westminster Magistrates Court, for practical reasons due to the high level of public interest in the case, and related security considerations. The hearing was booked to last four weeks, which is very unusually long. Proceedings were live-streamed to other court buildings to allow members of the public and media to follow along. All of that does not mean that the proceedings were in a Crown Court or County Court. They were in buildings used by those courts, but took place before the designated DJMC according to the special procedure of the Extradition Act. That procedure, among other things, means that the extradition hearing cannot take place as a hearing of some other court, and there is no jury no matter how much the defendant wants one.	I'm no expert, but I had assumed this clause was present in case of the following situation. Joe is arrested for a robbery of a London bank. Joe says nothing under questioning. At trial, Joe's defense is that at the time of the robbery, he was in Sheffield drinking beer with his brother. On the basis of common sense, a jury could think: "Surely if Joe were really innocent, he would have told the police of his alibi at the time he was questioned, and saved himself a lot of trouble. Since he didn't do that, maybe a more likely explanation is that he wasn't actually in Sheffield, but that sometime between arrest and trial, he came up with the idea of faking an alibi in Sheffield, and convinced people to testify falsely to that effect. Yes, that does seem more plausible. So we are not going to give much credence to Joe's supposed alibi." So it really would be the case that not mentioning the alibi during questioning would harm Joe's defense at trial. The warning, then, is intended to keep Joe from doing this inadvertently. If Joe's alibi is genuine, but out of a misguided desire to exercise his right to remain silent, he doesn't mention it during questioning, he may accidentally increase his chances of being wrongly convicted. Everybody has an interest in avoiding this.
What does "lived together as man and wife" mean? In a divorce complaint, there is a line that says "they separated and have not lived together as man and wife since that date." What does that mean? Not actually living together? Living together but neither people consider themselves man and wife? They're not having sex?	"Living together as man and wife" means actually living together under the same roof and being in personal relationship. Therefore, to prove "not living together as man and wife" it is sufficient to prove that the pair either or both 1) are not living together; 2) are not in personal relationship. What evidences "being in personal relationship"? Shared budget, joint ownership of bank accounts/property, mail addressed to the two names, travelling together, being seen going out together etc. Having regular sex together is also a good indicator, though it may be difficult to prove either way. So, if none of this happens, it is a good indicator that the separated are not living together as man and wife.	I'm not sure if the information is accurate, but according to the above text, when a wife cheats, it is marriage not biology that decides the paternity of the child. I got some questions: If my wife cheats on me, I would still be the legal parent of the child. If I don't want this paternity, is there a legal process to disavow it? In most states, yes (I can't think of any exceptions, but there are 50 states and more self-governing territories and this is a matter of state law). Typically there is a statute of limitations of one to five years from the date of birth for a husband or person listed as a father on a birth certificate to bring a legal action to disavow paternity. See, e.g., California Family Code §§ 7540-7541 (setting a two year statute of limitations from a child's birth for a person with standing to dispute that a cuckolded husband is the legal father with genetic evidence). Note also that the process and statute of limitations are usually not the same, if, for example, a child wishes to prove that the child's biological father is someone other than the legally presumed father of that child. If I fall in love with a married woman and we give birth to a child, I am the biological but not legal parent of the child. Is there a legal process for me to claim paternity of the child from the woman's husband? Sometimes yes, and sometimes no. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), held that a state is not constitutionally required to make such a process available, but some states do anyway. The details of how this plays out under New York State law are described in this Law.SE question and answer. An analysis of the relevant portions of Minnesota law can be found here. For example, in California, Family Code Section 7541 limits standing to dispute paternity to spouses, people "presumed to be a parent" under Family Code Section 7611, or representatives of children seeking to establish or disestablish the paternity of someone "presumed to be a parent" under Family Code Section 7611. So, the only people eligible to be found to be parents are (excluding spent provisions of only historical interest): A husband who was married to the mother at the time of the birth or within 300 days before the birth. § 7611(a). A putative husband who would have been a spouse under § 7611(a), who marriage is annulled (e.g. because a marriage license expired or a husband was too closely related to the mother or either spouse is already married). § 7611(b). A putative husband who cohabited with the mother within 300 days before the birth whose attempt to married was too obviously defective to require an annulment (e.g. two fifteen year olds who have a church wedding without a marriage license). § 7611(b). A husband of the mother who marries the mother after the birth and is also named as a father on the birth certificate, in a voluntary written promise, or in a court order. § 7611(c). A putative husband who attempt to marry the mother after the birth and is named as a father on the birth certificate, in a voluntary written promise, or in a court order. § 7611(c). A person "who receives the child into his or her home and openly holds out the child as his or her natural child." § 7611(d). A parent who dies while the "child is in utero" if this is established in a probate court proceeding. § 7511(f). Thus, in California, a father of the child of a woman married to someone else, who is still alive, (or someone of behalf of the child seeking to establish that he is the father) can only dispute the paternity of the husband of the child's mother (if the husband himself or the mother does not challenge the husband's paternity) if he "receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his or her natural child." Simply claiming paternity without "receiving the child into his home" isn't sufficient to overcome the presumption that the mother's husband is the father in California unless the mother of the child or her husband disputes this presumption. The document says "The reverse is not true". Why the decision about paternity is different between a wife cheats on a husband and a husband cheats on a wife? Because maternity (absent a surrogacy arrangement) is almost never in doubt, while paternity is often in doubt. Furthermore, it wasn't possible when these doctrines were formulated (centuries ago) to determine paternity reliably in all cases anyway, at least at an affordable price. Cheap and reliable paternity tests, that can be used in pretty much any circumstances{1}, have only been possible for less than forty years, which is why a case like Michael H. v. Gerald D. didn't come up until then. {1} There have been particular cases, for example, when mother and father are both white and a child is at least partially black, where it has always been possible to do so (although even that scenario isn't 100% accurate, as illustrated by a famous historical case in which both parents had a modest amount of African ancestry that wasn't visible phenotypically). Similarly, there was the scenario of @MartinBonner where husband "was away at sea/war at the time conception would have had to occurred". Later on, blood types could disprove paternity in some cases, but not prove it with any certainty. There is a quasi-magical process described in the Old Testament for resolving such disputes involving the wife drinking a semi-poisonous liquid. In the Roman Empire, those cases were resolved by the husband who had a right to commit infanticide if he wished. In modern times, something close to the existing legal process has usually been available, complicated in certain eras by criminalized adultery, "heart balm" civil actions, and fault based divorce.	Is it acceptable for person A (representing themselves) to refer to person B as "their neighbor" instead of by their name, or would that cause the suit to be dismissed? Omitting the neighbor's name in the pleadings & proceedings cannot singlehandedly cause the dismissal of a defamation suit. The matter would result in dismissal only if the plaintiff repeatedly disobeys court order(s) (if any) to disclose that information. Before the proceedings get to that point, the plaintiff will have had one or more hearings to dispute the defendant's alleged need for identifying a non-party by name. When opposing to that disclosure, the plaintiff's goal is to establish that the false narrative about robbing a neighbor at gunpoint is defamatory regardless of neighbor's name. Keep in mind that the focus in a claim of defamation is the defamed person, whereas the relevance of details such as who the non-parties are pertains to context and evidence. Lastly, the fact that a party to the suit is a pro se litigant is irrelevant from both substantial and procedural standpoints.	No The argument is vacuous in any event because AFAIK all jurisdictions that enforce sex discrimination laws have parental leave (paid or unpaid), not maternity leave so a man is just as likely to need it as a woman. This, of course, raises the issue of discrimination by marital status (on the basis that unmarried people are arguably less likely to have children) or age (on the basis that people outside 'childbearing' age are less likely to have children; fortunately these types of discrimination are also illegal. Notwithstanding, the loopholess you think there are in the laws are simply not there. For example s14 "Discrimination in employment or in superannuation" of australia Sex Discrimination Act 1984 starts with: (1) It is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against a person on the ground of the person's sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, intersex status, marital or relationship status, pregnancy or potential pregnancy, breastfeeding or family responsibilities: Later in s30 "Certain discrimination on ground of sex not unlawful" it says: (2) (a) the duties of the position can be performed only by a person having particular physical attributes (other than attributes of strength or stamina) that are not possessed by persons of a different sex from the relevant sex; If the job requires excessive strength or stamina, then you test your recruits for the level of strength or stamina the job requires.	If the parents left the brother, let's call him Bob, full or partial ownership of the house in a will, or a long-term right of tenancy, then he has a right to live there. If they left no will, their property will be handled according to the local law on intestacy. The details vary from one Australian state to another, but if neither has a living spouse, their children will probably split the estate. This will probably include a share of the house, and so Bob will have a right to live there, unless a different division is made. Or the house could be sold and the proceeds split. Bob would not have a right to live there merely because he had been living there for some years, or even all his life. Nor would Bob have such a right if he had been caring for his parents, not for that reason alone. Everything depends on who winds up owning the house. Generally the owner or owners get to decide who may live in the house. A person could also be given or left a right of occupancy. A co-owner normally has a right to live in a house. But there is no automatic right of a child to live in his or her parents' house.	My gut response without really analyzing it (which is honestly what a lot of these cases boil down to in the end) is that the proposed name would imply an affiliation with the company that does not exist. A case challenging that name could be expensive and come out either way. Instead, "The [Wife's Name] Toy Museum" with descriptive material in brochures and on a website saying that the exhibits were manufactured by "Toy Company", which is a nominative use that does not imply an affiliation with the Company would be a wiser move.	Yes Of course, the period is not actually "indefinite" - it has a definite end: the date of your death. It also has another (unstated) endpoint: the point at which the information ceases to be confidential other than through your breach: for example if published in a patent application. The correct legal term here is not "indefinite"; its "forever" or "perpetually". I prefer forever because perpetually technically means "all the time" rather than "neverending". However, documents commonly use “indefinite” when they mean “forever” so there is unlikely to be grounds to dispute the interpretation. Under US law there is no prohibition on perpetuities as there is in most common law jurisdictions (80 years is typical) so this contract is totally legit. As for the law preventing "morally bankrupt practices and intellectual enslavement"; it does: you don't have to enter this contract if you don't want to.	Apparently "alienation of affection" is still a tort in Hawaii, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Dakota and Utah. The assumption originally behind alienation of affection this is that one spouse (most usually the wife) belongs to the other and a third party stole them from the other (husband). This is now archaic, sexist, thinking that attributes no free-will agency to the spouse and treats her as property. Most states have no-fault divorce because the modern view is that if anyone decides they do not want not be married the state does not have an interest in the reasons.
Will company with product with ® sue me if my company name is the same as their product? I have purchased the company name Xxxxx Media in a province in Canada, but I recently realized that the product Xxxxx® is trademarked in the United States. I wish to sell my products in the US soon so I am wondering if I should purchase a different name instead so that I do not get sued by the company who has trademarked Xxxxx®. Will I get sued?	First of all, anyone can sue for more or less anything, with a good case or without. We have no possible way to predict who will sue or for what. What we might be able to predict is whether in certain circumstances a suit has plausible legal merit, and if someone filed such a suit, there would be a reasonable chance of winning it. Even that often depends on detailed facts which cannot be discussed or addressed here. Trademark protection is limited in several ways. First of all, trademark protection is limited by country. Each country has a different set of trademark laws, and a different mechanism for registering trademarks or determining which marks are protected, although there are many similarities. If a mark is protected in the US, that does not give grounds for suit in Canada, although if Canadian products or services are sold into the US, there could be a suit there. Secondly, trademarks are protected for specific industries or kinds of products/services. for example, "Bass Ale" is a well-known trademark for a beverage. But that does not mean that "Bass Media" used to identify a media company, would infringe that mark, because a drink and a media company are very different things, and one would not be likely to be confused with the other. Thirdly, some marks are "descriptive" while others are "distinctive" or "original". For example, "Tasty burgers" is descriptive. It describes the product (or claims to, at least). "Quadzos Burgers" is original. It is a coined word that has no meaning except to name this product. Original marks get significantly stronger protection than descriptive marks. Fourthly, Trademarks only protect against uses in trade, or in commerce. If you are not selling anything, or doing business using a mark, you are probably not infringing that mark's protection. Finally, and most important, the key question is whether a reasonable person in the market would be confused into thinking that the alleged infringer is the same as the maker of the goods or services named by the mark, or is endorsed or approved by that maker. Trademark protection is supposed to prevent one person or firm from benefiting by the reputation and good will of a product or firm with which they have no connection, from, in effect, falsely advertising "I am the same as those guys". If no reasonable person will be confused, then there is probably no infringement. If reasonable people might well be confused, there might well be infringement.	The register of trademarks can indeed be searched before an application is filed, and any prudent applicant will make, or pay an expert to make, such a search. Note that each country has its own trademark register (although some EU countries are working on a shared EU register, I understand). Marks registered in one country will not be protected under the laws of another, unless they separately qualify for protection under the laws of the second country. Note that in the US, marks that have never been registered but are in active use receive some trade mark protection, although not as much as those that have been registered. Searching for unregistered marks in current use is significantly harder than searching for registered marks. Application may be refused for conflict with an active, unregistered mark. Also in the US, registered marks may have their registrations canceled if they are not in use for a significant time, I believe at least 5 years. Many advise hiring a firm that specializes in trademark applications to do the entire application, including searches. This involves significant added cost. US trademark searches may be done via the Trademark Electronic Search System (TESS) Some information about doing such searches is provided at Search trademark database (an official USPTO page). That page states: Private trademark attorneys If you are an applicant, registrant, or party to Trademark Trial and Appeal Board proceedings domiciled in the United States or its territories, you are not required to have a U.S.-licensed attorney represent you at the USPTO. However, deciding what to search for and interpreting your results can be complicated. There are many factors to consider in determining likelihood of confusion. We can’t advise you on how to do a clearance search for your mark, do one for you, or interpret your search results. Therefore, we strongly encourage you to hire a U.S.-licensed attorney who specializes in trademark law to guide you throughout the application process. If you are a foreign-domiciled applicant, registrant, or party to Trademark Trial and Appeal Board proceedings, you must be represented at the USPTO by an attorney who is licensed to practice law in the United States. See the why hire a private trademark attorney webpage to learn more about what an attorney can do for you and how to find one. For more information about conducting a clearance search, please watch the news broadcast-style video titled “Searching” (video #3 in the Trademark Information Network (TMIN) series). I am sure that similar searches of the register in other countries are available.	You had bought product A. That constitutes you offering the seller a contract for you to get product A for your money. They keep the money and send product B - and now are in breach of the contract, as that is materially different from the contract both agreed to. Legal recourse is, depending on the customer protection laws, a refund of the payments or getting the correct product A. If you have a right for the Product A depends on exactly how it was advertized and the exact ToS.	Is this legal? Generally yes, unless it unlawfully exceeds the scope of the license. Also, if it is, how can I check if it's permitted by the original store's EULA? Read the whole EULA, focusing on terms related to resale, assignment, and transferability.	Can you ask the company to add the spelled out of the number to the text? If this will make you more comfortable. Also, I sometimes found an English text from European body that use the format of 12456 (no thousand mark at all) or 12 456 (use space).	I don't think so. While JSON stands for "JavaScript Object Notation", it doesn't say that. So the term "JSON" isn't infringing on a trademark for "JavaScript". To sue somebody because of an alleged trademark infringement, one needs to prove that the offender abused a trade name of the suing company in a way to make the public believe the offending company was related to the suing company. Nobody is even trying that by just using a file format. The file structure itself was developed as an open standard, so they can't claim any rights on that. I have not heard about a company claiming rights in file structures recently, because the data is considered the property of the user, not of the company that wrote the program it was created with. And users are often no longer accepting file formats that can only be read by a specific (expensive) application from a particular company. They want to be flexible to change their vendor and keep the data.	My gut response without really analyzing it (which is honestly what a lot of these cases boil down to in the end) is that the proposed name would imply an affiliation with the company that does not exist. A case challenging that name could be expensive and come out either way. Instead, "The [Wife's Name] Toy Museum" with descriptive material in brochures and on a website saying that the exhibits were manufactured by "Toy Company", which is a nominative use that does not imply an affiliation with the Company would be a wiser move.	A basic rule of trademark law is that a trademark is protected only for use in the same industry, or in regard to the same general sort of thing. "Maxwell House" for example, is the name of a brand of Coffee, and no doubt a trademark. If A business used it as the name of a brand of mobile home, it would not infringe the mark of the coffee brand. "Java" as a term for coffee , has been slang for any and all coffee at least as far back as WWII. I doubt that it is a currently active trademark in any case. It is, however, the name of a currently active programming language. Calling a new computer technology "Java" would probably infringe that (although the makers of javascript, a quite different computer language, seem to have gotten away with it). But it is hard to see how a realty company would so infringe. Of course there might be details which would cause this name to be infringing in fact, that I have no way of knowing. You could play safe with Sumatra Realty instead. Evin a quickly dismissed suit for trademark infringement could cost a startup time and money that might be a fatal handicap.
Are software licenses copyrighted? If someone wanted to 'fork' a private company's license, could they legally do so? That is to say, if, for instance, the company Grammarly found that significant portions of the company Evernote's EULA was worded better for their own use than the license they had been using, could they copy significant portions of it, legally, for their own use? Sub question: are any or all legal documents copyright?	To answer the question in your title: Yes, software licenses are copyrighted. They are written works that involve (significant, expert) creative effort to create. The best solution would be for Grammarly to hire a lawyer and say "we want a new EULA. We think this one covers a number of points our current one doesn't". Most legal documents will be copyright for the same reason (there may be a few that are so stereotypical that there is essentially no creative effort in putting them together).	Germany may be different, however in the United States this would be considered work-for-hire and the employer would be the rightful owner of the source code. Regardless of jurisdiction, and from a more practical point of view, you are better off not having a copy of the source code. Using it as reference or example in the future could easily turn into (unintentional) copyright infringement. If, in the future, you write code you would like to be able to freely keep and reuse in any project, make sure the owner/employer licenses it using something like the BSD, MIT, or ISC license.	I don't see how. Remember that a license is a contract where the author gives permission to copy (modify, redistribute, remix, etc) a copyrighted work, provided that the licensee fulfills the stated conditions. If the license is not in effect, then we revert to the default situation under copyright law, which is that the potential licensee has no rights to copy the work. (Not counting particular instances of copying which are permitted under fair use and similar exceptions - I presume that's not what you have in mind, or the whole question is moot.) In this case, the conditions include that the licensee must credit the author under their chosen pseudonym. The licensee can't get out of that obligation simply because they find it distasteful or objectionable for whatever reason. If they don't want to do it, then they should not accept the license in the first place, and so refrain from copying the work. (Of course, if the author is offering the CC license in hopes of encouraging reuse of the work, then this may not be a desirable outcome for the author, so they might want to think twice about their choice of pseudonym.) Even if the author's pseudonym were something that would actually be illegal to quote (say, because it is obscene), I don't think it lets the licensee off the hook. A contract with illegal terms is void, so legally it is as if there is no license at all, and we revert to the default in which there is no right to copy. A question was raised in comments about the word "reasonable". I don't know of case law where this has been tested, so I can only speculate: The context suggests that "reasonable" is intended to refer to the means of attribution (for instance, where the attribution should appear in a piece of source code or documentation), not to the pseudonym. There's a legal principle that the specific governs over the general, and the requirement to credit the author by a particular pseudonym is clearly more specific than the general requirement of "reasonableness". It seems clear that the author, who is the one offering these terms, didn't intend for the general term "reasonable" to render meaningless their request for the use of a specific pseudonym; if they had, why would they have bothered to put it in? On the flip side, there's the principle of contra proferentem, that ambiguities in a contract should be resolved in the favor of the party that didn't draft it - here, the licensee. But it's hard to argue that this is really ambiguous; it seems quite clear what the author wants. Of course, the author can circumvent the whole issue, if they're worried, by licensing the work instead under a modified version of the CC license in which the word "reasonable" is removed. After all, there is nothing particular magical about CC's language: the contract is whatever the author and the licensee agree to, and they're just using the pre-written CC license as a convenience to streamline their negotiations.	Yes. This is a frequently asked question on the foundation's homepage, and answered without ambiguity (source): Can I use a Raspberry Pi in a commercial product? This is a very common question, and the answer is yes! Once you have bought a Raspberry Pi, it's yours to do with as you wish. You would be in good company too, as in fact the Raspberry Pi is regularly used and sold for commercial applications third parties. Note that this the default consequence of a contract of sale in all jurisdiction I know of (but I am not a lawyer): The seller does not retain property rights in the particular item, and by the mere selling of the item implies there are no other rights that might prevent the buyer from using it as they wish. Apart from the particular computer now in your property, there are other legal requirements: "Copyleft" softweare: Large parts of the Raspbian software are licensed under "copyleft" licenses (importantly, versions of the General Public License, GPL). These licenses are meant to provide your customers with the means of reproduciing and building upon the "copylefted" software. You will need to provide your customers with the source code to those software items, the tools and documentation needed for building, and a written notice. Your own programs need not be licensed under a "copyleft" license, provided that you don't build on (distribute "derative works" of) "copyleft" software. The open source licenses involved are not meant to exclude commercial use, and there are helpful compliance guides available ( a, b ). Non-free software: Make sure to not include non-free software, like Mathematica or Oracle Java, which are not licensed for commercial redistribution. Trademarks: Your use of the words "Raspberry PI" or the raspberry logo is subject to restrictions, as is usual with trademarks. Speaking of the logos: You can request permission to use their "powered by Raspberry Pi" logo. Market regulations: You need to abide by regulations, for example safety and electromagnetic interference. Repackaging the Pi might mean you'll need to test and recertify your product, I'm not an expert. Video codecs: Some Raspberry Pis (up to 3) include specialised video decoding hardware. If you want to use it with the MPEG2 codec, you'll have to buy an activation key for small one-time fee per device - £2.40 for MPEG2, £1.20 for VC-1; other codecs are already activated. I don't think you'll need a license even for commercial, for-sale devices, but I am not your lawyer. Just to be clear, nothing prevents your buyers from cloning your software. (This is not a consequence of you providing the Raspbian source code - they can just clone the contents of your SD card.) While you can retain copyright in your own code, you'll probably have no effective means of detecting infringement. However, the physical design of the rest of your device will not be affected. Your business model needs to account for this fact.	Sure, you can. But if you, from the US, contract with and pay someone outside the US and then use the results of that effort - the reverse-engineered code, either directly in violation of copyright or to find workarounds - within the US, you may not be culpable in a criminal sense (depending on different jurisdictions and trade/IP agreements), but you certainly would be liable in a civil sense. If the US based software developer (I assume a US-based software company, as you said "outside the US") tracks you down, they can open a civil action against you for any damages they want to claim, including theft of IP, loss of profits, EULA violations, and on and on, because you posses and are using reverse engineered code. How much money do you have to lose?	You can licence your copyright under as many licences as you like to as many people as you like It's your copyright - you can do what you want with it. What you can't do is give someone an exclusive licence and then give licences to others - that would be a breach of contract with the exclusive licensee. How you let people know about the available licences is also up to you - your bio on Stack Exchange is fine.	Yes. A license is a legal form of permission to do something (usually, to use a particular property, whether real or digital or intellectual) and the conditions applied to that use. Different licenses for the same property are extremely common, for example, a free license for hobby or non-profit work and a paid license for commercial usage. Other conditions can include the requirement to make the derivative work also available in some manner or to disallow restrictive conditions should the derivative work be licensed itself, even up to requiring the exact same license be applied to all works. Wording the license exactly so that it achieves the goals you intend is the work of a qualified and registered lawyer, and obtaining their services is definitely recommended for this task.	You'll want to read the actual licenses yourself and understand what is required. If you don't understand, then you'll want to consult an attorney. But neither of these licenses are all that complex in my opinion. MIT: Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. Apache 2.0: Redistribution. You may reproduce and distribute copies of the Work or Derivative Works thereof in any medium, with or without modifications, and in Source or Object form, provided that You meet the following conditions: (a) You must give any other recipients of the Work or Derivative Works a copy of this License; and (b) You must cause any modified files to carry prominent notices stating that You changed the files; and (c) You must retain, in the Source form of any Derivative Works that You distribute, all copyright, patent, trademark, and attribution notices from the Source form of the Work, excluding those notices that do not pertain to any part of the Derivative Works; and (d) If the Work includes a "NOTICE" text file as part of its distribution, then any Derivative Works that You distribute must include a readable copy of the attribution notices contained within such NOTICE file, excluding those notices that do not pertain to any part of the Derivative Works, in at least one of the following places: within a NOTICE text file distributed as part of the Derivative Works; within the Source form or documentation, if provided along with the Derivative Works; or, within a display generated by the Derivative Works, if and wherever such third-party notices normally appear. The contents of the NOTICE file are for informational purposes only and do not modify the License. You may add Your own attribution notices within Derivative Works that You distribute, alongside or as an addendum to the NOTICE text from the Work, provided that such additional attribution notices cannot be construed as modifying the License. Nowhere does either license require you to publish your application's source code, even if your application is directly based on the original code.
Is there any specific law outlawing private nuclear weapons? I am not asking about any indirect or circumstantial restriction. Is there any law in any country preventing me from owning a nuclear weapon there? Is it a plutonium license or something specific to nuclear weapons?	In Germany, nuclear weapons are considered weapons of war, which are heavily regulated. In particular, under § 17 KrWaffKontrG, it is prohibited to develop or produce nuclear weapons or trade in them or acquire them from or leave them to another person or import or export them or transport them through the territory of the Federal Republic or in any other way take them into or out of the territory of the Federal Republic or in any other way exercise the actual control over them (my translation). Exceptions apply only to nuclear weapons controlled by the governments of NATO members, not to individuals. If you happen to come into the possession of a nuclear weapon without breaking the law yourself (e.g. if you inherit it from someone who illegally built it), it can and certainly will be confiscated under § 24 KrWaffKontrG.	What do you mean by "a public building"? Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public. It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category. As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. Assuming that the Senior Center is owned by the town, it is probable that the Administrator is empowered to act as the town's agent in this matter. Now, since this "No Trespass order" is specifically directed at you, there is a reason behind it. It may be something you've done. It may be that complaints have been received about your behavior. It may be an actual abuse by someone who doesn't like you. We have no way of knowing. It the order itself doesn't give you a hint as to why, you can ask the town administrator for the reason. As for being against your rights, there is nothing inherently illegal about this situation(that is, an agent of a property owner exercising the latter's right to prohibit an individual from said property), but some of the details, especially why it was specifically applied to you as an individual might be a civil rights violation.	Yes More exactly, nations will not regard places outside of their physical limits as outside of their jurisdictions. Overview Traditionally, a nation has regarded any ship flying its flag as under its jurisdiction, and a place where it may enforce its laws. More recently, many nations will undertake to enforce laws in cases where their citizens are the victims, or in some cases the perpetrators of crimes even within other nations, and more freely on the high seas outside the physical limits or territorial waters of any country. Historically, all nations undertook to enforce laws against piracy wherever they might be committed. Several countries, including the UK and the US, now treat the UN Law of the Sea convention as part of their national law, which defines as piracy: "illegal acts of violence or detention ... against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft" This would include the situation described in the question. Therefore such actions could and quite likely would be prosecuted by any of several countries, depending on the registry of the vessel and the nationalities of those involved. Sources 18 U.S. Code § 7 provides that: The term “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States”, as used in this title, includes: (1) The high seas, any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, and any vessel belonging in whole or in part to the United States or any citizen thereof, or to any corporation created by or under the laws of the United States, or of any State, Territory, District, or possession thereof, when such vessel is within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State. ... (7) Any place outside the jurisdiction of any nation with respect to an offense by or against a national of the United States. (8) To the extent permitted by international law, any foreign vessel during a voyage having a scheduled departure from or arrival in the United States with respect to an offense committed by or against a national of the United States. This US DOJ page says: Among the offenses within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States are the crimes of murder, manslaughter, maiming, kidnapping, rape, assault, and robbery. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 7(1) there is also jurisdiction over such offenses when they are committed on the high seas or any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States that is out of the jurisdiction of any particular state. See JM 9-20.000 et seq. The page "Maritime Offenses" from the law offices of Trombley and Hanes says: The Federal government also exercises jurisdiction over certain maritime offenses. There is Federal jurisdiction for offenses committed on American vessels in the territorial waters, harbors and inland waterways of foreign nations. See United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933). ... A number of Title 18 sections specifically declare certain conduct to be a Federal crime if committed “within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” See, e.g., murder, 18 U.S.C. § 1111. In some instances, the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13, is also applicable. See also, 15 U.S.C. § 1175; 15 U.S.C. § 1243; 16 U.S.C. § 3372. 18 U.S. Code § 1111 (b) provides that: (b) Within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, Whoever is guilty of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life; Whoever is guilty of murder in the second degree, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. The Britannica Article on "Piracy" says: Because piracy has been regarded as an offense against the law of nations, the public vessels of any state have been permitted to seize a pirate ship, to bring it into port, to try the crew (regardless of their nationality or domicile), and, if they are found guilty, to punish them and to confiscate the ship. The UN page on Piracy says: The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides the framework for the repression of piracy under international law, in particular in its articles 100 to 107 and 110. The Security Council has repeatedly reaffirmed “that international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (‘The Convention’), sets out the legal framework applicable to combating piracy and armed robbery at sea, as well as other ocean activities” (Security Council resolution 1897 (2009), adopted on 30 November 2009). Article 100 of UNCLOS provides that “[a]ll States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.” The General Assembly has also repeatedly encouraged States to cooperate to address piracy and armed robbery at sea in its resolutions on oceans and the law of the sea. For example, in its resolution 64/71 of 4 December 2009, the General Assembly recognized “the crucial role of international cooperation at the global, regional, subregional and bilateral levels in combating, in accordance with international law, threats to maritime security, including piracy”. The UK Piracy Act of 1837 defined as a crime: Whosoever, with intent to commit or at the time of or immediately before or immediately after committing the crime of piracy in respect of any ship or vessel, shall assault, with intent to murder, any person being on board of or belonging to such ship or vessel, or shall stab, cut, or wound any such person, or unlawfully do any act by which the life of such person may be endangered, shall be guilty of felony... The more modern UK law, the Merchant Shipping and Maritime Security Act of 1997 embodies the UN law of the Sea convention, including its article 101, which says: Piracy consists of any of the following acts: (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed— (a) (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (a) (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;	Can he name a particalur one, like Linkin Park? Or that would be considered non-allowed type of advertising? Generally speaking, that does not constitute unlawful advertising. Public figures are allowed to broadcast their preferences on issues that are more sensitive than topics of music. There might be few, rare exceptions where something like this would be outlawed, but most likely that has to do with a regime's censorship of specific bands or music styles rather than with a general prohibition.	I'm based in England, but I'm sure the principle is similar in Canada. The night club or concert venue is private property. When someone owns or rents private property one of the main things they are buying is the right to control who is present on that property, and generally they can use reasonable force to remove people who are not authorised. Security guards generally act as agents for a property owner, tenant or similar.	There is no country in the world that has absolute freedom of speech. There are many that have extreme limits on it. The country with the greatest freedom is probably the United States of America but even there there are limits. For example, it is illegal to defame someone. That is, make a factual statement about a person or organization that is not true and that could damage their reputation. For your case, as a student of the school you are subject to the rules of the school. If your statement breaks those rules you can be sanctioned. If the school is public, it would generally be as restricted as the government is in limiting free speech but, as stated above, such restrictions depend on where you are.	Self-Defense Law In A Nutshell Self-defense (or defense of others) with deadly force is generally authorized when a reasonable person would believe that the use of death force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily harm to a person (i.e. there aren't non-deadly options that can accomplish this end) and a reasonable person would believe that the use of force will prevent death or serious bodily harm to a person, subject to exceptions that would not apply to a private individual using deadly force in a stampede situation. Incidentally, every state and every country absolves someone of liability for homicide when deadly force is used in self-defense, or in the defense of others (not necessarily family), although the exact details of when this is justified varies slightly. For example, in D.C. v. Heller, the right to self-defense is considered a natural or universal right. The analysis would be somewhat different if the shooter were in law enforcement, and would be different again in the case of a shooter who was in the military with more or less clear orders. But, that legal standard doesn't get you to an answer. The Complex Phenomena Called Stampedes The analysis would be extremely fact rich, in the sense of exactly who one would attempt to shoot, what that would be likely to accomplish, and what other alternatives would be available. And, to do that, you also need to understand the phenomena of deadly stampedes which are complex and often somewhat counter-intuitive phenomena. While there are circumstances where it could be legal self-defense or defense of others to shoot a stampeding individual to save someone's life, there are also many stampede circumstances where a use of force would not be justified. In practice, most stampedes, as a matter of physics, can only be stopped by removing a crush of bodies from the rear, where they do not know that they are causing a deadly stampede, while those at the front who end up directly harming others are frequently physically incapable of stopping. Essentially, in a typical stampede that causes death, the problem is an inability of the people at the front to communicate to the people at the back to slow down. And, when a stampede is caused by a genuine threat to the people at the back like a fire or a terrorist, there is nothing that would persuade the people at the back to slow down anyway. So, usually, shooting to kill someone at the front of a stampede would not achieve the intended result of protecting someone in its path. The person shot would either continue to surge forward while dead under the crush of bodies behind them, or would have their dead body trampled over by the next person in line who also has no physical ability to do anything other than to surge forward. So, usually, using deadly force to shoot someone at the front of a stampede will be futile and only cause an unnecessary death. Given that using deadly force in a stampede, if directly at people in the front, is almost always futile, the question for the judge or jury deciding the case becomes whether a reasonable person would know that at the time, which would have to be decided a case by case basis. Sometimes it is obvious from someone in a vantage point to shoot at the front of a stampede that this would be futile and sometimes it isn't. This question would be highly fact specific and depend a lot upon exactly what information about the situation was available to the person shooting a person in the stampede. The situation where deadly force might not be futile would be one in which there is no actual life threatening harm that people are fleeing in which the deadly force is directed at the people in the back who are driving the stampede (even though they don't know it), to shock them into ceasing to do so. But, in that situation, if the shooting is done by someone who understands the situation well enough to know that this is what is actually necessary, that person also may be capable of firing warning shots or shooting to injure with the same effect, so justification might also be in doubt. Protecting Targets of Mobs v. Protecting Targets of Stampedes A similar situation where the use of deadly force might be justified is something visually similar to a stampede, but quite different in what would work factually. This is a mob that is about to attack someone, possibly armed with pitchforks or knives or clubs or broken bottles or a noose. In the case of a mob, the use of deadly force to protect someone threatened by the mob would almost always be a justified use of force in self-defense or the defense of others, because shooting someone in the front is likely to be both necessary and effective.	The Soviet Union generally had no copyright treaties with the western world before 1973. So, anything before then is public domain. The USSR had a policy of public domain and considered anything published to be the property of the "people", including anything published in the west. Even for works produced after 1973, they would have to be registered for copyright in the United States to claim a copyright here.
What are the main differences between Napoleonic law and Germanic law? I only recently started appreciating the differences between Civil Law and Common Law. The following map on wikipedia shows the distribution of different legal systems around the world, which makes a distinction between Napoleonic law and Germanic law: The respective articles articles on wikipedia are a bit too obtuse for my limited intelligence. In layman's terms, what are the main differences between Germanic and Napoleonic law systems, and the main implications of those differences?	Both Napoleonic and Germanic law are subdivisions of Civil Law and both are inheritors of late empire Roman Law plus ecclesiastical law and traditional law. The main differences between them are their route from the Roman Empire to the modern world. Napoleonic law was codified in 1804 under Napoleon I, unsurprisingly; and drew together the feudal laws of France. Germanic law came through the various Germanic tribes and was codified at various times and in various places. Do these historical distinctions matter? Probably not; they are both code based laws so you must know the code for the particular jurisdiction. However, knowing the origin of the code, while it may not help you draft a contract, will allow you to understand the mode of thought and jurisprudence behind the laws. In a way, it is like the difference between understanding languages and understanding linguistics.	The question should not include France and Germany, and should be limited to common law jurisdictions that are similar to India, because the function of judges differs starkly between adversarial vs. inquisitorial systems. The adversarial model pits two parties against each other, with the judge serving as the decider (of law, and perhaps of fact). The parties can offer witnesses, who can be compelled to respond to questions, and the attorney asking the question gets to control the question asked (subject to a possible objection by the other party, to be ruled on by the judge). The judge can rule on requests (which are not questions) i.e. petitions by either party. Otherwise, the judge sits there more or less mute, soaking up the argumentation being presented. Appellate proceedings are somewhat special in that the justices may address questions to the attorney, in order to better understand the logic of the proffered argument. The burden is on the attorney to make the case. There is no direct burden on the justice to "make a case". The "court of public opinion" may be relevant in a jurisdiction where the justice is an elected office or is appointed for limited time. Or, the contrary opinion of a higher court may have some influence on a justice's rulings – this is not the case with a Supreme Court. In other words, it would be highly dysfunctional within the adversarial system for a party to be allowed to interrogate a judge. Formal petitions are allowed, as long as you follow proper form.	Different socities, including some that are not considered sovereign nations, create laws, that is enforceable rules of conduct, in different ways. Not all write them down. But they are all Law in that they are rulwa that societies can and will enforce mon their members. I recommend reading Legal Systems Very Different from Ours by David D. Friedman (Professor of Law at Santa Clara University). There are free versions available on the web, and the final version is available from Amazon. It includes chapters on several systems where law is not written, including: Pirate Law Prisoners’ Law Romani Law Comanche, Kiowa and Cheyenne: The Plains Indians Somali Law Other chapters deal with systems where law may have been written, but its method of formation and operation are very different from the models usually discussed on this site. This include Roman law, Imperial Chinese law, Jewish law, Early Irish Law, and the law of saga-period Iceland.	What do the contracts with your suppliers and the policy with your insurer say? Changes in government regulation do not ipso facto relieve Parties of the obligations under a contract under common (English) law. Contracts are allowed to allocate the risk of force majeure (and indeed, to define it because it has no common law meaning) but if they don’t, then each party bears their own risk and if they fail to honour their obligations they are in breach of contract. Common law does have the doctrine of frustration, however, that is much narrower and must result in the inability of the contract to be completed at all. And then there are consumer rights which may apply. When the dust settles, we are likely to see a lot of litigation around force majeure. Your venue appears to be complying with both the law and their obligations under the contract so you have no breach of contract claim against them and no trigger for the insurance policy. If you choose to cancel, then you broke the contract. Importantly, the position is reversed in civil law jurisdictions - a party unable to fulfil their obligations under a contract is not in breach.	In the US, Congress may pass an act, and this creates one kind of law (if it is promulgated: signed, ignored, or re-passed with a super-majority). Some of those acts direct the executive branch to do things, and pursuant to that act, a regulation is promulgated. Together with case law, the whole thing is "law". A bill (in the House, or the Senate) may result in an act being passed by both houses. It may go through a number of drafts between the point when it is first introduced and the time it becomes an act.	Deadly self-defense is legal in Germany. The self-defense law (in particular Sect. 32 of the Criminal Code) makes no restrictions as far as the type of aggression and the type of defense is concerned. That means that - in principle - you can defend yourself against an attack by any means that is necessary to stop it. The principle behind that is "das Recht muss dem Unrecht nicht weichen", which translates to "the law does not have to yield to the unlawful". That particularily means that: You do not have to run. You do not have to yield. You do not have to wait for help from public authorities (notably the police). You can defend yourself (against any attack on you, be it life, limb or property), no matter if that would mean commiting a crime (even if that crime is killing a person). This is called "Trutzwehr" or "schneidiges Notwehrrecht", which can be translated to "active defense" or "aggressive defense" as opposed to passive defense. However... This regulation is not without pitfalls and limitations. There are quite a few, which means that in practice deadly force could be considered unlawful in self-defense. Books have been written about this subject alone, so it can not be exhaustively handled here. Some examples for corner cases are: Attackers that clearly can not understand the severity of their actions have to be spared from extreme effects of your self-defense. The classical book case is that you can't shoot little children stealing apples from your tree. If there is a massive discrepancy between what you want protect and the damage the attacker has to endure (called "qualitativer Notwehrexzess" - translating to "qualitatively eccessive self-defense"). If someone insults you, shooting him might go to far, since while your honour is attacked (which is protected by Sect. 185 Criminal Code), the attacker's life (protected by Sect. 212 Criminal Code) by far outweighs it. Note that, to ensure the effectiveness of the self-defense laws, the discrepancy must be extreme. And it does not mean you can't defend yourself. You just have to choose a less severe measure. So you might get away with knocking the insulter out. After the attack is over you hit the attacker once too often, which causes his death (called "quantitativer Notwehrexzess" - "quantitatively eccessive self-defense"). The attack was over at the time of the deadly blow, so your right for self-defense had ended. You might get away without punishment, if it was impossible for you to realize that the attack was over. If you only think an attack is happening, but it is not (for example someone attacking you with a rubber knife on Halloween). In this case there is no attack and so technically there is no right for self defense (called "Putativnotwehr"). Similar to the cases of excessive self-defense, it depends on your individual case (notable if you had a chance to realize the attack was false) if you are punished or not. To sum it up: You have the right to defend yourself by any means necessary, but you are held responsible if you go to far (not just a little, but really really to far).	First, mandamus is always a form of writ whereas injunctions are typically a part of the proceedings in a lawsuit. Writs and lawsuits are each distinct, individual legal actions whereas multiple motions for various remedies like injunctive relief can occur within one continuous lawsuit. The lawsuit and the various motions within it including injunctions have largely replaced the common law writ (including writs of mandamus except those from a higher court to a lower) as legislated in rules of civil procedure federally and in most states	In england-and-wales and scotland, no. At common law, with a hefty influence from Roman writers such as Gaius who tackled the topic, gradual changes in a natural boundary are distinguished from others. This is usually encountered in the case of a river, whose course may change slightly from year to year. New deposits are laid down and other parts are eroded, generally imperceptibly. These processes are called alluvion and diluvion, and distinguished from avulsion where a chunk of identifiable land is washed downriver. Deliberately-induced changes are also different. For those slow and natural changes, the position is that where ownership of the land is defined with reference to the natural boundary, the extent of ownership also changes when the boundary moves. This is a sensible rule in the absence of modern surveying methods, and generally matches what people expect - I own the land on the south bank, you own it on the north, and it doesn't make sense for me to gain a sliver of land on the other side if the river should happen to meander a bit. It is possible to override that assumption by agreement between the landowners (or else litigate it) but that is the starting point. The sea works in the same way, except that the "landowner" on the other side is the Crown. (Quotation marks because it is not the same kind of ownership that ordinary people exercise.) The intermediate area, the foreshore, has its own rules, so in fact there are multiple boundaries to think about - the mean high water mark, the mean low water mark - but it's the same idea. The foreshore might be owned by the Crown, as the sea is, but maybe by somebody else. Perhaps what was my land is now underwater at high tide, but exposed at low tide; and some other bit of land used to be foreshore and now is totally submerged. Everyday tidal changes do not affect ownership, nor do unusually large tides either way. But if I own land next to the sea, I may gain some land, or lose it, by natural action. Gradually rising sea levels move the tide lines and the property rights follow. Some riverbeds are also owned by the Crown, so the same principle is at work there too for the motion of Crown boundaries. The rationale for why the Crown owns these places is not clear: there are several possible explanations to do with it being for the common good, or alternatively just an old feudal rule. That might affect adjudication of rights in some cases, such as for access to the "new foreshore" for particular activities: see R (Newhaven Port and Properties Ltd) v East Sussex CC [2015] UKSC 7 for an investigation of the public right to swim on an English beach. Even in the case of Udal law in Orkney and Shetland, ownership does not extend to the sea beyond the low-tide mark, since the Crown has sovereign rights (Shetland Salmon Farmers Association v Crown Estate Commissioners 1991 SLT 166). In land registration, a boundary marked on a cadastral map is not taken as authoritative when the underlying geographical feature moves. That's in the Land Registration Act 2002, section 61(1) for England and Wales, and the Land Registration (Scotland) Act 2002, sections 66 and 73(2)(i) in Scotland. Courts have inferred that a boundary coinciding with such a feature is "meant" to be this way, even if it wasn't defined like that in words - see for example Southern Centre of Theosophy Incorporated v The State of South Australia (Australia) [1981] UKPC 41 in the Privy Council. So, even if the map shows my coastal property apparently extending into the large blue area, that is not the real situation - it just means that the registries are not required to keep those maps up to date when the waters shift.
How courts can supercede constitutional rights I am currently going through a domestic case with my recent ex-wife. Just the other day my public pretender, and that's not a spelling error, called me outside of the courtroom and asked me to plead guilty to all of the offenses. I then told him that I would plead guilty to what I have done, which is I violated a protection order when her brother told me she wanted to talk about Ollie our daughter. When he told me that I had prove my innocence, I interrupted him with no I don't, our Constitution says I'm innocent until proven guilty. He then told me that the Constitution doesn't apply to this. Now this States Attorney has declared me a danger to the community, with absolutely no violent crimes in my record, I have 2 DUI, and a federal prison sentence for conspiracy, which I believe the way I was indicted is now illegal	The courts do not supersede your constitutional rights, although you may believe that you have a constitutional right that isn't actually there. This article discusses the position that "due process forbids convicting an individual of a crime unless the government proves the elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt". This standard is actually not stated anywhere in the US Constitution, but it has been assumed as an implicit meaning of "due process". It sounds like you were charged with a crime, and there is most likely an applicable statute in your state that is analogous to RCW 26.50.110 in Washington. So you have the right to a trial and the prosecution would have the obligation to prove all of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It also appears that you did violate the applicable law and you were willing to plead guilty, as urged by your attorney. You are correct that you don't technically have to prove your innocence, but there is a practical problem that if the prosecution provides some weak evidence that you violated the law, then the jury might decide that your failure to refute the evidence means that there is no reasonable doubt. The problem is that there is a tendency for jurors to think that the defendant has to create a doubt. States differ somewhat in how they explain the burden of proof to jurors, and you might fare better in a state where the instruction is that "you must be firmly convinced". Since the attorney seems to have said that "the constitution doesn't apply to this", this is a puzzle. I would not assume (though it is possible) that the attorney was incompetent. It is possible that he was speaking of a non-criminal matter, and it is possible that you were talking at cross purposes. There is no legal situation where "the constitution doesn't apply to this", but perhaps "that constitutional limitation doesn't apply to this specific situation". Regardless of what the attorney said, your attorney doesn't violate your rights, even if he gives you bad advice. The actual court might, and then you would have a cause for an appeal. Similarly, if the district attorney reasonably believes that you are a danger to society and is prosecuting you, that is not a violation of your constitutional rights. An improper conviction would be a violation of those rights, although it might take an appeal to get the court to recognize that fact.	This is a good question, which I am going to answer from a practical perspective, rather than a theoretical one, which would probably justify a law review article (applications of the takings clause to criminal justice fact patterns is actually one of my pet areas of legal scholarship, but a lot of it calls for dramatic changes in established practice and precedents reached from other perspectives, making it impractical to pursue in real life). I recently had a case along these lines in my office where my client's property was seized as evidence in a criminal case against a third-party. The crime involved a gun shop where all of the guns that were in the possession of the shop owner for repairs at the time of the bust (i.e. as bailments), including ours worth several thousand dollars in addition to having some sentimental value, were seized as evidence of charges against a shop owner who was fencing stolen goods, making sales to felons off the books, falsifying excise tax returns, etc. He seemed legitimate and had been in business for many years in what was not a fly by night operation. He had all of the proper licenses. Who knew we were dealing with a crook? In that case, we intervened on behalf of our client in the primary case to seek the physical return of the property (basically a replevin claim), as have others affected by the bust. It took a few months and some legal fees, but we prevailed without too much effort, as have the other intervenors. Generally speaking, to make a 5th Amendment claim, you would have to show a total taking and move into some legal gray areas in this context, while it is usually hard for authorities to show a continuing need for possession of third-party property in the face of a demand for its return, especially when photography and other scientific tools can document the evidence in great detail these days. In that case, showing that our client's particular gun was not involved in any illegitimate transaction also simultaneously made it less important as evidence, although that would not necessarily be true in general in these kinds of situations. There is a pending case in Colorado posing similar issues, where a suburban police department essentially destroyed a guy's home in order to catch a felon with no relation to the homeowner whatsoever, who had fled into it and taken refuge there. But, that case, as far as I know, has not yet been resolved on the merits.	Let’s look at the full paragraph Neither the President nor Congress nor the Judiciary can disturb any one of the safeguards of civil liberty incorporated into the Constitution except so far as the right is given to suspend in certain cases the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. So what it actually says is: you can’t unless you can. The Constitution says this to say about habeas corpus: The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it. The case decided that military commissions (and the denial of habeas corpus) were constitutional where there was no civilian court available. Because Indiana had never been in rebellion and civil courts continued to function there, military tribunals could not be used. However, they could be uses in states that had been in rebellion. You can’t unless you can. This is specifically about rights guaranteed in the Constitution In this particular case, the right of habeas corpus. There is no equivalent right applicable to face masks so a law mandating them in certain circumstances does no more infringe a Constitutional right than mandating the wearing of clothes in public. You can’t unless you can. Breaking the law doesn’t cause you to lose your job The second quote, the origin of which is unknown and definitely not in the case, is total fantasy. Even if a law against face masks was unconstitutional, the authors of that law have overreached and the remedy is to go to a court to have it declared unconstitutional. They don’t lose their jobs as a result. Even if they wrote the law with criminal intent, they must be removed from office in accordance with the normal procedures such as impeachment for the President, by a two-thirds majority vote of their house for a Congressperson etc.	The constitutionality of each of the charges is well supported and there is no really viable First Amendment defense to any of them. There is literally a U.S. Justice Department handbook on how to prosecute attempts to undermine the integrity of elections accumulating the wisdom its has gleaned from doing precisely what it is doing in this indictment, successfully, for generations. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Conspiracy to Defraud the United States) This statute states that: If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor. Fraudulent statements which are protected by the First Amendment are the exception more than they are the rule. When fraudulent statements of presenting existing facts, or fraudulent concealment of presently existing facts, seek to impair someone's legal rights, it is generally constitutional to punish that conduct criminally. At noted here: Fraud and Perjury While, again, the First Amendment makes no categorical exception for false or misleading speech, certain types of fraudulent statements fall outside its protection. The government generally can impose liability for false advertising or on speakers who knowingly make factual misrepresentations to obtain money or some other material benefit (such as employment). Prohibitions on perjury — knowingly giving false testimony under oath — also are constitutional. This statute requires proof of intentional fraud, and not just a good faith difference of opinion sincerely held by the defendant. Probably the most on point precedent upholding the constitutionality of this statute in an analogous context is United States v. Rafoi, 60 F.4th 982 (5th Cir. 2023). This case held that the statute was constitutional where the charged conduct caused harm inside United States or to United States citizens or interests, that provided sufficient nexus, as required by due process, between United States and defendant's conduct in allegedly meeting with co-conspirators in Miami, Florida, where a noncitizen defendant, a citizen of Portugal and Switzerland who was employee of Swiss wealth-management firm, conspired to violate Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) as agent of a person while in United States, relating to alleged international bribery scheme between businesses based in United States and Venezuelan officials and the defendant has the intent or knowledge that the monies involved were proceeds of specified unlawful activity would be unlawfully transmitted from or through a place in United States to a place outside United States. The relevant holding in this case is that prosecuting violations of U.S. laws that exist for the purposes of insisting upon orderly and non-corrupt conduct of actions related to U.S. officials or U.S. persons through fraud under this statute, is constitutional. When it affects the conduct of U.S. government business, or of a U.S. business or person, the statute is actionable and constitutional. Also pertinent is a much older U.S. Supreme Court decision, Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182 (1924): [F]ormer President and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court William Howard Taft explained in a landmark 1924 opinion, the full meaning of the statute almost anticipates our current surreal scenario: “It also means to interfere with or obstruct one of its [the country’s] lawful governmental functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest." In contrast, fraud in the course of a political campaign to persuade voters is protected by the First Amendment. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (holding that a law criminalizing false factual statements about military honors received in a political campaign called the "Stolen Valor Act" in the version then in force was unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds). But that isn't what this charged is seeking to prosecute. A law review article from 2015 attempts to clarify the scope of Alvarez, distinguishing between completely unprotected lies, lies that are protected so as not to chill the expression of truthful statements, and "lies that must be protected for their own sake". The citation to the article is Alan K. Chen and Justin Marceau, "High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment," 68 Vanderbilt Law Review 1435 (2015). It is notable that in Alvarez every conservative justice on the Court at the time other than Chief Justice Roberts, voted to affirm the constitutionality of the "Stolen Valor Act", over a mostly liberal majority that held that it was an unconstitutional violation of free speech rights. Now that there is a six justice conservative majority in the U.S. Supreme Court, if the positions of conservative justices on the issue was consistent, the U.S. Supreme Court would be even more likely to uphold the constitutionality of a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 371 than the U.S. Supreme Court would have been inclined to in 2012. It is unclear, however, how much this conservative ruling was dependent upon the fact that the statute prohibited lying about military honors rather than about other matters. Conservatives tend to hold honor, and in particular, military honors, in greater esteem than liberals. Also, conservative justice may have been more clear than the liberal justices in that case about just how open and shut these cases were, since the truth or falsity of the statement can be determined definitively, from a single official document, the veteran's Form DD214, which there is a strong presumption that almost any veteran capable of running for political office would understand perfectly well. Another issue which influenced swing votes in the Alvarez case is that the statute that the U.S. Supreme Court considered at the time criminalized fraud regarding military honors even when it was arguably immaterial (e.g. in dinner table conservations with friends or family, as opposed to only in the context of an election campaign, or only in a request for economic benefits or legal privileges). This concern is not present in this particular prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 371, since Donald Trump would receive the legal benefit of being re-elected as President of the United States if his alleged election results related fraud conspiracy was successful. One critical distinction, previously noted by the Washington State Supreme Court its 2007 decision in the case of Rickert v Washington, is whether, in the context of the speech giving rise to the legal consequences, "the government is capable of correctly and consistently negotiating the thin line between fact and opinion in political speech." This will generally be true in the case of factual statements related to election results and administration, but will generally not be true in wide ranging statements about policy issues in the course of a political campaign. An August 1, 2022 report of the Congressional Research Service, the non-partisan research arm of Congress, generally confirms the analysis above. This is the only D.C. grand jury indictment for which there is even a colorable free speech argument, but given the case law, it is a weak argument. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512 (Obstruction of and Attempt to Obstruct an Official Proceeding and Conspiracy To Do The Same) Obstruction of an official proceeding in action action with an intended effect and doesn't prevent people from expressing opinions in a way that does not obstruct official government functions, so again this isn't unconstitutional. The charge in this case charges the crime that: Whoever corruptly-- obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so is guilty of a felony punishable by up to twenty years in prison. There is already case law testing the constitutionality of this portion of this statute in the context of the same course of conduct related to the January 6, 2021 riot by a lower level minor from the D.C. Circuit whose rulings are binding precedents in this indictment. United States v. Fischer, 64 F.4th 329 (D.C. Cir. 2023). The foundation for this ruling is longstanding: Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct In Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co. (1949), the Supreme Court held the First Amendment affords no protection to “speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.” A robber’s demand at gunpoint that you hand over your money is not protected speech. Nor is extortion, criminal conspiracy, or solicitation to commit a specific crime. Abstract advocacy of lawbreaking remains protected speech. There is no constitutional basis to distinguish a direct charge of obstruction with official business from a conspiracy charge to do the same. In the case of the conspiracy to obstruct charge, the co-conspirators take actions that collectively seek to deprive people of their constitutional rights or obstruct an official proceeding, the statements made in furtherance of the group effort to achieve those ends are not legally protected speech. It is the action (either a verbal act or another kind of act) and not the expressive content of the speech that is implicated. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (Conspiracy Against Rights) A conspiracy to cause false election results to be certified to Congress to change the results of a Presidential election by two or more persons impairs the constitutional right to vote, and rights under Congressional adopted federal election laws. Notably, a conspiracy to violate rights, which is a felony punishable by up to death if the conspiracy causes someone's death (as can be plausibly alleged in this case due to a death arising from the January 6, 2021 riot) provides that the felony has been committed: If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same. The U.S. Supreme Court has previously held that prosecuting conspirators for tampering with the process of determining the correct result of the election is constitutional. U.S. v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944). This also comes within the "Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct" exception to the protections of the First Amendment that is discussed above. FOOTNOTE: If the Justice Department sought the death penalty on this criminal charge the jury would have to be "death qualified" in the court of jury selection which tends to make the jury more conservative. But, there is no indication that the Justice Department intends to seek this relief in this particular prosecution of Donald Trump. As a practical matter, given Donald Trump's age, health, and the length of time necessary to fully appeal a death penalty conviction (which exceeds ten years in most cases), any criminal conviction with a sentences of ten or fifteen years or more would as a practical matter result in him dying in prison, and it is unlikely that appeals of a death sentence would be completed before he died of natural causes.	Two people can have an equal interest in real property without being married, and being incarcerated doesn't affect a person's property rights. What matters is that now your ex-wife has a legal interest in the property. As a separate issue, she presumably also has a legal obligation w.r.t. the mortgage (otherwise the quitclaim deed makes no sense). The easiest solution is for the other party to voluntarily transfer their interest in the property to you via a quitclaim deed. A difficult solution is to use the judicial process to remove a person from the title. This could be done if there was fraud involved in the property transfer process, for example if the quitclaim deed was forged (presumably not the case here). You might sue to correct an error which doesn't reflect the terms of the transaction, via a reformation action, but that doesn't seem to be the case (a party not understanding the consequences of transferring an interest isn't an error in the relevant sense). You need to hire an attorney to solve the problem (he will look at all of the documentation relevant for your case for a possible solution).	Is an attorney permitted to ask questions like those in either paragraphs two and three? Yes. That does not mean that they will be considered relevant or even appropriate, though. Is the witness allowed to decline to answer such questions for reason of irrelevance, or other grounds? Yes. In general, though, it would be safer for the witness to state an objection (be it on the basis of irrelevance, confrontational, asked & answered, as to form, etc.) and answer the question nonetheless, rather than simply refusing to answer it. By simply declining to answer a question regardless of the basis for refusal, the witness risks affording a crooked lawyer the opportunity to falsely generalize that the witness was uncooperative. One exception to the idea of "object-and-then-answer" is where some privilege is the alleged basis for the objection, since the substance of the answer could be such that it amounts to waiving the privilege even where that privilege is legitimate. The witness may also opt to answer the lawyer's irrelevant questions even without stating an objection. Some questions are so obviously irrelevant, dull, or stupid that a failure to raise an objection will be inconsequential. In such scenarios, raising objections can only lengthen the deposition transcript and make it harder to read. For a real-life example of deposition with plenty of dull questions, take a look at the transcript (which I split in parts one, two and three) of the 4-hour deposition where I myself was the witness (you can download the case file, almost in its entirety, from this page). You will notice that I did not raise objections during the deposition, the main reason being what I explained above: To avoid giving the opposing counsel an opportunity to falsely accuse me in court of being uncooperative during deposition. Furthermore, addressing the crook's futile questions (1) projects transparency and helps on the witness's part, and (2) precludes a false & misleading impression as if the witness had something to hide. After all, wrongdoers are the ones most interested in eluding testimony in ways very similar to this other deposition. The reason of being of objections is precisely that the law "is aware" that, as a matter of fact, lawyers indulge in all kinds of abusive questions when taking sworn testimony --be it in trial or at deposition-- of a witness.	No Besides this being clearly unworkable, the requirements for the state providing public defense attorneys include being in need (you will need to provide an affadavit or similar to the effect) and when the defendant is at risk of significant time of confinement. The 5 to 15 minutes of the traffic or Terry stop are not considered significant. Nor are the processing times of arresting you and taking you in. Trying to make the officer provide you with an attorney (or declaring you aren't doing anything without one) before complying with their orders may well result in your incarceration and subsequent assignment of a public defender.	When an individual or an organization (such as a business or a local or state government) thinks that a governmental action is in violation of a constitutional limitation, s/he/it may file suit against the government (Federal, state, or local as the case may be). Such suits most often seek injunctions against continuation of the action, but sometimes damages, particularly under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Also, persons accused of crime may argue that the law violates their Constitutional rights, or that some part of the enforcement procedure violated those rights. Such suits and court actions are the main way in which US Constitutional rights, including those in the Bill of Rights, are enforced. Constitutional rights are almost never absolute. For example the rights of free speech and a free press in the First Amendment are stated in rather absolute terms, but libel and defamation laws are constitutionally permitted, although they were somewhat limited by the decision in NY Times vs Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Regulation of the "time, place, and manner" of speech is also permitted. Although the same amendment guarantees Free Exercise of religion, laws prohibiting human sacrifice and polygamy are constitutional. the Fourth Amendment limits search and seizure, but search warrants are still issued every day. The Second Amendment does not mean that no regulation of guns can ever be constitutional. For much of our history, the clause A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State was considered to be a condition of the right, and no individual right to own firearms was guaranteed to those in no way connected with a governmentally authorized militia (private militias were not considered "well regulated"). Since DC. v. Heller that view has changed, but that does not make all regulation of guns impossible under the Constitution. Moreover, a number of legal scholars think that Heller was wrongly decided, and should be reversed. The Supreme Court could decide to do that, although the current Justices have not indicated any such intention. The U.S. Supreme Court in McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) said, quoting DC vs Heller: It is important to keep in mind that Heller, while striking down a law that prohibited the possession of handguns in the home, recognized that the right to keep and bear arms is not “a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” We made it clear in Heller that our holding did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as “prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,” “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” The question suggests that a dictionary definition of "infringe" implies that the right is utterly absolute. This contradicts the Supreme Court statement holding above, and all of our history of constitutional law. To the best of my knowledge there is no provision or right that does not have limited exceptions or room for interpretation. Justice Black's absolutist view of the Bill of Rights, and particularly of the rights of Freedom of Speech and of the Press, never carried a majority of the Court nor of the country. To "infringe" a right is to violate it, to fail to respect the right. But that leaves the question of just what the right guarantees. Suppose a law requires a permit to own a gun, but that permit is granted to anyone on filing an application and payment of a small fee. Would that infringe the right? Suppose a similar permit requirement, but one excluding felons, persons on parole, and persons under a domestic violence restraining order. Would that infringe? Suppose a requirement that a would-be owner first pass a firearms safety class, which most people pass easily. Would that infringe? There are many such questions, and current case law has not settled all of them. The first two above seem to be answered "No" by the US Supreme Court. By the way, the history of the debates does not suggest that the ability of individuals to defend themselves, particularly against the government, was a significant concern in drawing up the Second Amendment. The focus was largely on Federal funding of state militias (later the National Guard). Other data shows that gun ownership was comparatively rare at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights.
Does a Copyright owner lose his copyright if another one registered before him? If I didn't register my copyrighted material, and another one did. Do I lose my copyright?	The author, or the copyright holder if the author has sold or assigned the copyright, may register a copyright at any time, even many years after the work was copyrighted. However, for all modern works (since 1978 in the US) the work has copyright protection as soon as it is created and set down in a tangible form (such as on paper or in a computer file), whether it is registered or not. Registration cannot gain or lose copyright protection. It is evidence of the copyright, and it provides some additional rights if an infringement suit should occur. If there are multiple co-authors, one author should ideally register on behalf of all of them, listing all co-authors, but multiple registrations will do no major harm. No one who is not an author or copyright holder of a work (or a valid authorized agent of the author or copyright holder) may legitimately register a copyright in that work. Registration procedures and the exact benefits of registration vary by country. In fact, some countries do not have any copyright registration. Edit: In the US, registration procedures are described in Circular #2 from the Copyright Office. Falsely registering a copyright is a crime under 17 U.S.C. § 506(e), and could be reported to law enforcement. See also Wikipedia's article on "Copyfraud". If a false registration has been made, the true author can file a conflicting registration. This should be sufficient to allow a copyright infringement case to be filed. It would be very wise to consult a lawyer with experience in copyright infringement issues before taking steps in the matter. Second Edit: It is one of the elements of an infringement claim that the plaintiff owns the copyright, or has been authorized by one who does. often this is not disputed, and is passed by with no significant time or effort. But if a false copyright registration has been made, in which a person who was not the author claims to be the author, then evidence clearly establishing the actual authorship will probably be needed if the case goes to court. A registration establishes a rebuttable presumption that the person who registered the copyright owns it, and this presumption would need to be overcome.	Yes So far so good. This is a copyright violation but it is probably fair use - certainly there is case law permitting a copy of a backup digital asset to be made so I don’t see why a similar argument wouldn’t work with backing up a physical book. Clear copyright violation. Alice can rent out the original under the first sale doctrine but the ‘backup’ is not so protected. It’s not fair use because it’s use is commercial, the work is a type of work the author expects to profit from, the entire work has been copied and the use is deleterious to the market i.e. the renters are less likely to buy an original - it falls foul of all four factors of the fair use test.	More generally, can anyone just copy an existing website (without copying the code or images)? Yes. Could I make a website that lets people post pictures like Instagram but call it MyPics? Yes. In general, copyright protects particular expressions of ideas, not higher level ideas or concepts.	If you do not have permission to make and distribute reproductions of the work, then it is illegal to make and distribute reproductions of the work. US copyright law Indian copyright law	There are several possibilities The effects are not the same Minecraft has them under a different licence from the owner Minecraft is committing copyright violation And the most likely: they belong to Minecraft and someone has illegally uploaded them to the site	The copyright holder is free to release the work under whatever licenses the copyright holder wants, in the absence of a contract saying otherwise. A copyright holder could sign a contract not to release under another license, but otherwise I don't see why he or she would waive the rights. The copyright holder can always decide not to reissue under a different license. The copyright holder basically retains all rights not specifically signed away. Everyone else is limited to what copyright law allows and to what license terms they have.	"Only the owner of copyright in a work has the right to prepare, or to authorize someone else to create, a new version of that work." Copyright in Derivative Works and Compilations http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ14.pdf So if you have not been granted authorization, you are violating the right of the owner. It's always recommended that you get permission. Practically speaking, if the owner does not give you permission, there is probably someone else with a similar photo who will! Pretty famous recent case: Barack Obama "Hope" poster	The commentators are just making stuff up when they say that you can freely infringe on copyright as long as it is for personal use. It is true that "personal infringers" are less likely to suffer the legal consequences of any infringement (partly because it's easier to avoid detection and partly because the hassle to award ratio involved in suing a personal infringer is too high). It's a misunderstanding of "fair use", based on the legally erroneous assumption that anything is okay until you make a business out of it.
Source of Supreme Court's authority to overrule prior Supreme Court decisions If the Supreme Court is the final authority, where does the authority of future Supreme Courts come from, to overturn prior results? Wouldn't past and future courts be of equal authority?	If the Supreme Court is the final authority The Supreme court is not the final authority. The Supreme Court is the court of last resort, but that does not prevent its case law from possibly being superseded or invalidated by constitutional amendments or the enactment of legislation. Wouldn't past and future courts be of equal authority No. Whether in the form of statutes or court decisions, laws are supposed to preserve ordered liberty. That entails the need to keep up-to-date with the state or evolution of civilization. If the Supreme Court case law --aka authorities-- were deemed inexorably perpetual, the entire judicial system would become imminently useless due to its inability to respond to new challenges [in the civilization] which are (1) encompassed by prior SC authorities, and yet (2) not properly assessed therein.	Usually, an attack on the validity or prudence of the underlying order is not a defense to court action to enforce it. Usually, the only exception would be when it was impossible, or practically impossible, to perform the court order for some reason. You could seek to modify the order, but that would be prospective in effect only and usually isn't granted unless there has been a change in circumstances since the original order was entered. You could also bring a motion to set aside judgment (usually this has to be done within six months of entry of an order) on the grounds that this provision was included only due to mistake or irregularities in the process or excusable neglect. But, that only would have only prospective effect.	While the Supreme Courts of Germany, Honduras, India and Italy have asserted such authority, the U.S. Supreme Court's justiciable decisions about a U.S. Constitutional Amendment are generally limited to a determination of whether the amendment was lawfully adopted pursuant to Article V of the U.S. Constitution, which states: The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate. Usually, U.S. Supreme Court litigation over a constitutional amendment would be over whether the process of Article V has been conformed to in a particular case (which has been litigated in several prior cases). The U.S. Supreme Court has held, however, in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), that even some procedural issues are political questions for Congress to resolve that are non-justiciable, in part because the mode of ratification is expressly delegated to Congress in Article V. As the summary of Coleman at the link above explains: In an opinion by Chief Justice Hughes, the Court held that the Kansas legislators had standing to sue, but found that two of the plaintiffs’ claims raised political questions that could only be resolved by Congress. With respect to the whether the Kansas legislature’s previous rejection of the Child Labor Amendment precluded its subsequent ratification, the Court stated that this “should be regarded as a political question pertaining to the political departments, with the ultimate authority in the Congress in the exercise of its control over the promulgation of the amendment.” But, with respect to the language in bold in the quoted language of Article V above, the U.S. Supreme Court could determine that a constitutional amendment is unconstitutional. This narrow ground, however, is the sole basis upon which it may do so.	First, the relevant term is "precedent". You have misstated the nature of "precedent". Precedent is simply the addition of further information about what the law is. A legislature may set forth a law that say "If A, then (if you B, you will suffer consequence C)". But it is not self-evident in a given instance whether A is true, or B is true, or what exactly C refers to. In addition, law is an integrated system, so Law #39 may seem to contradict Law #12: does that mean that Law #39 doesn't apply, or is it that Law #12 (if #12 is a Constitutional provision, #39 is just wrong – laws exist in a hierarchy). Therefore, laws must be interpreted. "Precedent" refers to the creation of a rule of interpretation, one which is logically consistent with existing rules of interpretation (which are arranged in some logical hierarchy). If the Supreme Court establishes a rule that laws penalizing "hate speech" contradict the First Amendment (R.A.V v. St Paul) and therefore cannot be a law in the US, then any similar law is, by rule, also not actually a law. Creation of precedent itself follows rules, though ones that are harder to discern – this is what "jurisprudence" is about. For example, some justices believe that they should appeal to an inherent feeling of justice; others believe that a law should be interpreted according to perceived legislative intent; still others focus on the wording of the legal text (statute, usually). This does not involve appeal to popular sentiment. It does mean (usually) that law is seen to be a system of rules, and not case-by-case feelings.	While it is true that jury instructions are typically less than optimal, it is ideological hyperbole or cynicism to claim that instructions are purposely confusing. The ultimate source of the confusion is that the legal system has to assume (pretend) that it has clear-cut rules that any reasonable person can easily understand and automatically apply. In order to maintain uniformity of the law, there is an externally-defined instruction that a judge may read (rather than giving his personal spin on what "reasonable doubt" means or what the relationship is between "reasonable doubt" and convicting a defendant). Once the relevant body of government (committee of judges and lawyers) has established the apparently correct formula for expressing the applicable legal concept, they don't mess with it, until SCOTUS overturns decisions enough times based on crappy instructions. Legal professionals are trained to carefully scrutinze language so as to achieve a single interpretation of a given clause (never mind the fact that there turn out to be many such interpretations). Since they can apply these interpretive rules, it is assumed that anyone can apply them. But in fact, we know that people don't just use literal semantic principles to reach conclusions – but the law resist pandering to that imperfection in human behavior. There is a huge literature on problems of jury instructions, some of the better of which relies on psycholinguistic experimentation to establish that a given instruction is confusing or gives the wrong result. See for example Solan's "Refocusing the burden of proof.." (and references therein) that addresses the problem of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction, which has the unintended consequence of implying that the defense has an obligation to create a doubt (which is not the case, and allows conviction if there is the weakest imaginable evidence which hasn't been refuted). But who gets to decide what the improved instructions should say? The instructions have to correctly state what the law holds (where "the law" means not just statutes, but the trillions of relevant court decisions and applicable regulations). Thus there is massive inertia, and improved jury instructions will not come about quickly.	Prior to that act, civil procedure in federal courts was non-uniform (historical overview). The main problem seems to be that courts were supposed to conform to the procedure of the state in which the court is located (as mandated by the Conformity Act of 1872). The "has to" reason is that SCOTUS at the time did not feel that it was authorized by the Constitution to write its own rules when Congress could have done so, see Wright & Miller Federal Practice and Procedure. The root problems seems to be the Process Acts of 1789 and 1792, which in the latter case did not allow courts to set rules for actions at law, and in the former case required courts to apply rules in effect when the state joined the Union (regardless of how the rules changed subsequently).	Ultimately the answer (in the US) is the US Constitution. The courts pretty much have the unlimited power to interpret the law, and the limits on power mainly pertain to what the state can do. The length of the leash on the government depends on what kind of rights are at stake. The weakest and default limit is known as "rational basis", and comes down to asking whether a government action is rationally related to a legitimate government interest (such as stopping terrorist attacks) plus whether there was due process and equal protection. There are more rigorous standards (intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny) in case a law involves a "suspect classification", or in case a fundamental constitutional right is infringed. In the case of strict scrutiny, the government would have to show that it had a compelling interest in the action, the law would have to be "narrowly tailored" (i.e. does that thing and only that thing), and should be the least restrictive way to achieve that result. Roe v. Wade is probably the best-know example of that kind of review, which held that abortion laws "violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects against state action the right to privacy". A court would not order a party to do an impossible act. A court could order a party to do something which the party had argued was impossible, but you can interpret a court's decision to indicate that it rejected the argument. The defendant would not shoulder the burden of proving that the action was impossible, though they would have to counter the government's argument that the act could be performed if they believe it is not possible. (In the Apple case, the argument would probably be some Apple-internal document that says "Yeah, we can do it, but do we want to?"). There is probably an expense-related limit in that the courts would not order Apple to liquidate all of their assets to comply. But: if a case were to end up at the Supreme Court, the court is stricken with mass insanity and arbitrarily orders a defendant to do the impossible, there is only the option of impeachment and Senate trial to remove the offending justices, and that is just not going to happen. There is no higher authority that overturns SCOTUS.	On an issue of pure law, an appellate court decides if the trial judge got it right or wrong from scratch, and if there is a case that is a better match than the one that the judge used that leads to a different outcome in the case, then an appellate court is likely to find that the trial court's ruling is a reversible error. On an issue of mixed fact and law, or on a legal issue where a judge has more discretion in how the law is applied (like many evidentiary issues), a judge is given more deference, and the judge will generally only be reversed if no reasonable judge could have applied the correct law to the facts viewed in the light in which the judge saw them, and then, only if an application of the correct law to the facts viewed in the light in which the judge saw them would have changed the outcome of the case. There are a couple of ways that this standard of review is described, one of which is called "abuse of discretion" review.
When Is It Illegal To Show Emails That Were Sent To Me I emailed messages to a particular business that were replied to with the business having consistently giving rude and just-don't-care-about-the-customer responses and even grossly incompetent responses. So am I allowed to show these emails say in a youtube video meaning right when I open my email account and have the emails open? Am I only allowed to quote what the emails said in order to avoid some copyright violation or other law?	Technically speaking, such emails are copyrighted by the sender. However, showing such an email to a third party, or posting it publicly in order to comment on it would almost surely be a fair use in the US. In any case, such an email would have no commercial value, and so there would be no financial damages possible. A lawsuit over such a technical copyright infringement would, in my view, be quite unlikely, and even less likely to be successful. Indeed, filing such a suit would be one of the best ways for the business to draw attention to the issue, in an example of the Streisand Effect.	There are three main aspects to this: Its their website, and their terms of service. They can enforce those terms, or change them (in some appropriate manner). You have no recourse if they remove you, block you, or delete your account, for example. That's the measure that you would probably have, virtually every time. To claim damages, or litigate beyond just website access control, requires a legal claim. But there's a catch there. To claim damages, they need to show actual damage, which they wish to be compensated for. If you misused their website but no actual harm can be shown, the total damage claimable is zero, whether or not you followed their rules. Merely entering dishonest information isn't by itself harm. So they would have to show they suffered damage/harm because of that, which is directly attributable to your behaviour, was foreseeably harmful etc, or similar. They also need to consider legal costs, and ability to enforce, especially if you are in a different country. If for some reason the computer use was also illegal, then a criminal act could be committed and they could notify law enforcement. For example suppose you did this in the little known country of Honestania, where the law says that to prevent trolling and online abuse, anything posted on social media under any but your own legal name is a crime. Or suppose you'd been banned from the system and ignoring/evading such a ban was criminal computer use or criminal trespass due to the forbidden/unauthorised access (which can happen in several places). But this is purely for completeness; I guess you'd know if you were taking it further, into criminal computer use.	While German law indeed requires providing correct contact information it does not require the recipient to answer queries. It is there so that you can submit legal notifications. In your case I wouldn't be so sure that the information is not correct. However, even if the contact information is incorrect, there is not much you can do about it. This is reserved to the following groups by § 8 Abs. 3 UWG: every competitor; associations with legal personality which exist for the promotion of commercial or of independent professional interests, so far as a considerable number of entrepreneurs belong thereto, and which distribute goods or services of the same or similar type on the same market, provided such associations are actually in a position, particularly in terms of their personnel, material and financial resources, to pursue the tasks, under their memoranda of association, of promoting commercial or independent professional interests, and so far as the contravention affects the interests of their members; qualified entities that prove that they are entered on the list of qualified entities pursuant to section 4 of the Injunctions Act or on the list of the Commission of the European Communities pursuant to Article 4 of Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumer interests (OJ Number L 166 page 51); Chambers of Industry and Commerce or Craft Chambers. Unless you are a competitor you are out of luck. The hoster or other providers can't do anything and don't need to, as they are not required to check legality of their user's websites. It doesn't really matter where you are by the way for these laws.	Why use USPS to Deliver Demand Letter when email is available The answer essentially lies in NateEldredge's comment, and is consistent with Firefighter's Inst. for Racial Equal v. City fo St. Louis, 220 F.3d 898, 903 in that regular mail (and impliedly email) as a method of service is generally inadmissible "because the court cannot be assured that delivery has occurred". Even if the HOA replied to your email, phoog is right in that the possibility of falsification of email records may prevent some courts from admitting service by email.	Is that extortion? false advertising? or in any way illegal? Not at all. The owner of the site is simply exercising his right as outlined in the terms and conditions from when the user signed up. And giving users an option for continued use of the site (that is, for him not to exercise a right of which they were always aware) does not constitute extortion.	Am I as the user of this site in any way liable if the music turns out to violate copyright? Yes. In a similar way to if I give you “permission” to take my neighbour’s car. Only worse. Because stealing requires intent - you have to mean to do it - while copyright violation is strict liability - if you do it, you’re guilty. If the user that uploaded the item did not have the authority to give the site permission then the site does not have permission and neither do you. If you take reasonable precautions such as performing a reverse image source and verifying that the item appears to be owned by the same person everywhere and, perhaps, reaching out to them then your violation will be an “innocent” infringement which mitigates but does not eliminate damages. The only way to be sure with copyright is to know the provenance of the copyright/licences back to the original creator.	In all likelihood, the judge's order related to data collection and reselling is not legally enforceable. They weren't parties to the expungement action, so the judge doesn't have jurisdiction over them. And, the First Amendment protects the right to say truthful things pretty absolutely. Arguably, if the sites provided the information without making clear that it might not be current because records were expunged or corrected, there might be a claim for negligent misrepresentation, false light, or even defamation, but I seriously doubt that even those claims would hold up. The language in the order might cause sites to comply out of not legally justified concern, or just a desire to be accurate, even if it is not enforceable. So, it doesn't hurt to bring that information to the attention of such sites and ask them to take down the information. But, when push comes to shove, I very much doubt that you would prevail in court enforcing that order against them. Certainly, if you do nothing, they will do nothing, because they are not psychic and have no idea that the court order related to those records has been entered. Even a valid and enforceable order directed at a party over whom a court has jurisdiction is not effective until the person ordered to comply with it has notice of the order. And, there is no system that gives sites like that notice without you taking action to inform them of an order.	If you show that you received a message through WhatsApp that looks like it was sent by some person, then this is to some degree evidence that the person sent that message. Obviously they can claim that someone used their phone, or that someone forged the message and so on. The contents of the message may be hearsay. Just because someone sends a message doesn't mean the message is true. On the other hand, if someone sends a message saying "I'll kill you", that's not evidence that they were trying to kill you, but it is evidence that they threatened you.
Photo Moving Violation Tickets in DC I was driving my Out of State car in DC last year ( actually the car is in my Wife's Name but we are both listed as drivers on the Insurance Policy) when a Photo Camera issued 2 tickets for moving violations (11 to 15 miles over limit). I paid the fines ONLINE. Will DC DMV report the violations to my Home State DMV? If yes how would they know who was driving? I do not want anything on my wife's driving record. My Home state starts suspending license at 4 moving violations Will they report it to my Insurance company? Is this violation (11 - 15 over limit) considered minor? Is there something I can do proactively?	I live in MD near DC, and have been ticketed by the cameras in both DC and MD. At least for speeding and red-light violations (and I think for all camera detected violations) these are just fines, not true moving violations in that no license points are assessed, and there is no impact on insurance, provided the ticket is paid, unlike what would have happened had an officer written the ticket in person. One can contest the ticket, but it is not likely to be worth the time and trouble. This policy of not assessing points is precisely because there is no assured way of determining who the driver is with current technology, although cameras that can see the driver through the windshield and match him or her against a database by facial recognition may be coming. Currently a human reviews the images in an effort to rule out false positives and certify that an actual violation is shown. The name and title of this person is shown on the notice I get, at least from MD. What one can do "proactively": do not speed or go through red lights pay all camera tickets promptly (or file the paperwork to contest them). If unpaid beyond the deadline they turn into more serious violations that do carry points, just like failing to attend a court date.	You did not state a jurisdiction, but this sign is of the style specified by the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) which is used throughout the United States, so I will assume a jurisdiction which follows the MUTCD. The "Share the Road" sign is numbered W16-1P. (The MUTCD version just has the words and not the car/bike symbols; the latter might be a recent update or a local variation.) Its description reads: In situations where there is a need to warn drivers to watch for other slower forms of transportation traveling along the highway, such as bicycles, golf carts, horse-drawn vehicles, or farm machinery, a SHARE THE ROAD (W16-1P) plaque (see Figure 2C-12) may be used. So, as is generally the case for yellow warning signs, it does not have any effect on the laws which apply. (It is generally only white regulatory signs that do that.) Whether or not it is a "good idea" to share a lane, it is legal. Both cars and bikes are entitled to use the road, and if it's a road with only one lane in this direction of travel, then necessarily they must share it. Of course, they wouldn't typically travel side by side indefinitely, but they will be abreast briefly when a car passes a bike. California law, as an example, requires only that the car stay at least three feet away from the bicycle as it passes, when possible.	What §670 BGB basically says is that the default is that companies have to reimburse you for expenses that you incurred for interviewing with them. If they don't want to reimburse you, they have to tell you so in writing before you incur any costs. That way it's your decision if you still want to go if you have to pay for expenses yourself. It does not mean your expenses have to be paid, it means you should know beforehand whether they will be paid. So what I take from your story is that you never actually asked the company for reimbursement, expecting the Agentur für Arbeit to pay that for you. Well, no company is going to pay your expenses if you don't ask for it. And that's not a crime. You also never told the Agentur für Arbeit that you were not informed beforehand that your expenses would not be paid. They asked for proof, you delivered proof. It's not their job to find out how or when you got handed this written statement and if that constitutes a violation of §670. And as a little reality check: paying your expenses (probably something along the lines of a cab fare or bus ticket?) is way more cost effective for the AA than suing a small company for the same amount. Just the time of the lawyer filing the suit will probably cost more than your public transportation ticket for the next year.	An officer is allowed to pull you over for speeding and then decline to give you a ticket for speeding. So the lack of a ticket has nothing to do with it (unless you actually weren't speeding, not even 1 MPH over.) Simply having past felonies, however, is not a reason for an officer to be able to search the car. Without a warrant, he'd need probable cause, consent, or some other exception to the warrant requirement. It's impossible for me to say what happened here. Maybe your husband had an outstanding arrest warrant? Maybe the officer saw the gun from outside the car? Maybe one of you said "OK" when he asked to search the car? Or maybe the search was illegal after all?	There are multiple questions on different areas of law, but I will answer purely on any criminal liability arising by the drivers concerned and leave the question(s) on civil liability to others. The general rule to avoid creating unsafe situations appears to be in the Royal Decree of 1 December 1975, at Article 7, which states (via English translation): 7.2 Users must behave on public roads in such a way that they do not cause any inconvenience or danger to other users, including the staff working for the maintenance of the road and the equipment bordering it, the surveillance services and priority vehicles. Here are some specific regulations/offences relating to the railway crossing incident: Under Article 4 of the 30 September 2005 Decree: It is forbidden to stop or park a vehicle on level crossings. Carol may have committed an offence under Chapter 2, Article 2 of the 1975 Decree: It is forbidden to stop a vehicle or park it in any place where it is obviously likely to constitute a danger for other road users or to obstruct them unnecessarily... Dave may have committed an offence under Article 20 of the 1975 Decree: 20.2. The user approaching a level crossing must be extra careful to avoid any accident: when the level crossing is not equipped with barriers or traffic light signals or when these signals do not work, the user can only enter it after making sure that no vehicle on rails is approaching. ... 20.4. The driver cannot enter a level crossing if the traffic congestion is such that he would in all likelihood be immobilized on this crossing.	Yes. This doesn't remotely approach the threshold to which the excessive fines clause applies. Also SR-22 insurance isn't a fine, it is a requirement that you take extra responsibility because you are a high risk driver. In general, states have broad authority to regulate the right to drive a car.	When I move to Pennsylvania, will the State Jury selection system keep track of when I was called to serve in my previous state? and If I move to Pennsylvania from out-of-state, does my call to service in an out-of-state court system begin the exemption period from being called to a Pennsylvania state jury? This is a reasonable question. But the answer to both the title question and the question in the body text is "no." There is no system of interstate cooperation regarding jury service in the United States. Your service on a jury in one state is not a basis upon which you can be excused from jury service in another state to which you move.	I think the Washington law and order is fairly clear: you must stay home unless you are engaged in certain allowed activities. The underlying law, RCW 43.06.220(h) empowers issuing an order prohibiting "Such other activities as he or she reasonably believes should be prohibited to help preserve and maintain life, health, property or the public peace". Therefore I can walk my dog. When I do, there are a lot of people also out walking their dogs, so that provides a letter-of-the-law permitted exception to the stay-at-home order. Nothing in the order specifically addresses the situation where you pause your dog-walk to talk to a neighbor (the "appropriate social distancing" sub-rule only applies to recreational departures from your home). It is well-established that the central legal issue is what the "compelling government interest" is, and whether these restrictions fail on grounds of narrow-tailoring or least-restrictiveness. The failure to include "go to your brother's place for lunch, provided you follow appropriate social distancing guidelines" as a permitted activity is a candidate for not being least-restrictive. The problem is that the courts will not engage in an infinite regress of second-guessings about whether certain measures are "truly necessary". There is a SCOTUS challenge where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld that's state's order, but a SCOTUS order requires the state to reply to a petition by Monday. The "status quo" is that these orders are legal, until someone constructs a compelling argument that they are not, and that matter is then resolved in favor of petitioner by SCOTUS (which has not happened). So far, governors have prevailed at the state level.
Was my GDPR request not complied with? On the 12th of December I made a GDPR request to a major online retailer in the UK. While there was a minor email exchange with a chatbot to confirm the request, I neither received the requested data nor a notice that it will take longer than 30 days to process the request. I only received an email on January 11 saying that the request is now being processed. From my understanding, the company has 30 days to comply with the request or, with good reason, inform me that it will take longer (reference). Did the company violate the GDPR, and if yes, is there anything I can do about it?	The same page at the ICO website also lists what an organisation should do if they refuse to comply with a request: What should we do if we refuse to comply with a request? You must inform the individual without undue delay and within one month of receipt of the request. You should inform the individual about: the reasons you are not taking action; their right to make a complaint to the ICO or another supervisory authority; and their ability to seek to enforce this right through a judicial remedy. You should also provide this information if you request a reasonable fee or need additional information to identify the individual. Even if they did not inform you about this, the last two bullet points basically list your options. You can make a complaint (Art. 77 GDPR), or go to court (Art. 79 GDPR) requesting the online retailer to comply with your request. (Or do both). You can request a compensation for damages, but it is often difficult to prove if you have suffered (non-material) damages.	Your confusion might be caused by the fact that even with a contract, only the data necessary for that contract is covered under the GDPR. So yes, while there might be an "execution of contract" under the T&C, this would only cover necessary data. That means you can't ask arbitrary signup data under the guise of a contract. If you need to deliver a physical product, you can store a physical address. If it's an online service, you can store an email address or similar handle. But you can't mix the two. A physical address is unnecessary for the execution of a contract that's not physical in nature. Now, you mention "consent". Under GDPR, this is a distinct justification besides "execution of contract". You might have consent to store a physical address in addition to an online address, e.g. if you offer a customer to physically mail a password request form. This consent is additional to the contract. Also note that the bit above only covers the lawful reasons for the processing of personal data (article 6). You also have to obey the other GDPR rules, e.g. fully inform the user, make sure that consent is freely given, etc.	Cookies are information stored on the end users device and require consent¹ per the ePrivacy directive, even if the cookies or similar technologies don't contain personal data. Conditions for consent are defined by the GDPR. This was also confirmed by the "Planet49" case. 1. consent is required unless the storage of or access to information on the end users device is either strictly necessary for a service explicitly requested by the user, or necessary for technical reasons. E.g. functional cookies like a shopping cart feature in a web shop are fine, as are cookies used solely for security purposes or technical features like TLS session resumption. It is however likely that this cookie does qualify as personal data in the sense of the GDPR. The cookie contains an ID that lets you single out/distinguish this user from all other users, even though that ID doesn't link the user to a real-world identity. It is also possible to argue that the cookie is entirely anonymous, but the safer approach is to treat it as personal data. Similarly, other features of the website necessarily involve the processing of personal data, such as processing the user's IP address, if only for the purpose of responding to their HTTP requests. The GDPR's criteria for valid consent are mainly about ensuring that the consent is a freely given unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes. For example, consent can never be the default, it needs to be an opt-in. However, Art 7(1) GDPR says that the data controller has the burden of proof of showing that valid consent was given. The GDPR itself does not provide further guidance on what this means specifically. I would argue that it can be decomposed into two aspects: Showing that valid consent was given. The manner in which you ask for consent must enable a free choice, and must respect that "no consent" is the default. For example, you could archive screenshots of the cookie management flow to show that there is a free choice. You could archive the frontend software so that it can be demonstrated that the cookie is not set until consent is given. Showing that this user gave consent. There is a wide variety of opinions on how to do that. My personal opinion is that the existence of a cookie paired with a valid consent flow to set that cookie demonstrates that the cookie can only have been set in a valid manner. However, there are consent management solutions that provide additional insight, such as the user's entire history of giving and revoking consent. For example, the user's browser might generate a pseudonymous ID enabling that user's consent history to be stored on some server. Indeed, that would be personal data, and this would have to be disclosed transparently. It would not be valid to use the consent management information for other purposes, for example by using the consent management ID for analytics purposes. Storing the user's consent history is definitely appropriate if you have a concept of identity, such as for signed-in users. I have doubts whether this is also helpful on websites that don't have user accounts, and I have not heard of a case where the existence of such records made a difference. After all, such records can only be relevant if the user gave consent but later disputes this in a complaint with a DPA or in a lawsuit. Which approach to choose will depend on more specific guidance provided by your country's data protection authority, and on the risk balance appropriate for your business. After all, the purpose of such compliance work is not to be 100% safe from lawsuits, but to reduce risks from enforcement/litigation to acceptable levels. What is acceptable is ultimately a business decision. E.g. the only 100% safe way to do web analytics is to have no analytics at all, but that is not acceptable for most businesses.	Not legal advice - you should consult an attorney who knows your local jurisdiction. That's a general statement, but especially true here because the GDPR does not include personal liability for directors (or others) in the event of a data breach, but domestic laws may indeed do just that. The UK is one example where certain circumstances can lead to criminal liability for directors of a firm in the event of a breach. That said, your company should care. The fines for knowingly allowing a breach or not reporting it properly in a timely manner have been made more significant than the prior Directive. There are things you could do to potentially mitigate consequences in the event of a breach and a fine being levied on the company, such as aligning with best practices and getting certifications. In sum, the actual punishments for noncompliance will vary by jurisdiction, but any business that handles data in the EU should undoubtedly be ensuring it is aware of what, if any, obligations it has and taking steps to comply before May's deadline.	Article 32 of the GDPR requires companies to adequately secure their data when handling data belonging to EU citizens. This also applies to cross border scenarios where data is transferred between countries. Technically speaking, the GDPR doesn't set a standard for security: you don't have to encrypt your data, use AES or RSA encryption, or hash and salt passwords. It is your choice on how to secure your data, though the GDPR does mandate specific ways to secure data. However, not doing so opens yourself up to two consequences: The European data protection supervisor is tasked with the enforcement of regulations. A company can be forced to increase their level security if a valid complaint alleging that inadequate security measures are in place is made There is a significant amount of security risk, and if a data breach occurs, the GDPR allows authorities to levy heavy fines. Especially heavy fines may occur if it is found that the data was not securely stored. So the answer is: A complaint to relevant authorities can force the company to take action, or they will lose access to the European market.	There is a lot going on in this question, so I'll pick out some individual aspects. Last but not least, I'll discuss if GDPR even applies. Does the GDPR require consent for X? Almost always, no. Consent is only one of many legal bases of processing. A common alternative to consent is a “legitimate interest” where a balancing test is performed between this legitimate interest and your interests, rights, and freedoms. Consent is typically only appropriate if this balancing test fails, for example if you would not reasonably expect this processing activity to occur. It's worth noting that it's a reasonably common occurrence that businesses are sold or merged. This is not unexpected. In general, you would not be required to consent to such a transfer. What can a company do with personal data acquired through a merger/acquisition? The GDPR does not provide explicit provisions for this case. But it might be useful to think about the two cases where (a) the new company is a continuation or successor of the original one, and (b) where the data is transferred (“sold”) to an otherwise unrelated company. In case (a) where the business is continued as normal, there is no change. In case (b) where data is transferred to a separate company, things are more complicated. The original company would need a legal basis for transferring the data. But as mentioned above, there might be a legitimate interest. Arguably, such a transfer could also be based on Art 6(1)(b) if the transfer is necessary to continue to provide the service, for example if the original company would otherwise have to terminate service. Of course, activities like data brokering where access to data is granted to unrelated third parties would generally fail to be covered by contractual necessity or a legitimate interest, and would probably need consent – but that doesn't seem to be the case here. When a data controller (such as the new company) acquires your personal data from sources other than directly from you, then they are subject to the notice requirements in Art 14. They have to actively notify you about their processing activities. But because you received emails that mentioned the transfer, this condition might have been met. Of course the new company continues to be bound by the purpose limitation principle as detailed in Art 6(4) – they can only use the data for purposes that are compatible with the purposes for which the data was initially collected. Thus, the new company cannot arbitrarily widen processing purposes, though some change in scope is certainly permissible. How does the GDPR right to object and to restrict processing apply here? The Art 21 GDPR right to object means that if the legal basis for a processing activity is a “legitimate interest”, then you can ask for an opt-out. But in some cases, this objection does not have to be granted. An objection essentially requires the controller to repeat the legitimate interest balancing test, taking into account the “grounds relating to [your] particular situation” that you provided in the objection. The Art 18 GDPR right to restrict processing is an alternative to the right to erasure. It applies only in narrow circumstances, for example while an objection is being checked. It is likely that you were informed about the transfer to a new company about 1 month in advance, so that you would have been able to prevent this transfer by closing your account prior to the deadline. If the new company conducts processing activities based on a legitimate interest, then their presumably GDPR-compliant privacy notice about which you were notified will certainly explain that you have a right to object. Is the new company GDPR-compliant? That is impossible to tell, but nothing you've shown so far indicates that they're non-compliant. My largest issue with this story is that the new company is from Australia, a country with extraordinarily bad privacy protections (as of 2022). However, due to the way how the GDPR treats international transfers of data, this doesn't prevent Australian data controllers from being GDPR-compliant, although it does make it difficult for other companies to use services based in Australia. Does GDPR even apply? Whether GDPR applies to a non-European company depends only on whether they either offer goods or services to people who are in Europe (“targeting criterion”), and whether the monitor people's behavior that takes place in Europe. Factors such as your citizenship would be irrelevant. I'll ignore the monitoring criterion, and focus on the targeting criterion. I'll assume that you are in Europe (EU/EEA or UK). Whether a company is targeting people in Europe depends primarily on the company's intentions. It does not matter whether the service is accessible from Europe. Thus, it is quite possible that the original company was not subject to the GDPR. Then, any questions about GDPR, consent, and data transfers are moot. In contrast, the new company clearly mentions GDPR-compliance, which would only matter if they intend for people in Europe to use their services. So GDPR probably applies to them, giving you the full suite of GDPR data subject rights as (hopefully) outlined in their privacy notice. And as long as they notified you that they acquired your personal data in accordance of Art 14, I don't seen anything that they might have done wrong in respect to this acquisition/merger.	You could certainly allow twitter to delete the exchange, unless it is part of some record that the law in the relevant country require to be retained, which would be quite unusual. That would depend on the nature of the exchange, and the particular law requiring that records be retained. However, if the request is to be able to demand that Twitter delete the exchange, that would be much harder. In general a person or business is entitled to retain copies of communications, such as emails, sent to that person or entity. There is the "right to be forgotten" which applies under EU law, but that would not apply to records which a business needed to retain for its own legitimate purposes, and was not posting publicly, as I understand it. In any case Twitter is not an EU business, so I am not sure if the right would apply at all. (Twitter has an office in Amsterdam, so teh GDPR and other EU law clearly applies to it.) There might be some other basis on which such a demand could be made, depending on the detailed circumstances and the specific jurisdiction, but I cannot think of one offhand.	Per Art 3(2), GDPR only applies to non-European companies when their processing activities relate to the offering of goods or services to people in Europe, or when the processing activities relate to monitoring people in Europe. However, the word “offer” of this targeting criterion requires some level of intent. It is not enough for GDPR to apply that they're marketing to someone who happens to be in Europe, but GDPR would apply if they are intentionally marketing to people who are in Europe. I don't know what they are marketing, so I don't know if that would be the case here. Even if GDPR were to apply, it would not be the most appropriate law. Yes, there's the GDPR right to erasure, which applies under some conditions (though there's a pretty absolute right to opt-out from marketing). The EU's ePrivacy Directive provides more specific rules though, in particular that every such marketing email must offer a way to unsubscribe. Other countries have comparable anti-spam laws, potentially also the home country for this online service.
Definition of inhabitant in US Constitution? No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen. Shall not be an inhabitant? Isn't this the residency requirements? Why 'shall not' instead of 'shall'?	The comments have basically covered this, but: It's a slightly weird parallel structure ("who shall not be at least 25, and been a citizen for 7 years, and who shall not be a resident"). The Constitution is not written in fluid 21st-century English. But the obviously correct way to parse the sentence is that no one can be a representative who isn't a 25-year-old or older who's been a citizen for at least 7 years; furthermore, no one can be a representative who wasn't a resident of the state they represent when they were elected. With some parts of the Constitution (like the Second Amendment), the drafting results in actual disputes about the intended meaning. With other parts (like here), only one reading makes any sense. It's the same with the requirements to be President. The Constitution says "No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President," which could be read as "you're not eligible unless, when the Constitution was adopted, you were either a citizen of the US or a natural-born citizen." But that's a silly reading, so "at the time of the Adoption" is read as only applying to "a Citizen of the United States:" natural-born citizens are eligible period, and people who were born before the US was a thing but were citizens by the time the Constitution was adopted were grandfathered in.	There is a legal requirement for US citizens to have a US passport when entering and leaving the US, though there are some exceptions. (The exceptions mostly concern other kinds of documents that are acceptable when traveling by land or sea to Canada, Mexico, or the Caribbean.) The law is 8 USC 1185(b): (b) Citizens Except as otherwise provided by the President and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may authorize and prescribe, it shall be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid United States passport. There is no penalty for violating this law. And, of course, US citizens have an inherent right to enter the US. In practice, therefore, if a border officer recognizes that you are a US citizen without the required documentation, they are supposed to inform you of the requirements and then waive the requirement of section 1185(b) so you can enter. For more discussion, see What is the penalty for US citizens entering/leaving the US on a foreign passport? on travel.stackexchange.com. There was formerly a regulation allowing US citizen children of foreign diplomats to travel to the US on their foreign passports. This was removed in connection with the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative. It was at 22 CFR 53.2, which read as follows in 2006: (e) When he is under 21 years of age and is a member of the household of an official or employee of a foreign government or of the United Nations and is in possession of or included in a foreign passport; However, in 2007, paragraph (e) concerned the NEXUS program, and the paragraph concerning children in the household of foreign officials and employees was absent. The change was published in the Federal Register on 24 November 2006. The Department of State's [Foreign Affairs Manual] indicates that they continue to follow this policy despite the change in regulations; at 9 FAM 202.1-2 VISA-RELATED ISSUES WTIH U.S. CITIZENS, item (c) appears to have been last modified in 2011: c. Applications for Visas for Certain Dual National Children: (1) You should advise parents who apply for visas for dual national children that regulations prohibit the issuance of a visa or other documentation to a U.S. citizen or national for entry into the United States as an alien. The children of foreign government officials, however, may use their foreign passport for entry into the United States. (2) After the U.S. citizenship of a child has been determined by a citizenship officer, the consular officer may, to avoid delay or difficulty, give a written statement to the parents for presentation to carriers or immigration officials. The statement should make clear that the bearer of the foreign passport is a dual national child of a foreign government official or employee who is traveling to the United States on official business and as such may enter the United States on the foreign passport as an exception to the provisions of INA 215(b) regarding valid passport requirement. (3) A child under 12 years of age who is included in the passport of an alien parent in an official capacity may be admitted if evidence of U.S. citizenship is presented at the time of entry. A determination of the childs citizenship should be made by citizenship officer prior to departure from a foreign country and the parent should be instructed to have evidence of such citizenship available for inspection by the admitting Department of Homeland Security Officer. If this is indeed how your daughter got her US visa then the State Department's willingness to issue the visa presumably implies that CBP should allow her to enter with her Israeli passport and that visa.	Note that I am not a lawyer. All law code here is from the official Georgia Law at LexisNexis. In the case of Georgia, the law regarding a child’s election changed in 2008. Prior to 2008, a 14 year old child could choose with which parent to live, unless the judge determined that the chosen parent is unfit. As proving that a parent is unfit was not always easy, the Georgia General Assembly in 2008 replaced the unfit parent standard with a Best Interests of the Child Standard. This new standard provides more flexibility to the judge in determining custody. Some basic facts about how the law in relation to the child's selection of parent: A parent that wishes to modify an existing custody arrangement must show that a material change in circumstances has occurred that warrants a new decision by the court. If the child is 14 then the child's desire to select the parent may be considered as the "material change in circumstances". However the court will only consider the child's choice if at least two years have passed since the last custody determination. These aspects of the law can be seen in Georgia statute 19-9-3, article 5, which states: (5) In all custody cases in which the child has reached the age of 14 years, the child shall have the right to select the parent with whom he or she desires to live. The child's selection for purposes of custody shall be presumptive unless the parent so selected is determined not to be in the best interests of the child. The parental selection by a child who has reached the age of 14 may, in and of itself, constitute a material change of condition or circumstance in any action seeking a modification or change in the custody of that child; provided, however, that such selection may only be made once within a period of two years from the date of the previous selection and the best interests of the child standard shall apply. Note that the expression "The child's selection for purposes of custody shall be presumptive unless..." is the same as saying that "the child's selection shall be controlling (the decision) unless...". As to children that are between 11 and 14 the law states as follows (Georgia statute 19-9-3, article 6) (6) In all custody cases in which the child has reached the age of 11 but not 14 years, the judge shall consider the desires and educational needs of the child in determining which parent shall have custody. The judge shall have complete discretion in making this determination, and the child's desires shall not be controlling. The judge shall further have broad discretion as to how the child's desires are to be considered, including through the report of a guardian ad litem. The best interests of the child standard shall be controlling. The parental selection of a child who has reached the age of 11 but not 14 years shall not, in and of itself, constitute a material change of condition or circumstance in any action seeking a modification or change in the custody of that child. The judge may issue an order granting temporary custody to the selected parent for a trial period not to exceed six months regarding the custody of a child who has reached the age of 11 but not 14 years where the judge hearing the case determines such a temporary order is appropriate. (Note that a "guardian ad litem" is the same as a "legal guardian".) If the child is younger than 11, there is no expectation for the judge to consider the child’s preference when awarding custody. Besides the desire of the child, the judge may consider following factors listed under Georgia statute 19-9-3, article 3: (3) In determining the best interests of the child, the judge may consider any relevant factor including, but not limited to: (A) The love, affection, bonding, and emotional ties existing between each parent and the child; (B) The love, affection, bonding, and emotional ties existing between the child and his or her siblings, half siblings, and stepsiblings and the residence of such other children; (C) The capacity and disposition of each parent to give the child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education and rearing of the child; (D) Each parent's knowledge and familiarity of the child and the child's needs; (E) The capacity and disposition of each parent to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, day-to-day needs, and other necessary basic care, with consideration made for the potential payment of child support by the other parent; (F) The home environment of each parent considering the promotion of nurturance and safety of the child rather than superficial or material factors; (G) The importance of continuity in the child's life and the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity; (H) The stability of the family unit of each of the parents and the presence or absence of each parent's support systems within the community to benefit the child; (I) The mental and physical health of each parent; (J) Each parent's involvement, or lack thereof, in the child's educational, social, and extracurricular activities; (K) Each parent's employment schedule and the related flexibility or limitations, if any, of a parent to care for the child; (L) The home, school, and community record and history of the child, as well as any health or educational special needs of the child; (M) Each parent's past performance and relative abilities for future performance of parenting responsibilities; (N) The willingness and ability of each of the parents to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent, consistent with the best interest of the child; (O) Any recommendation by a court appointed custody evaluator or guardian ad litem; (P) Any evidence of family violence or sexual, mental, or physical child abuse or criminal history of either parent; and (Q) Any evidence of substance abuse by either parent.	It may help to start by clearing up some false premises in the question/comments: The Fourteenth Amendment does not "expressly list protecting citizens as a core responsibility of Government." The IRS does not define "U.S. person" as "someone that is born." The Internal Revenue Code has no bearing on whether corporations are considered people for purposes of political contributions. Then we need to clear up the main logical fallacy on which the question is built: Even if we accept that the Fourteenth Amendment requires government to protect citizens, and even if we accept that fetuses are not citizens, that doesn't mean states can't protect fetuses. That argument -- "States may protect citizens, therefore states may not protect noncitizens" -- is a straightforward example of denying the antecedent and pretty obviously untenable once you stop to think about it. Houses aren't citizens. Elections aren't citizens. Can state laws protect them? Foreign exchange students aren't citizens; can state laws protect them? How about the Canadian ambassador? The answer is quite well settled. The Tenth Amendment ensures state governments' right to enact virtually any laws to promote health, safety, and welfare, so long as those laws do not run afoul of some constitutional limit. Existing Supreme Court precedent makes clear that that authority -- known as the "police power" -- is virtually boundless. See, e.g., Bos. Beer Co. v. State of Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 27 (1877); Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. State of Ohio, 173 U.S. 285, 297 (1899); Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 398–99 (1895). While Roe v. Wade has long provided just such a constitutional limit against the exercise of that power to regulate abortion, it appears clear that protection is about to vanish. Without Roe, states looking to protect "potential life" will be free to enact virtually any law that would advance that goal.	The law doesn’t “defines a minor as a legal person below (some age)” It defines it as a natural person below (some age).	The list is enormous. For example, if subpoenaed to appear in a legal case, you must appear pursuant to the order. If ordered to pay child support, you must pay child support. If you are an executive in a company, you may not act on the basis of non-private information regarding the company. Your comment that "If it's not detailed on this list, you'll probably never be concerned with it, eg, gun registration laws and other situations that don't apply to most residents" applies to a number of things on the list, for example most people are not called for jury duty, probably the majority of people are not subject to property tax requirements. most people do not have to register for the draft. By adding "If X...", you can make these into universal rules – everybody that meets the filing requirements must file federal income taxes. Non-citizens have a few additional requirements, but they are a drop in the bucket compared to the general case, obey the law which applies to everyone.	This is controlled by 8 U.S.C. § 1401 which details who qualifies for "birthright citizenship". Including of course the condition mandated by the 14th ammendment, Congress is otherwise free to bestow such citizenship essentially as it pleases by duly enacted legislation. One of the cases that receives birthright citizenship is a person of unknown parentage found in the United States while under the age of five years, until shown, prior to his attaining the age of twenty-one years, not to have been born in the United States. So the presumption for young children found in the US is that they are citizens by birth. The law in particular requires positive proof that the individual in question was definitely not born in the United States. Lacking this, or it failing to be found prior to reaching the age of 21 years, they are citizens. For other cases, this will likely end up falling to the courts, who will decide the matter on the preponderance of the evidence. In this case it becomes the burden of the individual claiming citizenship to establish that they are a citizen. Birth certificates can be filed after birth, and can be submitted as evidence. The laws controlling the validity of birth certificates is locally determined. If there are other birth certificates from other countries, or conflicting witness testimony, then it will fall to the court to decide which case is more likely based on the evidence available. More accurately the burden generally falls on the entity making the claim about someone's citizenship (their own or someone else's). In a deportation hearing, for example, it falls to the government to establish the individual is not a US citizen. Deporation only applies to aliens, so the defendant must be established as such.	Shapiro v. Thompson was overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). See the Wikipedia article. In Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), the court notes and did not object to durational residence requirements imposed by states to qualify for the benefits of lower university tuition. In Vlandis the Court wrote: Like many other States, Connecticut requires nonresidents of the State who are enrolled in the state university system to pay tuition and other fees at higher rates than residents of the State who are so enrolled. Conn. Gen.Stat.Rev. § 1329(b) (Supp. 1969), as amended by Public Act No. 5, § 122 (June Sess.1971). The constitutional validity of that requirement is not at issue in the case before us. What is at issue here is Connecticut's statutory definition of residents and nonresidents for purposes of the above provision. ... The appellees do not challenge, nor did the District Court invalidate, the option of the State to classify students as resident and nonresident students, thereby obligating nonresident students to pay higher tuition and fees than do bona fide residents. The State's right to make such a classification is unquestioned here. Rather, the appellees attack Connecticut's irreversible and irrebuttable statutory presumption that, because a student's legal address was outside the State at the time of his application for admission or at some point during the preceding year, he remains a nonresident for as long as he is a student there. This conclusive presumption, they say, is invalid in that it allows the State to classify as "out-of-state students" those who are, in fact, bona fide residents of the State. ... It may be that most applicants to Connecticut's university system who apply from outside the State or within a year of living out of State have no real intention of becoming Connecticut residents, and will never do so. But it is clear that not all of the applicants from out of State inevitably fall in this category. Indeed, in the present case, both appellees possess many of the indicia of Connecticut residency, such as year-round Connecticut homes, Connecticut drivers' licenses, car registrations, voter registrations, etc.; and both were found by the District Court to have become bona fide residents of Connecticut before the 1972 spring semester. ... In sum, since Connecticut purports to be concerned with residency in allocating the rates for tuition and fees in its university system, it is forbidden by the Due Process Clause to deny an individual the resident rates on the basis of a permanent and irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence when that presumption is not necessarily or universally true in fact, and when the State has reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination. ... Our holding today should in no wise be taken to mean that Connecticut must classify the students in its university system as residents for purposes of tuition and fees just because they go to school there. Nor should our decision be construed to deny a State the right to impose on a student, as one element in demonstrating bona fide residence, a reasonable durational residency requirement, which can be met while in student status. We fully recognize that a State has a legitimate interest in protecting and preserving the quality of its colleges and universities and the right of its own bona fide residents to attend such institutions on a preferential tuition basis.
Does attourney client privilege protect communication with an employee? I will be starting a new job in the US soon. If I tell the company's immigration attorney a professionally embarrassing immigration issue I may face, are they likely to share this information with my new employer?	The attorney in question is not your lawyer so attorney-client privilege does not apply.	The only applicable law is the local trespassing law. If he wants, the proprietor can demand that the patron leave, and if the patron does not leave, he can be arrested for trespassing. It uncontroversial that the First Amendment protects racist declarations.	Go to know that you live in Washington. Per RCW 49.48.210, They must give you written notice with their evidence. Per RCW 49.48.210, section 3, you can (and should) request a review of the employer findings. Since the employer gave you the money, and you nor they saw any error until now, you may be protected under estoppel (WAC 388-02-0495). In the response letter, I would write something along the lines of " [Company Name] has paid IAW my expected rate and acted correctly when I received my money. I have also spent the money in good faith. Indeed, I still cannot see that any overpayment has actually happened. Please send me exact details why you believe that I have been overpaid, and why you believe that estoppel does not apply. Until this manner has been resolved per RCW 49.48.210, section 3, I request that you continue to pay my wages at normal rate for my time. I do not accept liability for the actions or inactions of [company name] and the claimed overpayment." Get receipt that the employer received the notice. Because it is in review, they don't have the right to garnish your wages. Challenge everything at the review. If something was changed or edited, challenge that. I would open up a new thread if they did that much. Best of luck	The statement "you don't need to put it in writing" is not an instruction, and should not be interpreted as on in lieu of other evidence (e.g. the follow-up question "you don't want to get fired, do you?"). It is, at best, a recognition that your concerns have already been noted (and at worst, a ham-handed threat). In the context of an at-will non-union position, it is legal for a boss to directly demand "take it or leave it, no back-talk allowed". The reduction in salary can't go below the statutory minimum, or otherwise circumvent any laws, but assuming that the new salary is per se legal, they can demand that you accept it and not argue. If this were a government position, there is a potential (but not guaranteed) First Amendment issue.	Since you asked, and it's a perfectly legitimate question, here's why it doesn't violate the Fifth Amendment (from Garner v. US): The Fifth Amendment doesn't say "you can't be made to say anything that hurts you." It says "no person...shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." The only time Fifth Amendment protection applies is if you are being forced by the government to make a statement that could open you up to an accusation or conviction of a criminal offense. It's fairly broad (if it would help prove any aspect of the charge, you can claim immunity), but it's also restricted (you can't claim it unless it really would tend to incriminate you). That means that you could only argue the Fifth Amendment if your tax return might help prove a criminal case against you (the fact that disclosing income leads to you needing to pay tax does not qualify as "self-incrimination"). But the amount of income is not one of those things that might incriminate you -- you can get income through all sorts of ways. The thing that is incriminating is revealing the source of the income, and you can claim Fifth Amendment privilege for that. So: The only time you could possibly claim privilege is if you were being forced into a statement that might tend to incriminate you in a criminal proceeding. A statement that makes you liable for tax doesn't mean it might incriminate you. Filing an income tax return isn't inherently incriminating. The fact that you have income not included in any other part of the return (illegal income goes under "other income") doesn't imply you've committed a crime -- lots of people have other income. The amount of income can't be incriminating. The source can be, but you can claim Fifth Amendment privilege for that if it might incriminate you. And lawful income under "other income" still might give rise to a reasonable fear of prosecution, so the fact that you're justified in claiming Fifth Amendment privilege in source of income doesn't mean you're guilty of a crime. Note that there are cases where you are flat-out exempt from filing tax returns under the Fifth Amendment: Marchetti v. US and Grosso v. US found that registration and tax on gambling could be blocked by a Fifth Amendment claim, which didn't even have to be asserted at time of filing, because merely filing the special return would establish you as a gambler (heavily regulated/often criminalized at the state level). The difference with the normal income tax form is that everyone (just about) files one, and so filing it doesn't mean you're a criminal. If there was a separate line along the lines of "Income from Illegal Drug Sales," that might be one thing (anything other than $0 is inherently incriminating). But all the questions are broad, and have many legal sources of income associated with them.	Submit emails in their totality Your testimonial affidavit can quote or cite them as applicable. There is no protection of anyone’s privacy in court. By the way, the email where admissions were made is probably inadmissible if it was sent were in the course of bona fide negotiation to resolve the dispute. If the other party objects they will be thrown out - I wouldn’t hang my case on them.	canada The Supreme Court has said (Descôteaux et al. v. Mierzwinski, [1982] 1 SCR 860): In summary, a lawyer’s client is entitled to have all communications made with a view to obtaining legal advice kept confidential. Whether communications are made to the lawyer himself or to employees, and whether they deal with matters of an administrative nature such as financial means or with the actual nature of the legal problem, all information which a person must provide in order to obtain legal advice and which is given in confidence for that purpose enjoys the privileges attached to confidentiality. This confidentiality attaches to all communications made within the framework of the solicitor-client relationship, which arises as soon as the potential client takes the first steps, and consequently even before the formal retainer is established. While the judgment somewhat conflates the terminology of confidentiality and privilege, these are distinct concepts. Privilege is the right of the client. It is a rule of evidence and has a constitutional dimension that protects against state intrusion. The duty of confidentiality is imposed on practitioners by law society rules. Descôteaux was in context clearly speaking about privilege and has been cited for this point related to privilege in many subsequent cases. See e.g. Maranda v. Richer, 2003 SCC 67 at para. 22.	It's a bit like talking to the police: anything you say might be used against you, so the conventional wisdom is to say nothing. It is a good rule of thumb. When you are paying a professional to represent you, why make things complicated by speaking on your own behalf about the same issue? As you point out, not everyone follows this rule. In some circumstances there might be benefits to discussing your case publicly, such as fundraising or deterrence. Whether the risk outweighs the benefits will depend on the details of the legal case and your role in it. Lawyers are likely to emphasise the following risks: If you are a witness whose credibility is in issue, any public statement could potentially become a prior inconsistent statement which is used against you in cross-examination. Again, one of the purposes of hiring a lawyer is to be careful about how you communicate your position on a litigious matter and reduce the risk of careless remarks having unexpected consequences. Speaking publicly undermines this goal. In Commonwealth countries, there is a significant risk that public comment on a case before the court could amount to sub judice contempt of court. Attempting to litigate the case in the media can be perceived as undermining the authority of the court. Lawyers are expected to uphold public confidence in the administration of justice and would be reluctant to condone anything that could be regarded as a contempt. This contributes to a culture where discussing active litigation is "not the done thing" and may itself cause problems with a witness's perceived credibility, aside from the risk of a contempt allegation. Speaking publicly about litigation is risky and the consequences are difficult to predict, which is why people often engage lawyers to do it. When the client continues to make their own statements without legal advice, it makes the lawyer's risk management job more difficult, so they are likely to advise against it.
Hospital billed me for services that I explicitly refused. Are there any legal ramifications for hospital? (well, my wife). Background - we lost a pregnancy early this year. Got pregnant again. Wife had some spotting during first trimester, became panicky, and rushed off to a hospital. The main thing they wanted to do was perform STD screening. We've been exclusive partners for over 7 years now and neither of us have ever had any STDs, so my wife outright refused. Doctor was flustered and asked what she did want done, and she said an ultrasound to check on the baby. They needed to do a urine test first (checking for HCG levels and what-not) and then after the HCG levels were deemed high enough, did an ultrasound (baby was fine). I wasn't there for the visit (I was out of town) but she called me while waiting for the ultrasound and gave me the full run down, reiterating to me her refusal to have STD testing done. A couple months later and lo-and-behold I get a bill from the hospital, including over $500 for the STD screening she refused. There were some other items on the bill that without question did not happen, so it is possible that this is a billing mistake and not simply them outright ignoring my wive's clear desires. As a result they either billed me for a test that didn't happen, or performed a test that my wife refused. Either way I obviously have no intention of paying for this. The hospital itself has been very obstinate about my attempts to get any information out of them. My goal here isn't some poorly-thought-out plan to sue the hospital for damages. Rather, they made a number of serious billing mistakes, to the tune of about $2000 that I absolutely should not have to pay (the total bill is about $3600). So far they have not been receptive to my attempts to fix this, and I'm trying to find any leverage I can to get them to take me seriously. I'm not above threatening to (or actually) taking them to small claims court over this. I would like to figure out what legislation or regulations might be applicable before I start throwing the word "lawyers" around. So, to recap: My wife refused some specific procedures. The hospital may have performed them anyway and definitely charged us for them (>$500). Are there any specific laws/regulations that this would violate that I can use to get them to take my requests seriously? Update After some more heated phone calls with customer service reps (I got out my grumpy voice, which is not my norm), they eventually assigned a manager/dedicated customer rep to discuss my case with me (took a couple weeks to finally get a call from them). They said they would look into it in more detail, and also suggested I file written requests for all hospital notes from my visit (which I was already doing anyway). After getting the results we determined that (not surprisingly) the procedures which we knew never happened really didn't happen. As a result of the manager's own digging they finally realized that some of the billed services never happened and finally removed them from the bill. However, I was told that the STD screening did happen, that the notes showed the results were discussed with my wife (they weren't), and that there was no mention of a refusal for STD testing in the notes, so those charges would stand. I fully intended to argue more (there were many mistakes in their notes so the fact that there was no record of us refusing the STD screening was meaningless, in my opinion). However, I got distracted by the holiday season. Fortunately, at the beginning of the year (aka a couple months after our last exchange) we got a phone call from the hospital telling us they were taking the charge for the STD screening off the bill. I'm not sure what changed their minds. All-in-all they took about $1700 off the bill. It's still far more than is reasonable (there was an expensive item which I contested which they did not change), but it's a big difference and I'm out of items that can be easily argued so...	There aren't any specific laws or regulations about medical charges. Instead, this is a matter of general contract law, where you have to agree. You have to consent to be treated, and a signature is taken to be evidence of consent. The law does not say that they have to ask permission for absolutely everything they do, the action just as to be in accordance with an accepted standard of medical practice among members of the medical profession with similar training and experience in the same or similar medical community as that of the person treating, examining, or operating on the patient for whom the consent is obtained This law insulates doctors from getting sued. In a situation where treatment is provided against a patient's instructions, you may have a cause of action for e.g. battery. In general, a doctor can't poke you, draw blood, make "offensive contact" etc. without consent, and consenting to one procedure does not "open the floodgates" of consent for any othre procedure. Of course, if the procedure was not performed, you obviously are not liable for the cost (and they are not liable for a non-occurring battery). This may in fact constitute gross negligence. During trial, the primary issue is likely to be whether there is proof that the procedure was expressly rejected. The doctor would probably provide the consent form, and that form may or may not indicate that the test would be conducted. It would not be surprising if the patient never saw an actual form and instead just electro-signed, having been told that this is authorization to treat. Corroborating witnesses would be helpful. From a practical perspective, especially if the billing department is being recalcitrant, this is probably a matter best handled by an attorney who would start with a formal letter summarizing the consequences of unauthorized medical treatment.	If they do a treatment which you didn't consent to and harm you they risk being sued. As such, they get you to sign a consent form to prove you agreed to the treatment and were informed about what was going on and any material risks. They had implied verbal consent from you which is enough legally, but there's a risk that if it went wrong you could claim you didn't consent, they lied about what treatment you had, and they illegally did it. As an example, they often drip something into your eye which can sometimes cause blurry vision for a while. If you had blurry vision after and crashed your car you could theoretically sue them because you say you didn't consent to that and they have no proof you did.	Consider that stuff "court costs" or "court fees." They are actually often things not related to the court, like environmental fee, or emergency medical something or other, or park poop bag fee. Pretty much whatever either the legislature or administrative decision makers what to put on there. And FWIW, if you were not texting get your phone records and bring them to court to prove that you did not send any texts in or around that time.	HIPAA imposes obligations on some people, but not all people. In the case of security and privacy questions, you would consult 45 CFR Part 164. A patient's actions are not subject to government sanctions, so a patient can provide or decline to provide email addresses following their own judgment. A healthcare or insurance provider would be required to securely keep PII under wraps. The regulations also do not impose obligations on unknowing potentially involved third-parties, i.e. no obligation is imposed on Google to know that an individual is using a Gmail account to transmit PII-related information. The medical provider has an obligation to store and transmit such information securely, which would mean for example that they do not send insecure plain text emails saying "Sally Jones at 12345 67th Ave SW was treated for a loathsome disease, we're coding that as 0102, and we want $500". That obligation is passed on to employees via employment-contractual obligations, for example that may dictate what computer or software you can use to do the job. If the provider passes the buck to the employee (and I assume that the employee is just an employee), they have violated the security rule. In that case, they may be attempting to mitigate the consequences of their actions or at least check if there were identifiable violations of the privacy rule. In the scenario where SmithMed provides all of the infrastructure needed to bill insurance companies, it is not a HIPAA violation to inspect computer logs, email etc. to verify that the employee has been complying with security and privacy policies. It would likewise not be a HIPAA violation to inspect third-party accounts (Gmail etc) to determine whether there has been a security / privacy rule violation. That is as far as HIPAA takes you. Whether or not the ex-employee has an obligation to turn over their email account information is mostly determined by the employment contract, but it is highly unlikely that any such contract has a "gimme your personal email on termination" clause. It is not inconceivable that the employee negligently used their personal account rather than opening a new billing-job only account. Also depending on the email service provider, it may well be a violation of the terms of service to hand over your account information. (Instead, for a certain email provider, the company is expected to set up and pay for a company account). Those are considerations bearing on possible legal impediments to turning over the email information. Needless to say, don't share passwords etc. because that exposes you legally, but that is not about HIPAA.	This practice is known as "rescission". It is legal under 45 CFR §147.128 in some circumstances. The regulation says (a) A group health plan, or a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage, must not rescind coverage under the plan, or under the policy, certificate, or contract of insurance, with respect to an individual (including a group to which the individual belongs or family coverage in which the individual is included) once the individual is covered under the plan or coverage, unless the individual (or a person seeking coverage on behalf of the individual) performs an act, practice, or omission that constitutes fraud, or makes an intentional misrepresentation of material fact, as prohibited by the terms of the plan or coverage. The law also prohibits surprises: A group health plan, or a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage, must provide at least 30 days advance written notice to each participant (in the individual market, primary subscriber) who would be affected before coverage may be rescinded under this paragraph (a)(1), regardless of, in the case of group coverage, whether the coverage is insured or self-insured, or whether the rescission applies to an entire group or only to an individual within the group. (The rules of this paragraph (a)(1) apply regardless of any contestability period that may otherwise apply.) Note that the regulation pertains to insurance plans, and not employers. The employer may in good faith believe that you are stuck with the medical bills, but their opinion does not matter as far as this regulation goes. However, the employer also does not have the right to "declare" on behalf of the insurance company that your wife was covered. If you assume that she had coverage because the employer (mistakenly) said you did, but there was actually no coverage, then that is between you and the employer, or possibly you and the doctor. A prior question is whether she was actually covered in that past period. The contract between the insurance company and the employer might hypothetically state that only employees are covered, and may have accidentally submitted enrollment information with mistaken information ("X is an employee"). Since there was no intentional misrepresentation (we assume), coverage cannot be rescinded. Also note that rescission is retroactive cancelling, not prospective cancelling ("henceforth, you are not covered").	My guess is the answer to this question is going to be in your lease. You likely signed a lease that agreed that you would pay accept this practice and spelled out what ever rights you have to challenge the billings. My guess is they are as limited as the courts will allow in Florida. And the only way to ensure access to those records would be to get the court to compel they provide you with the records. Perusal of the Water codes in Florida does not appear to directly engage this practice(I could have missed it). However it appears that there is code regulating the management of electrical limits the billing to no more than the actual costs to the customer of record(probably your real estate management company.) According the the NCSL (This refers to electrical service. I am assuming there is similar language used elsewhere for plumbing, or that the intent of the law is uniformity of these codes in all utility billings. Where individual metering is not required and master metering is used in lieu thereof, reasonable apportionment methods, including submetering may be used by the customer of record or the owner of such facility solely for the purpose of allocating the cost of the electricity billed by the utility. The term “cost” as used herein means only those charges specifically authorized by the electric utility's tariff, including but not limited to the customer, energy, demand, fuel, conservation, capacity and environmental charges made by the electric utility plus applicable taxes and fees to the customer of record responsible for the master meter payments. The term does not include late payment charges, returned check charges, the cost of the customer-owned distribution system behind the master meter, the customer of record's cost of billing the individual units, and other such costs. Any fees or charges collected by a customer of record for electricity billed to the customer's account by the utility, whether based on the use of submetering or any other allocation method, shall be determined in a manner which reimburses the customer of record for no more than the customer's actual cost of electricity. Each utility shall develop a standard policy governing the provisions of submetering as provided for herein. Such policy shall be filed by each utility as part of its tariffs. The policy shall have uniform application and shall be nondiscriminatory (Fla. Administrative Code §25-6.049). Now here is where the 3rd party comes in. The 3rd party is the one levying fees for the management on your landlord. Granted if you follow the strings ill bet you find that the billing company is owned by the same company that owns your rental management firm. So your landlord can collect no more than what it costs to provide you with the service, but part of providing the service is employing this 3rd party utility management firm.	If you want to take legal action, hire a lawyer. If you want to puff your chest and see if they flinch here is what you do: First let's deal with this arbitration agreement. (There is probably also a jurisdiction agreement in there, ignore that for now.) First you need to find someone to to arbitrate and a place to hold the arbitration. I suggest a babysitter, dog-walker, friend, whatever... just make sure it is a real person. You write them a letter saying that you are exercising the dispute resolution set forth in the terms and that you propose an arbitration by [insert person's name here] to take place at [location] on [date and time]. You are going to mail this to a physical address and should include a sentence asking them to let you know within 30 days if this schedule works for them. Also tell them that you prefer to communicate via email and provide an email address. Mail this letter. Just mail it plain old snail mail. In two weeks write another letter opening with a statement indicating two weeks ago you sent a letter and asked for confirmation of receipt, that you did not get receipt and would they please acknowledge. You have now puffed your chest. Pretty soon 30 days will run and you will go to the courthouse. Hopefully this will have gotten them talking to you and you can get this resolved. What I describe next is an absolute interbreeding and then slaughter of various states' court rules. I hope that more-informed stack participants edit with gusto. If you can't resolve things go to the courthouse and tell the clerk that you want to file a claim in small claims court against [company] for [dollar amount] based on breach of contract. She will give you paperwork to fill out. You will pay her the filing fee. One of the things you will fill out is a complaint, one is a summons. It might be two in one. Here is an random example. It should be a simple form. Keep it all as simple as possible but be sure to describe the facts that support your claim. You might include the fact that they ignored your requests to arbitrate. Take this complaint and summons and serve them on your defendant. To do this you will need to get someone in the company's city to serve it. There are professionals who do this, mail or email them (if possible) the summons and complaint and pay them. They will you with provide proof of service. Now you have moved past chest-puffing and you've thrown a punch. Now you have initiated a law suit. They must file an answer. This means that they must get lawyers involved. You've gotten their attention and it only cost you filing fees. They must now file an answer to your complaint. They will also likely file a motion to dismiss and do one of a few things: 1. complain that you need to arbitrate 2. It will complain that the contract requires legal action in a certain state or county 3. It will complain that regardless of the contract this is the wrong court for any host of reasons 4. they will claim that you haven't stated a valid complaint 5. some other boilerplate stuff. You might have a hearing scheduled to deal with these things, you might deal with them all on a trial date. Now go back to the clerk at the court and ask for a subpoena form. You will have this served on the defendant also - it must name a person. This is a document that requires them to come to court at a time and place. Again, lawyers get involved to quash this. Lawyers = $ so you probably got their attention. Oh yeah, you need to pay a witness fee and travel costs. You can also serve a subpoena duces tecum which requires them to bring documents that you ask for. This needs to be served on the person in change of keeping records. You will probably pay the costs of the documents. The clerk will have forms for you and will describe the process in ambiguous terms while repeating "we cannot give legal advice." You've got your documents, you have a witness coming, you are ready for trial. If you haven't had some sort of hearing already to deal with defendant's motions to get this thing dismissed, you will need to deal with that stuff now. They will claim that arbitration is required. You tell the judge that you invited them to an arbitration that you set up and they refused to come. You show all the paperwork, including your contract with the arbiter. They will argue about jurisdiction, good luck with this one but it's a whole other problem that I can't touch here! If you survive these objections you will tell the story to the judge, you will call the witness and question her, you will present your documents as evidence. In small claims court the judge (or magistrate or referee) might ask the lawyer some questions about facts. Then the judge will bang his gavel and you wait for his decision. If you win come back here and ask how to get your money.	What would be the most reasonable thing to do? Live with it. Oh, and stop breaking the law with your automated emails. Illegality on their part does not justify illegality on your part. Also, it’s likely that this activity has caused your email address to be blocked automatically which may explain why they aren’t contacting you. From a legal point of view, that’s the only reasonable option. You do have valid grounds for a lawsuit for the value of the watermelon but the cost of filing will be a couple of orders of magnitude greater than the value of the melon so doing so isn’t “reasonable”. If you want to vent, the internet offers a wide variety of social media platforms for which that seems to be their primary focus. But that’s got nothing to do with the law.
In fiction, is it legal to state a newspaper wrote an article when in fact it never did? I'm writing a novel. I have a line in my book that goes something like this: He looked at the newspaper on the table. The Chicago Tribune featured an article that read, "Hank Reed sentenced to 20 years in prison." The Chicago Tribune is a real newspaper and the article above has never been featured in the newspaper. Is it legally permissible to claim that the Chicago Tribune wrote this article? I have the normal disclaimers in the front of the book, but I'm not sure if that protects me.	Yes, as long as it is clear that this is fiction. It is utterly common for fiction set in the current world to mention real institutions and people, and have them do and say things that they never really did or said, to fit the plot or just to provide background. Busman's Honeymoon by Sayers included quotes from the (London) Times about Lord Peter Wimsey's wedding, an event which of course never occurred. Rex Stout's Nero Wolfe novels frequently included imagined stories in the New York Times, as well as in the (fictional) New York Gazette. The Novel Advise and Consent by Allan Drury included many fictional stories by real papers (often the Washington Post) about its fictional events, as well as fictional acts and statements by many real political figures of the day. The list could be extended almost forever. As long as a reasonable reader would understand this to be fiction, there is no issue of defamation. Nor does any paper have a copyright on its name. As for trademarks, as long as you aren't trying to sell a fake paper under a real name, there is no legal issue. Go ahead, and I hope it is a great story.	Publication after the author's death is still publication. As you can see in this excellent chart this work is copyrighted for 95 years after the publication date under US law. If it had never been published, it would be protected by copyright for 70 years after the death of Lovecraft, the author (a term which has now expired). However, statements of genealogy would be facts, and as such are not protected by copyright. limited quotes to support those facts would be appropriate in a work of non-fiction, and would normally be permitted as fair use under US law. Such quotes would probably not be appropriate in fiction in any case. The exact wording of the genealogy would probably be protected, but not the relationships (who is the parent of whom, etc).	I presume that Dad will check with the college attorneys, so this is for information purposes only. Smith v. Daily Mail 443 U.S. 97 concerns a newspaper which published the name of a minor arrested for allegedly murdering someone (having legally obtained that information). SCOTUS held that The State cannot, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, punish the truthful publication of an alleged juvenile delinquent's name lawfully obtained by a newspaper. The asserted state interest in protecting the anonymity of the juvenile offender to further his rehabilitation cannot justify the statute's imposition of criminal sanctions for publication of a juvenile's name lawfully obtained There was a state law prohibiting a newspaper from publishing a minor's name involved in a criminal proceeding – it specifically singled out newspapers, hence the holding includes the mention of newspapers, but the footnotes in the case indicate that they "don't need to go there" (the equal protection question was unanswered), because "First Amendment rights prevail over the State's interest in protecting juveniles". The First Amendment right would be the same, applied to video, and classroom use.	You are referring to Michigan State Police v. Sitz 496 U.S. 444 (1990). It does not require or suggest a requirement of advance publication of any details regarding the checkpoints. The dissent mentions that "a sobriety checkpoint is usually operated at night at an unannounced location. Surprise is crucial to its method." This point was not countered or even mentioned by the majority. In this case, a state committee had created guidelines setting forth procedures governing checkpoint operations, site selection, and publicity. The mentions this as a background fact, but does not rely on the existence of these guidelines as a requirement for the constitutionality of checkpoint stops. It does contrast checkpoints with "roving patrol stops". Quoting from Martinez-Fuerte 428 U. S. 543 (1976), the majority in Sitz said: "at traffic checkpoints, the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers' authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion". There are state guidelines, some states have constitutions prohibiting sobriety checkpoints (lots of case law at the state level regarding this), and some state legislatures have made these illegal. In Sitz, the checkpoints were being operated subject to guidelines developed by the Sobriety Checkpoint Advisory Committee (of the State Department of Police). Federally, the NHTSA has guidelines on visibility and publicity towards the goal of effectiveness.	It depends on the nature of the quote. Quotes from Buddha, Aristotle and Lincoln are out of copyright. Otherwise, the two basic questions are: who put that quote in fixed form, and is copying it "fair use"? If for example you happen to be at a political rally where a politician makes a noteworthy extemporaneous quote, you could be the copyright holder, because copyright law protects the person who first puts the work into fixed form. (If he's reading from prepared text, the speech writer or his employer would hold copyright). You can also quote small bits from any source, such as "Don't think about your errors or failures; otherwise, you'll never do a thing". It would not be "fair use" to chop up a novel into a sequence of 2-3 sentence quotes. This assumes that you manually assemble the quotes from legal sources, such as a print copy of "The Martian". Whether or not you can legally pull the data from an online source depends on the terms of service for that site. That lets out brainyquote as a source, so check the TOS for whatever source you get the material from.	In the United States, I would strongly expect that an accurate depiction of historical fact (even if uncomfortably graphic) would be protected under the First Ammendment. Otherwise, the government could functionally censor the worst parts of history (as being too awful to discuss or depict), which is exactly the kind of thing the First Amendment is designed to prevent. There are three important categories of speech that are not protected: (1) "fighting words" directed at a person intended to provoke a fight, (2) words that infict emotional distress such that it qualifies as a tort, and (3) speech that court finds to qualify as "obscenity". Of these three, your game probably will not qualify for the first, since it generally requires speech directed at a specific person or people. I also suspect (less confidently) that an emotional-distress tort would not succeed since your game is not directed at any particular living people. Even if the game caused emotional distress to someone, your public release of the game probably could not qualify as a tort against that specific player who happens to experience emotional distress. The Miller test is used to determine if a work is obscenity. Wikipeida summarizes its three parts, all of which must be satisfied to constitute obscenity: Whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards", would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct or excretory functions specifically defined by applicable state law, Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. The first two are explicitly sexual in nature. I don't know if there is any similar prohibition against hyper-violence, but even if there were, as long as your game does not run afoul of the "lacks serious artistic value" condition, you will be on the safe side of the line. Note that none of this stops anyone from initiating legal action against you (which may cause headaches for you); it only stops those legal actions from succeededing.	Even within the United States, this would depend upon the jurisdiction involved. Some jurisdictions recognize a legal privilege of a journalist to keep confidential sources secret (also called a "reporter's privilege"), while others do not. There is a split of authority on the question within the various circuits of the U.S. federal court system, and there is also a split of authority between different U.S. states. The First, Second, Third, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have all held that a qualified reporter's privilege exists. In the recent case of U.S. v. Sterling, the Fourth expressly denied a reporter's privilege exists. Furthermore, forty states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes called shield laws protecting journalists' anonymous sources. Three U.S. Court of Appeals circuits, the 6th, the 7th and the Federal Circuit, do not have any controlling case law on the subject. Ten U.S. states do not have shield laws protecting journalists' anonymous sources. The U.S. Department of Justice, as a matter of policy, seeks to compel journalists to disclose their anonymous sources only under specified conditions where the need is great, but this policy is not a defense available to a journalist in a case brought by the U.S. government. In the absence of a legal privilege, the journalist could be incarcerated until the information is disclosed or the need for the information is moot, for contempt of court. Quite a few journalists in the United States, faced with that choice, have opted to be incarcerated rather than to reveal a source. If the subpoena is upheld, even if the face of a good faith effort of the journalist to quash the subpoena on the basis of a legal privilege or other grounds, if the journalist does comply with the subpoena, the breach of the non-disclosure contract is legally excused and cannot be a ground for the journalist to be legally liable to the informant.	To what cases is the judge referring to here? None: neither the quoted article (2023-06-02 05:57: Prozess gegen Lina E.: Stadt Leipzig verbietet Solidaritäts-Demonstration) given in the english version of Wikipedia nor the german Wikipedia version (Dresdner Linksextremismusprozess – Wikipedia uses the quote given in the english version. In the article itself, the name 'Hans Schlueter-Staats' is used only once: The arrest warrant against them will be suspended against conditions, said Hans Schlueter-Staats, presiding judge of the State Protection Chamber at the Dresden Higher Regional Court, on Wednesday evening at the end of the verdict. She only has to serve the remainder of the sentence if the verdict becomes final. Assume that, for whatever reason, someone added a fabricated quote, in the Wikipedia page, that is not contained in the given source hoping that nobody would notice (either because the reader can't read German or simply wouldn't look). It would be very strange for a judge whos primary duty, in a civil law system, is to read the law as written, to give a personal opinion about previous rulings (which was the reason I looked: to read the exact German text). Whoever fabricated that quote was obviously unaware of this or didn't care hoping that others would simply assume it to be correct due the given source of a newspaper that has a reputation as being a reliable source.
What means 'higher democracy' in the Constitution? Source: Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think (2008). p 332 Middle. The problem is not that he is asking the court to weigh impondera. bles. For while "weighing imponderables" sounds like an oxymoron ("imponderable" is from the Latin ponderare, meaning "to weigh"), it isn't quite. Often a judge can know, even without quantification, that one interest at stake in a case is weightier than another. In a negligence case neither the burden of precautions nor the probability and magni- tude of the accident that will occur if the precautions are not taken may be quantified or even quantifiable, yet it may be apparent that there isa grave risk of a serious accident that could easily be averted (negligence), or that the cost of the precautions would be disproportionate to the slight risk of a minor accident (no negligence). That is the "tolerable windows" approach that I advocated in chapter 9. But the key terms in Breyers test, such as "impact upon the publicS confidence in, and ability to communicate through, the electoral process" and the "importance" of a challenged law's "electoral and speech-related benefits," are so nebu- Ious that they cannot be weighed against each other at all. High-level ab- stractions such as "democracy" and "active liberty" can be arrayed with equal plausibility on either side of constitutional questions. They are makeweights. A decision invalidating a statute on constitutional grounds may seem undemocratic, but even if it is not a democracy-enhancing de- cision (as reapportionment decisions are widely thought to be) it can be defended as an application of the "higher democracy" embodied in the Constitution. So originalists are democrats along with loose construc- uonjsts. Likewise federalists. who want to honor the democratic choices made at the state and local levels, and nationalists who want to honor the democratic chojces made at the federal level. Googling yields nothing.	First, I don’t believe the author is using quotation marks to indicate an actual quotation, it is being used for emphasis and to group the words as a concept. That concept is that while it may seem undemocratic for a judge to overturn a law enacted by a democratically elected assembly, the “higher democracy” is that it protects the democratic institutions themselves by limiting the power of the legislature to what the higher law of a constitution allows.	I don't believe your premise is necessarily true. As the Supreme Court has held, a defendant can be prosecuted for perjury after being convicted for another offense at trial: The conviction of Williams, at a former trial, for beating certain victims is not former or double jeopardy. Obviously perjury at a former trial is not the same offense as the substantive offense, under 18 U.S.C. § 242, of depriving a person of constitutional rights under color of law. . . . It would be no service to the administration of justice to enlarge the conception of former jeopardy to afford a defendant immunity from prosecution for perjury while giving testimony in his own defense. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 62 (1951) (emphasis added). Now as a practical matter, trying a convicted person for perjury is most likely rare, since the prosecutor has already obtained a conviction for the underlying offense. Starting another prosecution for perjury might be excessive or unnecessary. But that doesn't mean it's categorically prohibited. Note also that perjury by the defendant can be considered by the judge to enhance the defendant's sentence. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 96 (1993).	If the Senate took the extreme measure of attempting to abolish the Supreme Court, there's nothing in the Constitution that requires them to confirm any of the President's nominees. However, attempting to dismantle one of the three branches would be nothing short of a coup d'etat. The president has some options here: He [the President] may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses [of Congress], or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper. -- Article 2, Sec. 3 Basically, this means that, in an extraordinary circumstance (total defiance of the entire Senate would easily qualify), the President can lock the Senate in their chamber until they straighten their heads out. And when I say "lock them in", I don't mean that figuratively. The Constitution requires that a majority of each house be present to constitute a quorum to do business. The President could order up to 51 Senators to convene, and if they refused, could order the FBI or whoever to physically arrest them and drag them to the capitol building. This was actually done in Wisconsin by Gov. Scott Walker in 2011 when 14 Democrat Senators fled the state to avoid the quorum needed to vote on a controversial bill that they couldn't block. It would be messy for sure, and as far as I know, has never been done with the U.S. Senate. But there is precedent for it. Additionally, the President could use his vacancy power and just appoint a justice. Legally, he would have to wait for the Senate to be in recess, and the Senate would likely arrange things so that never happens. However, if there were no justices left, he could just appoint a Chief Justice (the Constitution provides that there be at least one justice). Even if he did this in the most "in-your-face" illegal way, with both middle fingers extended, the only judge that can tell him he did wrong is the guy he just seated. Of course, the Senate would move to impeach that judge, and probably the President too for having appointed him illegally, but you need a supermajority of both houses to remove them from office. If you had such a supermajority, then the game is over at this point; there's no way the President would step down in such a situation (who would force him?) and we're in a civil war because we don't have a functional government anymore. In reality, this isn't an "interesting twist in constitutional law that the Founding Fathers may not have considered." It's that if Congress ever went totally off the rails like that, the President, or the people would have to step up and hope they could end the standoff peacefully without resorting to violence, because this is the kind of thing that revolutions are fought over.	Art. 1 Sec. 9(8) says two different things. The first says that "No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States". That means that the US cannot grant a title (hereditary or otherwise) like "Duke of Detroit", "Prince of Princeton". It does not prohibit the practice of speaking of POTUS as "His Highness, the President of the United States", likewise "His Elective Majesty" or "His Excellency", but early discussions in the Senate put paid to even calling a president this, and instead he is just called "Mr. President" (just as judges are called "your honor"). An appellation such as "Chief Justice" is not a title of nobility, it is a job description. We don't have titles of nobility granted by the government. There is a constitutional amendment, the Titles of Nobility Amendment, which was considered but not ratified, which is stricter on the anti-nobility statce. Then there is second thing, that prohibits officials from "accept[ing] of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state", without Congressional approval. Accordingly, the president, sec'y of state or a congressman cannot accept a gift, such as a car, from a foreign power, unless it is approved by Congress. Every congressional "exception" was approved by Congress; moreover, such benefits are not from a foreign power. The Speech or Debate Clause Art. I, Sec.6(1) in fact gives congressmen a privilege (immunity from arrest) which ordinary citizens do not have. So there is no connection between titles of nobility and free bean soup or whatever legal exemptions Congress may give itself.	The holding of the Miranda decision says: (d) In the absence of other effective measures, the following procedures to safeguard the Fifth Amendment privilege must be observed: the person in custody must, prior to interrogation, be clearly informed that he has the right to remain silent, and that anything he says will be used against him in court; he must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation, and that, if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him The body of the opinion also says The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court. although also He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law When SCOTUS says do this, that is the law. Since SCOTUS say can, will, and can and will, the only safe course of action is to say can and will. This page has some interesting discussion about the problem of the meaning of modals in a legal context. The Miranda warning does not constitute a contractual promise between the arresting officer and the arrestee, so "will" cannot be construed as a binding promise to prosecute and use the evidence in court. "Will" can only be construed as a prediction, as do "may" and "might". If the warning said "can, and mightmay be used against you", that choice or wording would suggest that the probability of statements being used against you is low – that would be totally misleading. The strongest modal should be used, because the probability is high that some statement will indeed be used against the person. Simply saying "can" suggests that it's a mere possibility, as opposed to a probability. "Can and will" is thus the appropriate construction for conveying the probability that your confession will be used against you. "Shall" shall not be used (it is confusing since it doesn't mean what the legal profession sometimes thinks it means); "must" is just plain wrong (it's legally meaningless to say "anything you say must be used against you", when many things that a person says would be inadmissible).	If you have something to say, you should have said it before now When a judge is about to hand down a decision the case is all but over. Just like figure skating at the Olympics, the points are scored even if nobody but the judges know what they are yet. The onus is on the parties to bring forward all the evidence and make all the submissions on the law that they want the judge to consider before and during the hearing. If they didn't then that's their fault and they can't introduce new stuff now. Now, it's not uncommon for a judge to share their thoughts during the hearing or in writing when considering written submissions. This is because their thinking on the law is at variance with what the parties are contending. The plaintiff says the law is X, the defendant says the law is Y, the judge thinks they're both idiots and the law is clearly Z. They will usually call for submissions on this because the judge's role is to decide the dispute between the parties on the evidence the contend -not to impose the judge's interpretation on them; by doing this the parties may relies the judge is right and a lot of the dispute disappears or they may convince the judge that they are wrong (it's not unknown) and move on from a clear agreed position.	Marbury V. Madison did not establish judicial review. It was simply the first case where that power was used. It was clearly spelled out in The Federalist #78 that this power would exist in the new constitution, and those who voted to ratify it understood, or should have understood, that it would exist. All that Marbury V. Madison decided was that the Supreme court did not have original jurisdiction to issue Writs of Mandamus That could be overturned, or the constitution could be amended to grant such jurisdiction to SCOTUS. That would not have any major effects on the US judicial system as far as I can tell. I suppose that the constitution could be amended so as to deny the power of judicial review to the courts. But I think the resulting system would be potentially unstable, and this would require a far more fundamental change than simply "overruling Marbury V. Madison" As #78 of The Federalist said: By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex-post-facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing. (emphasis added) The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents. . . . [W]here the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former. They ought to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws, rather than by those which are not fundamental. . . . [W]henever a particular statute contravenes the Constitution, it will be the duty of the judicial tribunals to adhere to the latter and disregard the former.	It is binding precedent for lower federal courts in the Ninth Circuit. They are required to follow it. It is persuasive precedent for the other circuits and for state courts. They may be persuaded by the reasoning and will consider the fact that the Ninth Circuit held as it did to be one factor in their decision-making, but they can make a different decision if they want to. Some courts are also more persuasive than others, although this is usually not explicitly acknowledged in written opinions. For example, state courts in the Ninth Circuit are likely to give more weight to a Ninth Circuit opinion than they are to give weight to a decision from another circuit. Cases from the Second Circuit are more likely to be persuasive than cases from other circuits, because of its reputation. Cases from the Southern District of New York are more likely to be persuasive than cases from most other non-local District Courts. There is also a personal reputation function that comes into play when looking at persuasive decisions. Some judges have a better reputation or a better reputation with a particular other judge, and their decisions may be considered more carefully. This is not explicit, but it means a good lawyer will mention the judge's name when a case in support of his position was decided by a well-regarded judge. Finally, the Ninth Circuit's holding would be persuasive precedent for the Supreme Court. You could write law review articles about this, but to dip one toe in: they may be persuaded by the reasoning and it matters to their function of providing unifying law, so especially during the process of applying for a writ of certiorari, they will care what different circuits have held on an issue and which circuits are going which way. But they are not bound by the circuit courts, and will overturn all of the circuits if they think that's the right decision. They did that a while ago with a statute about what it meant to use a firearm while committing a crime, for example.
Does travelling through the US border with encrypted files break the law? If I have encrypted files and I'm going to US, do I break any encryption import laws? Likewise, if I go out of US with those files, do I break any encryption export laws?	The Electronic Frontier Foundation, a San Francisco-based digital rights non-profit, specifically advises to use encryption when crossing the US borders. Read more at https://www.eff.org/wp/digital-privacy-us-border-2017. While the EFF doesn't say that using encryption would be illegal, keep in mind that the US borders are a gray area, legally-speaking, and US Government agents have a wide range of powers that would not be available elsewhere - within the US, or outside the US. The EFF also advises this: We appreciate and respect technologists’ efforts to find ways to help travelers protect their data. However, we recommend against using methods that may be, or even appear to be, calculated to deceive or mislead border agents about what data is present on a device. There is a significant risk that border agents could view deliberately hiding data from them as illegal. Lying to border agents can be a serious crime, and the agents may take a very broad view of what constitutes lying.11 We urge travelers to take that risk very seriously.	I think the law there is quite clear - you have 14 days to return the goods for a full refund, except for digital content, which you can't return once you started downloading it. That's what it says. The arguments that you try to give were quite obvious to the law makers. I think you can assume they were aware that "digital content does not have a physical form". Now if you purchased, but haven't downloaded or started downloading yet, then obviously you can get your money back. You came up with some theory that this is a "visual vanity item". You can't see it unless you download it. Once you download it, that's it. If you don't download it, you can return it. Let me repeat this: Your fancy analogies mean nothing. There are in the EU laws about being allowed to return goods for a refund. There's the general rule for buying in a store (no right other what the store offers voluntarily), online purchases (some days to return), and online purchases of digital goods (no return once you started downloading). That's the law. Your attempts at redefining the situation are totally pointless. The law says what it says. What you try to redefine doesn't mean one thing. The law clearly distinguishes several situations, and analogies don't count. What happens counts. You bought from a digital item from an online store that needs to be downloaded. And as soon as you start downloading, there is your right to return it gone. And your reasons for wanting to return the goods are completely irrelevant. You don't need any reasons, and having reasons doesn't help you.	If the tool circumvents Windows' copy protection (which is a computer question, not a legal one, but I cannot imagine a circumstance in which this isn't access-circumvention), then it is a violation of 17 USC 1201, which forbids "circumvent[ing] a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title". It is both illegal to use, and to "manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic" in such a program.	To do so I used some images and Gifs which may be under copyright but since I don't earn money for myself and there is no company backing me I was hoping that there is some protection for private persons like me who just want to showcase the project. Sorry. If your website is public facing (i.e. not password protected and available only to family and close friends), you need to follow copyright law. There is no exception to copyright just because a project is run by an individual for non-commercial purposes. I am also insecure about the GDPR regulations since I give users the ability to create an account and try it out. Your profile says you're in the EU. Then you need to comply with the GDPR. Is there any way to protect me against greedy lawyers and companies? Could I write something like: "This website is a peace of art" and save myself with arguments like "artistic freedom" or "free speech"? Nope. A controversial website run by Peter Sunde had at one point a "free speech" disclaimer (similar to the one you propose) posted. However, Sunde did never use this defense in court: Finnish court slaps Peter Sunde with €350k fine. If he had shown up in court, I am pretty sure the court would have told him that such a disclaimer has no legal merit. The only protection that will make you completely safe is to adhere to the law.	No If you break the law you are legally responsible. Can you make it more difficult for law enforcement to find and prosecute you? Of course, that's why bank robbers wear masks.	It should be pointed out that smuggling doesn't just involve illegal goods but also includes legal goods that are brought in without following proper procedures such as paying required duties. https://www.findlaw.com/criminal/criminal-charges/smuggling-and-customs-violations.html False Declarations; Exporting violations; and Importing violations. False declarations can happen when a person returns to the U.S. or enters for the first time. They must declare the value of any goods they are bringing in from overseas. You can violate the law by misrepresenting the value of the goods, omitting them from the declaration form completely, or making false representations. Also, if you fail to disclose leaving or entering the country with $10,000 worth of currency, you can be criminally charged. While I am not a lawyer I could see that the authorities might have an issue with someone pulling a stunt like that in order to "test" them. Even if there is no legal issue the person could be put through a lot while they run tests to confirm that nothing illegal is being brought in and there is nothing preventing them from making the process as long and painful as they can. Something else to consider they also have rules in place for brining other legal objects on board planes if they resemble objects that are not allowed. https://www.tsa.gov/travel/security-screening/whatcanibring/items/toy-guns-and-weapons Squirt guns, Nerf guns, toy swords, or other items that resemble realistic firearms or weapons are prohibited. We recommend emptying water guns, which must follow the 3-1-1 Liquids Rule. Replicas of explosives, such as hand grenades, are prohibited in checked and carry-on baggage. TSA officers have the discretion to prohibit any item through the screening checkpoint if they believe it poses a security threat. It is also possible to be charged with selling fake drugs and the local authorities can bring those charges and it can become their word versus your word about what your intentions are. In this case you might not be intending to sell them but it would be impossible to argue that you are not trying to pass it off as fake drugs. https://www.criminaldefenselawyer.com/legal-advice/criminal-defense/drug-charges/jail-selling-fake-drugs.htm Question: I sold a baggie of aspirins that I said was OxyContin to a guy at a concert. After the show, I heard that there were undercover officers in the crowd. Could I be busted for selling fake drugs? Answer: Yes. States and federal laws make the sale of fake drugs illegal, and you can even be charged with an attempted drug sale under some laws.	There is also the part that says "except as expressly permitted by law". In the USA, you are allowed to run the software. This means the operating system making the copy that transfers the software from your hard drive to the RAM of the computer, and all necessary changes there. And this includes modifications to relocate the software, or to protect it against certain attacks by hackers, and I'm confident that Apple checked that it includes translating x86 machine code to ARM machine code and store the translated copy together with the original. Similar things have been done already around 2000 or so, and no software manufacturer has ever complained.	Yes, it triggers the GDPR obligations Considerations: Can you surely identify those residing in Europe? In that case you should ask them to sign up again and confirm the consent. A lot of mailing lists are doing just that. Did they previously give consent and you can document it? If so, then you can argue that you have the required consent. Do you have business in Europe? If not then I don't think they would bother to go after you. You could just walk away from the fine. What other personal informastion are you storing? If you know who reside in Europe then you already have more info than just the email. The email address itself wouldn't be much of a documentation issue, SAR or Portability task.
Was the Iraq war an act of terrorism, according to the UK definition? http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/1 Reading the above legal definition, was the UK's action in Iraq terrorism? (and for that matter, were the actions in Libya and Syria terrorism as well?) The war clearly falls within all of subsection (2), was designed to influence the Iraqi government (well, remove - but that falls within influence), so 1)(b) is satisfied, and even without the ideological motive that the United States government later adopted (spreading Democracy), at the very least there was a political motive for the war, therefore 1)(c) is satisfied.	R v Gul [2013] UKSC 64 Quoting from the trial court, the judgement includes a jury question to the judge: “Re: definition of terrorism in [section 1 of the 2000 Act], would the use of force by Coalition forces be classed as terrorism? The judge replied: the use of force by Coalition forces is not terrorism. They do enjoy combat immunity, they are ordered there by our government and the American government, unless they commit crimes such as torture or war crimes … The Supreme Court noted that an ordinary language interpretation of the definition would include military activity, even if that activity is approved by the UK government. As a matter of ordinary language, the definition would seem to cover any violence or damage to property if it is carried out with a view to influencing a government or IGO in order to advance a very wide range of causes. Thus, it would appear to extend to military or quasi-military activity aimed at bringing down a foreign government, even where that activity is approved (officially or unofficially) by the UK government. However, an ordinary language interpretation isn't the ending point of the analysis (as demonstrated by the judge's reply which uses the principle of combat immunity). The Supreme Court left open the possibility that international law could make the definition narrower than the ordinary language interpretation, but they don't get to that question in this case. It is neither necessary nor appropriate to express any concluded view whether the definition of “terrorism” goes that far, although it is not entirely easy to see why, at least in the absence of international law considerations, it does not.	(I am not your lawyer. I am not here to help you. If you are reading this because someone has died, please stop and instead read the Scottish Courts and Tribunals guide to dealing with a deceased's estate in Scotland, or contact a solicitor.) Yes, in general. Section 1 of the Wills Act 1963, which is in force in Scotland, specifies that "[a] will shall be treated as properly executed if its execution conformed to the internal law in force in the territory where it was executed." Furthermore, Section 4 states that "[t]he construction of a will shall not be altered by reason of any change in the testator’s domicile after the execution of the will." "Construction" here refers to interpreting the language and effect of the will. So if the will was validly executed in England, it should also be in force in Scotland, and a Scottish court will give it the same meaning it would have had under English law. Furthermore, the same rule of validity seems to apply in both England and Scotland: Wills Act 1837 section 9. There may be other Scottish laws affecting the disposition of the estate that differ from English law. Relevant statutes include Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, section 21A, which seems consistent with Wills Act 1963. (I am trained in U.S. rather than English or Scottish law; I'm trusting the accuracy of the UK's excellent online legislation archive for the proposition that the statutes cited are in force in Scotland. I haven't checked the case law for contrary interpretations.)	Generally speaking, British courts, when making judgments on constitutional matters regard themselves as interpreting existing law, rather than creating new law. But technically speaking, any legal precedent established by a court can be interpreted as "creation of new law". For the avoidance of doubt, the sources of law in the law of England and Wales include: statute law, constitutional convention, prerogative powers, common law, and legal commentary. I may have missed some out and may edit those in later. Common law refers to the judgments of courts. So here we come to your question: Several legal principles and precedents were established by this judgment, and you may consider this new "law": The court held that prerogative powers are justiciable - courts can limit the scope of these powers The prerogative power in question had limits. It can be limited when its use has an extreme detrimental effect on the democracy of the UK and parliamentary sovereignty. What is important with point one is that the court recognised that this power has always existed, stemming as far back as the bill of rights in the 17th century. As such, the court is implying that it is creating nothing new, but recognising a law that has always existed. You will see a LOT of this when studying constitutional law.	The US has jurisdiction because you committed a crime in the US. Canada has jurisdiction because you committed a crime in Canada. As added complications, if you are a Mexican citizen then Mexico has jurisdiction and if your victim is Chinese then China has jurisdiction. If you get arrested on an Interpol warrant in Spain then Spain has jurisdiction. And so on ... Your implicit assumption is that jurisdiction is exclusive, it isn't. Any country (or sub-national jurisdiction) that claims jurisdiction has jurisdiction, at least to the extent of testing that claim. Whether any given polity has jurisdiction depends on the particular law involved, some laws are only applicable within that countries borders others are extra-territorial, some are applicable to citizens but not non-citizens or vice-versa, etc.	So Maryland is a Defimation Per Se state, and lists accusations of moral turpitude, criminal conduct, or fraud. I would say on the second statement about offering support ot Hamas and/or Hezbollah, which are considered terrorist organizations. Being buddies with Louis Farakhan's buddy is likely not a Per Se defamatory statement but a Per Quod meaning you would have to prove damages from this false assertion. Remember that just because you disagree with his political positions does not mean you aren't capable of sitting down with him for a friendly happy hour debate over politics. Lots of people have good friends who they debate politics with and will still be friendly with. I would make certain that you go through your history of statements on social media and in public to make certain you don't have anything that can be construed as supporting political beliefs that these organizations support (even if you don't support those organization's methods of obtaining their political goal). Do not limit yourself to just material support (donating things of value to them). I'm not for the purposes of this answer going to comment on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, but if your political opinions on the matter are in favor of Palestine, the statements above, while hyperbolic, are not totally out of line and thus defamitory, since all of the accused associations against you are also big names in pro-Palestine support circles. Try to also look for any statements where, unprompted, you are critical of the statements of the three false associations. As always, you should discuss specifics with a lawyer specializing in this matter. Most firms will offer a consultation for free so you can discuss the case and the specifics and get advice as to what you should do. I do not think you will be awarded much beyond basic actual damages and legal fees from the guy, since the statements have not caused you any damages such as loss of job or becoming a target of government investigation by law enforcement agencies.	You can certainly do so: it's been done many times in the past, and can be done even with a written constitution. The most recent famous example that I know of would be how the Nazi party used the Enabling Act, 1933 and Reichstag Fire Decree, 1933 to amend the constitution by essentially neutering all the safeguards, and used force to ensure that they could stay in power. Julius Caesar's reforms follow in a similar vein. For someone to successfully force change like this, you generally need a political system that is unstable and has no strong (or at least effective) checks and balances. Additionally, you need the support of the military because otherwise they will generally support the existing structure. Other less extreme examples I can think of where a system has changed to another system would be former colonies adopting new constitutions (e.g. Ireland and Pakistan), or where there has been significant change in the country's model (e.g. South Africa). Again, you need support, but this time it is within the existing political and judicial framework.	The answer provided by Dale M is half right, but there are a few things that I think are wrong. Firstly, the actual reality of the situation doesn't matter. What matters is that you act in a reasonable manner, performing assessments of the situation as a reasonable person would do. If you misread the situation, and end up killing a police officer that was acting in a lawful manner, it doesn't necessarily mean you were acting unlawfully yourself. Because police officers are generally exposed to situations where they would be forced to use their firearm, that obviously would impact how a reasonable person would see the situation, but the test for reasonableness would not go out the window. In addition, even if you were found to not be acting in a reasonable manner, there is certainly a question if you would be found guilty of a lesser charge of manslaughter rather than murder. It's possible the self-defence claim would be upheld as an imperfect defence.	"Law" is actually a very broad term, which encompasses statutes, rules, regulations, precedent and I'm sure some other things that I'm forgetting. The popular understanding of "law" is the statute, which involves Congress (at the federal level) or the legislature (and the state level). That is the kind of law that we say is "passed". At the federal level, some number of representatives or senators will introduce a bill into the House or Senate, and it is discussed in a relevant committee; if it is approved, it moves to debate by the whole House / Senate and if it passes it moves to the other house. Once it has passed both the House and Senate, it goes to the President where it may be signed, rejected, or ignored. If signed, it becomes "a law", if rejected (vetoed) it can become law anyhow if it gains a 2/3 majority vote in both houses. If the President ignores it ("pocket veto"), it becomes law in 10 days (Sunday is not a day), unless Congress is not in session. Oh, and, that's just the tip of the iceberg. At the state level, there is a similar process, with the further option of referenda and initiatives. In the former case, a particular law will have been passed by the legislature and then it is put to a popular vote for affirmation / overturning, and in the latter case a new law is proposed by the people (generally through a petitioning process) and then voted on by the populace. There is a fair amount of variation on how this works and what can be done, by state. A law can be repealed (withdrawn) by passing a law that repeals a given part of the existing law, and it can be re-written. The Supreme Court of the jurisdiction can also withdraw a (part of a) law if it is found to be unconstitutional. No foreign body can override US law, although if the US is bound by treaty (which necessarily involves another country) then we might have to do whatever that treaty says, because we approved the treaty. One limit on what we can be forced into by treaties is that a treaty cannot violate the constitution. The largest source of law in the US is actually not statutory, it is regulatory law, where a regulatory agency writes rules with the force of law (so really, it is law). In that case, there has to be a statutory basis, where at the federal level a law is passed empowering an agency to write rules, where the scope of the regulation is supposed to be related to the empowering statute in some manner. In that case, there is a vetting process, but basically no voting, just an announcement, some discussion, and eventually the rules are set. Analogous processes exist at the state level. We also have various county and city governmental bodies, where e.g. the city council can vote to create a law; or, they can empower an agency to write regulations. Yet another source of law is the Executive Order, where the president can decree that such and such will be the case (as long as it has something to do with what the executive branch does). These are somewhat limited in scope, but every president seems to like to test what that limit is. Governors get to do it too! And lastly, courts have an indirect power to make law, by ruling on how an existing law is to be interpreted (as well as ruling that a law or part of a law is unconstitutional).
Can I use "Donald Trump" in my brand name? I am creating an apparel brand and want to use the words "Donald Trump" in the company name. Is this illegal? I will be selling political apparel.	If you are Donald Trump posting under an assumed name then it is illegal, because he is currently president of the USA and not supposed to run any businesses. If you are not Donald Trump, then be aware that Donald Trump owns a trademark for "Donald Trump" according to this site https://onlinetrademarkattorneys.com/donald-trump-trademarks/ so you will be infringing on his trademark.	From your question(s), as well as your various comments, I understand you to have two general inquiries: 1. Is there any infringement of copyright laws if you use things like the titles of books, games, apps, names, address (and any other number of things) which you will then put into datasets that will be licensed for proprietary commercial purposes? You may freely put titles, names of people, places or things into datasets without fear that you are infringing on copyright or any other laws. That is clear. Copyright law does not protect names, titles, short phrases or expressions. Even if a name, title, or short phrase is novel or distinctive it cannot be protected by copyright. So, there is no point in discussing the doctrine of fair use in this context, because Fair Use is a defense, or a legal safe harbor that is merely an exception to copyright infringement allowing people to use a copyrighted works under specific circumstances. As I understand your intended endeavor, you will not be infringing on any copyrights to the extent that you are merely using factual data, like names of copyrighted things for the purpose of creating a dataset or an application to help access it. This is why I say you need not concern yourself with the test for Fair Use with regard to this issue. The Copyright Office states clearly, despite what people may think, that there are no exclusive rights in brief combinations of words such as: • Names of products or services • Names of businesses, organizations, or groups (including the names of performing groups) • Pseudonyms of individuals (including pen or stage names) • Titles of works • Catchwords, catchphrases, mottoes, slogans, or short advertising expressions • Listings of ingredients, as in recipes, labels, or formulas. When a recipe or formula is accompanied by an explanation or directions, the text directions may be copyrightable, but the recipe or formula itself remains uncopyrightable. Hence, these things are not registrable under a copyright. While something may be potentially attached to or included in copyrighted material, is not in and of itself subject to the protections of these laws. If it (whatever it is) cannot be registered for a copyright, it is not copyrightable. Because copyright registration/notices have been optional since 1989, when the U.S. attached itself to the Berne Convention, whereby copyright protection is automatic as soon as a work is “fixed in a tangible medium of expression” (written down, recorded, painted, etc.) it’s protected. No notice is required. Registration only becomes required for litigation or enforcement purposes. But this is really extraneous to your inquiry anyway, as far as it applies to the actual data. When you get into copying whole databases for your purpose, that analysis is different. 2. You want to "scrub" the internet for information that you intend to put into your proprietary datasets and use for commercial purposes, some or most of which is already in a database or some organized form, and you want to know if there is some sort of copyright or duty owned to the person who originally databased the materials? Since ideas, procedures, principles, discoveries, and devices are all specifically excluded from copyright protection, if you want to compile this type of information from the internet for the purpose of creating datasets, or searchable databases, this is permissible. That said, there are protections for existing databases under copyright law, provided under the concept of a "compilation copyright". A compilation copyright protects the collection and creative assembling of data or other materials. Compilation copyrights protect the collection and assembling of data or other materials, such that databases are generally protected by copyright law as compilations. Under the Copyright Act, a compilation is defined as a "collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship." 17. U.S.C. § 101. The preexisting materials or data may be protected by copyright since the selections of materials and the form they take in an existing database may be original enough to be subject to a copyright. However, the data itself is merely information and is not protectable. The Copyright Act specifically states that the copyright in a compilation extends only to the compilation itself, and not to the underlying materials or data. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b). As a result, "compilation copyrights" can't be used to place protection upon those things that are otherwise not protectable. In the case of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a compilation work such as a database must contain a minimum level of creativity in order to be protectable under the Copyright Act. Feist makes clear that even a copyright protected database does not hold the right to prevent an individual from extracting factual data from the database (so long as you're not copying the entire database as a whole). If you take an already compiled and copyrighted dataset in its entirety, you must obtain a license for its use. However, if you are merely amassing great amounts of data to then put into your own dataset, that you are free to do. The big issue will be (and you seem to realize this) where you will amass this data from. Some websites have specific licenses in place that say you cannot use or rework their content. However, many times these websites simply throw these license requirements out there for users to see, despite the fact that they may not be (and some would argue) are not enforceable. The courts have heard arguments that "contracts" (the end-user licenses) that protect databases and information on websites is beyond the protection available through copyright law should be "preempted" by the Copyright Act itself. The preemption argument goes like this: Federal law controlling something that is subject to interstate commerce or use, should be controlled by the federal laws. So,since the federal government has enacted the Copyright Act to govern any protections to any original works, states should be (arguably are) prohibited from having contradictory laws. Because of the ability of a federal statute to preempt state law, and the fact that the Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. § 301 sets forth specific preemptions, no state may create rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights provided under the Act. It is this concept of preemption that prevents copyright protection from varying depending upon the state where a work of authorship is created. Arguably, the same is true for the internet, and supposed contractual relationship created through licenses that dictates how non-copyrightable material may be used. In the case of ProCD, Incorporated v. Matthew Zeidenberg and Silken Mountain Web Services, Inc. the court examined whether an end-user of a CD ROM phone database was subject to the license, when they extracted a large portion of the database and made it available over the Internet. The database was almost the same as the type of data in the Feist case-The lower court rejected all copyright claims and found that the shrinkwrap license that controlled the end user's right to use the data was both unenforceable (as a shrink wrap license) and preempted by the Copyright Act. As a result, there was no relief available to the creator of the phone database and the end-user was free to extract the data and use it as he saw fit. However, on appeal this decision was reversed (7th circuit). The appellate court did acknowledge that the database (on the CD) was not original enough to be protected by copyright (finding no copyright infringement by the end-user); However, they did find the end-user was breach of contract, since the shrink-wrap license prohibited the end-user's conduct. What this tells us is that these licenses (on websites) may or may not be enforceable. While the 7th Circuit found a contract right pursuant to the license, despite the preemption argument, another appellate court that is more liberal may find otherwise. Also, this was a disk, not the internet, which is the "wild west" of information, largely unregulated and unlitigated as it pertains to the legality and enforceability of (some) regulations that do exist. License agreements for site use on the internet are everywhere. If you take a database from some site that has a license saying you cannot take their work and add to it, or whatever, and you do add it to other databases that are not licensed and then make your own dataset - chances are you are NOT going to be infringing on anyone's copyright. That said, you may be in breach of contract (the license) if they find out about it, and sue you (using it doesn't put you in breach; only getting sued and having a court determine you're in breach puts you in breach. It may be a distinction worth contemplation, but that is up to you). The safest, bet would be to get a license from them to rework the materials. If the material is generic enough, and will be changed enough, that you are creating your own new (copyrightable) work - I'm not sure how they would know you "scrubbed the data in contravention of their license agreement ( I have NO CLUE if there is coding or metadata attached to it such that it's identifiable in that way. I have not tech background and do not endorse taking what's not yours). But if they can and do know, they could cause problems for you. Lastly, I will just say that the internet is littered with sites that claim copyrights, or impose unenforceable licenses on material that is ripe for public use. Just because it says it's theirs does not make it so. The inverse is also true. Just because a site does not claim copyright to something, does not mean it is in the public domain. I would recommend either sticking to public domain/use sites for your scrubbing endeavors, or seeking permissions from the sites who impose licensing requirements. Short of that, I would recommend (as I already have) seeking an formal legal opinion to say that you are not imposing on anyone's copyrights (this could only be done once you showed an attorney every place you took material from, as well as what the material is), and that the licenses from sites with generalized information that may try to limit use, are unenforceable. I would do this before you invest a lot of time or money into something that is largely based on the accumulation of other peoples work product. I wish there was an answer certain, but there just isn't without seeing everything in the end.	I suspect contract law will affect the ability to do this. Terms like "USB" and the associated logos etc are intellectual property (trademarks, copyrights, etc) owned by the USB Consortium. If you don't comply with their terms, you probably cannot describe your product as a USB product. THE USB-IF LOGOS MAY BE USED ONLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH PRODUCTS WHICH HAVE PASSED USB-IF COMPLIANCE TESTING AND ARE CURRENTLY ON THE INTEGRATORS LIST. THIS REQUIRES THAT THE COMPANY BE ASSIGNED A USB VENDOR ID NUMBER.	A short phrase such as the band's name, or a song title is not protected by copyright, either in the US or the UK. The shirt as a whole is not protected by copyright, because you created the combination of image and words. The band's name or song title could have been protected by trademark law, but this almost surely doe snot apply, because: A. You are not selling anything, so trademark protection would not apply. B. The phrases are not now being used in trade, because the band is no longer selling music. Thus any trademark protection should have lapsed. The image of the singer may be protected under his "personality rights" but this usually only protects use for commercial purposes, which a shirt for your own personal use isn't. Even if there were an active trademark, the owner is not likely to find out and order you to stop for one short for personal use. In short, the actions described should be legally safe, but selling such a shirt to multiple other people would be a different matter.	One can certainly remove a trademark from an item that one owns, whether it be a car, cell phone, blender, or computer. Using some other firm's mark would not be trademark infringement if one did not try to sell the item. If the logo was complex enough to be protectable by copyright, copying it might be copyright infringement, but for such personal use it might fall under an exception to copyright, depending on the country. In any case a copyright infringement suit in such a case seems unlikely. For a car, registration is generally required, and must accurately specify the make and model. The same is true for insurance coverage, a falsely stated make or model would be fraud. If one were to sell the "rebranded" item, one would have to make the situation clear to any potential buyer, otherwise this might be some form of fraud.	Names like Champagne, Roquefort, Parmigiano-Reggiano and Aceto Balsamico Tradizionale di Modena have a special status under EU law, that these are Protected Designations of Origin, which states standards for the product and gives legal protection regarding use of the name. That limits what you can call "Roquefort" in the EU. These restrictions have not been legally relevant in the US and are still fairly widely ignored especially in the case of Champagne, although Parmigiano-Reggiano and Aceto Balsamico Tradizionale di Modena are not used as generic terms as Champagne or Asiago are. Violations in the EU may involve charges of counterfeiting, false advertising, or fraud. The essence of PDO designation is that it describes a product that is traditionally and wholely made in a geographic region and where the character of the product derives from that region (e.g. the grass that the cows eat). This protection does not operate in the US or Japan (as far as I can tell). There are some specific agreements between the EU and particular countries such as a wine and spirits agreement with South Africa, but PDO really only operates within the EU. Otherwise, the applicable concept is "trademark". You could not register a trademark for "Champagne" in the US, because that is a generic term, but you could coin a new term like "Gorgonzeddar" for a greenish-orange cheese, and register it. From what I can determine about Japanese trademark law, you similarly could not register "Sake" as the name of a rice-based drink, since it is a general term. If you had an unused name that you want to protect, you can register a trademark, and you would need to register that trademark in every country of interest.	A person isn't required to state their evidence that the claim is true when they make the claim, and as a public figure, a defamation suit filed by Trump would be judged under the stronger "actual malice" claim, meaning that the statement was made with knowledge that the claim is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false. You would have to look at the specific statement. It is generally not defamatory to hurl insults like "rapist!", "pedophile!", "criminal!" etc. against a public figure especially a political figure, since such word don't generally amount to an actual accusation of wrong-doing. On the other hand, a detailed but false claim purporting to relate factual events could cross the threshold. Hyperbole is not actionable.	It's more likely a trademark problem than copyright but it's not easy to identify which legal theory the mark owner would use to enforce compliance with their rules. My first thought was initial interest confusion. But if a person sees the logo what are they going to confuse it with? It's not a typical case where an infringing competitor uses the other's trademark to confuse buyers into buying the infringer's goods. Perhaps if buyers are confused they might NOT click a link because they don't recognize it. In this case Facebook loses a click. But they don't have a right that click so that's a stretch also. The misuse they claim is probably dilution. If someone makes a particularly crappy modification it could be argued that this tarnishes the brand. No confusion is needed for dilution, all that is required is that the mark must be "famous" and used by the infringer in way that causes the dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark. This is known as tarnishment. Tarnishment occurs when the plaintiff's trademark is likened to products of low quality, or is portrayed in a negative context. Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994). See Louis Vuitton vs Chewy Vuiton where Louis Vittuon lost when Chewy Vuiton got summary judgment. ...the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)... provides that the owner of a famous mark can enjoin "another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark. But the Supreme Court has held that the dilution statute "unambiguously requires a showing of actual dilution, rather than a likelihood of dilution." Moseley v. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433, 123 S. Ct. 1115, 155 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2003) So this requires that messing with logos actually diminishes a brand and that the company can prove it. I don't know of a case where any of these social media companies tried to enforce their rules. I came across a few blog posts about these rules indicating that the authors had contacted the companies, asking about enforcement theories; no social media company had replied to any of those bloggers.
Can a US state be charged with a crime in federal court? Like the title asks: I know that US states (and their agencies) can be sued by the United States in federal court (this is an exception to their normal sovereign immunity). Does this exception extend to criminal charges? If a state or a state agency does something which would result in criminal charges against a private corporation, could the United States bring charges against the state? Citations would be nice, especially if there have actually been cases involving this.	No, each state is a "sovereign" and whenever a statute describes a crime it is always some act committed by a "person" and these two categories are mutually exclusive. See, for example, US Supreme Court in U.S. v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 SCt 677 (1947): "In common usage, the term `person' does not include the sovereign and statutes employing it will ordinarily not be construed to do so." Repeated by US Supreme Court in Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe 442 US 653, 667 (1979): "In common usage, the term 'person' does not include the sovereign, and statutes employing the word are ordinarily construed to exclude it."	The law was first promulgated on June 8, 1940 By the 76th Congress. The original text is here. It doesn’t seem to be a particularly important piece of legislation and I can find commentary on it and I’m not going to read the debates - if you do, please get back to us. Two points to note, it was passed at a time when most of the rest of the world was at war and the US was quietly preparing to be at war and it seems to be intended to fill a gap in state law since conviction under state law is a defence under Federal.	The Answer Depends Upon The Facts Of The Case Related To The Forum Where The Suit Is Commenced The analysis depends upon some key facts that a person asking a question might not know, because they are not intuitively obvious and have actually changed in the last few years, without knowing the relevant law. When The Forum State Has General Jurisdiction Over All Defendants The most important question to consider is this one: Is the state in which the class action suit is brought is home to the headquarters of the US manufacturer (or a state where the manufacturer has a substantial equivalent to a headquarters)? This question matters because, if and only if the answer to this question is "yes" then, "general jurisdiction" would be present under a U.S. Supreme Court precedent established in 2014. If a forum state's courts have "general jurisdiction" over a defendant, this means that the defendant can be sued in that forum on any cause of action against that defendant arising anywhere in the world, regardless of any other relationship that the claim has to the forum state (except for claims in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts which can be brought in a U.S. District Court located in the same state, or in an arbitration forum pursuant to a valid arbitration clause that binds the parties, an issue beyond the scope of this question and answer). Until recently general jurisdiction over a defendant (i.e. jurisdiction over any lawsuit against a defendant without regard to the particular facts of the case) was present in any state where a company has a permanent office for the conduct of business, under half a century of precedent on the issue that traced back to a U.S. Supreme Court case known as International Shoe v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In the case of large corporations doing business nationwide, this usually meant that a plaintiff had a large number of states to choose from in which a defendant could be sued on any matter whatsoever which also facilitated the filing of class action lawsuits with plaintiffs from all over the world covered by a single lawsuit. But, in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U. S. ___ (January 14, 2014), general jurisdiction was limited to the state where the headquarters of the business is located, or another state the defendant is otherwise equally "at home." (For example, the state where Amazon.com chooses to locate its proposed "HQ2" in the case of a lawsuit against Amazon.) If so, the foreign plaintiff member of the class can probably join the lawsuit, since general jurisdiction is present. When The Forum State Does Not Have General Jurisdiction Over All Defendants But, if the forum of the class action lawsuit is not one of the typically one or two states where the defendant is "at home", then a U.S. Supreme Court ruling from June of 2017 that significantly changes the law of "specific jurisdiction" probably bars the joinder of the foreign plaintiff as a member of the class. This case holds that specific jurisdiction over a defendant arising solely from the fact that it sold a defective product in a particular state or country which it caused an injury to be limited to plaintiffs who actually purchased the product or suffered an injury in that state. So, if there is more than one defendant, the forum state must have general jurisdiction over all of the defendants, or must have specific jurisdiction over all defendants over whom it does not have general jurisdiction for a reason that applies to all members of the class bringing the lawsuit. For example, if the defective product was an airplane that crashed in California as a result of a defective product, everyone hurt in the crash could sue in a single action in California because that is where the injury occurred to all of them, even if the people on the plane who were injured or died came from different states and countries. Similarly, if the product was defective as a result of design work conducted by multiple large corporate defendants with different home states outside Colorado that took place entirely at a design collaboration workshop at the University of Colorado at Boulder, a class action including all persons injured globally by the defective products could be brought in Colorado, even if the injuries were dispersed all over the world at places where the defective products were delivered. The case adopting this radical change in the law of specific personal jurisdiction is Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty. (U.S. June 19, 2017) in which the court finds that "specific personal jurisdiction" (as opposed to "general jurisdiction") is lacking with regard to the claims of members of the class of plaintiffs who are not California residents in this case brought in a California state trial court (in an 8-1 decision with Justice Sotomayor dissenting). According to the official syllabus of that case: A group of plaintiffs, most of whom are not California residents, sued Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (BMS) in California state court, alleging that the pharmaceutical company’s drug Plavix had damaged their health. BMS is incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in New York, and it maintains substantial operations in both New York and New Jersey. Although it engages in business activities in California and sells Plavix there, BMS did not develop, create a marketing strategy for, manufacture, label, package, or work on the regulatory approval for Plavix in the State. And the nonresident plaintiffs did not allege that they obtained Plavix from a California source, that they were injured by Plavix in California, or that they were treated for their injuries in California. The California Superior Court denied BMS’s motion to quash service of summons on the nonresidents’ claims for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that BMS’s extensive activities in the State gave the California courts general jurisdiction. Following this Court’s decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U. S. ___, the State Court of Appeal found that the California courts lacked general jurisdiction. But the Court of Appeal went on to find that the California courts had specific jurisdiction over the claims brought by the nonresident plaintiffs. Affirming, the State Supreme Court applied a “sliding scale approach” to specific jurisdiction, concluding that BMS’s “wide ranging” contacts with the State were enough to support a finding of specific jurisdiction over the claims brought by the nonresident plaintiffs. That attenuated connection was met, the court held, in part because the nonresidents’ claims were similar in many ways to the California residents’ claims and because BMS engaged in other activities in the State. The high court finds that the absence of an in-state injury or injury to a resident plaintiff is controlling. It is not sufficient in the high court's analysis that the corporation is already subject to suit in California as a result of its conduct in California to most of the people in the suit. Instead of analyzing whether California has jurisdiction over the product liability situation, in general, the high court decides that the determination regarding whether California has jurisdiction over a suit against a particular defendant must be made on a plaintiff by plaintiff basis when "specific jurisdiction" rather than "general jurisdiction" is involved. Sotomayor's dissent in this case emphasizes implications of this ruling in the kind of situation posed by this question at Law.SE: Three years ago, the Court imposed substantial curbs on the exercise of general jurisdiction in its decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U. S. ___ (2014). Today, the Court takes its first step toward a similar contraction of specific jurisdiction by holding that a corporation that engages in a nationwide course of conduct cannot be held accountable in a state court by a group of injured people unless all of those people were injured in the forum State. I fear the consequences of the Court’s decision today will be substantial. The majority’s rule will make it difficult to aggregate the claims of plaintiffs across the country whose claims may be worth little alone. It will make it impossible to bring a nationwide mass action in state court against defendants who are “at home” in different States. And it will result in piecemeal litigation and the bifurcation of claims. None of this is necessary. A core concern in this Court’s personal jurisdiction cases is fairness. And there is nothing unfair about subjecting a massive corporation to suit in a State for a nationwide course of conduct that injures both forum residents and nonresidents alike. . . . It “does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,’” International Shoe, 326 U. S., at 316, to permit plaintiffs to aggregate claims arising out of a single nationwide course of conduct in a single suit in a single State where some, but not all, were injured. But that is exactly what the Court holds today is barred by the Due Process Clause. This is not a rule the Constitution has required before. I respectfully dissent. The most serious issues arise in one of the situations that Justice Sotomayor addresses which the majority does not adequately consider in the rebuttal in its own opinion, which is the situation where there are multiple possible defendants with different home states, whose relative liability is unknown or independent or mutually dependent. For example, suppose that the product has two kinds of defectively manufactured components manufactured by companies with two different home states in the U.S. (e.g. an electronic device charging bay and a battery) that are assembled by the customer after they are delivered independently, which, when acting together, cause the assembled product to be dangerous and cause injury even though the design itself is not defective. Under Bristol-Myers, there is no U.S. forum with jurisdiction over all injuries caused by these compound manufacturing defects that can allocate responsibility between the responsible manufacturers on a consistent basis. Why Didn't It Matter That The Drugs Were Distributed By A California Distributor? The high court is also unimpressed with the fact that the drug giving rise to the product liability was distributed by a California company, presumably because the cause of action in question in the case was brought against the manufacturer as a strict liability defective product claim, rather than as a claim against a seller of the product arising from a warranty that the product was free of defects arising under the Uniform Commercial Code or an express warranty. This makes sense if the California distributor was a wholesale company not in direct privity with the retail buyers of the products from retail pharmacies who were injured by the products. The wholesaler could be sued under the Uniform Commercial Code on its warranty to the buyers of the drugs, only by the intermediate wholesalers or retail pharmacies that bought the drugs. The wholesaler could also be sued on its warranty only if those direct buyers themselves suffered injuries as a result of the defective product. For example, a retailer might have injuries in the nature of breach of warranty liability in suits brought against retail sellers by injured consumers under the Uniform Commercial Code that the retail sellers would be seeking indemnification of from the California based wholesale distributor. But, Bristol-Meyers does mean that it is basically impossible for injured consumers who were not injured in the forum state to sue both the manufacturer of the defective drugs (where jurisdiction would be present in New York and New Jersey) on a tort theory, and the distributor of the defective drugs (where jurisdiction would be present in California) in the same action. So, it is effectively impossible in this case for all people injured by the defective drugs to sue all of the potential Bristol-Meyers case defendants in a single lawsuit. Statutory Considerations Existing statutory limits on federal court jurisdiction limit the jurisdiction of the U.S. District Courts in most cases of cases to cases in which a state court in the state where the U.S. District Court is located would have either general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction of the defendant (without regard to the fact that the case might be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction which pertains to the nature of the cause of action asserted rather than the ties of the defendant to the forum state). But, the decision leaves Congress with the option of potentially changing that statute which currently limits the personal jurisdiction of federal trial courts to that of a state court of general jurisdiction in the same state, as it already does in cases that are predominantly "in rem" (e.g. interpleader cases and interstate boundary and real property title disputes), in bankruptcy cases, and with respect to the subpoena power of U.S. District Courts. The official syllabus also notes that: The Court’s decision will not result in the parade of horribles that respondents conjure up. It does not prevent the California and out-of-state plaintiffs from joining together in a consolidated action in the States that have general jurisdiction over BMS. Alternatively, the nonresident plaintiffs could probably sue together in their respective home States. In addition, since this decision concerns the due process limits on the exercise of specific jurisdiction by a State, the question remains open whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the same restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court. Constitutionally, Congress still has the authority to vest all U.S. District Courts with jurisdiction over any case in which the United States treated as a single state for purposes of general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction analysis. This would leave the question of which particular U.S. District Court was the proper one to file in as a question of venue (which does not have a constitutional dimension) rather than a question of jurisdiction (which is subject to constitutional considerations), and many legal scholars have urged Congress to do just that. But, so far, Congress has not altered a status quo that does not give U.S. District Courts the maximal jurisdiction allowed under the United States Constitution. But, so far, Congress has instead taken an intermediate position on the geographic scope of federal court jurisdiction in the jurisdictional portion of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (which also limits the extent to which "coupon settlements" of class action cases are permitted). In particular (per the link in this paragraph): The Act permits federal courts to preside over certain class actions in diversity jurisdiction where the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5 million; where the class comprises at least 100 plaintiffs; and where there is at least "minimal diversity" between the parties (i.e., at least one plaintiff class member is diverse from at least one defendant). The court, however, may decline jurisdiction under certain circumstances, and is required to decline jurisdiction in certain others. But, while the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 allows many class action lawsuits which would otherwise be brought on exclusively state law claims in state court to be brought in federal court, or removed from state court to federal court, it does not authorize class action lawsuits that could not be brought in a state court which a U.S. District Court is located due to lack of either general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction from being brought in that federal court either. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 was favored by businesses likely to be defendants in future class action lawsuits (such as manufacturers), because state civil procedure law in some U.S. states such as California, is more favorable to class action plaintiffs than federal civil procedure laws related to class actions.	Clearly, British laws against e.g. murder, theft, fraud, and most other crimes were received into state law because those matters are under the jurisdiction of the states. States (and also to some extent federal criminal statutes) received British common law definitions of various crimes and defenses, but not British penal statutes (which often didn't define those crimes in the late 18th century). The statutory law of Britain did not apply as U.S. law at either the state or federal level upon the U.S. Declaration of Independence, except in isolated cases where a state, or the federal government expressly adopted it by reference in their own statute. The existence of British law, both statutory and through case law, informs how the U.S. common law was understood (something that was predominantly a matter of state law) and how concept in the U.S. Constitution, U.S. federal statutes, and state constitutions and statutes were understood (especially when terms from British statutes are used in a similar matter in U.S. state and federal statutes and constitutions). But, British statutes did not have direct force and effect in the U.S. after independence. As much as anything else, this simply reflect how the nature of statutes v. common law was understood in the late 18th and early 19th century. Nobody expected that British statutes would be directly applicable, so they weren't. There may have been instances where common law rules actually had their roots in British statutes that were mostly forgotten in long layers of British common law case law, and many statutes expressly adopting British case law also expressly incorporate selected relevant British statutes of generally applicability. But, no British statutes were applicable "automatically" in the U.S. For example, before Congress enacted the Naturalization Act of 1790, would a person born outside the US to a US citizen father have been a US citizen by dint of the US "inheriting" the British Nationality Act 1772 mutatis mutandis? No. Basic ways of thinking about what nationality or citizenship even was or meant would have been received, but not by receiving the British Nationality Act 1772 as U.S. law. And before Congress enacted the Crimes Act of 1790, would an American who levied war against the US, gave aid and comfort to its enemies, or counterfeited US currency have been convicted and sentenced under the Treason Act 1351? Not really. From the adoption of the Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776 until the adoption of the Articles of Confederation on June 11, 1777, as a practical matter, the revolutionary forced had very little actual control of the courts in an enforceable way, there was an insurgency against the British underway, and it was an ad hoc effort from day to day and month to month that was muddled through without a formal structure or guidance at a colony by colony level, or even more granularly within a colony. In the period from June 11, 1777 until the new U.S. Constitution was implemented in 1789-1790, under the Articles of Confederation, the situation was fluid and irregular. State governments made most statutory and common law, adopting their colonial era colonial statutes but not necessarily British statutes that their local legislature didn't adopt. Central government laws usually acted on the states, not directly on individuals, much like treaties today. There was little or no directly applicable central government legislation. Many topics, like citizenship, were simply ignored in this era. The U.S. Constitution adopted in 1789, and the initial acts of the First Congress to implement it, were a response to the realization that after the war and its immediate aftermath had settled down, that the newly formed country needed to regularize, institutionalize, and deal with a lot of governance issues and legal questions that nobody had had the time or resources or authority to deal with while a war had been going on. For much of this time period the Revolutionary War was in progress and it wasn't always obvious who even controlled the courts or had practice authority to enforce court judgments. The Revolutionary War was not concluded until 1783. It was an improvisation at first, and not necessarily a uniform one, since the Articles of Confederation conceived of the U.S. as many countries in an alliance with each other rather than an actual single nation that had to address legal issues uniformly. Prior to the establishment of the federal court system under the U.S. Constitution of 1789 that remains in force, the only institution of the central government was Congress and its committees, which functioned as a legislative body, a body selecting people with executive authority, and as a court of last resort from state court judgments. Everything was carried out at the state level except for courts-martial. Structurally, the Articles of Confederation were a fused system, akin to the U.K. Parliament which had its highest court of appeals and its prime ministership fused with the legislative authority of parliament, layered on top of 13 separate sovereign state governments.	There are a number of areas in which the US states can pass laws only to the extend that they do not conflict with Federal laws passed by Congress. When a federal law clearly says that states may not pass laws on a given subject, the issue is clear. When it specifically invites state laws, the issue is also clear. But when a Federal law imposes certain regulations in a given area, it may not be clear if a state may go beyond the Federal requirements. Sometimes it can. For example, there is a Federal Minimum Wage. But states are free to impose higher minimum wage levels, and some have done so. So when a court decision or legal article says "Congress having occupied the field" it means that a set of Federal laws is intended to be a compelte regulation of a given area, and states may not add additional regulations of their own in that area. I am not sure what rules apply to disclosure of information by the Capitol police.	Be careful: from the Wikipedia article, it appears that there is a state criminal trial and there will be a federal criminal trial. In addition, there is a federal civil suit which incorporates some stats law claims. The defense in each trial may be different. Have you read the complaint in the civil case? As an example, count 1 alleges, in paragraph 214, that the defendants' actions were "without legal cause." An obvious defense is to show that the actions were actually justified under the law. The law under which they would have been justified would be state law. It's still possible that the state law justification isn't sufficient, but that is another point to be argued in court. If they can't prevail in showing that state law did authorize their actions then the act was certainly unlawful under both state and federal law. Do defendants have standing to invoke self-defense given the context or did they give this up at some point in time? Standing is a threshold that plaintiffs must meet. But defendants can certainly argue self defense. Whether they can prevail on that argument depends on the facts of the case as determined by the court, in particular by the "finder of fact," which is the jury in a jury trial and the judge in a bench trial. The facts that I'm aware of in the public record suggest that the defendants would not prevail on such an argument, but that doesn't deprive them of the right to advance it in court. If someone claims that Arbery was grabbing for the shotgun then the defendants have a right to introduce any evidence of that fact that they may have. It is for the finder of fact to judge the credibility of the evidence.	Yes, there is legal precedent against this that would only apply to a government employee. First, let's discuss the private sector. In this case, you are a private employee that comes to your place of work and accuses you of "stealing the cookies from the cookie jar" which is a serious criminal offense. They wish to talk and your boss is in the room. You plead the 5th, but your boss says you're fired if you don't talk to the cops. This is legal because you still have the right to refuse to talk, you just lose your job. A private employer has the right to free association, and wants nothing to do with cookie thieves, alleged or actual. However, in the government employ, your boss is an agent of the government. This same situation is different because the government pays the boss and the agent... so in essence the government is saying talk or be fired. This is unconstitutional as the government cannot retalitate against you for your refusal to talk. Generally, in order to talk to you, the investigator would need either a signed Garrity Statement or a Signed Kalkines Statement. The former is a statement saying that they are investigating a wrong doing but you cannot lose your job if you refuse to speak to the investigators, where as Kalkines says you must talk but you are granted immunity for your part in the wrong doing, so long as you make truthful statements. For more on this, check this legal blog. There is also the matter that a false accusation (and let me be clear... this is academic, I'm not saying the accusation in the real life topic is false, nor am I saying that the defense is false... we're merely discussing a possibility) is made to your employer and they do not offer the job on the basis of the accusation alone, this is grounds for defamation actions... and in certain jurisdictions, it's criminal defamation, so there could be jail time. It's interesting you mentioned teachers, because this happens alot. Kids do know that there are certain things that get a teacher fired quickly, so teachers do get the occasional false accusation of sexual assault (I know one teacher who has had multiple accusations over the course of her career). One of the few good things I can say about the Teachers Union is they cover the legal defense of accused teachers. The accusations do get the teacher removed from the class for sometime, but they don't lose their jobs over this matter. It's followed up but the accusation doesn't immediately lead to the teacher getting fired..	Because the relevant law enforcement decided not to In the US (and indeed in all common law jurisdictions), law enforcement and prosecutors have discretion over when and if to lay charges by considering such things as the wishes of the victim, the prospects of success and whether charges would be just in the circumstances. At best, this allows a measured response to the particular situation. At worst, it enables discrimination and persecution. Either way it solves the problem of allocating limited resources to comparatively unlimited need.
Can your landlord raise rent for running a business? Say you run an academy from your house. Can your landlord raise rent? Nolo.com says Also, in most states your landlord can’t use a rent increase (or evict you or decrease services, either) in retaliation against you for exercising a specified legal right. Is running a business exercising a legal right? It is legal, anyways. This is a month-to-month (lease-at-will) rental in Florida.	It may not be legal -- in many places zoning restricts running a business from a residential address. If the academy involves physical students, the landlord could reasonably claim an increase in wear and tear, and liability risks. In any case, with a month-to-month tenancy, the landlord can normally raise the rent with a month's notice for any reason or none.	Unfortunately, your relative is more in the wrong here First, the COVID situation does not change anyone's rights and obligations under a contract (see What effect does an event like the current Covid-19 pandemic have on contractural obligations?). So the landlord (through their agent) is obliged to provide the property and your relative is obliged to pay the rent and to occupy the premises (most residential leases contain a requirement for the tenant to live in the premises and not leave it empty). Your relative (through you) has indicated that she will be in breach of her contract. The agent has considered her position and has offered two (IMO generous) alternatives: Allow her to continue with the lease without taking possession providing the rent is paid. To release her from her obligations under the contract and return the rent. To put it in perspective, if your relative simply "walked away", she would be liable for the rent until a new tenant was found and, if that new tenant was paying less rent than she was, the difference for the duration of the lease plus the costs of finding a new tenant - advertising, agent's fees (usually 1 month's rent) etc. Now, the landlord has an obligation to minimise your costs so advertising the property could just be prudent. However, if they lease it when your relative's contract has not been properly terminated then it is they who are in breach. Surely they can't take the rent and offer to re-let the property at the same time? Surely they can. What they can't do is relet the property without properly terminating your relative's lease. Would they even be entitled to retain the deposit under these circumstances? Absolutely. The deposit is to cover their losses if your relative breaks the lease - as she has indicated she is going to do (this is called anticipatory breach). Finally, I'd rather not go down this route but is there any protection for my relative for not being forcefully 'evicted' - since she's paid the deposit, rent - and those haven't been returned? Having never taken possession, she is not being evicted.	You can contract to do anything that is not illegal. In many jurisdictions unconscionability is a thing that statute or case law makes illegal. These clauses may be unconscionable, however ... In most jurisdictions real estate rental agreements are highly regulated; particularly as regards eviction. So, even if these don't cross the line into unconscionable (and for what it's worth, they're nudging it at least) they are probably prohibited anyway. There probably is an independent third party that decides on evictions anyway in the form of a court or rental tribunal.	Since you did not provide the full text of your bylaws I will proceed by how I would imagine the language was written. I will give an alternative at the end of the answer. Your organization (HOA) created a set of bylaws. The bylaws indicated the method by which they can be amended. Later on the HOA added an amendment to these bylaws authorizing dues and instituting a specific procedure by which the dues could be increased. Now assuming this amendment was properly adopted (i.e. the original requirement was followed to amend the bylaws) it is now on equal footing to any other part of the bylaws. What this means is you now there is a process which can voluntarily be followed for increasing dues. You can either continue using the old process to amend bylaws and increase the dues that way or you can use this new process to increase dues through a majority vote of the members in good standing. Either way is valid to increase the dues. Thus the procedure as you described is a valid way to increase dues. However, if the language in your bylaws was poorly worded I might come to the opposite conclusion, which is possible. Suppose the amendment to the bylaws, which originally created dues, specified the dues as part of the bylaws (like exact dollar amount). Suppose that the language about increasing dues was poorly written and said exactly what you quoted: “Any increase in this amount must be approved by a majority vote of the Members in good standing of the Association”. Then there really needs to be an analysis of what procedure was indeed meant by the original adopters of the language or relevant case law in your state. It is unlikely, but possible, that this language could be interpreted to put another, separate, requirement on amendments to the bylaws that specifically increase the dues. I.e. dues increasing amendments must be both approved by the majority of the members and majority of the members in good standing. However, if at all competently written the bylaws should not require this method of approval unless it was intended to require this method.	Absolutely not. You have to use the legal system, whereby the sheriff is the one who uses force if it is necessary and ordered by the court. You can file an action at your local courthouse. If you want to do this self-help style, figure out how to file a petition, and figure out what you are petitioning the court to do. First off, of course, you need to figure out what you really want. For example, do you want a squatter to leave your apparently abandoned house; do you want a fence removed from your property; or do you just want to be sure that he can't claim possession of a chunk of your land in 3 more years (but the fence doesn't bother you)? Since you're apparently talking about removing a person from your property, you might start by calling the police. If this is a former tenant as opposed to a stranger who broke in, don't bother (police don't get into civil matters until the court tells them to), just start the appropriate legal process. You might be filing an unlawful detainer action, but it would be a slower eviction if the person is a tenant.	"an agreement by email for the cost of rent and damage deposit etc." may well constitute a lease. If it doesn't specify a term or ending method, it is probably a month to month lease. If nothing is specified about notice to leave, you probably should gt 30 days notice. The law in BC is the Residential Tenancy Act. However, many localities have laws that modify or supplement the provincial law. You probably need legal assitance beyond the scope of this forum. a Tenant Resource Advisory Center (Trac) might be able to help. Their web sitre also provides links to various other resources, including legal referrals. The Tennant Survival Guide offers pointers to legal aid. This site offers additional resources. So does the BC Law institute Note, even if you have certain legal rights in theory, the person from whom you are renting may not respect these. Consult legal or community sources to determine your best approach. This question is really beyond the scope of this forum.	No The criteria for adverse possession is that you have to be in possession without permission. A tenant, even one that pays no rent (or stops paying rent), has permission.	If it's not in the lease agreement, then you did not agree to it. Even in the absence of the law prohibiting the late fee, the landlord would not be able to impose it because it is not in the lease. It is of course up to you whether you want to test it. It may be more trouble than it is worth. Then again, it's probably not worth the landlord's trouble to begin eviction proceedings over a late fee. Paying late and refusing to pay the fee would probably sour your relationship with the landlord, which is usually something you want to avoid. If you do pay late at some point, you may want to point out to the landlord the relevant provision of Massachusetts law. The matter would probably end there: either the landlord doesn't know about it, or the landlord is hoping that you don't know about it. Pointing it out in a polite manner will inform the landlord of the law and that you are acquainted with the law. Unless the landlord is quite unreasonable, that should take care of it. Whether there is any law prohibiting landlords from announcing an intention to take a prohibited action is indeed a different question. Is there any legal reason for me to bring this up and get the landlord to formally acknowledge that they will not in fact charge illegal late fees? No. You have a contract with the landlord that already says you are going to move in. He cannot modify that contract simply by sending you a letter.
Trademark holder doesn't grant permission due to 'high request volume'; any risks? I requested permission for MATLAB's trademarked logo usage on my site, https://dragonnotes.org/ , from MathWorks (trademark holder) - who responded, "Due to the high number of these types of requests that we receive, we are unable to evaluate and respond to each request on an individual basis and thus unable to provide permission." What are the implications for my site? Does MathWorks still hold the right to take action, and what would such an 'action' constitute?	I am assuming that you are in the United States for this question. Please correct me if this is not the case. MathWorks still holds the right to take action, which may be anything from cease-and-desist letters up to litigation. You have followed the correct process in asking for permission to use a trademark. The owner of the trademark, MathWorks, has given you their answer, which is quite simply, "no". You may not feel that their reasoning is fair, but the default state of trademarks is that they are under ownership of whomever created them, and you do not have permission to use them. Things will remain that way unless MathWorks changes their mind. It doesn't matter if it feels dismissive of them; they are under no obligation to even consider requests to use their marks. If they didn't explicitly say, "sure, go ahead", or even, "yes, you may use it provided you follow a list of conditions", then using their trademark will be an unlicensed usage. If you still would like to pursue getting permission to use their trademarked assets, you will need to try to contact them again. Until they say otherwise, using their trademarks will be considered unauthorized use. (Edited to add this clarification brought up by @David Siegel): However, your usage might not be violation of trademark. The primary purpose of trademark restriction is to stop someone from misrepresenting a product as being from the entity that owns the trademark; this stops someone from, for example, selling a cola soft drink called "Coke-a-Cola". The reasons for this are manyfold, but the basic idea is that allowing that type of usage means that consumers might not be able to tell that your product is distinct from the original, and could then mistakenly attribute the quality and level of service of the previous brand with the new product. If your usage of MATLAB marks is such that you are identifying the products used as from MathWorks, and not yourself, and are doing everything in good faith to disassociate your website and/or offerings from MathWorks, it is possible that your usage would be considered correct usage of trademark. Even if it is legal usage, MathWorks still may decide to take action. If MathWorks believes that your usage is unauthorized and that it is trademark violation, they may decide to take action. This is regardless of whether it actually is; until you have this case in front of a court, you will not get a definitive answer. We cannot answer whether this is a legal usage of trademark. Ultimately, whether or not a usage of a mark is considered to be correct usage is a question that can only be answered by the courts, which means the only person who can give you concrete advice on a course of action is a lawyer. In lieu of proper legal advice, you will need to weigh the risk of MathWorks taking action against your usage with the benefit you receive from usage. (Edited to add this clarification by @Dale M): Regardless, you may be breaking copyright by using the logo. There is a separate issue besides just trademark at play here. The copyright for the MATLAB logo belongs to whomever created it/owns it (presumably, MathWorks in this case). Using the logo without permission is a copyright violation. The only case in which this would not be a violation is if the logo is released for use in general under a compatible license, such as Creative Commons; do note that these licenses typically have additional conditions, such as requiring attribution. If you are unaware as to whether there is a such a license, or if you fail to follow the terms of the license, usage of the logo almost certainly constitutes copyright infringement.	If you are producing and selling it, that is an absolute bar to patentability by anyone else (this is known as prior art). So if you are using it very publicly before they file, they can't get the patent.	I am not a lawyer, and none of the following should be seen as legal advice. While it is always best to assume every image has a copyright.... In your scenario... traditionally if you are selling a product, there's generally no harm in using images of that product to assist in the sale. But even then photographer copyrights should be considered. Images of products may not only contain copyrighted material within the photo, but the photo itself is probably also copyrighted by the photographer. Just blankety taking images from other web sites is a poor practice in general and will customarily just get you into trouble. However, many manufacturers or distributors will actually provide resellers with product images. You can check the product manufacturer's web site for a "press" or "media' section. There are often downloads provided in those areas. I don't know hairdressing.. but as an example, General Motors has a special web site known to GM car dealers where the dealers can download high resolution images of the cars and products for ads, etc. I've done work in the past for a GM dealer who provided me with the web site and log in details so I can get product imagery. In addition, few manufacturers will take umbrage that you are using their images to sell their products. They want their products to look as good as possible wherever they may be displayed. In many cases, they may prefer you use supplied images rather than use your own. Customarily you would include a disclaimer in the footer somewhere: The product names, company names and product images used on this web site are for identification purposes only. All trademarks and registered trademarks are the property of their respective owners. Note, I am referring to images from the manufacturer's web site, not from competing businesses. If you are building a site for "Bob's Hair Styling" it's unethical to take images from "Kate's Hair Dressing" for your use. Stick to the manufacturer... if selling Paul Mitchell products, check the Paul Mitchell web site for available product images.	As you've presented them, I doubt the functions are protected by copyright in the first place. Originality is one of the threshold requirements for copyright protection, and it demands that the work in question be independently created by the author, and that it possess some minimal degree of creativity. If you're talking about programming at a level so basic that the function truly must be created in a particular way, there is no originality in simply following the instructions. And even if there's some wiggle room, but the language you used has likely been independently replicated by many programmers, that's still not original enough to be copyrightable. What you want to watch out for, though, is the possibility that they've been combined into an original arrangement that is protected. I don't know enough about how copyright law is applied to code to say where or how that line is drawn, but my instinct would be that it could be a fairly low threshold.	Your app is a simple case of copyright infringement. All the Pokémon are copyrighted, the lettering and names are also protect by trademarks. Trying to claim fair use will be outright impossible: you'll use huge portions of the individually protected Pokemon (the iconic ones like Pikachu) and you are usurping a market they are already in. They have given licenses for apps (Pokemon Go). Pokemon are artistic and some form of fiction. The last straw might be if you'd do a rather obvious parody, but even then, I see no way to show Fair Use with what you stated. No disclaimer can change that, and publishing your work might open you to a huge lawsuit with damages for each individually protected Pokemon you infringed on. With between 750 $ minimum and 150,000 $ absolute upper limit per infringed item (last is for willful infringement), you don't want to infringe on Pokemon, as you could be very easily liable for a number in the 6 to 9 digits! Even if Nintendo might only try to get the statutory damages for all the 900 Pokémon, that is a number of at least 675,4000 $. And that's before looking at Trademarks. Pikachu has about 6 live word marks and there are 111 different Pokémon trademarks filed (some expired or dead)!	The companies really need to speak to an IP lawyer as this question is seeking specific advice which this site is loathe to give out for fear of compouding issues. The answer would depend on the license agreements and enforceability in various jurisdictions. According to https://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/vstudio/en-US/0368d7ee-0eb3-4e3e-a143-4410969a15bb/eula-for-vs2010?forum=vssetup Microsoft says you cant rent out the software - but this applies to the "Pro" version - I could not find anything on the "Premium" version - so most likely Microsoft to have some clam. The flipside is how enforceable this EULA is - and this would probably vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. It would be a very, very good idea to speak to a lawyer before letting Microsoft come onto the premises - as "inviting them" to do this is almost certainly not going to improve the Asians company's case and will allow Microsoft to go fishing further and make it easier for them to expand on and collect evidence should they decide to pursue the matter.	Probably not, without permission. Images of the character are usually copyrighted. The characters themselves are usually protected by trademark. Using the name of a fictional character without permission would imply endorsement by the firm that published works with that character. I've taken day long seminars focused mostly on all of the things that comic book companies do to protect their intellectual property rights in their characters. Of course, if you live in Finland, it is likely that no one in the U.S. would decide to take up the case for a U.S. media property, either because they aren't aware of it, or because it isn't economically worthwhile to pursue.	Let me be sure that I understand the situation. You set up an account with Big Company, which uses BigCo as a trademark. You want email about that account to reach you with a unique address, so you set up '[email protected]" and gave that as your email when setting up tha account. You don't plan to use that address for any purpose but communications from BigCo to you and from you to them. (Of course these aren't the actual names.) Have I understood the situation correctly? It seems that you ar not using 'BigCo" in trade, nor are you likely to be confused with an official representative of BigCo, so you are not infringing their trademark. However, someone using such an email more generally could perhaps be so confuse, so BigCo has a somewhat legitimate concern, as they cannot know the very limited use you plan to make of this address. The only way that the could force you not to use such an email address would be via a court order as part of a suit for trademark infringement, whcih under the circumstances I doubt they would get. However, unless they have some sort of contract with you to the contrary, they can control who registers on their site. and could refuse to register you using an email address that includes their name or alias. Convincing them to accept your registration, even though it does no harm to them, will almost surely be more trouble than it is worth. Give them "[email protected]" or something else that is not their name, but will suggest their name enough that you will know who it is. This will serve your purpose fully, and avoid a long argument with people who are reading from a script (once you get past the automated process, if you can even do that). This is all assuming that I have understood the situation correctly. I am also largely assuming US law, since you didn't mention a jurisdiction. (EDIT: UK law should not be very different on these points.)
Can I pay less taxes because of the government shutdown? It's my understanding that the role of taxation is to maintain a functional government. At this time, I suspect that the U.S. government is saving quite a bit of money by not paying some subset of its employees, etc., per the partial government shutdown. What I've heard in the news leads me to believe that many of those employees will not receive back-pay. Can I pay less taxes this year, prorated against the duration of the shutdown and the proportion of the government which was not operational during that time?	No. Reason: Taxes are not a contract for specific services, so even if the government did nothing for you in return for your taxes, you do not have recourse to a rebate for "breech of contract." The only recourse is political. Theoretically if the government failed to provide a service that was required by law or Constitution, there could be legal action to force the government to do that action but you still don't get your tax money back. It might be an interesting act of civil disobedience, but no not legal. That is the answer. But to address some of the other premises of your question (Note: these are irrelevant because see above answer): The U.S. government runs at a deficit anyway, meaning the amount spent each year is more than the amount of revenue collected. For example, in May, 2018 the CBO estimated that for FY2018: BUDGET PROJECTIONS FOR FY 2018 (As of May 24, 2018 ) OUTLAYS $4.1 Trillion REVENUES $3.3 Trillion DEFICIT $793 Billion DEBT HELD BY THE PUBLIC (End of Fiscal Year) $15.7 Trillion So even if in the partial shutdown, gov saved 20%, every cent of your taxes would still go to the expenditures; the deficit would just be a little less. The U.S. government is saving quite a bit of money by not paying some subset of its employees, etc. .... believe that many of those employees will not receive back-pay. Probably not true. In the past modern shutdowns, employees received the back pay, whether they worked as emergency employees or were home. A bill as already been proposed in Congress to ensure that all will be paid when this ends. Some contractors might not get paid because they get paid by their employers, not directly by the gov. So in some cases no work, no pay. There are bills proposed to get them paid also. Note- I do not at all mean to downplay the effect on people's finances and morale. Missing a paycheck today even if the money will/might come eventually is a real hardship.	First of all, if your Delaware LLC earns money, you will pay tax in America on that money. America still taxes "foreigners" on American income, just not on"global" income. That is, unless the U.S. has a tax reciprocity treaty with your home country, Malaysia. I don't know about Malaysian law, but I am writing as an American about American law regarding the Seychelles (and I am not a lawyer). The following is only as an "example." If you set up an LLC in the Seychelles, you could, in theory, avoid American tax by accruing income there. In practice, if you did nothing but "banking" in the Seychelles, America would look at your lack of "value added" there, and could tax you on Seychelles income as if your corporation was American. The way to make such a claim stick (typically in a place like Ireland), is to set up a manufacturing or operating facility (e.g. call center) there so that you were shipping goods or services from your offshore operation. Then you'd have a strong claim in America that your operation actually earned most of its income abroad, and the U.S. company was just a holding company.	If the employment contract treats base pay as an advance on future commissions when an employee has not earned the minimum number of units, then the company is probably entitled to repayment of advances not earned out. On the other hand, if it treats the base pay as a guaranteed minimum, the company would not be entitled to a refund. The specific wording of the contract will be vial here. There may also be state laws regulating such an arrangement. Under Nebraska Revised Statute 48-1230.01 commissions not earned when an employee leaves must be paid: on the next regular payday following the employer's receipt of payment for the goods or services from the customer from which the commission was generated.	The EU has established rules about member governments subsidising industries. The intention is to ensure that trade in the EU is not distorted by government incentives, so that factories get built in the most efficient location rather than where a government offers the biggest subsidy. This is the mirror image of the rules which prohibit tariffs; governments cannot protect their own industry from competition either by imposing tariffs on imports or by providing subsidies to exports. The Irish government was found to have provided an illegal subsidy to Apple in the form of a tax reduction made especially for Apple. Hence the tax break was invalid and effectively did not exist. Legally Apple therefore had to pay their back taxes. As to why Apple had to pay after being assured that they would not have to, its a basic principle that civil servants cannot change the law merely by saying something. If a civil servant tells you that you don't need to pay tax when you do, then the civil servant is simply wrong. You could use their opinion as a defence against criminal charges of tax evasion, but you would still have to pay the tax.	This happened recently in Washington state, when the state Supreme Court ordered the state government to comply with a constitutional funding mandate (McCleary v. Washington, 2012). The state did not comply for 6 years and was fined ($100,000 per day) for 3 years. I don't recall that the state paid a penny, and the courts did not demand payment of fines for that period. Public opinion did not have any obvious effect, but you could take this to Politics SE to get a lot of opinions as to whether public opinion mattered. The federal government can't get involved, unless they (the federal government) first make a federal issue out of it, perhaps because of some law suit. Power of enforcement is essential non-existent, given a sufficiently non-cooperative state government. I should point out that the court's order was a bit vague, that is, it was not "release Smith from custody instantly", it required the government to act to the satisfaction of the court.	I can only speak from experience for Pennsylvania, but this is how it works there: When you are working as a 1099 contractor you are "unemployed" for purposes of claiming unemployment. As you learned the hard way: you should apply for unemployment as soon as you lose your W-2 job. Every time you go to claim unemployment compensation the agency will ask if you have any earned income for the period you are claiming. That's where you would declare your 1099 income. Your unemployment compensation for the period will be adjusted accordingly. Basically you want to keep your unemployment claim "open" until either you secure full-time W-2 employment, or until you have exhausted your unemployment benefits. The system isn't setup to deal with any other scenario very gracefully. Of course, never omit or falsify information provided to the unemployment agency!	People make mistakes. My assessments come with information on how to dispute them, and if yours don't you should be able to get that information. File a dispute or whatever it is you do to challenge the assessment. Include the information about you being outside the district and not having he measure on your ballot. If you're just outside the district, you might have been mistakenly included. You'll either get a revised assessment or you'll be told that you have to pay the tax. You don't have a reasonable complaint unless and until your challenge is denied.	Political risk insurance exists, but not in the format hypothesized. What the question is contemplating is more like a gambling bet, or a futures contract (which is a type of "derivative" contract), than insurance. What constitutes an insurable risk of harm to an insurable interest is mostly a matter of common law although there are some state statutes on point in the U.S. which is the level of federalism at which insurance is regulated. Basically, you can only insure against a loss to an "insurable interest" caused by an insurable risk. In practice, this means that insurance has to be linked to an individualized loss of an individual or business that is clearly and directly caused by a covered occurrence. A change in governing political party itself, doesn't give rise to such a loss. The mere fact that a party is elected or that the people elected take an oath of office, doesn't itself change any laws or regulations. It just puts in place people who might do such things in the future. Political risk insurance, when it exists, insures against the nationalization of one's business at a loss, or against the industry that one is engaged in becoming illegal, at a loss. It is the specific action taken by the newly elected regime towards the particular insured firm or individual, and not the actual new regime itself, that gives rise to a loss to an insurable interest in the case of political risk insurance. For example, you might be able to buy political risk insurance against the possibility that your marijuana business which is legal under state law but not federal law, will be seized in a civil forfeiture or shut down by a change in the practical effect of the relevant state law. If you are worried that your company's stock will decline in value due to an election result, the available financial instrument would be to short sell your company's stock, hedging against losses arising from a drop in stock price below a certain dollar value by a certain date for any reason. If your company is not publicly held, the risk of a decline in business due to an election result is not something that can be insured against.
When can an immigrant claim US nationality? Inspired by this question over at EL&U. In my research for a response that question (which I never posted), I found this article in the Economist, which includes this paragraph: In general, to be a national is to be a member of a state. Nationality is acquired by birth or adoption, marriage, or descent (the specifics vary from country to country). Having a nationality is crucial for receiving full recognition under international law. Indeed, Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares that “Everyone has the right to a nationality” and “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality” but is silent on citizenship. Citizenship is a narrower concept: it is a specific legal relationship between a state and a person. It gives that person certain rights and responsibilities. It does not have to accompany nationality. In some Latin American countries, for example, such as Mexico, a person acquires nationality at birth but receives citizenship only upon turning 18: Mexican children, therefore, are nationals but not citizens. I was born in the US, so I am a US citizen and a US national. At what stage of the immigration process can an immigrant to the US truthfully and legally declare the US as their nationality? (Limiting this to the US since different countries handle citizenship and nationality differently.)	When the person has been naturalised, that is, when the US government officially recognises them as a US citizen. There are many pathways to citizenship and the ones on the linked page are pretty typical across the world although the details vary: residence for a period with or without marriage to a citizen service descent.	The President has the power under Article II of the U.S. Constitution to faithfully execute the laws enacted by Congress. Any power that the President has to regulate international travel of non-U.S. citizens arises from statutes enacted by Congress that give the President (or the executive branch more generally) that authority. Immigration laws, in practice, give very substantial discretionary authority to the President, and public health laws probably also do so. I don't have chapter and verse to cite to you regarding which specific statutes provide that authority, without considerably more research, but that is the general idea. The primary statute regulating immigration is the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (and more generally, Title 8 of the United States Code). It is not uncommon in the United States for there to be disputes over how much discretion a President has under a particular statute in the United States, because unlike parliamentary systems of government, the execution of laws and the passage of law is split between different branches of the federal government in the Presidential system of the United States, rather than being fused with a Prime Minster who serves at the pleasure of the legislature.	Only for certain parts of the constitution, and not for the parts you are asking about. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has squarely stated that neither the First Amendment nor the Fifth Amendment "acknowledges any distinction between citizens and resident aliens."13 For more than a century, the Court has recognized that the Equal Protection Clause is "universal in [its] application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to differences of ... nationality."14 The Court has repeatedly stated that "the Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent."15 When noncitizens, no matter what their status, are tried for crimes, they are entitled to all of the rights that attach to the criminal process, without any distinction based on their nationality.16 Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights As Citizens? - David Cole, Georgetown University Law Center	Short answer: You find a country who is willing to recognize you as stateless, and issue you travel papers. At that point you can enter the U.S. by applying for a visa. The USA really does not want to create stateless people. They are laboring diplomatically to eradicate statelessness. As such, the State Department will want to see that you are secure in another country's citizenship before they will repudiate your US citizenship. Otherwise, they are very reluctant. The State Department will insist you do the repudiation in a foreign country at a US embassy. If you want to become stateless with your feet in the United States, you'll likely have a legal fight on your hands. Regardless, it will cost you $2300 in filing fees (plus, all your back taxes) :) At that point, you become the problem of the foreign country. You aren't anyone to the USA, and you have to apply for a visa just like anyone else. When a stated person enters the US, immigration's pivotal concern is whether you'll leave the US consistent with the terms of your visa, i.e. return to your country of citizenship. Being stateless increases this risk, and being a USA expat increases that risk further, since you are so familiar and comfortable in the US. If you found yourself in the kind of piccadillo that would qualify a foreigner for refugee or asylum status, the US would consider it just the same as others, since those statuses include right of residency. Some countries manufacture stateless people, e.g. Syria will not grant citizenship to a non-Muslim born there.	International organizations such as the UN are typically treated similar to foreign governments, and thus enjoy various privileges. One consequence is that typically, income from employment by these organizations is not subject to taxation by the host countries where the employee lives or carries out their work. However, the details depend very much on the tax laws in that host country. The employee might still be required to file taxes, but would then likely be able to declare the income as tax-free under the corresponding provision of the national tax law. This usually also depends a lot on the treaties which created the international organisation. For example, the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations contains an explicit tax exemption for UN officials, though not necessarily for regular employees. As an example for how a country treats employees of international organization, the IRS has guidance regarding US tax law here. Other countries tend to have similar rules, albeit with less accessible online documentation :)	Probably not, because there is no legal case or controversy, and the law is clear enough. In US v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, SCOTUS held that A child born in the United States, of parents of Chinese descent, who, at the time of his birth, are subjects of the Emperor of China, but have a permanent domicil and residence in the United States, and are there carrying on business, and are not employed in any diplomatic or official capacity under the Emperor of China, becomes at the time of his birth a citizen of the United States, by virtue of the first clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution The opinion has a long analysis of the "subject to jurisdiction" clause, reasoning that this excludes only children of diplomats, who are not subject to US law. Harris's parents were not immune diplomats so she was never immune to US jurisdiction. They are never forced to take any case, and are especially not likely to take a case so lacking in legal merits.	What distinguishes a civilian charge of treason versus being an enemy combatant? Nationality. Someone who is not a US national cannot commit treason against the US, because treason is a breach of allegiance, and non-nationals do not owe allegiance. The ruling you mention is not concerned with treason because the defendant is not a national of the United States. If a US national meets the definition of enemy combatant then that person has committed treason, the definition of which is limited in the constitution to "giving aid or comfort to the enemy." It is also possible to commit treason without being a combatant, for example by giving indirect support to an enemy where that indirect support is found to constitute "aid."	Insofar as those treaties don't bind the US, the notion of "violating" such laws is moot. Hoda Muthana is, under Yemeni law, a Yemeni citizen (it is immaterial whether she has ever "accepted" or exploited it), and as such stripping her of US citizenship would not leave her stateless. In the case of Hoda Muthana, the action is based on the legal argument that she was not ever a citizen, based on the premise that her father was a foreign diplomat. Under US law, children born to foreign diplomats in the US are not birthright citizens, following US v. Wong Kim Ark. Birthright citizenship cannot be revoked. However, a person can renounce their citizenship, via certain acts, including taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof, after having attained the age of eighteen years;or (3) entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state if (A) such armed forces are engaged in hostilities against the United States, or (B) such persons serve as a commissioned or non-commissioned officer The defense argument would presumably be that ISIS is not a foreign state (despite their own claims to the contrary) so her affiliation with ISIS does not qualify. There are grounds for denaturalization, including falsifying or concealing relevant facts pertaining to naturalization, refusing to testify before Congress, or joining a subversive organization including Al Qaeda within 5 years of naturalization.
What is the liability of a person who signs as a witness? I've seen this answer and this answer, but the answers don't entirely explain some things. For example, long back my boss wanted my signature as a witness signature on a contract for one of his property deals. All other signatures were already on the contract, so I wasn't really a witness to the signatures. My uncle advised me that "if you were not a witness, then you don't have to sign". So I didn't. My boss however had told me that a witness has no liability, so there is no issue in signing. Is that true? For example, in this form, the witness has to mention their name in full and give their full address. In another form I've seen, the witness just has to mention their name and sign there. From this website I got: The underlying purpose of having a signature witnessed by a third party is for evidential reasons. The witness would be able to confirm that the signature on the agreement is indeed the signature of the party whose name appears. In India a contract may be effective without any signatures being witnessed, although it is always advisable to have a contract attested by witnesses. In some countries, in order to be legally enforceable, the contract may have to be signed before a notary public. As different jurisdictions have different rules, always check the position before finalising the contract. When a signature is witnessed, as well as signing, it is sensible for the witness to write their name in block capitals and insert their home address. and from this answer, which says: In India the undermentioned persons can be appointed as a Notary: a) a person who has been practicing at least for 10 years or b) a person belonging to scheduled Castes/ Scheduled Tribes and other backward classes and has been practicing for at least seven years, or C) a woman who has been practicing at least for seven years as a legal practitioner or D) he has been a member of the Indian Legal Service under the Central Government or E) he has been at least for ten years - I) a member of Judicial Service or ii) held an office under the Central Government or a State Government requiring special knowledge of law after enrollment as an advocate;or iii) held an office in the department of Judge, Advocate General or in the Legal Department of the armed forces. Source: The Notaries Rules , 1956 as amended and subs by GSR 8-7-97and 5/1/2000. as amended by (Amendment)Rules, 2014. This is not an exact reproduction of the said rule but is only broadly for information. Pl. read rule 3 for details. At least the above points make sense, because a notary is a person who knows the law, has the authority to be a witness and can even give the notary stamp for a confirmation. But if a common person signs as a witness, they might not even know what they are doing and might not know what their liability is, especially if the signatures were not done in front of them. So when a person requests for a witness signature, should they in good faith, first call the witnesses and sign in front of them? If the signature was not done in front of the witness and the witness still signs, what is the liability on the part of the witness? Can any punitive action be taken on the witness (the witness might not even mention their full/correct address)? If there is no liability, then couldn't a person simply put some fake signature and name, purporting that some witness had signed it (in case the document is genuine and they see no reason why someone would actually call the witness to establish the truth)?	Signing as a witness will not generally make you liable on a contract. But, if you sign as a witness to something that you did not in fact witness, you could be liable for fraud or negligent misrepresentation is someone suffers harm as a result of you untrue statement that you witnessed the document being signed. Update: Usually you would be sued for whatever damages are caused plus pain and suffering plus punitive damages (the latter two limited in some states but not others in a variety of ways). It would probably be a crime as well if you had criminal intent, but it would be very unusual for a prosecutor to agree to prosecute an isolated case like this unless it was part of a larger criminal enterprise. A criminal sentence would usually depend on the amount of harm done and would often be a minor felony leading to a year or two in prison but states vary greatly on this.	I will not speak to your specific situation. I am unfamiliar with the jurisdiction and real estate contracts are one of the most highly regulated contracts so local statutes may override common law. In general, the terms of a contract are what the parties agree; the written document is not the contract - it is evidence of the contract. In a case where the parties agree that the written version is wrong then the written version is wrong. Where the parties disagree that the written version is wrong (or agree that it is wrong but disagree as to how) then each will need to provide evidence to support their position. A signed written contract that supports one parties position is extremely strong evidence! The other party would need to provide some overwhelming evidence to trump this. The general position that the courts take is that the written contract accurately documents the agreement unless someone can prove that it doesn't.	The requirements for a valid will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In most U.S. states there is a two part test. One part is determined based upon the face of the document, the other is based upon extrinsic evidence. Formal Requirements To be formally valid without a hearing unless an interested party requests one in most U.S. states on its face (i.e. to be a "self-proving will") a will must: Be in writing. Be signed by the person making the will who is at least eighteen years of age. Be signed by at least two witnesses who do not have conflicts of interest, who are attesting that the person making the will was competent and that they saw him or her sign it. The signatures of the witnesses must be notarized. If their statements are not notarized, usually at least one witness must testify in a hearing or with a later affidavit. The language of the will must indicate an intent to make a binding disposition of property in the estate of the person making it when they die, and other rights related to their estate and their death. Various exceptions to these requirements exist in most state (e.g. a "holographic will" is valid if it is in writing, indicates the necessary intent, is signed, and has its material provision substantially in the hand writing of the person writing it). Some states allow oral wills called "nuncupative wills" in very specific circumstances usually limited to soldiers or sailors in circumstances of actual battle or imminent mayhem likely to result in death, with the proper witnesses. A will is like a dollar bill, a copy is not as good as the original document. If the original document cannot be found it is presumed that the will was revoked by physical destruction of the will, in the absence of evidence to the contrary submitted at a hearing to a judge. Extrinsic Requirements Any interested party can contest a will that appears valid on its face under the standards describe above on several grounds. Two of these relate to the condition of the person signing the will at the time it was signed. The notarized witness statements create a presumption that these two conditions were met. But, that presumption can be overcome with other evidence from witnesses and/or documents or other kinds of evidence. These conditions are: The document was procured from the person making it with duress or undue influence, even if the person making it did have "testamentary capacity." The person making it lacked testamentary capacity which is also a two part test. The first part is that the person making it knows who their family and the "natural objects of their bounty are", knows in general terms what they own, and knows what a will is intended to do and is capable of understanding the general outlines of what it does. This basically rules out people with severe dementia. The second part is that if the person is not suffering from dementia but is suffering from hallucinations, that the hallucinations have not influenced the nature of the provisions contained in the will. In practice, "undue influence" is the predominant ground for contesting wills that are formally valid on their face because testamentary capacity is a very low standard. A will can also be contested on the grounds involving extrinsic evidence that: A later validly executed document revoked the will, or The document is a forgery. If any of the issues related to extrinsic evidence are disputed, both the party contesting the will, and the party defending it, has a right to have that issue resolved in a jury trial, although often the right to a jury trial in a case like this is waived by the parties. This is determined by making a reasonable inquiry before submitting the will and examining the physical document and the place where it was when it was discovered, closely. The inquiry should be very searching if the terms of the will are surprising, and can be fairly lax if the terms of the will are what was widely expected. There is generally a notice given to all interested parties when a will is submitted to a court with probate jurisdiction to be given effect that contains a deadline to raise a contest along these lines. A will that is not submitted to a court with probate jurisdiction usually has no force or effect until that happen in most U.S. jurisdictions. Public Policy Even if the will is valid in general, some terms of the will may be invalid as a matter of public policy, or modified by statue, in certain circumstances. These exceptions can usually be determined on the face of the document or with minimal additional information (although "your mileage may vary" and cases where, for example, the cause of death or date of death is uncertain can be difficult). For example, the following limitations are common: A term in a will conditioning a gift at death on marrying or not marrying a particular person is void in most, if not all, U.S. states. Under certain circumstances a will is required to leave certain minimum amounts to a surviving spouse and/or minor dependent children. If a will appears to omit a child of the person making it by accident, it is modified in particular ways mandated by statute. Will provisions making gifts at death or giving responsibilities to someone who murdered the person who wrote the will are void. Some states invalidate provisions in favor of an ex-spouse upon divorce, unless a post-divorce document reaffirms those inheritances. Certain kinds of words are given defined statutory meanings unless the express language of a will says otherwise, such as "by representation", or "if he survives me", that are not necessarily intuitive or in line with every day use of language. It is usually necessary to review the probate court and case law in the state where the decedent was domiciled at death to determine if these limitations apply, ideally with a probate or estate administration lawyer.	It's a bit like talking to the police: anything you say might be used against you, so the conventional wisdom is to say nothing. It is a good rule of thumb. When you are paying a professional to represent you, why make things complicated by speaking on your own behalf about the same issue? As you point out, not everyone follows this rule. In some circumstances there might be benefits to discussing your case publicly, such as fundraising or deterrence. Whether the risk outweighs the benefits will depend on the details of the legal case and your role in it. Lawyers are likely to emphasise the following risks: If you are a witness whose credibility is in issue, any public statement could potentially become a prior inconsistent statement which is used against you in cross-examination. Again, one of the purposes of hiring a lawyer is to be careful about how you communicate your position on a litigious matter and reduce the risk of careless remarks having unexpected consequences. Speaking publicly undermines this goal. In Commonwealth countries, there is a significant risk that public comment on a case before the court could amount to sub judice contempt of court. Attempting to litigate the case in the media can be perceived as undermining the authority of the court. Lawyers are expected to uphold public confidence in the administration of justice and would be reluctant to condone anything that could be regarded as a contempt. This contributes to a culture where discussing active litigation is "not the done thing" and may itself cause problems with a witness's perceived credibility, aside from the risk of a contempt allegation. Speaking publicly about litigation is risky and the consequences are difficult to predict, which is why people often engage lawyers to do it. When the client continues to make their own statements without legal advice, it makes the lawyer's risk management job more difficult, so they are likely to advise against it.	What would you suggest I should do in this situation? Do not sign the NDA and do not get intimidated by Mr A. Instead, think about how you can prove the terms you two already agreed. Mr A is trying to override the initial agreement with one which clearly is more favorable to him. Your problem is that proving the terms of a verbal agreement is quite difficult, especially once the counterparty's/partner's attitude has worsened that much. This is why you two should have signed a contract at an earlier stage. Hopefully at least some your communications with him are in writing, since the substance of those records might support your account of the facts and therewith a fact-finder could infer the terms of the initial agreement. In those communications Mr A might have inadvertently said something that weakens or defeats his legal position. Depending on how much your friend knew about the matter, you might also want to secure an affidavit from him, any written communications you had with him in that regard, and also ask him (in writing) to preserve records of any communications he has had with Mr A from the time your friend was making the connection that led to this partnership. That being said, it is important to emphasize that these lines of action will be unavailing if you agree to Mr A's new terms.	It’s a foundation objection The basis of a foundation objection is the witness does not have first hand knowledge of the physical evidence sought to be introduced. It’s perfectly normal for the court to establish if they do or do not have such knowledge. In the linked case, the objection to the document is that it contains annotations that the witness did not make i.e. the witness did not have first hand knowledge of this annotated document. There are also some objections to parts of the document on the grounds of relevance because they deal with other people.	ontario Any party may call a witness that has relevant evidence (Rules 53.01 & 53.04). There is "no property in a witness" (see also Unifirst Canada Ltd. c. 9766065 Canada inc., 2021 QCCQ 7946 at para. 10). The adverse party may be called as a witness unless they've already testified or counsel has undertaken to have them appear as a witness in their case (Rule 53.07).	Unless the notary personally knows the signer, the notary should, and normally will, ask for identification, and the name that the notary puts in the notarization certificate should be copied exact6ly from whatever ID is presented. For Alan Jones to sign as J7, he would need some sort of official proof, acceptable to the notary, that he is "J7". What would that be? I doubt that any notary would certify such a doccument. (If the document is signed as "Alan Jones" but the ID says "Alan J Jones" I am not sure if the notary must follow the ID or may follow the document, assuming that the notary is convinced that the two are the same person. Many notaries in practice will follow the ID.) I agree that the normal way would be for the document to say "Alan Jones, also known as 'J7'", and possibly include wording such as "I Alan Jones, am the person who posts on site XYZ.com as "J7", and specifically who posted a message starting {quote} at {timestamp}." (Or it could give the secure hash of the message, or of several messages.) This would clearly est6ablish a link between the document and the online conversations/acts that it is meant to refer to. The questions says: a need has developed for Alan Jones to sign a document using the name J7 I doubt that doing such a thing is either required or helpful. Rather I suspect he will need to sign a document in which he acknowledges being the particular "J7" involved in the matter.
Membership cancellation and poking the bear I would like to start wearing a shirt to ABCGym stating something to the effect of: ABCGym refuses to refund payment it accepted for membership to a gym ABCGym closed. ABCGym has substituted an inferior-to-me option. My question has two parts. The first is more of legality and definition. The second is more around what could they do. Can it be construed as libel, solicitation or something else I probably should be aware of? Though it might tarnish the image, assuming those statements are true I believe the criteria for libel would not be met. To solicitation, they have a broad and basic anti-solicitation policy, including "Any solicitation within any club is absolutely forbidden." While provocative, I don't see that this can be defined as soliciting. Even if I were to list competitors, without me benefitting from any sales that still seems at worst a gray area. Am I misinterpreting soliciting? As to recourse, sure they can ask me not to wear it. Were I to refuse to remove the shirt, could they bar me from using the membership without refund for doing something that is legal and within dress code, but deemed naughty in their sight? Edit: Background I joined XYZ 22 years ago. ABC bought XYZ four years ago. At the time of ABC buying the XYZ, my membership was specifically to location A. It remained so after the purchase and we continued under essentially that agreement (I now pay annual dues to ABC in return for membership to location A). In late September, ABC accepted annual payment, then announced about five weeks later they were closing "my" gym (location A). It is, IMO, a bit disingenuous at this point to accept payment on an agreement they likely knew they were going to alter. On Nov. 30, they closed location A and transferred me to location B. As to why it's bothersome, admittedly part of the issue is annoyance with just being told, in effect, "We broke the agreement, and you'll take what we substitute." But more materially it's a matter of: adding 9-15 minutes travel to every workout; being more crowded; more tightly spacing equipment; less of the equipment I use; worse condition of the equipment; fewer "spare" weights; and smaller open training area. Two have asked: Prior to reaching this point, I attempted... a request over their website without response; speaking to a person in the cancellation department. I was directed to the talk to a manager in club; speaking to manager I was forwarded to the GM/Operations Manager; emailing with the GM/OM cited due to the type and history of the account, no refund was possible; a second request over the website without response; calling the membership department. After time on hold the representative relayed the supervisor's statement it wasn't possible because they have another location within 25 miles; Still awaiting a call from said supervisor that was supposed to occur 12/26. Resolution Before it came to the shirt, inquiry with BBB led ABCGym contacting me and refunding the remainder of my contract. I expect the Yelp review that has been marked as helpful and 1-on-1 discussions with a number of people, they've lost far more in business than the $131 they finally refunded.	The statement ABCGym refuses to refund payment it accepted for membership to a gym ABCGym closed. ABCGym has substituted an inferior-to-me option. could certainly be considered as defamatory. However, in the US and many other countries, truth would be a valid defense, if the person making the statement could prove that the statement is true. I don't see how it could be construed as solicitation. If worn on a shirt into ABC, the management could surely ask the wearer to remove it. If that request is refused, they could ask the wearer to leave. If the wearer has a valid membership, then it would depend on the exact terms of the membership contract, and provisions of local law, whether ABC could insist that the wearer leave, or have the wearer arrested for trespass should the wearer refuse. Any regulations incorporated by reference into the contract would also matter. At least in the US. walking back and forth on a public sidewalk just outside ABC's door, wearing such a shirt or carrying a classic picket sign with such a message would be pretty clearly legal, provided that others are not unduly obstructed, and no valid local ordinance is violated. In the wear-the-shirt-inside case, if the wearer refuses to remove the shirt or leave, the management would probably call law enforcement. LE will not want to decide whether wearer has the legal right to remain in the club wearing the shirt. They will probably ask the wearer to leave. If the wearer protests that s/he has a valid membership and thus a contractual right to stay, who knows what they would do. If they still ask the wearer to leave, the wearer would be wise to comply and perhaps take legal action to enforce his or her membership rights, which will depend on the contract details as mentioned above. A lawyer would probably be very helpful if the wearer wants to take that route. The wearer would be wise to remain polite and appear calm, not yelling or using epithets.	tldr; the agreement is a mess, one-sided, do not sign. This agreement does little to serve your interests, and a lot to harm them. It is also fairly poorly phrased, I have doubts that someone with legal knowledge wrote it. It states: I agree to not disclose, or discuss with anyone, any matters relating to the investigation You are agreeing not to talk to the investigator. If you do talk to them, you will be in breach of the terms you've agreed to. I'm sure they'll just say "oh, that's not what it means" - but that is not how contracts work, they mean what they say. It also says: which includes but is not limited to: ... All documents created by me or shared with me during the investigation. This applies to documents created during the investigation, not in relation to the investigation, not for use in the investigation, not related to the complaint. And again, you can't share these documents with anyone, including the investigator. It may well be unenforceable, as it gives you nothing in exchange for the rights you are giving up, and the concept of "consideration" is key to the common law of contracts in the USA, and also Canada (stemming from British common law) which means both parties must receive something of value: Here's a wiki article on Consideration in US law and a page on Consideration in Canadian law With all of these flaws and the fact that it may well be unenforceable, it would not be wise to sign it. If it did the following, it might be a more useful agreement: Had time limits, after which the restrictions are lifted Allowed you to acknowledge the case and state that you can't discuss it while it is ongoing Applied only to the workplace, talking to the press and publishing details to the public internet, such as social media - this may already be in your contract of employment (relating to bringing the company into disrepute) if so it isn't really a restriction being applied by this agreement, but a re-iteration of the existing agreement Promised a fair investigation in a timely manner, with a report at the end, and appropriate action is taken if claims are substantiated, and libel has occurred Or, they could offer you money right now for your silence, that would absolutely be consideration, in some jurisdictions, the sum may need to be considered reasonable, but this is not universal. There are also cases where NDAs turn out to be invalid: 11 ways NDAs can be invalidated An actual case where an NDA was found to be too broad	Summary from comments. (Hat tip @jqning) Daniel Nathan Ballard writes here: [It] is not only improper it is UNLAWFUL and may result in serious repercussions... Such a misuse may constitute false advertising... (“It is no doubt true” that affixing the ‘Trade Mark Registered U.S. Patent Office” notice on goods that are not protected by a federally registered trademark creates “a prima facie case of fraud against the public… .”). ... Such use is also a form of “unclean hands” that can bar the user’s registration of the mark. ... Such a use may also bar the maintenance of an infringement case. ... And the fraudulent use of the trademark registration symbol DOES provide other marketplace participants with standing to oppose the user’s registration of the mark. http://www.avvo.com/legal-answers/use-of---symbol-but-not-federally-registered-1125746.html	the first two highlighted parts seem to contradict each other. No, in this case they do not. The first highlighted portion refers to works or items produced "for or under the direction of the Company", whereas the second highlight refers to your creations that satisfy conditions (a) and (b). Where contradictions actually exist, the doctrine of contra proferentem entitles you (the non-draftsman of the contract) to adopt the portion or reasonable interpretation that favors your legal position. Also wondering how valid those statements actually are They are valid and become enforceable as soon as you sign the contract or your subsequent conduct reflects your acceptance thereof. it's a matter of privacy. So the question is what I can do or what the reality is of the situation The reality is that you are asked to sign a contract that is abusive and ridiculous. One vulnerability from describing your inventions (presumably in Appendix A) is that the employer gets "irrevocable, worldwide, etc" rights on them as soon as you "use or disclose any [items listed in Appendix A] when acting within the scope of [your] employment". This means that if instead of reinventing the wheel you share or apply any portion of your prior creations so as to enhance your productivity, you knowingly and irreversibly grant to the employer perpetual rights to those items. Legal disputes regarding APIs can become extremely intricate. And, since judges usually have no decent background on IT, even those few judges with integrity are unlikely to grasp the key subtleties that would lead to a correct ruling. "not useful with or related to any Company Interest" is very vague. The company could be interested in literally anything these days. Clauses which are too vague or excessively wide-encompassing are supposedly stricken as unconscionable, unenforceable, etc. However, I personally would foreclose upfront the risk of judicial hassle and decline the abusive contract. Legal issues aside, keep in mind that you are offering your expertise (in terms of supply & demand, you are on the supply side). This fact has a less derogatory connotation than "asking for a job". Accordingly, the relation between the parties should be more leveled.	If the landlord gave you a key, and you can not give it back to him he has every right to charge you for correcting the oversight. I put to you that if you can't provide it back to him, he can't be certain that it has not fallen into the wrong hands, and he would be prudent to change the lock - and indeed, he may not even have another copy of the key in which case he really does not have a lot of alternatives. If you look at the section on "Claims for Damages or Loss" pdf there is a section B - Damage which confirms that Loss includes less tangible impacts including "loss of a service or facility provided under the tenancy agreement" Section C of the same document goes on to assert that "The purpose of compensation is to put the person who suffered the damage or loss in the same position as if the damage or loss had not occurred". There is arguably a question of the amount of loss suffered, and they can't sting you for punitive damages, but they can charge you a reasonable amount to get a new key cut (or possibly to replace the lock) - but that was not your question, and would probably arise if the amount he charges was unreasonable in the circumstance. Depending on if he has already taken action - and if not, how much the bill would be - promptly remedying the breach by finding and returning the key or equivalent action might save you some money.	"Legal requirement" can and in this case simply means "it's what is required in order for us to be reasonably able to offer you this service", noting that it would be unreasonable for such a dangerous business to operate, when one moron slipping and suing them could put them out of business. It's a little surprising that you've never had to sign a waiver before, but there are quite a number of similar waivers out there, such as REI (Seattle), The Edge (Vt), Croc Center (Coeur d'Alene), YMCA (MI) and U. Nebraska. They all have in common the requirement of a signature (indicating that you've waived your right to sue them), birth date, date of signature. This is the bare minimum that's required to have a valid waiver, and more info would be better (to uniquely identify the customer out of the 1000 John Smith's in the state and 500,000 in the US). If you break yourself and try to sue, they will trot out the waiver to put an end to the suit. Name, address, phone number and birth date do a long ways towards proving that the person who signed the waiver is indeed you.	You could sue them for commercially exploiting your image without permission, so the waiver is necessary. It is entirely legal to require of tenants (even if weird) that they be part of an advertising campaign, in a specified way: it's also your right to refuse to sign. There is a minuscule chance that there is a local ordinance prohibiting such a clause.	Conditions pertaining to cancellation of a contract are contained in the contract, that is there is no general "right to cancel a contract", apart from certain 3-day window rights in some jurisdictions. For example, Washington state has some specific cancellation laws, summarized here. If the contract does not allow for cancellation, then you can't cancel the contract. I assume that your contract does have a cancellation clause: then you could have to see what that clause actually states. As it turns out, Florida has a law (Fla Stat. 501.017) which regulates health studio (gym) contracts, requiring certain clauses above the signature box. One required clause per (1)(b)2 is that notice of intent to cancel by the buyer shall be given in writing to the health studio. However, If the health studio wishes to enforce the contract after receipt of the notice, it may request the department to determine the sufficiency of the notice. This means that if they want to enforce the contract after a cancellation, they may request "the department" (Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services) to rule whether the notice was according to the contract (as mandated by law). It will also contain under (1)(d) A provision for the cancellation of the contract if the buyer dies or becomes physically unable to avail himself or herself of a substantial portion of those services which he or she used from the commencement of the contract until the time of disability, with refund of funds paid or accepted in payment of the contract in an amount computed by dividing the contract price by the number of weeks in the contract term and multiplying the result by the number of weeks remaining in the contract term. The contract may require a buyer or the buyer’s estate seeking relief under this paragraph to provide proof of disability or death. A physical disability sufficient to warrant cancellation of the contract by the buyer is established if the buyer furnishes to the health studio a certification of such disability by a physician licensed under chapter 458, chapter 459, chapter 460, or chapter 461 to the extent the diagnosis or treatment of the disability is within the physician’s scope of practice. A refund shall be issued within 30 days after receipt of the notice of cancellation made pursuant to this paragraph. It appears, then, that you simply need to give notice in the correct form (written, with a doctor's notice). In case the club does not have the required provisions in the contract, the contract violates state law and is unenforceable.
Intellectual property and storage medium A State owned hard drive contains intellectual property belonging to an individual. Can the State remove that hard drive from the premises of the individual without his consent? EDIT: The property was proprietary data given to the researcher in the course of his research There may be other copies around, but I believe that is more or less immaterial to the question The individual was not given the opportunity to remove the IP from the drive, and even if he was, forensic tools are available to recover that material. Followup Question: Does this mean that the owner of the hard drive can walk off with the intellectual property of the user of that drive? Does hardware ownership 'trump' the ownership of material on the hard drive? Followup Question: Does the State have the right to move an author's intellectual property from one medium to a different, possibly less secure, medium without the consent of the Author? Or, to put it another way, does the author have any rights with regard to the disposition of his intellectual property?	Assuming that the owner of the hard drive (irrespective of if that owner is a government or private person) is legally entitled to take possession of the hard drive then they can do so subject to the fact that they generally cannot commit a crime to do so (e.g. trespass or damage to property). If the person in possession of the hard drive refuses to hand it over, the owner can seek a court order to seize it - this may allow trespass etc. Any IP on the hard drive that doesn't belong to the owner of the drive is still protected by all relevant IP laws. For example, the owner of the drive cannot copy copyright material without permission unless it is in accordance with fair use/fair dealing rules.	It is absolutely not the case that Providers are not allowed to keep PII without consent. Article 6 of the GDPR identifies six possible lawful bases for processing personal information. These are: (a) the data subject has given consent ... (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person; (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Point (f) of the first subparagraph shall not apply to processing carried out by public authorities in the performance of their tasks. If a person requests services from an online service provider, basis (b) will apply, at least to some information. If there is evidence of criminal activity, basis (c) may well apply, as it also will for much routine record keeping. Any in many such cases, basis (e) or (f) will also apply. In short, article 6 does not create a "haven for online criminals/hackers". In a comment on another answer the OP writes: The offender has the right to not be identifiable and he can't be denied this right That is simply not correct. Nothing in the GDPR says anything of the sort. It is true that consent may not be forced, but if a user requests a service that service may require the user to identify him- or herself. For example, one cannot order physical goods without giving a name and a shipping address. And the provider may retain PI and even PII when it has a "legitimate interest" in doing so, although if challenged it must justify that legitimate interest.	Mere possession of copyrighted material does not infringe any of the copyright holder's exclusive rights.1 This conclusion is echoed by Jay Dratler: Nothing in copyright law prohibits the mere possession of an unauthorized copy of a copyrighted work.2 From the Fifth Circuit: The copyright owners not only had no interest in the tangible video cassettes that contained copies of the works, but they did not have the exclusive right to possess or authorize possession of video cassettes containing copies of the works.3 From the Tenth Circuit: The Copyright Act, however, says nothing about an exclusive right to possession of a copyrighted work.4 Possession may be used as evidence that you copied the work, though. courts have held that when two works are so strikingly similar as to preclude any reasonable possibility that the defendant’s work was independently created, access may be presumed. Any circumstantial evidence of copying (i.e., proof of access and probative similarities, including the presumption of access created by striking similarities) can, however, be rebutted.5 The fact that your copy is encrypted doesn't change the copyright infringement analysis, but it may be an investigatory hurdle. 1. 17 U.S. Code § 106 2. Jay Dratler, Cyberlaw: Intellectual Property in the Digital Millennium 2-83 (2000) 3. United States v. Smith 686 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1982) 4. Khandji v. Keystone Resorts Management Inc. 140 F.R.D. 697 (D. Col. 1992) 5. Jason E. Sloan, An Overview of the Elements of a Copyright Infringement Cause of Action - Part I: Introduction and Copying, American Bar Association (last visited Dec. 7, 2016).	Content posted to the web is usually openly accessible to all (unless protected by a password, paywall, or similar restriction). But that does not mean it is freely copyable by all. Such content is protected by copyright in just the same way as if it had been published in a book of essays by various contributors. Unless the copyright holders (who are likely to be the original authors, but might not be) give permission, or an exception to copyright applies, copying such content would be clear and obvious copyright infringement, and any copyright holder could sue for damages. Permission could be given by publishing the content under a permissive license, such as a CC-BY-SA license, or any of many other available permissive licenses. Or a would-be reuser could find the copyright holders and ask for permission. If the holder cannot be found or identified, or does not respond, then no permission has been granted. In the US the main exception to copyright is fair use. See this answer and other threads with the fair-use tag here for more on fair use. Since the question seems to contemplate using the whole of the posted content, since it might well damage any potential market for that content, and since the use does not seem to be "transformative", nor used for criticism or comment, a finding of fair use for this situation seems unlikely. But Fair use findings are very much fact-driven, and the exact facts do matter. Thus I cannot be at all sure whether a court would find this toi be fair use or not. In other countries there are a variety of exceptions to copyright, and I have not come close to reviewing them all. But none of the ones I know of seem to apply to the situation described in the question. Many are narrower than the US concept of fair use. I fear that without permission, copying this content would be infringement. However, it would not be infringement to create a site that includes a link to the existing content, and a summary or description of that content, along with new content, including comments on the old, with brief quotes to indicate what is being commented on.	You are correct that facts in general are not protected by copyright, and most raw data are facts. However, a collection of data may be protected by copyright as to its selection and organization. A use which copies such selection might possibly be copyright infringement. If data constitutes a trade secret it may be protected as such, and "improper" access might be unlawful. This would not apply to publicly available data or collections of data. If, to access a data set, one must sign or agree to a contract, that contract may limit the use of such data. Again, this would not apply to most publicly available data.	These documents constitute personal data and - in principle - you, as the subject, have the right to get a copy of them by issuing a "subject access request". The controller shall provide a copy of the personal data undergoing processing. For any further copies requested by the data subject, the controller may charge a reasonable fee based on administrative costs. Where the data subject makes the request by electronic means, and unless otherwise requested by the data subject, the information shall be provided in a commonly used electronic form. (Art. 15 (3) GDPR) GDPR applies to controllers of any kind, including government organisations. The subject access request can usually be a simple email. The ICO has a template for this: https://ico.org.uk/your-data-matters/your-right-of-access/ (but keep it simple, you can literally just ask for "all personal data" they have on you; no need to speculate on what kind of data they may have). The subject access request is sent to the actual controller, but if you don't get a response to your request after 30 days, you can file a complaint with the supervisory authority (see here for Germany; note that federal institutions are supervised by the BFDI, not the data protection authorities of the Länder). Also note that you may have to go through some trouble to be properly authenticated by the controller. They do need to be certain that you are the data subject. There are also reasons why a controller can refuse to provide some or all of the information (e.g. if your request is clearly excessive or unfounded, if it's impossible to comply without violating another data subject's rights), but I would be surprised if any of those applied in your case. Your rights can also be restricted depending on the legal basis for processing. This includes rights that are illogical as well as some that provide special protection for processors: You can't object to processing based on consent (but you can revoke your consent), fulfilment of contract (but you can cancel your contract), a legal obligation on the part of the processor, or a vital interest (but you still have the right to erasure) Your right to portability and right to erasure does not apply if processing is based on a legal obligation or a public task (justice, parliamentary or government functions, statutory functions etc.) your right to portability also doesn't apply if processing is based on vital interest (e.g to protect someone's life) or legitimate interest of the processor. It is possible that processing all or some of your data was based on the performance of a public task, in which case they will refuse your request.	Probably Not The creator or owner of a piece of software does not in general have any copyright over the output when others run the software, unless that output is itself a derivative work of input supplied by the copyright owner, or forming part of the software. In this case the translation is a derivative work of the 19th century original, but that is assumed to be in the public domain. SAo google has no copyright on the resulting translation. But copyright protection is only available for "original works of authorship". (See 17 USC 102 in the US, and similar laws elsewhere.) A machine-produced translation is not an original work, and it is surely not then work of the author of the overall book. However, the author would still have a copyright on the book as a whole. The legal situation is no different than if the author had simply quoted a 19th century work. One may incorporate public domain works into a later work, and that later work is still protected by copyright, provided that there is enough original contentr to make the work as a whole "an original work of authorship". Others may use the PD [arts, or the original from which they are taken, but not the rest of the work (beyond what fair use would allow in any case). For example, I have made a number of posts here on LAW.SE. In several,of those I quoted sections from one of the numbers of The Federalist. That 19th century work is in the public domain. Anyone else may re-quote the passages I quoted from it. But that gives them no rights to use the rest of my work, except as the CC-BY-SA license or fair use permits. So the author would retain copyright on the book as a whole. But soemoen who merely quotes or uses the translated 19th century article but none of the original parts of the book would not be infringing that copyright. I say probably in the header, because I do not have any actual case-law to cite here. It is possible that some court has rules otherwise on the subject of the copyright on the output of a software tool, but I strongly doubt it.	You are referring to Section 29.22 of the Copyright Act of Canada. This allows for format shifting for private purposes but only if the copy of the work or other subject-matter from which the reproduction is made is not an infringing copy and the individual legally obtained the copy of the work or other subject-matter from which the reproduction is made among some other conditions. In the case of downloading a copy from the internet, the source is likely an infringing copy (violating the first condition) and you wouldn't have legally obtained the copy of the work from which the reproduction is made (you don't even have the copy from which the reproduction is made, since it is on a remote server somewhere).
What are the implications of an obvious mistake in a signed employment contract? My brother was recently employed full time in a very specialized (and sensitive) job in South Africa for a company based in the US. There are less than 300 people in the world suited for his job. His employer was so anxious to get him to sign the contract that things were rushed a little it seems. My brother signed the contract he had been given (already signed by the employer) and noticed that the salary they had agreed on per year, was stated in the contract as the salary per month. My brother, informed the employer and an amendment to the contract was signed. Due to the nature of the job, very advanced notice (minimum 6 months) is required by both parties for terminating the contract. What would the implications be if an employee were to refuse signing an amendment and insist on what was stated in the original signed contract, even if he/she knows it's a mistake?	What would the implications be if an employee were to refuse signing an amendment and insist on what was stated in the original signed contract, even if he/she knows it's a mistake? The contract is voidable unless the employer's subsequent conduct reinforces its legitimacy. The employee's attempt to take advantage of something he knew was a mistake contravenes the covenant of good faith and fair dealing on which contracts are premised. South African contract law is not an exception to this: The law of contract underpins private enterprise in South Africa and regulates it in the interest of fair dealing. The employer can resort to records of prior communications between the parties to prove that the stated compensation was intended as yearly, not monthly. Even if those records are not available in a judicial dispute, the employee would have a hard time persuading a court that the salary that was agreed upon is 12 times --or exceeds by a factor of 12-- the market rate for a job position of similar type.	As I understand it you are responsible for removing the stump and replacing the tree. The fact that a particular method was agreed (and failed) doesn’t relieve you of that responsibility. If a contract doesn’t specify a time for fulfilling an obligation then it must be done within a reasonable time. That is, a time that is reasonable in the particular circumstances. You suggested a time of April/May - it is now November and is probably beyond a reasonable time. By not stating a year, a reasonable interpretation is that you meant this year i.e. 2018. It would appear that you are in breach of your agreement and the other party can take whatever action the agreement contemplates.	No The contract is created at the moment that an offer was accepted. In normal circumstances: You accepted an offer that they made to the general public by sending a purchase order for specific items at specific prices, or They accepted your offer by communicating their acceptance to you (being advised that the goods have been dispatched counts). However, in this circumstance, the company has been explicit that the contract is only created when either: You checkout and pay, or They “supply an invoice to you.” It appears that neither event happened so there is no contract. Their specific terms have overridden the common law rules on offer and acceptance (as they are allowed to do) and the offer has not been accepted until you receive their invoice. Specifically, it cannot be accepted by performance (dispatching the goods) and the requirement for the invoice to be supplied overrides the postal rule. Note that, in this case, you got lucky. 99 times out of 100 there would have been a valid contract and you would have breached it. In future, cancel orders specifically, don’t make assumptions.	It is the tenant's responsibility to understand the written contract. Oral statements about the contract do have to be consistent with the written contract (that is, in the context where you ask the landlord what a particular clause means before signing -- not in the case where you are modifying an existing contract). If I were renting a room and the contract says "Du må betale $1000 hver dag", which I don't understand because my Norwegian is terrible, I would ask about this, and the landlord might say that it means "You must pay $1000 every month", which could be a decent deal. Actually, the clause says "You must pay $1000 every day". When the reality of the situation becomes clear, then it is obvious that we didn't have an agreement in the first place. Perhaps he mis-spoke, or his English is as bad as my Norwegian, but I would not be held to rate in the written contract, assuming that I could back up my claim that he gave me that interpretation: the lease would probably be voided, as not an actual agreement. The underlying principle is that there has to be a "meeting of the minds" where the parties understand what they will get and what they must give, and there was a demonstrable failure of understanding. On the other hand, if I sign a contract without really reading it carefully, and there is a clause in English (which I speak) saying that I have to pay $1000 a day, but I didn't really think about the clause so that in a sense I didn't understand what I had agreed to, well, I may still be on the hook. (On the third hand, a court would probably say that's a ridiculous rent and void the contract on policy grounds). In general, "not my first language" is not a get-out-of-contract card, though attempts to trick people into signing documents in languages that they really have no understanding of won't be successful. Virtually nobody but a lawyer actually understands contractual language, yet contracts are enforced all the time. A contract can be explicitly modified by verbal agreement, or can be entirely verbal, but oral agreements face evidence problems, namely, what exactly did A and B say? It's scientifically well established that parties can be morally certain that the conversation went "A" (for one person) and "Not A" (for the other person). Using "could" rather than "would" in speech makes a huge difference in interpretation. There is a rule, the parol evidence rule, which essentially says that unless there is a good reason to not do so, the contract as written is what is enforced. Even if the conversation had been written into the contract, there's no basis in the contract for objectively determining whether a thing is old and "just broke". So even as an additional clause in the contract, it doesn't afford you a clear escape hatch. You might be able to prove with expert testimony that indeed the pipes had been corroding for a hundred years, and you could not have caused the pipes to burst.	A typo in a contract does not ever void the contract. If the typo changes the meaning of the contract from what was actually intended, then it is up to a judge to interpret the contract and whether it is reasonable that a person would assume its intended meaning. In your example, it is obvious that the word "least" was meant to be there and not "lease" - as the alternate word makes no sense in context - so a judge would not void the contract or release you from your 30 day obligation (which is probably even granted to the landlord by local laws regardless of whether it was stated in the contract). Even misspellings of people's names or addresses on a lease do not void a contract if you have already paid or taken up residence. If any of these situations were brought to court, the judge would just amend the contract to a corrected version that would then serve as the contract between the two parties, replacing the version with the typo. This is known as contract reformation.	Do I give my letter 60 days from the end of the contract, or 60 days before September? My boss told me that it would be 60 days before the end of the contract, but I wanted a second opinion. Your boss is wrong. The contract requires a party to give a 60-day notice only if the party intends to override the default condition that "the contract shall run for the full term named above". Since your contract ends on June 30th and you plan on working there up to and including that date, you are abiding by the [contract] default condition. Therefore, you are not required to send a notice for something you are not intending to do (namely, to terminate the contract ahead of schedule). The information you provide here does not reflect any language in your current contract relating to subsequent contracts/renewals. The existence of such language might or might not change the assessment. That issue aside, you might want to ensure that the preliminary offer made to you verbally be somehow reflected in writing. It will not be more binding than the verbal offer, but that evidence could prove useful in the event that the new employer unexpectedly changes its mind at a time when your current employer has discarded you for contract renewal. Your prospective employer should become aware of how its request for a reference from your boss jeopardizes a renewal with your current employer.	A company generally cannot compel an employee to agree to a non-compete, but they have a wide variety of alternatives for inducing employees to do so. Most obviously, they may threaten to fire employees who refuse, whether immediately or at the end of their current term, as another answer observes. Indeed, if Big Company makes an NC a condition of employment then they are likely to insist on the same for employees they obtain from Original Employer. Firing employees for refusing to sign does, of course, put them in the job market as potential competitors, but the company may well find it acceptable to do that on their own terms. In particular, Big Company can ensure that those who won't sign go out the door with minimal knowledge of Big Company's clients, trade secrets, etc. other than those obtained from Original Employer. And that leads into other forms of inducement. Big Company can do some or all of the following things, depending on the particular employment situation: offer bonus compensation for signing promote those who sign and / or demote / reassign those who don't change job duties for those who refuse to sign do all manner of nastier things to be unfriendly to employees who refuse to sign Some of those fit directly into Big Company's perceived interest in avoiding employees using Big Company internal information to jump ship and compete with them, and others could fit into Big Company policy about which jobs require an NC. Some are just pressure tactics, but that does not necessarily make them unlawful (nor are all variations on the others necessarily lawful).	why do they sometimes specify the federal law as well as the state/provincial law? Isn't it redundant? Not necessarily. The contract might be entered and/or performed in a different country, whence mentioning only the Canadian provincial law does not override the other country's federal law (or that country's "supra-provincial" equivalent). Mentioning Canadian federal law removes --at least on paper-- the ambiguity of which law applies for matters beyond the scope of Canadian provincial law. In such scenarios, portions or the entirety of the provision might be null and void. For instance, an employment contract might establish waivers which are void or perhaps even unlawful under the legislation of that other country. Please note that in general a copy/paste of sample clauses is strongly discouraged unless the parties fully understand their meaning and implications.
Can the Feds not put Bank Executives (or their employees) in Prison for Fraud? I see stories such as this one quoted below where a Wells Fargo exec who headed phony accounts unit collected $125 million. Basically the notion is that big fat cat bankers can swindle people out of BIG money and have absolutely no consequences, and they actually still benefit from defrauding others and be set for the rest of their lives. On Thursday, Wells Fargo agreed to pay $185 million, including the largest penalty ever imposed by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, to settle claims that that it defrauded its customers. The bank’s shareholders will ultimately have to swallow the cost of that settlement. Tolstedt, however, is walking away from Wells Fargo with a very full bank account--and praise. In the July announcement of her exit, which made no mention of the soon-to-be-settled case, Well Fargo’s CEO John Stumpf said Tolstedt had been one of the bank’s most important leaders and “a standard-bearer of our culture” and “a champion for our customers.” In a statement following the settlement, Wells Fargo said, “Wells Fargo reached these agreements consistent with our commitment to customers and in the interest of putting this matter behind us. Wells Fargo is committed to putting our customers' interests first 100% of the time, and we regret and take responsibility for any instances where customers may have received a product that they did not request.” Shortly after the financial crisis, big banks in the nation, including Wells Fargo, promised that their top bankers would not be able to keep large paydays if it was found that those rewards were gained through harmful conduct. It was supposed to be the stick to the carrot of Wall Street bonuses. But the latest example of fraud at Wells Fargo shows that the big banks are unwilling to wield those sticks, especially when it comes to their top executives source It's quite obvious leaving decisions like this up to the companies that are found in violation of a federal regulation or fraud does not work to deter the fraudulent activity from occurring so to my question(s): Can the feds not charge anyone from this company with a crime that has "prison time" or "felony" consequences? Do bankers ever go to prison in America for fraud of this amount (fraud is fraud)? If the shareholders are paying for most of this settlement, then how can this not be fraud to the shareholders or the correlated stock (e.g. some disclosure when you buy the stock that you may have foot the bills for fraudulence with their employees)? Maybe there is a simple answer to this that could clarify which I could've found on my own with a little research, but I'm interesting more in what attorney's, or other legal professional's, or the legal enthusiast's more than doing my own research on the topic.	Prosecutors have discretion to not bring charges. Wayte v. United States 470 U.S. 598 (1985), Bordenkircher v. Hayes 434 U.S. 357 (1978) The Department of Justice says: The reasoned exercise of prosecutorial discretion is essential to the fair, effective, and even-handed administration of the federal criminal laws. Decisions about whether to initiate charges, what charges and enhancements to pursue, when to accept a negotiated plea, and how to advocate at sentencing, are among the most fundamental duties of federal prosecutors. The US Attorney's Manual says: The prosecutor's broad discretion in such areas as initiating or foregoing prosecutions, selecting or recommending specific charges, and terminating prosecutions by accepting guilty pleas has been recognized on numerous occasions by the courts. See, e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Powell v. Ratzenbach, 359 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 906 (1966). This discretion exists by virtue of his/her status as a member of the Executive Branch, which is charged under the Constitution with ensuring that the laws of the United States be "faithfully executed." As of April 28, 2016, 35 bankers had been sent to prison for fraud and other financial crimes relating to the 2008-and-onward financial crisis.	"Fraud" requires an intent to deceive. In cases like this I would fall back on the saying, "Never attribute to malice what can be explained by incompetence." Practically speaking: the email you received from them is an amendment to their Terms of Service. I.e., your contract with the company starts with their standard Terms of Service, and is modified by any agreement you reach that explicitly supersedes the ToS. Based on your description it is your credit card company that is in violation of its duty to adjudicate chargebacks. If you refuse the charge, and present the email agreement and evidence of A's "failure," then the card company has no grounds to impose the charge on you (unless the merchant in its response to the chargeback can convincingly argue that the email agreement is invalid).	There are basically two kinds of conduct that you identify. One is backing away from what you believe were oral promises made by the employer and lawyer regarding payment. Whatever the status of the promises made by the employer, the oral statements made by the lawyer would probably be viewed by a court or ethics board as settlement offers or proposals rather than actual binding agreements, and this is unlikely to be considered an ethical lapse. For purposes of ethics questions and fraud lawsuits, lies about what kind of deal you are willing to make with an adversary don't count as lies. This isn't a terribly logical rule, but is is a well established one. Given that: I was told (by employer), verbally and in text/email messages that I "would be paid when the deals closed." It is going to be very hard for the employer to take back those written statements and text and email messages are usually given the effect of signed writings in a court of law. This is going to be taken as a confession of the employer regarding the probably unwritten agreement of the parties regarding your right to be paid on these deals, so you would be well advised to stick to your guns on this issue. The percentages will be another point that is hard for the employer to fight if there is a course of dealings between the parties in which you receive a consistent percentage or there was a written agreement concerning your commission percentage. Also, even if the lawyer did make a promise and breached it, this would still only be a breach by the employer of a contract made on the employer's behalf by his lawyer. It is not an ethical lapse to breach a contract about future conduct, and a lawyer is not personally responsible for contracts he makes as a disclosed agent of your former employer. The second is making a false statement of fact about whom the lawyer has discussed the matter with. Lawyers do have an ethical duty to be truthful and failing to do so is an ethical lapse. But, this duty is generally interpreted to apply only to statements of fact which are material. If a lawyer lies to you about how old he is, or whether he's ever had an affair, in the context of a pre-litigation negotiation like this one, the ethical officials won't care. If a lawyer lies to you about something material to the transaction (e.g. claiming that the employer has money in the bank to pay a settlement when in fact it is overdrawn on all of its accounts and has no money coming in and the lawyer knows those facts), this is a serious ethical breach. It is hard to see how this information would be material, even though it casts doubt on his credibility. Ethically, he owes any duty of confidentiality to his client and not to you, so it isn't your complaint to make from a confidentiality point of view. Also, unless he discusses confidential advice that he provided to his client when no one else was present to you, he has not waived the attorney-client privilege, contrary to the answer by @IñakiViggers on that issue. Of course, proving that the lawyer said anything in an oral conversation at which no one else was present comes down to a credibility fight between your sworn statement and his if the lawyer testifies inaccurately about the discussion. A sworn statement from you is proof and would meet the "burden of production" to provide proof in support of your case at a trial, but wouldn't necessarily prevail easily at trial since the judge might not be convinced regarding who is accurate in their account of the discussion (I have avoided the word "lying" because there are a variety of reasons that people inaccurately recall discussions). What would be the sensible way to use this information to my advantage while trying to resolve these matters with having to bring suit and go to court? Is there anything that this lawyer should fear, if his unethical behavior was brought to light, either in court or to a bar association? The conduct you describe on the part of the lawyer will provide you with little or no leverage in your negotiations and is likely to not even be considered admissible evidence in court since it may be considered a form of settlement negotiations. Your strongest leverage will be the written statements from the employer. But, depending upon the amount in dispute, it may still make sense to compromise given the time and expense and uncertainty of going to court. Even in the clearest case, you probably only have a 90% chance of winning a contested case, and you wouldn't cross the street if you knew you had a 10% chance of being hit by a car as you crossed, even if you knew that the collision wouldn't be fatal. Unless your state has a wage claims act that covers you, you may have little or not prospect of an attorneys' fee award if you prevail, and representing yourself when the employer has a lawyer will always put you at a disadvantage in a court setting. If the amount in dispute is great (e.g. $50,000+), hiring a lawyer is probably worth it. If the amount in dispute is small (e.g. $5,000) you may want to file a suit in small claims court and only hire a lawyer for a couple hours of pre-hearing coaching.	Expanding on @Rick's answer, the UK government does not hold all of its money in an undifferentiated general fund (although much of it is held that way). In non-profits and government, one generally uses "fund accounting", in which particular pots of money can only be used for particular purposes and the government keeps track of how much money is held in each fund. In this case, credit in a fund for cabinet operations would be transferred to a fund for privacy violation fines whose disposition would be set forth either in the Data Protection Act (2018) itself, or in some other piece of legislation (perhaps statutes on court administration) setting forth how funds collected as fines are used. This said, the intuition of the question isn't wrong. When one part of the government fines another part of the government, especially if the fine has the impact of preventing the fined part of the government from carrying on necessary governmental operations, the economic effort of the fine can be swiftly wiped out in the next annual appropriations bill, or in an interim emergency appropriations bill, if necessary. And, if the individual offenders who committed the violations aren't penalized, this may not be a very effective incentive to bring about compliance with the law. Of course, even if the economic incentive that the fine creates to comply is negligible, this doesn't mean that the symbolic and political cost of holding a government agency accountable in the same way that a private firm would be held accountable, that indicates the magnitude of the wrong done, is meaningless for the politicians running that agency.	The provisions of the credit card account agreement will be governed by Delaware law, except to the extent to North Carolina public policy overrides it. The provisions of the online services agreement will be governed by New York law, except to the extent to North Carolina public policy overrides it. The electronic communications agreement will be governed by the law of the place with the most significant connection to any disputed issues arising under it. It could also be considered to be an extension of the online services agreement rather than a separate agreement. UDAP is an acronym referring the state deceptive trade practices acts. The unfair act involves non-receipt of paperless billing statements. Even with this level of detail, I don't believe it is possible to know in advance which of the agreements is implicated and which state's laws will be held to apply (or if the differences between the laws of the candidate states is even material on the issue in question). These issues are decided on a case by case basis when there is a mishmash of facts and the outcomes are not terribly predictable. It also isn't obvious that there is a provision covering the conduct in question in any of the three potentially relevant states. The Delaware Deceptive Trade Practices Act doesn't appear to clearly apply to financial services at all. New York's application to financial services is quite narrow and subject to an exception for conduct in conformity with federal law. A failure to provide an invoice, without more, isn't necessarily a deceptive trade practice at all. All in all, there isn't a straightforward or easy answer to this question that can be reached from the information provided.	In essence, Schwab is stating that they are not a law enforcement agency and they have neither the interest nor the legal right to pursue criminals. They state that they will assist law enforcement but also tell you that, from their experience, law enforcement while they have the legal right also don't have any interest in doing so. This is completely correct. I'm not going to comment on what you should do to protect yourself from identity theft. With respect to the reverse transfer: you are on very shaky legal ground here - you transferred funds without authorization and you are not legally allowed to do this even to recover your own losses. If you had limited this to just recovering your own funds then you would be extremely unlikely to be prosecuted but by taking more than was yours you have technically committed a theft of your own. That said, it seems unlikely that law enforcement will be interested - Schwab are not making a complaint and I doubt that the original thief will - for obvious reasons. However, its possible (even likely) that this was not the thief's bank account - this is likely to be an innocent third party's account that the thief was using to obfuscate their crime. If so, the money you took (both the original amount and the extra $50) you took actually belongs to that innocent party - your money had probably spent very little time in that account.	John Edwards was charged and acquitted on similar facts. Note, though, that Cohen isn't being charged with unduly influencing the election. As far as campaign-finance laws are concerned, there's nothing wrong with influencing an election by paying hush money to a candidate's side piece. Instead, the law simply asks that you disclose the money you spend when you file your campaign finance reports, and it prohibits direct corporate contributions to a campaign, as well as individual contributions in excess of $2,700. Cohen went wrong by coordinating his work with "Individual-1" to help his campaign by providing valuable legal services and paying hush money to "Woman-1" and "Woman-2" without the campaign paying for it and without the campaign disclosing it. Had Cohen been on the campaign's payroll, and had the hush money come out of the campaign treasury, and had the campaign disclosed it all on their campaign-finance reports, I think he would not be in any legal trouble (although there is the tax evasion, too). I think it's probably safe to say that campaigns make these types of payments to people with damaging information somewhat frequently, and they don't get in trouble because the money comes from campaign funds (why would you want to go out of pocket, anyway?) and they report the expenditures as required. Because the campaign-finance laws are so loose, "disclosing" the expenditure isn't going to give anything away, because you can basically just say "$100,000 to Stephanie Clifford for personal services."	You are mostly mistaken. Prior to the enactment of the STOCK Act in 2012 (as amended in 2013), insider trading by members of Congress based upon information obtained in their official duties was legal. This is no longer the case, but there is no private cause of action to enforce the STOCK Act. Instead, the principal means by which violations are enforced is via a federal criminal prosecution which is something that the Justice Department is very reluctant to direct at a member of Congress. There are at least two barriers to such prosecutions, in addition to the political issues involved with having an agency prosecute members of the body that funds it and regulates it: To bring a case here, however, federal authorities must overcome two obstacles: the Speech and Debate Clause, and proving “materiality” in novel circumstances. Indeed, the announcement that the authorities have closed their investigations into three senators may show these obstacles already have proven too steep. As a result, it is hard to bring federal criminal cases against members of Congress (or their aides) to enforce the STOCK Act, so it is much more toothless than it seems on the surface. The further fact that a security is structured as an Exchange Traded Fund (ETF), however, is not itself necessarily all that much of a barrier to insider trading criminal liability for members of Congress, beyond the barriers already noted. This is because many ETFs are focused on something less than the total securities market. If a member of Congress, for example, has inside information on something that will impact the entire manufacturing industry, that member of Congress can engaged in insider trading in an ETF pertinent to that industry. Similarly, if a member of Congress gains advanced insight about an imminent war in Latin America, the member of Congress could engage in insider trading in connection with a Latin American securities ETF. There is no requirement that insider trading be restricted to, or focused upon, a single issuer of securities (i.e. it does not have to be limited to stocks or bonds in a single corporation).
How to "sign anywhere" For a volunteer position at a local public institution, I have been given a list of policies to which I must agree. I have no issues with the specific policies. My question is because I was asked to sign "anywhere" on the page and return the copy. I'm not sure it's wise to just "sign anywhere" without writing anything else around my name. I'm considering writing "Acknowledged, (Signature)" but am not sure if there is a better legal phrase to be used in conjunction with my signature.	"Acknowledged" is fine. There is no "preferable" substitute with which to prefix your signature. As a precaution, never leave too much space between the end of clauses and your signature, lest another clause later on gets slid in without your consent (a public institution is unlikely to incur such misconduct, though). Also, always be sure to ask for a copy of the contract/agreement you sign.	The question of whether a person was acting on their own behalf or that of a company would generally be a question of fact, so if such a case came to court it would be for both sides to present evidence and argue for their interpretation of it. In most cases the context makes it clear. You mention having a company email domain and associated email signature; that is certainly good practice and would go a long way towards creating a presumption that you were acting for a company. Also signing yourself with your job title or role (e.g. "Joe Bloggs, Chief Bottlewasher") makes it clear that you are speaking in your role as an employee. The content of the communication also matters; if you use your company email address to order goods from a supplier that the company has used before then the recipient can reasonably assume that you are ordering on behalf of the company and a court is likely to agree. OTOH if you use the company address to send libellous emails then the recipient would have a much higher bar to claim that this was the company view rather than a personal one.	That release needs to be provided in writing to each legal entity (read: office) that provides you with medical care. Providing the release verbally (ie: 'I say that my assistant speaks for me') does not cut it; the offices that agreed are technically in jeopardy of some hefty fines and are just trusting you won't turn around and report them. Most offices are going to have their own forms for this and won't accept some generic letter that you write up, sign, and send all of them. Have your assistant call each office and ask for them to fax over a copy of their release form. List your assistant as an authorized contact, sign it, and send it back to them.	The language "I therefore place you on notice that" in your proposed missive is superfluous and adds nothing that is legally relevant. Flourishes like that are common among former paralegals, court clerks, common law country notaries, and other non-lawyers who want to sound legalistic but don't really have the relevant legal knowledge. It is common to say "I put so and so on notice that" in a legal opinion or a summary of a case, but mildly uncommon and not necessary to put those magic words in the notice itself in a situation like this where there is no prescribed statutory language that must be used on a specific legal form. In this situation the important thing is that the person is actually made aware of the situation, not that you conform to a statutory form. Also does it add anything to have stated the effect if they do not do so ("This may be detrimental..."), if the matter proceeds to a court case? If they complain of a lack of an opportunity to inspect in a later court case, it allows you to say, "I told you so and I gave you a chance to do something about it" which might be fairly convincing to a judge and would probably overcome any arguments that you engaged in spoliation of evidence.	If the question asks, "did you do X" where X is or includes a crime that you could be criminally prosecuted for, you can invoke the 5th amendment in refusing to answer that. I have seen that done and seen that objection to the question sustained in court. However, if admitting to X would provide only civil liability, then the 5th would not apply. At trial, you may also have to take care not to give direct testimony on things that are so closely related that you "open the door" to being required to answer that question. For example, you can't say "I don't owe because I did X" and then expect to not have to answer "So just to be clear, did you do X?" Also, depending on context, invoking the 5th might cause a jury to view your testimony more skeptically (cpast points out that "For civil cases, adverse inferences based on pleading the fifth are totally okay"), and if that's going to come up you should ask your attorney about whether or not it'd be a good idea strategically.	Any written communication is generally admissible Subject to all the normal rules for admissibility of course. For texts between you and a third party the major issue that springs to mind is relevance. As in, how are they relevant to the dispute between you and this man? If they are not, your lawyer should have objected to them on this basis, however, its too late now. I'm curious as to how he obtained these and whether it was done legally or not. Illegality will not affect their admissibility as the exclusionary rule doesn't apply to civil matters, however, it does speak to the gentleman's character.	Can I sign legal documents with a smiley face? Yes, that is lawful. A person's signature does not necessarily have to include the person's name or initials. What matters is that the signature reliably and unequivocally identifies the person who produces it, which apparently you have been able to prove by showing your driver's license. The Black's Law Dictionary (4th Edition) states in its entry for signature that "whatever mark, symbol, or device one may choose to employ as representative of himself is sufficient". It directs to the entry for sign, which likewise speaks in terms of "any mark, as upon a document, in token of knowledge, approval, acceptance or obligation". Accordingly, your signature qualifies as mark or symbol that fits these purposes. Your history of signing other legally binding documents that way further reinforces the authenticity of your signature. If it is legal, is it a bad idea? It is a bad idea to the extent (if any) that (1) others can easily forge your signature (notwithstanding that forgery or identity theft might be proved circumstantially); and (2) verifying your identity may cause hassle or annoyance to you and/or third parties. But this paragraph obviously is applicable to any and all signatures, not just those which at first glance may seem to be a joke.	You can't You agreed: by submitting Materials in any form to the Company, in addition to other provisions of the Terms, you automatically grant Company a royalty-free, world-wide, irrevocable, non-exclusive, and assignable right and license to use, copy, reproduce, modify, adapt, publish, edit, translate, create derivative works from, transmit, distribute, publicly display and publicly perform such Materials for the purpose of displaying and promoting the Materials on any website operated by, and in any related marketing materials produced by, the Company and its affiliates. They can keep and use your data forever and give it to whoever they want. The clause you quote doesn't alter that. All it says is that once a year, if you ask, they will tell you what information they shared and with whom. If they feel like it they will tell you how to get the information deleted.
Is intentionally advertizing and billing for more service than provided legal if the contract mentions that the quality of service is variable? Here's the situation. A certain telecom company is advertising a "7 Mb/s" internet connection plan, and the monthly bill shows "7.1 Mb/s" internet service. When measured, connection speed is 3 Mb/s. Called customer service and found out that the contract for the "7 Mb/s" plan specifies that connection speed may vary between 3 and 7 Mb/s, and, what surprised me most, I was told that customers in my area are "allocated 3.3 Mb/s". That is, the allocated bandwidth is fixed at 3.3 Mb/s and doesn't really vary between 3 and 7, and most certainly can never reach the advertised 7 Mb/s. I wonder whether this practice is legal. Can a baker advertise a 7 lbs cake, bill for 7.1 lbs cake, mention in the contract that the actual weight of the cake may vary between 3 and 7 lbs, and fine tune its machinery to always produce 3.3 lbs cakes to be sold as the 7.1 lbs ones? EDIT: After quick googling I found that the same telecom company has been accused of all kinds of deceptive practices and fraud: medium, consumeraffairs, bayleyglasser, dorothyayer.	Assuming everything exactly as in the question, that is probably deceptive advertising. But ads for ISP services, much less contracts for them, tend to be full of exceptions and details, and he exact wording of those will matter here. If there was "fine print" that said the service will often be at 3 Mb/s, that may be enough to make this legal. Also, that each customer was 'allocated" 3.3 Mb/s may well not mean that each customer's connection was fixed at the speed, in fact it is unlikely to. It more likely means that for each 100 customers, bandwidth of 330 Mb/s was available to be shared among them dynamically, with the exact amount a given customer receives varying by demand. if 7.1 Mb/s is the maximum bandwidth ever provided to a customer, the ad may be considered accurate. Legal aid for consumer issues may be available at http://lawhelpca.org/ for those unable to afford a lawyer. For further information this FindLaw page gives section numbers for some key California consumer protection information.	All of this is illegal. You do not give a jurisdiction so I will use NSW, Australia as an example but many countries' laws have similar effect. Australian Consumer Law prohibits misleading and deceptive conduct: It is illegal for a business to engage in conduct that misleads or deceives or is likely to mislead or deceive consumers or other businesses. It doesn't matter that what you have said is strictly speaking factual - the way it has been said is likely to mislead or deceive. However, what you are proposing goes further and IMO crosses the line into fraud (s192E of the Crimes Act): 192E Fraud (1) A person who, by any deception, dishonestly: (b) obtains any financial advantage or causes any financial disadvantage, is guilty of the offence of fraud. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years. (2) A person’s obtaining of property belonging to another may be dishonest even if the person is willing to pay for the property. In addition to the illegality, stealing other people's money is morally wrong by any reasonable standards of morality.	Clearly in this case the writing does not reflect your actual agreement. If you were to bill for 1.5x your normal rate for hours over 40/week, relying on the writing, and it came to court, you might win, based on the general rule that matters explicitly covered in the written agreement are treated as final, and evidence of contradictory oral agreements are often not accepted to contradict the contract document. This is known as the parole evidence rule. But you don't plan to issue such a bill, so that won't come up. I don't see that you are at any legal risk. But you could send the client a letter saying that you signed the contract document so as not to hold the job up, but you think there is a mistake in it (pointing out exactly where and what the error is). This would help establish your ethics and good faith, so that if somehow there was a problem over this later (although that seems unlikely) you can't be accused of any improper actions. Keep a copy of any such letter. By the way, if you are an independent contractor, the governmental standard for overtime does not normally apply (in the US). If you are an employee of a consulting company, it may or may not, depending on your salary level and the kind of work you do. An independent contractor can contract for a higher rate for overtime hours, if the client is willing to agree. Many clients will not be willing.	I don't think the issue is that it is a violation of a law, but rather that it is a violation of the terms of service you agree to when you sign up for the site - which is a breach of contract. You can be sued for breach of contract, if the site can prove any damages based on your breach. So if you use a bot to make money on a site, in violation of the site's license agreement, then I believe the site could indeed sue you to get the money back. Also, the phrasing of your question ("creating a robot") raises a separate issue. It is not actually creating the bot that is illegal, but using it where not allowed can be a violation of contract. Suppose person A makes a poker bot, just as a programming exercise, and doesn't use it. But then suppose person B uses the robot created by person A on a site that forbids it. Although this could be a gray area, I do not believe the site would have any recourse against person A (even though they probably would against person B).	Just at the offset this does not constitute legal advice, just some opinions I have on this point. Technically, you would not be prohibited to generate speech and use it however you like. Under normal circumstances any output generated by the system that does not contravene the service agreement would be your intellectual property. This would include the text and speech generated. Once you go about the request limit you would naturally be required to pay, but until that time you can use the service as a paying customer. Just to clarify this point I would like to make reference to the service license agreement, clause 3, which make reference to the following prohibitions: (a) copy, modify, create a derivative work of, reverse engineer, decompile, translate, disassemble, or otherwise attempt to extract any or all of the source code of the Services (subject to Section 3.4 below and except to the extent such restriction is expressly prohibited by applicable law); (b) use the Services for High Risk Activities; (c) sublicense, resell, or distribute any or all of the Services separate from any integrated Application; (d) create multiple Applications, Accounts, or Projects to simulate or act as a single Application, Account, or Project (respectively) or otherwise access the Services in a manner intended to avoid incurring Fees or exceed usage limits or quotas; (e) unless otherwise set forth in the Service Specific Terms, use the Services to operate or enable any telecommunications service or in connection with any Application that allows Customer End Users to place calls or to receive calls from any public switched telephone network; or (f) process or store any Customer Data that is subject to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations maintained by the Department of State. Unless otherwise specified in writing by Google, Google does not intend uses of the Services to create obligations under HIPAA, and makes no representations that the Services satisfy HIPAA requirements. If Customer is (or becomes) a Covered Entity or Business Associate, as defined in HIPAA, Customer will not use the Services for any purpose or in any manner involving Protected Health Information (as defined in HIPAA) unless Customer has received prior written consent to such use from Google. Similarly, as specified here: Customer will not, and will not allow third parties to: (i) use these Services to create, train, or improve (directly or indirectly) a similar or competing product or service or (ii) integrate these Services with any applications for any embedded devices such as cars, TVs, appliances, or speakers without Google's prior written permission. These Services can only be integrated with applications for the following personal computing devices: smartphones, tablets, laptops, and desktops. In addition to any other available remedies, Google may immediately suspend or terminate Customer's use of these Services based on any suspected violation of these terms, and violation of these terms is deemed violation of Google's Intellectual Property Rights. Customer will provide Google with any assistance Google requests to reasonably confirm compliance with these terms (including interviews with Customer employees and inspection of Customer source code, model training data, and engineering documentation). These terms will survive termination or expiration of the Agreement. You should also take a look at this and this. However, as per the terms of the agreement the speech generated would be your intellectual property, unless otherwise specified. Good luck!	It's not legal The terms that you agree when you enter a contract can only be changed if: the contract provides for variation of its terms and then, only in accordance with that procedure. This may allow unilateral changes - these are common in ongoing relationships like telephone and ISP contracts but it appears from the Kickstarter page that this was not the case here. the parties agree to vary the contract either by deed or by another contract. If by deed then the law of making deeds must be followed, if by contract then the laws of contract must be followed. You mention "around $70AUD" which leads me to guess that you are in Australia. If you were there when you entered the contract then the Australian Consumer Law will apply to the transaction and, more generally, to William Painter since they explicitly "do business in" Australia because they ship there. It is illegal to make misleading and deceptive claims under the ACL and the fines can be huge. Perhaps a note pointing this out to them and letting them know that if they waive their fees in you case(s), you wont feel the need to report them to the ACCC.	No (in almost all U.S. jurisdictions). Truth or falsity is evaluated when a statement is originally made and doesn't have to remain true forever. Also, generally the law treats an ad like that as an invitation for you to make any offer to them, not a binding offer to form a contract that is held open indefinitely. So you can't force them into a contract simply by accepting their offer. The default rule is that an ad is an invitation to make an offer rather than an offer that can be accepted. And, even if it really is an offer, when it does not state any termination date, the default rule is that it can be withdrawn at any time.	if a friend hires someone to fix something in their house, but after the repairs are done, the friend refuses to pay, this would likely fall under theft of service. This is incorrect. The most common distinction is intent. (The federal Canadian criminal code provision for theft (Section 332) requires intent to commit the crime, although "false pretenses" (Section 362) is probably a better match within the Canadian criminal code to theft of services and also requires a showing of intent). If breaching a promise to pay that the person making the promise to pay intended to be honor when the promise was made fails to pay (e.g. due to poor budgeting or losing a job) this is a breach of contract. Similarly, if someone accidentally attaches the wrong cable line to their TV and gets the premium package rather than the regular one, but didn't realize that fact, the cable company might have a claim for negligence or for unjust enrichment, but this would not constitute theft. In contrast, obtaining services knowing at the outset that you do not intend to honor your promise yet deceiving the service provider with your promise is theft. Theft (in the context of a theft of services) is intentionally obtaining services by deceit with an intent not to pay for them at the time that they are obtained. Proving this intent is usually prohibitively difficult and no something that law enforcement will choose to press charges regarding, but with very clear evidence (e.g. an audiotape of the person making a promise to pay bragging immediately before or after making the promise to pay about how he never intends to pay in the first place, or in a case with a pattern of conduct involving many service providers on multiple occasions), charges can be pressed and a conviction can be won. Also, to be clear, it has nothing to do, per se, with the power relationships of the parties. If an employer picks up a bunch of day laborers telling them that they will be paid an agreed rate at the end of the day for the work they are made to do, and the employer not only doesn't pay them at the end of the day but didn't intend to do so in the first place and perhaps has a practice of picking up day laborers and then refusing to pay them without good cause, that is theft of services a.k.a. wage theft. if I play a movie from a streaming service and screen-share on Zoom, I would be committing civil copyright infringement (if it is not fair use), but if I give other people my login credentials for the streaming service, it would be theft of service, I think, depending on the jurisdiction This isn't a good analogy as it implicates copyright law which is quite different from other bodies of law. Some acts are both civil and criminal copyright violations. But criminal copyright violations are generally not a theft of services. In Canada, the typical criminal copyright violation involves the sale or rental of the copyright protected material to third parties for money. how does this distinction affect the outcome for a person liable/guilty of either? Civil law violations are a basis to bring a lawsuit against someone who breaches the law in a civil manner for money damages sufficient to compensate the person bringing the lawsuit for the damages that they have suffered. Theft is a criminal offense. The prosecutor's office decides whether or not to bring charges and if it does bring charges does so (in Canada) in the name of the Crown, at the government's expense under criminal procedure rather than the civil procedure applicable to lawsuits. The victim is usually a witness and is usually consulted, but is not a party to a criminal case. If a conviction is obtained for a criminal offense, the penalty is usually some combination of incarceration, a fine, probation and community service, as authorized by statute, with court costs and restitution to the victim tacked on as an afterthought. The measure of what is owed as restitution is typically more grudging than the measure of the damages that can be awarded in a civil lawsuit. The two remedies are not mutually exclusive. Someone who is prosecuted for committing a crime can also be sued if the evidence supports both civil and criminal claims. Someone who is sued can also be prosecuted if the evidence supports both civil and criminal claims.
what is the validation of logo design? Recently I notice two game in one is appstore and another one is google play store. but there different company but using almost same logo. My question: is there a violation of copyright?.	The images as displayed are quite similar, similar enough that one could violate the copyright of the other. But that is not enough to know if there was in fact a copyright infringement. There are several possibilities: Although using different names, the developers could in fact be the same company. One developer might have obtained permission to use the image from the other. Both images might be based on the same 3rd-party image which both are using with permission. Both images might be based on a public domain image. Copyright is only infringed if a protected work, or a derivative version of the work, is used without permission from the copyright holder. Without knowing who the rights-holder is, and if permission has been obtained, one cannot know if an infringement has occurred. There is no independent or 3rd-party entity that checks for copyright infringements. By the way, the similarity here is close enough that there might also be an issue of trademark infringement. But again, infringement requires use of a protected mark without permission, and so some of the same possibilities arise. (The source of a trademarked logo doe not matter. On the other hand there cannot be trademark infringement unless the mark has been registered, or actually used in commerce. If the same image is used on products in very different industries, say games and hammers, there may or may not be infringement.)	Trademarks protect against consumer confusion. Ask yourself if a consumer seeing that image with the "studio" portion removed might think that the altered image represents the same company as the original image. Of course, the answer will be "yes." But in the end it also depends on how the trademark is used. You've used the original image in the question; have you violated the trademark? No. Do you violate Tesco's trademark when you say "I went shopping at Tesco"? No. Do you violate their trademark when you sell food using the name "Tesco"? Yes. A distinctive graphic design such as this will also be protected by copyright, so you will also have to consider whether your intended use infringes copyright.	In the US at least, copyright does not normally protect titles and other short phrases, they are considered not original enough. (See the US Copyright office Circular #33). However, titles, brand names, and slogans may be protected as trademarks, as may logos. A trademark is a word, phrase or symbol used to identify goods or services to customers and others. They key issue in a trademark case is: "might reasonable people be confused into falsely attributing the infringing item with the trademarked item, or into thinking that is is associate, endorsed, or sponsored by the makers of the trademarked item, or comes from the same source". When the name is the same and the general area and genre is similar, trademark protection seems plausible. Marvel is known to be quite protective of its IP, and might well have trademarked such a title. A successful suit by a trademark owner could lead to an injunction (a court order) against future use of the infringing m,ark, and significant money damages, depending on the detailed facts. A name such as "Black Pirate" is fairly generic, and might not receive much protection. On the other hand, if that name has become associated with a detailed and specific character or content, it might have acquired a "secondary meaning" and be more strongly protected. Consulting an experienced trademark lawyer or other expert might well be a very good idea.	You are creating a derivative work. You are only allowed to do this if the library comes with a license that allows this. If you want to give your derivative work to anyone else, copying it is copyright infringement unless the license allows it. Copying the derivative work and attaching a different license is most likely to be copyright infringement. And if people receive a copy with an open source license that is not justified and rely on it, that’s creating one unholy legal mess for everyone involved and can be massively more expensive than plain copyright infringement. No license means you don’t have permission to do anything with it, not creating derivative work, not distributing it, and certainly not publish it with an open source license.	Is this legal? Generally yes, unless it unlawfully exceeds the scope of the license. Also, if it is, how can I check if it's permitted by the original store's EULA? Read the whole EULA, focusing on terms related to resale, assignment, and transferability.	Software qua property is protected by copyright *perhaps patent, in some jurisdiction). The general rule is that whoever creates the thing (book, song, software) has the exclusive right to the thing. If an employee of Company 1 writes software for Company 2, that employee might (rarely) hold the copyright, but typically that scenario would involve a "work for hire", where the employee is hired by Company 1 to do such tasks as part of his duties with Company 1 (which might then be given to Company 2). This would then be a work for hire, and the copyright is held by Company 1. If the actual author was an independent contractor, he would hold the copyright – see Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reed for analysis of the subtle nuances in making that determination. The concept "work for hire" which crucially involves the "employee" relationship would not be applicable to Company 2 paying Company 1 for a product, and as long as the actual author is an employee of C1, C1 has not created a "work for hire" in the legal sense. Without some explicit disposition of copyright, Company 2 is in a sketchy position. Since C1 holds copyright, they must grant a license to C2 so that C2 can legally use it; or, C1 must transfer copyright to C2. This does not happen automatically, and (if C1 does not want to remedy the situation after the fact) C2 would need to take C1 to court to force a resolution to the situation. At that point, the issue would be what C1 implicitly promised, even though they didn't put it in writing. It is likely that the initial exchange was along the lines "Can you make us a program that will do X?", and the answer was "Sure, that will cost Y", and then "Okay, go ahead, looking forward to the product". The courts would not simply say "Well, you didn't explicitly require a license, so you don't get to actually use the software that you paid for". However, it's a somewhat open question whether the court would order a license (of what nature?) or a transfer of copyright. The disposition would depend heavily on the facts of the case (what was said, what C1 actually did, what kind of business they are, what did creating the work involve...).	I know that some of this may be covered by either the Creative Commons license or the OGL it was published under, but it's not clear to me how far those freedoms extend. It was all published as materials under copyright to the original authors, TSR, WotC, &c. and if things had been left like that hszmv's answer would've been completely correct: stay vague and allow users to enter those names and descriptions, talk to WotC's lawyers and sales department about license fees, or just keep it to yourself and your friends. You're right, though: WotC went whole-hog, dumped their partial OGL idea, and relicensed some things as Creative Commons. There are different Creative Commons licenses, though, some restricting commercial use that would still keep your app to yourself and friends without a specific licensing agreement. Go find out exactly what WotC put under CC. If it's only the Player's Handbook, then you can only use names and descriptions that are from the Player's Handbook and you're still facing a cease-&-desist if you start adding in Monster Manual info.If it's everything, it's everything they have but still won't include any older modules that they don't have the right to change the copyright status of. It'll still be under copyright, usually until 70 years after the death of the original creator. For Gary Gygax, that'll be 2078. Expect that length to extend during your lifetime though. US copyright usually extends every time Mickey & friends come close to entering the public domain. [Edit: The comments below suggest it might only have been the Systems Reference Document (I assume for 5e). It's 403 pages of not nothing but it's not much given the universe we're talking about. The spell and monster lists are generic. Bigby is nowhere to be found and the only mention of a beholder is a reminder not to use the name beholder without their written approval.] Go find out exactly which CC WotC used. The article above says "all use" but you need to find out the exact number of the Creative Commons license for each thing you're using and make sure all of your uses fall within its terms. Some are basically free use but still insist you mention the copyright holder prominently or in every use. Go ahead and do that if you have to. [Edit: The comments below say it is probably CC 4.0. The SRD download page says you can use CC 4.0 or their own OGL. In both cases, yes, you must acknowledge WotC by name in a way prominent enough to satisfy the license you choose.] And of course, Don't trust legal advice from internet randos or ChatGPT. If this is a serious thing you're going to be spending a good chunk of your life working on or expect to make significant money from, go talk to an actual lawyer. Bonus points for one specialized in IP with a knowledge of roleplaying and the way it's been (partially) opening up lately.If you start off just by talking to WotC's lawyers, just do that somewhere where you get their explanations and permissions in writing. Then keep that somewhere safe in electronic and hard copy. Then still take that with you when you go talk to your own lawyer.	Trademarks apply only to a limited field. If you follow the link, it reports that it applies to class 42, graphic art design. So you are free to use (and register "mama" for your food delivery service, for example.
What, besides the younger person's complaint, has caused DAs to prosecute statutory rape? If I were a DA (District Attorney) looking out "stamp out" statutory rape, I would make the rounds of the hospitals, identify women who gave birth, or were impregnated when underaged, and go from there. But few, if any DAs, do this. As a DA, I would of course, follow up on any complaints lodged by the victim, or even by her/his parents. And maybe I would prosecute a case where people were "caught in the act, or there were nude pictures, etc. May even an especially egregious PDA (public display of affection). But suppose there were no complaints or smoking guns. Could someone investigate based on something like a teenager "holding hands" with someone much older? To make the question objective, what has historically caused DAs to prosecute people outside of the above parameters?	If I were a DA (District Attorney) looking out "stamp out" statutory rape, I would make the rounds of the hospitals, identify women who gave birth, or were impregnated when underaged, and go from there. But few, if any DAs, do this. No, you wouldn't. First, you have neither the time nor the budget to do this. Second hospitals are not public property, you would need a warrant which the court won't give you because you don't have probable cause to believe a crime has or is being committed. As a DA, I would of course, follow up on any complaints lodged by the victim, or even by her/his parents. And maybe I would prosecute a case where people were "caught in the act, or there were nude pictures, etc. May even an especially egregious PDA (public display of affection). No, you wouldn't. You would follow up on complaints to the extent that you have the time, budget and manpower to do so and you would prosecute cases where you believe that you have a reasonable prospect of getting a conviction and where prosecution is, in your opinion, in the public interest. In the real world, that means where the police hand you a brief of evidence that is a lay-down misere and (for statutory rape) where there is a real power imbalance between the perpetrator and the victim - giving 2 willing 15 year old kids the label of 'sex offender' for life is probably not in the public interest. But suppose there were no complaints or smoking guns. Could someone investigate based on something like a teenager "holding hands" with someone much older? To make the question objective, what has historically caused DAs to prosecute people outside of the above parameters? With some exceptions, it is not the role of the DA to initiate or conduct investigations of criminal actions - that is the role of law enforcement officers, usually for this particular crime, police officers. Notwithstanding, the general rule in western, liberal democracies (which the United States, with a certain generosity of spirit, can still be considered) is that citizens are allowed to get on with their lives without day-to-day interference from the state. That is, law enforcement officers do not 'go fishing' for crimes, they investigate crimes that they have a probable cause to believe have actually happened, either because they themselves saw it happen or someone has reported it to them as having happened. The term for having a law enforcement officer following you around waiting for you to break the law is 'harassment' and may itself be illegal. A law enforcement officer can initiate an investigation based on anything but as no law enforcement agency has unlimited resources, they tend to follow only those investigations that might lead somewhere. For example, it has been known for parents to hold the hands of their children and even to publicly display affection towards them and parents are often "much older" then their children - this would not generally be grounds for initiating a statutory rape investigation.	It seems generally uncontroversial that in examining a witness at trial, a lawyer may not ask questions implying that the witness has engaged in some wrongdoing, unless the lawyer has some basis for asking those questions. This is not true. A lawyer is allowed to guess and ask such a question, although if it assumes a fact not in evidence it could be objected to for lack of foundation. For example, the opposing counsel could object if the lawyer asked, "After you drank twelve beers at BigTown Sports Bar, isn't it true that you got into a car and drove away?", because there would be no evidence in the record at that point that he drank twelve beers at BigTown Sports Bar. For instance, in the absence of any evidence indicating that alcohol was involved, I would imagine that a plaintiff's lawyer in an accident case could not cross-examine a defendant with leading questions suggesting that he had been drunk at the time of the crash. Sure he could. He could ask, "Isn't it true that you were drunk at the time of the crash?" There is nothing objectionable about that question. If the answer was "no", however, and the lawyer had nothing else to back up that suggestion, the question might not help the case, but the question is proper. Sometimes a lawyer just has a hunch and goes with it, and sometimes the hunch is right. Is this rule codified in a rule of evidence or is it just rooted in the courts' ideas of decorum and propriety? I can see how it might implicate the Rules of Professional Conduct, but that wouldn't seem to provide a remedy to a party who was prejudiced by such behavior. I'm more interested here with civil cases than criminal, where a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights might be complicate the question. It isn't codified because such a rule does not exist. There are some special rules that apply to prosecutors, who are ethically required to bring criminal cases only when they believe that the cases are supported by probable cause. But, that rule applies at the case level and not at the question by question level. Lawyers are also prohibited, especially in criminal cases, from making statements asserting personal knowledge of the credibility of a defendant or witness. This is because this transforms the lawyer from an advocate to a credibility witness. But, the lawyer can ask a judge or jury to find that someone is not credible in closing argument based upon X, Y and Z evidence presented at trial.	I am not a lawyer either, though I have been through Pennsylvania a few times. The relevant law is 18 Pa.C.S. 5703, which prohibits recording without consent of all parties (Penna is a "two-party consent" state, like Florida and Washington). Unfortunately, violation of that law is a third degree felony, which has a maximum of 7 year prison. A specific instance of someone getting in trouble for recording their boss is Commonwealth v. Smith (Smith used a cell phone to record his boss, then argued that a cell phone isn't a "device"; the court determined that it is, and that was Feb 16 2016 so who knows the final outcome). An attorney in Pennsylvania might be able to tell you how often people actually serve time for violating the law. You should call one.	I presume that Dad will check with the college attorneys, so this is for information purposes only. Smith v. Daily Mail 443 U.S. 97 concerns a newspaper which published the name of a minor arrested for allegedly murdering someone (having legally obtained that information). SCOTUS held that The State cannot, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, punish the truthful publication of an alleged juvenile delinquent's name lawfully obtained by a newspaper. The asserted state interest in protecting the anonymity of the juvenile offender to further his rehabilitation cannot justify the statute's imposition of criminal sanctions for publication of a juvenile's name lawfully obtained There was a state law prohibiting a newspaper from publishing a minor's name involved in a criminal proceeding – it specifically singled out newspapers, hence the holding includes the mention of newspapers, but the footnotes in the case indicate that they "don't need to go there" (the equal protection question was unanswered), because "First Amendment rights prevail over the State's interest in protecting juveniles". The First Amendment right would be the same, applied to video, and classroom use.	Even before the police have any idea who did it, Bob is guilty of whatever wrong he did. However, if you want this to be a legal question and not a moral one, we should assume that you really want to know "Can Bob be convicted of murder, if the evidence proves that he did do it?". Yes, he can. See Morris v. State, 214 S.W.3d 159. The critical question was whether the defendant understood the charges (he did) and whether he could assist in his defense (he could). The desideratum of being able to assist in your own defense only goes so far. On the other hand, maybe no, per Wilson v. US. A government expert witness "testified that appellant had permanent retrograde amnesia and would not be able to aid in his own defense in terms of remembering any of the acts alleged in the indictment". The crucial difference seems to be whether one just has loss of memory, vs. loss of memory connected with some other mental disorder. [Addendum] Per Dusky v. United States 362 U.S. 402, competence to stand trial depends on whether the accused has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. I am not aware of any exceptions e.g. whether this is not the case with strict liability crimes like statutory rape, and since it is generally held that "competency" is a requirement mandated by the due process clause, I don't think there could be an exception.	A party to a civil suit in a US court generally has wide latitude on discovery. If it is not completely implausible that one of those text messages might contain something helpful to the other side, then they might well be able to demand and obtain them. This would be true even if Jan has no plans to use any of them. If Jane thinks that there is something in some of those messages which should not be disclosed, she could, normally with the advice of hr lawyer, file a motion to limit discovery in some way. Whether there is good grounds for such a motion will depend on very specific details of the facts, and is beyond the scope of an answer at this forum. It is true that Jane is only required to produce the messages if the judge in the case has in fact ordered this. It would be highly unethical for Jane's lawyer Arnold to lie to here about this. If he did so and got caught, it might cost him his license to practice law, plus additional penalties. If Jane seriously suspects that he is outright lying to her, and colluding with the opposing party, she needs to take steps to confirm or disprove this, or if she can do neither, to obtain a different lawyer.	In the USA communication between an attorney and their client is "privileged". This makes it illegal for, amongst other things, the police to listen in to conferences between a suspect and their attorney. However in practice there is often little to prevent the police actually doing so.	I have encountered this problem in Pennsylvania. The PA Code requires a District Attorney to approve all private criminal complaints. If the DA declines to prosecute, then an affiant can petition the Court of Common Pleas to review the decision. However the affiant bears the burden of convincing the court that the DA abused his descretion in declining to prosecute, which is a pretty high hurdle. In the United States the only other legal appeal I am aware of is through federal courts under broad federal laws like 18 USC 242 or 42 USC 1983.
Is a website OK with GDPR if it is not permitting the users to delete their posts? Think of a website that has gives no option for the users to delete what they have posted -but still the users can delete their account completely. Is it against the right to erasure mentioned here as a part of GDPR?	Think of a website that has gives no option for the users to delete what they have posted -but still the users can delete their account completely. That's easy - this is exactly how all StackExchange sites (including this one) work :-). See for example: How does deleting work? on meta.SE. Is it against the right to erasure mentioned here as a part of GDPR? No, it is not (otherwise StackExchange would be in rather big trouble). The "right to be forgotten" is subject to limitations. Most importantly, it only applies to personal data. Personal data is defined as (GDPR, art.4): any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’) If what you posted contains no personal information about you, it is not "relating to" you. The details are complicated (as usual, see e.g. The GDPR: What exactly is personal data?), but "personal data" is things about you (your name, your address, your sexual history, maybe even your IP address). On the other hand, if someone asks how to solve a programming problem, and you write an answer explaining what API to call, that answer is not personal data. In addition to that, even personal data may be retained if the data controller has a need to retain that information. This is also covered in article 4. For example, the controller may retain information "for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims" - otherwise you could buy something online without paying, and then ask the seller to forget about your purchases so they cannot collect the outstanding payment. So, in summary: A website will need to allow users to delete or hide personal data that they posted - such as their user profile information, or personal information in their posts. That does not mean they are allowed to delete entire posts - it is enough if personal information is redacted or anonymized. The website may be allowed to retain that information (hidden) if they can show legitimate interest - for example billing information, or posts that are the subject of a lawsuit. The StackExchange network, for example, covers this by allowing users to: disassociate posts from their account delete their account entirely (thus effectively disassociating all posts from personal information) asking a moderator for redaction of personal data	No, it is not legal. Regardless of their location, the only legal options for companies serving to EU residents are to either deny access altogether or to make consent truly optional1 Recital 42 states (emphasis mine): Consent should be given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s agreement[...] Recital 43 states: Consent is presumed not to be freely given [...] or if the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is dependent on the consent despite such consent not being necessary for such performance. 1 Of course, remember that consent is only one of several means that allow them to process data. For example, if you were getting a trial account for a limited time, it would be considered a legitimate business need to ensure that you are not just opening new trial accounts when the old ones expire. So, if they wanted some data from you to ensure that you are not a previous user and you refused to provide it, then they could deny giving you that trial account without breaking the GDPR.	The status of any PII (Personally Identifiable Information) is the same in GDPR regardless of location, or who enters it. Its goals are (among others) to stop any actor (company / government or other) from hiding responsibility about their use and practices around people's data. GDPR does even apply to anything offline and on paper. Basically it means you have to validate any entry field is free of PII before processing it. Or make it clear in your privacy statement how you handle this use-case.	These kinds of cookie banners are typically noncompliant and useless since they are not clear and provide too little information to users. Careful: blocking a user who declines consent is usually a GDPR violation! Instead, only those aspects of the site that rely on this consent should be disabled. When cookie consent is needed Per the EU ePrivacy directive (PECR in the UK), information society services (websites, apps, …) are only allowed to store or access information on the end user's device if one of the following holds: the access or storage is strictly necessary for performing a service that was explicitly requested by the user; or the user has given consent Note: there is no “legitimate interest” exception for cookies. When is access/storage strictly necessary? For example, it is strictly necessary for a photography app to store photos on a device. It is strictly necessary for a website to store session cookies so that you can log in to the site. It is strictly necessary for an ecommerce site to store the contents of your shopping cart. It is strictly necessary to remember cookie consent status. And so on. It is not strictly necessary from the perspective of the user to have analytics cookies, ad personalization cookies, or cookies for features that the user doesn't actually use. Many websites that just provide the service the user expects will therefore not have to ask for cookie consent, even if they use cookies. It is worth noting that the ePrivacy definition is entirely technology-neutral. It doesn't relate specifically to cookies, but to any kinds of storage, including LocalStorage. Regulatory guidance considers any access or storage of information on the device to be in scope, even JavaScript APIs in a browser (for example to read the screen dimensions), and considers techniques like fingerprinting to be functionally equivalent and therefore subject to the same rules. It is also worth noting that these rules apply regardless of whether the information being accessed/stored qualifies as “personal data”. What consent is Consent is defined in Art 4(11) and Art 7 GDPR, and further explained in EDPB guidelines 05/2020. A defining feature of consent is that it must be freely given. The user must not suffer “detriment” for revoking or declining consent. And per Art 7(4): When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract. This disallows making access to a service conditional on unrelated consent. For example, it would not be permissible for a website to exclude users who decline consent for advertising cookies. But: The EDPB guidelines discuss that there can be “permissible incentive” for consent. For example, courts and some DPAs seem to be of the opinion that a subscription website can offer free access to users that consented to personalized ads: consent-or-pay-walls can be compliant, whereas consent-walls alone would not. Sometimes consent is really needed for a processing activity, in which case it is OK to block that service until consent is given. For example, websites should not load third party content like YouTube videos or embedded maps until consent is given to share personal data with the third party. The rest of the website should still work, though. If consent was not freely given, if the user didn't have an actual choice, then the consent is invalid. What should the data controller in your scenario do? The data controller should reassess the role of the cookies for which they are trying to ask for consent. If these cookies are strictly necessary from the user's perspective, then it is proper to inform the user about them – but this should not be confused with consent. It is my personal opinion that purely informational cookie banners are confusing/misleading and should be avoided, but this could also be argued differently. If these cookies are not strictly necessary, then the phrasing “We need to use cookies to provide you with our service” is quite misleading. It should be made clearer to the user that they can opt-in to additional services/improvements if they want to. The user should be able to configure this on a per-purpose basis. Thus, more compliant cookie consent flows will typically give the user three options: continue with only strictly necessary cookies/purposes (must be default behaviour if none is selected) consent to all purposes configure purposes For example, I'm fairly happy with the current Reddit cookie notice: Why this is a good notice: it explains the data controllers (Reddit and partners) it summarizes the purposes for which consent is sought it links to more detailed information the presented options “accept all” an “reject non-essential” are less ambiguous that “accept/decline” Comparing this with the list of minimum required information for informed consent in section 3.3.1 of the EDPB guidelines linked above, the following information is missing though: the identity of the “partners” what (type of) data will be collected and used the existence of the right to withdraw consent	Update: On 1 October 2019 the CJEU ruled in Case C‑673/17 (Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband vs. Planet49 GmbH) that cookies require explicit consent regardless of personal data is being processed. (Where the exceptions don't apply). (paragraphs 68-70 of the ruling). That does probably invalidate my answer below. However, because I have based my answer on information provided by the Dutch DPA, I will not update my answer until that DPA has responded on this. Basically, your thoughts are all correct. The Dutch DPA (Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens) has written a manual how to use Google Analytics compliant with the GDPR without having to ask for consent. But unfortunately it is not available in English. Based on Art. 28 GDPR, you need a Data Processing Amendment with google. Open the settings menu from Google Analytics Go to Admin Choose Account Settings Scroll down to the data processing amendment Open it Accept it Click Save Anonymize your visitors IP Address. A full IP address is considered personal data. It is possible to remove the last octet before it is processed by google. Add { ‘anonymize_ip’: true } to the tracking code on your website Create a screenshot of the change, so you can prove later at which date you made this change. Disable Data Sharing with google. By default Google uses the data for 5 different purposes. Each of them would require consent from the visitor of your website. So you need to switch that off. Open the settings menu from Google Analytics Go to Admin Choose Account Settings Scroll down to the data sharing settings Uncheck all checkboxes (Google producs & services, Benchmarking, Technical support, Account specialists and access for sales experts) Click Save Disable Data Collection for Advertising. This has to be disabled at a different location, for the same reason as the previous step. Open the settings menu from Google Analytics Choose Property settings Choose Tracking info Choose Data collection Turn off these two options (remarketing and advertising reporting) Click Save Disable the User-ID feature. This is probably turned off by default. But it is important to keep it turned off. So you need to verify this. Open the settings menu from Google Analytics Choose Property settings Choose Trackinginfo Choose User-ID Disable it Click Save Even though you don't need consent to use Google Analytics, you still need to inform your users, for example by adding a few lines to your privacy policy explaining: You are using Google Analytics cookies. You have a data processing agreement with google. You have enabled IP anonymization/masking. You have disabled data sharing. You are not using any other google services in combination with Google Analytics. The Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens still recommends to offer an opt-out for Google Analytics, but it would not be required. As the Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens is a DPA as defined in chapter 6 of the GDPR, you have to assume their advice really is GDPR complaint. In the past they also had performed other investigations to the privacy policies of google.	Note that the answer to most of your questions has nothing to do with the GDPR specifically, but has to do with the legal force that an EU Regulation has. Here's a related answer on EU Regulations vs. Directives. That said, here are my answers to your specific questions: So member states can define a different age, even though the GDPR says that it should be 16. But is this an exception? Yes. Are there any other exceptions? Yes. Scanning the Regulation for instances of "Member State" is a good way to find them. In my opinion, the biggest area of the GDPR where Member States have influence is Article 6, "Lawfulness of Processing". In some circumstances, it allows Member States to specify what could be considered a lawful basis for processing. Must these exceptions be explicitly stated in the GDPR? Yes. As a Regulation, exceptions must be explicitly stated in order to be permissible because Member States have no authority to overrule EU law. I'd like to understand to what extent the GDPR must be followed by member states, and to what extent it could be amended in national laws. "Amended" is a fuzzy term. It can mean adding, changing, or removing from the law. Unless otherwise specified, Member States could not change or remove provisions, but there could very well be additions consistent with the GDPR. Some Member States dispute this statement when it comes to constitutional issues.	I believe in this case, your company (OrgX) is a data processor and your customer's organization (OrgY) is the data controller. OrgY is responsible for establishing a lawful basis for sending you (OrgX) the personal data for their employees. Note that consent is just one of six lawful bases outlined in article 6(1). I'm no expert, but I believe OrgY's admin can claim they have a legitimate interest in sending their employee's personal data for training sake. In either case, the data processor is not responsible for establishing the lawful basis for processing. Of course, data processors aren't completely off the hook. GDPR outlines specific requirements for data processors (see chapter 4, particularly article 28).	The Right to Access is pretty absolute. However, there are some limitations: Is the service even the Data Controller for the data in question? Here, you're talking about notes of one user about another. Is the platform the controller for the notes, or would the note-taker be the controller? Or both, jointly? If the platform weren't a controller but merely a data processor for these notes, it would be illegal for them to disclose the information. Trish also correctly points out that the GDPR does not apply to processing for purely personal or household purposes, e.g. personal social media use. So GDPR would not provide a basis to compel a user to disclose their notes to the data subject, assuming that the note-taker is covered by this exception. Of course, this exception wouldn't apply if the notes are taken for other purposes, e.g. professional networking. Also, this exception doesn't affect the platform. There is an explicit limitation to the right of access in Art 15(4): The right to obtain a copy referred to in paragraph 3 shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others. Disclosing user A's notes about user B to user B would likely violate the privacy rights of A. The notes are both A's and B's personal data. However, the correct balance depends on context. E.g. an employer probably can't refuse to provide access to a performance assessment merely because it was written by an identifiable manager. The UK ICO has provided detailed guidance on this aspect to the right of access. They propose a three-step test: Step one – Does the request require disclosing information that identifies another individual? For example, it might be possible to redact other people's information (but not in your Mastodon notes example). Step two – Has the other individual provided consent? Step three – Is it reasonable to disclose without consent? What is reasonable is highly context-dependent, but UK data protection law gives some concrete criteria to consider. The EU EDPB has draft guidance on the Right to Access. They note that the Art 15(4) can cover a wide range of rights, not just other people's privacy rights. But as in all things, the data controller is required to strike an appropriate balance between user A and B's conflicting rights. In the Mastodon user notes scenario, I think that the note author's rights to privacy should be considered more important than the data subject's right to access those notes, thus making it possible to reject that part of a DSAR under Art 15(4) GDPR. If we assume that the note-taker A is a (joint) controller for these notes, then it would also be necessary to consult them before making a decision about the access request.
Copyright infringement in paid course An art instructor who charges for his courses is using one of my photographs in his class. All the students including himself have painted the photograph and he has posted his painting on his site. I did not give permission to any of these people to paint my photograph. This is my most popular photograph which I sell in many shops in the area (I live in Canada). Is my copyright infringed and what can I do to remedy it?	This may well be infringement, but I agree that you should start by reaching out to the instructor. You don't want to pay a lawyer if the matter can be be adjusted peacefully. In the US there is a special limited exemption to copyright for "use in classroom instruction" which might apply in such a case. I am not sure if there is a similar provision in Canadian copyright law. But the instructor is likely to change his practice if you notify him of your objection, even if he has the technical right to use the photo. At least it is worth finding out. If he won't, then you can always consult a lawyer.	Content posted to the web is usually openly accessible to all (unless protected by a password, paywall, or similar restriction). But that does not mean it is freely copyable by all. Such content is protected by copyright in just the same way as if it had been published in a book of essays by various contributors. Unless the copyright holders (who are likely to be the original authors, but might not be) give permission, or an exception to copyright applies, copying such content would be clear and obvious copyright infringement, and any copyright holder could sue for damages. Permission could be given by publishing the content under a permissive license, such as a CC-BY-SA license, or any of many other available permissive licenses. Or a would-be reuser could find the copyright holders and ask for permission. If the holder cannot be found or identified, or does not respond, then no permission has been granted. In the US the main exception to copyright is fair use. See this answer and other threads with the fair-use tag here for more on fair use. Since the question seems to contemplate using the whole of the posted content, since it might well damage any potential market for that content, and since the use does not seem to be "transformative", nor used for criticism or comment, a finding of fair use for this situation seems unlikely. But Fair use findings are very much fact-driven, and the exact facts do matter. Thus I cannot be at all sure whether a court would find this toi be fair use or not. In other countries there are a variety of exceptions to copyright, and I have not come close to reviewing them all. But none of the ones I know of seem to apply to the situation described in the question. Many are narrower than the US concept of fair use. I fear that without permission, copying this content would be infringement. However, it would not be infringement to create a site that includes a link to the existing content, and a summary or description of that content, along with new content, including comments on the old, with brief quotes to indicate what is being commented on.	Their code, their rules A copyright holder is free to offer their work under none, one or many licences. They can, at the same time, use their own work however they see fit without regard to the licences they have given/sold to others (except, they can only give one person an exclusive licence). As an analogy, let’s say I own a fleet of cars. I can drive my cars anytime I want. I can let Jim drive my cars anytime he wants for free. I can let Mary drive a specific car on Thursdays and only within 10km of the depot. I can let Joe drive my cars providing he pays me $50 a day. And I’m not going to let Fred drive them at all because Fred’s a jerk. Each of those is a different licence.	If you are subcontracted, then some other company is going to use the code that you wrote, and since you were not paid for it, you are the copyright holder. A letter to that company's legal department might work wonders.	Under United States law, copyright is normally held by the creator of a work. There is one major exception to this rule: the "work for hire." If something is considered a "work for hire" under the copyright statutes, the copyright is held by the employer. Whether something qualifies as a work for hire is a complex analysis: here is a Copyright Office circular covering some of the basics. To be clear, I'm not giving an opinion (and I don't have enough information to give an opinion) on whether any specific works you or your fiance may create or commission qualify as "works for hire." It's a narrower test than you probably think it is. If the work is not a work for hire, the copyright holder owns the copyright, and anyone else can use it only with a license from the copyright holder. A license can be implied by the parties' behavior and communications--but it shouldn't be. If you're in a situation where you need to know, for example: That you are allowed to use the artwork forever, and the artist can't ask you to stop later; That you are allowed to change the artwork if you need to, even a simple change like cropping or adding a filter or text; or That, if your product is successful, the artist won't be able to sell another license to someone else to compete with you; then you need a written contract spelling out who owns the copyright and what the rights of the other party are. A lawyer can draw up a simple, re-usable form contract for you cheaply that will prevent the problems you're worried about. Remember: even if this is a work-for-hire situation, if you need to prove that down the road, it may require a trial, or at least preliminary motion practice, to do so. That's a lot more expensive than getting your ducks in a row now will be. tl;dr: Get a lawyer. If you're in a major city, there may be a local arts law organization that will provide you with free help for a simple job like this one. (Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts operate in several East Coast cities, and I know many top commercial lawyers who do pro bono for them).	Arguably, no one owns the copyright in the general case. This is a similar case to a previous question I've answered. In short, the US has a statutory provision which bars infringing derivatives from gaining copyright. In this particular case, it's helpful to take a look at what the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had to say. While evaluating transformativeness, they did not declare Warhol's works to be derivatives, but left that possibility open and stated it was closer to being a derivative than transformative fair use: Nonetheless, although we do not conclude that the Prince Series works are necessarily derivative works as a matter of law, they are much closer to presenting the same work in a different form, that form being a high-contrast screenprint, than they are to being works that make a transformative use of the original. That Warhol's prints might have no copyright attached to them does not mean that anyone can use them though – they are still very much based on Goldsmith's photo and the underlying copyright to the original still belongs to Goldsmith. This could well mean that Goldsmith would be able to use the Warhol prints as if she owned its copyrights. Update: The Supreme Court has now affirmed, albeit on a narrow appeal from the Second Circuit Court of Appeal which dropped the issue that this question is about. Only the first fair use factor of transformativeness was challenged by the Andy Warhol Foundation (AWF). Additionally, and more important for this question is that only a single use was ruled on: the licensing of one of the prints by AWF for a 2016 magazine article reprint following Prince's death. This is because Goldsmith dropped the wider infringement claims. Here's where I realize I missed a key distinguishing fact in the case: There was indeed a narrow license for use of the photo for "artist reference" in relation to an article to be published in a 1984 Vanity Fair issue. In effect, due to the license, the (probable) derivative could be considered non-infringing1. Nevertheless, the court ruled that the use in the 2016 issue was not fair (given there was no license for use beyond the 1984 article, AWF had to rely on a fair use defense). In other words, the Warhol prints as a whole are not necessarily infringing derivatives2, rather, the specific use in the 2016 article was affirmed to be infringing. In particular, I'd like to highlight the following from court: The fair use provision, and the first factor in particular, requires an analysis of the specific “use” of a copyrighted work that is alleged to be “an infringement.” §107. The same copying may be fair when used for one purpose but not another. The full license text is not in any of the court decisions, so it's impossible for us to know for sure, but the portions that are quoted lead me to believe the license is vaguely worded. In particular, its in the realm of possibility that only the single derivative used on the 1984 article was licensed, but I would argue its reasonable to expect an artist to try multiple derivatives given a license for "artist reference." This could potentially have been of some consequence as the print used in the 2016 article is not the same as the one used in the 1984 article. But since this case was initiated in district court by the AWF seeking declaratory judgment of non-infringement, my understanding of the matter is that once the case is passed back to the district court, it will enter in that declaration given Goldsmith dropped the wider infringement claims. Take this with a grain of salt, I'm not very well-versed in trial procedure.	You can’t use pictures You can’t use any of these, nor can you make your own art that is derived from these. That’s copyright infringement and there is no fair use defence because you are specifically trying to do something Nintendo already does. You can reproduce that stats of the Pokémon because stats are facts (even if they are facts about fictional things) and facts are not protected by copyright.	If I draw something, having been inspired by looking at some other thing, you are not copying that thing. If you carefully copy something even if you are also deliberately changing features of the original, then you are copying. Copyright law gives the copyright holder the exclusive right to make copies. There is a difference between copying music and visual art in this respect, since music can be reduced to a small set of specific symbols, so "being inspired by" a musical work is often found to be infringement. The difficult part is legally distinguishing "making a copy" versus "being inspired by". The courts use a subjective test of "substantial similarity" to decide if there has been copying. the case of Mannion v. Coors. "Pose" is an element that is considered in assessing similarity: the question the court would ask (itself) is whether such a pose could ever have come from elsewhere (such as, your own creative efforts).
Protecting myself against my future self There is always a grey zone between being 100% mentally operational and the beginning of, say, age-related dementia. Before a physician can declare that someone is not able to make clear, rational decisions anymore, there is always a more subtle decline that affects e.g. one's ability to manage money and properties, and often the decision to place someone's finances under supervision/trusteeship requires their mental state to be quite degraded. Before that happens, a senior is sometimes susceptible to suggestion by unscrupulous people and/or family members, or may simply make gross mistakes. Is there any process, in any country, through which one can make a decision that they cannot undo later? A (theoretical!) example: if I decided to disinherit my child because they've been really, really awful, is there any way to protect myself from, say, them convincing me to undo my decision when I'm older and emotionally more vulnerable (especially if there's nobody else to control whether I am being influenced by other people)? Another example with an imaginary horrible heir: could I specify, while I'm mentally OK, that I want to spend my money going into private retirement home XXX rather than public retirement home YYY, even if it is more pricey and my child tries to "force me" to go to YYY because they would inherit more money this way? I'm curious to know if there is such a thing as a "non-modifiable will".	In general, no, if you make a will then you can revoke that will while ever you are still legally competent. Also, in general, this is a good thing. For your first example, you are ruling out all possibility of redemption - people change: a person who is a selfish a*$%^#@e in their 20s may be a kind, caring, dutiful and loving person in their 40s. For your second example, what if XXX gets demolished? Or you move cities? If you are truly serious, you can transfer all your assets to a trust, put your instructions in the trust deed and then nominate someone you really, really, really trust to be the trustee. This would prevent you modifying the instructions but you are then relying on the trustee interpreting them.	There is pretty much never a right to retaliate against harm to oneself, even blatantly unlawful harm. There is a right to defend oneself and others. One can use force to stop someone from inflicting unlawful or unjustified harm, or to prevent someone from inflicting such harm when the harm is imminent. One is not permitted to use more force than is "reasonably required" under the actual circumstances. This is true in pretty much every jurisdiction that i know of. The details on how much force will be considered "reasonable" will vary. In some jurisdictions there is, under some circumstances, a s"duty to retreat". This generally means that if a person attacked can avoid the harm by fleeing with reasonable safety, that person must do so rather than using force in self-defense. In some jurisdictions this "duty to retreat" applies id the victim is attacked in public, but not in the victim's own home. The right to self defense does not apply when the "attacker" is an agent of the state acting lawfully. For example, a prison guard taking a condemned prisoner to a death sentence cannot be attacked on the grounds that the prisoner is engaging in self defense. In theory a police officer engaging an excessive force, particularly unjustified deadly force, may be resisted in self-defense. But courts are quite reluctant to find such resistance justified in practice. There generally must be very clear evidence of egregious misconduct for the court to rule for the non-police person in such a case. Note that "self" defense can equally be defense of another person. Pretty much all the same rules apply. Self defense applies no matter who the attacker is, but that force is reasonable may vary depending on the attacker. Only such force as is reasonably required to stop or prevent the harm may be used with a justification of self-defense.	An adult is normally assumed to be competent to enter into a contract unless there is some reason to think otherwise. It is not usual to demand evidence of competency unless there is something in the appearance or actions of a party that raises such a question, or something about that party, such as a history of mental illness, known to the other party, that raises such a question. I have heard of a party being medically examined just before signing an important document, to provide evidence of competence, but generally in connection with a will, and generally when the signer is elderly and in poor physical condition, and even then such a procedure is rare. If competence is disputed, medical evidence is required to resolve the question, or more exactly to establish lack of competence. In the absence of such evidence, competence will be presumed. That was the conclusion of the MA Supreme Court in FRANCES M. SPARROW vs. DAVID D. DEMONICO & another, 461 Mass. 322* (2011). The court held: without medical evidence or expert testimony that the mental condition interfered with the party's understanding of the transaction, or her ability to act reasonably in relation to it, the evidence will not be sufficient to support a conclusion of incapacity. It was a significant part of the court's reasoning in that case that a reasonable person might well have entered into the agreement in question, and that the party was represented by a lawyer, and acted in accord with the lawyer's advice. That does not, however, seem to be a requirement; merely additional evidence of the reasonableness of the action.	It’s a common law rule dating from the 17th to 19th centuries Known as the rule against perpetuities “that prevents people from using legal instruments (usually a deed or a will) to exert control over the ownership of private property for a time long beyond the lives of people living at the time the instrument was written.” The rule has its origin in the Duke of Norfolk's Case of 1682. That case concerned Henry, 22nd Earl of Arundel, who had tried to create a shifting executory limitation so that some of his property would pass to his eldest son (who was mentally deficient) and then to his second son, and other property would pass to his second son, but then to his fourth son. The estate plan also included provisions for shifting property many generations later if certain conditions should occur. When his second son, Henry, succeeded to his elder brother's property, he did not want to pass the other property to his younger brother, Charles. Charles sued to enforce his interest, and the court (in this instance, the House of Lords) held that such a shifting condition could not exist indefinitely. The judges believed that tying up property too long beyond the lives of people living at the time was wrong, although the exact period was not determined until another case, Cadell v. Palmer, 150 years later. Historically, the rule was no longer than 21 years from the death of some person alive at the time the trust or estate was created. However, that person(s) must be limited and identifiable. Which led to the creation of Royal lives clauses. The descendants of British monarchs became popular because it’s easy to find out who they are, even many years after the fact, and that family tends to live a long time. Other popular choices, particularly in the United States, are the descendants of John D. Rockefeller or Joseph P. Kennedy. This is often only one of the conditions for the end of the trust and becomes a “savings clause” to prevent violation of the rule if the other conditions are (or become) too far in the future. The period has been changed or abolished by statute in many jurisdictions. For example, England and Wales has adopted a flat 125 year limit. As a state-based law, the United States is hugely variable. Examples For example, one of the businesses I run operates under a trust deed that says: "The Vesting Date" means the first to occur of the following three dates namely:- (i) Sixty years after the date of this Deed. (ii) Twenty years after the date of the death of the last survivor of the lineal descendants of His late Majesty King George V born and living at the date hereof or, (iii) The date (if any) which the Trustee shall in his discretion appoint as the distribution date of this settlement. The deed was made in 1982, which partly explains its style and implicit sexism, but I suspect that the solicitor who drafted it has been using the clause about George V for a lot longer than that. As of today, there are 35 living people who fall into the definition, including Charles III (see if you can work out the others); since there are now less than 20 years to go until 60 years after the deed, the clause will never be relevant. Another business operates under a deed made in 2022: 14.1 Termination date The Trust shall be wound-up and terminate on the first to occur of: a) the date which The Trustee with the written consent of the Leading Member Appointer determines; or b) 80 years from the date of this deed unless a State law allows otherwise including South Australia. Note that the reference to living people is gone. Also, note the specific reference to South Australia, a jurisdiction that has abolished the rule against perpetuities. So long as they don't change their law back, this trust is effectively perpetual. Finally, not how much easier this is to read and skips the implicit sexism; progress. Why doesn’t it affect the property of ‘immortal’ entities like companies or governments? Because, in theory, it isn’t dead people telling living people what they can do with the property. While the organisation may be ‘eternal’ the people making decisions for that organisation aren’t - the directors and legislators/executives in charge today can decide what to do with the property. This includes having the capacity to rewrite the rules of the organisation. While it may be hard to change a company’s rules and very, very hard to change a country’s constitution, it isn’t impossible the way it is with a trust deed or a will. Changing a deed or will too much can result in resettlemet; creating a new trust and usually crystalising tax obligations the delaying of which was often one of the motivations for the trust in the first place.	You're thinking of "unconscionability." In the United States, the general rule is that a contract provision will not be deemed unenforceable for unconscionability unless it is both procedurally and substantively unfair. A provision is considered procedurally unfair if it results from some sort of unfair asymmetry in bargaining positions. This could include situations where a party was acting under duress, had a diminished mental capacity, or unequal experience in the . A provision may be considered substantively unfair if it imposes disproportinately unfavorable terms on one party, perhaps by imposing costs far out of line with market prices, or by allocating all risk to that party. If the agreement is not both procedurally and substantively unconscionable, it won't be voided. So the Google TOS may be procedurally unfair because Google's market position gives it disproportionate bargaining power, but because they don't really impose any serious costs on you, they aren't unconscionable. Similarly, a contract provision requiring you to give me your house if you ever forget to turn off the porch lights at night wouldn't be unconscionable if it was agreed to after lengthy negotiations between our lawyers.	You can start here, with the attractive nuisance doctrine, which is aimed at children and the fact that they don't have adult common sense. The extent to which you are at risk depends on your jurisdiction. However, a fence does not necessarily protect you, because children can find a way to get around a fence, instead you need to eliminate the risk (so you also have to identify the risk). This article reviews some of the outcomes in attractive nuisance cases: there is no simple rule like "put up a fence and you're safe". Insurance is more predictable, as long as you read the fine print.	This is a matter of state law, so the answer is not precisely the same in all jurisdictions. Many states have laws that prohibit child support orders from being modified retroactively. In those states, they can only be modified back to the date of the motion seeking to modify them. In the case of an adult child in college, where an agreement ends child support at a given date, simply not living in the home while in college or on vacations during college is not likely to be a valid basis for discontinuing child support or modifying it, because this was a circumstance that was foreseeable when the order was entered. The fact that a child has some support from others or from a part-time job does not necessarily discontinue the obligation.	RCW 26.50.060 governs the duration of protective orders. It depends on the reason for the order (and also note that there has been a change in the law, taking effect July 25 this year or next, depending on which section). The key provision is "(6) The court order shall specify the date the order expires if any", which means that a perpetual order is possible. An order cannot be faked or altered, but a piece of paper purporting to be an order can be. You can obtain a copy of the actual order from the county courthouse. If you read para (2) in the statute, you will note that is says If a protection order restrains the respondent from contacting the respondent's minor children the restraint shall be for a fixed period not to exceed one year. This limitation is not applicable to orders for protection issued under chapter 26.09, *26.10, 26.26A, or 26.26B RCW. 26.09 is about dissolution and separation, suggesting that it is not necessarily faked. But yes, it is possible that the "11" was faked, and you can test that theory.
Is creating a informatical robot for poker or games illegal? I am talking here about informatical robots that will make some operations without any human interaction. You can find many stories about poker robots that play without anyone behind the computer on online cash poker site. Each time is explained that their account were closed because the site chart say it is forbidden, and that player who played against the robot got their money back. But I never heard about one of thoses robots creator being sued. Is this illegal to violate thoses charts? Or only the site's operator can close the account and it can't go to court? (I took the example of poker but video games are facing similar problem : thousands of accounts level uped with bots and then sell on E-Bay or other websites.) So is this illegal and one man can have to pay a bill, or is this forbidden only on the website? Is this the same reglementation for Europe and America?	I don't think the issue is that it is a violation of a law, but rather that it is a violation of the terms of service you agree to when you sign up for the site - which is a breach of contract. You can be sued for breach of contract, if the site can prove any damages based on your breach. So if you use a bot to make money on a site, in violation of the site's license agreement, then I believe the site could indeed sue you to get the money back. Also, the phrasing of your question ("creating a robot") raises a separate issue. It is not actually creating the bot that is illegal, but using it where not allowed can be a violation of contract. Suppose person A makes a poker bot, just as a programming exercise, and doesn't use it. But then suppose person B uses the robot created by person A on a site that forbids it. Although this could be a gray area, I do not believe the site would have any recourse against person A (even though they probably would against person B).	Yes and No Selling your own body for sex is legal. Buying sex is illegal. Therefore the transaction as a whole is legal on the part of the seller and illegal on the part of the buyer. See Prostitution in Canada and Prostitution law in Canada. If you think this is odd, you are not alone '... one judge referring to the laws as "Alice-in-Wonderland" and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court referred to the situation as "bizarre"'. In the circumstances, although I know of no case law on this, it would appear that any contract for prostitution would be void for illegality. Presumably, to enforce payment for services rendered the service provider would need to pursue a quantum meruit claim in equity.	It may be illegal under product labelling regulations that apply to that kind of product (or under a general deceptive trade practices act), but even then, only if you are interpreting the numbers, whose meaning is not clearly spelled out, correctly. But, to be actionable as fraud it must, among other things, be a misrepresentation as to a material fact (which if the goods, such as cordless drills, are not perishable it probably isn't) and the recipient of the misrepresentation must have justifiably relied upon the misrepresentation (which is necessary not true in the case of a representation that it was made in December 2018 on a product sold no later than July of 2018). It is also not entirely clear that this is a "made on" date. It could refer, for example, to the the twelfth batch or lot or shipment of products made in 2018, and not to the month of December, or it could refer to a product made in 2018 at factory number 12. @NateEldredge in the comments also makes the plausible observation that it could be a week number which is a common system in manufacturing which would put it in a more reasonable March 2018 time frame. You probably shouldn't do anything, because you haven't been harmed by this cryptic string of numbers embossed on the product, and even if you were, your damages would not be worth the time or money involved to pursue it as anything other than part of a class action lawsuit.	You can’t use pictures You can’t use any of these, nor can you make your own art that is derived from these. That’s copyright infringement and there is no fair use defence because you are specifically trying to do something Nintendo already does. You can reproduce that stats of the Pokémon because stats are facts (even if they are facts about fictional things) and facts are not protected by copyright.	I realize it has been eight months, but I believe I can offer an opinion. Given the nature of the question, please keep in mind that I am not a lawyer and my opinion is no substitute for professional legal counsel. [Preparing this post has been an educational experience and my opinion should in no way be interpreted as expert opinion] Assuming you have not infringed on any patents, the relevant legal challenges Valve could try include breach of contract, copyright infringement, and trade dress infringement. Breach of Contract The potential breach of contract occurs because the Steam client setup application requires you to accept a contract of adhesion (The License) before the software can be installed. I could not find a copy of The License online in plain text (this is separate from the Steam Subscriber Agreement, which you also agree to by accepting The License), but you can read it any time by running the Steam client setup application which is available at [redacted due to low rep - the Steam website]. These so-called "shrink wrap licenses" are of questionable legal value, depending on how the licensee assents to the contract. People often bring up Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp. In that case, the only reference to a license was on the download webpage, and it was only visible if the user scrolled down past the download button - Netscape argued unsuccessfully that clicking the download button indicated assent to the terms of the license. The Steam client setup application has a prominent dialogue box showing the terms of The License and requiring your explicit assent before installation can continue. A more relevant case may be ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, where the Seventh Circuit ruled that a license agreement was valid where the licensee had to click on a dialogue box assenting acceptance to the agreement. In short, you may be required to defend yourself under the terms of The License. If the licenses are thrown out as unenforceable, the prosecution would probably move towards copyright infringement. Section 1 Paragraph C of The License states (emphasis added): Except as expressly set forth elsewhere in this License Agreement, you may not, in whole or in part: copy, photocopy, reproduce, translate, reverse engineer (with the exception of specific circumstances where such act is permitted by law), derive source code from, modify, disassemble, decompile, or create derivative works based on the Program. Now you assert that there has been no reverse engineering, that you made yours "completely from scratch using completely different styling and images (even different website inside the client that is mine)". You may be challenged on these claims in court, for example comparison of source codes could rule out reverse engineering. I will touch on derivative work status later. Note that under Section 5, the provisions of Section 1 Paragraph C do not apply after you have uninstalled the Steam client software. This means in the case that you [can prove you had] uninstalled the Steam client software before making your own client, you would have a defense to breach of contract under Section 1 Paragraph C. However... The License also includes the terms of the "Steam Agreement", viewable online at http://www.steampowered.com/agreement. The Steam Agreement takes effect when you register for your Steam account. Section 2 Paragraph G of the Steam Agreement echoes the above referenced Section 1 Paragraph C of The License, and even survives termination of the Steam Agreement (your steam account being cancelled). Now assuming you can provide defense against reverse engineering, you may need a defense against the charge that your work is a derivative work. Your case may be pretty strong if you can show that your client was indeed written from the ground up - which rules out the possibility of deriving your program code from Steam's code as literary copyrights go. The prosecution could try saying you have copied the audiovisuals of their program, but your program was written "from scratch using completely different styling and images". Eventually prosecution may have to move into trade dress infringement. Copyright Infringement In a case of alleged copyright infringement, the first order of business is to prove there is a copyrighted work to begin with. The work in question is the Steam client by Valve Corporation. Again, I am not an expert but I could not find any copyright registration for the Steam client (http://www.copyright.gov/records/ -> Post-1978 Records -> Search by Name "Valve Corporation"). Copyright registration is required before infringement suits can be filed. Valve can register after infringement occurs but they will be limited to actual damages and profits. Nevertheless Valve does claim copyright over its product. A notice is posted on The License and Steam Agreement, and from the client itself the Help menu contains a command "Legal Info" which opens a webpage containing a copyright notice. Since 1979 it has not been necessary to post a copyright notice, but a notice helps break a defense of innocent infringement. You imply that you copied elements of the Steam client "to give customers a similar feel to what they are used to [the Steam client]". In your specific case innocent infringement may not be a valid defense. It seems you are most concerned about copyright infringement over the menus. An extremely relevant case is Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc. In that case the First Circuit held that the menu heirarchy for Lotus 1-2-3 (the progenitor of virtually all menu heirarchies today) was uncopyrightable as a "method of operation" under U.S.C. 17 Section 102(b). We think that "method of operation," as that term is used in [U.S.C. 17 Section] 102(b), refers to the means by which a person operates something, whether it be a car, a food processor, or a computer. Thus a text describing how to operate something would not extend copyright protection to the method of operation itself; other people would be free to employ that method and to describe it in their own words. Similarly, if a new method of operation is used rather than described, other people would still be free to employ or describe that method. We hold that the Lotus menu command hierarchy is an uncopyrightable "method of operation." The Lotus menu command hierarchy provides the means by which users control and operate Lotus 1-2-3. If users wish to copy material, for example, they use the "Copy" command. If users wish to print material, they use the "Print" command. Users must use the command terms to tell the computer what to do. Without the menu command hierarchy, users would not be able to access and control, or indeed make use of, Lotus 1-2-3's functional capabilities. If specific words are essential to operating something, then they are part of a "method of operation" and, as such, are unprotectable. This is so whether they must be highlighted, typed in, or even spoken, as computer programs no doubt will soon be controlled by spoken words. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision with an even court (Judge Stevens recusing), so no national precedent was set. Nevertheless the ruling has not been overturned - the First Circuit goes into great detail explaining their decision, and I do recommend reading the ruling. We have already discussed derivative works and reverse engineering with contracts, and the same defense would apply under copyright law: source code comparison. Trade Dress Normally things like design and layout are left to patent law. A desperate prosecution, however, may claim that by copying their "look and feel" you infringe on their trade dress. The relevant text is part of U.S.C. 15 Section 1125(a) (emphasis added): (1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which- (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act. (2) As used in this subsection, the term "any person" includes any State, instrumentality of a State or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity. Any State, and any such instrumentality, officer, or employee, shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity. (3) In a civil action for trade dress infringement under this chapter for trade dress not registered on the principal register, the person who asserts trade dress protection has the burden of proving that the matter sought to be protected is not functional. Defense against such a claim would be showing that the elements of Steam's "look and feel" were adapted because of functional reasons - see example rationale in the previously mentioned Lotus v. Borland. Overall, so long as you did write the program from scratch and there are no patent violations, you have in my opinion a strong case. There may be moral questions about unfair competition (why should you be allowed to capitalize off Valve's work put into the Steam client?), to which I would point out that your product does not appear to be in direct competition with the Steam client. Without direct competition or confidence in evidence of IP infringement it is quite unlikely Valve will file suit against you. If you would rather avoid even the possibility of legal action, you could always contact Valve directly and ask for a license.	united-states The flowchart included in the question is trying to summarize a rather large amount of legal uncertainty into one image. It must be emphasized that each decision point represents an unsettled area of law. Nobody knows which path through that flowchart the law will take, or even if different forms or implementations of AI might take different paths. The short and disappointing answer to your question is that nobody knows what is or isn't legal yet. To further elaborate on each decision point: The first point is asking whether the training process requires a license at all. There are two possible reasons to think that it does not: AI training is protected by fair use (see 17 USC 107). This is a case-by-case inquiry that would have to be decided by a judge. AI training is nothing more than the collection of statistical information relating to a work, and does not involve "copying" the work within the meaning of 17 USC 106 (except for a de minimis period which is similar to the caching done by a web browser, and therefore subject to a fair use defense). The second point is, I think, asking whether the model is subject to copyright protection under Feist v. Rural and related caselaw. Because the model is trained by a purely automated process, there's a case to be made that the model is not the product of human creativity, and is therefore unprotected by copyright altogether. Dicta in Feist suggest that the person or entity directing the training might be able to obtain a "thin" copyright in the "selection or organization" of training data, but no court has ever addressed this to my knowledge. This branch can also be read as asking whether the output of the model is copyrightable, when the model is run with some prompt or input. The Copyright Office seems to think the answer to that question is "no, because a human didn't create it." The third decision point is, uniquely, not a legal question, but a practical question: Do you intend to distribute anything, or are you just using it for your own private entertainment? This determines whether you need to consult the rest of the flowchart or not. The final decision point is whether the "output" (i.e. either the model itself, or its output) is a derivative work of the training input. This would likely be decided on the basis of substantial similarity, which is a rather complicated area of law. To grossly oversimplify, the trier of fact would be shown both the training input and the allegedly infringing output, and asked to determine whether the two items have enough copyrightable elements in common that copying can reasonably be inferred.	Yup, it's illegal. You want something, they have something you want. They let you have the thing provided that you do certain things, otherwise they won't give it to you. So providing a credit card is material to the contract. You know that the credit card number is false, you are representing that it is true, the card is a material fact, you intend to get them to allow you in using this false representation, they don't know it is false and they rightfully rely on your truthfulness. They have been harmed by your false representation (maybe: it would cost you a lot in attorney fees to try to challenge on this point). This is fraud.	Yes, you are then an online bank. This is an issue that computer games have had to figure out, when it was possible to move money both ways, cash to game gold and game gold to cash. (think Diablo's Real Money Auction House). If you allow people to store cash value in the game, and then take the cash value back out, then you are banking. Even though it's a game, you'll have people using it as a bank, and not playing the game at all but merely using it for funds storage and movement. Even if you surcharge significantly to deter this (i.e. $1 buys 90 game gold, and 110 game gold pays $1), there will always be people willing to pay the surcharge -- criminals. This is the whole point of the Homeland Security-driven "Know Your Customer" laws. The government doesn't want criminals using your real-money-trading platform to launder money. I know that you imagine a business model where this would be awesome. Actually you'll spend most of your time dealing with this kind of thing: Ann Onymous signs up and does nothing on your platform except load the account with money and send it to someone. Harold Hack is longtime customer who is active on the platform in all the normal ways. One day Harold adds a card, and loads an unusual amount of money onto the account. Both of them transfer money to Boris Badguy, who withdraws it. All fine, working as intended. But then, Ann and Harold's credit card payments reverse. They were stolen credit cards. But you're angry at Ann and Harold, and you dun them ferociously to make good their payment per your Terms of Service. Ann is unreachable. You don't believe Harold because deadbeats lie. It takes you awhile to realize this isn't first-party credit card fraud, and Harold's account was actually hacked. Harold doesn't normally post from Moldova at 3:30am. By this time, Boris is in the wind. Unfortunately, your business model doesn't let you make enough money to offset these kinds of losses. And it's hell on customer relations. You finally get arrested for using customer deposits to pay payroll, because you should've been keeping it in escrow. Being a bank is not for amateurs.
Landlord or tenant responsible for the furnishing damaged after a flooding? I live in Sweden and the last 29th of July a flooding occurred in the basement of my building. I am renting a flat there and it goes with a small storage in the basement where I had some furnishings from the apartment there (bed, mattress, carpet). I was abroad on holidays at that time, I came back the 14th of August (16 days after). The 15th of August I received a mail from the landlord asking all the tenants to remove all the moldering furnishings that were starting to smell. That's how I learnt about the disaster. I threw away the items that were smelling as they were asking to do so if the items in the basement were damaged. There was a container for this purpose at our disposal. It was their only answer to my proposal of checking by themselves whether they wanted to decide if the items were salvable or not. They said that they would send an invoice to replace these items (my personal estimation of the invoice is about 350-450$). I checked the contract and it says that their insurance doesn't cover my personal belongings. But these items are their belongings, not mine. In the contract, it also says that I am responsible to take care of the furnishings, and financially responsible to replace missing or damaged items. I did not directly damaged these items, I am not responsible of the flooding. If I was there during the flooding maybe I could have dry them faster which would have prevented the moldering? But I had no idea how much time it took them to remove the water and dry the basement. My question is: am I really supposed to pay for these items? Were they responsible to warn me sooner about the disaster so I could have come back earlier to take care of it? Could I really have done something to avoid the moldering? Is it my responsibility to be informed of any sinister happening in the basement of my flat even if I am abroad? ------------------------Edit/Updates 1 ------------------------- Direct explanation from the responsible: From the moment the tenant moves in, she/he is responsible for the apartment and the items that this includes. As you removed these items from the apartment and unfortunately they were damaged you need to answer for them. Our insurance does not cover those damages but you are welcome to ask your home insurance if they can take this costs for you. You are also welcome to take a look at your contract: “Furnishings The tenant undertakes to take good care of the apartment and the furnishings. The tenant is financially responsible to the landlord for missing or damaged furnishings. If something is damaged upon arrival, the landlord has to be informed within one week after arrival.” ------------------------Edit/Updates 2 ------------------------- Parts from the leasing agreement Insurance The landlord has an insurance for the apartment regarding fire, break in or other damages. Personal belongings are not covered by this insurance, neither is health care. It is the responsibility of the tenant to have a proper insurance. Damages The tenant is responsible to take good care of the apartment. Costs for repairs of damages in the apartment caused by accident, neglect or on purpose will not be covered by the landlord or house owner. Only costs for repairs that can be considered as a result of normal use are covered. Furnishings The tenant undertakes to take good care of the apartment and the furnishings. The tenant is financially responsible to the landlord for missing or damaged furnishings. If something is damaged upon arrival, the landlord has to be informed within one week after arrival.	Landlord or tenant responsible for the furnishing damaged after a flooding? This brief analysis of Scandinavian Contract Law explains the difficulty of addressing with certainty matters of Swedish contract law. Despite the legal and factual ambiguities, it seems to me that the contract terms and landlord's conduct preclude his entitlement to a reimbursement from you. (Disclaimers: I have never litigated in Sweden's courts; I do not purport to be knowledgeable about Swedish law; and it is unclear to me whether Swedish contract law has evolved since the date of the publication of Ramberg's criticism of Scandinavian contract law) First, it appears that the landlord was negligent by waiting several days to ask tenants to remove moldering furnishings (as these were starting to smell). If that was the landlord's earliest reaction to the flooding, then the delay might evidence [landlord's] failure to mitigate damages. In other legal systems, failure to mitigate damages is an obstacle to recovery from the sued party. Second, the landlord's unqualified instruction to throw everything away --in response to your proposal of checking for salvage-- might forfeit his entitlement to reimbursement. In this regard, page 4 of the aforementioned publication points out that [t]he Swedish Supreme court [...] generally stated that a contract containing the standard terms was deemed to have been concluded due to the parties' behaviour. Obviously, not all of the contract would be void, but only the application of the clause about tenant's financial responsibility for missing or damaged items in this particular context of landlord's delay and reckless response to your proposal. Third, in the clause regarding tenant's financial responsibility "to replace missing or damaged items", I would say that the qualifier "missing" is key. Here, the usage of "missing" connotes a deliberate act of taking items away in violation of the landlord's proprietorship, regardless of whether it was the tenant or a third party who removed/stole them. That same connotation of deliberate act should govern the very next qualifier, "damaged", absent any language that expands the latter's connotation of causality. Also a criterion of negligence would fail, because you were not notified that a flooding occurred. The contract's clarification that their "insurance doesn't cover [your] personal belongings" opens --albeit weakly-- the door to the possible interpretation that instead the policy covers the counterparty's (that is, the landlord's) belongings. On the other hand, the landlord could avail himself of arguments such as (1) tenant should have made arrangements prior to leaving for the holidays; and (2) landlord's bed & mattress were not intended to be stored in the basement, and instead should have been notified toward procuring an appropriate storage for them. It is hard to make a more precise assessment without knowing more about the terms of the contract and the circumstances. Therefore, the best thing to do is to look at the subtleties in the language of the contract (as I did above regarding the deliberate nature inherent to the adjective "missing" and its interpretative effect on the adjective "damaged").	The one answerable question regards the legality of taking the damages out of the security deposit. Consulting the Ohio landlord-tenant law, the tenant has various obligations including to Dispose of all rubbish, garbage, and other waste in a clean, safe, and sanitary manner ... Comply with the requirements imposed on tenants by all applicable state and local housing, health, and safety codes The citation should indicate the specific violation, but dumping trash in the street is a health violation. The act that says that if the tenant violates his obligation, the landlord may recover any actual damages that result from the violation together with reasonable attorney's fees. Causing a landlord to be saddled with a fine is actual damage. It would be pointless to contest the fine with the city, unless you are alleging that some vandal drove by and dumped trash in the road near your apartment. (Even then, unless you already reported supposed illegal dumping to the sheriff, it is unlikely that you wouldn't be held responsible).	As someone who acts for both landlords and tenants I would say that I have never seen exclusions for personal injury or death in a commercial lease. I would recommend that you have the whole lease reviewed by a solicitor dealing in commercial property, particularly as, as has been stated in another reply, exclusion of liability for personal injury or death is prohibited by UCTA. This would suggest there may be other provisions which, if not prohibited, are unreasonable and you should be aware of the commitments you are taking on prior to signing This pure speculation, but the fact that those clauses would not be in a standard lease precedent does make me wonder if the landlord has done a DIY job and produced a lease from the internet suitable for another jurisdiction.	Jurisdiction: england-and-wales Preliminary issues Firstly, as some of the comments have highlighted, this could be a scam. I have personally come across such a scam on two occassions. The scammer rents a property short term (e.g. 2-3 weeks) on AirBnB. They then pose as a landlord or letting agent and advertise the same property as a long term let. They collect a deposit and rent from any person who wants to be a tenant. They may even copy the keys and give each "tenant" a set. On move in day, you arrive at the property to find that you are not the only person trying to move boxes in. It has always struck me that landlords are generally very careful to vet their tenants by checking ID, proof of address, obtaining references, and running credit checks. Yet tenants rarely do any vetting at all of their landlords. A very basic and easy check you can do is to purchase the title register (not title plan) for the property from the Land Registry. This costs £3 and will give you the name of the person who owns the property. If the property is an apartment then you will generally want the leasehold title register (not the freehold). Once you have the name, you can then ask your landlord to provide proof that they are that person. Secondly, you've tagged the question united-kingdom, but the UK is actually comprised of multiple legal jurisdictions and housing law varies among them (particularly in Scotland). I'm answering this on the basis of england-and-wales. Third, questions asking for legal advice on real situations are off-topic here. My answer will just address the general issues and shouldn't be taken as advice for your situation. Contract and due dates There is nothing in contract law which prevents obligations from arising before the date that the contract is agreed. It is not unusual for parties to draft contracts which govern past behaviour. In that sense, it is perfectly acceptable to agree a contract on 12 August which requires rent to have been paid on 8 August (albeit it would be inadvisable to agree such a contract as you would immediately be in breach if you had not already paid). On the other hand, a contract which purports to have been agreed on a date which is earlier than when it was actually agreed, can amount to fraud. I would be wary of a subsequent email which purports to allow a later due date which contradicts the contract. Unless there is a clause in the contract allowing for the landlord to postpone due dates, the email is unenforceable and your real due date is still 8 August. The attempt to change the due date is effectively a variation of the contract, and a variation which is not permitted in the contract itself needs to be executed as a second contract. That means you need all the elements of a contract: offer/acceptance, intention to be bound, and consideration. The problem here is the latter. The landlord is providing consideration (a later due date) but you are offering nothing in return. Holding the room "The agent told me they cannot hold my room too long due to the high volume of interest in booking the rooms." "Once you have signed this agreement you will be liable for the full rent set out in the agreement unless released from your tenancy by the Landlord or Management Company." These two positions are contradictory. If you agreed a tenancy (as implied by the second quote), then you have a contract which is legally binding on both parties. The first quote is incorrect - there is nothing to "hold" because the room is already yours. On the other hand, it may be that what you agreed was a holding deposit agreement (rather than a tenancy agreement) which is merely a commitment on the part of the tenant to forfeit a sum of money (which by law cannot exceed 1 week's rent) in the event that the tenant (as opposed to the landlord) decides not to proceed with the tenancy. The wording from the second quote (liability for full rent) implies that it is a tenancy agreement rather than a holding deposit agreement. Or, in the alternative, that it is an illegal holding deposit agreement which asks for more money to be forfeited than is lawful. You'll need to read your full contract to understand what it is. If it's a tenancy agreement, it will be obvious from the wording that you have actually rented the property. Obligation to pay rent "My question is do I have any legal responsibility to pay for the entire rent by the new due date (25 August) for APT1?" Unfortunately, if you have signed a tenancy agreement, then you are legally bound to fulfill your obligations under it (provided such obligations do not break the law). If it contains a clause stating that you must pay 51 weeks's rent, then that is what you must do. "If they told me they cannot hold my booking any longer, do I need them to confirm in writing that I'm released from the agreement?" As a general rule of contract law, nothing needs to be in writing unless (a) the law requires it to be in writing or (b) the contract requires it to be in writing. You agree non-written contracts all the time when you go shopping, use the bus, etc. The same applies to taking actions which are governed by a pre-existing contract e.g. giving your taxi driver verbal directions once you are en-route. The phrase "unless released from your tenancy by the Landlord or Management Company" says nothing about the release needing to be in writing; therefore it can be verbal (provided that there isn't another clause somewhere else in the contract which requires it to be in writing). Be aware however that verbal statements can be difficult to prove.	Not even real roaches are an emergency. The event was foreseeable and scheduleable. According to the terms of your lease, you are entitled to a 2 day warning. From your description, the landlord did not violate the lease, but he came close to it, perhaps to the point that the courts would consider it as good as a breach. In Chicago, §5-12-050 of the municipal code mandates 2-day notice, and the following section says that If the landlord makes an unlawful entry or a lawful entry in an unreasonable manner or makes repeated unreasonable demands for entry otherwise lawful, but which have the effect of harassing the tenant, the tenant may obtain injunctive relief to prevent the recurrence of the conduct, or terminate the rental agreement pursuant to the notice provisions of Section 5-12-110(a). In each case, the tenant may recover an amount equal to not more than one month's rent or twice the damage sustained by him, whichever is greater.	he is jointly liable for the remaining 3 months, even though he never signed anything. Is this true? That seems unlikely. The lease is between Adam and the landlord. Although the lease might have language making all tenants jointly and severally liable, it would affect Bob only if it can be proved that he was aware of those terms when he moved in. Your description does not elaborate on any agreement(s) between Adam and Bob. But Adam is not allowed to impose on Bob any obligations merely because relations between them broke down. Absent a contract between Adam and Bob, the question of whether Adam is entitled to any recovery from Bob could only be assessed on equitable grounds.	You inspected the property online and based on that inspection you signed the lease. You have a legally binding contract. Now, it is not at all like the pictures How? I mean, are these pictures of a different house? If that is so then your contract is void for fraud. However, if the pictures are of the actual house and you just imagined from them that the house would be other than it is then tough luck for you. the stairwell in the house is a huge safety hazard for children OK. Does it comply with relevant building codes? If not then the landlord needs to bring it up to standard: you cannot walk away from the contract. Is it in need of repair? If so, the landlord needs to repair it: you cannot walk away from the contract. If it is compliant and in good repair and you think it is a hazard notwithstanding then you need to manage that hazard: this is not the landlords problem. I refused to move into the house That's fine: so long as you keep paying the rent there is no obligation on you to move in. If you stop paying the rent then it would appear that you have repudiated the contract and the landlord can sue you for damages - probably the costs of finding a new tenant and the rent up until that tenant takes over.	A "land contract" is not a way of renting property, it is a way of purchasing property on an installment basis without bank financing. It is Ohio's version of what in some other places is known as "contract for deed". See "What is a Land Contract in Ohio" and "How Land Contracts Work" The actual law is Section 5313. In a land contract, the buyer has equitable but not legal title. The buyer normally pays all taxes and fees, and is responsible for maintaining the property, just as if s/he has bought the property. But if the buyer defaults, all payments and equity would be forfeit to the seller. Until the buyer has paid 20% of the purchase price, or made 5 years of payments (whichever comes first) a single missed payment constitutes default and can lead to the buyer being evicted with all payments to date going to the seller, the buyer coming out of the deal with nothing. Also, if the seller still has a mortgage and defaults, the buyer may lose everything paid to date. The buyer does not have the protections that a lease gives a tenant, nor the protections that legal title gives a purchaser via a traditional mortgage. Land contracts are often used when the buyer cannot qualify for a mortgage. The buyer pays interest, and it is often at a higher rate than the current rate on a mortgage. Land contracts are often a form of predatory lending, but for some buyers they make sense. A buyer needs to carefully review the contract with a lawyer knowledgeable about land contracts, and consider the risks and benefits of this form of financing. As I understand it, there cannot be a valid land contract for one apartment in an apartment building. A land contract must be for title to the land and all fixtures, including all buildings, on it. (There was at one point some unclarity if the question referred to an apartment. It is now clear that it refers to a house, so this statement is not relevant to the OP, but may be to others.) It is not clear just what the OP's landlord (LL) has in mind. It may be that LL plans to offer a "land contract" in which the purchase would be completed only after a very long time, with the idea that the OP would simply default when s/he wanted to move. Such a default could harm the OP's credit. There seems no benefit to the OP in such a scheme compared to a lease, unless LL will lower the price significantly, taking into account maintenance costs and taxes, which OP may well be expected to pay under a land contract. Note that a landlord can't legally force a tenant to sign a document cancelling a lease, or to sign whatever s/he will call a "land contract". Nor can s/he cancel the lease without the tenant's consent except for good cause as specified in the law (such as not paying rent). S/He could become uncooperative on other matters if a tenant doesn't do as s/he wants. If a tenant does cancel his or her lease, s/he will lose some rights. Others are guaranteed by law as long as the tenant is paying rent. If one signs a "land contract", what happens depends on its provisions. OP needs to very carefully consider just what is being offered, and its risks and any possible benefits. Details of the contract will matter. No matter exactly what LL has in mind, this is not at all a usual procedure for a landlord. OP or anyone in a similar circumstance should be very careful.
Is it legal to have a "Create custom x" in your D&D program, if that can result in the enduser violating the copyright? First an introduction to what i am doing! I am creating a tool for players and DMs of D&D. The reason i've been trying to understand the copyright law in regards to this issue is that upon using any information from the books created by WotC you'd violate their copyright. Luckily, WotC has a "Open Gaming License" that you can use, to have much of the rules, items and monsters in your book, program, etc. for free (Link to the link of the SRD-OGL: http://dnd.wizards.com/articles/features/systems-reference-document-srd) My issue is that WotC has intentionally left out some of the unique monsters that they themselves has created over the years. Which in itself is fine, but i have no idea if i would violate their copyright for these unique monsters if i were to create a module in my program where the enduser would be able to build a custom monster from a blank template (name: input here, armor class: input here etc. - you can look at an example on, say, page 279 with the Tyrannosaurus Rex. Here name would be Tyrannosaurus Rex and Armor class would be 13 (natural armor)) If the enduser were to create a totally custom, madeup creature i'd imagine that tool would be fine, but i can also see the scenario where a enduser could copy letter for letter the information of a copyrighted monster into my custom monster template and essentially adding a copyright-violating item into the program. So. I guess in essence what i am asking is: By making a tool in my program that can enable the user to create their own monsters, will i then be in trouble because i've also, if the user is malicious, by extension enabled the user to violate the copyright of WotC? I am from Denmark if that makes any difference, which i'd guess it doesn't. I have no real legal experience which is why i thought it'd be a good place to ask such a question. Thanks for your time!	Generally, no, this will not violate copyright. Your end user might violate copyright, but that is their problem not yours. Your program is a tool, just like a word processor is. If I copy a Harry Potter book into a word processor that does not make the word processor maker liable. There is a concept of "contributory infringement", which I think is what you are concerned about. I don't know about Danish law in particular, but most countries would require evidence that you had reasonable knowledge that actual copyright violation was occuring, rather than just being aware that it might happen in theory. This is normally applied to file sharing services who have to have "notice and takedown" measures, file filters and the like. This isn't your concern as you never have any access to the files created by your users. You can also be found liable if you induce anyone to commit copyright violations. Don't draw your customers attention to the custom monster feature as a workaround for those copyrighted monsters, as that could be considered to be inducement. Also don't provide any "wizards" or similar tools which make it noticeably easier to duplicate the custom monsters (e.g. if you notice that the copyrighted custom dragon stats are all on a linear scale with dragon size, don't create a "dragon creation wizard" embodying that fact.) This assumes that your program runs entirely on the end user computer. Its different if you provide any kind of cloud storage for generated characters.	That would be pretty much a classical case of copyright infringement. Drawing a thing from memory is copying just as much as drawing a thing with the original before you or xeroxing a thing. The degree of match between the original and your copy may vary depending on how good your memory is, but that doesn't matter, because copyright protection is not about "making exact replicas", it is about copying in any form.	This is similar to giving a hammer and needing to state to one is not responsible if the taker uses it to hit their head with. I believe this is the wrong analogy to use here. It would be more like giving somebody a hammer and saying you are not responsible if the head flies off and injures you. There is a concept in "things" you obtain called "fitness for purpose", so if you download open-source software like a registry cleaner, and it deletes your entire registry, the "WTFPL" doesn't absolve the authors of liability. Explicitly denying any kind of "fitness for purpose" or warranty helps shield the author from legal claims (even if they are meritless) because it kills it out of the gate. It's possible that the WTFPL license granter/author could still be sued and have to defend themselves in court because it isn't explicitly stated that there is no warranty or fitness for purpose. Open source does not mean that it's "use at your own risk", which is why there are so many types of licenses and disclaimers. From comments: Thank you for this very clear answer. Does the fact that someone willingly retrieves free code with no control of the provider changes anything? (vs a software vendor which provides code suitable for A and B, in exchange for money) I think closer to your hammer analogy where I would sue the producer of hammer XXX, a hammer I found on the street or which was given to me without involvement of vendor XXX. No, this doesn't change anything. The software vendor here is the person who writes the code, even if they don't charge for it. They are the ones who license the software and they are the ones who take some level of responsibility for it. In this case, the software author is the "hammer producer" that you would sue... If you buy "Registry Cleaner XL" from Best Buy and it bricks your computer, you don't sue Best Buy, you sue the person who authored the software. In pretty much every case, the author is the responsible party, not the vendor, and it is the author who licenses it, not the vendor (the vendor just acts as an intermediary).	No. The images are copyrighted, and you are using them in a way that would leave you with virtually no argument for fair use. The factors for fair use are set out in 17 USC 107, and they indicate that the courts would reject your use: The purpose and character of the use, including whether it is of a commercial nature or for nonprofit educational purposes: There's no indication that your use would be for nonprofit or educational purposes. The nature of the copyrighted work: Works of fiction and art are highly creative works at the heart of the policy for copyright protection. The amount of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole: You are apparently copying entire images, though I suppose you could argue that each image is just one small portion of a larger book or website. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work: You are trying to create a board game, putting yourselves basically in direct competition with the makers of D&D. I generally prefer a pretty liberal interpretation of what constitutes fair use, but this just has virtually nothing that would make me comfortable arguing in your favor.	An additional important fact is that the EULA at the time did not assign Blizzard the rights to custom maps.1 And since 2010, Blizzard and Valve have jointly registered DotA-related copyright. See e.g. U.S. Copyright Registration Nos. TX0008153084 and TX0008149056. The theory of ownership is as follows. Because the EULA did not assign Blizzard the copyright in the customization, the modders gained copyright in those, despite the restriction that they not be used commercially. It was then free to them to transfer those rights to Valve. A court has considered in passing whether this assignment to Valve was valid. See Blizzard Entm't, Inc. v. Lilith Games (Shanghai) Co., Ltd., No. 3:15-cv-04084-CRB (N.D. Cal. May. 16, 2017). The judge recognized that the EULA explicitly prevented Eul and Icefrog (the modders who assigned their rights to valve) from using their creations for commercial purposes. However, because uCool "twice failed to argue that the ban prevented Eul and Icefrog from validly assigning their rights to Valve," the judge understood uCool to have waived that argument. Thus, the status of the copyrights is still in flux. However, commentators speculate that Blizzard and Valve have an agreement/protocol for dealing with these copyright issues. It would take a third-party to argue that copyright in one or more of the DotA variants is in the public domain or actually owned by some other creator and force a court to assess the copyright and validity of the assignment.2 1. Today, the language has been updated to "assign to Blizzard all of your rights, title, and interest in and to all Custom Games." 2. For one person's theory of how this could be the case, see David Nathaniel Tan, "Owning the World's Biggest eSport: Intellectual Property and DotA" (2018) 31:2 Harv. J.L. & Tech 965 at 984 (analogizing to Sherlock Holmes). I am not suggesting that a third party with no ownership interest in the copyrights would have standing to enforce Blizzard's former ToS, ELUA, or other agreements, or its copyrights. I am proposing that the third party might raise these as an arguments in defence of their own use (as uCool did).	If I lock you in a room without access to anything and tell you "Write a novel" and you write a novel with characters, you have copyright in the work. But it's not absolute: If you use your own characters, you own all the copyright in the work, but not in the idea, as ideas are not copyrightable, see Feist v Rural. If you use someone else's characters extensively (as in more than a short hommage/cameo), you very likely make a derivate. You own a copyright in your part, as in the expression of the story or pictures you created, but you do not gain property interest in the existing characters' expression. Since the copyright to the characters lies with the owner of their IP, you need their OK to release (and also to even make) your work - as with the owner of a copyright is the sole right to decide on distribution and creation of derivates under 17 USC § 106 (2). Also remember that making an unlicensed derivate work risks having nothing you can sue for in case the original copyright owner lifts your ideas and scenes-a-faire parts and adapts them for their own derivate, see Anderson v Stallone The strange case of fanfiction chains... Now, there is a strange situation when a work is based on a work which is based on a work... Then, publishers and editors start with red ink and the result is, that what people know as Twilight now has nothing to do with the fanfiction it started as (It wasn't Vampires in the original draft), and 50 Shades of Grey ended up striking any and all supernatural from it, despite it having been a Twilight fanfiction originally. By making own characters and own expression of the world, there could be no copyright infringement. US law vs Egypt law? Both Egypt and the US have signed the Berne convention, meaning that copyright is very very similar in the broad strokes that the right to allow or disallow derivates is with the copyright holder. Also, since Ben10's copyright owners are to the best of my knowledge in the US (Cartoon Network Studios & Men of Action Studios), they will sue in a US federal court.	Copyright does not protect the idea for a game, its name or title, or the method or methods for playing it. Nor does copyright protect any idea, system, method, device, or trademark material involved in developing, merchandising, or playing a game. Once a game has been made public, nothing in the copyright law prevents others from developing another game based on similar principles. Copyright protects only the particular manner of an author’s expression in literary, artistic, or musical form. Link https://www.copyright.gov/registration/other-digital-content/	You can't, in general, know whether a distributor of a work has permission to distribute, or is a pirate site. I verified that they have posted an illegal copy of a work that I created, and I know that I did not grant permission to them (or anyone) to infringe my copyright. Both hosting and downloading works without permission is a violation of copyright law, so both parties are liable. Downloaders may erroneously rely on the "I didn't know!" defense, which in the US carries no legal weight. Even so, if you download my book, it will probably cost me vastly more to sue you for infringement than the damages that I might be awarded over your infringement. Usually, copyright holders go after the pirate sites, and only rarely go after particularly egregious serial downloaders.

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