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[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

A WAY FORWARD FOR VENEZUELA:
THE HUMANITARIAN, DIPLOMATIC, AND NATIONAL SECURITY
CHALLENGES FACING THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION

=======================================================================

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
WESTERN HEMISPHERE, CIVILIAN SECURITY,
MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

__________

March 3, 2021

__________

Serial No. 117-5

__________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,
or http://www.govinfo.gov

__________

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
43-577PDF WASHINGTON : 2022

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York, Chairman

BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey Member
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts DARRELL ISSA, California
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas ANN WAGNER, Missouri
DINA TITUS, Nevada BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania KEN BUCK, Colorado
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota MARK GREEN, Tennessee
COLIN ALLRED, Texas ANDY BARR, Kentucky
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GREG STEUBE, Florida
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia DAN MEUSER, Pennsylvania
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey PETER MEIJER, Michigan
ANDY KIM, New Jersey NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York
SARA JACOBS, California RONNY JACKSON, Texas
KATHY MANNING, North Carolina YOUNG KIM, California
JIM COSTA, California MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida
JUAN VARGAS, California JOE WILSON, South Carolina
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas
BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois

Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director
Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director

------

Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, Migration and
International Economic Policy

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey, Chairman

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas MARK GREEN, Tennessee, Ranking
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan Member
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas
JUAN VARGAS, California MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida

C O N T E N T S

----------
Page

WITNESSES

Reyna, Mr. Feliciano Founder and Executive President, Accion
Solidaria...................................................... 8
Arnson, Dr. Cynthia J., Director, the Wilson Center Latin America
Program........................................................ 18
Fonseca, Mr. Brian, Director, Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public
Policy, Florida International University....................... 26
Berg, Dr. Ryan C., Research Fellow, Latin America Studies,
American Enterprise Institute.................................. 35

APPENDIX

Hearing Notice................................................... 66
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 67
Hearing Attendance............................................... 68

OPENING STATEMENT FROM CHAIRMAN SIRES

Opening statement from Chairman Sires............................ 69

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses to questions submitted for the record.................. 72

A WAY FORWARD FOR VENEZUELA: THE HUMANITARIAN, DIPLOMATIC, AND NATIONAL
SECURITY CHALLENGES FACING THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION

Wednesday, March 3, 2021

House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
Civilian Security, Migration, and International
Economic Policy,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Albio Sires
(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Sires. Good morning, everyone. Thank you to our
witnesses for being here today.
This hearing entitled, ``A Way Forward For Venezuela: The
Humanitarian, Diplomatic, and National Security Challenges
Facing the Biden Administration,'' will come to order.
Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a
recess of the committee at any point and all members will have
5 days to submit statements, extraneous material, and questions
for the record, subject to the length limitation in the rules.
To insert something into the record, please have your staff
email the previously mentioned address.
As a reminder to members, staff, and all others physically
present in this room, per recent guidance from the Office of
the Attending Physician, masks must be worn at all times during
today's hearing. Please also sanitize your sitting area.
The chair used these measures as a safety issue and,
therefore, an important matter of order and decorum for this
proceeding.
As a reminder to members joining remotely, please keep your
video function on at all times, even when you are not
recognized by the chair. Members are responsible for muting and
unmuting themselves. And please remember to mute yourself after
you finish speaking.
Consistent with H. Res. 8 and other accompanying
regulations, staff will only mute members and witnesses as
appropriate, when they are not under recognition, to eliminate
background noises.
I see that we have a quorum, and will now recognize myself.
This is our first subcommittee hearing of the 117th
Congress, so I want to welcome all of our new and returning
members. I look forward to working with each of you, Democrats
and Republicans, to advance United States interests and deepen
our engagement with the Western Hemisphere.
I want to recognize my friend, Juan Vargas, who will be our
new vice chair. And I would like to welcome our new ranking
member, Mark Green. Congressman Green and I met for the first
time last week, and I am optimistic that we will be able to
work effectively together on a bipartisan basis.
I called today's hearing because I want to begin this
Congress where we began last year, by shining a spotlight on
the crisis in Venezuela. Two years ago, I chaired a hearing
entitled, ``Made by Maduro,'' where we discussed the
humanitarian crisis caused by Venezuela's dictator, Nicolas
Maduro.
Unfortunately, while international attention seems to be
shifting away from Venezuela, the crisis in the country has
only deepened over the last 3 years. A report issued by the
United Nations last September confirmed that Maduro's regime
has committed crimes against humanity. Over 90 percent of
Venezuelans are living in poverty, suffering under conditions
made worse by the pandemic. Over five and a half million
Venezuelans have been forced to flee their homes.
In April 2019, I led a congressional delegation to the
Colombia border with Venezuela. I met mothers who had walked
hours in the hot sun just to get a meal for their children. I
heard stories about family members with chronic diseases who
could not obtain the medication they needed in Venezuela and
were struggling to survive. I saw firsthand the suffering this
regime has caused.
For me, the Venezuela crisis has never been about politics.
The question I have always asked is, what can we, the U.S.
Congress, do to help end the humanitarian tragedy?
We have a moral obligation not to turn away from what is
happening in Venezuela. I am proud that the U.S. Agency for
International Development has led the way in providing
humanitarian assistance to the region.
I salute all those courageous Venezuelans and international
aid workers who are working in the country to deliver food and
medicine.
I want to recognize the efforts of the interim President,
Juan Guaido, and his government. They are prioritizing the
needs of the Venezuelan people by pursuing an agreement for
vaccine deployment and by calling for the World Food Programme
to be allowed to operate in the country.
I also want to applaud the Colombian Government, in
particular President Ivan Duque, for his recent decision to
grant temporary protective status to Venezuelans. In the face
of one of the largest refugee crises in modern history,
Colombia has shown tremendous generosity in providing safe
haven for Venezuelans.
I urge other countries to follow Colombia's example and put
an end to harmful policies like deporting Venezuelans back into
harm's way.
I also urge Congress to urgently pass legislation to grant
temporary protective status to Venezuelans fleeing the crisis.
House Democrats did this in 2019, and I sincerely hope that all
of my colleagues would join that effort this year to finally
provide the relief that Venezuelans deserve.
Ultimately, know that an end to the humanitarian crisis
requires a political solution. Ranking Member Green and I will
introduce a resolution in the coming days expressing our
bipartisan commitment to supporting democratic aspirations of
the Venezuelan people. We must pursue a solution to the crisis
with the urgency it deserves.
I believe the U.S. must work more closely with our allies
in Latin America and in Europe to advance a coordinated
diplomatic strategy. We should also be much more assertive in
calling out the regimes that are helping to keep Maduro in
power, including Turkey, China, and Iran, and especially Cuba
and Russia.
I am confident that President Biden, who has demonstrated a
lifelong commitment to Latin America, will bring the
international community together behind the goal of pursuing a
peaceful transition that swiftly leads to free and fair
elections.
I look forward to hearing from the experts with us today
about what the U.S. Congress and the new administration can do,
in close coordination with our allies, to help the Venezuelan
people in reclaiming their democracy.
Thank you.
And I now turn to the ranking member for his opening
statement.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Chairman Sires, for holding this
hearing on the ongoing crisis in Venezuela. It is an honor to
serve as the new ranking member of this subcommittee, and I
look forward to working closely with you, Mr. Chairman, on the
various issues.
And I do believe that when we met the other day, we
realized you and I have a lot more overlap in the way we think
than the traditional right/left side of the aisle. So I think
we are going to have a great time standing up for the people in
this hemisphere.
Today, we are discussing the political and humanitarian
crisis caused by the illegitimate Maduro regime that has left a
once prosperous country in political and economic shambles. The
regime's socialist policies and endemic corruption have
resulted in years of economic free fall, hyperinflation, and
shortages in basic goods. Venezuela has a poverty rate of 96
percent that has driven almost 6 million of its citizens to
seek a better life in other regions.
This migration crisis has strained the resources of
neighboring countries in the region, including Colombia, our
closest regional partner impacted by the Venezuelan crisis.
In addition to the economic crisis, the Maduro regime is
among the world's worst violators of human rights, including
recent accusations of crimes against humanity by the U.N.'s
fact-finding mission.
According to local human rights group Foro Penal, there are
currently close to 330 political prisoners in Venezuela, not
including the illegal detention of six American Citgo
executives held on false charges and without due process.
But the regime cannot carry out these atrocities alone. It
has been bolstered by some of the world's most brutal regimes.
The Communist regime in Cuba has successfully exported its
oppressive system to Venezuela and directly supports the Maduro
regime's oppressive tactics and human rights abuses.
Further, the Chinese Communist Party has provided billions
in loans to the regime and was recently found to be sharing
technology used to surveil political opposition figures.
The Maduro regime has also strengthened ties with Russia,
which has provided military equipment, and Iran, which has
joined Russia in helping the Maduro regime avoid U.S. oil
sanctions.
The regime has also built ties with the region's non-state
criminal actors, including FARC and ELN, U.S.-designated
criminal groups who are allowed free rein in Venezuela to carry
out narcotrafficking, illegal mining, and other illicit
activities.
I applaud the Trump administration for leading
international recognition of the interim President, Juan
Guaido, and for holding the Maduro regime accountable by
imposing tough and necessary sanctions on Venezuela's State oil
company and individuals accused of corruption and human rights
abuses.
Some claim that U.S. sanctions are to blame for the
country's economic crisis. But I want to be very clear today:
The Maduro regime alone is responsible for the crisis and for
blocking humanitarian assistance from entering Venezuela. I
applaud the European Union for recent sanctioning 19 Maduro
regime officials, and I strongly condemn the Maduro regime's
expulsion of their Ambassador in retaliation.
The United States has also led humanitarian efforts by
donating more than $1.2 billion in assistance to Venezuela and
its neighbors in the region to address this humanitarian
crisis. And while the United States is proud to lead, I urge
the rest of the international community to join us in this
effort.
I also applaud the brave efforts of the interim government
and the democratic opposition, which has withstood violent
oppression and has been illegally removed from the rightful
post in the National Assembly through the Maduro regime's
illegitimate elections. These brave men and women deserve our
support as they seek freedom for the Venezuelan people.
Additionally, I was pleased to hear that the Biden
Administration will continue to recognize President Guaido as
the legitimate leader of Venezuela. And while I believe there
is a role for multilateralism in addressing the crisis, the
United States must continue to lead these efforts.
The Maduro regime's continued subversion of democratic
institutions, human rights abuses, and criminal activities
demonstrate their unwillingness to reform. I believe that
dialog with this criminal regime cannot be possible without a
clear demonstration that they are willing to negotiate in good
faith.
The U.S. Congress and this committee will play a critical
role in overseeing U.S. policy in Venezuela and ensuring that
we have a comprehensive strategy that will lead to a peaceful
democratic transition for the Venezuelan people.
The crisis in Venezuela does not only impact our neighbors
in South America, it threatens United States national security,
and we cannot afford to allow it to worsen.
I look forward to the testimoneys of our witnesses today,
and, Mr. Chairman, working with you.
And I yield back.
Mr. Sires. Thank you very much Ranking Member Green.
I will now introduce Mr. Feliciano Reyna. He is the founder
and executive president of Accion Solidaria, an organization
that has worked since 1995 to combat the HIV-AIDS epidemic.
Between 2005 and 2012, he also was president of Sinergia, the
Venezuelan Association of Civil Society Organizations.
Mr. Reyna has coordinated relief efforts in Venezuela
through Accion Solidaria since 2016 to address the country's
humanitarian crisis. He is also a board member of the
International Center for Not-for-Profit Law.
Mr. Reyna holds a bachelor's of architecture from Cornell
University.
Mr. Reyna, welcome. We welcome you to the hearing.
We will then hear from Dr. Cynthia J. Arnson. She is the
director of the Wilson Center'sLatin American Program. A
leading expert on Latin America and the Caribbean, she has
testified numerous times before the House and the Senate and
has written many publications on the region, particularly on
U.S. policy toward Latin America.
She also served as a former foreign policy aide in
Congress. Dr. Arnson holds a Ph.D. From Johns Hopkins
University.
Dr. Arnson, thank you for joining us today.
Our third witness is Mr. Brian Fonseca. He is the director
of the Jack D. Gordon Institute of Public Policy at Florida
International University and an adjunct professor of politics
and international relations.
Mr. Fonseca is an expert on U.S. national security and has
written publications focused on Russian and Chinese engagement
in Latin America and Russian-Venezuelan relations.
He holds a degree in international business and
international relations from Florida International University
and attended Sichuan University in Chengdu, China, and the
National Defense University in Washington.
Mr. Fonseca, we welcome you to the hearing.
Finally, we will hear from Dr. Ryan Berg. He is a research
fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. His research
focuses on Latin America and specifically U.S. foreign policy,
national security and development issues, and the region's
transnational organized crime and narcotrafficking.
Previously, he served as a research consultant at the World
Bank, a Fulbright scholar in Brazil, and a visiting doctoral
fellow at the Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland.
Dr. Berg obtained a Ph.D. In political science from the
University of Oxford.
Dr. Berg, thank you for joining us today.
I ask the witnesses to please limit your testimony to 5
minutes, and, without objection, your prepared statements will
be made part of the record.
Mr. Reyna, you are recognized for your testimony.

STATEMENT OF MR. FELICIANO REYNA, FOUNDER AND EXECUTIVE
PRESIDENT, ACCION SOLIDARIA

Mr. Reyna. Good morning, Chairman Sires. Thank you and
distinguished members of the subcommittee. As a Venezuelan
implementing a humanitarian action program in Venezuela, I
really appreciate your invitation to address this subcommittee
today.
Since late 2015, Venezuela's complex humanitarian emergency
has caused deprivations of the people's rights to health, food,
education, livelihoods, and access to basic services, such as
water and electricity. Human insecurity has forced millions to
flee, unable to cope with such daily struggles here at home.
Understanding the nature and broad dimension of the
humanitarian emergency and its effects in widespread loss of
life and human suffering continues to be necessary to properly
address it, finding the means to work through the barriers
imposed by the political conflict which have been an obstacle
to scaling up much needed humanitarian support.
In this challenging environment, over 120 national and
international NGO's have partnered with the U.N. system and
many others are coordinating independently to implement
humanitarian programs all over the country. Venezuelan NGO's
not only were the very first responders in early 2016, but have
continued building capacities to provide a progressively
increasing humanitarian response.
Despite fear of politicization of aid delivery among donor
countries, the United States continues to be the largest funder
of the humanitarian response, with over 40 percent for 2020.
However, even though Venezuela has the world's fourth-largest
food insecure population, it had the least-financed 2020
humanitarian response plan among 34 countries in need.
Despite having the world's second-largest migrant
population, Venezuela's appeal for the regional migration
response in 2020 was $1.4 billion while Syria's was $6 billion.
Regardless of challenges, there are opportunities for the
United States to scale up humanitarian support.
One, promoting multilateral engagement among donor
countries to address both the humanitarian emergency in
Venezuela and the migrant response in the region.
Two, increasing funding for local Venezuelan humanitarian
and community-based organizations, allowing for longer-term
funding, at least 2 years at a time, strengthening local
capacities for future sustained development.
Three, continuing to support initiatives, such as the
agreement reached between the Humanitarian Aid Commission of
the 2015 National Assembly and the Venezuelan Health
Department, as well as the COVAX initiative and the
Humanitarian Response Plan 2021.
Four, engaging multilaterally and creatively with key
actors within the Maduro government to open the humanitarian
space, expand humanitarian action, and protect humanitarian
workers and organizations serving people in need.
Five, revising general and secondary sanctions which have
an impact on the Venezuelan population already severely
affected by the humanitarian emergency. Licenses for oil for
diesel swaps, for example, should be extended again.
Six, adopting the TPS for Venezuelans, joining the recent
approval by the Colombian Government.
These humane and rights-based initiatives could also become
a framework for a coordinated regional response.
Distinguished members of the subcommittee, humanitarian
responses save lives and alleviate suffering, adhering to the
``do no harm'' principle. Finding a long-lasting, nonviolent,
democratic solution to Venezuela's political conflict will take
time. Without such a solution, the humanitarian emergency will
continue to take its toll on the Venezuelan people, forcing
many more to flee.
However, we all have a moral obligation, as Chairman Sires
said, to save lives today, to alleviate suffering today. We
cannot wait to do so once the political conflict is solved, for
it will not be solved for a while, not for the millions in need
inside Venezuela, not for those forced to migrate who also
suffer along the way, not for the region, which will also
continue to be impacted.
To save lives and alleviate suffering today and to continue
contributing to a long-lasting, nonviolent, democratic solution
to Venezuela's political conflict demands multilateral thinking
and action by the international political, diplomatic, human
rights, and humanitarian community, as well as engagement with
those who control power today in Venezuela.
Together with Venezuelan political party actors,
multilateral thinking and action must include Venezuelan civil
society organizations on the ground which have proven to have
the capacities, commitment, courage to generate solutions to
the humanitarian emergency, create opportunities for sustained
development, and continue advocating for human rights despite
threats and risks.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Reyna follows:]

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Reyna.
Now we will hear from Dr. Arnson.
I now turn to you for your testimony.

STATEMENT OF DR. CYNTHIA J. ARNSON, DIRECTOR, THE WILSON CENTER
LATIN AMERICA PROGRAM

Dr. Arnson. [inaudible] And notably--oops. I am--am I
muted? Uh-oh. Am I muted? No, I am not muted. Sorry. Okay.
The prospects of a democratic transition in Venezuela have
worsened. The Armed Forces, an essential pillar of regime
survival, have remained united despite multiple efforts inside
and outside the country to foster divisions. Maduro's
repressive apparatus remains fully intact, with murders carried
out with impunity in poor neighborhoods, political prisoners
tortured, raids and attacks on nongovernmental organizations.
As others have pointed out, this growing authoritarianism
has gone hand in hand with Venezuela's economic collapse.
Because of that collapse, others have made reference to the
refugee flows. The United Nations estimates that another 3
million Venezuelan migrants and refugees will leave the country
in 2021.
Countries in South America and the Caribbean are simply
incapable of absorbing such large additional refugee
populations and the threats to social cohesion and political
stability should not be taken lightly.
In approaching the Venezuelan crisis, the U.S. Government
should establish both long-term and short-term goals.
The long-term goal is the one that we all know and has been
longstanding in U.S. policy, which is the democratization of
Venezuela's political life via free, fair, and verifiable
elections.
So the question is, what are the short-term measures that
can be adopted that could help lead to that outcome?
First, now that the scenarios aimed at the collapse of the
regime have been tried and have failed, it is important to
achieve broad political agreements that offer some guarantees
to the regime and its supporters in exchange for concessions.
This constitutes a more fruitful strategy for stabilizing and
democratizing Venezuela.
As Feliciano Reyna was pointing out, humanitarian
agreements can serve as stepping stones toward a more
comprehensive settlement. Partial agreements build trust among
the parties, and if they are successful they build faith among
the population at large in the possibility of negotiated
outcomes.
And as we have just heard, the discussions in Venezuela
over ways for access to the COVID-19 vaccines through COVAX to
carry out a national vaccination campaign are a hopeful step.
The U.S. Government should not lead these efforts at
partial agreements, but the Biden Administration should
recognize that the sectoral, the secondary, the individual
sanctions, the criminal indictments, give the United States
tremendous leverage in Venezuela.
Prudently targeted sanctions relief in exchange for
verifiable concessions, such as the release of political
prisoners, an easing of the restrictions on humanitarian aid,
the reform of the National Electoral Council, should be
carefully considered as part of a broad strategy coordinated
with Venezuelan civil society and other actors in the
international community.
In any negotiation, creating incentives, not just wielding
sticks, is essential to bringing the parties together.
Although U.S. sanctions policy allows for humanitarian
exemptions, as the recent GAO report pointed out, these may not
be functioning well enough to provide enough maneuvering space
for humanitarian actors on the ground. Those humanitarian
exemptions should be revised in coordination with Venezuelan
civil society actors.
The Biden Administration should also consult with a broad
range not only of Venezuelan actors, but international relief
organizations to clear up remaining obstacles.
As others have mentioned, the Biden Administration's oft-
cited preference for multilateralism in foreign policy is an
asset in approaching Venezuela. Multiple international partners
of the United States have worked to maintain channels of
communication with all sides. These include the European Union,
the International Contact Group, the Lima Group, the
Governments of Norway and Sweden.
All of these countries and organizations have, as a common
denominator, their search for a peaceful, democratic solution
to the Venezuelan crisis.
And as my colleague Brian Fonseca will shortly indicate, we
should not harbor illusions that the only important
international actors in Venezuela are Western democracies
seeking a democratic outcome. Russia, China, Cuba, India,
Turkey, and Iran have played a variety of roles in sustaining
the Maduro regime. But we should keep in mind that their
interests are diverse, as is their relative importance to
regime survival.
Finally, and to reiterate the point about refugees, the
United States has done a huge amount to assist South American
and Caribbean countries hosting Venezuelan refugees, but much
more needs to be done. In 2020, the United Nations Refugee and
Migrant Response Plan received less than half of the
international funding that it requested and identified to meet
the needs of Venezuelan migrants and refugees across the
region.
And special attention, as Chairman Sires pointed out,
should be given to Colombia, which hosts more Venezuelan
refugees than any country in the world and which just extended
temporary protective status for 10 years to the almost 2
million refugees within its borders.
The United States can and must play an ongoing leading role
in mobilizing resources that are sufficient for Colombia, as
well as other frontline nations that are directly impacted by
Venezuela's ongoing meltdown.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Arnson follows:]

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Mr. Sires. Thank you very much.
I now turn to your testimony, Mr. Fonseca.

STATEMENT OF MR. BRIAN FONSECA, DIRECTOR, JACK D. GORDON
INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Mr. Fonseca. Thank you, Chairman Sires, Ranking Member
Green, distinguished members of the subcommittee, of course
including my own hometown Representative, Congresswoman
Salazar. It is my privilege to address you today on the state
of Venezuelan foreign relations and its short-term and long-
term effects on U.S. policy.
As already stated, Venezuela isin the midst of one of the
worst economic contractions ever recorded, and because of that,
the Maduro dictatorship continues to lean on a small group of
States to remain in power. Russia, China, Cuba, Turkey, and
Iran have all played important supporting roles for the regime.
These countries help Maduro bypass U.S. sanctions to keep
the Venezuelan economy muddling through and provide technical
assistance to help stave off internal and external threats.
The question before the House today is not whether the
Venezuelan Government is a repressive and corrupt authoritarian
regime. I believe that is clear. Rather, what can we do to
alleviate the ongoing humanitarian crisis, regain influence on
the ground, displace our geopolitical rivals, aid in the
restoration of democratic governance, and help pave the way for
a prosperous country for the Venezuelan people?
My testimony will focus on Russian-Venezuelan relations,
but I must point out that Russia is just one of a handful of
countries vital to Venezuelan domestic and foreign policy
interests.
The considerations binding Russia, Venezuela, and the
others are far less ideological. Instead, these countries are
tied together by common authoritarian political structures and
economic and political opportunism.
Furthermore, these countries all share antagonistic
relationships with the United States. That is, regime survival,
combined with our policy position, for better or worse,
encourage these authoritarian regimes to travel together.
These countries also overwhelmingly prioritize their own
survival well above the relationships. That leads me to
conclude that these relationships--Russia-Venezuela included--
are largely transactional and vulnerable to fracturing.
The Russo-Venezuelan relationship has evolved a great deal
since former President Hugo Chavez and Vladimir Putin first met
in Moscow in 2001. Putin saw tremendous economic and political
opportunities in Venezuela, while Chavez sought to diversify
its foreign relations away from the United States.
In subsequent years, Russian companies invested billions
into Venezuela, largely focusing on arms and energy deals.
Chavez also offered Russia political and military access on the
ground in Venezuela.
Interestingly, much of the surge in Russian-Venezuelan
engagement occurred during Maduro's tenure as Chavez's Minister
of Foreign Affairs from 2006 to 2013.
After ascending to office in 2013, Maduro sought to
leverage his relations with Russia and others to stave off
challenges from internal political opposition, offset the
massive amount of money siphoned through widespread corruption
and criminality, and mitigate the economic death spiral that
accelerated shortly after he took office.
Today, most experts would agree that Russia's direct
business activities in Venezuela have not yielded the desired
return on investment. Still, it maintains important economic
interests; namely, energy infrastructure and enduring arms
contracts.
However, the lack of direct ROI has forced the Russians to
focus more on the indirect economic benefits and extracting
political and geopolitical value out of Venezuela, primarily,
maintaining a geostrategic footprint near the U.S., portraying
Russia as a global power, unsettling American policymakers,
undermining Western democratic values, and scoring political
points at home for Putin.
In the economic context, Russia is just one of several
countries vying for access to Venezuela's large proven oil
reserves. There are clear indications that Rosneft and other
Russian companies were taking huge losses well before U.S.
sanctions.
Despite their losses, Russia owned significant energy
assets in Venezuela, including nearly 81 billion barrels of
proven reserves via its joint ventures with PDVSA--that, by the
way, it chooses to leave in the ground.
One theory is that Russiais content with locking up
Venezuelan oil in the ground and reducing global supply so that
it can fetch a higher price for its own heavy crude on the
global market.
Russia exports roughly 9 to 10 million barrels of heavy
crude per day. So a $5 increase in price of a barrel would
generate roughly an additional $50 million a day for Russian
exporters. Thus, Russia may be deriving indirect economic
benefits from a deteriorated Venezuelan oil industry made worse
by U.S. sectoral sanctions.
In 2020, Russia oil exports to the U.S. hit a 16-year high,
solidifying its place as the second-largest exporter of U.S.
crude to the United States. Industry experts argue that the
spike in Russian imports to the United States is driven, in
large part, by U.S. sanctions against PDVSA.
Oil and gas are not the only drivers of Russian economic
interests in Venezuela. Military sales are also an important
part of Russia's broader economic interests. Building on
military sales, Russia has established important military-to-
military relationships with Venezuela. Russia provides
technical assistance and offers professional military
educational opportunities in Russia for Venezuelan military
personnel.
Russia also maintains a formidable intelligence footprint
in Venezuela. Although it is difficult to estimate how deep
this aspect of the relationship goes or whether these
relationships will be enduring, Russian military and
intelligence presence in Venezuela is not in our national
security interest.
Still, I assess the strategic intent for Russia is not to
directly challenge the U.S. military. Instead, I think it finds
value in creating a low-cost opportunity to irritate the United
States, but not necessarily provoke an escalatory response.
Let me cover just a few recommendations, if I can, and then
conclude.
I mean, to be clear, there is no easy path to transition in
Venezuela and there are severe limitations to what the U.S. can
do now. Still, I think there are meaningful actions that we
should be thinking about as the situation continues to evolve.
First, we should reevaluate our sanctions and consider
doubling down on targeted sanctions against individuals and
reversing broader sanctions that may be hurting our national
interests and the interests of the Venezuelan people.
There is good reason to believe that some of our sanctions
are undermining our long-term domestic and foreign policy
objectives. Our sanctions should not exacerbate the ongoing
crisis, erode America's reputation, or work in the interests of
our global rivals.
Second, we must find ways to close the important pressure
release valves or else the sanctions will do little to effect
change. If the dictatorship can leverage its allies and use
illicit trafficking proceeds to subsidize its struggling
Venezuelan economy, meaningful change will remain elusive.
Third, we should consider reestablishing some diplomatic
and economic access. I am not suggesting we reestablish an
embassy without evaluating important concessions, but we should
look to regain some diplomatic footprint.
We should also create space for the American private sector
to outcompete Russia, China, and others taking advantage of the
U.S. absence. There is certainly a clear preference for
American businesses over Russia, China, Iran, and Turkey.
Finally, we should consider bolstering the governance
capacity and reassure our partners in the region, especially
Venezuela's neighbors Guyana, Colombia, and Peru, and consider
working more closely with our international allies, especially
the U.K., France, and Canada, which all maintain diplomatic
relations.
The fact that this is among the first hearings of the 117th
Congress and the first for this committee is a testament to the
importance of Venezuela to the United States and our commitment
to the Venezuelan people.
As I said before this committee in 2019, nature abhors a
vacuum. If we do not have a presence, then China, Russia, Iran,
and others antithetical to our interests and the interests of
the Venezuelan people will be more than happy to fill that
void.
Again, thank you for this amazing opportunity, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fonseca follows:]

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Mr. Sires. Thank you.
Dr. Berg, you are recognized for your testimony.

STATEMENT OF DR. RYAN C. BERG, RESEARCH FELLOW, LATIN AMERICA
STUDIES, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

Dr. Berg. Chairman Sires, Ranking Member Green, members of
the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on
this timely topic today.
The political and economic devastation wrought by the
Maduro regime in Venezuela, Latin America's erstwhile
wealthiest country, is truly unprecedented. The country has
lost 20 percent of its pre-crisis population, 5 to 6 million
refugees, a number that could rise to as many as 10 million by
2023, according to the International Monetary Fund.
De facto President Nicolas Maduro has presided over the
largest economic decline outside of war in world history and
his regime is now considered a criminalized or a mafia State.
Venezuela's institutions are so thoroughly penetrated by
corruption and criminal interests that senior leaders,
including Maduro himself, are actively participating in
transnational criminal enterprises.
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, the
National Liberation Army, or ELN, and Lebanese Hezbollah all
have received shelter and even material support from the Maduro
regime.
Maduro's Venezuela represents a combustible mix of national
security threats that have metastasized throughout the
hemisphere, leaving the door wide open and beckoning the
involvement of extra-hemispheric actors and U.S. strategic
competitors that have seized on the bedlam in Venezuela to
enter our shared neighborhood, sow chaos, destabilize the
region, and augment their power-projection capabilities.
Russia has provided the Maduro regime with a critical
sanctions-busting lifeline, as well as myriad weapon systems.
China has provided more than $60 billion in loans since
2007 and traded repressive digital surveillance technology to
further Maduro's control.
And Cuba has remade the repressive organs of Venezuela's
police state in exchange for oil.
Perhaps the most concerning aspect of Venezuela's slide
into chaos, however, are the bonds it has forged and solidified
with Russia, China, and Cuba, in many cases turning
transactional relationships into blossoming strategic
partnerships and even, in some cases, outright dependencies.
Venezuela has become a prime example of the phenomenon
known as authoritarian export or authoritarian learning,
whereby authoritarian leaders share best practices in
repression and adopt survival strategies based upon their prior
successes in other countries.
Like a family recipe, authoritarians have bequeathed to
Caracas their best advice in regime survival. If not for Cuba,
the Venezuelan regime would arguably not exist in its current
form. And if not for Russia and China, the Maduro regime would
probably have collapsed.
As Venezuela's economy slips further into the abyss,
however, the Maduro regime has doubled down on the narrative of
a nation under siege and abdicated any responsibility for the
country's collapse.
I think it is critical to avoid misconstruing the realities
of who is to blame here because it means misidentifying the
most appropriate strategies for addressing the unique security
challenges the regime poses to the region.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to use the remaining time
available to highlight very briefly several policy
recommendations for the United States.
First, pursue a policy of management, not solutionism. The
Biden Administration should recognize that it has inherited a
significant position of leverage, but it should resist the
temptation to go big and rush into negotiations with the Maduro
regime. A Hail Mary pass at this inauspicious moment could
actually entrench the regime further.
Second, attend to the unfolding humanitarian disaster. As
we have all heard today already, this is the most underfunded
humanitarian crisis in modern history. For comparison, Syrian
refugees have received the equivalent of $3,150 per refugee,
while Venezuelans have received a paltry $265 per refugee.
Aid should be targeted to encourage and defray the costs of
further integration of Venezuelan refugees in host countries
such as Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and others.
Third, monitor the effect of sanctions on humanitarian
efforts. The Treasury Department should monitor potentially
negative humanitarian consequences of our U.S. sanctions. The
U.S. should seek to ensure the reliability of the humanitarian
exemptions that are built into our sanctions architecture, and
fine-tuning sanctions should be the first impulse, rather than
simply lifting them.
Fourth, avoid the siren song of negotiations until minimum
conditions in the country are met. By some accounts, there have
been nearly a dozen attempts to negotiate with the Maduro
regime and limited progress has been made, with significant
opportunity costs to the Venezuelan people.
I will note that there is currently no consensus of what
the minimum conditions would be for a negotiation, and major
questions persist regarding objectives, timing, process, and
trust-building measures with the Maduro regime.
Fifth, encourage the European Union to bring more pressure.
While awaiting a more fortuitous diplomatic moment, the Biden
Administration should encourage the European Union to adjust
its policy in a nod to reality.
Quite simply, the EU's current approach is riddled with
inconsistencies and the pressure setting is insufficient to
meaningfully contribute to a negotiated solution and to protect
human rights on the ground.
Sixth, broaden the diplomatic tool kit to complement
sanctions. The U.S. should employ nonsanctions instruments
concurrently with U.S. sanctions to achieve the effective
pressure level. These instruments include legal referrals to
international tribunals, such as the current case pending
against Venezuela before the International Criminal Court, and
anti-money-laundering mechanisms and resource certification
regimes to deter the Maduro regime's participation in the
illicit economy.
And seventh and last, bolster intelligence capabilities.
The failed April 2019 uprising announced from La Carlota Air
Base in Caracas and Operation Gideon, the failed 2020
amphibious invasion planned in neighboring Colombia by a
sanctioned Venezuelan general, should prompt the incoming
Director of the CIA and the intelligence community to conduct a
thorough investigation of intelligence failures in the country
related to the Maduro regime's authoritarian resilience and
bolster U.S. intelligence assets and capabilities in Venezuela.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to answering
the committee's questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Berg follows:]

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Mr. Sires. Thank you to our witnesses today.
Now I would like to ask unanimous consent that
Representatives Omar, Steube, Malliotakis, and Wasserman
Schultz participate in today's hearing after all subcommittee
members have had the opportunity to participate and question
any of the witnesses. Thank you.
And now we will get into questions. I will start by asking
questions to our members.
First, I would like to say that for years I have been
saying that Russia and China participate in this Western
Hemisphere in order to create anarchy, in order to destabilize
governments, in order to play with our closest allies.
Cuba has a security apparatus in Venezuela. Russia has been
selling arms. And one interesting conversation that I had with
someone from the Colombian Embassy the other day told me that
in 2019, 6,000 Russians visited Colombia. Last year, due to the
pandemic, it dropped down to 3,000. The Colombian Government
expelled three Russians recently.
I can only think that having Russians visiting Colombia,
6,000, Colombiais not exactly a beach destination for the
Russians, plays into this idea that Russia and China would love
nothing better than to create chaos in the Western Hemisphere.
So I was wondering from our members, can you comment on
that?
Anyone? Do not all answer at once. Just one.
Mr. Fonseca.
Mr. Fonseca. Chairman, I apologize. I thought when you
meant members, that you were querying somebody else.
No, I could not agree with you more. I absolutely think one
of the primary objectives, certainly of Russia, is to continue
to sort of poke a finger in the eye of the United States.
Keep in mind that, as I mentioned, I think they find it
incredibly valuable to have a geostrategic footprint near the
U.S., and I think that is one of it. And oftentimes that sort
of--this idea of reciprocity gets thrown into the discussion
among experts that look specifically at Russian engagement in
Venezuela, because oftentimes that reciprocity sort of pathways
back to the pronounced U.S. footprint in Eastern Europe.
And so oftentimes in the past you have even heard rumors
about the potential tradeoffs of maybe the U.S. kind of
withdrawing its support in places like Ukraine in exchange for
Russia withdrawing its support in Venezuela. And, again, for
now, that is all been sort of hearsay, kind of listening to
people on the ground.
But there is no doubt that, in the consciousness of Russia,
having that geostrategic footprint is really vital, No. 1.
No. 2, I also think that--and this is inclusive of--by the
way, that geostrategic footprint is also inclusive of China. Of
course, the United States has a tremendous footprint in Asia,
notwithstanding our support to Taiwan, our military access in
South Korea, Japan, in broader sort of Southeast Asia, you
know, U.S. influence.
But that is No. 1. So geostrategic value to having close
proximity to the United States.
No. 2, they both have a tremendous interest in undermining
sort of Western liberal order, undermining democratic
institutions around the world, and trying to strategically
create space to sort of embrace their authoritarian political
models.
I think that sort of lends itself to destabilizing the
democracies around the region. And we have seen at times in the
past Russia leveraging information operations in other
sophisticated technology means to be disruptive and impact sort
of the political stability of partners across the hemisphere.
So, Chairman, I could not agree with you more. I think
China and Russia absolutely are intent on disrupting and
undermining U.S. policy.
Mr. Sires. Thank you.
I also think that we just do not pay enough attention to
the Western Hemisphere. So if we do not pay attention, the
Russians and the Chinese and all the other countries that are
helping Venezuela fill that void that we have in the Western
Hemisphere.
Dr. Arnson. Mr. Chairman, if I might add to that.
Mr. Sires. Sure.
Dr. Arnson. I certainly associate myself with what Brian
Fonseca just said, and I agree that the influence of China and
Russia in Venezuela is counter to U.S. interests. But I think
that one needs to separate the kind of involvement that the two
countries have had. As Brian was saying, it is geostrategic, it
is an opportunity for the Russians to mess around in what they
call or what they consider the U.S. ``near abroad'' in the
reciprocal kind of way that Brian was mentioning.
China's interests have been somewhat different. China is
the largest oil consumer in the world. Venezuela has the
world's largest known oil reserves.
And so the relationship has been heavily focused on oil
extraction, and the $62 billion in loans approximately are
being repaid in oil and there has not been any new money for
some time. And the loans that were given in recent years were
simply to allow Venezuela to continue paying back the loans
that had been initially given.
There is also, I think, the case that China has reached out
to the opposition at various points trying to guarantee its
long-term access to Venezuela's oil resources independent of
the political leadership of the country.
So I see it as less committed to the survival of Nicolas
Maduro and the regime overall and much more committed to the
long-term survival of its interest in the oil fields.
Mr. Sires. Thank you very much.
Now I will recognize Ranking Member Green.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Chairman. Again, appreciate your
opening remarks and appreciate the witnesses' testimony. I
thank all of them for being present and their participation
today.
I think one of America's greatest challenges is China, and
I am greatly concerned with their penetration into not only
Venezuela, but all of Latin America. And my comments are really
to the whole slate of witnesses, whoever wants to jump in.
In 2019, China specifically stated that the blackouts in
Venezuela were because of cyber attacks from the United States,
obviously a blatant lie.
One of my questions is, how do we confront this
disinformation campaign from China in Venezuela and throughout
Latin America?
Dr. Berg. Let me jump in on this here, Ranking Member
Green.
As you well stated, the cyber attack claim, of course, is
spurious. Largely, the blackouts were a cause of the fact that
there was not only corruption, but a failure to maintain the
power grid in Venezuela. And also something, quite simply,
somebody did not bother to cut the vegetation around one of the
main power plants outside of Caracas, and so that vegetation
overgrew some of the power lines and ended up knocking off
power periodically throughout 2019, as we saw.
This is an incredibly important question in terms of the
disinformation environment. It is not just China. It is also
Russia. It is also Cuba participating as well.
And I think in this sense, the United States can do its
best to try to get reliable information to Venezuelans on the
ground, to members of the opposition, in especially critical
periods of time. We have seen the internet knocked off grid in
really important periods of time around protests, around street
pressure, around moments in time when the regime felt like it
was quite vulnerable.
And so this is one of those areas that kind of flies below
the radar, but is quite important in terms of our ability to
help the opposition on the ground. Given the lack of political
space in the country to organize, the reliable presence of the
internet is absolutely critical.
Mr. Green. One other, sort of taking that a step further.
It appears that ZTE, China's big telecommunications giant, has
created ID cards for the Venezuelan people, which essentially
do the same thing that their social score system does--tracks
their behavior, monitors their actions, can dig into their
checking accounts, all of this.
How do we stop that?
Mr. Fonseca. So, Ranking Member Green, I think it is an
excellent question. I think it underscores the point of China
as the real strategic competitor in the region. And Chinese
tech proliferation has been growing rapidly certainly for the
last decade or so.
The idea of the fatherland card, as you reference, is
something that certainly we have been battling around in terms
of how to--sort of how to combat that. In Venezuela perhaps it
is very difficult to sort of overturn that.
But I think education, continuing to sort of dominate the
educational space, not just in broader Latin America, but
wherever we can sort of reach in and help educate consumers on
the threats and challenges associated with China tech
penetration.
It is important for us to disaggregate good from bad. Not
all Chinese activities in the region I think should be seen
through sort of a threat landscape. But I do think we have to
provide education as tech penetration becomes more proliferated
across the broader hemisphere.
And I think this is also consistent with what Dr. Berg was
saying just a few minutes ago about information operations. The
Russians are incredibly sophisticated in terms of their ability
to effect impact on information operations. They also have an
incredibly sophisticated and forward-leaning cyber capability.
In fact, lots of open reporting about that threat. In fact,
the Atlantic Council's digital analytics lab has done some
really good work on assessing information operations and
putting out recommendations that can help undermine sort of the
effect of those information operations.
And part of that is about sort of credibility of the
source. The United States needs to remain credible as a source
across the broader hemisphere. We have to ensure that our
actions do not undermine our credibility, broadly speaking.
And I think we need to continue to point out and attack the
credibility of Russia, and when China does it call them out as
well, for proliferating just false information that affects the
social, political, and economic landscapes across the region.
Mr. Green. My timeis up. Mr. Chairman, I will go in second
round.
Mr. Sires. Thank you.
Congressman Castro, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairman.
This question is for Mr. Reyna.
First, thank you for speaking to our committee about the
important work that civil society organizations like yours are
doing in Venezuela.
I chair the subcommittee that handles international
development policy, and so I want to ask you a question along
those lines.
As you know, on February 11, Venezuela's opposition and
Nicolas Maduro agreed to cooperate to purchase and distribute
COVID-19 vaccines for 6 million Venezuelans. I think this is a
positive step toward fighting the coronavirus pandemic in the
country. And it has been reported that about 1.4 million doses
of the vaccine will come from the World Health Organization-
linked COVAX initiative, while the source of the rest of the
vaccines is yet unclear.
So my question is, how can the United States help mobilize
resources to ensure countries in need, like Venezuela, receive
the appropriate amount of vaccines? And how can we ensure that
there is a proper oversight and equitable distribution of those
vaccines in Venezuela?
Mr. Reyna. Thank you very much for your question. I think
this is really important.
One way in which it is possible to continue providing
support in regards to health, and with vaccination
particularly, is to support these efforts that the Humanitarian
Aid Commission of the 2015 National Assembly has been carrying
on and also being able to work with the Pan American Health
Organization, as well as with the Health Department of
Venezuela.
I think this is one example of possibilities that still
exist to provide support. And the signing of this COVAX
agreement is also a show of those possibilities. So we did have
a previous agreement, now this COVAX one.
And the oversight and the mobilization to expand, on the
one hand, and the oversight, one perhaps can be achieved
through supporting the entrance into Venezuela of the World
Food Programme with its logistical capacities.
We are seeing huge challenge there with issues, for
example, of cold chain. And since our transportation
infrastructure has been also somewhat collapsed, as many other
areas, then the World Food Programme can play an important
role.
And in regards to oversight, we are proposing to follow the
model that has already been in place since 2018 by the Global
Fund for HIV, TB and Malaria, Pan American Health Organization,
UNH, and Venezuelan civil society, again, with the Health
Ministry, to followup on the provision and distribution of
antiretrovirals.
It has worked well, with challenges, with difficulties. But
that oversight has been in place. And there is a working group,
monthly information, and followup of the results. Whenever
there is a gap or difficulties, then these can be called by the
activists on the ground doing that oversight.
So these are the kinds of perhaps mechanisms that would
deserve looking into and supporting.
Thank you.
Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Congressman Castro.
Congressman Pfluger, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Pfluger. Mr. Chairman thank you for an excellent
hearing on a very important topic. And to all of our panelists
thank you for your time.
I have got a couple of questions. I will start with Dr.
Arnson. Knowing that Maduro is--it will not sign any sort of
deal with the World Food Program, unless he can control the
distribution of that food, how do we as the United States in
working with our, with our allies and partners in the region
ensure that delivery of food gets to the people that need it
the most and can prevent Maduro from controlling that
distribution.
Dr. Arnson. Thank you very much for the question,
Congressman Pfluger. It is an essential principle of
humanitarian assistance that it must be given with neutrality
and without any regard for the political affiliation of the
recipient. Up until now, the Maduro regime has maintained tight
control over food distribution through this program known as
CLAP, through food boxes which are woefully insufficient. And
it is a form of social control. And it is obviously reluctant
to relinquish that form of control.
But I think what Feliciano was indicating is that on
humanitarian issues involving health, there have been--there
has been the possibility of reaching agreement between the
opposition, the government working closely with civil society
organizations.
I do not know what the magic formula will be to allow or to
convince the regime to allow the World Food Program to operate.
I suggested in my testimony that there might be some
consideration given to relaxing U.S. secondary sanctions that
would permit the import of fuel, gasoline, and diesel which are
in short supply. I know that that is a controversial
recommendation that we should not have to offer anything to
Nicolas Maduro to get him to allow the international community
to feed starving people.
I mean, we are talking about at a minimum 9 million
Venezuelans who are either severely food insecure, or
moderately food insecure, and that is the assessment of the
World Food Program itself in 2020.
So I think that these humanitarian agreements that have
been reached over COVAX, the kind of things with
antiretrovirals that Feliciano was mentioning, provide a kernel
of hope that these kinds of agreements around food and food
insecurity can also be reached.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you very much.
And now for Dr. Berg. My question is what are the
consequences to the U.S., and the region, if this crisis
continues and if these criminal groups are allowed to thrive?
And, specifically, to our southern border, what is the threat
with this crisis, continuing the number of refugees?
Dr. Berg, to you.
Dr. Berg. Thank you very much, Congressman, for the
question. I think the crisis has region-wide impacts. As Dr.
Arnson mentioned in her opening statement, the region is not
poised to be able to absorb this level of refugees we have seen
so far, about 5-and-a-half million. Remember that figure that I
mentioned in my opening statement from the IMF that this could
rise by 10 million by 2023.
And so the numbers of people and the pace which they are
exiting the country is still unabated. And this really has dire
consequences, not only for the stability and security of the
region, but the future economic growth of the region. Many
countries have difficulty not only absorbing this number of
refugees, but also--look at a country like Colombia, it has
taken the very commendable step of including about 1.7 million
refugees into its, into its legal ranks. About 1 million of
them will be affected by the temporary protective status that
they granted to them.
But that is going to be a Herculean undertaking, which the
United States can help with because many of us do not believe
that countries in the region have the capability to absorb
these types of numbers on a bureaucratic level, on an economic
level, on a political level. There are political ramifications
as well. We have seen in some places, despite the fact that the
region has had a pretty welcoming stance, a rise in xenophobia.
I mentioned Colombia before. I looked at a poll the other
day that said that a clear majority of Colombians were actually
against the move by Ivan Duque to allow temporary protective
status for Venezuelans in the country. So the regional cohesion
here is at stake as well.
And the last thing that you mentioned is a migratory crisis
that could push north to our borders. Again, we have seen a lot
of refugees in South America. As I think the next waves start
to come out, we might see more and more actually traversing
through Colombia, going up into Panama and into Central
America, certainly more so than they are now.
And, lastly, Congressman, if I can just go back to the
question that Dr. Arnson answered previously about the
neutrality principle and humanitarianism. Obviously, it is
absolutely critical. I think that there is one cautionary tale
here, and that is the agreement that was signed last summer to
bring in personal protective equipment and COVID PCR tests,
which were very quickly, sort of, confiscated by the Maduro
regime. They were not actually spread around the country in the
way that the agreement stipulated. And the opposition since has
been crying foul about it. And with the regime in control of
those resources, there is not much we can do at this point.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you very much.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Sires. Thank you.
Congressman Andy Levin, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Levin. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for holding
this important hearing. To our panelists, thank you. I am going
to try to ask a number of questions, so I ask you to try to be
brief in your answers.
A February GAO report, which I requested along with the
full committee back in 2019, found that U.S. sanctions,
particularly those on the oil industry, have likely contributed
to the steep decline of the Venezuelan economy and suggested
steps that the Treasury Department and other agencies could
take to mitigate the humanitarian impacts of sanctions, which
some of you have addressed very movingly.
Mr. Reyna, what recommendations do you have for the U.S.
Government regarding how it could provide clear guidance for
financial institutions or take other steps to minimize any
second-order impacts of sanctions on the operations of
humanitarian organizations that are doing their best in this
situation?
Mr. Reyna. Thank you very much, Congressman Levin. We
really welcome that report. We think it offers information that
is quite important, because one may think, you know, of the
impact of sanctions on issues that were already deteriorating.
But to us, what is of serious concern today is impact on the
Venezuelan population. And, certainly, there is some that can
be--work differently.
But what we have had sometimes is conversations with
Treasury, for example, to give precise examples of how
sanctions can put obstacles and restrict the work of
organizations. I think that is--you know, having those
conversations, even before imposing certain types of sanctions
made--would have made sense and still makes sense to talk
through them.
One issue that we have faced, for example, is that--and we
understand Treasury cannot impose, for example, they say issues
on operations of the banking system, lets say. But they can
offer certainly a more decisive kind of advice in order for,
you know, the system not to prevent us from carrying on our
humanitarian work, our accompanying, for example, victims of
situations of lack of access to food or health.
So I think that this requires perhaps sitting down, looking
at particular issues and seeing how to solve them. Licenses,
for example, when we were looking at them, they might take from
18 months to 24 months to get. So, again, it is not even having
license to get them for organizations such as ours here on the
ground. So, you know, thank you for your concerns then.
Mr. Levin. Yes, I tell you what, we will be a partner with
you in trying to work with the administration to help you do
your work, basically. It is so important.
Mr. Reyna. Thank you.
Mr. Levin. Yes, the Trump administration strategy toward
Venezuela relied on maximum pressure betting that sanctions
would lead to a quick transition to democracy. But here in
March 2021, Maduro's grip on power appears stronger than at any
point since 2019. It seems that in order to work toward a
democratic transition, the U.S. will need a longer-term
strategy.
Dr. Arnson, it is good to see an old friend. Given reports
that the Biden Administration is reviewing its sanctions policy
in many parts of the world, can you talk, specifically, about
sanctions you think should be reassessed or advised, or how
should we look at this in more detail than you may have gone
into earlier?
Dr. Arnson. Sure. Well, I would say that it is certainly
not in the cards for the United States to be unilaterally
lifting certain sanctions. But as I said in my statement, they
do convey enormous amounts of leverage. The question is how
they can be used in a back and forth to require verifiable
steps by the Maduro government in exchange for certain forms of
sanctions relief.
Now, that implies that the government is actually
interested in that kind of sanctions relief. There may be--it
may be the case that they are more interested in the lifting of
criminal indictments or, you know, the lifting of these
individual sanctions that have frozen bank accounts and
prohibited them from traveling to the United States in the case
of the EU to the European Union.
But I think it is very positive that there is a recognition
at this point that the campaign of maximum pressure actually
did not achieve the--either the democratic opening or the
regime collapse that was hoped for. And, therefore, a different
approach is needed. And I think that those consultations are
under way and should be encouraged.
And sanctions are, you know, an instrument in the, in the
toolkit. And the United States has, because of the economic
sanctions against the oil sector, the financial sector, and
secondary sanctions on those who also trade with PDVSA and
other Venezuelan entities give us tremendous leverage. And we
should explore, you know, what combination of concession and
sanctions relief should be desirable.
Mr. Levin. All right. Thanks.
Mr. Chairman, I see my time is up. Great hearing, and I
yield back.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Congressman. We now recognize
Congresswoman Salazar from Florida for 5 minutes.
Ms. Salazar. Thank you, Chairman. Wonderful to be here. And
it is such an important topic for the Americas, and I thank the
witnesses for their time and their expertise, specifically, Dr.
Fonseca who is one of the most prominent scholars in my
district. So wonderful to have you here.
I just want--I have a different type of questioning, and I
would like to start with Dr. Fonseca just to take this to a
more basic or granular topic where reality is more crude, and
it is more understood. So, I am going to have--I am going to do
ten questions, and I would like you to just answer yes or no if
it is possible. Is it true that Venezuela went from being one
of the richest countries in the hemisphere to one of the
poorest?
Mr. Fonseca. That is correct.
Ms. Salazar. Is it true that inflation right now is over
4,000 percent?
Mr. Fonseca. That is correct.
Ms. Salazar. Is it true that the Venezuelans can only go to
the supermarket a few days a week because there are no goods on
the shelves?
Mr. Fonseca. In most places, that is absolutely correct.
Ms. Salazar. And is it true that the average Venezuelan has
lost more than 50 pounds in the last 20 years because of lack
of food?
Mr. Fonseca. That is also correct.
Ms. Salazar. Is it also true that Venezuela is empowering
Hezbollah, the terrorist group, and that the United States has
indicted members of the Venezuelan Congress just like if one of
us were participating or working with the terrorist group
Hezbollah? We know who that person is or who that group is. Is
that true?
Dr. Fonseca, did you hear me.
Mr. Fonseca. I am sorry. I was muted. Yes, that is correct.
Ms. Salazar. The has dog gone away.
Is it true that the Venezuelan is empowering--the
Venezuelan Government is empowering the terrorist group
Hezbollah, and that the United States indicted a member of the
Venezuelan Congress for working with Hezbollah.
Mr. Fonseca. That is true.
Ms. Salazar. And is it true that Venezuela is becoming a
major hub for drug trafficking? And that criminal organization
is their only--their only purpose is to harm the United States?
Mr. Fonseca. They are absolutely a major hub for drug
trafficking.
Ms. Salazar. And is it true that Maduro's representative or
the repressive apparatus is controlled and directed by more
than 30,000 high-ranking Cuban agents like Ramiro Valdes, and
they control even the Venezuelan customs office and the
passport issuing office?
Mr. Fonseca. There is absolutely a heavy presence. And I
know you wanted a ``yes'' or ``no,'' but I am not sure that the
numbers are what I am seeing as high. I think to your point,
they still play a really vital, vital role in fire-walling the
regime and absolutely have an important presence around Maduro,
ensuring the survival of the regime.
Ms. Salazar. And the Maduro is blocking at this hour the
aid for food and medicine that, we, the United States are
offering to give to them so they can help their people? They
are blocking it and denying it?
Mr. Fonseca. That is right, yes.
Ms. Salazar. And, finally, is it true that 20 years ago,
Hugo Chavez promised in an interview to yours truly that he was
going to establish democratic socialism of the 21st century for
the Venezuelan people?
Mr. Fonseca. Yes, I recall that interview well, and yes, he
did.
Ms. Salazar. Thank you. Now, my question to you and to the
rest of the panel is to what can we do as a country to help the
Venezuelan people?
Mr. Fonseca. I think, you know, one, we have to continue to
apply pressure and, again, look for ways to allow access for
vital humanitarian assistance. I think we also need to continue
to reassure and support Venezuelan neighbors and those in the
region that are having to absorb millions of Venezuelans
fleeing the country. I think it should be noted that the--that
the millions of Venezuelans fleeing the country are another
really important release valve that allow the regime to muddle
through by having to, you know, sort of having fewer mouths to
feed in the country with an economy that continues to sort of
move in a death spiral. And so I think that----
Ms. Salazar. If there is one single thing that we could do
as a country to help the Venezuelan people, what would that be?
Mr. Fonseca. Continue to apply pressure. I do not--
unfortunately, I do not see a short-term----
Ms. Salazar. What type of pressure? What type of pressure?
Mr. Fonseca. I think we need to continue to apply
diplomatic and economic pressure. We need to continue to press
for the admission of humanitarian assistance in to support
those--and, again, I think we need to--I know you asked for
one, but I also think we need to shore up our allies and
partners in the region----
Ms. Salazar. I only have 50 seconds. Why do not you let
me--Dr. Arnson answer. If there is one single thing we can do
as a country to help the Venezuelan people, what would that be?
Dr. Arnson. It would be to work closely with our
international allies, with the Venezuelan opposition, and with
a broad range of actors in civil society that can come together
around a common agenda, first, for humanitarian issues, and
then eventually to tackle some of the more difficult political
and security challenges.
Ms. Salazar. Dr. Berg, one thing in 13 seconds. What could
we do as a country to help the Venezuelan people at this hour?
Dr. Berg. Thank you, Congresswoman. I would say to
reiterate what Mr. Fonseca said, the pressure is, obviously,
key. It has to be multi-dimensional. As I mentioned in my
opening remarks, it is not just sanctions, but sanctions and--
and Congresswoman Levin asked a great question, previously,
about sanctions and targeting. I think we can look at targeting
and look at----
Ms. Salazar. What does targeting mean? I only have 14
seconds. One thing. What does targeting mean?
Dr. Berg. To look at the actual targets of our sanctions.
The people on whom we are putting sanctions. The theory behind
the maximum pressure campaign was that sanctions would be
enough to dislodge Maduro. But unfortunately the targeting of
those sanctions has not been on actual military figures whom we
all believe to control the security apparatus on the domestic
level.
So looking at targeting when it comes to our pressure will
be key, Congresswoman.
Ms. Salazar. Thank you.
I yield back. My time is up.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Congresswoman.
Congressman Vincente Gonzalez, you are recognized for 5
minutes.
Congressman Gonzalez, are you on?
Congressman Vargas, are you on?
Mr. Vargas. Yes, I am.
Mr. Sires. You are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear
me? This is Juan Vargas.
Mr. Sires. Okay, Juan. You are on.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, first of all, Mr.
Chairman, for having this hearing, and I also want to thank the
ranking member and all of the witnesses.
Two things jump out at me in this hearing, one, our failure
with humanitarian aid. That seems to jump out when I hear
statistics that Syrian refugees have received, literally,
almost ten times as much aid as have Venezuelan refugees, that
is one.
And, second, our intelligence failures. It seems like that
we believed that one thing was going to happen with sanctions
and maximum pressure, and then it did not come about.
So I can start first with humanitarian aid. I am very
concerned about not only internally displaced people, but, of
course, refugees, also. How can we work better with the allies
that we have all been talking about, both in the region,
European allies as we have said earlier, how can we work better
with everybody to have a better result? Because the result
right now is disastrous.
I would ask that of Dr. Arnson.
Dr. Arnson. Thank you very much, Congressman, for the
question. I think that the United States certainly can
contribute more of its own resources, but there are other ways
to continue to mobilize the international community. There have
been donors' conferences convened by the European Union. We
should press for more.
They, of course, are dealing with their own influx of
refugees from Syria, from Afghanistan, from other parts of the
Middle East and Northern Africa, and it is a complicated
situation there as well. But we could also look to mobilize
more contributions by the U.S. private sector and work in
partnership with other organizations like the DFC to provide
employment opportunities on the ground for Venezuelan refugees
and host communities in the region.
Mr. Vargas. I guess I am also very concerned about the food
insecurity, in particular. I mean, I have great respect for the
United Nations Food Program. As you know, they just won the
Nobel Peace Prize for all the work that they are doing. But at
the same time, they alerted us to all the millions of people in
this world who may starve this year because of COVID and other
issues.
How can we work with the U.N. better knowing that what the
Maduro regime has been doing to manipulate the food
distribution because they want to do it? What can we do? I am
very concerned about that.
Dr. Arnson.
Dr. Arnson. Yes, well you know, you have hit the nail on
the head. I mean the greatest source of--the greatest obstacle
to greater food assistance by the international community is
precisely Nicolas Maduro and the rest of the Venezuelan
Government.
The United Nations has dramatically expanded its footprint
in Venezuela over the last 2 years. There are a variety of U.N.
agencies that are on the ground, the Office of Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA, the--UNICEF and others. This does
not include at this time the World Food Program.
And I would note that, you know, there have been numerous
efforts to take the issue of Venezuela to the U.N. Security
Council. Most of those have served to just reproduce the
polarization between the United States on the one hand and
Russia and China on the other. But in bringing the humanitarian
issue to the Security Council that did provide an opening--and
there was agreement on providing this greater opening for U.N.
agencies to have a presence.
So the bottom line is, you know, how do you force people to
do something that they do not want to do? It is very difficult.
And so the question is can you offer them something which is
not violating of your, you know, basic principles? Can you
offer them anything in exchange?
Mr. Vargas. If I can just interrupt the last few seconds
that I have. What about the intelligence failure? Why have we
gotten it so wrong?
Dr. Arnson. Is that a question for me?
Mr. Vargas. Yes.
Dr. Arnson. Theories of political change are multiple. And
there was the sense that by tightening the screws enough, you
can create fractures in the regime, you can cause the military
to divide. There were all kinds of ways in which, you know--
there was the assumption that the Maduro regime would implode
or cry uncle and agree to the kinds of things that the United
States and others wanted, including, you know, the Venezuelan
opposition and the majority of the Venezuelan people. And that
theory of change has proved false.
And so I think it is to the credit of the Biden
Administration that they are now looking at alternatives and
looking to see what, if any, kind of, you know, negotiations
that involve the opposition, that involve this big tent, civil
society, you know, organizations, academia, unions, et cetera,
can collectively pressure for some real change.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you. My time has expired. I yield back.
Thank you.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Congressman.
Congressman Gonzalez, are you on the line.
Mr. Gonzalez. Yes, sir. Thank you.
Mr. Sires. You are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gonzalez. Sorry, I had some technical difficulties
there for a second. But my question is, there is--you know,
American companies have seen their investment severely affected
by the crisis in Venezuela. And while Venezuela's oil
capabilities have severely decreased, some energy companies
have played a crucial role in preventing the total collapse.
How can Congress work with the private sector to protect
American investment in Venezuela? And how can the private
sector assist us? I chair the Oil and Gas Caucus for the
Democratic Party. And I have a pretty good relationship with
some of the energy companies that are down there. And they seem
to have--talk about intelligence failures, they seem to have a
lot of intelligence, and they seem to know a lot about what is
going on. How could we better work together, or are we--and it
just has not been working out--to both protect our energy
investments in Venezuela? And how can they assist us in
structuring policy?
Dr. Berg. Congressman, if I can jump in on this one. It is
a great question. So we have seen a lot of American companies
and American investment in Venezuela affected by the Maduro
regime, and its operations. I think--you and I are both
observing energy companies, for example, trying to operate
under extremely difficult conditions, under conditions where
they do not have proper partnership from PDVSA with which they
have to partner as a condition of being able to operate in the
country.
But there have been unique approaches by some American oil
and gas companies to operate, basically, with the attempt of
putting proceeds from those operations in say an escrow account
or some way of sort of syphoning it off or kind of bracketing
it off to the side and ensuring that a lot of the proceeds from
that activity does not actually flow to the Maduro regime and
the funding of that repressive security apparatus.
And so there are creative ways in which we can think about
keeping American investment there and keeping a footprint on
the ground, as Mr. Fonseca said in his opening statement, while
also ensuring that that money is not actually fuelling and
funding the repressive apparatus there.
Mr. Fonseca. Congressman, can I make one brief addition.
Again, I could not agree more with Dr. Berg. And I do think we
need to create space for the American private sector to out-
compete Russia, China, and others and gain some access back on
the ground. I cannot underscore how important, I think, to
unleash the American private sector, and how that can provide
consequential long-term influence in aid in ushering democratic
transition at some point.
The U.S. could consider the issuance of specific licenses
to American companies engaged in sort of an oil for food
medicine, rather than, you know, their removal of sectoral
sanctions in the near term. I think this would give the
American private sector some access on the ground, as well as
possibly help alleviate some of the humanitarian pressures.
One of the things I am most concerned about is the
September 2020 Anti-Blockade Law that was passed. I think
Venezuela in the near-term is going to be going, Maduro is
going to be going through the process of privatizing major
Venezuelan assets. And I think our adversaries are going to
move in and try to consume those assets. And it might be very
difficult to get them back at some point in the future, even if
the hand or the pendulum swings back to the opposition.
Mr. Gonzalez. That is just a huge concern.
Dr. Arnson. Could I just add to that? I mean, I think what
Brian Fonseca said nature earlier, of course, that nature
abhors a vacuum is really true. And if U.S. companies,
particularly, in the oil sector, and mostly in the oil sector
are prohibited from producing, even if those assets go into an
escrow fund or some other mechanism that is verifiable that
does not benefit the regime, they are going to be taken over.
And, you know, I think one of Maduro's survival strategies
is going to be, over this next year, precisely to privatize
PDVSA assets and other government assets and look for
international companies to step in and run them. And we know
exactly who those--who will be eager to acquire a greater share
of the economic price of the country.
Dr. Berg. Congressman, if I can just jump in here really
quickly and piggyback on what Dr. Arnson said.
One thing that I think the regime is looking at here is
that during this--the political and economic crisis in the
country, there are sort of three types of crudes within
Venezuela: Light, medium, and heavy. The heavy crude is largely
produced in conjunction with the private sector and with
international companies. And that has been, if you look at the
oil output in the country, some of the least affected as
compared to medium and light crudes, which have been some of
the most affected. And that is entirely basically produced by
PDVSA the State owned oil company.
So I think the regime is looking at this very clearly and
saying, as Dr. Arnson mentioned and Mr. Fonseca, privatization
might be the way to go here in terms of being able to increase
productivity, because PDVSA is essentially beyond repair in
terms of its ability to actually maintain the rigs and
contribute to an uptick in oil production in the country.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you so much. I yield back.
Mr. Sires. Thank you.
We now recognize Congressman Steube from Florida for 5
minutes.
Mr. Steube. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And first I want to thank
you for allowing members who are not on the subcommittee to ask
questions. I appreciate that greatly, as these issues affect
state of Florida that I represent in my district.
My questions are directed to Mr. Berg. President Trump
signed an order on his last full day in office which defers
deportation of some 145,000 Venezuelans for 18 months.
Venezuelans who are eligible for deferral can continue to live
and work in the United States. Some of those included under the
TPS program. President Trump blamed the Venezuelan socialist
government and President Maduro for quote, ``The worst
humanitarian crisis in the Western hemisphere in recent
memory,'' Secretary of State Blinken even called Maduro a
brutal dictator.
The shortage and basic goods in medicine has forced these
Venezuelans to flee the country. As a member of the Florida
delegation, I know there is a significant number of Venezuelans
in my State. What do you think the Biden Administration's plan
should be regarding President Trump's order that he signed on
those last days in office?
Dr. Berg. Thank you for the question, Congressman, as I
understand it, the deferred enforced departure was signed on
the last day, but the details were left to the Biden
Administration. And so from that standpoint, I would certainly
encourage the Biden Administration to--not only to implement
but to work out the exact details of the stay, the duration,
the documentation, as well as the work permits. Because it is
not in the United States' interest to send back Venezuelans to,
as we have heard today at this hearing, to humanitarian
disaster and a brutal dictatorship.
I would also note that there is a real economic opportunity
here with the number of Venezuelan migrants we have in the
country. Numerous reports of late have shown just how educated,
how entrepreneurial, and how dynamic this diaspora is. And so I
think from an economic standpoint, particularly, from your
state's standpoint where there are quite a few Venezuelan
refugees, it could be a huge economic boom if done the right
way.
Mr. Steube. Well, Maduro has strengthened ties with--and it
has been discussed already in this committee hearing--with
Russia, China, Cuba, and Iran for political, economic, and
military purposes. These malign, external actors prop up the
regime and perpetuate the ongoing humanitarian crisis despite
U.S. sanctions. What steps can the international community take
that complement or support U.S. efforts to counter-support from
these external actors to the regime?
Mr. Fonseca. Congressman, I can take a shot at that, if
that is okay. I think that is absolutely right. I think one of
the things the United States, you know, needs to continue to
place pressure and leverage our allies, multilateral
organizations to continue to pressure, specifically, China,
Russia, Iran, Turkey, and Cuba for the activities they are
doing on the ground to, you know, keep the regime sort of
muddling through, as well as, you know, not sort of
contributing positively to alleviating the humanitarian crisis.
I think we definitely need to do that.
And to sort of build off of a comment, you know, that we
made earlier, collectively, not having a presence on the ground
allows our, you know, our adversaries, our rivals, you know, to
certainly, you know, run, you know, run fairly rampant
throughout the country. And so I think we need some presence
back on the ground, not just sort of intel collection, but also
to occupy influence space.
Mr. Steube. What steps can the U.S. take to counter efforts
from State actors, like Iran and Russia, to support the regime
in evading U.S. sanctions, Mr. Berg?
Dr. Berg. Great question, Congressman. I think one of the
things that we have seen here is the regime's head-long plunge
into the illicit economy, specifically, as the sources of legal
activity in the country have dried up.
And so I have outlined a number of recommendations, both in
my oral testimony, my written, as well as in other places about
certification regimes, for example, that we could--we could
seek when it comes to parts of the illicit economy such as gold
mining, which are very easily sort of brought into the legal
economy through a number of maneuvers in countries like
Colombia and in Brazil.
And so those certification processes will be key. And a lot
of it is just about pressure, as has been mentioned many times
here, is that we have quite a bit of leverage, and we would be
wise to use it for the right purposes here rather than
squandering it.
Mr. Steube. The Chinese Communist Party has helped the
Madura regime evade U.S. sanctions and is one of regime's main
financial backers and has more recently delayed Maduro's debt
repayment in exchange for some shipments of oil.
What does the Chinese Communist Party gain from involvement
in Venezuela, and how does it reflect the nature of the Chinese
Communist Party's influence in other parts of the region?
Dr. Berg. Congressman, I think that China's role in, in
Venezuela, as Dr. Arnson mentioned earlier, it started as a
transactional economic relationship. It has now evolved into
more of a geopolitical and possibly even strategic partnership.
And so I know that there has been mention of the fact that
there are no new loans that have been given to the country
since 2017. But the fact is of the more than $60 billion in
loans that were given since 2007, there is still a reasonable
amount of that money that is outstanding.
And so as long as China is bearing the burden--as long as
Venezuelan debt remains in arrears, China in some sense is
carrying the burden of this country's collapse. But
nevertheless, I think for China, Venezuela at a standstill and
therefore as a major liability and potential strategic threat
for the region is actually to China's advantage in this broader
geopolitical rivalry than a Venezuela working toward a
democratic transition, possibly giving the United States an
increased position or boost in their region.
Mr. Steube. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Sires. Thank you.
We now recognize Congresswoman Omar from Minnesota for 5
minutes.
Ms. Omar. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you for allowing me to
come and be part of your committee. My colleague, Ms. Salazar
from Florida asked her questions to everyone except the
panelist who lives in Venezuela.
So, Mr. Reyna, I would like to give you a chance to address
her question.
Mr. Reyna. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Omar. Perhaps
not in just one issue, I have to say that aid has been coming
in, not of course in the numbers that is needed. But just in
our case as a small organization on the ground, in 3 years, we
have brought in over 180 tons of aid and have distributed, just
last year, 86 tons of aid in terms of medicines, medical
supplies, and so on.
My position here and my recommendation has been to engage
in spite of all the reservations with some key actors within
the Maduro government, as well as to continue working, for
example, with the National Assembly of 2015 commission on
humanitarian aid to increase the number of aid, I mean, the
amount of aid coming into the country.
I think that if one looks at the humanitarian situation and
humanitarian impact on the lives of everyday Venezuelans, this
is a must. And so I thank you for this, but I do believe that
it is possible. We have been able to do this in spite of
challenges, risks, and threats, and even having some of our
personnel and colleagues going through, you know, difficult,
risky situations, but we are still here, and we believe that
this is possible. And once again, that engagement to me
requires flexibility and creativity, but it is a must if we
want to help the Venezuelan people.
Ms. Omar. I am really grateful for the opportunity to hear
directly from you. It has not been lost on me sitting here,
hearing my colleagues engage on Venezuela and not having a
single question addressed to you. So thank you so much.
I am hoping that you can expand on a couple of points from
your testimony. As you outlined the situation in Venezuela is
dire, people are going without food and medicine. And,
obviously, to many of us, you know, we believe that we cannot
allow people to continue to suffer because of our own domestic
policies.
Can you tell us how your work has been impacted by the
canceling of licenses for oil-for-diesel swaps, and what other
sanctions are proving to be significant barriers to the
humanitarian response?
Mr. Reyna. Thank you. That is--there is one issue in
particular that I think that is--that can be solved, I think,
quickly, also, as a show of good faith between both the U.S.
administration, the Biden Administration, and hopefully having
bipartisan support, and the Maduro government. And this is
lifting the sanctions on secondary--in the secondary sanctions
on the swaps of oil for diesel. And this has quite an impact
again on the population.
The committee, the human rights committee in one of the
States of Venezuela working with the anticorruption network
stated very recently, this was just last month in February,
Venezuela began 2021 with a severe shortage of diesel, the fuel
used to transport heavy cargo, food stalls for public
transportation, and turbo electric plants. Essential groups
report diesel distribution failures since the end of 2020. For
the agricultural sector, this has brought paralysis on the
field. And they go on with other issues regarding that--this in
particular.
I think it would be quite an important step to lift the
sanctions on the oil for diesel swaps and open a conversation,
also in having the World Food Program coming into Venezuela
with their capacity.
Thank you.
Ms. Omar. All right. And, then, just my last question to
you--again grateful for the opportunity to ask these questions.
How is the political stalemate between Maduro and Guaido
impacting your ability to do your work and just the lives of
Venezuelans since you are the only Venezuelan on this panel?
Mr. Reyna. Thank you. I think that given the principles of
humanitarian action, you know, we have worked in our own space,
let's say, even though we have had, of course, conversations,
for example, again with the Commission of Humanitarian Aid of
the 2015 National Assembly, which is really important. I mean,
if the aim is to help, it is to support the Venezuelan people
suffering the consequences of the humanitarian emergency, that
should be the consideration.
So we have not been involved in the political conflict. It
has to be solved. It needs to be addressed, definitely. But,
certainly, we can find ways to have sort of a two-track kind of
work. And the one that goes toward supporting the Venezuelan
people suffering severely the consequences of the emergency can
be worked out again, and we have shown that, a civil society
organization is on the ground.
Ms. Omar. Thank you. And, Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Congresswoman.
Now, we will recognize Congresswoman Malliotakis. You are
recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Malliotakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
you for allowing me to participate in today's subcommittee
meeting. And I have really have found the exchange to be
enlightening and a good discussion.
You know, for me, it is heartbreaking to see how the
wealthiest country in South America has been destroyed by
corruption and socialism. People--and let's make it clear that
the people of Venezuela suffer because of their own government,
not for any other reason. And as a Cuban, the daughter of a
Cuban refugee, it is all too familiar to me, because it is very
similar to what happened in my family. But we have an
obligation as the leader of the free world to help the
Venezuelan people.
And I look forward to working with the people on this
committee to achieve that.
I was pleased when the Biden Administration recognized Juan
Guaido as the leader of the Nation. And--but I am--I am I guess
a little upset about his announcement to reenter the United
Nations Human Rights Council without having any type of
concessions. And, as you know, last week at the first day of
the session of the U.N. Human Rights Council, it was Nicolas
Maduro who was given a platform to speak.
One of the--one of the biggest violators of human rights
was given a platform to speak at the United Nations Human
Rights Council. And I think we have an obligation to speak out
against that.
And I would like to know from the panel their thoughts on
how we can utilize the leverage of President Biden wanting to
return to the council, and how we should be using that as
leverage to try to get some accountability and to protect the
human rights of not only the people of Venezuela, but of the
nations that have propped up Venezuela, like Cuba, like Iran,
like China, like Russia? That is my first question.
And the second question is, in terms of it is good to have
verbal support for Guaido, but what actions, specifically, do
you think we should be taking as a nation to support him? Thank
you.
Dr. Berg. If I can jump in on the U.N. Human Rights Council
question, that would be great. Congresswoman, that is a great
question. And this exactly--this shows exactly the linkages
that I mentioned in my opening statement. It was precisely the
support of other authoritarian regimes, also, on the human
rights council, like China, like Russia to be able to help
Venezuela win from the South America region when there were
really no other sort of competitors for those, for those seats
on the human rights council.
It was a total disgrace that Nicolas Maduro and his envoy
in Geneva are giving the world lessons on human rights
protections. So I absolutely share, your--your concern. And as
a matter of fact AEI has done a report on reforming the U.N.
Human Rights Council, which includes a number of things,
actionable things that should happen before the U.S. sits in
that body again. So periodic reviews of members that are on the
council. So a kind of policing of one another to make sure that
the body does not become a rogues' gallery of suspect States.
More competitive elections. In many cases, we have
elections where there are real only a few countries on the
slate for--to represent their region. And so you have countries
like Venezuela able to slip through because it has the support
of greater powers, but also it just does not face that much
competition. We have to increase the level of interest here, I
think, in terms of the desire to sit on this body, and part of
that is going to be shoring up its reputation.
And, last, I would mention that there should be some sort
of review, I think, before you are even eligible to put
yourself forward for membership in this body that you sort of--
you comply with basic human rights standards. Because as we
have seen, quite a few candidates in U.N. Human Rights Council
elections have been extremely suspect. And so those are three
sort of tangible things that I would throw out there right
away.
But I absolutely share your concern that Maduro and his
envoys were given time in Geneva to present last week.
Ms. Malliotakis. Please send me a copy of your report. I
would like to read that. Thank you.
Mr. Sires. I recognize now Debbie Wasserman Schultz. A
tireless defender of Venezuela, and of human rights of
Venezuela, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you for your indulgence in allowing me to moonlight as member
of your subcommittee on the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Some of you may know that I represent the largest
concentration of Venezuelans in the United States. My home town
has so many Venezuelans that its nickname is West Venezuela,
and proudly so. In my own neighborhood we are surrounded and
are mixed with friends and neighbors who have family in
Venezuela who have themselves fled from Venezuela. I have heard
harrowing experiences shared with me repeatedly, a fight from
political persecution, businesses confiscated, denial of basic
food, or lifesaving medicines. And so making sure that we shine
a spotlight on this plight is really critical.
I want to ask Ms. Arnson and Mr. Reyna if they can talk
briefly about the relief that declaring temporary protective
status for Venezuela would provide the Venezuelans and the
United States who fear deportation. And, specifically, if you
could address why TPS, which is a legal protection that is
based in statute offers better protection than DED, which was
haphazardly declared in the last 16 hours of the previous
President's term.
And making sure, you know, from my perspective, I have been
pleased to see as I--that President Biden has clearly indicated
his plans to declare TPS for Venezuelans. And if you could
share with us your perspective on the difference and why TPS
would be preferable.
Dr. Arnson. And I do not know if Feliciano wants to go
first. Congresswoman Wasserman Schultz, I am not an expert on
U.S. immigration law, but I think that, you know, what you have
indicated in your question is true. That temporary protected
status gives much greater certainty to Venezuelans that they
will not be deported, but they will have not just a temporary
stay of deportation, but also a number of rights to work in the
United States and to have a life until such time as they may
choose to return to Venezuela when the country is in a
dramatically different circumstance.
The deferred deportation is exactly that. It says we will
not deport you. But there are many other things that go with
being able to survive and live a productive life in the United
States. And I think that Congress has on numerous occasions, in
a bipartisan way, endorsed TPS for Venezuelans. And I would
certainly support that and hope that the Biden Administration
will follow through on its commitment which it made repeatedly
during the campaign.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you. Mr. Reyna.
Mr. Reyna. Yes, thank you very, Congresswoman. I agree with
Cindy that any status that would grant more rights to people in
the United States who have migrated forcefully from Venezuela
and who if coming back would really face, you know,
difficulties, it is--it is the right way to go.
So again, without having the total knowledge of the
migration situation in the U.S., I understand from what I have
read, from what I heard from colleagues that TPS would be the
proper way to go. Thank you.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you.
And Mr. Reyna, I know earlier you spoke about the need for
the donor community to step up globally. I am a member of the
Appropriations Committee, and you know, as I said just
moonlighting on the Foreign Affairs Committee today, but I
curious about what more the United States should be doing.
Particularly, where should we be focusing our efforts, our
funding efforts within Venezuela, as well as neighboring
countries like Colombia who has taken in, you know, significant
refugees and migrant populations and also maybe throw in what
about the rest of the international donor community?
Mr. Reyna. Thank you. I believe that, again, in seeing the
numbers and the extent of the situation here that there is room
for much more. There are reservations because of the political
situation and manipulation, for example, of humanitarian aid.
But this is a risk I think that has to be taken, unfortunately,
because such is the situation in Venezuela, and that does not
mean that one cannot overcome, for example, a narrative or
propaganda, or something like that. It can be done.
And at the end, the end result is really supporting a
popular
[inaudible]. I think that there are others who should be
coming in. Again, perhaps in a multilateral kind of reflection
on the obstacles in Venezuela, why, and how to overcome. It
would be possible to increase the amount of resources that are
coming in. Working through the U.N. system is one way, is an
important way both inside and outside of Venezuela, but also
directly to civil society as has been happening so far, but
perhaps this can be increased.
And so are different ways in which I am quite sure that
international cooperation can be increased in the case of
Venezuela. Again, looking at the numbers with other countries
in need, it really does not make any sense to see why is it
that Venezuela is not receiving all the funding that it should
receive for humanitarian aid.
Thank you.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield
back.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Congresswoman. We have votes at
12:15, so we are going to go for another 10 minutes. The
ranking member and I will have one more question.
My question is to you, Mr. Reyna. Mr. Reyna, the reason you
are a guest of our committee is because we recognize the work
that you do inside of Venezuela. We recognize the risk that you
take all the time.
So as a recognition of your work and your effort, we want
to make sure that we receive your thoughts here today at this
committee. I happen to have visited Cucuta, Mr. Reyna, a couple
of years ago. I have never seen anything like it. People from
Venezuela work hours and hours just to get a meal. There had to
be a line of about 5,000 people. There was a line for the
bathroom for about 500,000 people alone. And there is a priest
that through volunteers provides the meal for these people. I
think that priest should be canonized because of the way he has
organized and helped those people in that area.
I was just wondering if your organization is involved at
all in trying to help this particular part of Colombia or
Venezuela at all? Are you involved, your organization, or any
of your members involved?
Mr. Reyna. Thank you, Chairman Sires. At Accion Solidaria,
we are not working on the border, but we are part of the
community of humanitarian organizations on the ground.
What you are describing really is for us--this is sort of a
daily happening, and it is something that, that takes you know,
our time fully in terms of--I mean, even today, we are having
about 80 people at our doors receiving medicines donated, and
this goes to about 1,400 to 1,500 per month. But we do have a
large network.
Some of the organizations on the border towns are working
with the UNHCR and others in order to provide support for the
displaced, internally displaced, and then also working with
others outside of Venezuela to provide support for refugees and
migrants on the other side of the border. So----
And, again, I think, I really appreciate that you took the
time to go to Cucuta to speak to the people and to see what
they are going through. And, hopefully, also perhaps this
would--you know, as I was saying, will lead to an increase in
support, not only for what the response is here in Venezuela,
but also in the region. We do need that.
And the organizations that are working outside in this
platform called response for Venezuelans would really
appreciate such support.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Reyna.
I now recognize the ranking member.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have heard throughout
our discussion today something that made me think of a quote
that I used to use when I run my healthcare company. I used to
tell my physician leaders that, ``No one cares how much you
know, until they know how much you care.''
And I want to make sure that both the people of Venezuela
who can hear my voice today, the international community and
all of our witnesses, and we want to help. We want to help. We
want to help the people of Venezuela who are suffering one the
greatest humanitarian crises ever and, certainly, the greatest
economic collapse ever.
But my concern is that if that assistance is funneled to
and through the regime, it only empowers the regime's
leadership. One example is Maduro's henchmen destroyed,
literally destroyed resupply convoys of humanitarian aid coming
in from Colombia.
So my last and final question is how effective would
relaxing sanctions be if Maduro is just going to seize,
destroy, or misuse that aid?
Ms. Arnson. If I could address that, Congressman Green.
I mean, again, just to repeat, the Maduro regime is the
principle obstacle to greater delivery.
But as Feliciano Reyna was pointing out, there is, I think,
a lot of experience in Venezuelan civil society, in the
international community, in delivering aid in an apolitical
fashion. And that has to be a fundamental principle.
And to go to what a number of questions have touched on, I
think that the scale, the resources for the humanitarian
response, both inside Venezuela and outside Venezuela, for the
refugees and migrants, has to be dramatically increased.
And there are multiple international relief organizations,
U.S. relief organizations, church organizations, USAID, State
Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migrants, that
are involved in this every single day, and they just do not
have enough. There is just not enough funding to go around.
So I would encourage people, as they look to what are the
next steps to help Venezuela, to dramatically increase the
amount of resources available.
Mr. Green. Yes. And I was, in my preparations for today's
committee hearing, surprised to see the delta between the aid
to Syrian refugees and the aid to the Venezuelan refugees. And
I agree with you, that disparity, I mean, we have got to
recruit international partners to it, to this cause.
But, again, my great concern is, whether it is an NGO or
governmental assistance, it is got to get past Maduro to get to
the people who need it.
And I appreciate your thoughts and your comments.
And, Mr. Chairman, I yield.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Ranking Member.
And thank you again to our witnesses and the members for
their participation in this important hearing today.
The crisis in Venezuela deserves our urgent attention. I
will continue to work closely with my colleagues and the Biden
Administration on a bipartisan basis to pursue the peaceful
return to democracy in Venezuela.
With that, the committee is adjourned. Thank you to our
witnesses. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX
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