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	<title> - HOMELAND SECURITY: THE 9/11 COMMISSION AND THE COURSE AHEAD</title>
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	[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
	[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



	HOMELAND SECURITY:
	THE 9/11 COMMISSION AND THE COURSE AHEAD

	=======================================================================

	HEARING


	before the

	SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
	HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

	ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

	SECOND SESSION

	__________

	SEPTEMBER 14, 2004

	__________

	Serial No. 108-56

	__________

	Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security


	Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
	index.html

	__________


	U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
	25-549 WASHINGTON : 2006
	_____________________________________________________________________________
	For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
	Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
	Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�0900012006


	SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY



	Christopher Cox, California, Chairman

	Jennifer Dunn, Washington Jim Turner, Texas, Ranking Member
	C.W. Bill Young, Florida Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
	Don Young, Alaska Loretta Sanchez, California
	F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
	Wisconsin Norman D. Dicks, Washington
	David Dreier, California Barney Frank, Massachusetts
	Duncan Hunter, California Jane Harman, California
	Harold Rogers, Kentucky Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland
	Sherwood Boehlert, New York Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New
	Joe Barton, Texas York
	Lamar S. Smith, Texas Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
	Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Nita M. Lowey, New York
	Christopher Shays, Connecticut Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey
	Porter J. Goss, Florida Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
	Dave Camp, Michigan Columbia
	Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida Zoe Lofgren, California
	Bob Goodlatte, Virginia Karen McCarthy, Missouri
	Ernest J. Istook, Jr., Oklahoma Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
	Peter T. King, New York Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
	John Linder, Georgia Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
	John B. Shadegg, Arizona Islands
	Mark E. Souder, Indiana Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
	Mac Thornberry, Texas Ken Lucas, Kentucky
	Jim Gibbons, Nevada James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
	Kay Granger, Texas Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
	Pete Sessions, Texas Ben Chandler, Kentucky
	John E. Sweeney, New York

	John Gannon, Chief of Staff

	Stephen DeVine, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel

	Thomas Dilenge, Chief Counsel and Policy Director

	David H. Schanzer, Democrat Staff Director

	Mark T. Magee, Democrat Deputy Staff Director

	Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk

	(II)


	C O N T E N T S

	----------
	Page

	STATEMENTS

	The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From
	the State of California, and Chairman, Select Committee on
	Homeland Security.............................................. 1
	The Honorable Dave Camp, a Representative in Congress From the
	State of Michigan.............................................. 20
	The Honorable Benjamin L. Cardin, a Representative in Congress
	From the State of Maryland..................................... 39
	The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Delegate in Congress From
	the U.S. Virgin Islands........................................ 32
	The Honorble Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress From
	the State of Oregon............................................ 42
	The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From
	the State of Washington........................................ 20
	The Honorable Jennifer Dunn, a Representative in Congress From
	the State of Washington........................................ 21
	The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From
	the State of North Carolina.................................... 51
	The Honorable Barney Frank, a Representative in Congress From the
	State of Massachusetts......................................... 28
	The Honorable Kay Granger, a Representative in Congress From the
	State of Texas................................................. 37
	The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress
	From the State of Texas........................................ 20
	The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress From
	the State of New York.......................................... 44
	The Honorable Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress From
	the State of Massachusetts..................................... 35
	The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, a Delegate in Congress From
	the District of Columbia....................................... 21
	The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress
	From the State of North Carolina............................... 4
	The Honorable John B. Shadegg, a Representative in Congress From
	the State Arizona.............................................. 41
	The Honorable Christopher Shays, a Representative in Congress
	From the State of Connecticut.................................. 27
	The Honoralbe John E. Sweeney, a Representative in Congress From
	the State New York............................................. 30
	The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
	From the State of Mississippi.................................. 2

	Witness

	The Honorable Tom Ridge, Secretary, Department of Homeland
	Security:
	Oral Statement................................................. 4
	Prepared Statement............................................. 8

	FOR THE RECORD

	Questions and Responses Submitted:
	Responses from the Honorable Tom Ridge......................... 54


	HOMELAND SECURITY:
	THE 9/11 COMMISSION
	AND THE COURSE AHEAD

	----------


	Tuesday, September 14, 2004

	House of Representatives,
	Select Committee on Homeland Security,
	Washington, DC.
	The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:08 p.m., in Room
	2318, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Cox
	[chairman of the committee] presiding.
	Present: Representatives Cox, Dunn, Shays, Camp, Diaz-
	Balart, King, Linder, Shadegg, Souder, Granger, Sweeney,
	Turner, Thompson, Markey, Dicks, Frank, Harman, Cardin,
	DeFazio, Lowey, Andrews, Norton, McCarthy, Jackson-Lee,
	Pascrell, Christensen, Etheridge, Lucas, and Meek.
	Chairman Cox. [Presiding.] The Select Committee on Homeland
	Security will come to order.
	Pursuant to notice, the committee will proceed today to
	hear testimony from the secretary of the department, Tom
	Ridge--
	Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman?
	Chairman Cox. --on the Department of Homeland Security's
	response to the 9/11 Commission recommendations.
	The gentleman from Mississippi?
	Mr. Thompson. Motion for unanimous consent that opening
	statements be limited to the chair and ranking member.
	Chairman Cox. Is there objection? Without objection, so
	ordered.
	Secretary Ridge, we welcome you once again to this
	committee, which is uniquely devoted to the department's
	mission: protecting the United States of America from terrorist
	attack on our soil.
	I know that you are sincere when you say you appreciate
	being here because you do not appreciate to an equal extent
	having to go to 88 committees and subcommittees in the House
	and in the Senate.
	We have lots of ground to cover this afternoon. I will be
	very brief so we can move directly to our members' questions.
	We have just observed the third anniversary of the
	September 11 attacks. The memory is as raw as it ever was.
	Just a few weeks ago, in late July, the 9/11 Commission
	issued its long-awaited report. In its wake, we find ourselves
	compelled to focus our attention on the commission's
	recommended reforms. That is the lens through which we in the
	Congress will in the immediate future view the horrific story
	of the 9/11 attacks themselves. That is not a bad thing because
	it demonstrates that we are focused on prevention, as we on
	this committee have always been focused.
	The objective of all of our efforts, of all reforms of the
	bureaucratic structures and processes that have burdened and
	balkanized our federal intelligence and law enforcement
	agencies, is to render this ability that the terrorists have
	had to succeed in destroying our country far, far more
	difficult than it was three years ago.
	Because the remarkable thing about the 9/11 attacks was how
	simple it was for a motley assortment of suicidal terrorists to
	brush past our defenses. That has changed. And I am confident
	of further and more significant changes in the near future.
	To date, though, the biggest change has been creation of
	the Department of Homeland Security, focused on a disparate
	array of over 22 formerly separate federal agencies and
	enterprises, on a new overriding mission: protecting us, our
	territory and our way of life.
	This committee has, ever since its inception, sought to
	encourage those who lead these efforts to greater and larger
	successes in meeting that central challenge to our
	civilization.
	But today, in the midst of a welter of well-meant but
	mutually exclusive proposals to reform our intelligence
	community and the Congress itself, we have a fundamental
	question to ask you, Mr. Secretary. And I am sure it will come
	up in a wide variety of factual contexts this afternoon.
	How does the Department of Homeland Security fit into the
	grand plan that the president has proposed? What is its unique
	contribution to ensuring our security?
	It is superfluous to add that we look forward to your
	testimony, and an understatement to note that we are grateful
	for your unstinting service.
	At this time, I recognize the gentleman from Mississippi
	for any opening statement that he might have.
	Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here with us, for all
	your exceptional service over the past three years.
	Mr. Secretary, as you know, there is strong bipartisan
	support for your department. Every member of this committee
	wants your department to succeed. And we strongly support
	virtually all of the initiatives that you have launched over
	the past 18 months.
	Our differences arise with respect to the speed and scope
	of the administration's homeland security program. We realize
	that you cannot snap your fingers and instantly achieve all the
	security that our times demand. Yet we continue to have glaring
	gaps in our homeland security that could be addressed through a
	more aggressive and robust effort by the administration.
	Let me mention a few examples.
	Chemical plants have been characterized as prepositioned
	weapons of mass destruction. Yet the department has visited
	only a couple of dozen of the hundreds of chemical plants that
	present a serious threat to their surrounding communities.
	There has not been a single hearing in this House of
	Representatives on the administration's proposal to strengthen
	security at these plants.
	Clearly, if this legislation were a priority for the
	administration, this bill would have passed the House long ago.
	Stopping a nuclear and radiological weapon from entering
	the United States should be our greatest homeland security
	priority. However, your department's program to install
	technology to screen cargo container for these materials is
	woefully behind schedule.
	Radiation portal monitors would not be installed at all of
	our sea ports by December 2004 as promised. And under the
	current budget, it may be years before these devices are
	available on the southern borders. This is unacceptable.
	The 9/11 Commission identified the failure to screen air
	cargo as a serious vulnerability in our aviation security
	system.
	In response to the events in Russia, your department
	ordered that all air cargo be screened for flights to and from
	that country. Consistent with this measure, it seems that the
	100 percent screening can be accomplished. It is just a matter
	of having the desire and will to devote the necessary resources
	to get it done.
	The administration often mentions that it has stockpiled
	enough smallpox vaccine for every person in America. It does
	not mention that the program to pre-vaccinate thousands of
	emergency workers was a dramatic failure. Consequently, I do
	not believe we have an effective program in place to vaccinate
	our population in the even of a smallpox outbreak.
	We also have only 159 vials on anthrax vaccine in the
	stockpile, even though a manufacturer has the capability to
	produce thousands of doses of this vaccine.
	Providing effective communication systems for our first
	responders has been identified as a top priority for your
	department. Special patch kits have been developed and
	additional frequencies identified. But improvements have still
	not been seen nationwide.
	Also, more resources are needed to ensure first responders
	can communicate with one another. Remarkably, the
	administration's budget eliminated their only grant program for
	interoperable communications in existence and cut other
	programs that could be used to address this critical need.
	In sum, even though we know that Al-Qa`ida continues to
	plot attacks against the homeland, we are not moving as quickly
	or as strongly as we should to close these security gaps. We
	have the resources to do so; it is just a matter of the
	administration's priorities.
	Mr. Chairman, I thank you, and that concludes my remarks.
	Chairman Cox. I thank the gentleman.
	I would advise members that our witness, Secretary Ridge,
	is under a hard deadline and needs to depart at 4:30 p.m.
	today.
	I have conferred with the ranking member, and we have
	agreed that out of the previous consent order members who have
	statements may submit them for the record, and we will be
	proceeding under the 5-minute rule in putting questions to
	Secretary Ridge.
	In consideration of other members' right to ask questions
	of the secretary, these 5 minutes should be understood to
	comprise both the question and the reply from the secretary.
	Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Chairman, you saw what happened last time
	when we had witnesses before, during this hearing. We were not
	able to get to each of the members. Today the same thing is
	going to happen. We are going to have a vote in 15 minutes.
	There are three or four votes we will vote on. Same situation.
	With all due respect to the secretary's schedule, can we
	ask the secretary to come back for a second round so that all
	of us can ask questions?
	Chairman Cox. Well, I appreciate the gentleman's comment,
	and we will do the following.
	First, we will be monitoring the hearing clock closely so
	that all member adhere to the 5-minute rule, which should, for
	those members who are present, give us the opportunity to put
	questions.
	And second, we will continue, with the secretary's
	indulgence, questioning the witness even during votes, and a
	member will be here in the chair at all times to enable that to
	happen so that members can go to the floor to vote and back.
	With that understanding, Mr. Secretary, I will look forward
	to your testimony.
	Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman.
	Chairman Cox. The gentleman--
	Mr. Pascrell. Can I have one second, please? I take your
	answer to be no, then, to my question.
	Chairman Cox. Well, as I said, the secretary is under a
	hard deadline. Let us see what we can accomplish in this
	hearing. I know that the secretary and the department have been
	very, very cooperative with this committee and will continue to
	be such. The secretary is back again. We have had him several
	times before. And I know that this will not be the last time.
	Mr. Pascrell. I am not questioning the cooperation of the
	secretary. The secretary is doing fine in cooperating. It is
	the Chair that is not doing fine. That is why I asked the
	question.
	We have a right to ask questions. We need the time. We are
	not going to be rushed through this. This is important to all
	of us, our families, our grandchildren.
	You have heard the speech, okay? And you continue to--
	basically the second half of the questioners never get a chance
	to ask a question.
	Chairman Cox. In the interest of members--
	Mr. Pascrell. That is the record.
	Chairman Cox. --having the time, I think the correct course
	just now is to proceed with the secretary's testimony and the
	opportunity for members to put their questions.
	So, Secretary Ridge, please proceed with your testimony.

	STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TOM RIDGE, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
	HOMELAND SECURITY

	Mr. Ridge. Well, thank you for the opportunity to update
	the committee on the many recent improvements to our nation's
	homeland security posture.
	As both the Chairman and Congressman Thompson have noted,
	it is particularly timely in the wake of the thoughtful and
	thorough recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission. Some of
	those recommendations, I suspect, will be the subject of our
	conversation here over the next several hours.
	With this committee's bipartisan support, the Department of
	Homeland Security was established to bring together all of our
	scattered entities and capabilities under one central authority
	to better coordinate and better direct our homeland security
	efforts.
	In the span of our 18-months existence, I believe we have
	made significant progress. Yet there is certainly more to do.
	There is certainly greater capacity to build and more
	improvements to be made.
	Nowhere is this more important than with our intelligence
	operations. That is why improved coordination and cooperation
	across all elements of the intelligence community have been an
	absolute imperative of the homeland security mission and one
	which the president has fully embraced as well as addressed
	with many recent reform initiatives.
	Already we have improved intelligence capabilities and
	information sharing with our partners in the federal
	government, as well as with state, local and private-sector
	partners who work across America on the front line of homeland
	security.
	As an example, the president recently established the
	national counterterrorism center, consistent with the
	recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. The Department of
	Homeland Security's Office of Information Analysis will
	participate in the new center, which builds on the capabilities
	of the previous reform in the Terrorist Threat Integration
	Center.
	And as a member of the intelligence community, Homeland
	Security will have full access to a central repository of
	intelligence information.
	Just as importantly, we can effectively and efficiently
	channel that information to those who need it by using new
	communication tools, such as the Homeland Security Information
	Network.
	This network is a real-time, Internet-based collaboration
	system that allows multiple jurisdictions, disciplines and
	emergency-operations centers to receive and share the same
	intelligence, the same tactical information, and therefore,
	when need be, be operating around the same situational
	awareness.
	This year we have expanded the information network to
	include senior decision-makers, such as governors and state-
	wide homeland security advisers in all 50 states and
	territories, as well as into the 50 largest major urban areas.
	In order to increase compatibility and reduce duplication,
	we are also working to integrate this information network with
	similar efforts of our partners in the federal government,
	including the law enforcement online and the regional
	information sharing system that operate within the FBI.
	And all of our federal partners, as well as many, many
	others, participate in the department's new Homeland Security
	Operations Center. This 24-hour nerve center synthesizes
	information from a variety of sources and then distributes the
	information, bulletins and security recommendations, as
	necessary, to all levels of government.
	Our progress in intelligence and information sharing
	demonstrates the links we have made between both prevention and
	protection.
	By establishing a comprehensive strategy combining both
	vulnerability and threat assessments with infrastructure
	protection, we are taking steps daily to protect the public and
	mitigate the potential for an attack.
	We have significantly bolstered our nation's security by
	implementing a layered system of protections at our entries and
	our ports, on our roadways, railways and waterways and even far
	from our borders and shores.
	Many of our initiatives and security measures were tracked
	closely--and were tracked closely with the recommendations of
	the 9/11 Commission.
	With newly trained professional screeners, hardened cockpit
	doors, baggage X-rays and federal air marshals, we have made
	airline travel safer from the curb to the cockpit.
	The recently announced Secure Flight Program will allow the
	government to operate a more robust passenger prescreening
	system for domestic aviation, adding another layer of security
	for airline travelers.
	For most visitors to our country, the comprehensive
	screening process begins overseas at our consulates and
	embassies, where visa applicants often provide biometric
	information, such as their digital photograph and finger scans.
	This closely protected information is used in conjunction
	with US-VISIT, the entry/exit system which was implemented
	ahead of schedule earlier this year.
	In this case, one of the commission's most important
	recommendations was also one of the department's most
	significant accomplishments.
	More than 8.5 million people have been admitted to the
	United States through US-VISIT with biometric verification of
	their identity, and more than 100,000 have turned up on watch
	lists.
	Biometrics are an important tool for our security and will
	significantly improve screening procedures. It is one element
	that will be evaluated as part of the president's recent
	homeland security directive to review screening procedures
	across the government. That is why I have asked for a complete
	evaluation of the current use and future potential of
	biometrics throughout the department.
	I might add--and hopefully our discussion will get into
	this later on, Mr. Chairman--it is not only our current and
	future use within our department within this country, it is
	actually finding a way to move the international community to
	accept international standards for biometrics.
	So that whether we are authenticating documents or
	verifying identities, the United States, in conjunction with
	its allies and partners around the world, will have one
	agreeable standard that, frankly, will enhance security for all
	of us.
	The use of biometrics for screening, access control,
	credentialing and identity verification adds a critical layer
	to our border security strategy.
	The Container Security Initiative helps push another layer
	of security even further outward, as we work with partners in
	foreign ports to help screen cargo before it reaches our
	country.
	With new, advanced manifest requirements, 100 percent of
	the incoming cargo is screened and prioritized using a risk-
	based system, which allows for expedited treatment of low-risk
	cargo, such as that shipped by members of our Customs Trade
	Partnership Against Terrorism program.
	And the International Ship and Port Security Code is now in
	effect. The Coast Guard, along with port security grants, have
	helped every port in the United States increase their security
	measures.
	We have armed our nation's first responders and first
	preventers with resources and tools they need to keep America
	safe in our towns and neighborhoods by allocating or awarding
	in excess of $8.5 billion to our state and local partners
	around the country.
	More than just money, we have launched the SAFECOM and
	RapidCom initiatives to provide both short-term health and
	long-term solutions to the problems of interoperability. We
	want to ensure that our first responders can communicate when
	necessary and across jurisdictions, regardless of the frequency
	or the mode of communication.
	To further help our heroes and our first responders, we
	have launched the National Incident Management System and
	published the nation's first-ever comprehensive response plan,
	so we are all on the same page in the event of an attack or an
	emergency. And that includes our citizens, as well.
	We launched the Ready Campaign a little more than a year
	ago to encourage people to get prepared, and we will be adding
	the Ready for Business and Ready for Kids campaigns soon.
	All will encourage citizens to do a couple of simple,
	simple things: Make a communication plan with the people you
	care about. Have a little kit set aside and just stay informed.
	Many people have done so, but we need to spread the word
	even further and faster. So September is National Preparedness
	Month. This month, 82 organizations in all 50 states and
	territories are combining efforts to encourage millions of our
	fellow citizens to be prepared and get involved in the common
	effort for the common good.
	Unfortunately, we have seen in the past few weeks just how
	important preparedness can be. The people of Florida have been
	hit with two hurricanes, a third on the way, and the damage has
	been considerable. But the long lines at many of the outlets
	are indications that citizens know how to be ready.
	And the Federal Emergency Management Agency knows how to be
	ready, as well. They have helped thousands of Floridians
	recover, at least begin the process of recovery, from Charley
	and Frances by prepositioning disaster supplies so they can
	reach affected areas faster.
	It is very important to note, Mr. Chairman, just briefly,
	that there was some concern about bringing FEMA into a
	department because it had such a strong independent identity,
	and people were somewhat concerned that it would compromise
	their ability to respond to natural events.
	But, in fact, our ability as a department to respond to
	these pending natural disasters has taken us far beyond what I
	think anyone could have expected from FEMA acting
	independently.
	FEMA now working with the Coast Guard, working with
	Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Frankly, they just
	recruited and we have sent down over a thousand volunteers from
	our citizen corps to help this effort.
	So by bringing FEMA in, remembering what its historic
	mission was, and that is responding to natural disasters, but
	then making available resources of the department within their
	partners in the department to it, I think have effectively
	added to, I think, a positive legacy of disaster relief for
	FEMA.
	Along with local authorities in Florida and volunteers from
	around the country, I think they have done a remarkable job.
	And I believe the people associated with the effort are to be
	commended for their effort.
	The spirit embodied by FEMA workers is not unusual to all
	the men and women that work in homeland security. We work with
	countless partners every day around the country to ensure that
	the country is protected.
	The breadth of issues I have covered, Mr. Chairman, and
	that are covered by the recommendations of the commission, are
	both indicative of yet also not sufficient to capture the full
	scope of this department and our mission.
	As we continue to evolve into a more agile agency, we look
	forward to continuing our close working relationship with
	Congress. We appreciate and value the mechanism for
	congressional oversight that has been laid out in the
	Constitution.
	However, we believe the relationship would be significantly
	enhanced, substantially improved--and here I know I am treading
	on some very thin ice, but will say it anyhow as a former
	member--if there was an effort within Congress to reduce the
	number of committees and subcommittees that have oversight over
	this department.
	Working together is the only way we can accomplish our
	goals. And no doubt, those goals are the same: preserve our
	freedoms, protect America and secure our homeland.
	I appreciate the opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to share these
	few thoughts with you and look forward to the questioning
	period.
	Thank you.
	[The statement of Mr. Ridge follows:]

	Prepared Statement of the Honorable Tom Ridge

	Introduction
	Good morning, Chairman Cox, Congressman Turner, and Members of the
	Committee. I am pleased to have this opportunity to update the
	Committee on the Department of Homeland Security's (the Department or
	DHS) activities and tremendous progress in improving the security of
	America's families and communities. This is particularly timely in the
	wake of the thoughtful and thorough recommendations made by the
	National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/
	11 Commission).
	As the 9/11 Commission recognized, in the aftermath of September
	11th, it was clear that the Nation had no centralized effort to defend
	the country against terrorism, no single agency dedicated to our
	homeland security. While many of our Nation's prevention and response
	capabilities existed, the Nation was not in a position to put the
	pieces together in a comprehensive manner to combat the scale of
	attacks we suffered on September 11th.
	Our enemies are relentless, and their desire to attack the American
	people and our way of life remains, though weakened by our successes in
	the global war on terrorism. To prepare our country for the future and
	these new realities, the President and the Congress worked together to
	create a centralized point of command for homeland security. Unified by
	a common mission, the 180,000 people of the Department are focused
	daily on one vision for a safe and secure America.
	I want to thank the Commission for recognizing the tremendous
	strides we have already made. Allow me to mention a few, which I will
	later elaborate upon further.
	First, the Administration's progress is marked by dramatically
	increased intelligence capabilities and information sharing amongst not
	just Federal agencies but with our State, local, tribal and private
	sector partners on the front lines of homeland security. As an example,
	the President's creation of both the Terrorist Threat Integration
	Center (TTIC) and the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) is centralizing
	terrorist-related information enabling significant coordination on the
	Federal level, ensuring that a comprehensive view is achieved.
	Further, we are dismantling roadblocks that once prevented
	communication between the Federal government and our partners in
	States, cities, counties and towns across America. Through systems like
	the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), we can share a common
	picture of events, recognize the patterns and take action to mitigate
	vulnerabilities and thwart our enemies.
	The Homeland Security Information Network also demonstrates the
	links we have made between prevention and protection. By integrating
	vulnerability and threat assessment data with infrastructure protection
	efforts, we work with the owners and operators of our critical assets
	nationwide to mitigate the potential for attack.
	Additionally, we have bolstered our Nation's border and
	transportation security by turning the pre-existing patchwork of
	programs into a layered system, closing vulnerabilities with programs
	like US-VISIT and the Container Security Initiative (CSI) that start
	overseas and bring travelers and cargo more securely into the U.S.
	Finally, as you know, this month is National Preparedness Month.
	The men and women of the Department and our first responder partners
	across the Nation are keenly aware that preparedness is vital to our
	ability to prevent and respond to acts of terror and other emergencies.
	In addition to awarding over $8.5 billion to States and local
	governments, DHS has made great strides in improving the way we
	administer, award, and disburse critical Federal assistance to the
	police, fire, and EMS agencies within our communities.
	The President is seeking the same unity of command for intelligence
	and has recently asked Congress to create the position of a National
	Intelligence Director with full budgetary authority. The National
	Intelligence Director will assume the broader responsibility of leading
	the Intelligence Community across our government.
	The President has also announced that we will establish the
	National Counter-Terrorism Center, which that will become our
	government's shared knowledge bank for intelligence information on
	known or suspected terrorist and international terror groups. The new
	center builds on the capabilities of the Terrorist Threat Integration
	Center, and will ensure that all elements of our government receive the
	source information needed to execute effective joint action, and that
	our efforts are unified in priority and purpose.

	Intelligence and Information Sharing
	With the introduction of intelligence reform in the interim and
	longer term through proposed legislation, the President took an
	important step to strengthen our Nation's homeland security and further
	demonstrate his resolve in fighting the war on terror. On August 2,
	2004, the President directed his Administration to take quick action on
	reform initiatives that would strengthen the intelligence community and
	improve our ability to find, track and stop dangerous terrorists. Two
	weeks ago, the President delivered on that tasking by signing a series
	of executive orders and Homeland Security Presidential Directives that
	will ensure that the people in government who are responsible for
	defending America and countering terrorism have the best possible
	information and support to identify threats and to protect the
	homeland. These executive orders and Homeland Security Presidential
	Directives are supported by the valuable recommendations made by the 9/
	11 Commission, and build upon existing efforts within the
	Administration.
	The first of these executive orders substantially strengthens the
	management of the intelligence community by establishing interim powers
	for the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Under this order, the
	DCI would perform the functions of the National Intelligence Director
	(NID), within the constraints of existing law, until the NID position
	is codified in law. Under the President's order, the DCI will be able
	to develop and present, with advice from departments and agency heads,
	the national foreign intelligence program budget. The President also
	provided the Director of Central Intelligence expanded authority to
	coordinate policy within the Intelligence Community (IC). The DCI will
	now develop common objectives and goals that will ensure timely
	collection, processing and analysis of intelligence.Sec.
	The President's Executive Orders will provide better unity of
	effort in the IC and improved linkage with law enforcement, which will
	greatly enhance our ability to do our job of protecting Americans and
	securing the homeland. The new responsibilities of the DCI will ensure
	that DHS has what it needs from other intelligence agencies and that
	our efforts are properly integrated in the national intelligence
	picture. DHS and other members of the IC will now go to one person who
	will formulate an integrated approach to common goals and objectives.
	In addition, the President established the National
	Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) by executive order. This new center
	builds on the capabilities of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center
	(TTIC), which was created by the President more than a year ago. The
	NCTC will allow DHS to have a better focused intelligence interface,
	building off the successful integration efforts of TTIC. It will also
	allow my Department to have access to a central repository of
	intelligence information. The DHS Office of Information Analysis (IA)
	and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Intelligence Program, as the two
	national IC members within my Department, will participate in the NCTC
	and will continue to engage in support to State, local, and private
	sector officials from a broader knowledge base. Effective July 9, 2004,
	the Departments of Homeland Security, State and Justice together with
	intelligence agencies established the interagency Human Smuggling and
	Trafficking Center as an all-source information fusion center to
	support efforts against the linked national security threats of alien
	smuggling, trafficking in persons and smuggler support of clandestine
	terrorist travel. As the 9/11 Commission put it: ``For terrorists,
	travel documents are as important as weapons.'' An Immigration and
	Customs Enforcement Special Agent is expected to become the first
	Director.
	This centralization is critical to ensuring that all DHS
	intelligence analysts have access to the work of the other IC analysts
	and vice versa. The DHS personnel assigned to the new NCTC will be an
	integral part of the success of the Center and will be the direct link
	to the 13 other IC members' products, personnel, and other resources.
	This open flow of analysis will enable DHS to be better informed
	regarding terrorist threats and intentions, which will make America
	more secure. Only by working cooperatively will our borders be better
	secured, our skies be made safer, and our Nation be better protected.
	The exact impact of the NCTC will not be fully known for some time, but
	all involved members of the IC will work together to make it fully
	functional in the fastest manner possible.
	In addition to the NID and NCTC, the President ordered the DCI to
	ensure we have common standards and clear accountability measures for
	intelligence sharing across the agencies of our government.The
	President established the Information Systems Council to identify and
	break down any remaining barriers to the rapid sharing of threat
	information by America's intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and
	State and local governments. DHS will participate on this Council.
	Within DHS, the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
	Directorate (IAIP) has the lead on intelligence and information
	sharing. At the direction of Under Secretary Frank Libutti, IAIP has
	invigorated the communications with our State, territorial, tribal,
	local, major city, and private sector partners. A guiding principle for
	this effort is that there is more to information sharing than one
	Federal agency talking to another. We must ensure that those on the
	front-lines of homeland security have the best information to safeguard
	our communities and critical infrastructure. To that end, DHS is
	working together with its partners to identify and provide effective
	and workable solutions to our most challenging information sharing
	needs.
	One information sharing initiative I would like to mention is the
	HSIN, which is the umbrella under which various information sharing
	programs fall. One such program, launched in February of this year, is
	the Joint Regional Information Exchange System (JRIES). The initial
	goal was to have all States and major urban areas in America connected
	to DHS by the end of summer. I am happy to say we met that goal. This
	low-cost system provides secure, real-time connectivity in a
	collaborative environment so vital homeland security information can be
	shared among appropriate Federal, State, and local officials. This
	growing system has been very successful and numerous investigations
	have resulted from its implementation. As a key factor in its success,
	it should be noted that this effort is not a federally run system, but
	rather a partnership with State and local officials. This is
	representative of how DHS approaches its mission--only by working as
	partners will we be most effective in securing our hometowns.
	To further integrate Federal efforts with State and local
	officials, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and DHS information sharing
	staffs are working hard to bring the HSIN, Law Enforcement Online
	(LEO), and the Regional Information Sharing System (RISSNET) together
	with the goal of making the systems more compatible, without
	duplicating efforts, as quickly as possible.
	Other HSIN efforts include establishing a Secret-level classified
	system to the States. It also will provide greater connectivity to
	critical infrastructure owners and operators to enhance opportunities
	for two-way information exchange. Surveillance activities by owners and
	operators at their own facilities often garner valuable information to
	identify potential terrorist activity. With the staffing of dedicated
	critical infrastructure sector specialists within IAIP, members of the
	private sector also now receive threat-related information enhanced by
	recommended protective actions, making threat information more
	meaningful and actionable. Through the HSIN system at the local
	community and regional level, private businesses receive alerts,
	warnings, and advisories directly from DHS.
	DHS is also working with its Federal partners to share information
	more effectively. Members of 35 different Federal agencies are now all
	co-located together in DHS's new 24-hour Homeland Security Operations
	Center (HSOC), which allows incoming information coming from various
	sources to be synthesized and shared with other Federal partners such
	as the FBI and the Department of Defense. In addition, since March of
	last year, nearly 100 bulletins and other threat related communiques
	have been disseminated by DHS to homeland security professionals across
	the country.
	Another information sharing capability that was established in
	March of this year is the IAIP National Infrastructure Coordinating
	Center (NICC). The NICC maintains operational awareness of the Nation's
	critical infrastructure and key resources, and provides a comprehensive
	mechanism and process for information sharing and coordination between
	and among government, critical infrastructure owners and operators, and
	other industry partners for 13 critical infrastructure sectors and 4
	key resources. The NICC will be collocated with the Transportation
	Security Operations Center and includes the infrastructure coordination
	activity, the National Communications System National Coordinating
	Center for Telecommunications (NCC-Telecom ISAC), and the National
	Cyber Security Division US Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT).
	The NICC has the capability to fully integrate activities of ISAC
	partners and other industry and government representatives. Our efforts
	to develop improved information sharing procedures have involved
	cooperation with local DAs as well as our State and local partners.

	Building International Partnerships
	Information sharing efforts within the U.S. Government related to
	anti-terrorism are not confined to our Nation's physical borders. We
	have made significant progress, in cooperation with our international
	partners, in the global war on terror. Through bilateral mechanisms and
	multilateral forums, we have sought to share terrorist-related
	information to better secure international travel and trade and further
	impede and deter terrorist exploitation of that system.
	As a key example of these activities, the Department, in
	cooperation with the Departments of State and Justice, advanced the
	Secure and Facilitated International Travel Initiative (SAFTI), which
	was adopted by the President and other heads of state at the G8 Summit
	in June. The SAFTI Action Plan contains 28 specific action items that
	will advance our Nation's security. Among those are efforts to:

	<bullet> Accelerate development of international standards for
	the interoperability of smart-chip passports.
	<bullet> Develop mechanisms for real-time data exchange to
	validate travel documents.
	<bullet> Provide effective and timely information exchange on
	terrorist watchlists or lookout data of participating countries
	on a reciprocal basis.
	<bullet> Commence sharing lost and stolen passport data to an
	Interpol database that eventually will allow for real-time
	sharing of the data amongst member countries.
	<bullet> Develop a methodology for assessing airport
	vulnerability to MANPADS threats and effective countermeasures.
	<bullet> Improve methodologies to analyze data on passengers,
	crew, and cargo in advance of travel.
	<bullet> Develop best practices for the use of Air Marshals.
	<bullet> Examine ways to collaborate on the forward placement
	of document advisors.
	<bullet> Develop robust flight deck security measures.
	<bullet> Expand research and development on biometric
	technologies.
	<bullet> Enhance port and maritime security through
	implementation of international standards and compliance with
	International Maritime Organization (IMO) requirements as set
	forth in the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code.
	Working with the Department of State and other agencies, Department
	of Homeland Security agencies including the Coast Guard, Immigration
	and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, Federal Law
	Enforcement Training Center and others provide training, data sharing,
	help in procuring technology, mutual law enforcement cooperation and
	related assistance to Mexico, other key countries in our Hemisphere and
	around the world. These efforts not only fight terrorism directly, but
	help key countries counter-attack against trafficking in drugs, human
	beings, weapons, money and other crimes that terrorist organizations
	often rely upon. Helping other countries strengthen their homeland
	security is often critical to preventing threats from reaching the
	United States.

	Terrorist Financing
	The U.S. government is using the information and intelligence
	gathered about terrorists to destroy the leadership of terrorist
	networks, eliminate sanctuaries found in the support of foreign
	governments, and disrupt their plans and financing. A partnership of
	Federal agencies, led by the Department of Treasury, and working in
	cooperation with the international community, are going after
	terrorists' sources of financing. Together, we have frozen nearly $143
	million in terrorist-related assets, designated 383 individuals and
	entities as terrorist supporters, apprehended or disrupted key
	terrorist facilitators, and deterred donors from supporting Al-Qa`ida
	and other like-minded terrorist groups. America is safer today because
	we have made it harder and costlier for Al-Qa`ida and other terrorist
	groups to raise and move money around the world.
	DHS has a role in these operations through U.S. Immigration and
	Customs Enforcement (ICE). Last year, DHS and DOJ signed a memorandum
	of agreement that greatly enhances the U.S. government's ability to
	wage a seamless, coordinated campaign against sources of terrorist
	funding. This agreement, which established the F.B.I. as the lead
	agency for the investigation of terrorist financing cases, outlines a
	protocol for ICE and FBI coordination of these investigations under the
	auspices of the Joint Terrorist Task Forces (JTTF's). The agreement
	also contains joint vetting procedures that allows ICE and the FBI to
	work collaboratively in determining roles and responsibilities
	regarding these cases. ICE, in turn, continues to play an important
	role in these investigations, utilizing its historic expertise in
	financial crime and money laundering,
	DHS also uses its expertise and jurisdiction in financial crimes,
	money laundering, and commercial fraud, within both ICE and the U.S.
	Secret Service, to work with other Federal agencies and with the
	financial sector to address vulnerabilities that are open to
	exploitation by terrorists and criminals. Addressing these
	vulnerabilities provides yet another layer, or avenue, of defense in
	identifying, preventing, and dismantling groups that seek to attack our
	economic security and undermine our way of life.

	Border and Transportation Security
	As noted above, the Administration has worked extensively with its
	international partners to bolster our Nation's homeland security by
	instituting prevention and protection measures overseas. It is
	important to recognize our programs are part of a layered approach to
	security. There is no silver bullet, no single security measure is
	foolproof, and the strategy lies in creating a systems approach,
	starting far from our borders.
	On the commercial side, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
	Officers and USCG personnel work with their foreign counterparts to
	instill a security mindset in the international supply chain through
	foreign port assessments and cargo screening through the Container
	Security Initiative. U.S. Officers are operating in 24 international
	ports of trade working alongside our allies to target and screen cargo,
	helping to identify and even inspect high-risk cargo before it reaches
	our shores. Further, with advance manifest information requirements,
	100 percent of cargo is screened through targeting using a set of
	specific indicators. These measures enable risk-based decisions
	regarding prioritizing inspections and use of technologies to inspect
	cargo. This is not only good for security, it is good for trade
	facilitation, allowing expedited treatment for low-risk cargoes, such
	as those shipped by members of our Customs-Trade Partnership Against
	Terrorism program (CT-PAT).
	A holistic view of maritime security includes a robust security
	planning regime. The U.S. worked hard within the IMO to implement the
	ISPS code--it is now in effect, and the USGC issued corresponding
	regulations to put in place a security planning regime for ports,
	facilities and vessels. As a result, new security measures are in place
	at every port in the United States.
	When it comes to foreign visitors, the comprehensive screening
	process begins at our U.S. consulates and embassies overseas, where
	visa applicants at most locations provide two fingerscans and a
	photograph along with their biographic data (By October 26, 2004, the
	Department of State will have this process in place at all locations).
	That personal information, closely protected, is screened against
	extensive terrorist-related information, to which consular officers now
	have direct access. Upon arrival at our air and sea ports of entry,
	these same visitors are matched with their biometric information
	through US-VISIT. US-VISIT will soon expand to cover individuals from
	visa waiver countries as well.
	The 9/11 Commission noted the importance of a strong entry exit
	system. And I want to underscore that point in elaborating on US-VISIT,
	as the implementation of this program is truly one of the Department's
	greatest accomplishments. With the launch of US-VISIT in May of last
	year, we actually commenced the implementation of a comprehensive entry
	exit system, an idea that had languished for decades. US-VISIT,
	particularly including the biometrics component, adds a critical layer
	to our border security strategy. With great leadership from Under
	Secretary Asa Hutchinson and the head of the program team, Jim
	Williams, we have admitted more than 8.5 million people to the United
	States with biometric verification of their identity. This has resulted
	in more than 1,100 watch list matches as of September 9 and the
	decision to deny more than 280 persons admission to this country.
	Our transportation sector is more secure than ever--across all
	modes. We are working diligently with the Department of Transportation
	and State, local and private sector stakeholders to protect critical
	infrastructures and deploy base security measures, as demonstrated in
	the security directives issued to passenger rail and transit operators
	in April. Certainly, the Federal responsibilities in aviation,
	historically and as a result of the 9/11 attacks, focused intense
	efforts on air travel. And, to that end, DHS has put in place a strong,
	layered security regime, upon which we are consistently building. This
	includes hardened cockpit doors on 100 percent of large passenger
	aircraft, vulnerability assessments at over 75 of the Nation's largest
	airports, screening of 100 percent of all baggage, deployment of
	thousands of Federal air marshals, training of thousands of air crew
	under the Federal flight deck officer program, and development of a
	professionally trained screener workforce which has intercepted more
	than 12.4 million prohibited items since their inception. In addition,
	a robust screening system is in place for all international flights
	into the United States, and all passenger names for domestic flights
	are checked against expanded terrorist watch lists.
	We have also recently announced our intention to move forward on
	our plans for a more robust passenger pre-screening system for domestic
	commercial aviation. The Secure Flight program, which will be tested
	this fall and implemented early next year, will enable the
	Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to better compare
	travelers to a list of known or suspected terrorists maintained by the
	Terrorist Screening Center. This list will expand dramatically upon the
	current No Fly and Selectee lists now operated by the airlines and will
	be managed entirely by the government. TSA will also retain a modified
	set of CAPPS I criteria that will provide a better focused layer of
	security, and reduce the number of passengers selected for enhanced
	screening.
	In addition to these strides forward, we continue to seek
	opportunities for continued improvements in our terrorist-related
	screening processes. For this reason, the President issued Homeland
	Security Presidential Directive-11 (HSPD-11) on August 27, which
	directed DHS to lead a Federal Government-wide effort to develop a
	strategy to ensure that an efficient and comprehensive framework exists
	for terrorist-related screening across the Government. The Directive
	requires development of a plan to implement enhanced comprehensive,
	coordinated government-wide, terrorist-related screening procedures to
	detect, identify, and interdict people, conveyances and cargo that pose
	a threat to homeland security. It also calls for the enhancement of
	terrorist-related screening in a manner that safeguards legal rights,
	including freedoms, civil liberties, and information privacy guaranteed
	by Federal law, while facilitating the efficient movement of people,
	conveyances and cargo.
	HSPD-11 builds upon the Department's efforts in this area, as I
	recently directed a review of all biometrics programs within the
	Department with the same goals in mind. The use of biometrics provides
	improved security through application in identity verification, access
	control, credentialing and facilitation programs.
	With continued developments in the area of identification security,
	the President also signed Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12
	(HSPD-12) two weeks ago, to set a common identification standard for
	Federal employees and contractors, which does the following:

	<bullet> Mandates the expedited, public, and open development
	of a uniform standard for Federal employee and contractor
	identification that ensures security, reliability, and
	interoperability;
	<bullet> Closes security gaps and improves our ability to stop
	terrorists and others from accessing or attacking critical
	Federal facilities and information systems; and
	<bullet> Improves efficiency among Federal agencies through
	more consistent systems and practices.
	Secure identification is a priority for the United States. As noted
	by the 9/11 Commission, birth certificates, drivers' licenses, and most
	other forms of identification have traditionally been issued by State
	and local governments, not the Federal Government. There are more than
	240 different types of valid drivers' licenses issued within the U.S.
	and more than 50,000 different versions of birth certificates issued by
	States, counties, and municipalities.
	At the Federal level, we are working closely with our State and
	local partners to find ways to strengthen the standards used to issue
	documents that people use to establish their identity without creating
	a national identity card. DHS has supported the efforts of the American
	Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) in looking at the
	security of drivers' licenses and strongly supports the States in their
	endeavors to improve the security of these documents.
	When it comes to international travel, significant work has been
	done to combat fraudulent documents through information sharing with
	foreign governments and implementation of key programs, like US-VISIT,
	which use biometric identifiers to mitigate this risk. These efforts
	continue through the background checks conducted by U.S. Citizenship
	and Immigration Services (USCIS) in granting immigration benefits.

	Civil Liberties/Privacy
	In all of these initiatives, the President's commitment to the
	protection of civil liberties and privacy is a guiding principle. The
	rights that are afforded not only to Americans but also to those who
	visit and live with us in this great Nation form the foundation of
	American society. Let me say simply that if we fail in this area, the
	terrorists will have won.
	The Department's commitment to these ideals is further demonstrated
	by the appointment of our Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties,
	Dan Sutherland, and our Chief Privacy Officer, Nuala O'Connor Kelly.
	The Privacy Office has made privacy an integral part of DHS
	operations by working side-by-side on DHS initiatives with the senior
	policy leadership of the various directorates and components of DHS and
	with program staff across the Department. As a result, privacy values
	have been embedded into the culture and structure of DHS, ensuring that
	development of DHS programs is informed by thorough analysis of privacy
	impacts. And, once implemented, these programs are effective in
	protecting the homeland while protecting personal privacy.
	The Department also has made the preservation of civil liberties a
	priority, and relies on the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
	(CRCL) to provide proactive legal and policy advice to senior
	leadership in the Department and its components. For example, CRCL
	worked closely with the Border and Transportation Security Directorate
	to craft positive policy changes in response to the issues raised by
	the DOJ Inspector General's report on the 9/11 immigration detainees.
	CRCL has also developed policies to establish DHS as a model employer
	for people with disabilities and is helping me to implement President
	Bush's recent Executive Order directing that people with disabilities
	be fully integrated into the emergency preparedness effort.
	The President stands firm on the protection of our fundamental
	freedoms and recognizes the importance of safeguarding our civil
	liberties and privacy in the war on terrorism. This was noted by the
	recent establishment, through Executive Order, of the President's Board
	on Safeguarding Americans' Civil Liberties (the Board).
	The Board will ensure that while the government takes all possible
	actions to prevent terrorist attacks on America's families and
	communities, we continue to enhance this commitment to safeguard the
	legal rights of all Americans, including freedoms, civil liberties, and
	information privacy guaranteed by Federal law. It will advise the
	President on government-wide efforts, request reports and otherwise
	monitor progress, and refer credible information about possible
	violations for investigation, and is empowered to seek outside
	information, perspective, and advice. Chaired by the Deputy Attorney
	General, with the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation
	Security of the Department of Homeland Security serving as Vice Chair,
	and other senior officials drawn from across the Federal Government
	with central roles in both the War on Terror and in civil liberties and
	privacy issues, the Board held its first meeting yesterday.

	Preparedness
	I am proud to speak of our significant gains in the area of
	national preparedness, particularly since it is National Preparedness
	Month. Throughout the month of September, hundreds of activities are
	planned to highlight the importance of individual emergency
	preparedness. Eighty-five partner organizations and all 56 States and
	territories are sponsoring events to encourage Americans to take simple
	steps now to prepare themselves and their families for any possible
	emergencies. In addition, the public education campaign Ready, and its
	Spanish language version Listo, educates and empowers American citizens
	to prepare for and respond to potential terrorist attacks and other
	emergencies. Ready is the most successful public service campaign
	launched in Ad Council history and is delivering its messages through
	the www.Ready.gov and www.Listo.gov websites, radio, television, print
	and outdoor public service announcements, brochures, and a variety of
	partnerships with private sector organizations.
	Business Ready will be launched later this month to encourage small
	to medium sized businesses to take steps to better protect their
	employees and their livelihood. Also, nearly 1,300 communities around
	the country, encompassing 50 percent of the U.S. population, have
	established Citizen Corps Councils to engage citizens in preparing,
	training and volunteering, including delivering the important messages
	of the Ready campaign.
	In our initiatives to educate the public on preparedness, we have
	had strong partners in the first responder community--those who have
	been on the front lines for a long time. The Department has many
	efforts underway to support our Nation's first responders, particularly
	in the area of training and equipment.
	Since September 11th, the Department and its legacy agencies have
	directly provided nearly $8.5 billion in grants for equipment,
	training, exercises, planning, and other assistance to our first
	responders and State and local partners. This is on top of the billions
	of dollars also provided by DOJ and the Department of Health and Human
	Services. This represents a dramatic increase in funding for State and
	local efforts in prevention, preparedness and response for terrorism
	and natural disasters.
	DHS is improving the way this assistance reaches the end users in
	the communities. Earlier this year, the Department consolidated all of
	its first responder and emergency preparedness grant and assistance
	programs into a single ``One-Stop Shop''--the Office of State and Local
	Government Coordination and Preparedness (OSLGCP). OSLGCP offers the
	State and local government first responder agencies, seaports, rail and
	transit operators, dedicated research institutions, and citizen
	volunteer agencies with a single Federal Government portal for Federal
	assistance for terrorism preparedness.
	Without preparedness standards, the billions of dollars spent on
	these activities would not be the most efficient use of these limited
	resources. Therefore, in December of last year, the President issued
	Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD-8), which, among other
	things, establishes a national preparedness goal. OSLGCP is leading
	this effort and is devising plans to implement the 16 separate actions
	and capabilities identified to improve the mechanisms of administering
	Federal preparedness assistance, preparedness reporting, standards, and
	assessment of our Nation's first responder capability.
	Further, the Department is engaged in significant training
	activities, covering the spectrum of all-hazards preparedness, with a
	special emphasis on terrorism prevention and weapons of mass
	destruction awareness. DHS programs have provided such training to more
	than 205,000 first responders in fiscal year 2004 alone (more than
	450,000 since fiscal year 2002).
	To address the critical communications needs of our first responder
	community, we are developing a new office to coordinate Federal, State,
	and local communications interoperability, leveraging both ongoing and
	new efforts to improve the compatibility of equipment, training, and
	procedures. Incorporated within the parameters of this new office are
	the SAFECOM and RapidCom initiatives. DHS's SAFECOM program provides
	long-term technical assistance to Federal, State, tribal, and local
	programs that build and operate public safety communications, while
	RapidCom focuses on the immediate development of incident-level
	interoperable emergency communications in high-threat urban areas.
	Under DHS leadership, the SAFECOM program has made significant
	progress in achieving the goals of interoperability, including the
	release of the first ever consensus Statement of Requirements for
	Public Safety Wireless Communications and Interoperability.
	I am also pleased to report that as part of the RapidCom program,
	DHS is working with the State and local leadership in New York City,
	the DC Region, and eight other major urban areas to ensure that first
	responders can communicate by voice, regardless of frequency or mode
	during an emergency. RapidCom will ensure that high-threat urban areas
	have incident-level, interoperable emergency communications equipment
	by September 30, 2004. The program will support deployable
	communications capability in these urban areas for an incident area
	approximately the size of the attacks on the World Trade Center towers
	on September 11th. Thus, at the incident area, emergency personnel from
	various regional jurisdictions will be able to communicate using
	existing equipment that is made interoperable by a patch-panel device,
	interconnecting various models of equipment that would otherwise not be
	compatible. In addition to these targeted efforts, interoperable
	communications planning and equipment has been a high priority for
	Federal homeland security assistance to States and localities,
	particularly in high-risk urban areas.
	We have also achieved some tremendous milestones in implementing
	National Incident Management System (NIMS) and completing the essential
	core of the National Response Plan (NRP), which will ultimately consist
	of this base-plan and a number of supporting annexes to be finished
	this year. Required by Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5
	(HSPD-5), issued by the President on February 28, 2003, the NIMS
	ensures that Federal, State, and local governments and private-sector
	organizations all use the same criteria to prepare for, prevent,
	respond to, and recover from a terrorist attack, major disaster, or
	other domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity. It
	builds upon well-established principles of the Incident Command System
	(ICS) including the unified command structure to provide organizational
	clarity and a common terminology that facilitates planning,
	coordination and cooperation at all levels of the responding community.
	A NIMS Integration Center, involving Federal, State, and local
	government representation, continues to develop and improve this
	system. DHS plans to conduct research in fiscal year 2005 to develop
	devices to locate first responders, and allow Incident Commanders to
	better understand where their resources are and how they are employed;
	and to provide virtual reality simulation training. The NRP applies the
	incident command concepts to include Federal support to States and
	local governments during disasters. It also establishes a framework for
	DHS to interact with the private sector in preparation for, response
	to, and recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters and other
	emergencies. It will integrate operations into a seamless system and
	get help to victims more quickly and efficiently.
	Before moving away from the Department's significant preparedness
	activities, I want to mention the devastating hurricanes that have hit
	this country recently. In addition to continuing to send our thoughts
	and prayers to all of the families who have been affected, the
	Department has been on the ground and fully engaged in providing
	emergency assistance. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
	pre-positioned emergency response teams and disaster relief supplies
	throughout the southeast region in preparation for anticipated response
	operations and continues to coordinate Federal response and recovery
	activities with State and local agencies. Further, President Bush
	ordered the release of Federal disaster funds and emergency resources
	for Florida to aid people battered in these disasters, requested
	additional funds from Congress as needed, and we continue to provide
	assistance to those who need Federal support in the wake of these
	disasters.

	Oversight of DHS
	The breadth of issues covered in this testimony, while addressing
	many significant activities, does not speak to the entire scope of this
	Department's great work. We have pulled together 22 agencies and
	180,000 employees into a unified Department whose mission is to secure
	the homeland. We are operating as a single unit--one team, one mission,
	one fight. Yet long term integration takes time--and we are daily
	challenged to ensure strong internal organization, as we continue
	building bridges with all of our partners in homeland security.
	As we continue to evolve into a more agile agency, we work closely
	with our partners in Congress. I appreciate the importance of our
	relationship and value the mechanism laid out in the Constitution, very
	appropriately, for Congressional oversight. However, this relationship
	would be significantly improved if there were an effort within Congress
	to reorganize itself, to enable more focus on homeland security,
	facilitate better oversight and ensure an even closer day-to-day
	relationship. Last year we testified before 145 committees and
	subcommittees, briefed members of Congress or committee staffs over 800
	different times and met thousands of requests for information just from
	committee staffs. This year we're already well beyond that. We still
	have pending over 300 General Accounting Office reports and we've
	already submitted at least that number. Again, the Department benefits
	from its relationship with Congress and an intense scrutiny of homeland
	security efforts, but these numbers demonstrate the need for a more
	effective structure.

	Conclusion
	We are committed to leading the unified national effort to secure
	America. We have done so--and will continue to do so--by developing
	innovative methodologies to prevent and deter terrorist attacks, and
	protect against and respond to threats and hazards of all types. All
	the while we ensure we maintain safe and secure borders, welcome lawful
	immigrants and visitors, and promote the free flow of commerce. Every
	day, the memories of September 11th inspire us in our efforts to
	preserve our freedoms and secure this great homeland.
	Thank you again for this opportunity to speak with you about the
	Department's activities and respond to the recommendations of the 9/11
	Commission. I am happy to answer any questions you may have.

	Chairman Cox. Thank you.
	The Chair recognizes himself for 5 minutes.
	Mr. Secretary, the department and this committee have both
	worked to make prevention the priority from the outset. That
	meant within the Department of Homeland Security, bringing the
	information analysis portion, the intelligence arm of DHS, up
	to statutory full strength as quickly as possible.
	We knew, because experience had shown us, that if the
	department did not serve state and local and private-sector
	customers, nontraditional intelligence customers, with timely
	and reliable analysis, that possibly nobody else in the federal
	government would or could.
	The intelligence community surprised us, however. By all
	accounts, it did not even serve its traditional national
	security customers, as the 9/11 Commission pointed out. The
	president has noticed; so have voters. And so we find ourselves
	now in a high-stakes, high-speed effort to reform the
	intelligence community.
	About a week ago the White House released its outline of
	the president's own reform proposals. The commission's report
	shows that the undersecretary of Information Analysis and
	Infrastructure Protection in some way answers ultimately to a
	new national intelligence director. The McCain-Shays bill has a
	similar feature.
	I am hoping that you can help us understand at least what
	the department's vision is for how this is all going to shape
	up or how it ought to shape up.
	First, what should be the IAIP role, the intelligence role,
	in the department in terrorism threat analysis? How would the
	president's proposals change the status quo and change the role
	for information analysis for intelligence, as outlined in the
	Homeland Security Act?
	How should IAIP relate to the rest of the intelligence
	community? Should it be the lead federal agency--that is to
	say, should the department be the lead federal agency--in
	conveying terrorist threat information to state, local and
	private-sector officials, as is presently the case in practice
	and under statute?
	And finally, should IAIP continue to be responsible for the
	homeland security advisory system, even under this newly
	reorganized intelligence community plan that we are developing?
	Mr. Ridge. Mr. Chairman, the Congress gave the new
	department a very specific, exclusive mission. And that was to
	take relevant threat information that related to domestic
	threats and use that information to map against the potential
	vulnerability to which the threat was directed, and shore up
	that vulnerability.
	So we take a look at the threat, map it against the
	potential target, and what have we done to reduce the
	vulnerability, to eliminate the likelihood of the prospects of
	being attacked, if it were attacked, to reduce or eliminate any
	damage?
	I believe that mission is and will remain one of the most
	strategic pieces, one of the most strategic roles that the new
	department would play.
	However, under the configuration, as I have read it, of the
	9/11 Commission, the relative bills, the president's own
	initiative, the strategic threat assessment relating to the
	homeland would be done under the auspices of the national
	counterterrorism center. It would be doing strategic threat
	assessment for both foreign and domestic.
	That does not mean that we relocate all our analysts. We
	are still going to be assessments. We will still be providing
	competitive analysis.
	So I think, clearly, the mission that you, the Congress,
	specifically gave us is compatible with the reorganization that
	is contemplated by the pieces of legislation.
	I also believe that under any restructuring, IAIP should
	still have the primary and the sole responsibility to deal with
	the homeland security advisory system. Again, specific
	responsibility by statute. We undertake it. I think it is a
	system that is working, and nothing conflicts in any of the
	existing proposals with that mission.
	The third question you asked, however, I think is one that
	will need to be addressed, if not in the legislation, but
	sometime thereafter. And that is, who is to channel the threat
	assessment and these kinds of information down to the state and
	local partners?
	We are talking about the integration of the country. We are
	talking about improving information sharing side by side within
	the federal government, but from top to bottom, federal, state
	and local.
	We know that historically the FBI has done that with the
	law enforcement community. And we have built up, for the past
	two years, strong ongoing daily relationships, interaction,
	with the states and local communities through bulletins and
	advisories, most of them submitted with the support and
	collaboration of the FBI and with the Homeland Security
	Information Network, with a series of calls, hooking up our
	operations centers and secure videos to the states and the
	locals.
	So again, one of the challenges we will have, I believe, no
	matter how we reconfigure the national intelligence director
	and the national counterterrorism center, is to hopefully
	minimize the number of means of communication down to the state
	and locals, so they are not getting disparate messages from
	multiple federal agencies about the same thing.
	Again, that is a real challenge, and we think we are,
	obviously, the agency that is best suited to work in
	conjunction with the FBI to deliver that information.
	Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Mississippi is recognized
	for 5 minutes.
	Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will not take up
	the entire 5 minutes.
	Mr. Secretary, you are aware of the lack of inspections of
	chemical plants and the fact that we do not have any real
	security standards for our chemical plants at this point.
	Is there a reason why we have not taken stronger mandatory
	measures to protect chemical facilities up to this point?
	Mr. Ridge. Congressman, to your point, there have been no
	mandatory measures that have been taken, but there have been
	many initiatives undertaken in conjunction with the chemical
	industry and hundreds of millions of dollars invested to add
	security and prevention.
	You are absolutely right. We literally have thousands and
	thousands of chemical facilities around the country. Within the
	unit of infrastructure protection, I dare say it is one of the
	top, if not the top priority.
	And what we have done is take a look at these facilities
	and, by and large, provide the homeland security adviser of
	each state, as well as the operators of the facilities, certain
	documents and planning tools as we beef up security.
	Characteristics and common vulnerabilities: Some of them
	have--many of them have the same kinds of vulnerabilities. So
	in a certain extent, one size does fit all.
	We have given them indicators of what the might look for,
	potential terrorist activity in terms of surveillance,
	reconnaissance, mindful of their need to limit access to
	critical areas within their facilities.
	And we have also given them buffer zone protection plans so
	they can begin working both internal, inside their operations,
	and external, outside the community, to protect these
	facilities.
	And in time, as these have all been distributed and we have
	begun working with some of the largest and most critical
	companies to see that the vulnerabilities are assessed and the
	buffer zone protection plans are put into place, and then
	working with the state, and particularly the local police and
	fire chiefs, go in and confirm that the vulnerability gaps have
	been closed and the buffer protection plans have been put in
	place.
	But we still have a long way to go, Congressman. There are
	thousands of those facilities out there. But we, frankly,
	started with those closest to the most densely populated areas
	that have the greatest potential for harm if they were turned
	from an economic asset into a weapon.
	Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
	Of those thousands of facilities you mentioned, how many do
	you have knowledge that your department has actually visited?
	Mr. Ridge. I believe your earlier comment with regard to a
	couple dozen is probably correct. I will get that number back
	to you.
	I think one of the challenges that we have is to
	understand, one, that there are common vulnerabilities among
	many of them; and, two, we are going to rely heavily upon those
	first responders at the state and local level to help us make
	some of these assessments and help us ensure that the buffer
	zone protection plans are put into place.
	After all, these are the men and women who are going to
	respond to it in the first place. And there have been a lot of
	initiatives that they have undertaken as well.
	So I can get back to you with a specific number that we
	have visited. But, again, part of our challenge in trying to
	deal with thousands and thousands of chemical locations, is
	building a standard, at certain levels, for protection. And
	that is our first effort, to create a standard of best practice
	for certain facilities that we want to see adopted across the
	board.
	To date, the chemical industry estimates they have invested
	about three-quarters of a billion dollars in security measures.
	I am not in a position to confirm it. But we are aware that we
	have gone into some of these chemical facilities where
	literally there have been hundreds of thousands of dollars
	worth of investments made.
	Mr. Thompson. So is it your department's belief that the
	voluntary approach to working with chemical plants is working
	and it is better and having a mandatory situation with the
	chemical plant?
	Mr. Ridge. Until such time as Congress mandates a specific
	approach, we will continue to work in collaboration not only
	with the chemical companies, but in collaboration with the
	first responders, who are the ones who are going to be called
	in the event something happens in that community, to see that
	the best practices are adopted and the appropriate investments
	are made.
	And we will continue to prioritize within all of these
	chemical companies and go out and personally visit and
	personally oversee the development of the protection zones
	around those, and just work our way down the list with the help
	of state and local first responders.
	Mr. Camp. [Presiding.] The gentleman's time has expired.
	Mr. Secretary, the need to improve border security and have
	a national strategy for the management of our border has been
	evident for some time, for decades, some might say. And your
	testimony goes to improvements that have been made in
	bringing--
	Mr. Dicks. Will the Chairman yield just for a point of
	inquiry?
	Mr. Camp. Yes.
	Mr. Dicks. Are we going to go vote at the end of the
	Chairman's--
	Mr. Camp. We are going to continue to stay in session, and
	the Chairman has gone to vote and will come back, and we will
	continue to move forward. We are going to continue to question
	during the vote.
	There are 10 minutes of debate, we think, on a motion to
	recommit. And we will continue to question as long as we can
	during the votes.
	Ms. Jackson-Lee. What time--
	Mr. Camp. I believe the Chairman said he had to leave at
	4:30.
	Ms. Jackson-Lee. Okay, thank you.
	Mr. Camp. Thank you.
	Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
	In your testimony, obviously we have a lot of improvements
	that we need to make at our border. Your testimony goes to some
	of the changes in bringing travelers and cargo into the U.S.
	more safely. And as the chairman of the Subcommittee on Border
	and Infrastructure, we have had a lot of hearings on the
	progress that has been made there.
	But my question is this: In a single day--and there is a
	recent article in Time magazine that is coming out highlighting
	this--in a single day, more than 4,000 illegal aliens cross the
	375-mile border between Arizona and Mexico, every single day.
	And as the article indicates, there are no searches for
	weapons, there is no shoe removal, there are no ID checks.
	Where are we in stopping that, and where is this
	administration on that specific issue?
	Mr. Ridge. Well, first of all, I am familiar with the
	article and regret that, at least to my knowledge, there was no
	effort to contact the department that has some statistics that
	might have been helpful to the author and to highlight some of
	the changes that we have made over the past 18 months.
	Having said that, I am not in a position to confirm any of
	their statistics, one way or the other. I am in a position to
	tell you, however, that we have got, because of congressional
	bipartisan support, we have got about 1,500 more agents, border
	patrol folks down there than we did before.
	We are not using unmanned aerial vehicles to get us to
	places where heretofore it has been pretty difficult for the
	border patrol to get to. We have adjusted our tactics
	accordingly.
	We have heightened particularly our effort in the areas
	that had previously been very, very porous. That is the Arizona
	Border Patrol Initiative where we continue to pick up, I think,
	probably 50 percent more people than we did in previous years.
	And there is a list of initiatives that we have taken at
	the border that were not reflected in the article. I am not
	going to say to you, Mr. Chairman, that the border is no longer
	porous, there are no longer illegal immigrants coming across.
	But in the span of 18 months, between more technology, more
	sensors, more border patrol agents, and frankly a better
	integration of effort, I think we are doing a lot better job in
	the past 18 months than we probably did in the past 18 years.
	We have still got more work to do, though. I am the first
	one to admit we still got more work to do.
	Mr. Camp. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
	I am going to yield the rest of my time to Ms. Dunn.
	Ms. Dunn. [Presiding.] I thank the gentleman.
	We are, as you can see, racing back and forth for votes.
	Has the gentlelady from Washington, D.C., asked her questions,
	or would you like to ask your questions now?
	Yield 5 minutes to the gentlelady from Washington, D.C.
	Ms. Norton. Thank you, Madam.
	And thank you, Secretary Ridge, for your important work for
	our country.
	There is a growing sense of many of us that we may be
	fighting the last war, and I encourage you to continue to fight
	the last war, because I know that is not over yet.
	I would like to ask you about two very large
	vulnerabilities that some of us see as perhaps part of the next
	war which we would not like to see. One is protection for the
	much larger private sector of our country, the business sector,
	that produces the resources and revenue. And the other is about
	mass transit and rail.
	This city is typical of large cities, with its official
	sites protected and fortified, but most large cities have very
	small official sectors and huge business sectors. So, first, as
	to the private sector, you endorsed before the 9/11 Commission
	the national standards for the private sector. But you said you
	objected to the inclusion of such standards in a bill that has
	been introduced, and I was one of the sponsors of that bill.
	I am talking about NFPA-1600. You say you objected to it
	because there should be a number of different kinds of
	standards to draw on. Then you seem to end up saying that the
	NFPA-1600 would be a good starting point, additional standards,
	guidelines and best practices.
	So are we reading from the same script here? Because far
	from pinning you down, all that this bill said was--it began,
	just as you say, you believe we should, with the American
	National Standards Institution and National Fire Protection,
	then it says, you know, anything else--and it says existing
	private sector emergency preparedness guidance or all best
	practices.
	And the reason I ask it is that we are sitting here with a
	wide-open federal sector. We went to your Web site and could
	not find anything on the Web site that gave guidance to the
	business sector, to the private sector.
	And so I want to ask you when such guidance will be coming
	forward, particularly since you objected to the bill which I
	think would do exactly what you testified before the 9/11
	Commission you would be doing.
	And then, about rail security, just let me say how
	completely fearful I am about rail and mass transit. That is
	where the people are, Mr. Secretary. I went to a rail hearing
	here, sat in on a rail hearing here. And I was just astounded.
	Somebody from your department and somebody from the Federal
	Railroad Administration were both there. I could find no locus
	for who deals with rail and mass transit security in our
	country, no assessments going on, no national standards or
	plans even being thought of by these two officials.
	I did not expect something comparable to aviation, but it
	is very frightening to think that people get on Metro, get on
	the subways in New York, get on railroads, that there is no
	funding and not even any guidance in these two sectors.
	And the private sector is one, the mass transit sector is
	the other. And if you wanted to ask me where the American
	people are, it would not be on the airplanes, where we are
	beginning to fight the good fight, it would be on these two
	sectors which I believe are almost completely uncovered.
	Ms. Dunn. I remind the gentlelady--excuse me, Secretary
	Ridge--that there is only 1 minute left for the reply of the
	director.
	Go ahead.
	Mr. Ridge. Let me respond, Congresswoman.
	First of all, I would like to personally get back to you,
	because the standards that I have endorsed before the 9/11
	Commission, if it was communicated to you that somebody opposed
	them, I need to find that out, because I do not.
	But I would like to get back and deal with issue
	personally, because it was a voluntary standard, very
	appropriate for the private sector to review and certainly a
	strong recommendation on behalf of the 9/11 Commission. I stand
	by how I testified before the 9/11 Commission. So I will get
	back to you on that.
	Ms. Norton. Thank you. Because they have endorsed what you
	have said.
	Mr. Ridge. Absolutely. And I think endorse what you are
	saying. I mean, the point of it is, we throw some standards out
	there, get the private sector engaged.
	But you should also know that pursuant to our mission in
	infrastructure protection, as well as a presidential directive,
	we are presently working on sector-specific protection plans.
	Transportation is included as one of them. But this is across
	the entire private sector arena: transportation, financial
	services, chemical.
	Now, because we are working on a national strategy dealing
	with each of these sectors, does not mean that we are not
	taking steps now to add additional layers of security in those
	sectors; for example, mass transit.
	As you know, we are running pilot programs with regard to
	explosive technology on both passengers as well as baggage
	along with Amtrak's route. We are also running some pilots on
	biological and chemical sensors that certainly, in time,
	potentially would be deployed both within the units and
	elsewhere along the mass transit line.
	We also know that we put in more canine teaMs. And a lot of
	the local communities, with our support, have more plain
	clothesmen and uniformed police providing greater security.
	We also know that on a matter of course the railroad and
	mass transit companies, on their own volition--because they are
	partners in this--often go out and review their infrastructure,
	go through certain tunnels or review the bridges for safety and
	security purposes.
	So there is a good partnership developing. And we will have
	by the end of this year a national transportation security
	plan, which will build on, hopefully, some of the technological
	advancements that we make, some of the initiatives that have
	already been undertaken.
	So I think, to your point, I will get back to you on the
	voluntary standards. Please know that we are required by
	presidential directive, as well as part of the mission the
	Congress gave us to come up with sector-specific protection
	plans. We are doing that across the country.
	And by the end of the year we are also obliged to have a
	critical infrastructure database. We are working with homeland
	security advisers in all the states and territories to list
	critical assets, many of which could be if they were destroyed
	could turn into weapons and others destroyed would have
	enormous economic and psychological impact.
	So, again, all that is a work in progress.
	Ms. Dunn. The gentlelady's time has expired.
	My intent is not to cut off either of the speakers; it is
	to provide an opportunity for each of the folks on both sides
	to be able to ask questions.
	I now yield to myself 5 minutes for the purpose of
	questioning.
	Secretary Ridge, the 9/11 Commission report put a spotlight
	on some of the inefficiencies in congressional oversight. I
	think this is a very good time for us to look at our own
	responsibility and our effectiveness as an oversight body and
	take advantage of the increased will that we see coming out of
	the 9/11 Commission when it comes to reforming what our
	responsibility is.
	Do you agree with the 9/11 Commission report that there
	should be a permanent oversight committee in each body of the
	Congress?
	Mr. Ridge. I certainly would appreciate the reduction in
	number of oversight committees. Whether or not in the wisdom of
	the leadership and the consensus of the bodies in the House and
	Senate, you could reduce it from 88 to one in each, I will
	leave it to you. But it is pretty clear from our perspective,
	just based on our very appropriate interaction with Congress.
	You have got the congressional oversight responsibility. We
	look to you for the appropriations. So we have to build this
	department. There has to be a partnership. I happen to think if
	there was more concentrated emphasis on oversight, we could
	have a more effective relationship.
	To give you an example, Madam Chairman, this year so far
	the secretary, the undersecretary and the assistant secretaries
	generally have appeared nearly 160 times at hearings. They have
	been involved and many of our staff have been involved on the
	hill over 1,300 times for briefings.
	And literally we have hundreds and hundreds of General
	Accounting Office inquiries. And you know those are enormous,
	labor-intensive responses that we have to provide,
	understandably. So anything that the House will do to reduce
	not the intensity of the oversight, but the number of
	committees and subcommittees to which we report for oversight
	would certainly, we think, improve the effectiveness of our
	interaction and frankly make us a stronger department and more
	secure country.
	Ms. Dunn. Do you think that the committee you are
	testifying before today has been useful to you in terms of
	advising you and working with you to protect our country?
	Mr. Ridge. Yes. We have had a good interaction. And, again,
	how the leadership in both chambers decides to allocate those
	responsibilities, we have got to leave it to them.
	But and I would say to you in response to some of the
	concerns that some of your colleagues have, I am prepared to
	stay a little longer. I do want people to get a chance to ask
	their questions. I have sat on that side of the table myself
	and appreciate that. I will do as much as I can to accommodate
	the interest of colleagues on both sides of the aisle.
	Ms. Dunn. Thank you very much. We appreciate your
	sensitivity.
	Let me ask you a general question. What would be the two or
	three first things you would do or you would wish accomplished
	if there were unlimited funds and time and staffing?
	Mr. Ridge. Much of what I would hope we could accomplish
	will not be driven as much by money as it will be by science. I
	mean, I think there are a lot of gaps and weaknesses out there
	that science and technology may help us fill. And Congress has
	been very, very generous in that regard.
	I suspect, because there continues to be concern about the
	borders and concern about immigration and concern about matters
	related to that, that at some point in time there would be
	additional dollars appropriated for enforcement. But that would
	require, I think, not only looking at the enforcement side, but
	what the policy might be relative to our borders.
	Ms. Dunn. In the early days of the Department of Homeland
	Security--and actually up to the current time--there has been
	discussion about TTIC, where it belongs, who should be
	overseeing it.
	Are you satisfied with the fact that TTIC is now housed
	with the CIA, or would you rather have that under the
	Department of Homeland Security?
	Mr. Ridge. We were not initially looking to acquire more
	responsibility, inasmuch as we are just trying to integrate the
	responsibilities we had. And it just seems to me that that
	question has been answered by the embrace of the 9/11
	Commission, Congress and the president of the national
	counterterrorism center.
	I think basically that threat integration center has
	evolved and is evolving into the national counterterrorism
	center. And as defined by the president and the role it would
	play according to the president's proposal, frankly, it would
	provide us probably even better integration of foreign and
	domestic threat information that we can apply to our role to
	reduce vulnerabilities and secure the country.
	So it is a moot point, Madam Chairman. I think the national
	counterterrorism center is where the strategic threat
	assessment will go, and we are quite comfortable with that.
	Ms. Dunn. All right. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
	The Chair now yields 5 minutes to the gentleman from
	Washington, Mr. Dicks.
	Mr. Dicks. Mr. Secretary, good to see you back on the Hill.
	I am very concerned about one subject. Out in our part of
	the world, port and container security, is a major issue for
	the port of Seattle, Port of Tacoma. The Chairman has the port
	Los Angeles.
	As you know, the Coast Guard estimated last year that the
	ports need to make about $1.5 billion worth of improvements in
	the near term and roughly, $7.3 billion over 10 years to meet
	the security standards set by the Coast Guard, as instructed by
	Congress in the Maritime Transportation Security Act.
	The administration's budget since September 11th have
	requested only $46 million for port security.
	And although Congress has provided additional money, there
	remains a billion-dollar funding gap to meet the immediate
	needs identified by the Coast Guard.
	The House approved $125 million for port security grants
	this year.
	But even that figure leaves us well short of where we need
	to be to ensure the security of our ports.
	And as you remember, just a year or so ago, there was a
	lock-out on the West Coast of our longshoremen. And that
	immediately had economic implications. And if we ever got into
	a situation, heaven forbid, that a dirty bomb came in on one of
	those containers, was shipped to Chicago, it explodes,
	contamination spreads, there would be a problem, I think,
	bringing these containers into the ports of Tacoma, Seattle,
	Los Angeles and the other West Coast ports, with serious
	economic repercussions.
	Now, in light of that, I am concerned that we are still not
	putting enough money into port security and container security.
	We are also told that the number of people going abroad--a
	little group of five goes over for 120 days to get set up for
	the container inspection program and that the professional are
	telling us that that is not long enough to get the job done at
	these foreign ports. And I agree that we have to do this. But
	let us try to make this effective.
	Can you address these issues for me?
	Mr. Ridge. Yes, Congressman, I would. Thank you.
	Our ports, appropriately viewed as a potential point of
	vulnerability, have been the highest priority within the Coast
	Guard. Obviously, they are the point of the sphere when it
	comes to maritime security. But they have worked in partnership
	with Customs and Border Patrol.
	And we try to do, once we have identified vulnerabilities,
	you try to lay in multiple layers, multiple systems so that you
	do not have a single point of failure. And so then in our job
	to manage the risk, we do it several different ways.
	You correctly pointed out that we begin that whole process
	with the Container Security Initiative, where today as you and
	I are having this conversation, we have DHS employees either
	working or on their way to 25 ports overseas where we work with
	our allies to use X-ray equipment to, once we have located and
	targeted high-risk cargo.
	The high-risk cargo is identified through a very, very
	sophisticated operation, based on kinds of data that is being
	accumulated by Customs. We know a lot about ships; we know a
	lot about shippers; we know a lot about ports.
	And every shipping container is required--everybody sending
	a container on a vessel to the United States electronically
	must send a manifest to us 24 hours in advance. If we do not
	get it 24 hours in advance of loading, it is not loaded.
	So we know we get that. We have had about 1,000 do-not-load
	orders, and they just sit on the side, regardless of the
	contents, because you did not comply with the regulation.
	Once we take a look at that, we have identified about 6
	percent of these as high-risk cargo: there was something about
	the ship, the shipper, potential content, an anomaly in the
	manifest. There is an algorithm we put together, and we change
	it all the time.
	To give you an example, we had once situation where the
	manifest said frozen fish, obviously a commercial product,
	should be distributed from the Pacific to Central or South
	America. But we also had the ship registered on the manifest,
	and we knew it was not a refrigerated ship.
	Obviously, we opened it, and found hundreds of thousands
	dollars worth of illegal weapons.
	So just an anecdote, but 100 percent review of the
	manifest. High-risk cargo, we X-ray over there. The ship moves
	to the United States, we pick up more information about
	passengers and crew. The National Targeting Center vets the
	passengers and crew. And sometimes for intelligence purposes,
	in response to intelligence, we will board vessels before they
	come into the United States. And then there are security
	protocols in our states, as well.
	Congress said to the Coast Guard: You need to come up
	security plans at every port. One size does not fit all. You
	need to sit down and work with the private sector to develop
	your vulnerability assessments and bring in security measures.
	Mr. Dicks. But, Mr. Secretary--
	Ms. Dunn. The gentleman's time has expired.
	Mr. Ridge. I am sorry to be so long-winded, Congressman.
	I think the original estimate was correct, but it did not
	say the government necessarily has to pay for it. The
	government is spending billions and billions and billions of
	dollars on port security. It is not as if you have too many
	companies that cannot afford a little more money to help secure
	part of their distribution chain. It is a debate we need to
	have. But I do not think it is fair to say that the federal
	government is not contributing significantly to the security of
	our ports. We are.
	Ms. Dunn. The gentleman's time has expired.
	The Chair yields 5 minutes to the gentleman from
	Connecticut, Mr. Shays.
	Mr. Shays. Thank you.
	Mr. Ridge, you have done a very fine job in a very
	difficult position. I have a number of questions. I would like
	some shorter answers just to cover them as long as you feel
	like you can answer them.
	One, I would like to know what the public's right to know
	is when we issue a threat. If we know, for instance, that a
	particular city is targeted, does the public have a right to
	know that?
	Mr. Ridge. When we have had credible information, as we did
	about a month ago with regard to a particular community and
	particular sector in the community, we made it public.
	Mr. Shays. And is that the consistent policy of the
	administration?
	Mr. Ridge. Yes. I must tell you that that was made public.
	There are times when we get threat information, the credibility
	of which may be questionable or undetermined--
	Mr. Shays. Okay, I understand.
	Mr. Ridge. --and then we will let those folks--
	Mr. Shays. How about with cargo? That is not baggage on a
	passenger plane. Do you think the public has a right to know
	when cargo is on a plane that is not checked the same way that
	baggage is checked?
	Because 23 percent of all cargo goes in passenger planes.
	Does the public have a right to know when there is cargo on a
	plane that is a passenger plane?
	Mr. Ridge. The public has a right to know the security
	protocols that we have undertaken in order to manage the risk
	of the cargo in the hull. They have a right to know that we
	have got a known shipper program. They have a right to know we
	have got random inspections, but we do not inspect every single
	item that is in the hull.
	They have a right to know we do background checks on crew
	members and employees have access to it. They have a right to
	know that we are working on explosive--
	Mr. Shays. So the answer is kind of no, though, I am
	gathering from you.
	Mr. Ridge. I think--
	Mr. Shays. No, I mean, I would like to know if 50 percent
	of the cargo on a passenger plane is not checked the same way
	baggage is. I would want to know that. And I know that you
	believe--
	Mr. Ridge. Yes.
	Mr. Shays. --believe that the known shipper is important. I
	do not think it covers my need.
	Are you concerned about the assassination of any public
	official during this campaign season? There has been a lot of
	talk about this. Is there dialogue? Is there any threat that
	public officials are being targeted?
	Mr. Ridge. The most frequent position mentioned in any
	threat reporting, and I dare say it is probably been historic,
	regardless of the administration, has been the president of the
	United States. But other than those threats that we get on a
	regular basis, and I dare say probably always have and always
	will from time to time, I do not believe there is any other--
	Mr. Shays. What is the most important recommendation of the
	9/11 Commission, one or two of them, from your perspective, of
	homeland security?
	Mr. Ridge. The direction to the national intelligence
	director to do everything they can to make sure that the
	information is necessary for both federal agencies, but the
	state and locals to help secure America is shared quickly and
	effectively.
	I think one of the most important responsibilities of this
	new national intelligence director is to ensure that
	information sharing continues to improve, and that, frankly, we
	go back over the old war, Cold War classification of
	information and the handing caveats that are attached to it, to
	scrub them to see if they are relevant in combating terrorism.
	Because I do think we need to get more information down to the
	state and locals.
	Mr. Shays. I would like to ask you, with the time I have
	left, what you think your biggest success is and what your
	biggest disappointment or biggest failure has been to date.
	Mr. Ridge. I believe in totality gaining greater control
	over our borders from land, sea and air has been a significant
	accomplishment, and it has been done within the department with
	a lot of assistance from the federal agencies. Not the greatest
	disappointment, but the greatest challenge that it is still
	going to take us years to deal with is the integration of all
	the databases that we have to enhance that ability to protect
	ourselves at the border.
	We have the US-VISIT that is connected to multiple
	databases. But integrating all of that and then frankly the
	integration of broader information resources in time is I think
	the biggest challenge. Not a disappointment, it is just the
	greatest challenge.
	Mr. Shays. Thank you for your responses.
	And thank you. I yield back.
	Ms. Dunn. The Chair yields 5 minutes to the gentleman from
	Massachusetts, Mr. Frank.
	Mr. Frank. Mr. Secretary, in the immigration area, one of
	the things that struck me about the commission, they quite
	explicitly said in a staff report that the problem with people
	coming into this country who are dangerous is not the legal
	authority to exclude bad people, but the difficulty of
	administering that.
	Would you concur with that? Do we need to change the
	substantive law or do you now have in the department sufficient
	legal authority to keep people out; the problem being of course
	you do not always have the evidence right at hand, et cetera?
	Mr. Ridge. I would dare say that I believe like any older
	statute, Congressman, Immigration and Naturalization Act is
	probably in need of review and modification, but there are
	basic authorities within that statute that are probably eternal
	that could be the basis for more rigorous enforcement.
	Mr. Frank. Okay. The current law was redone in 1996, so it
	is not quite as old as some of the other things around here.
	But you are not aware of a major need to amend the law to
	tighten up your ability to exclude?
	Mr. Ridge. That is a fair question. Not at this point, but
	we do have people with Citizenship and Immigration Services
	reviewing this statute for me presently. I cannot tell you
	today, but I might tell you tomorrow.
	Mr. Frank. Actually, the commission staff report referred
	to what they said was the myth that the murderers of September
	11 came in legally. And the answer they said was, no, they were
	not. It was not that the law was not inadequate.
	I would be interested in that review. The Civil Liberties
	Board, I am glad to see the Civil Liberties Board that you
	referenced--and I appreciate the fact that the commission
	called for it. I think it is very important, we have this need
	to give law enforcement more vigorous powers. I think that is
	virtually, unanimously agreed to when you are dealing with
	people willing to kill themselves to kill others.
	But commensurate with that, you need to have better
	supervisory authority. And with the best one in the world, we
	have seen mistakes that were made by law enforcement.
	Here is my problem with the board, the board that is
	supposed to monitor what is done by, presumably, the Justice
	Department, the Department of Homeland Security and et cetera:
	It is a board that is composed of all the people that it is
	monitoring. It is entirely self-policing. It is kind of the
	like the House Ethics Committee. And that does not give me a
	lot of hope that it is going to be all that effective.
	It is chaired by the deputy attorney general, the
	undersecretary for border and transportation security.
	Shouldn't we have some independence built into this? I mean, it
	is not a case of people being bad people, but it is very hard
	if you are in charge of an operation and you are in charge of
	these people, being given the supposedly independent authority
	to supervise them goes against what we know about human nature.
	Wouldn't we be better off if we were able to have at least some
	independent capacity here?
	Mr. Ridge. Well, first of all, I think you know that
	whatever their deliberations or activity they take, it would be
	done in a very transparent way. So all those organizations with
	whom we work, who represent groups--frankly, they represent
	America's interest in protecting privacy and civil liberties
	and freedom, will have access to that information.
	And, frankly, the make-up of that commission, I believe,
	exists primarily to establish a culture of privacy and
	awareness of that within the federal government. And they have
	plenty of opportunity for external groups to influence that--
	Mr. Frank. Well, I appreciate that about the culture. But I
	guess I disagree that having the external groups just be able
	to influence them. I mean, they can do that now. The notion of
	a board does, generally, suggest some independence from the
	agencies.
	The inspector general have given, for instance--the
	inspector general's department has more independence from the
	department's normal operation than this board would. And I am
	troubled by there being no--it really is people appealing to
	themselves and governing themselves. And it does not mean that
	they are, as I said, weak-minded or not committed, it is just
	very hard to wear two hats, to be the people running the
	agency.
	I mean, we are talking about the deputy attorney general
	and the undersecretary. These are people who help run the
	agency, and then they say, ``Okay, now we are through running
	the agency, we are going put on our hat of monitoring the
	agency.'' And I am just not persuaded that is easily done.
	Mr. Ridge. Well, hopefully, at least, you are persuaded
	that, at least from your perspective, it is a very important
	first step for us to recognize what the Congress did as it
	relates to homeland security.
	You created that privacy officer with homeland security.
	And you created a mechanism within homeland security through
	that privacy officer that we have empowered whenever we begin
	to discuss anything within homeland security, Congressman, that
	has any impact on privacy or civil liberties, one or both of
	those individuals are brought in.
	Mr. Frank. Are they on the board?
	Mr. Ridge. This administration--yes.
	Mr. Frank. Are the privacy officers--
	Mr. Ridge. Yes, yes.
	My recollection, Dan Sutherland, whose our civil liberties,
	and Nuala O'Connor, who is our privacy officer, will be part of
	that board. And I will tell you, the first time we had it
	tested in terms of monitoring our own process is when we had to
	deal with the European Union that had serious privacy concerns
	about our use of their passenger name records. They took a look
	at our process and procedures--
	Mr. Frank. But that proves my point because you had an
	independent entity there, the European Union, that was able to
	assert that privilege--their concerns. I do not see anything
	comparable if we are entirely domestic.
	Mr. Sweeney. [Presiding.] The gentleman's time has expired.
	Mr. Secretary, welcome. Thank you for being here.
	I have very little time because we are running out of time
	on a vote. But I wanted to get to a specific question I have
	asked you about in appropriations before.
	And as you know, I have spent the better part of the last
	year with others--Mrs. Lowey and other folks--trying to get a
	threat-based funding formula passed through Congress.
	We asked the 9/11 Commission to consider the change. They
	made it part of their recommendations. Their quote was:
	``Homeland security systems should be based strictly on an
	assessment of risks and vulnerabilities.''
	In this committee, an underlying first-responder bill has
	such a formula in place. There is a separate free-standing Bill
	that make threat, vulnerability and consequences the formula
	change.
	You retain significant authority, regardless of what we are
	able to do or not to do here in Congress. And if we do not pass
	such legislation in this next cycle, I am interested in hearing
	what recommendations you would make, what changes you could
	make to really ensure that the federal resources and funds are
	really getting to those places that are most threatened.
	And I hate to do this, because of the appearance of a ``New
	York verses everybody else'' proposition or a ``rural verse
	urban'' proposition. But I come form the 32nd largest rural
	district in America, and I do not think that is relevant at
	all.
	It really is not about New York. But New York is obviously
	a very threatened place. And we seemingly are going backward in
	terms of what resources we are able to send them. For example,
	in fiscal year 2003, we sent a total of $312 million. New
	York's expenses were somewhere in the range of one billion
	dollars. We recognized that the federal government is not going
	to be able to cover everything for any particular jurisdiction.
	But that was the best we ever did. In 1994, it receded to about
	$183 million.
	Your Department, because you have political pressures, and
	I think there is a valid recognition of need in a lot of other
	places for some minimal level, of preparedness, has essentially
	taken the high-threat fund that we established in the
	supplemental in 2003 and really deluded it at the expense of
	what I believe are the seven or eight jurisdictions that face
	the greatest threats.
	I am wondering if you have alternative plans in mind. What
	authorities would you use to ensure that those resources are
	going there? Because Mayor Bloomberg, in New York, as other
	big-city mayors have told me, they cannot sustain their level
	of security without bankrupting their jurisdictions.
	Mr. Ridge. Congressman, I think the president outlined a
	compromise between the ideal and the real. The real is a
	recognition that within Congress, it is unlikely that we will
	get away from some kind of formula that effectively distributes
	a certain number of dollars to every state.
	And I think one can make an argument, a persuasive one,
	that every state is entitled to some modicum of support to
	build up an internal capacity, just given the random
	unpredictable nature of terrorism.
	However, as the president indicated in the 2005 budget
	submission, we would prefer to see a substantial number of
	those dollars removed from the funding formula side to the
	urban area security initiative side, where on an annual basis,
	not just population comes into the formula, but a
	vulnerability, critical infrastructure protection and threat.
	There is a certain fluidity to both the threat and the
	vulnerability. As communities and private sector companies have
	built up the security and preventive measures around their
	infrastructure, the vulnerability is reduced, the possibility
	of attack is reduced, perhaps the level of threat is reduced.
	Mr. Sweeney. Is that the case in New York?
	Mr. Ridge. Pardon me?
	Mr. Sweeney. Is that the case in New York?
	Mr. Ridge. I think there are some cities like New York City
	and Washington, D.C., and a few other major metropolitan areas
	that for the foreseeable future are going to require heavy
	support, no matter what the equation. No matter what the
	equation is for the Urban Area Security Initiative grants, New
	York is always going to be at the top of the list, by far.
	There is not even a close second.
	Mr. Sweeney. Very quickly, we failed in this body in the
	appropriations process to put the President's number back in,
	as you will recall, and failed pretty miserably. It puts you, I
	think, at a distinct disadvantage to really meet those highest
	threat area needs. And so what are you going to do if we do not
	change that in conference?
	Mr. Ridge. Well, again, we will take a look at whatever
	language you have given me, to determine whether or not the
	dollars that were available previously that we distributed to--
	we went from 30 to 50 urban communities is compressed, so that
	fewer communities receive more dollars. It is a question of
	dollars and threat assessment. But we know there are two or
	three that are always going to be at the top of the list.
	Mr. Sweeney. Well, I would like to work with you because we
	have a conference where we could do something.
	And I have run out of time. There are 4 minutes remaining
	in the vote. So we will recess for 10 minutes subject to the
	call of the Chair and come back.
	[Recess.]
	Chairman Cox. [Presiding.] With the secretary's indulgence,
	we will proceed with the gentlelady from the Virgin Islands,
	Ms. Christensen.
	Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	And welcome, Mr. Secretary.
	I am going to hopefully get in three questions. The first
	one is a very basic one.
	Are all of the directorates, all of the offices, now fully
	housed and staffed within the department?
	Mr. Ridge. They are fully established. We still have
	additional analysts to be hired for the information analytical
	group and more people for the IAIP group generally.
	But, by and large, with that and a few more people in the
	Office of Management, we are pretty much up to required
	staffing levels.
	Mrs. Christensen. Okay. Thank you.
	I am also glad to hear your focus on border security,
	because, as you may know, I have sponsored legislation to
	create a border patrol unit for the U.S. Virgin Islands to deal
	with both our human and narcotic smuggling that has been
	increasing in the area. And I am sure you can imagine that as
	you close the borders in one area, the focus will shift to
	another. And we are already seeing some increase.
	So I raise the issue to solicit your support or at the very
	least a commitment to work with me on that issue.
	Mr. Ridge. Congresswoman, I would be pleased to take a look
	at your legislation specifically and see what we could do to
	support your objective.
	Mrs. Christensen. Yes. Thank you.
	And, you know, as another part of that, from the very
	outset of your tenure as the secretary of homeland security,
	you have always stressed the fact that homeland security begins
	beyond the borders of the United States.
	We are also in the region of the Caribbean, and a lot of
	the network that we are involved with that send some of that
	human and narcotic traffic to our jurisdiction comes up through
	the Caribbean region.
	The United States has put a lot of demands on the countries
	of the Caribbean who are very close, long-term neighbors and
	friends, and they are really ill-prepared to bring their
	security up to the levels that we are requiring of them. And
	this country has provided decreasing amounts of aid to the
	Caribbean region.
	Are you aware of any initiative from the federal government
	to assist these countries in the Caribbean who are struggling
	right now just to meet their everyday requirements of their own
	citizens, to deal with the security needs that we are imposing
	on them to provide security for us?
	Mr. Ridge. Congresswoman, I am not aware of any specific
	initiative. What I am aware of, however, is a growing
	recognition, certainly within our department and other places
	within the administration, that some of the concerns that you
	have addressed, the change in migration pattern for illegal
	aliens, drugs and others, is altered because when we close one
	gap--
	Mrs. Christensen. Right.
	Mr. Ridge. --and do more in certain areas of the Caribbean,
	the same network that illegally pushes humans and drugs will
	find a weaker link or an opening. And to that end, we are
	taking a look at, even within our department, what we could do
	to bolster our efforts in that regard in the Caribbean.
	Mrs. Christensen. Thank you.
	Just this morning, the Joint Center for Political and
	Economic Studies and the New York Academy of Medicine released
	a report that says terrorism response plans will not protect
	many Americans. And what they are saying is that many Americans
	would not be safeguarded because existing terrorism response
	plans do not account for how people would behave, that current
	plans have been created in a top-down style, telling people
	what to do in the event of attacks, without considering all of
	the risks and concerns that drive people's actions.
	So the study documents that only two-fifths of Americans,
	perhaps, would follow instructions to go to a public
	vaccination site, in the case of a smallpox outbreak, and only
	three-fifths would follow the instructions to stay inside an
	undamaged building other than their home after a dirty bomb
	explosion.
	How do you think the department in their planning can
	address, or have you begun to address the issue of how people
	behave under certain circumstances, in that they might not
	follow the instructions and therefore place more people at risk
	under events such as these?
	Mr. Ridge. I am not familiar with the specifics of the
	report, but I dare say without reading it, I probably agree
	with their conclusions that the response that the emergency and
	medical community and first responder community would hope for
	in times of a crisis, a biological attack, a chemical attack, a
	radiological attack is not necessarily the one they are going
	to get from people in that community.
	And that is why one of our missions is to build and then
	sustain a public awareness and public education campaign. It
	was very interesting, I think back to all the political
	cartoons I have on my desk, when duck tape and sheeting was the
	subject of some humor. That was to be involved in the emergency
	kit only for very, very selective occasions, just a handful
	when we want you to shelter in place. But there was a reason
	that it was included.
	So the bottom line is that there are different responses to
	different kinds of attacks. And part of the mission of the
	Department of Homeland Security--and here is where we can work,
	I think, in collaboration with the Congress that has the
	ability to go out and educate as well--we have training
	responsibilities and we work with emergency management
	professionals, but to build up the response capability, build
	up the informational awareness and situational awareness so
	that the numbers of an appropriate response, of people who are
	prepared to take an appropriate response, will increase in the
	next survey. Because I dare say their conclusions are probably
	correct.
	Mrs. Christensen. All right, and I think the focus--what
	they are trying to say is that it is not just an education, a
	top-down education process, but communities want to be more
	involved in the planning themselves, and then the response
	would probably increase.
	You have been asked questions about the director of Central
	Intelligence, but I also wanted to raise a question about that.
	You assert that the president first gave the director of
	Central Intelligence expanded authority to coordinate policy
	and develop the budget for the entire intelligence community
	while he waits for us to change the law, set up the scope and
	authority of a national intelligence director.
	In light of this and your comments, is it your
	recommendation that President Bush should endorse or a
	president should endorse and pledge to sign legislation to
	establish a national intelligence director with budget and
	other authority over all of the various intelligence agencies
	throughout government?
	Mr. Ridge. I believe the president during a congressional
	briefing last week indicated his total support not only of the
	concept and the office of national intelligence director, but
	also expressed publicly to the members, your colleagues
	assembled, both chambers, both sides of the aisle, that he
	thought individual should be vested with complete budget
	authority.
	Mrs. Christensen. But it would bring together all
	intelligence under that one director?
	Mr. Ridge. Yes. The budget authority would be brought
	together under the national intelligence director.
	Mrs. Christensen. In light of this and your comments, is it
	your recommendation that President Bush should endorse, or that
	a president should endorse and pledge to sign legislation to
	establish a national intelligence director with budget and
	other authority over all of the various intelligence agencies
	throughout government?
	Mr. Ridge. I believe the president, during a congressional
	briefing last week, indicated his total support not only of the
	concept and the office of national intelligence director, but
	also expressed publicly to the members, your colleagues
	assembled, both chambers, both sides of the aisles, that he
	thought that individual should be vested with complete budget
	authority.
	Mrs. Christensen. But it would bring together all
	intelligence under that one director?
	Mr. Ridge. Yes. The budget authority would be brought
	together under the national intelligence director. But as part
	of the president's proposal, you would have the national
	intelligence director.
	But you would also have a joint intelligence community
	council; that means those who have a legitimate reason to
	discuss with the intelligence director intelligence
	requirements, intelligence needs, budget priorities. There are
	a lot of operational issues that need to be vetted throughout
	the intelligence community.
	So the president has said, strong national intelligence
	director, but to be supported and to interact with the joint
	intelligence community council. And those are all Cabinet-level
	members who would rely upon the NID for collection and analysis
	and the like.
	Mrs. Christensen. One final question. I was not clear that
	you supported having one committee for oversight. For example,
	the establishment of this committee--
	Mr. Ridge. I will let you decide which one it should be.
	Obviously, from our perspective, Madam Congresswoman, the fewer
	the better. I guess the fewest is one.
	[Laughter.]
	But there might be something, however, understanding the
	unique nature of the intelligence role that we play, that at
	least for the information-analysis piece to be accountable,
	responsible and to have the oversight from the Intelligence
	Committee as well.
	Mrs. Christensen. Thank you.
	Thank you, Mr. Chair.
	Mr. Shays. [Presiding.] Mr. Markey? We will not hit the
	clock until you actually sit down and say your first word.
	Okay. Time has started.
	Mr. Markey. Can I appeal the Chair?
	[Laughter.]
	Welcome, Mr. Secretary.
	Mr. Secretary, could a Beslan occur in Boston or Birmingham
	or Baltimore?
	Mr. Ridge. From what I know now, and we still do not have
	all the information relative to how several dozen terrorists
	gained control of the school, but based on preliminary
	information, I would say that it is very unlikely, but there
	are still probably some lessons to be learned. And right now,
	much of the information we have received is just through open-
	source reporting.
	But I think in this business, you never say never. And we
	do need to take a look at what transpired; how so many people
	managed to get their way, I think, surreptitiously; how so many
	explosive devices appear to have already been in place; how so
	many weapons may have already been inside the school.
	It is not as if the school was rushed by a platoon of
	terrorists. There is something else at work here, Congressman.
	And until I know and all of us know completely what happened, I
	think it would very difficult to draw conclusions.
	Having said that, I think I know where your line of
	questioning is going. And improving security around our
	educational system, regardless of Beslan, is something we need
	to do, and have done and will continue to do.
	Mr. Markey. Are you in the process of doing an examination
	of the lessons of this Russian catastrophe?
	Mr. Ridge. Yes. We are, the intelligence community is, and
	the FBI is.
	Again, much of the initial information we received was,
	frankly, just through their TV commentary and press reports. We
	are getting more information from the government. But I do not
	think anyone would conclude that we have complete information
	yet, Congressman.
	But we try to learn from any of these incidents overseas
	involving a terrorist attack, see if there are lessons we can
	apply here.
	Mr. Markey. Obviously, we spend a lot of time talking here
	about chemical facilities and nuclear facilities, about New
	York City and Washington, D.C., being potential targets.
	Clearly, what has happened here is that the playing field
	has been broadened by these terrorists, and they realize the
	impact that they can have upon a country. And, obviously, on
	September 11th there were 19 terrorists who were suicidal,
	potentially well armed. And if that kind of an incident
	occurred in a school, in a community in our country, it would
	be the most horrific event that we had ever witnessed.
	And I think it is very important for us to take all of the
	steps that are necessary and to articulate to the American
	people what a plan would be to make sure that we would not have
	a Beslan which happened in our country.
	Mr. Ridge. Congressman, the horror associated with that
	incident speaks to the nature of the evil that we are trying to
	combat. The notion that children in school and their parents
	and their teachers, innocents all, would be subjected to the
	horror of the day, in our minds is unspeakable and
	unconscionable. So we agree on that.
	I think we also note, in response to smaller-scale but
	violence in our schools in the 1990s, there are a lot of
	schools that began, unfortunately, taking security precautions
	after Columbine and a series of shootings that occurred in our
	schools.
	A lot of our schools generally reduced the number of places
	you can enter and exit. Many of them now have uniformed, and
	some have un-uniformed police officers patrolling the halls.
	Unfortunately, some have metal detectors. So we already have a
	level of security.
	We have got a Ready for Kids program that is going to be
	part of our national preparedness campaign we are rolling out,
	working with the secretary of education.
	But we also have to--
	Mr. Markey. Could I ask you just one more quick question?
	Mr. Ridge. Sure. I am sorry.
	Mr. Markey. It is on a different subject. And it has to do
	with the direct flights from Moscow to the United States.
	A Washington Post report on September 3 indicated that TSA
	requires that all cargo loaded onto Delta and Aeroflot planes
	must also be screened for explosives.
	As you know, almost none of the cargo that is carried on
	U.S. passenger planes is inspected for explosives or other
	dangerous materials, which is a huge security loophole that
	puts airline passengers and crew members at risk.
	Other than the flights from Russia to the United States,
	are there any other instances where TSA is currently conducting
	full screening of all cargo on board?
	Chairman Cox. The gentleman's time is expired. But, Mr.
	Secretary, you can answer the question.
	Mr. Ridge. I think, in answer to your question,
	Congressman, that is an emergency directive, whether or not it
	remains a permanent part of the security infrastructure remains
	to be seen. But given the circumstances around the loss of
	those two flights and what we believe to be the reasons, we
	decided temporarily we needed to bolster their security
	measures until such time we were satisfied that they had
	frankly ramped up to the level of security that they had
	professed to have achieved long before that incident occurred.
	Mr. Markey. So you may actually discontinue the inspection
	of cargo on those flights?
	Mr. Ridge. As we try to manage the risk with regard to that
	and other flights, we continue to take a look at additional
	ways to screen cargo. There is a possibility that that would be
	discontinued, that is correct.
	Mr. Markey. I think it would be a big mistake not to screen
	those planes flying into the United States without ensuring
	that all potential explosives have been searched for on those
	planes. I do not think that we should run the risk.
	Mr. Ridge. You and I have had some very good discussions
	with regard to air cargo, and I do not want to leave you the
	impression that the Russian incident is being ignored.
	We continue to require certain levels of inspection from
	foreign carriers coming in. We are continuing to explore
	explosive technology for our domestic air cargo to start with
	potential application overseas down the road.
	There are a lot of initiatives that we have undertaken, but
	I cannot tell you with absolute certainty today that for all
	time and for all purposes those four or five flights daily in
	the United States are going to have that technical requirement.
	We do not know yet. Depends on circumstances.
	Mr. Markey. Again, I think it is a mistake.
	Chairman Cox. [Presiding.] The gentlelady from Texas, Ms.
	Granger, is recognized for 5 minutes.
	Ms. Granger. Thank you very much, and thank you for being
	us again.
	When I first came to Congress eight years ago, the numbers
	that I heard were that we could reasonably accept 300,000
	people coming into the United States a year, and we were
	getting about 1.2 million.
	I am looking at a Time magazine article ``Who Let the Door
	Open?'' And they say that it is as many as 3 million now coming
	illegally in the United States, and said a small but growing
	number come from other countries, and said that 55,890 were
	apprehended, described officially as ``other than Mexicans,''
	because more than often, it is Mexicans.
	First of all, I would ask do your numbers--to one side--do
	you believe those numbers? And the most important question is
	what are we going to do about it and what are we doing about
	our border?
	Mr. Ridge. Our numbers would differ. Unfortunately, I
	believe, they have to guesstimate the number of people that are
	not apprehended. Coming in with a conclusive figure about the
	number of people if you do not actually know who cross the
	border, I think, is somewhat speculative. But having said that,
	we admit that we have not closed the border completely.
	But I would share with you, Congressman, that I think we
	have gained significant operational control over the border
	over the past 18 months with the creation of the department. It
	is one of our highest priorities. And there is a variety of
	means that we have used to try to close the border.
	We certainly have more agents down there because of
	congressional appropriations. We have more sensor technology.
	We have begun to experiment with unmanned aerial vehicles so
	that we have basically an opportunity to see what is going on
	in some of the more perilous and difficult terrain that we have
	difficulty accessing, but illegal aliens use as a route into
	the United States
	We have much closer cooperation with our friends in the
	Mexican law enforcement community. So there are a variety of
	things at our land borders that we continue to promote to try
	to continue to close the gaps.
	Admittedly, we still have work to do.
	Ms. Granger. What more do you need? What more do you need
	from us?
	Mr. Ridge. I think, in time, depending on how the
	experiment with the unmanned aerial vehicles works out, there
	may be need for more capital, equipment and more agents.
	One of the challenges we have is to continue to generate
	even greater support form our friends in Mexico with regard to
	really backing down and eliminating the alien smuggling
	network.
	Everyone has great empathy for those young men and women
	and families that try to come across our borders. We do not
	look at Mexicans as a terrorist nation or these folks as
	terrorists. They are coming in for the same reason immigrants
	did many, many years ago.
	But we do have a responsibility to protect our borders and
	try to ensure that any immigration is legal. And so to the
	extent that we can do more to break down the illegal network
	that has been established within Mexico that supports this
	effort, I think, frankly, we are doing better there, but more
	cooperation would be helpful.
	Ms. Granger. I will be going on a tour of the border this
	coming weekend. And I know what I will see. And they take you
	to the places where it is regulated crossing. But what we are
	hearing are the crossing that are certainly not regular
	crossings.
	And, you know, the border is so long, the number of
	agents--I do not see how we can ever get there from the number
	of agents. So it has to be technology, it seems to me.
	Mr. Ridge. I think the biggest challenge we have is: What
	are the kinds of technology that we can deploy along the border
	that give us the information, the awareness, the alertness that
	we need to interdict.
	And we are experimenting with different kinds of sensors.
	And the latest experiment, I think, has high potential, great
	potential, the unmanned aerial vehicles.
	Ms. Granger. Thank you very much.
	Chairman Cox. The gentlelady's time has expired.
	The gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Cardin, is recognized for
	5 minutes.
	Mr. Cardin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
	Mr. Secretary, it is a pleasure to have you once again
	before our committee.
	I want to follow on the Chairman's comments as to how the
	implementation of the 9/11 Commission's recommendation for a
	national intelligence director could impact on the operations
	of your agency, particularly the Information Analysis and
	Infrastructure Protection Unit, in getting information that is
	shared particularly with local government.
	There is a concern that as Congress considers how to
	implement the national intelligence director, that there are
	changes being made or suggestions being made that may affect
	the Department of Defense and how it gathers information, et
	cetera.
	My concern is that your information analysis section within
	the Department of Homeland Security, which is of utmost
	importance for our domestic needs, particularly with local
	government, that that is not compromised, as it allows local
	governments to access the up-to-date information in order to
	protect their communities.
	So I just want to give you a little bit more time to
	express whether this is being carefully reviewed to make sure
	that the needs of local governments to access information for
	your department will not be compromised as we implement the 9/
	11 Commission's recommendations.
	Mr. Ridge. Appreciate the additional time to amplify the
	earlier response.
	There is no doubt in the mind of our professionals within
	the agency that ceding to the counterterrorism center the
	responsibility and working with the NID to have a strategic
	assessment, as it relates to domestic threats, will not
	compromise the mission that you have given us; and that is to
	take a look at the domestic threat, match it or map it against
	either the potential target or the broader potential
	vulnerability, and make sure you do everything you can to
	protect the target or reduce the vulnerability.
	We will not forego, however, within our own information
	analysis unit, the responsibility and the obligation to do our
	own competitive analysis. So we will certainly take a look at
	the strategic threat, as it relates to the United States and as
	it relates to an attack, but we will also do our own analysis,
	just to make sure that we agree.
	And if we disagree, obviously, we have got to meet and
	resolve whatever the disagreement might be.
	What I think it does is I think it frees up that
	Infrastructure Analysis and Infrastructure Protection unit to
	develop and then sustain more thoroughly the kind of
	relationship I think Congress wanted the department to build
	with the state and locals; that is, get this threat
	information, credible threat information, and make sure that
	the right people receive it and that with your support or with
	your direction, they act upon it.
	And one of the challenges I think we have in the new
	intelligence structure is to determine the best way, the best
	means of communication of that threat assessment down to the
	state and locals.
	And, I mean, I think we are best equipped as a department
	or agency to do that because we have built and continued to
	build out relationship with governors, homeland security
	advisers, police and fire chiefs at the local level, and even
	into the private sector, through the Internet, video
	conferencing.
	There are a lot of ways. And we do a lot of it in
	conjunction with the FBI. But I do not think we need more than
	a couple of people communicating with the state and locals.
	Mr. Cardin. I appreciate that response. I agree with that.
	I think that the Department of Homeland Security is in the
	best position to maintain those types of relationships with
	local governments. And if it is through the national
	intelligence director or through one of the collection
	agencies, it is a lot more difficult.
	So I think that your role needs to be maintained there. And
	I hope as we work to implement the provisions that that is
	maintained.
	I just want to raise the issue that was raised by
	Congresswoman Norton, and that is the rail security issues. It
	has not been as high a priority as some of the other modes of
	transportation. We do not do the same thing with rail security
	as we do with other; with air security, for sure.
	And I know you are implementing certain pilot demonstration
	programs. I would just urge you to try to develop a reasonable
	strategy as quickly as possible working with as many
	organizations as possible. Because I do think it is an area
	that cries out for just higher priority as we try to now deal
	with the vulnerabilities of our country.
	Mr. Ridge. Well, I appreciate the comment. As you know, you
	gave us some discretion with some of the grant money. And we
	carved out some for mass transit a year or two ago.
	Actually, there were some very appropriate lessons learned
	there. And you should also know that we have on a daily basis
	an ongoing working relationship with the railroad industry,
	mass transit industry generally. And so we are not vetting
	these independently of their input.
	So as we develop our national transportation strategy and
	then focus in on mass transit, we are going to take a look at
	lessons learned in Madrid, take a look at the technology and
	the pilot programs we have been running, take a look at
	measures, some of the initiatives that some of the initiatives
	that have been undertaken without any federal support, and see
	the best combination of protective measures that exist so that
	we do not compromise the purpose and the use of mass transit.
	But I just do not think we are ever going to be able to
	line up, and you basically undermine the purpose of mass
	transit. But there is certainly more that we can do, and we are
	hopeful that technology can fill a substantial part of that
	security gap.
	Mr. Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
	Chairman Cox. The chairman of the Subcommittee on Emergency
	Preparedness and Response, the gentleman from Arizona, Mr.
	Shadegg, is recognized for 5 minutes.
	Mr. Shadegg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you very much for being
	here. I certainly appreciate your testimony here today and your
	efforts on our nation's behalf.
	I particularly want to express my appreciation for your
	efforts on the Arizona border, for your visit there last
	December. As you will recall, we were able to spend the day in
	helicopters over the border and look at it, and had a great
	policy discussion thereafter.
	I also want to express my appreciation for your efforts on
	the Arizona Border Control Initiative. I think that, along with
	the additional allocation of resources to the problem in
	Arizona of smugglers particularly, the coyotes who bring in
	individuals for pay, and some of the safe houses that you have
	been able to go after.
	And I just want to make it clear that you understand I
	appreciate all of those efforts. It has made a material
	difference. And my constituents for I think the first time in
	many years see that the federal government is at least focusing
	on, if not yet solved the problem of an open border on the
	southern side of the nation.
	I think everybody understands this is an extremely
	difficult issue, but they also appreciate the fact that there
	are now resources being devoted to the Arizona-Mexico border,
	whereas in the past, those resources, at least in my district,
	were perceived as going to other states. So on behalf of the
	people of Arizona, I want to say thanks.
	As you know, there is an article in this week's Time
	magazine and there has been some focus on the OTMs, other than
	Mexicans, that are crossing the border that have been
	intercepted. I wondered if you have a comment about that, as
	that directly implicates the issue of homeland security and the
	concern I have, which is of trying to prevent an attack before
	one occurs.
	Mr. Ridge. The article did not refer to another new
	initiative. Actually, the article did not refer to anything
	that we are doing in the Department of Homeland Security, which
	is a point of frustration, but I guess that is literary
	license.
	Mr. Shadegg. Here is your shot.
	Mr. Ridge. Well, we are doing a lot. It is a shame some of
	it was not mentioned in the article. But with regard to the
	OTMs, other than Mexicans, we have a program now of expedited
	removal which we are working in two areas to determine the cost
	and to see how effective it is.
	But, frankly, until we had the department, and until we had
	this expedited removal program, if those illegals came in
	through a non-port of entry--in other words, if they did not
	walk up and try to get through one of the regular ports of
	entry, they came in through wilderness area--we had a difficult
	time in dealing with them. We sometimes apprehended them,
	sometimes let them go and said, ``Report back for a hearing.''
	Now, when we apprehend them, we want to them around and
	send them back to their country of origin.
	So I think, again, one of the new initiatives that we are
	working on dealing with other than Mexican illegals coming
	across the border at non-ports of entry is the expedited
	removal program.
	In time, I think we will probably look for additional
	dollars to accelerate the program. We do not want to just
	replace them across the border, we want to send them back home.
	Mr. Shadegg. As you know, the administration has proposed
	or considered and is looking at seriously some type of a guest
	worker program. Those words, in my district, cause some
	consternation, and yet there are many of us who believe you can
	never completely seal that border. We have put a lot of people
	on it.
	And I think the prospect of sealing it when the economic
	pressure to come across is so great, it seems to me we could be
	better devoting our resources to the people who cross the
	border with evil intent, with animus, terrorists, if we had a
	program which set aside and enabled people who want to come
	here for the economic opportunity, just to get money and send
	it back home to their families.
	And I wondered if you had looked at that issue from that
	perspective.
	Mr. Ridge. I think it is hugely important from a security
	perspective if you legitimize the presence of people coming to
	and from the United States, particularly Mexicans, for work,
	and accompany that with a much more vigorous enforcement, you
	will serve to, one, respect the economic needs of both the
	employee and the employer.
	And as the president said, not satisfactory if you are
	going to replace a job for which an American citizen might be
	hired, but you respect the economic need of employer and
	employee, but you also say to those who seek employment here,
	there is only one way to get it, one legitimate way to get
	employment.
	And I must say this: It is not just more border enforcement
	along the land border. We are going to have to have some
	rigorous enforcement within the business community--
	Mr. Shadegg. Absolutely.
	Mr. Ridge. --for those, if we had the program, would seek
	to still go around the expressed intent of the policy, and that
	is to legitimize the presence of foreign nationals for
	employment purposes.
	So I can see it adding enormous benefit to our security
	measures at the border, so we can just focus our people and
	technology on those who are not legitimately present, period.
	Mr. Shadegg. Those who are a real threat. I could not agree
	more.
	I do not know if I have time remaining. I would like to
	focus on intelligence for just a moment. A lot of
	recommendations have been made to us with regard to--
	Chairman Cox. The gentleman's time has expired.
	Mr. Shadegg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Oregon, Mr. DeFazio, is
	recognized for 5 minutes.
	Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Mr. Secretary, good to see you again. Thank you.
	A quick note, before I get started here, after your last
	testimony before the committee, I had had some questions about
	disaster medical assistance teams and you asked I follow up in
	writing. I did on March 19th. But we have had no response. If
	you could prod your staff on that, it would be great.
	I think it is an important issue to better utilize them and
	to get their new chain of command straightened out.
	I have some questions relating to aviation, in particular,
	my concern in the aftermath of the Russian incident, which,
	actually, I have had a concern long before that about plastics
	explosives.
	Just week before last when I was flying back for a hearing
	of the aviation committee during the August break, I was flying
	out of a different airport--Medford--and I watched as a person
	who had been profiled with the black S's, they took him aside
	for additional screening, including using a metal detector on
	the bottoms of his bare feet. He was not wearing socks.
	Now, here is the point. They wanded the bottoms of his bare
	feet. He had the black S's. They did not frisk him. So if he
	was wearing a suicide belt, they got no clue. You are not going
	to find a suicide belt with a metal detector or a wand that is
	hand-held.
	And I feel very strongly about, sort of, our protocols
	here. I asked Admiral Stone that next day at that hearing about
	that, and said: Are you going to start frisking people who are
	selectees or otherwise looking for hidden plastics explosives?
	And at that point, he said, no. I think that is a grave error.
	You know, there will be no metal in a plastic explosives
	belt. I mean, because they are not trying to wound people like
	in Israel. They just want to take down a plane. It does not
	have to be in a belt either. It could be otherwise concealed,
	electronic devices the size of an iPod.
	There is technology out there. The staff of Homeland
	Security admitted in a meeting with aviation staff that the
	technology for portals is mature. There is no reason to pilot
	it as we are doing now in five airports this year and nine next
	year. It is mature. It has worked. It is used at defense
	installations and nuclear plants.
	Can you give me any idea if you are going to push a little
	here with your folks and maybe move us ahead more quickly on
	plastic explosives detection?
	Mr. Ridge. Let me respond, I think, in two parts to your
	inquiry. First of all, I believe since the time you had the
	conversation with Admiral Stone, the whole issue of patting
	down folks, in secondary, has been revisited.
	And, you know, it is a matter that we constantly wrestle
	with with privacy, with decency or with how we can
	appropriately check passengers for the possibility of carrying
	on their person explosive devices--
	Mr. DeFazio. Right.
	Mr. Ridge. We decided to change that policy and allow for a
	different and more vigorous body check, again, trying to
	respond to the concerns of privacy and decency and the like.
	Previous patting was actually with the external part of
	your--as crazy as it may sound, but we had people patting down
	the back of their hands. And that has been changed so that a
	more thorough and more routine patting down can occur.
	And of course, there is the gender-specific, as well. But
	we are going to try to address it in as delicate and as
	responsible and respectful a way as possible.
	I do not know the staff members that concluded that the
	technology is cost-effective and error prone, or at least it
	does not give us a false-positive rate at a level that would
	cause us to think twice about it, but I will personally get
	back to you within the next 10 days on that issue, so that the
	delay between the last letter and now, which hopefully we will
	rectify by then, but I will get back to you personally on that
	issue.
	Mr. DeFazio. Well, in addition to the trace portals, I have
	seen the ion scan at National; that is a good step forward. But
	there is also--
	Mr. Ridge. I am just not sure how accurate, I am not sure
	how--I do not have the technical assessment with me. I will
	personally get back to you on that.
	Mr. DeFazio. Okay. There is another promising technology,
	too, which, again, I had demonstrated a couple years ago, which
	is a back scatter X-ray which exposes a person down to the
	skin. And what I heard two years ago from I think Admiral Loy
	at the time, or maybe it was still even Mr. McGaw, was, well,
	the potential for embarrassment.
	I said, ``Well, you know, we can take care of that
	technologically. You give them whatever body they want. It just
	shows where on the body things are located.''
	And Admiral Stone said there is a big breakthrough and now
	they have developed it so they can do it with a stick figure.
	It should not have taken two years.
	And that also is very promising to find things concealed on
	the body.
	So I would hope that we can just move ahead with some sense
	of urgency, because I just think we are biding our time until
	we see a similar attempt on a U.S. flight.
	And given the fact that we are doing a much better job on
	baggage, even though that is not totally secure yet, I expect
	they may well try carry-on explosives, and we need to do what
	we can there.
	Mr. Ridge. Congressman, I want to assure you, we share the
	sense of urgency. You have given us--been very generous to our
	science and technology unit, and we are looking precisely for
	those kind of technologies to add another layer of security to
	aviation.
	Mr. DeFazio. Thank you.
	Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Chairman Cox. The gentleman's time is expired.
	The gentlelady from New York, Ms. Lowey, is recognized for
	5 minutes.
	Mrs. Lowey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	And welcome, Mr. Secretary.
	While the focus in the media and in Congress with respect
	to the September 11 Commission report has been on the major
	structural changes recommended, I hope that we can focus for a
	moment on the recommendations that could be implemented
	immediately, in many cases without enacting legislation.
	Strengthening airport security, and I think it is
	appropriate that I am following my good friend Mr. DeFazio,
	because we have both been working in this area, and it has been
	one of the areas in which we have an identifiable failure and
	specific commonsense remedies at our disposal.
	We know that in the wake of September 11th we passed
	legislation requiring the physical screening of all airport
	workers. We know that airport workers have been implicated in
	plans to use their access to secure airport facilities for
	illegal operations. The most recent major case in the news was
	the drug smuggling ring at JFK Airport in New York.
	And as you may know, a June 2004 GAO report, a report with
	which TSA generally agreed, found that vulnerabilities in
	airport security remain, and that the most recent security
	directives failed to fully address these concerns.
	The 9/11 Commission report recommends clearly that a TSA
	security plan ``take into consideration the full array of
	possible enemy tactics, such as the use of insiders.''
	When I asked Chairman Kean about worker screening, he
	replied firmly, ``Everybody should go through metal detectors.
	Everybody should go through metal detectors. My belief, without
	exception.''
	Mr. Secretary, I was pleased before that, within another
	context, you referred to international standards. Many of my
	colleagues and I have repeatedly urged the adoption of stricter
	worker screening standards in our nation's airports. We have
	repeatedly been told by TSA that they are too expensive, too
	inconvenient to implement.
	However, at Heathrow Airport in London, the busiest
	international airport in the world, 100 percent of workers are
	physically screened, and that at Charles de Gaulle in Paris,
	they are working to meet that standing.
	Well, first of all, to my understanding, no cost analysis
	of such a screening has ever been done. And even so, I would
	hope that cost and inconvenience would not be the deciding
	factor besides whether or not the TSA implements such a
	program.
	And just a few questions. How would you suggest I answer my
	constituents who ask why airport workers who are going into
	secure, sterile areas--food service workers, ramp worker, et
	cetera--are not subject to the same physical screening standard
	as airline passengers?
	Are there other fundamental security procedures that have
	been considered and then rejected because of a perceived
	inconvenience?
	And will you, Mr. Secretary, perhaps we can make news
	today, will you issue a security directive requiring that all
	airport workers and their possessions receive the same physical
	screening as passengers?
	Now, I have to just tell you, I have a congressional badge.
	I expect that I am going to go through the metal detectors. But
	the workers, ramp workers, food caterers, had their background
	check, which might have been issued two years ago. They do not
	have to go through metal detectors. It is left up to the
	discretion of the airports.
	I think this is absurd. It is outrageous. Can you make a
	decision today directing the TSA to issue that order that
	everyone who has access to secure, sterile areas must go
	through the metal detectors?
	Mr. Ridge. We have been in the process of reviewing some
	security directives that would subject employees to go through
	a physical inspection--
	Mrs. Lowey. Could I be rude and interrupt you?
	Mr. Ridge. No, if you would just bear with me 30 seconds,
	so I can check. Along with a contract that we let out to an
	organization to begin to accelerate the process for
	transportation worker identification cards so we can do
	background checks, biometrics, et cetera, as well.
	I just need to confirm something. If you will excuse me,
	Madam Congresswoman. Bear with me.
	I ask the unanimous consent that the gentlelady have
	another however much time I am consuming by--
	Chairman Cox. The witness is out of order.
	Mr. Ridge. Just wanted to make sure, Congresswoman.
	We have implemented additional screening requirements for
	airport workers that come into the secure areas so that they
	will be physically inspected.
	There are other zones, yet--and this is the worker who may
	be involved in one of the shops or the restaurants, et cetera,
	so when they come in, they are inspected.
	The secure area, the sterile area, that around the
	airplanes themselves, the ramp area, they are to be covered
	under the transportation worker program identification card
	where we do background checks, issue a biometrics, so we can
	make a decision that these are not terrorists. They are who
	they say they are. We have confirmed their identity not only
	with a background check, but with a security check.
	So we are not quite where you want us to be. But we have
	begun the process of running employees who work in the secured
	area through physical inspections.
	Mrs. Lowey. If I may just continue for a moment--
	Mr. Ridge. Please.
	Mrs. Lowey. --and I know Mr. DeFazio has been working on
	this, as I have, and he probably much longer.
	Number one, he has requested information from FAA and TSA
	that he has not received--we have not received--clearly
	outlining the security procedures in place at each airport.
	Because, as you well know, or your staff in consulting with
	you, it is up to the individual airport.
	I think this is outrageous. This has been going on--it is
	three years since 9/11--
	Mr. DeFazio. Nita? Nita? Could I? I am sorry, it is over
	here.
	Actually, he did. And it is confusing because they talk
	about secure and sterile. The major focus of what I had been
	asking and they could not provide was about the secure areas
	and the workers going into the terminals. They now have a
	uniform rule that everybody has to go through screening.
	Now the other area in question is the one you are raising
	questions about, which is the sterile area--
	Mrs. Lowey. Correct.
	Mr. Ridge. Which is access to the airplanes and the--
	Chairman Cox. The gentlelady's time has expired. The time
	belongs to Mr. Pascrell.
	And I have already granted the gentlelady an additional
	minute and a half, but the secretary can certainly answer the
	question.
	Mrs. Lowey. Well, let me just make, if I may, one, if you
	could get back to me, it is my understanding that airport
	workers are still going into sterile areas without going
	through metal detectors. And I have been told by the local
	airport and other airports, until it is mandated, until this
	cost is picked up, they cannot do it.
	I think this directive has to be put in place. I will keep
	going through metal detectors; you should; and everyone who
	could possibly put an explosive on a plane, seems to me, should
	be going through a metal detector. And it is so simple. We do
	not have to go through this great reorganization of our
	government.
	Chairman Cox. Gentlelady's time has expired.
	Mrs. Lowey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence.
	And I hope we can continue the discussion.
	Chairman Cox. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Pascrell,
	is recognized for 5 minutes.
	Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Mr. Secretary, there are a few areas in the 9/11 report
	which the Homeland Security Department does not have direct
	attention to, and that is in the area of our relationships with
	other countries. You brought up one of the examples of
	biometric standards, looking for a universal standard, because
	we are going to need the cooperation of other countries in
	order to employ that particular standard. How critical it is.
	And chapter 12 of the 9/11 report deals with the subject of
	our relationships with other countries. And you know that, Mr.
	Secretary, I am not asking you respond to this, you know our
	relationships with other countries in the last two years has
	gone south, whether we are talking about Ireland, whether we
	are talking about Greece, whether we are talking about a lot of
	other countries.
	Not only in the biometric standards are we seeking to have
	cooperation from other countries, but we need cooperation from
	other countries if we are going to check the containers that
	come into this country.
	We cannot--we cannot--we have been told over and over
	again, have enough of the state-of-the-art to check every
	container, the millions of containers that come into this
	country, from every port into our ports into this country, and
	that is why we have sought--and some countries are cooperating;
	many countries are cooperating, from what I understand--that
	they are checking the container before it gets on the ship that
	is coming to the United States of America.
	And this is only part of the example. If we do not have the
	cooperation from other countries, we cannot do--you cannot do
	your job, we cannot do our job.
	Would you just briefly comment on that?
	Mr. Ridge. First of all, in a broader context, Congressman,
	I think you are right. As we try to build a global response to
	a global threat, and we improve security around commercial
	aviation and commercial shipping, and to improve the process
	around where all countries are comfortable with people and
	cargo coming across their borders, therefore developing
	standards with regard to maritime safety, aviation safety,
	document authentication and identity verification is critically
	important.
	I would say there has been great cooperation in those areas
	among our allies. The Coast Guard took the lead in working with
	the International Maritime Organization to begin developing
	security measures relating to ports and vessels, and Congress
	followed on when it passed the Maritime Transportation and
	Safety Act.
	We have begun working with the European Union on getting
	advance passenger information, and along that process have
	begun discussions with them about biometric standards that will
	provide added layers of security so that we know the person
	that gets the document is the person that comes into this
	country.
	We are working a process right now within our own
	Department of State so that if a foreigner gets a visa, they
	will have their photograph taken, the finger scans given so
	that when they come into a port of entry here, we can match the
	photograph and the finger scans. That is helping us
	domestically; we need international standards like that across
	the board.
	The Container Security Initiative, we are in 25 countries.
	We are not there unless they agree. And matter of fact, most of
	those countries help pay for the technology.
	So with regard to some of the initiatives that we have
	undertaken, and certainly from a law enforcement and an
	information sharing-basis, I think the collaboration within the
	broader world community has been very, very good. And frankly I
	think it is getting better.
	Mr. Pascrell. We need the international community, there
	are no two ways about it. And I hope that we can have damage
	control. And I hope with people like yourself--yourself--that
	you will have--you know, because Chapter 12 has been ignored by
	most folks who look into the commission report, and that is a
	critical part of this.
	You know, I have seen fear. I have seen terror in the faces
	of people, Mr. Secretary. We do not need folks attacking us,
	because we are talking about non-state terrorism, for the most
	part. But I have seen terror on the streets of America of folks
	who cannot look out their windows in areas that are consumed by
	illicit drugs.
	And I am very concerned about that terror that is just as
	real as the terror that you are doing such a wonderful job in.
	I am very concerned about drugs. They are off the map. We do
	not even talk about them.
	And you know you can go to most cities in this country, and
	there is terror, and it is spreading into the suburban
	communities, and it has been spreading for a long time.
	I am not making a political statement. I remember when we
	first started this committee.
	Chairman Cox. The gentleman's time has expired.
	The gentleman may proceed with the balance of his question.
	Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	I remember when we first started this committee, we asked
	the Coast Guard and we asked the FBI if we were going to be
	taking away personnel and resources in looking at non-state
	terrorism and perhaps neglecting the interdiction which is so
	critical to more and more drugs which are getting into this
	country. That is, to me, part of homeland security, isn't it?
	Mr. Ridge. I think, number one, you should know that all
	the agencies that we inherited who had a role within our war to
	combat illicit drug traffic still participate aggressively and
	very, very effectively.
	You are right, Congressman, it is another form of chemical
	warfare, and we have been waging that battle for a long, long
	time, and it is a weapon of mass effect.
	But you should be assured that the resources we have--I
	mean, there is so much interplay between illicit drug networks
	and illegal human networks, smuggling networks and potential
	terrorist networks so that when we work with the Mexican
	community with regard to illegal human smuggling or drugs or
	others, you should know that that collaboration has improved
	significantly.
	And we have not lost sight of the fact that an historic
	mission or responsibility for the Coast Guard and for other
	elements within our department is combating drugs, and frankly,
	pulling these together--these units together under one
	department.
	And I would love to have Roger Mackin come up and spend
	some time with you. He has done a wonderful job in our
	department seeing to it that these resources have been
	integrated. We see change in the migratory pattern of drug
	traffic because of the interdictions in a certain part of the
	Caribbean and efforts we have undertaken both with all the
	assets we have and other resources within the federal
	government. We are seeing some of the drug flow patterns change
	because the interdiction is getting much, much better.
	So I am going to make it a point to have Roger come up and
	spend a little time with you. I think you would be very
	comforted and appreciate the fact that even within this
	Department of Homeland Security, this historic mission has--we
	have a sense of urgency about it, and we have made some
	significant changes in affecting the flow of drugs to the
	country.
	Chairman Cox. The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee,
	is recognized for 5 minutes.
	Ms. Jackson-Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
	Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member.
	Mr. Secretary, I think we to a one have said that you have
	done a very able job on a very, very tough task, and I thank
	you for it. I am going to try and run through this like a
	locomotive train.
	One, if you could refer to the Transportation Security
	Administration on this expedited card process where you had the
	five pilot airports that were engaging in it, where you get an
	ID card--can I ask you to extend on that?
	There was a 2,000 cap, meaning you enrolled 2,000 persons.
	I think it was a 90-day--and we are being asked all over the
	country if it could be extended for 30 days. And that is just a
	request. If you can get me an answer back.
	Houston happens to be one of the airports. And we would
	appreciate that extension, if you could do so.
	A quick question: Do we have enough money to fund the US-
	VISIT program and have the proper staff? Also, would you
	comment on your understanding and support of the concept of the
	privacy office that was recommended by the 9/11 Commission?
	Three quick questions together.
	And the last one: I wrote a letter on March 19, 2004, where
	I inquired as to what security enhancements are reimbursable. A
	letter came back. But one of the concerns that was raised was
	this whole idea of the monies coming to the states--you have
	heard this many, many times--and then having to translate into
	smaller jurisdictions like cities.
	Houston happens to be the fourth largest city in the
	nation. And my concern is that in those instances, many time
	politics gets in the way sometimes of the generating of those
	dollars. Mayors have asked you, some of us have asked you--I
	happen to be one of those that believes dollars should go to
	the more vulnerable places--so I support the concepts of New
	York and California and Houston.
	Could you help us in how we can eliminate the politics when
	you start sending dollars to states and then local
	jurisdictions are somewhat inhibited by getting those dollars?
	Maybe you could just talk about the sort of fire wall that
	prevents any kind of negative politics from getting to--cities
	not getting dollars.
	The last two points are somewhat testimonial statements.
	Lou Dobbs, the Times, everyone has been talking about the
	trials and tribulations at the border. I just came back from
	the border, just a few weeks or so ago. There is just a great
	catastrophe, if you will.
	But I am glad to hear you mention the fact that the borders
	are more of concern than the 12 million to 14 million
	undocumented that are in this country that are already hear
	working and paying taxes and doing what they need to do, and
	that has to do with fixing the immigration system.
	How can we best work with the borders? How can we border
	states best work with you? How can we get more dollars for
	border patrol and technology and as well provide more beds for
	detainees when they actually are arrested?
	And I come to my last point, which has to do with the whole
	question of the organization of the Department of Homeland
	Security, pursuant to 9/11.
	One, give me your answer again about the structure of
	committees in the Congress, what is better suited for you in
	terms of committees. And give me an answer as it relates to the
	real reform of the intelligence system, how important that is
	for the Homeland Security Committee to get good intelligence in
	order to be able to secure the homeland.
	I would offer my own editorial comment and just say that I
	know that there is testimony going on today on a person
	nominated. I am not sure for what, because we do not know
	whether we are looking at a national intelligence director.
	But let me just say, with respect to Mr. Goss, my concern
	is that there is not a sense of independence; there is not a
	sense of being a reformer. And I might question someone who was
	averse to having an investigation of the CIA when there was
	questions about whether a covert agent had been uncovered.
	So I hope that you will weigh in, quietly, on how the
	intelligence will be effective and you working in the Homeland
	Security Department.
	But in any event, I know hopefully you will be able to
	answer, at least partially, some of my questions.
	Thank you.
	Mr. Ridge. Congresswoman, let me see if I can respond
	quickly to all very appropriate questions.
	First of all, I will tell you that it is unlikely that you
	will see a 30-day extension. Frankly, if there is good lessons
	learned, with regard to the registered traveler program--we
	think there will be--we would like to expand it nationally, not
	on a pilot, but make it a national program.
	So I think it is unlikely--we felt 90 days was time
	enough--I think it is unlikely we will get the extension.
	Yes, we do have sufficient dollars coming, I think, in the
	fiscal year 2005 budget for US-VISIT. We will be asking for
	more as we prepare a budget for next year.
	The notion of a privacy council, given all the initiatives
	that this government has taken since 9/11 to enhance security I
	think is very consistent with what America would expect, what
	the president wants, and what the Congress frankly directed we
	do within Homeland Security; and that is we must continue to
	preserve the freedoms and liberties and the protections we have
	had as we combat terrorism.
	And we must generate and create a culture of awareness of
	these privacy concerns so that at the very outset, as we are
	thinking about new initiatives that would enhance security, we
	would be worried about the privacy, and we would be worried
	about civil liberties.
	And so I think it is a historic move. It is something that
	has been done in other parts of the world. And whatever the
	ultimate constitution of that committee might be, the president
	has taken I think a very appropriate bold step by saying,
	administration-wide, we are going to have this privacy council.
	I know the two extraordinary attorneys that I have on my
	staff, one dealing with civil liberties and freedom, the other
	dealing with privacy issues will be part of that group, so--
	Ms. Granger. [Presiding.] I am going to interrupt you, Mr.
	Secretary. I am sorry. We have got a vote, and we have got one
	last person to ask questions, Mr. Etheridge.
	Mr. Ridge. All right, well, let us let him go. And I am
	going to call you, Congresswoman, and answer the rest of the
	questions.
	Ms. Granger. Good. Thank you.
	Mr. Etheridge. Thank you.
	And thank you, Mr. Secretary, and thank you for staying.
	You have a huge challenge in the broad breadth of what you have
	to do.
	Let me return back to one. I have asked this question to a
	number of our witnesses when I have had the opportunity and--
	Ms. Granger. We have 9 minutes left before the vote.
	Mr. Etheridge. --and I must confess, we have not gotten a
	resolution to it yet. You started on it, well, just let me
	return.
	Just last week, the America Preparedness Campaign released
	their report on the preparedness of America's 20 largest school
	districts, by and large most of them are metropolitan, urban
	school districts, in their preparedness for security, terror,
	et cetera.
	And certainly the incidents in Russia shocked us all,
	shocked us to a new realization. And having served as a
	superintendent of schools in North Carolina, I think we have
	done a lot of things putting people in place.
	My question is, though in keeping with that, because it is
	not uniform across the country as you well know--urban as well
	as rural--do you think the schools should be added to the
	national critical infrastructure list of having enough
	information to be able to pull together a critical
	infrastructure of what needs to happen in response, or what
	ought to happen?
	Mr. Ridge. Well, I think, first of all, we know schools are
	certainly intellectually and emotionally part of our critical
	infrastructure.
	Mr. Etheridge. Absolutely.
	Mr. Ridge. I also think that we have said that out of the
	billions we are giving to state and local governments, some of
	those dollars are eligible to be used to enhance security
	around schools as well. So whether or not they are on a
	national list of private sector infrastructure, it is not as
	important as they are eligible for some of the dollars, the
	billions of dollars we distributed to the states and locals,
	depending on the need of that school district or that school--
	Mr. Etheridge. Let me follow that up--
	Ms. Granger. Mr. Etheridge, let me say, we have about 6
	minutes left before the vote. And of course we promised
	Secretary Ridge that he would be out of here by 4:30. So if you
	can do it very quickly.
	Mr. Etheridge. I still I have a little time on my clock
	please. I was here for the last meeting and did not get to ask
	questions.
	Ms. Granger. All right.
	Mr. Etheridge. Mr. Secretary, in keeping with that, we have
	a lot of schools that, in addition to that, children in a lot
	of trailers across America. And they are isolated from the main
	buildings for security purposes.
	And in addition to what you have just said, they add an
	additional vulnerability for principals and teachers and those
	who are in those buildings because I know of instances where we
	have had situations not like what happened in Russia.
	Would you care to comment on that? Because I think that is
	a critical piece as we look down the road, and not just say
	they are eligible.
	Mr. Ridge. I must say, respectfully, to a former
	superintendent talking to a former governor, there is a shared
	responsibility--
	Mr. Etheridge. Absolutely.
	Mr. Ridge. --when it comes to education. And the decision
	for whatever reason for a particular school district to isolate
	a building from the main school is certainly within the purview
	of that school district or that secretary of education. And if
	there is, frankly, if there are attendant security problems
	associated with that permanent isolation of the building, one
	could argue very appropriately that it is much more a
	responsibility of the local or the state government.
	Having said that, Ready for Kids will be part of our roll-
	out of our national preparedness campaign, working with the
	school districts to review security procedures, evacuation
	procedures, emergency procedures when the children might be
	required to stay at school, and under what circumstances not
	only do they stay, but how we support them.
	There are a large range of issues where I do think the
	federal government has a role to play and federal resources can
	be used. Not to get down in the weeds, but the kind of
	situation you described, I think, is much more local and state
	than federal.
	Mr. Etheridge. Let me clarify that. I think you
	misunderstood my question.
	In some cases, you have school districts who are growing so
	rapidly or for lack of resources, they wind up being isolated
	unintentionally because they are in trailers rather than the
	main building. And this creates some additional problem.
	And if we can make resources available to those who are at
	least eligible, I think it would add a lot of security to those
	local jurisdictions.
	Mr. Ridge. I think the first responsibility of the local
	school district and the state department of education is to
	educate and, secondly, to make sure they are being educated in
	a secure environment.
	There is a role that the federal government has in support
	of both of those missions. And we have made some progress in
	advancing those roles with the Ready for Kids, working with the
	Department of Education on some of the procedures that I
	mentioned.
	And from a personal point of view, I would love to continue
	the private conversation, since we ran out of time.
	Mr. Etheridge. I would like to do that, if we could,
	please. Thank you.
	And I yield back.
	Ms. Granger. I thank Secretary Ridge for his valuable
	testimony and the members for their questions and
	participation.
	The member of the committee may have some additional
	questions for the witness, and we will ask you to respond to
	those in writing.
	The hearing record will be held open for 10 days.
	[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

	For the Record

	The Honorable Tom Ridges's Responses to Questions for the Record from
	the Honorable John E. Sweeney

	Acting Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis Karen Morr submits
	on behalf of DHS.

	If all the President's announced intelligence reform initiatives
	and Executive Orders were fully implemented today, how would it
	strengthen:

	Collection of terrorist network information:
	Response: The collection of terrorism information requires a robust
	collection capability that fully leverages the Homeland Security
	Community, Intelligence Community (IC), Law Enforcement (LE), and other
	Communities of Interest (COIs) collection and information-gathering
	resources. The collection of terrorism information is a matter of
	national concern and an area in which overarching collection guidelines
	would serve to ensure the integration of collection activities among
	Federal and non-federal collectors of terrorism information. The
	National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) in concert with the Interagency
	Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT)* will work to identify a
	common list of terrorism information needs to ensure collection is
	appropriately tasked to fulfill intelligence gaps and shortfalls.
	The DHS Office of Information Analysis (IA) has several efforts
	underway to increase reporting from within the Department and from
	nontraditional external partners. Jointly with the FBI, IA produced
	Terrorist Threat Reporting Guides to improve information collection
	from state and local law enforcement and homeland security officials as
	well as from critical infrastructure owners, operators, and security
	managers. IA is also developing a cadre of reports officers who are
	exploiting DHS-origin information to publish that of counterterrorism
	interest and is of value to the greater communities of interest.
	<SUP>*</SUP> The</SUP> IICT</SUP> is</SUP> the</SUP> interagency</SUP>
	forum</SUP> for</SUP> coordination</SUP> and</SUP> cooperation</SUP> on</SUP>
	counterterrorism-related</SUP> intelligence</SUP> activities,</SUP>
	including</SUP> collection</SUP> requirements.</SUP> The</SUP> IICT</SUP>
	has</SUP> representation</SUP> from</SUP> over</SUP> 50</SUP> U.S.</SUP>
	government</SUP> agencies</SUP> and</SUP> organizations</SUP> from</SUP>
	the</SUP> intelligence,</SUP> law</SUP> enforcement,</SUP> regulatory,</SUP>
	defense,</SUP> and</SUP> consequence</SUP> management</SUP>
	communities.</SUP> The</SUP> Committee</SUP> currently</SUP> reviews</SUP>
	terrorism</SUP> priorities</SUP> on</SUP> a</SUP> quarterly</SUP>
	basis.

	</SUP>Integration of intelligence and infrastructure vulnerability:
	Response: Through the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Department
	of Homeland Security (DHS) Information Analysis and Infrastructure
	Protection (IAIP) Directorate is charged with ``integrating relevant
	information, intelligence analyses, and vulnerability assessments
	(whether such information, analyses, or assessments are provided or
	produced by the Department or others) to identify protective priorities
	and support protective measures by the Department, by other executive
	agencies, by State and local government personnel, agencies, and
	authorities, by the private sector, and by other entities.'' IAIP fuses
	intelligence and infrastructure information by performing risk analysis
	and assessment activities, including the development of protective
	measures.
	As established by the Office of Infrastructure Protection and
	serving as an extension of the Homeland Security Operations Center
	(HSOC), the National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC)
	maintains operational awareness of the nation's critical
	infrastructures and key resources, and provides a mechanism and process
	for information sharing and coordination between and among government,
	critical infrastructure owners and operators, and other industry
	partners. In support of its mission and that of the IAIP, the NICC will
	continue to provide real-time operational and situational awareness of
	the nation's critical infrastructures and key resources to IAIP and the
	HSOC, as well as between and across all infrastructure sectors. Real-
	time sector awareness information, fused with intelligence data and
	risk analyses from the directorate, will continue to enhance the
	domestic counterterrorism focus of IAIP and DHS.
	The creation of the NCTC re-emphasizes the critical national
	requirement to develop an environment for the fusion of information
	related to terrorism. The DHS IAIP responsibility under this construct
	is to ensure that its needs for all-source intelligence information and
	finished threat products are communicated to the NCTC. The Office of
	Information Analysis (IA) within IAIP is required under statute to mesh
	intelligence information with infrastructure vulnerability data and
	develop risk assessments for the homeland. While much of this work
	requires that IAIP have `raw' intelligence access, some efforts can be
	completed by NCTC delivering products that respond specifically to
	IAIP's needs. In addition, IA, as the DHS Departmental Intelligence
	Headquarters, must deliver DHS-origin information to the Intelligence
	Community that can support counterterrorism operational and analytic
	efforts. NCTC can be a supporting mechanism in this regard as well, as
	it continues to build out the infrastructure for disseminating
	information at all classification levels.

	Productive competition in the analytic intelligence community:
	Response: The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
	2004 (the Act) will have a substantial impact strengthening competitive
	analysis (also known as ``alternative analysis'' or ``red cell'' or
	``red team'' analysis) within the Intelligence Community (IC). The Act,
	for the first time, mandates the conduct of such analysis across the
	IC. It will give impetus to those IC components that do not currently
	conduct such analysis, and further spur those that do.
	The wording of the Act, however, is very general. It will have the
	greatest positive impact if it is implemented to encourage use of the
	broadest possible range of innovative alternative analysis/red team
	techniques to address intelligence and homeland security issues. It
	will have less positive impact if applied in a ``cookie-cutter'' way to
	require merely the provision of one alternative assessment for each
	mainline assessment (one potential interpretation of the Act).
	ompetitive analysis requires innovation and diverse approaches.
	In the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Information
	Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Analytic Red Cell is
	working with mainline analysts to constantly enhance the range of
	alternative, creative approaches to analysis to broaden thinking,
	challenge assumptions, prevent surprise, and ultimately explore ways to
	more rationally deploy security and intelligence resources. This
	includes conducting analysis on issues that mainline analysts have not
	yet focused on, providing outside independent perspectives that may or
	may not track with mainstream analysis, and conducting contrarian
	analysis.
	The Executive Order that preceded the Act may also benefit this
	kind of analysis in DHS and the homeland security community because it
	calls for the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to share
	information necessary for the conduct of alternative analysis in the
	IC. This will ensure that the DHS IAIP Analytic Red Cell can perform
	its function of providing and promoting alternative assessments based
	on the most up-to-date and pertinent information on threats,
	vulnerabilities, and countermeasures affecting the homeland.

	Information sharing with State and local government entities, and
	Response: The Executive Orders and Intelligence Reform initiatives
	will help to strengthen the Department of Homeland Security's ability
	to communicate with state, territorial, tribal, local, and private
	sector officials in ways that protect the privacy and civil liberties
	of American citizens and legal permanent residents. The Secretary of
	DHS will work with other Federal agencies, including the Director of
	National Intelligence (DNI) to assure that terrorism information
	sharing and collaboration among all levels of government are executed
	in a manner to achieve enhanced fusion of information. Information
	sharing is far more extensive than simply intelligence. DHS and its
	leadership will continue to strive to provide a single, unified voice
	on behalf of the Federal government to our State, territorial, tribal,
	local, and private sector partners.

	Information sharing with the private sector?
	Response: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) estimates that
	approximately 85 percent of our critical infrastructure and key
	resources are owned or operated by the private sector. They are the
	front line in securing many of the nation's critical infrastructure
	assets. The President's proposed legislation, Executive Orders, and
	intelligence reform initiatives have identified that information
	sharing is critical to the exchange of terrorist threat and other
	homeland security information with the private sector, state and local
	governments and among federal governmental agencies. Strategic threat
	information enables owners and operators to focus. Actionable tactical
	threat information allows them to assess risk and respond appropriately
	in a timely manner. There are currently a number of ongoing successful
	programs for the two-way sharing of unclassified information with the
	private sector. Iplementation of the Critical Infrastructure
	Information Act of 2002 and the establishment of the Homeland Security
	Information Network are two examples. Additionally, the Department
	continues to dedicate resources to the process of granting appropriate
	security clearances to private sector individuals. This furthers our
	ability to share classified terrorist threat information and other
	sensitive products that address the security of and potential threats
	to our critical infrastructure and key resources.
	Secretary Ridge, I have asked you repeatedly on the record, in
	questions for the record and of your senior staff the same question
	without resolution. The FY05 House Homeland Security Appropriations
	bill advises you to stand up an Office of Geospatial Management within
	the CIO's office to create a Department Wide Geospatial Information
	System capability. Specifically, when will you stand up this office and
	where will it be located organizationally?
	Response: The DHS Geospatial Management Office (GMO) has been
	established within the DHS Office of The Chief Information Officer
	(CIO) and is currently operational within the Department. The GMO is
	responsible within the Department to coordinate geospatial information
	needs, requirements and other related spatial data activities that
	support the Enterprise Geospatial Information System (E-GIS)
	capability. The GMO will provide clear and concise policy direction
	across the Department as needed for an E-GIS geospatial information
	capability. The GMO will guide the development and execution of the
	implementation plan for the geospatial enablement of DHS mission
	systems. The plan will provide a common set of geospatial data
	management and processing capabilities that will be incorporated into
	the emerging Homeland Security (HLS) Enterprise Architecture. This will
	allow the Department to further enable awareness, prevention,
	protection, response, recovery of the homeland security mission.

	From the perspective of DHS, do you support the 9/11 recommendation
	to declassify the top line intelligence budget?
	Response: Both the 9/11 Commission and the United States Congress
	have done extensive and indispensable work in the area of intelligence
	reform and made valuable recommendations in reference to a Director of
	National Intelligence. Similarly, steps need to be taken to ensure
	sensitive information remain protected from our terrorist adversaries
	that have shown their desire and willingness to use all means possible
	to gain information about the United States Intelligence Community.

	Mr. Secretary, do you agree with the 9/11 recommendation to
	establish an open source analysis center? If so, specifically how would
	DHS accomplish this task financially and organizationally?
	Response: In their quest to gain information from all possible
	sources, terrorists have proven willing and able to use open sources
	for their purposes. Intelligence Community (IC) members recognize this
	vulnerability and as a result, personnel are working daily to analyze
	this type of intelligence. The IC will address this issue, as well as
	the placement, organization, and financing of any future centers as
	plans for the reorganization of the IC continue to take shape. As we do
	so, it will be important to ensure that all actions are consistent with
	protecting privacy and the civil liberties of the American people.

	With centralization of intelligence analysis production priorities,
	how will DHS keep a high priority on integration of intelligence and
	infrastructure vulnerability information?
	Response: The Office of Information Analysis (IA) will continue to
	act as the Office of Intelligence for DHS and will collaborate on
	intelligence related to the terrorist threat with NCTC elements.
	Specifically, IA will provide support to the Department by continuing
	to develop and execute information sharing relationships and procedures
	with State, territorial, tribal, local, and private sector officials,
	will work with IP to support risk analysis and assessments and
	development of protective measures, will provide direct support to the
	Secretary and Department Senior Staff, and will support the Homeland
	Security Advisory System (HSAS). IA will also continue to represent DHS
	component requirements to the Intelligence Community (IC), perform
	threat assessments on domestic terrorism, foster international
	agreements for information sharing, and perform alternative analysis.
	Additionally, the IA roles of developing a cadre of Homeland Security
	Analysts for DHS and the IC and developing an education and training
	program for DHS analysts and intelligence professionals will increase
	in scope.
	Further, the Intelligence Community works selectively with critical
	infrastructure and key resource sectors, depending on the nature of
	specific issues and the agencies involved. These relationships and
	processes are based primarily on past experience and existing
	relationships. In July 2004, the White House asked the National
	Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) to develop recommendations that
	would improve the utilization and effectiveness of intelligence
	capabilities to protect critical infrastructure. The NIAC members are
	appointed by the President and are supported by the Information
	Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate of the Department.
	Specifically, the NIAC, comprised of private sector critical
	infrastructure and key resource business leaders, state and local
	government officials, emergency services officials and educators, was
	asked to explore ways to improve the information requirements
	definition processes and interaction between the intelligence community
	and critical infrastructure sectors. The NIAC plans to provide its
	recommendations to the President by the end of 2005.

	From the perspective of DHS, do you believe that ``Centers'' in the
	intelligence community provide added value?
	Response: Yes. Centers within the Intelligence Community (IC) can,
	and in the case of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC)--now
	the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)--do provide important
	conduits for information sharing throughout the Federal Government and
	help to prevent the kind of miscommunication that occurred prior to the
	attacks of September 11, 2001.

	Do you believe a new National Center to Counter Weapons of Mass
	Destruction Proliferation is needed?
	Response: The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the
	United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (the ``Robb-
	Silberman Commission''), was created by Executive Order to examine the
	capabilities and challenges of the Intelligence Community (IC) to
	collect, process, analyze, produce, and disseminate information
	concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of such foreign
	powers relating to the design, development, manufacture, acquisition,
	possession, proliferation, transfer, testing, potential or threatened
	use, or use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, related means of delivery,
	and other related threats of the 21st Century. The Commission has been
	tasked by the President to assess whether the Intelligence Community is
	sufficiently authorized, organized, equipped, trained, and resourced to
	identify and warn in a timely manner of, and to support United States
	Government efforts to respond to, the development and transfer of
	knowledge, expertise, technologies, materials, and resources associated
	with the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, related means of
	delivery, and other related threats of the 21st Century and their
	employment by foreign powers (including terrorists, terrorist
	organizations, and private networks, or other entities or individuals).
	The Commission has already done important work and will make valuable
	recommendations to the President regarding its findings in its report
	due March 31, 2005.
	Secretary Ridge, when the 9/11 Chair and Vice Chair were before
	this Committee, I spent time questioning witnesses about Congress'
	intent when it established the Department of Homeland Security to solve
	the infrastructure information and intelligence integration problem.
	I am an advocate of lessening bureaucracy and avoiding duplicity of
	effort with taxpayer funds. DHS' Information Analysis and
	Infrastructure Protection directorate has a clear statutory mandate, is
	putting its team together, and is distributing information to key
	customers through the Homeland Security Information Network.
	The Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) was set up to have
	the primary responsibility in the U.S. Government for terrorism
	analysis (except information relating solely to purely domestic
	terrorism) and to be responsible for the day-to-day terrorism analysis
	provided to the President and other senior policymakers. All members of
	the intelligence community participate in its work, provide
	comprehensive information to its staff, and have a stake in its
	success.

	What is the difference between your recommended National
	Counterterrorism Center and the TTIC?
	Response: The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) created
	through Executive Order on August 27, 2004 will build upon the
	capabilities of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). In
	addition to serving as the primary organization in the United States
	Government (USG) for analyzing and integrating all intelligence
	possessed or acquired by the USG pertaining to terrorism and
	counterterrorism (excepting purely domestic counterterrorism
	information), the NCTC will conduct strategic operational planning for
	counterterrorism activities, assign operational responsibilities to
	lead agencies for counterterrorism activities, serve as the central and
	shared knowledge bank on known and suspected terrorists and
	international terror groups, and ensure that agencies, as appropriate,
	have access to and receive all-source intelligence support needed to
	execute their counterterrorism plans or perform independent,
	alternative analysis.

	Do you believe that DHS will play a central role in the new
	National Counterterrorism Center?
	Response: Yes. NCTC operates as a partnership of organizations,
	including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DHS analysts
	contribute the unique ability to understand intelligence information
	and its impact on State, territorial, tribal, local, and private sector
	elements. Integration of DHS analysts allows the NCTC to leverage DHS
	partnerships with the aforementioned elements, and threat information
	developed at NCTC will support the homeland security mission--
	optimizing information developed by DHS to better understand the
	domestic condition.'' The Department will also play an appropriate role
	in NCTC's Strategic Operational Planning function.

	How can you guarantee this?
	Response: NCTC's success is dependent upon the contributions of its
	partners. DHS information expertise, personnel, and relationships are
	critical components of that success.

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