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	[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
	[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


	IRAN ON NOTICE

	=======================================================================

	HEARING

	BEFORE THE

	COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
	HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

	ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

	FIRST SESSION

	__________

	FEBRUARY 16, 2017

	__________

	Serial No. 115-5

	__________

	Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs


	[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


	Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
	or
	http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

	_________



	U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
	24-242 PDF WASHINGTON : 2017
	_________________________________________________________________________________________
	For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office,
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	COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

	EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
	CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
	ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
	DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
	STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
	JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
	MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
	TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California
	DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
	TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
	JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina AMI BERA, California
	MO BROOKS, Alabama LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
	PAUL COOK, California TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
	SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
	RON DeSANTIS, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
	MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
	TED S. YOHO, Florida DINA TITUS, Nevada
	ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois NORMA J. TORRES, California
	LEE M. ZELDIN, New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
	DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
	F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
	Wisconsin TED LIEU, California
	ANN WAGNER, Missouri
	BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
	FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
	BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
	THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia

	Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director

	Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director

	C O N T E N T S

	----------
	Page

	WITNESSES

	Ms. Katherine Bauer, Blumenstein-Katz Family Fellow, The
	Washington Institute for Near East Policy...................... 4
	Mr. David Albright, founder and president, Institute for Science
	and International Security..................................... 21
	Mr. Scott Modell, managing director, The Rapidan Group........... 30
	Andrew Exum, Ph.D., contributing editor, The Atlantic............ 37

	LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

	Ms. Katherine Bauer: Prepared statement.......................... 6
	Mr. David Albright: Prepared statement........................... 23
	Mr. Scott Modell: Prepared statement............................. 32
	Andrew Exum, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................... 40

	APPENDIX

	Hearing notice................................................... 80
	Hearing minutes.................................................. 81
	The Honorable David Cicilline, a Representative in Congress from
	the State of Rhode Island: Material submitted for the record... 83


	IRAN ON NOTICE

	----------


	THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 2017

	House of Representatives,

	Committee on Foreign Affairs,

	Washington, DC.

	The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in
	room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce
	(chairman of the committee) presiding.
	Chairman Royce. This hearing will come to order. This
	morning we consider options available to the new administration
	as it contends with an emboldened Iran.
	As one witness will tell the committee, we should start
	with this premise: Iran ``gets no special pass'' on its
	dangerous and provocative acts. Unfortunately--despite its
	promises to the committee--that is not how the previous
	administration handled Tehran. Terrorist and missile activities
	that should have been designated were not designated. In a
	country where beatings and torture and executions are the norm,
	just one individual has been sanctioned for human rights abuses
	after negotiations began, just one. After that deal was inked,
	the former Secretary of State traveled the world
	enthusiastically touting that Iran was open for business.
	Indeed, the administration went out of its way not to
	offend Tehran. In December, when this committee pressed the
	extension of the Iran Sanctions Act, the President took the
	very unusual step of letting this legislation become law
	without his signature.
	So it is not surprising that Tehran believes it is in a
	``post-sanctions environment.'' But as long as Iran is firing
	missiles, fueling terror, and shouting ``Death to America,''
	nothing can be normal.
	Sanctions can be imposed even while adhering to and
	strictly enforcing the nuclear agreement--as flawed as it is.
	Remember, even under the previous administration's reading, the
	administration has the ability to press back on Iran's support
	for terrorism, for human rights abuses, and for missile
	development. ``None of these sanctions were relieved under the
	[agreement],'' in the words of the former administration.
	So Iran's continuing intercontinental ballistic missile
	program--whose only purpose is to carry a nuclear warhead--must
	be front and center. This month's designations are a good
	start. But more can be done to find and target the banks and
	companies that are supplying this dangerous program aimed at
	us. It also means more extraditions, more prosecutions, and
	indictments of sanctions violators. This proactive approach
	also means stepping up our defenses and those of our regional
	partners.
	Second, the administration shouldn't be shy about tackling
	Iran's terror arm and that is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
	Corps. This is the group fueling the Assad regime in Syria and
	this is the group responsible for the death of hundreds of
	American troops. Since the Guard has been labeled Iran's ``most
	powerful economic actor'' by the U.S. Treasury Department,
	there are plenty of options here available. Indeed, there are
	hundreds of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps affiliates that
	are yet to be sanctioned--what one observer calls a
	``Revolutionary Guard's Gap.'' These are the front companies
	that are funding the missiles that have on the side of them,
	``Israel must be wiped off the face of the earth.''
	These terror outfits need to be sanctioned, and the new
	administration should look at ways in which companies closely
	linked to the Revolutionary Guard Corps--but not fully owned by
	them--could be sanctioned. The threat of secondary sanctions
	against those around the world dealing with these IRGC units
	which even tried to carry out a terrorist attack here in
	Washington, DC, to kill the Saudi Ambassador here in
	Washington. Looking at this must be a priority, and it has to
	be real, and it wasn't under the previous administration.
	Around the region, the administration can attack Iran's
	proxy Hezbollah thanks to a new law advanced by this committee.
	We can focus on increased interdiction of Iranian arms
	shipments to the revolutionary Houthis in Yemen, on clearer
	rules of engagement, and better defense cooperation with our
	partners on the front lines of the Iranian threat.
	The nuclear agreement does not leave us defenseless against
	Tehran's threatening behavior. Careful coordination with allies
	is a must, and all along we should be clear that the choice is
	with Iran to end its threatening, destabilizing behavior.
	I am going to introduce our panel this morning, and then I
	am going to go to Mr. Eliot Engel of New York who is the
	ranking member of this committee.
	On our panel we have Ms. Katherine Bauer. She is the
	Blumenstein-Katz Family Fellow at The Washington Institute for
	Near East Policy and previously she served in a series of
	positions at the Treasury Department.
	We have Mr. David Albright. He is the founder and president
	of the Institute for Science and International Security. Mr.
	Albright is a trained physicist and former weapons inspector.
	We have Mr. Scott Modell, managing director at the Rapidan
	Group and previously served for 13 years in the Central
	Intelligence Agency.
	And we have Dr. Andrew Exum, contributing editor at the
	Atlantic and previously Dr. Exum served as Deputy Assistant
	Secretary of Defense for Middle East Policy.
	Without objection, the witnesses' full prepared statements
	are going to be made part of the record and you will be asked
	to summarize if you could. The members here are going to have 5
	calendar days to submit any statements or additional questions,
	any extraneous material they might want to put into the record.
	So we would start with Ms. Bauer, but before we do that
	allow me to have the ranking member of the committee Eliot
	Engel open with his opening comments.
	Mr. Engel. Well, thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
	Chairman, and let me also thank our witnesses and welcome all
	of you to the Foreign Affairs Committee.
	At this point we all know Iran's record of provocative
	actions, from ballistic missile tests to transferring weapons
	to terrorist organizations and other bad actors that seek to
	destabilize the region. Technically speaking, all this bad
	behavior doesn't violate the nuclear deal. However, those
	actions are inconsistent with U.N. Security Council Resolution
	2231 which governs the implementation of the agreement.
	Responsible governments around the world have an obligation to
	respond.
	The Trump administration imposed new sanctions against
	several entities involved in Iran's ballistic missile program
	and support for terrorism. And just to make sure we are all
	being fair, I will mention that these designations matched
	exactly the Obama administration's response over the last
	several years since negotiations began.
	The difference between the Trump administration's response
	and the Obama administration's response was a two-word phrase,
	``on notice.'' Then National Security Advisor Mike Flynn said
	as a result of Iran's provocative actions the United States is
	putting Iran ``on notice.'' So what does it mean exactly to put
	Iran ``on notice''? How will the administration respond if Iran
	tests the President again? Does the administration have a plan?
	In a follow-up briefing to the ``on notice'' warning a
	reporter asked what that meant. The response was, ``We are
	considering what options there are and how we want to
	communicate and enforce our concerns.'' That is not really a
	plan. I hope that the administration will make it clear what
	their plan is on Iran because surely Iran will continue its
	provocative behavior.
	We cannot afford a half-baked or reckless foreign policy.
	Rash decisions concerning America's role in the world could
	have serious consequences for American personnel and interests.
	American and Iranian forces are operating in close proximity in
	Iraq. Who knows what could happen if the administration doesn't
	have a cohesive policy? Additionally, if this turns out to be
	an empty threat, then this administration will not have done
	its job. We have to really confront the Iranian threat and let
	them know that we are serious about it, that we mean business.
	I don't trust the Iranian Government. I didn't vote for the
	Iranian deal. But the Iranian deal is now in place and I think
	we have to ensure that Iran lives up to every bit of its
	responsibility under that deal. Let me just say this. I look
	forward to our hearing from our witnesses about what a
	responsible course of action would be. Iran and the terrible
	regime in Tehran is not going away and I think that if the
	United States doesn't stand up to it, it will only get worse. I
	believe with all my heart that everything must be done to
	prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapon. However, looking the
	other way and just tough rhetoric doesn't really cut the
	mustard. We have got to make sure that Iran understands that
	there are severe consequences if they continue their ways. And
	I look forward to hearing from our witnesses as to what they
	think our response should be.
	Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Chairman Royce. Thank you very much, Mr. Engel. We now go
	to our witnesses.
	Ms. Bauer.

	STATEMENT OF MS. KATHERINE BAUER, BLUMENSTEIN-KATZ FAMILY
	FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY

	Ms. Bauer. Good morning. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member
	Engel and members of the committee. Thank you for the
	opportunity to testify before you today to discuss the future
	of U.S. policy toward Iran. My testimony will focus on the role
	of sanctions and restraining Iran's malign influence in the
	region and disrupting its global terrorism, money laundering,
	and procurement networks. It will draw on analysis done in
	conjunction with my colleagues Patrick Clawson and Matthew
	Levitt at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy as part
	of a new study that we released earlier this week. I will
	summarize key points here.
	There is no doubt today that sanctions played a pivotal
	role in bringing Iran to the table to negotiate constraints on
	its nuclear program. Over roughly a decade, the U.S. and its
	allies imposed powerful multilateral sanctions on Iran that
	isolated Tehran from the international financial system and
	crippled its economy.
	Following implementation of the Iran nuclear deal in
	January 2016 and suspension of nuclear related sanctions, the
	pace of sanctions against Iran under remaining authorities
	slowed. Despite assurances the United States would vigorously
	press against Iranian activities outside of the Joint
	Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Obama administration did so
	only sporadically. Thus, in many ways Washington ceded the
	narrative to Tehran which successfully convinced many in the
	private and public sectors that in the wake of implementation
	of the nuclear agreement they operate in a post sanctions
	environment.
	But the deal was never intended to give Iran a free pass on
	its nonnuclear malevolent actions. Iran made no commitment to
	cease nonnuclear malign activity and has not in fact halted it.
	In the words of Abbas Araqchi, Iran's deputy foreign minister
	and one of Iran's chief negotiators of the deal, ``During the
	nuclear negotiations we clearly said that questions of
	security, defense, ballistic missiles and our regional policies
	were not negotiable and not linked to the nuclear talks.''
	Sanctions remain a viable and powerful tool to confront
	Iran over its nonnuclear illicit conduct. In our study we
	suggest a multi-pronged approach that includes taking back the
	narrative, emphasizing the sanctions that remain, and
	vigorously enforcing them. Such enhanced sanctions will work
	best, however, if they are proportional and accompanied by
	diplomatic, military, and intelligence measures in a
	coordinated campaign against Iran's destabilizing activities.
	Sanctions are a tool in such a strategy, but not a strategy
	unto themselves. There is a place for unilateral sanctions such
	as the action taken by the Trump administration late last month
	against Iranian procurement and terrorist support networks.
	These actions were likely prepared under the Obama
	administration, and as Congressman Engel noted they demonstrate
	a bipartisan consensus on targeting Iran's malign activities.
	They are also effective because banks around the world look to
	the U.S. and to the OFAC list and they can be very disruptive.
	As well, they lay the groundwork for other countries to follow
	suit.
	However, sanctions are most effective when adopted by an
	international coalition. Foreign partners have long been
	skeptical of U.S. unilateral sanctions when they are viewed as
	being capricious. Thus, focusing on Iranian conduct that
	violates international norms will be most likely to draw
	multilateral support and compliance. In this manner, sanctions
	can also demonstrate to Iran the benefits of accommodating
	itself to the international order.
	Consider the benefits that Iran has gleaned from the
	nuclear deal. Oil sales and other exports are up and inflation
	has stabilized. Iranian officials claim that hundreds of small
	banks have already reestablished correspondent relationships
	with Iran. But Iran will not be able to attract the foreign
	investment it desperately needs while global banks continue to
	view it as a financial pariah, and there is no reason to
	believe that Iran has ceased the illicit financial conduct or
	sanctions evasion conduct that underpinned the U.S. FinCEN 311
	finding of Iran as a jurisdiction of Primary Money Laundering
	Concern or earned Iran its place on the Financial Action Task
	Force blacklist.
	Previously, private sector engagement on the risks of doing
	business with Iran proved incredibly effective as a tool to
	restrict Iran's operating environment. Given this history, the
	U.S. Government should resume such sanctions diplomacy and
	engagements with private and public sector actors around the
	world to highlight evidence that Iran continues to pose a
	threat to the global financial system. Rather than reassuring
	banks that doing business with Iran will help enshrine the
	nuclear deal, U.S. Government officials at every level should
	emphasize that Iran bears the onus of demonstrating its
	adherence to the same requirements imposed on every other
	country by reining in illicit financial activity and conforming
	with international norms.
	Thank you again for the opportunity to testify.
	[The prepared statement of Ms. Bauer follows:]
	[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

	----------

	Chairman Royce. Feel free, Mr. Albright, please.

	STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID ALBRIGHT, FOUNDER AND PRESIDENT,
	INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

	Mr. Albright. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and
	other members of this committee for holding this hearing today
	and inviting me to testify. I applaud your committee's efforts
	to understand and chart a way forward on Iran policy.
	I would like to limit my comments to the Iran nuclear deal
	which I would like to see maintained, but the deal must be
	better enforced and implemented, its nuclear conditions more
	strictly interpreted, its verification improved, and its short
	and long term deficiencies fixed. I have listed in my testimony
	several steps to fix the weaknesses in the deal and will
	discuss some of them here.
	But first, I would like to talk a little bit about some of
	the specific problems in the deal's implementation. As the
	chairman mentioned, Iran continues to test nuclear-capable
	ballistic missiles. We can argue whether this is inconsistent
	with or in violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231,
	however, the fact of the matter is that a nuclear warhead
	without a reliable delivery system is not a militarily useful
	weapon. So progress on ballistic missiles today and tomorrow
	represents progress toward Iran building a nuclear weapons
	arsenal in the future.
	The workings of the deal have been far too secret.
	Moreover, the IAEA continues to under report the actual
	situation on the ground. Many of the Joint Commission decisions
	are questionable and I have given several examples in my
	testimony. Also, so far Iran has resisted IAEA inspections of
	military sites and the risk is growing that Iran is creating
	no-go zones for inspectors inside Iran. Moreover, during the
	JCPOA negotiations and extending for some time afterwards, the
	Obama administration interfered in U.S. law enforcement
	efforts. It blocked or did not process the extradition requests
	and lure memos aimed at Iranians and their agents alleged of
	violating U.S. trade control and sanction laws.
	I would like to briefly discuss some specific steps to
	ensure stricter enforcement in strengthening the JCPOA in the
	short term, and I give many in my testimony. There is a need to
	achieve greater transparency in IAEA access. The U.S. and its
	allies should press IAEA to include greater details in its
	quarterly reports to the Board of Governors. Parallel
	agreements to the JCPOA should be publicly released. More
	importantly, it is critical to ensure that Iran provides
	guaranteed, timely IAEA access to Iranian military facilities.
	It is also a priority to prevent Iran from developing an
	indigenous enriched uranium fuel capability. If they do so this
	would lay the basis for an expanded industrial scale centrifuge
	program that would be very difficult to stop. Toward that goal,
	further exemptions to the 300 kilogram enriched uranium cap
	should be deferred indefinitely. There are also numerous
	loopholes to the JCPOA that need to be fixed. I will mention
	two here.
	The Oman loophole for heavy water should be plugged. To
	that end all shipments of Iranian heavy water from Oman or
	other overseas storage locations should be subject to approval
	by the Procurement Working Group. It is also important to
	ensure that Iran is abiding by restrictions on centrifuge R&D
	under the JCPOA. There are examples where they are pushing the
	envelope and the pushback needs to happen.
	It is also critical that Iran create and implement a
	strategic trade control system that meets international
	standards. As part of creating a strategic trade control regime
	in Iran, the United States should also interpret the JCPOA as
	stating that Iran will commit not to conduct illicit commodity
	trafficking for government controlled or owned military,
	missile, nuclear, or other industries and programs.
	As we await that there needs to be more effective
	enforcement of trading bans and sanctions. The administration
	should commit to more aggressively investigate, indict, and
	extradite those involved in outfitting Iran's nuclear missile
	or conventional weapons programs in defiance of U.S. laws and
	sanctions. The administration and its allies should step up
	efforts with allies to detect, interdict, or otherwise thwart
	Iran's illicit procurement efforts that violate national and
	international laws.
	At the same time, the United States and its allies should
	take steps to better detect and block Iranian cooperation with
	North Korea on ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and
	conventional arms. They should also devote more intelligence
	resources determining if North Korea and Iran are cooperating
	on nuclear programs or transferring nuclear or nuclear related
	technology, equipment, or materials.
	Beyond the short term problems, the Iran deal has
	fundamental long term deficiencies that need to be addressed.
	Which problems to focus on and how to remedy them should be
	part of an Iran policy review by the Trump administration and
	Congress. Two priorities are extending the nuclear limitations
	in the deal and limiting Iran's ballistic missiles. One
	suggestion covering the former is to maintain a 12-month
	breakout requirement forever.
	Since I have run out of time let me end there. Thank you.
	[The prepared statement of Mr. Albright follows:]
	[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

	----------

	Chairman Royce. Mr. Modell.

	STATEMENT OF MR. SCOTT MODELL, MANAGING DIRECTOR, THE RAPIDAN
	GROUP

	Mr. Modell. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, members
	of the committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to
	come back and discuss what I would call the next generation of
	Iran pushback. I have testified here before and I think I am in
	the consensus to say that the last 8 years has been overly
	passive.
	And I have pushed forward--thinking ideas that there are
	ways, the tools we have and ways in which we can push back
	against what we often call the Iranian Action Network that have
	been overlooked and ignored as a result of an overly
	accommodating policy over the last 8 years. A lot of the
	recommendations I have in here are on the basis of things that
	I have already seen that we have that just need to be dusted
	off and sharpened, tools we have we have used in the past, ways
	in which we can improve on what already exists.
	But going back to the overarching theme of putting Iran
	``on notice,'' I think that former National Security Adviser
	Flynn did the right thing. I think there needs to be follow-up
	in that regard, follow-up on what the new rules of engagement
	are, follow-up in terms of making very clear to the Iranians
	that escalation, we have a very clear intent of reestablishing
	escalation dominance, of changing the nature of the dynamics
	between the U.S. and Iranians and the Gulf in other places and
	Yemen as well.
	But I also don't think that we have done nearly enough to
	point out the fact that while the original hostage crisis was
	in 1979, there is another hostage crisis. The Iranian regime
	continues to take Iranian-Americans and Canadian-Americans and
	other hyphenated Iranians hostage. It has become the systematic
	policy for the IRGC and for those businesses, particularly
	foreign businesses that are looking to get back into Iran, I
	think that needs to be part of, I guess, an overhaul of our
	media offensive and making clear about the dangers and risks
	not only to reputation, but literal risks of doing business in
	Iran.
	So I think Iran needs to be put on notice on various other
	dimensions. The other thing I would say is know your customer
	and do due diligence. My understanding from foreign businesses,
	large multinationals that are going into Iran, is that those
	requirements are actually rather easy to satisfy. I think this
	committee might consider ways of enhancing those, making those
	stricter, raising the bar for companies that are looking to get
	back in.
	The IRGC has done a very good job of cloaking itself, you
	know, two or three degrees removed from the core so that
	businesses, you know, can avoid that type of risk. But I think
	that they are ensconced in ways that ordinary businesses don't
	know and they are not being held liable to actually verify.
	Corruption, I think, is the one thing that gets at the
	heart of all the Iranians. To the extent that you are going to
	move Iranians, channel that anger and get them to do more
	inside and outside of Iran to stand up and protest, I really
	think that we need to do a much better job of systematically
	pointing out how deep corruption is. And I think that there are
	certain ways of doing that not only by overhauling what I said,
	the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, and actually
	returning to the day when those were tools that were part of
	U.S.-Iran policy, but also on U.S. Government Web sites I think
	that there needs to be putting businesses on notice as well.
	I also think partners, proxies, and allies of the Iranian
	Government as well need to be put on notice and there are a lot
	of ways in which we can do that, and Chairman Royce mentioned
	some of those in some of the war zones in which we are all
	familiar. I look forward to expanding on some of these ideas,
	most of which I have mentioned in my testimony. Thank you.
	[The prepared statement of Mr. Modell follows:]
	[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
	----------


	STATEMENT OF ANDREW EXUM, PH.D., CONTRIBUTING EDITOR, THE
	ATLANTIC

	Mr. Exum. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member, thank you so
	much for the opportunity to speak to the committee today. I
	have been asked to present testimony on Iran and I will do so
	in my capacity as the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of
	Defense for Middle East Policy during the Obama administration.
	I left the Department of Defense last month and my testimony
	today was cleared by the Department to ensure what I tell you
	remains at the appropriate level of classification and is as
	boring as possible for the rest of you listening in, but I will
	do my best to talk about things within the constraints I have
	been given.
	The United States has three vital interests in the Middle
	East: The security of the State of Israel, countering terrorism
	and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and
	freedom of navigation and commerce in and around the Arabian
	Peninsula which all of you know is the home to vast hydrocarbon
	reserves. Iran can and does pose a threat to all of those
	interests and it does so in three ways: Its nuclear program,
	its buildup of conventional arms, and what we call its
	asymmetric activities that support the proxies such as
	Hezbollah or some of the Shia militias in Iraq.
	During the Obama administration we countered Iran through
	what we called our four Ps: Our posture, our plans, our
	partners, and our preparedness. With respect to posture, we
	have about 35,000 troops in and around the Persian Gulf alone.
	We have major airbases in Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE. We have a
	major naval base in Bahrain. And these bases and the troops
	operating out of them allow us to ensure freedom of navigation
	in and around the Arabian Peninsula, combat terror groups--for
	many of these forces are in the skies above Iraq and Syria
	right now--and deter conventional Iranian aggression against
	our Gulf partners.
	We maintain a robust suite of plans to respond to regional
	contingencies. In my capacity at the Pentagon I reviewed these
	plans. They are real, they are resourced, and our forces are
	ready to execute them. Over the past three decades, meanwhile,
	we have invested in our regional partnerships, specifically
	building partnership capacity in our Gulf partners.
	We have a long way to go, but one of the areas where we
	have made the most progress, ballistic missile defense, helps
	us counter Iran's build-up of conventional weapons. We also
	engaged in unprecedented levels of defense and intelligence
	cooperation with Israel while making available some of our most
	advanced U.S.-made weapons to Gulf partners.
	Finally, we have our preparedness, and we chose this word
	because we needed the fourth P for people like me to remember.
	But what this really stands for, the many dozens of bilateral,
	unilateral, multilateral exercises we conduct on an annual
	basis to help us prepare for regional contingencies.
	So how are we doing? I will be blunt in my assessment and
	then offer some words of advice for this new administration as
	well as some words of caution for this committee. Specifically,
	I will argue that this administration's strategic flirtation
	with Russia is incompatible with what I assess to be its desire
	to pressure and counter Iran.
	First, the Department of Defense did not play a role in
	negotiating the nuclear deal with Iran, but the deal very much
	helped the U.S. military. Despite all the sturm and drang here
	in Washington and elsewhere in the summer of 2015, most
	strategic planners I have spoken with both here and in the
	region see the deal as offering real, positive opportunities
	both for the United States and for Iran.
	As you know, the Pentagon was always in charge of providing
	the enforcement mechanism for U.S. policy. If Iran cheats we
	will know about it, and the Pentagon is prepared to act
	accordingly. From our perspective then the nuclear deal was a
	pretty good deal because it constrained Iran while placing no
	such constraints on us.
	Iran also has some opportunities of course, and it appears
	to be largely squandering them. Some optimists in the Obama
	administration had hoped the nuclear negotiations would be a
	way to bring Iran in from the cold, so to speak, and encourage
	Iran to play a more helpful role regionally. The view of these
	optimists was not universally shared within the administration.
	Many of us argued within the administration and to our
	allies that the reason we needed to sign a deal with Iran was
	not because Iran is a benign actor but because they are a
	malign actor and thus needed to be prevented from acquiring a
	nuclear weapon. Iran's actions since signing the nuclear deal
	have vindicated the pessimists. Iran continues a robust build-
	up of conventional weapons, including what we military folks
	call anti-access, area denial weapons like anti-ship cruise
	missiles and air defense systems, and while I don't think our
	own military commanders are losing sleep over these weapons
	just yet, I know our regional partners are.
	And here is my first word of caution. These weapons systems
	for the most part are not indigenous to the Islamic Republic of
	Iran. These are Russian weapons, sold by Russia to Iran with
	the aim of constraining U.S. freedom of maneuver in
	strategically important waterways and airways. Any serious
	effort to counter the build-up of these Iranian capabilities
	has to take Russia into account.
	Iran is also continuing what I would call its asymmetric
	activities. Its support to Shia and allied militia in Lebanon,
	Iraq, Syria, and Yemen continues. The presence of anti-ship
	cruise missiles in Yemen is especially concerning since it
	threatens a key commercial waterway, the Bab al-Mandeb.
	And let me be blunt again regarding the administration's
	overtures to Russia. In Syria it will be exceptionally
	difficult and likely impossible to reach any accommodation with
	Russia and the regime in Damascus that does not end up
	strengthening Iran and its proxies, including Hezbollah. So
	before the administration goes down that path they should
	recognize that in the short term at least they are going to
	embolden some of the very people they have pledged to counter
	in the region. And they will embolden Iran and these groups to
	the detriment of Israel's security.
	In Iraq, meanwhile, the Islamic State is on a clear path to
	defeat. But the long term threat to Iraq's sovereignty is both
	Kurdish separatism and the Shia militia, many of them supported
	by Iran, that exist only loosely affiliated with the Iraqi
	state. In addition, Iraq's long term stability will be
	dependent on the United States being able to keep a small
	contingent of trainers and special operators in the country,
	which is why the President's dismissive comments about the
	Iraqi Government, his comments about how we should have taken
	Iraq's oil, and his ban on Iraqis coming to the United States
	have been so strategically misguided.
	This all plays into a narrative of an Iran that very much
	views Iraq as a zero-sum game with the United States. It has
	spent millions of dollars to convince Iraqis that we have the
	types of malign activities toward Iraq that the President seems
	to in fact have but which few other share. If the United States
	wants to push back on that it needs to do so in the President's
	words and with robust diplomacy.
	I would also caution this administration from trying to
	push back against Iran and its proxies in Iraq right now. We
	have a Sunni terrorist enemy to defeat in Iraq and our 5,000
	soldiers in Iraq need to focus on them not on war with Iran's
	proxies. I fought in Iraq, and as any of you who fought there
	remember, Iran can make our life pretty miserable. So we don't
	need that fight right now and we should sequence how we push
	back on them.
	Finally, a few words on Yemen. We have talked about Islamic
	fundamentalism, but I am somewhat of a freedom of navigation
	fundamentalist. The United States should be prepared to
	robustly counter any threats to key waterways, and I am not
	going to lose any sleep if a couple of Houthis die because they
	made an error of firing an anti-ship cruise missile into the
	Bab al-Mandeb.
	I should note though that the vast, vast majority of
	commercial traffic--1,400 vessels, 80 million tons on a monthly
	basis--that flows through the Bab al-Mandeb is not American. It
	comes from the European Union, India, China, Korea; these are
	the countries that have the most at stake in any actions which
	threatens shipping, and before the administration escalates a
	war in Yemen it should start with some multilateral diplomacy
	telling Iran, in essence, to knock it off, lest their own
	commercial interests be at stake.
	In conclusion, in Secretary Mattis we have a Secretary of
	Defense who keenly understands the threat posed by Iran. And in
	Secretary Tillerson and Gary Cohn we have, respectively, a
	Secretary of State and a director of the Economic Council who
	understand the centrality of market access to hydrocarbon
	resources in the Gulf to the global economy.
	So there is some cause for optimism that this
	administration will eventually put together a coherent strategy
	to counter Iran's malign activities in a way that serves U.S.
	interests. But the contradictions in the administration's
	strategic initiatives thus far, not to mention the alarming and
	unprecedented dysfunction within the national security decision
	making process, leave plenty of room for worry as well.
	Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to go over.
	[The prepared statement of Mr. Exum follows:]
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	Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Exum. Thank you to the
	panel. One of the questions that I was going to direct at Mr.
	Albright concerned a portion of your testimony where you said
	that the previous administration interfered in U.S. law
	enforcement efforts when it came to them blocking the efforts
	to arrest and convict Iranians and their agents engaged in
	breaking U.S. export and sanctions laws.
	One of the focuses I have is sort of reversing that policy,
	especially with respect to the IRGC, but what measures can we
	take to send the signal that extraditing and arresting and
	convicting those that are involved in breaking our laws has to
	be a priority?
	Mr. Albright. Well, first thing, I think some of these
	memos and extradition requests should be revisited. I mean they
	still exist, some cases may still be active. I mean these are
	not public cases. The other, and I must say one of the impacts
	that I heard very clearly was that this in a sense interfering
	in what the investigators were doing in our enforcement
	agencies was discouraging, and these are hard cases to launch
	and they hesitate to do more.
	So I think the administration should send a very strong
	signal that it fully supports these investigations and
	prosecutions of these Iranian and Iranian agents.
	Chairman Royce. So that would have to be through State and
	so it was the State Department----
	Mr. Albright. That is right.
	Chairman Royce [continuing]. That put the kibosh on it.
	Mr. Albright. Well, that is where they tended to die.
	Chairman Royce. Yes.
	Mr. Albright. So that is where they tended to die, but I
	think it has to be done at the White House level.
	Chairman Royce. Okay.
	Mr. Albright. And to get these cases moving again, because
	I think my understanding is Iran hasn't stopped its illicit
	activities and it is very important to counter them.
	Chairman Royce. Well, another way to counter it, and I will
	go to Ms. Bauer's comment here, but I bet there would be a
	tremendous ripple effect from sanctioning just one or two
	European companies for transactions with the Iranian
	Revolutionary Guard Corps. They are the main economic player in
	Iran.
	And I think you had a line in your testimony where you said
	that the application of U.S. secondary sanctions for dealing
	with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps remains a
	significant risk for companies looking to reengage with Iran
	and that this application of secondary sanctions has never been
	done.
	So another question is why not and what would the impact be
	if our response now to their missile tests and maybe to General
	Soleimani's trip 2 days ago to Moscow is such a robust action?
	And let's push that button there.
	Ms. Bauer. Thank you, Chairman. Indeed, the remaining
	sanctions on the IRGC and the fact that they include secondary
	sanctions risks remains a great deterrent to businesses looking
	to reengage with Iran. And in fact that is one reason I think
	why you haven't seen action against a European country in
	particular is that they do not want to lose access to the U.S.
	financial system, and so they are able to look at the OFAC list
	and ensure that they don't do business with anyone on that list
	or anyone who holds a 50 percent or an aggregated 50 percent
	share of a business they are working with.
	So they are able to do some due diligence. Where they are
	not confident with the due diligence it appears that they are
	not engaging. But there are things that could be done to make
	it harder and to isolate the IRGC further, for example,
	designating additional IRGC affiliates to make it clear to
	those companies going in.
	Chairman Royce. So maybe those with less than a 50 percent
	ownership share but you could expand that out, or you are
	saying there is affiliates out there that we haven't captured
	yet?
	Ms. Bauer. There are affiliates who haven't been listed.
	Even those that are not listed by operation of law, companies
	are restricted or could be sanctioned for doing business.
	Chairman Royce. Why don't we do this on that answer. Why
	don't I just ask the panel if you have ideas on that, if you
	could give me some specifics, and I could just get to this
	Soleimani question which I wanted to ask, because it was a
	surprise to me, you know, to see him travel again to Moscow.
	This is the third time he has done it, and as a matter of fact
	he is there right now. And I would just ask the panel for any
	creative solutions for effectively pushing back on his
	continued travel.
	And the thing I find most objectionable here is that he has
	been, you know, fingered as the fellow behind the death of many
	Americans, the one who plotted the Russian-Iranian tag team
	slaughter that went on in Syria in the middle of the Iranian
	negotiations. I mean there have been so much that this guy, as
	head of the Qud Forces--which is in charge of assassinations
	outside the country--has been responsible for, attacks across
	Europe and so forth where they take out anybody perceived to be
	an enemy of the regime.
	I mean this is a really bloodthirsty guy. And it seems to
	me that the reason he is headed to Moscow for these meetings
	has got to be the ballistic missile systems or other weapons
	systems that he intends to introduce into the theater. So ideas
	on how to react to that? Maybe Mr. Modell, do you have a----
	Mr. Modell. One of the things that I have thought and again
	what I hear from Iranians all the time is why is the U.S.
	Government not doing more to come up with a large matrix of all
	IRGC officials that we know of, businesses that we know that
	are linked, and publicize it constantly and to show their links
	to corruption? I mean this isn't necessarily going to directly
	address the Soleimani issue, but I think it is going to
	significantly weaken the IRGC.
	So when you are talking about publicizing the----
	Chairman Royce. Well, I think this cuts into another point
	you made in your testimony here about the need to make some
	changes of the broadcasting into Iran so that yes, it is
	objective but we do touch on issues that is important there. We
	now have a single head of the agency who has the ability to
	direct information.
	And so as information spills out about corruption or
	whatever that access to that information on social media and on
	a platform of radio and television should be available so that
	people know exactly what has happened here with respect to the
	IRGC taking all of these assets usually through nationalization
	and transferring them to the ownership of the Revolutionary
	Guard Corps.
	I need to go to Mr. Engel. My time has expired. Thank you
	very much, panel.
	Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Exum, let me ask
	you this. In your testimony you pointed out one way in which
	Russia and Iran collaborate to destabilize the Middle East. You
	mentioned that Russia provides Iran with anti-access, area
	denial weapons like anti-ship cruise missiles and air defense
	systems. Obviously this is very disconcerting to us and our
	allies because their goal is using these weapons to inhibit
	freedom of movement in strategic waterways and airways.
	There have been Russian media reports that Iran and Russia
	are in discussions over $10 billion in weapons. How would you
	suggest the Trump administration respond to this?
	Mr. Exum. Well, I think one of the things that the Trump
	administration can do and then here with respect to sanctions
	that defer to the sanctions experts, because I am sure that
	there are aspects outside of the military lane that you can
	use. I think with respect to diplomacy, I will just focus on
	diplomacy and the military steps that I think he can take with
	respect to diplomacy by constraining the access to waterways.
	And look, these are, we don't need the oil and gas that is
	coming out the Persian Gulf as much as the global markets need
	them and as much as we need them for the stability of the
	global economy. So it is not just the United States or the
	Trump administration that has a stake in this, that has a stake
	in freedom of navigation and freedom of commerce in and around
	the Arabian Peninsula. I would think that you would start with
	a large multilateral effort to pressure Iran on the deployment
	of these weapons systems and on Russia on the sales of these
	weapons systems.
	From a military perspective we are already doing quite a
	lot. Again I don't think that the commander of NAVCENT would
	argue that his freedom of movement is in any way constrained
	right now, but it is clear that we need to do two things. We
	need to increase the degree to which we have ballistic and air
	missile, or integrated air and missile defense systems, within
	the Middle East. That includes both sales to partners and
	increasing partner capacity, but it also means that our
	partners in the region need to get more serious about their own
	maritime capabilities. Historically, maritime capability of the
	Navy has been the third of three services within most of our
	Gulf militaries. They need to get serious about their own
	efforts to be able to keep the waterways in and around the
	Arabian Peninsula secure.
	And I would defer again, like I said, to my Treasury
	colleagues or my colleagues from the Washington Institute with
	respect to what more we can do in terms of sanctioning those
	Russian businesses or those Iranians that are purchasing these
	types of weapons systems, Mr. Ranking Member.
	Mr. Engel. Thank you. Anybody else have comments on that?
	Mr. Modell. Mr. Ranking Member, the only thing I would say
	is that it is a very asymmetric process that Iran is involved
	in and that includes commercial acquisition of the conventional
	military stuff. Building on what Dr. Exum is saying, I think we
	have not done enough to work with our allies in the region,
	particularly in the GCC which is often the site of enabling
	Iran to do these things, to front companies based in their own
	Emirates, for instance, to develop the capabilities to work
	asymmetrically in a defensive capacity. And I don't think we
	are systematically oriented in that sense.
	Mr. Engel. Thank you.
	Mr. Albright, let me ask you this. You have criticized the
	IAEA for lack of transparency in reporting and I quote you,
	this is what you said: ``The IAEA reporting continues to lack
	critical technical details that implementation of the
	agreement. Its lack of information in the IAEA reports combined
	with the secrecy surrounding the decision making of the Joint
	Commission is a serious shortcoming on the implementation of
	the JCPOA and erodes support for this important deal.''
	Let me ask you this, what information is missing from IAEA
	reporting and what information do you need to be made public?
	What specific recommendations do you have for the Trump
	administration and Congress to encourage more transparency so
	that experts like you can better evaluate the implementation?
	Mr. Albright. Well, in my testimony I gave there is a
	footnote and I apologize for making a footnote. But essentially
	the IAEA is not reporting on almost any of the technical
	details that it used to report on--levels of enriched uranium,
	controversies with Iran. I mean Iran is pushing limits of the
	JCPOA. The IAEA may or may not be pushing back but it could
	report on the status of that. So I would say that they are
	providing very little information.
	On heavy water we hear a lot, well, they are over, you
	know, the cap of 130 tons by 100 kilograms, they leave out 70
	tons was sent off to Oman in a kind of a clever trick that in
	essence allowed Iran to be 70 tons over the cap on heavy water,
	if you judge that cap by the heavy water Iran owns and
	controls.
	So I think that there is a lack of information inhibiting
	analysis, and the lack of information is providing a false
	narrative about where things are at and we need a lot more
	information. Now I will say under pressure, some from Congress,
	some from us, some from the media, the Joint Commission did
	decide in December to start releasing its major decisions
	publicly. I mean I don't think they wanted to do that but I
	think that they felt the absolute need to do it. And so I think
	pressure does work in this case and I think the Trump
	administration should push for much more openness.
	Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my time is up. Thank
	you.
	Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Engel. We go to Mr.
	Rohrabacher of California.
	Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like
	to thank you and the ranking member for again providing us the
	information and a focus on a very significant element to our
	nation's security, and so thank you both. And I would identify
	myself certainly with your opening statement.
	I am however, and this panel has not changed my, I don't
	know if it is observation or my analysis that frankly our
	policy toward Iran and the mullah regime in Iran has been
	detached from reality in that it is basically wishful thinking
	of the worst sort. Let me just mention about Russia and how
	they have armed the mullah regime, this horrible dictatorship,
	with weapons to shoot planes out of the air and take care of
	that type of military threat.
	Quite frankly, we are not going to invade Iran. I don't see
	it even if they have a bomb we are not going to invade Iran.
	Those weapons are aimed at preventing some sort of, or
	countering a military threat to that regime which now has a
	positive relationship with Moscow. That if we are going to get
	rid of the mullah regime it won't be U.S. military personnel
	with U.S. weapons going in and doing that job.
	If we are going to get rid, and unfortunately all the talk
	about that and all the details about every little increment in
	which the Iranian mullah regime now is closer to getting a bomb
	has taken us away from the real solution, the only solution
	which is make sure that we deal with the people of Iran who
	hate the mullahs. And you are taking focus away from that by
	talking about weapons systems and this.
	We need to make, while we left the Baluch who would be in
	charge of the Strait of Hormuz I might add if we would support
	their fight against the mullah regime. The Kurds, there are
	more Kurds in Iran than there are in Iraq. The Azeris, we have
	Azerbaijan right next door that is willing to help. But all of
	this time, and even the Persian element were as ready to
	overthrow the mullahs several years ago in this Green
	Revolution and we let them go without any, even verbal, support
	for their effort.
	Now getting rid of the mullah regime by helping the people
	of Iran is the answer. You have Persians, the MEK, I know as
	everybody criticizes them because they have a checkered past,
	well, they also, they have been willing to help us get rid of
	the mullah regime and they have been struggling for a more
	democratic government along with the other Persians who are
	there. Ninety percent of the Persians don't like it. And like
	you said as you would expect from a journalist to focus in on
	the corruption and the repression that is going on. Well, if we
	focus on that that is how we would mobilize the only real power
	we have to get rid of them which is the Iranian people
	themselves.
	And one last note about this idea about all this focus on
	how much heavy water they have and et cetera, et cetera. We
	gave them $150 billion with this nonsensical treaty that we
	signed with them, $150 billion were made at their disposal. How
	much do you think it would cost them to buy a nuclear weapon
	from Pakistan? It wouldn't cost, I bet it wouldn't even cost $1
	billion. I bet they could get it for in the tens of millions,
	if not $100 million. The fact is that regime with its hands on
	a military capability of nuclear weapons, that is the threat.
	It is the regime, it is not the weapon itself.
	So I think we should quit focusing America's attention on
	things that will not change the situation and make us any
	safer. And again talking about how much heavy water they have
	and how are they going to be able to stop them from building
	their own bomb, if they want to bomb now they can afford to buy
	it. And the answer is the mullahs have got to go. The mullah
	regime has to leave and how we get rid of it is not through
	American military operations, but instead reaching out to the
	people of Iran and helping them win their freedom.
	And that is, if anybody in the panel would like to spend
	their time refuting that, please go right ahead. How about my
	journalist friend, go right ahead.
	Mr. Exum. Well, sir, first off, thank you for that. I will
	be blunt. First off, you know, if it were to come to those
	types of activities, and then I well know your biography, I
	know your experience, you would know that the Department of
	Defense, this is not within our wheelhouse so to speak. You
	know, any outreach toward separatist movements is usually done
	either clandestinely or overtly through diplomatic channels.
	And there have, you know, certainly been examples where we have
	done that.
	I think with respect to, I will focus on one thing which is
	the note about the dollars that Iran has. First off, you know,
	Iran always has the cash on hand if they wanted to, you know,
	purchase a nuclear weapon. I think--and I hate to do this, I am
	putting on my Ph.D. hat now--there is a lot of academic
	literature and a lot of analysis that would suggest that that
	is not a really likely thing.
	So if you were the Pakistanis and you sell a nuclear weapon
	to somebody, first off, you lose all of the control that you
	would have on that nuclear weapon and you would get all of the
	blowback if it is used. So I think that threat, although it is
	real and it is something that we carefully monitor, it is
	something that contains a lot of risk for anybody that would
	sell that.
	The second thing I would say is that when it comes to money
	and what the Iranians are doing in terms of the asymmetric
	activities, in terms of these nefarious activities, a lot of
	these things are really cheap and they didn't need the money to
	keep doing this stuff. What they are doing in Yemen, what they
	are doing in Syria and Iraq, it is not that expensive to begin
	with.
	And as we have established, if the Quds Force wants to get
	a piece of the budget they are going to get a piece of the
	budget. They are going to get their way and thus far they have
	gotten their way with respect to I guess what we would call the
	Islamic regime's discretionary spending. But, and I don't think
	that the amount of money that was freed up, which is a little
	less when you look at actually the liquid assets, has had much
	of an effect on what Qasem Soleimani and his lieutenants are
	doing in Iraq and Syria.
	Chairman Royce. We go now to Mr. Brad Sherman of
	California.
	Mr. Sherman. The gentleman from California, Mr. Royce,
	makes some interesting points and the chairman was quite
	indulgent with him on time. I hope that inspires a whole new
	approach.
	Chairman Royce. Well, certainly with respect to Mr. Brad
	Sherman it does, so thank you.
	Mr. Sherman. Because I do want to deal with some of the
	points he raises. But before I do that in some minds the
	picture of the Islamic Republic of Iran, this regime, is the
	smiling face of its foreign minister Javad Zarif--dapper,
	debonair--in Geneva. The real face of this regime, the real
	picture of this regime is Alan Kurdi, that 3-year-old boy on
	the beach in Turkey in the Mediterranean, one of 400,000
	Syrians who died as a result of the Islamic Republic's support
	for the butcher in Damascus.
	I for one don't think that we can excuse Russian arms sales
	to Iran on the theory that we are going to achieve regime
	change any time soon. We have watched the Arab Spring. We have
	seen which regimes survive and which don't. Those regimes that
	have 50,000 thugs willing to machine gun their own citizens
	survive. Those whose army is unwilling to do that and are
	confronted by their own people don't. And we have had other
	panels so I want to ask this panel, I have been assured by
	other panels that there are tens of thousands of Quds Force
	soldiers willing to machine gun other Iranians if that is what
	it takes to keep this regime in force.
	The gentleman from California says that the weapons that
	Russia is selling they are only defensive, it wouldn't affect
	us. But of course the S300s are the anti-aircraft weapons that
	make it much more difficult for Israel or even the United
	States to take out this nuclear program if that becomes
	necessary, and the fact that all options are on the table is
	the only thing that keeps Iran from not cheating more on the
	JCPOA and one of the only things that got them to sign it.
	But I want to focus on the gentleman from California's idea
	of buying a nuclear weapon. He mentions Pakistan, but Pakistan
	might well listen to their friends in Saudi Arabia. If they
	have a bomb for sale maybe they would sell it there. They are a
	Middle Eastern country, or nearly one, and would be directly
	affected.
	I want to focus a little bit about our friends in North
	Korea. The death of Kim Jong Nam illustrates that we should
	never have taken North Korea off of the State Sponsors of
	Terrorism list. North Korea provided the kit that was used to
	create a nuclear bomb-making facility that was destroyed by
	Israel, located in Syria, destroyed by Israel last decade. Do
	any of our panelists have any idea how much money North Korea
	got in return, not for a nuclear weapon but just a kit to build
	one, technology? I am seeing four shaking heads.
	But I would point out that North Korea is in need of cash.
	Iran has some already loaded on pallets wrapped in cellophane.
	And I know that Iran would want the indigenous capacity. I know
	that they would want more than one weapon. But will any of you
	comment on why has Iran not purchased a weapon from North
	Korea? Knowing now that North Korea has a few more weapons than
	they need to defend themselves from us, they could afford to
	part with one. Mr. Albright.
	Mr. Albright. Yes, I think there is worry. I mean, and a
	nuclear weapon can be transferred in different ways. It doesn't
	have to be a fully commissioned, workable----
	Mr. Sherman. Yes, it could be just the fissile, they could
	sell the fissile material, they could sell the weapon, they
	could sell----
	Mr. Albright. That is right. And I think there is a lot of
	worry.
	Mr. Sherman [continuing]. The two separately.
	Mr. Albright. Yes, and I think there is a lot of worry and
	I think it needs to be looked at, just what is the level of
	cooperation? I mean I don't know of any credible evidence right
	now saying that Iran and North Korea are cooperating on nuclear
	weapons related or nuclear weapons issues, but there is a lot
	of cooperation on missiles. They have common enemies. And I
	think it needs to be looked at much more----
	Mr. Sherman. Do any of you have an opinion on whether the
	Syria-North Korea transaction of last decade would have
	inevitably involved Iranian observers, advisers, or cash?
	Anyone have an opinion on that?
	Mr. Albright. There has been statements or some evidence
	that Iran would have had some involvement in it. I was never
	able to confirm direct involvement. But given the closeness of
	Iran and Syria, fortunately that reactor doesn't exist anymore
	and there could certainly, cooperation could----
	Mr. Sherman. I am going to try to sneak in one more
	question which is indulgent of the chairman, but on the comment
	that we need to prevent U.S. banks from financing any aircraft
	sales to Iran because that creates an incentive for U.S. banks
	to come here and lobby us in favor of Iran to make sure they
	get repaid.
	The press reports are of discussions of a $10 billion
	military hardware deal between Russia and Iran including tanks,
	artillery, and aircraft. The JCPOA says Iran can't buy those
	kinds of weapons without the approval of a secret, five-member
	committee that operates in secret but we have a seat on that
	and can veto such sales. Is there any possibility that the
	United States would approve or fail to veto, any transfer of
	weapons from Russia to Iran?
	Mr. Albright. I don't think so. If I can say the problem is
	that the ban ends after 5 years or earlier if the IAEA issues
	its broader conclusion on the additional protocols. So really,
	this duration issue transcends nuclear to conventional and
	ballistic missile and it is something the Trump administration
	is going to have to factor in strongly into its policy review
	on Iran of how do we deal with these exemptions that in essence
	take place in not that distant future.
	Mr. Sherman. Okay. I will give one more comment and then I
	will yield back. No, I will yield back.
	Chairman Royce. Let's do this.
	Mr. Sherman. I will yield back.
	Chairman Royce. Let's get back to 5 minutes and let's start
	with Steve Chabot on that from Ohio. Thanks.
	Mr. Chabot. Thank you for your indulgence. As we all know,
	ultimately the President became aware because most of us didn't
	like or agree with the Iran deal and ended up taking action on
	his own. And some would argue that the previous administration,
	the Obama administration, had so much invested in the deal that
	they overlooked provocative actions, overlooked, arguably, a
	whole series of flagrant violations of the deal itself, and
	Iran pretty much got away with murder, I think, literally in
	some cases, but figuratively also.
	I would just like to go down the line and see, what do you
	think of what a lot of people think about this, the fact that
	the administration did overlook far too much, some of those
	things which you have already commented on here today, because
	this was one of their great accomplishments, something some
	people thought couldn't be done.
	So I will start with you, Ms. Bauer.
	Ms. Bauer. In terms of potential violations on the margins
	of the JCPOA, I think it is important to consider proportional
	responses. In my testimony there is a section where I look at
	the use of proportional responses to what the previous
	administration may have called ``deviations'' in terms of
	compliance with the deal, but what this administration might be
	more inclined to call ``violations.''
	And so I think it is important to have options available
	short of abrogating the deal. Those could be things like not
	approving decisions that come in front of the Joint Commission
	or suspending licensing, not the licenses themselves perhaps,
	but suspending licensing under the agreement until such issues
	are resolved.
	Mr. Chabot. Mr. Albright.
	Mr. Albright. I think my criticisms are fairly well known.
	I thought that conditions should have been stronger in many
	cases. I mean I did not support the deal despite a lobbying
	effort on the part of the administration. And I had supported
	publicly the JPA, but I thought there were several cases,
	conditions that just weren't strong enough where I could
	support them. I didn't come out against it.
	I have since, with implementation, become more critical of
	that. I think too many concessions were made, many more noes
	should have been given rather than yeses, and I think it has
	made this situation more difficult to deal with. And one of the
	challenges of the Trump administration is going to be to
	reverse this, and I think it is going to be challenging.
	And I think the things I put in my testimony, the short
	term things, are the things to do today. I mean obviously you
	can't get them all, but there are a lot of opportunities to
	start changing the nature of the implementation that can start
	today and the U.S. has the power to do it. But I do think it is
	going to be tough.
	And then there is this issue of, there are these problems,
	I mentioned one, and Congressman Rohrabacher in a sense is
	alluding to them, that the duration is a real problem in this
	agreement. I mean I wish 10 years was a long period of time in
	the Middle East, but it is not. And in some sense the major
	limitations of the deal start to unwind quicker than it took to
	negotiate this deal, if you go back to the start point as 2003.
	And so you have a real problem of how does now the
	administration deal with these conditions that are going to
	unwind in the future with conventional weapons, ballistic
	missiles----
	Mr. Chabot. Thank you. Let me cut you off there because
	some of us are being held to 5 minutes.
	Mr. Albright. Okay, I apologize.
	Mr. Chabot. Mr. Modell.
	Mr. Modell. No, to a couple of things to Mr. Rohrabacher's
	point, I think that the deal is actually a large setback to
	those in and outside of Iran who were eager to see us to
	actually do things that would lead to momentum for channeling
	resistance against the regime.
	And I think, you know, everything from 2009 when the Green
	Movement started happening and there was a moratorium on
	dealing with members of the Green Movement and actually aiding
	people as they were trying to channel resentment and figure out
	how to take disparate clusters of resistance and form an actual
	resistance movement for the first time in 35 years at the time,
	it was a tremendous failing and it was all in the interest of
	ill-conceived rapprochement in the nuclear deal.
	I won't comment on the nuclear deal in particular, but the
	one thing I think it is important to consider is that the deal
	itself--in a sense from an intel perspective or a law
	enforcement perspective--was a real setback, because now
	everyone is so eager to preserve the deal that we are putting
	the brakes on and we are cautiously walking around the idea of
	law enforcement. The verification of this still is critical.
	And I think to the extent that the CIA and the intelligence
	community were actually on the right path of developing better
	ways of working with law enforcement--detecting, disrupting,
	and dismantling counter proliferation networks--there has been
	a setback to that degree. And I think now we have an uphill
	climb in terms of verification and counter proliferation.
	Mr. Chabot. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.
	Can Dr. Exum respond? I leave it up to you.
	Mr. Exum. Mr. Chairman, with permission, could I briefly
	respond?
	Chairman Royce. Yes.
	Mr. Exum. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. First off,
	Congressman, I believe we overestimated the degree to which the
	diplomatic channel we established between Secretary Kerry and
	Zarif who could bear fruit outside of the nuclear negotiations.
	I think we thought it could, bottom line is it didn't. They
	didn't want to talk about anything except for the nuclear deal.
	Second, in terms of pushing back against other things Iran
	was doing, there were lots of reasons having nothing to do with
	the nuclear deal why we didn't. In Syria, the President as you
	all know took several options off the table in terms of what we
	could do in Syria. In Iraq we had a fight against the Islamic
	State to prosecute that we didn't want to endanger by pushing
	back against Iran too soon. And then third, in Yemen, I don't
	think the administration wanted to get drawn any deeper into
	Yemen. It is actually in Yemen and specifically with respect to
	the threat to freedom of navigation where I think we could have
	been more aggressive and think that would have made sense.
	Chairman Royce. We now go to Mr. Greg Meeks of New York.
	Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me just say,
	first of all, I appreciate the opportunity to be able to
	examine our policy toward Iran. I think that this will be our
	seventh full committee hearing on Iran in the past year, and I
	appreciate the opportunity to understand the threat that Iran
	poses to the Middle East and I know that we will have further
	questions.
	However, I must also say with the ongoing new
	administration and President Trump's bizarre policies toward
	Mr. Putin and Russia, as you have said, Mr. Chairman that
	Russia has demonstrated that the hope of cooperation cannot
	survive the cold calculation of his narrow interests, I would
	hope that and I know that we are going to have some hearing on
	Russia in a couple of weeks or so, but I hope that we have more
	focus on Russia and its involvement because it seems to be
	threatening our very democracy.
	It has come out clearly about the Russian involvement in
	our elections for the President of the United States here in
	America, and Russia's involvement in France and in Germany and
	those elections there. It seems to me that there is a great
	threat of what Russia is doing around the world.
	And being a committee that has gotten together and, you
	know, I see the Senate is starting to move on that side in a
	bipartisan way to start talking about where Russia is and what
	Russia is doing, whether it is in Iran or other places around
	the world, and what the connections are between Russia and our
	current administration, because it seems as though every day
	there are more ties to Russia's intelligence services that are
	being discovered at the highest level of our national security
	apparatus.
	So I would think that this committee, and one of the things
	that I do like about this committee is that we work in a
	bipartisan way. That we would be the committee, since it does
	not seem that anybody on the House side, and I do see some
	senators on the other side of the aisle starting to talk about
	doing something, but I would hope that--and I don't hear any
	committee or anything being done on the House side. I know that
	when we had Benghazi, et cetera, there was other committees
	that stood up and did certain things at their end for
	investigation.
	I would hope then that the Foreign Affairs Committee in a
	bipartisan way would step up and say, ``there is a threat to
	our democracy,'' and we hold many hearings. In fact we could
	lead Congress in coming together to say that we are going to
	look into what is happening in Russia and Russia's narrow
	interest in how they are affecting us here in the United States
	of America.
	And look at what the President's positions have been and
	the people that are affiliated with him, because just recently,
	just even yesterday it comes out that even during the campaign
	there has been many individuals from the Trump campaign that
	had some contact with Russia. And clearly when we had General
	Flynn, who had to leave because of his connections with Russia.
	So I think that it provides a unique opportunity for us to
	have some continuous hearings on Russia, its relationship and
	contact with the United States, what it is doing, what it is
	not doing, its connections with the current administration.
	That conversation is very important to every American whether
	you are Democrat, whether you are Republican, whether you are
	Independent, it is something that I think is going to the
	heart.
	And as the camera of history rolls it will be looking back
	on what did we do in the United States Congress? What did we do
	at the time that our own democracy was threatened by outside
	entity? Did we fully investigate and go into it as an
	independent body, a separate branch of government to make sure
	that we have done everything to protect ourselves?
	So, you know, it is good that we and we could even talk
	about----
	Chairman Royce. Will the gentleman yield?
	Mr. Meeks. We could even talk about, and I am not going to
	get a minute left, but I know we only get five.
	Chairman Royce. I understand.
	Mr. Meeks. We could even talk about, you know, Russia, you
	know, and I think we have had some of these conversations about
	Russia and its involvement with reference to Iran, of clearly,
	you know, we have heard questions here today talking about
	Russia providing ballistic missiles to Iran. We have talked and
	heard about that had Russia, had discussions over $10 billion
	in military hardware. So that is, you know, a problem to us
	even as you talk about dealing with Iran.
	And then when you figure out, you know, Russia and the
	consequences of the U.S. and Russian cooperation which has, you
	know, this administration has expressed openness to U.S.
	cooperation with Russia in Syria and how does that affect us in
	Iran and can you do an agreement with Russia? What is this deal
	with Russia and this administration?
	We have got to get to the bottom of this, and I think there
	is nothing more important for us as members of the legislative
	branch and the Foreign Affairs Committee for us to focus on
	where, what, when, and how Russia is involved with this
	administration. I yield back.
	Chairman Royce. Well, thank you, and I thank the gentleman
	for yielding. Even before this week's events I have been
	discussing with Ranking Member Engel a hearing focused on the
	way in which Russia works to undermine Western democracies
	including the United States, including France and Germany, and
	including efforts to undermine NATO. As the intelligence
	reports from January noted, they did that here. They will do it
	again in the upcoming European elections in France and Germany.
	So it is appropriate that we hear from experts on the
	appropriate steps to be taken in response and this will
	continue the critical oversight role that our committee has
	played on U.S.-Russia policy. I will remind the members that we
	have had hearings specifically on Russia and its aggressive
	acts in the past and, after all, this is the committee that led
	the way to impose sanctions on Russia. We did that after its
	invasion of Ukraine. And this is the committee that has been
	sounding the alarm about Russia's weaponization of information
	if you go through the hearings that we have had on RT, and I
	would expect that to be the first hearing we hold after next
	week's recess, as I have shared with Mr. Engel.
	So I appreciate the gentleman's observations and we now go
	to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida.
	Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Chairman Royce and
	Ranking Member Engel, for continuing to focus on the real and
	serious threat of Iran. As recent events have indicated and as
	you both have pointed out, Iran's provocative actions have not
	subsided in this post nuclear deal world and in fact, in many
	aspects, its illicit activity seems to have been on the rise.
	Iran remains a direct threat to our national security, to our
	friend and ally the democratic Jewish
	State of Israel, and to the stability of the entire Middle
	East.
	Often lost in the discussion of the JCPOA or Iran's
	ballistic missile test is how closely this all mirrors North
	Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Our Middle East
	Subcommittee has convened several hearings on this topic in the
	last few weeks. North Korea and Iran have been suspected of
	having some level of nuclear cooperation; at the very least,
	Iran learned from the North Korea playbook on how to win
	concessions from the West and still get its nuclear weapons.
	For certain these two rogue regimes have a long history of
	collaboration on ballistic missile development. Iran's latest
	test was apparently a ballistic missile of North Korean origin.
	This is a very dangerous alliance, we must not continue to view
	Iran and North Korea as two separate tracks. We have the Iran,
	North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act, INKSNA, which now
	could be a valuable tool to prevent proliferation of nuclear,
	radiological, chemical, or ballistic missile material to these
	regimes. Unfortunately, the previous administration was
	severely deficient in its reporting requirements under INKSNA.
	A GAO report found that the administration was years behind in
	its reporting, years behind, which had the unfortunate
	consequence of delaying sanctions on proliferation activities
	by Iran. By doing so, the previous administration effectively
	blocked key sanctions against Iran while the nuclear
	negotiations were ongoing, much to our detriment.
	In order to be effective we must fully and vigorously
	enforce sanctions and we must look at ways of expanding them if
	we are to curb Iran's dangerous actions. This includes, Mr.
	Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member, rigorous enforcement of the
	JCPOA and it includes reimposing some sanctions lifted by the
	JCPOA that fell under more than just nonproliferation
	sanctions. That is why I will introduce my Iran, North Korea,
	and Syria Nonproliferation Accountability Act which will modify
	the existing law and give us greater flexibility to hold these
	regimes and those individuals and entities accountable for the
	proliferation of their illicit activity. So I ask the panel
	kindly, could you tell us a little bit more about the Iran-
	North Korea nexus and what that proliferation network looks
	like, especially as it relates to their ballistic missile
	collaboration?
	And finally, Mr. Albright, you discussed Iran repeatedly
	taking advantage of loopholes and going over the threshold on
	heavy water and low enriched uranium. For what purpose would
	Iran need to enrich more than the alloted 300 kilogram cap on
	low enriched uranium or 130 metric tons of heavy water?
	Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member.
	Mr. Albright. It is very hard to penetrate the Iran-North
	Korean cooperation. I think it is better left to closed
	hearings to really get into that. I mean one thing that can be
	said though, and it is a little bit of an answer to an earlier
	question, is I think it is very important for the United States
	to sanction companies in Europe and in China that are linked to
	providing goods to Iran and North Korea.
	And I bring up the European side of this mainly because it
	is very hard for the European countries now to do that. Their
	sanctions or listing of companies can be challenged quite
	easily because of the nature of their system, and I think it is
	important that the U.S. sanction European and Chinese
	companies.
	Now in terms of taking advantage of the loopholes, and I
	listed several, now why would it need to enrich more? I mean I
	don't think it does. I think it just wants to push the
	envelope, create precedence. It wants to undermine the
	limitations of the JCPOA that were, at least from the U.S.
	point of view, intended to be pretty robust on that limit. They
	want to be able to justify why they would need a large gas
	centrifuge program, and one of the ways they are going to try
	to do it is by developing an indigenous fuel fabrication
	capability that uses low enriched uranium which of course has
	to be tested, you have to go above the limit to make more
	enriched uranium for the test fuel.
	And by doing that when the international community would
	want to stop enrichment, the justification for the enrichment
	would be deeply embedded in a civil nuclear argumentation
	whether that is the original or the ultimate intention or not.
	So I think again it is for Iran----
	Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir, I am sorry, I was long-
	winded and ran out of time.
	Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Chairman Royce. Thank you.
	Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir. Thank you, again.
	Chairman Royce. Mr. Gerry Connolly of Virginia.
	Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate the
	chairman's recitation of groundbreaking work done by this
	committee on Russia and I agree with him. I guess the concern
	on this side of the aisle that could easily be reassured is
	moving forward. Minority wrote----
	Chairman Royce. If the gentleman would yield.
	Mr. Connolly. Only if he suspends my time. If you suspend
	my time I am happy to yield, because you only give me 5
	minutes.
	Chairman Royce. Mr. Connolly, go ahead with whatever points
	you want to make.
	Mr. Connolly. All right. Three months ago, the minority
	wrote a letter to Eliot Engel, the ranking member, asking him
	to deliver it to the chairman asking for an immediate hearing
	even before the inauguration on this Russia connection. We
	have, to my knowledge, not received the reply.
	Earlier this week, Mr. Cicilline and all of the Democrats
	signed a letter asking that General Flynn be brought before
	this committee so this committee can examine the foreign policy
	implications of what just happened. And I certainly look
	forward to an answer on that request. So I associate myself
	with remarks of Mr. Meeks that moving forward that is what we
	are concerned about.
	And I continue to hear gratuitous slaps at the previous
	administration on the subject of Iran because the agreement
	wasn't all encompassing. Dr. Exum, are bilateral agreements
	between us and another country, are they typically all
	encompassing? Is that the record?
	Mr. Exum. No, they are not. And in this case we again, this
	one particularly----
	Mr. Connolly. So when we sign nuclear, well, going back to
	the very first nuclear test ban treaty during the Kennedy
	administration with the then Soviet Union, you mean those
	agreements did not address human rights violations or Jewish
	immigration or Gulags or misbehavior in other parts of the
	world that were causing us great grief?
	Mr. Exum. Not only that, Congressman, I seem to recall that
	we still faced significant conventional overmatch in the
	continent of Europe.
	Mr. Connolly. So, well, certainly the JCPOA has failed
	though, Dr. Exum, isn't that right? I mean every single metric
	set by the JCPOA has been violated by Iran or they have
	cheated, and we have caught them at it, right?
	Mr. Exum. Well, I think with respect to the JCPOA I think
	that there is room to push back against Iran in a more robust
	way, but we ought to do so with caution.
	Mr. Connolly. Dr. Exum, is there a single metric they have
	not reached?
	Mr. Exum. I am not, I would defer to the Energy Department
	and to the Department of----
	Mr. Connolly. Enrichment of uranium--they reached the goal.
	The Iraq production facility, plutonium reactor--they filled it
	with cement. Shipping enriched material out of the country--
	they did it. You know, inspections--they have done it. I mean
	by all accounts they have pretty much met the metrics. Now we
	have to monitor it, and I agree with my friends on the other
	side of the aisle. In fact, I have introduced legislation that
	would create a Helsinki-like commission to do just that so it
	is hopefully removed from politics and partisanship.
	But compliance obviously remains an issue, but you can't
	argue that the JCPOA has been a failure. And that is why after
	hearing all of the predictions for a year or more of how it
	would fail and they would cheat and by the way it would
	accelerate them as a nuclear power, surely you would agree that
	is not what happened. They are not closer to nuclear
	development today than before the JCPOA, are they?
	Mr. Exum. No, that is exactly right. Now Mr. Albright may
	have more to add, but as far as I----
	Mr. Connolly. I only have 1 minute and 24, and I have a
	feeling the chairman is going to be strict about it, so let me
	talk about the Russian connection. How about we talk about the
	new President.
	Mr. Exum. Sure.
	Mr. Connolly. And I listened with interest to your
	testimony. In some ways this Russia connection makes it harder,
	not easier, for us to try to deter or address Iranian behavior,
	does it not?
	Mr. Exum. Well, I believe it absolutely does.
	Mr. Connolly. Please explicate.
	Mr. Exum. Well, especially with respect to Syria, I think
	we have seen many disturbing, and on the one hand the coalition
	in Syria they are not as, the opposing coalition in Syria they
	are not as stable as our own counter-Daesh coalition is, so
	there are some fissures between the Russians and the Iranians,
	for example, or between Hezbollah and the Russians.
	But I am growing increasingly alarmed by the degree to
	which their coalition activities in Syria have brought Russia
	and Iran closer together. We have certainly seen just images on
	social media of Russian Spetznosts on the ground in Syria with
	Hezbollah patches on in a way that alarms us in the same way
	that U.S. special operators on the ground in northeast Syria
	working with Kurdish groups alarms the Turks.
	And I think quite frankly we have reason to believe that
	Russia's introduction and escalation in Syria in the fall of
	2015 made it more difficult, not easier, to push back against
	what Iran was doing in Syria and elsewhere in the region, sir.
	Mr. Connolly. I thank you.
	Chairman Royce. We go now to Mr. Joe Wilson of South
	Carolina.
	Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate you
	and Ranking Member Eliot Engel for your bipartisan approach to
	the issues that we are facing concerning Iran. I am grateful
	that we had a bipartisan success in adding language to the
	National Defense Authorization Act to require an analysis of
	Iranian missile testing.
	The Trump administration took a good first step in
	designating Iranian missile proliferation networks in response
	to the recent tests. More needs to be done. And for Ms. Bauer,
	what are your recommendations for near and short term actions
	to address Iran's ballistic missile system?
	Ms. Bauer. Thank you. I think there are a lot of options to
	use the existing authority. It is like the authority that was
	invoked in last month's action to continue to identify
	procurement networks. What is especially impactful can be
	targeting those previously non-public affiliations between
	commercial fronts and Iranian actors, because these front
	companies need to operate, they need to appear to be legitimate
	in order to procure dual use goods. They need to hold bank
	accounts, and exposing this publicly can be incredibly
	disruptive.
	Mr. Wilson [presiding]. And I appreciate that. And of
	course what they are doing violates U.N. resolutions too, so it
	really is insulting in light of the Iranian nuclear deal that
	everything seems to continue. In fact, Mr. Albright, apologists
	for the dangerous nuclear deal claim, ``If Iran cheats, we will
	know it.'' I agree with Mr. Rohrabacher earlier who said this
	is wishful thinking which puts American families at risk of
	attack. What is your assessment?
	Mr. Albright. In the short term, with the program rolled
	back quite a bit the chance of detecting cheating is pretty
	good, but in the longer term I would say it is not. And that is
	why it is critical to, in a sense, really deal with this issue
	of access by the IAEA. Iran will have greater incentives to
	cheat in the future if it now can limit the ability of the IAEA
	to access.
	And in the longer term, I mean I don't think this deal can
	be verified after a certain number of rollbacks in the
	conditions. If you are talking 10, 15 years from now, I think
	it will be extremely difficult to verify this arrangement if
	Iran builds up its nuclear program as it stated it is going to
	build up.
	Mr. Wilson. Well, to me it is such wishful thinking, the
	notification, the number of days we have to provide, the fact
	that there are no Americans serving on the inspection teams.
	This is beyond wishful thinking. It is putting the American
	families at risk.
	Mr. Modell, Obama administration officials repeatedly
	incorrectly testified that the dangerous nuclear agreement
	would in no way impact our pressing Iran on human rights and
	sanctioning those responsible for the brutal treatment of the
	Iranian people. However, there have been no designations for
	human rights abuses since the nuclear deal was implemented
	despite continued calls from Congress to do so. What specific
	steps can the new administration take to press Iran on human
	rights?
	Mr. Modell. First of all, in terms of the first thing is
	listing individuals for human rights abuses. The second thing
	though, and I have spent a great amount of time here on human
	rights abuses and terrorism and the other violations of the
	Iranian regime, but on human rights in particular is to use the
	media tools that we are funding that we are spending millions
	of dollars on every year to highlight those things and to make
	it an integral part of U.S. policy pressuring the regime from
	the outside.
	Mr. Wilson. And I appreciate so much Mr. Rohrabacher
	pointing out that the prior administration, we had such an
	opportunity with the Green Revolution. I had many friends in
	South Carolina, of all things, Iranian-Americans who had such
	hopes for regime change to give opportunity to the
	extraordinary people of the culture of Persia, to be under a
	theocracy that is so debilitating and so threatening to all the
	neighbors. And with two sons who served in Iraq, I know
	firsthand where the IEDs came from, and anyone who has faced
	that understands.
	And this really follows too, something never to be
	forgotten and that was the bombing of the Beirut Marine
	barracks. Hundreds, 283, I believe, Americans murdered and it
	was by the Iranian regime, the largest explosive device since
	Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It should not be forgotten.
	I now yield to Mr. Deutch of Florida.
	Mr. Deutch. I thank the chairman. First, Mr. Modell, I want
	to thank you for bringing up the issue of Iran's abduction of
	Iranian-Americans and dual nationals.
	I would also like to take this opportunity to note that
	March 9th will mark the 10th anniversary that my constituent
	Bob Levinson went missing off of Kish Island. And as I have
	said at every hearing that we have had about Iran, that has to
	continue to be Issue 1 in every discussion that we have with
	the Iranians. There is a new administration here, and I urge
	this administration just as I urged the last administration to
	make this a very important priority. And I appreciate you
	raising the issue.
	Mr. Albright, you criticized the IAEA for a lack of
	transparency. I am very concerned about that as well. My
	understanding is that the new administration hasn't reached out
	to the IAEA yet to discuss its monitoring of Iran. Clearly that
	is a problem. They need to hear from our representatives to the
	IAEA. There needs to be an exhaustive discussion with the
	coordinator for Iran nuclear implementation, whom I understand
	still holds that position. The administration should do that,
	but I also, Mr. Chairman, would urge this committee in order to
	tackle the issue of transparency to request that our
	representatives to the IAEA and the coordinator come to testify
	here in front of us to address specifically the transparency
	issues that Mr. Albright has raised. They are very serious.
	They will impact not just this deal in this year, but as Mr.
	Albright rightly points out, as the deal carries on for the
	remainder of its term. So Mr. Chairman, I hope that you will
	consider that.
	And finally, Dr. Exum, I want to just spend my remaining
	couple of minutes talking to you about the ``strategic
	flirtation,'' I think is how you referred to it, that this
	administration has engaged in with Russia. Before getting
	specifically to Russia and Iran that flirtation also takes
	place as there is a Russian spy ship off of our coast and as
	there is a mock attack on a U.S. destroyer in the Black Sea and
	at a time when Russia has now deployed a cruise missile, and
	then focus with that as background focus on Iran for a minute.
	How do we engage in the ways that this administration has
	seemed intent on doing with Russia while Iran has thousands of
	fighters and proxies like Hezbollah fighting alongside the
	Russians in Iran and as this committee and this Congress look
	at additional sanctions outside of the nuclear area, Iran's
	support for terrorism, for example, how do we do that in an
	effective way when we are simultaneously engaged in this new
	relationship with Russia that weakens our ability to do what we
	need to?
	Mr. Exum. Well, thank you, Congressman. I will be blunt. I
	don't think you can do it. I think that--and I am unfortunately
	the veteran of many weeks spent across a negotiating table with
	Russians in Geneva over the last year trying to find some way
	forward on the conflict in Syria. We conducted these
	negotiations as Russia was enabling the destruction of East
	Aleppo and the slaughter of thousands of Syrian civilians. We
	did so in an effort to determine whether or not Russia might be
	some sort of partner in Syria, whether they could use their
	leverage over the regime, over Iran, over Hezbollah, to broker
	some sort of peace in Syria.
	And at the conclusion of that quite bluntly, Congressman, I
	don't think that Russia necessarily has the influence over the
	Syrian regime to be able to broker any type of peace. And I
	think that frankly Russia and the Iranians have more common
	cause than they do any strategic disagreements.
	So for me again, Congressman, I just don't see the
	administration's outreach toward Russia, I just don't see how
	they can do that without strengthening the Iranian hand in
	Syria, without strengthening the Iranian hand regionally,
	without strengthening the hand of groups like Hezbollah which
	pose a clear threat to the state of Israel, and without
	emboldening groups like Hezbollah and these Iranian-backed PMF
	that potentially pose a threat to U.S. forces in Iraq in
	addition to the Iraqi state.
	Mr. Deutch. I appreciate that.
	Mr. Chairman, just before I yield back I would note for the
	record the reason that it is so important to engage immediately
	in a bipartisan investigation into the relationship between the
	White House and Russia is not just because of leaks, which
	seems to be the President's biggest concern, but because of the
	policy implications that stretch not just to U.S., Russia, and
	our discussions with our NATO allies, but all the way to Iran
	and the threats against the United States and our allies in the
	region that Russia may be contributing to. And with that I
	yield back.
	Mr. Wilson. And thank you, Mr. Deutch. We now yield to the
	judge, Congressman Ted Poe of Texas.
	Mr. Poe. I thank the chairman. I am going to talk about
	Iran which is I think the basis of this hearing. Maybe we will
	have a hearing on Russia at some point.
	I think we gave away the farm, the mineral rights, when we
	made the Iranian deal. I couldn't disagree with you more, Dr.
	Exum, about the Iranian deal. It was a bad deal for the United
	States. We gave them $150 billion that they should not have
	gotten. I believe that money did not go to build schools and
	hospitals in Iran, it went to the IRGC which runs 80 percent of
	the economy, and the IRGC funds terrorist operations throughout
	the world, namely with their proxy group Hezbollah.
	So I want to talk about Iran not Russia, and Iran and their
	status in the world today. One of you mentioned rules of
	engagement, hopefully we will change the rules of engagement
	with Iran. I hope that we do and we don't find ourselves in
	another situation like in the last administration on January
	the 10th or 12th of 2016 when two of our river command boats
	surrendered to the Iranians, surrendered.
	So much for the American phrase, ``Don't give up the ship.
	We gave up two ships to the Iranians, and Secretary Kerry
	almost apologized. We still haven't gotten the facts of that
	situation. Maybe we will change the rules of engagement where
	we don't allow Iranians to capture our ships without a fight
	over in that part of the world.
	But I want to talk about the IRGC. Do you think that the
	IRGC has planned and executed terrorist attacks throughout the
	world including against Americans, Mr. Modell?
	Mr. Modell. Thank you for the questions, Congressman. I
	don't that there is any doubt whatsoever that the IRGC,
	particularly the Quds Force, has planned terrorist activities
	against the U.S. and U.S forces, U.S. persons, and its allies
	around the world. I think between 2012 and 2015, there were at
	least 30 such activities that were in some way traced back to
	the IRGC. So I don't think that there is any doubt about that
	whatsoever.
	Mr. Poe. Does the IRGC have training camps in Iran that
	train other people from other parts of the world in terrorist
	activities?
	Mr. Modell. I think the publicly available information
	would point you to Iranian sponsored and run training camps in
	southern Lebanon. Are there training camps in Iran? I think
	that is probably meant for discussion in a more private
	setting.
	Mr. Poe. Well, how about in South America? How about South
	America, can you answer that question?
	Mr. Modell. South America, beyond the rumors of Iranian
	training camps in Margarita Island and certain parts of
	Venezuela I have not heard of anything. I have heard of Iranian
	outreach in various nefarious ways to certain groups in Latin
	America, but the links between for instance the Vice President
	of Venezuela and Iran have been long discussed and long, there
	has been a lot of speculation about links therein to terrorism
	and destabilizing activity----
	Mr. Poe. How about the Iranian sponsor of Hezbollah in
	Syria and Lebanon?
	Mr. Modell. I don't think there is any doubt about that.
	Mr. Poe. That it happens. I mean they sponsor the terrorist
	group Hezbollah.
	Mr. Modell. Not only do they sponsor the terrorist group
	Hezbollah, but I can tell you when Syria began in full force
	and Iran really started to take a leading role, Hezbollah
	actually put up some resistance and said we are not sure that
	we really want to become embroiled in this, and the Iranians
	strong-armed them and said yeah, you are going to do that. So
	it is not a matter of Iran supporting or sponsoring them, it is
	about them controlling them to a large extent.
	Mr. Poe. Do you think that the IRGC based on their
	activities worldwide and their sponsorship of terrorism should
	be back on the list or on the list as a sponsor of terrorism,
	that the Treasury Department should designate them as a
	terrorist organization? Just want your opinion.
	Mr. Modell. In my opinion, I don't think so. I don't think
	so. I think that there are certain parts of the IRGC that
	should be and the Quds Force. I don't think that the original
	purpose of the designations for foreign terrorist organizations
	were meant for entire militaries, and that is essentially what
	the IRGC is. I think it is overreach and I think, actually I
	don't think it will have much of an impact.
	Mr. Poe. I am not asking for a foreign terrorist
	organization designation, I am asking if you think that the
	Treasury Department under their power should designate it as a
	terrorist organization. It is a different designation.
	Mr. Modell. Treasury designating the IRGC as a terrorist
	organization makes sense just given the depth of IRGC
	involvement in all facets of Iranian terrorism, so yes, in that
	regard it is. It would be sensible, yes.
	Mr. Poe. I am out of time, I yield back. Thank you very
	much.
	Chairman Royce. Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island.
	Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you
	for calling this hearing. Now more than ever the United States
	must show the world that we are serious about holding Iran to
	account and enforcing the JCPOA as well as examining Iran's
	destabilizing activities around the world. But it is impossible
	to talk about Iran and not talk about Russia, particularly when
	you consider Russia's blocking of sanctions against Iran at the
	U.N., and Russia's support of Iranian activities in Syria.
	But I fear that we are at a disadvantage when we have a
	President who seems unable and unwilling to stand up to
	Vladimir Putin, Iran's biggest supporter and patron. As the
	body in the House responsible for our foreign policy it is
	incumbent upon us to examine the very real consequences of
	President Trump's pivot toward Russia and what that means for
	our national security, our relationships with allies, and the
	function of our own Government.
	Mr. Chairman, it has been 8 months since we had a full
	committee hearing on Russia. I believe we are long overdue, and
	we must have witnesses from the administration appear before us
	and give a full and honest accounting of what their plans are
	for dealing with this unprecedented Russian aggression and
	meddling in the United States.
	Moreover, as the body tasked with oversight of our foreign
	diplomacy apparatus, we absolutely must require General Michael
	Flynn to appear before this committee and answer truthfully
	about what his relationship and contacts were with Russian
	officials before and during his tenure as national security
	adviser. The issue impacts the United States' relationship with
	our friends and foes around the world. If we cannot be an
	honest broker in our dealings with Russia we lose credibility
	everywhere.
	And that is why 19 of my colleagues on this committee and I
	sent you a letter asking that we have Michael Flynn testify
	before this committee as soon as possible. I ask unanimous
	consent that a copy of this letter be entered into the record.
	Chairman Royce. Without objection.
	Mr. Cicilline. This request is made in the context of the
	following facts: Unprecedented Russian interference in our
	elections directed by Vladimir Putin to help elect Donald Trump
	as concluded by 17 intelligence agencies; a sophisticated plan
	of hacking, fake news, and a sophisticated use of propaganda;
	repeated contacts between the Trump campaign and Russians
	during the course of the campaign. Three members of President
	Trump's inner circle--Carter Page, Paul Manafort, and now
	Michael Flynn--have had to leave the inner circle because of
	their ties to Russian officials. Secret conversations between
	the national security adviser and the Russian Ambassador, then
	Michael Flynn lied to the American people, lied to the Vice
	President of the United States, and denied those conversations,
	those conversations happening right on the day that sanctions
	were imposed for interfering with the American Presidential
	elections.
	At the same time, Sally Yates, the acting attorney general,
	brought that information to the attention of the White House
	counsel and she concluded that he was a compromised individual
	who could be blackmailed by the Russians. What did they do?
	Shortly thereafter Sally Yates is fired, Michael Flynn stays in
	place for 17 days with full access to classified information
	continuing all of his responsibilities as a national security
	adviser.
	This is in the context of a President who is bellicose and
	fighting with all of our allies--Mexico, Australia as two most
	recent examples--but has showered praise on the brutal dictator
	Vladimir Putin. He maligns our intelligence professionals,
	compares them to Nazi Germany, and at the same time we learn
	that Michael Flynn has appeared at a celebration of RT, the
	single most powerful Russian propaganda machine, and the
	President has refused to answer questions about his investments
	or financial dealings in Russia or to produce his tax returns.
	Then we learn his son at a real estate conference in 2008
	said, and I quote, ``Russians make up a pretty disproportionate
	cross section of a lot of our assets.'' And then he went on to
	say, ``We see a lot of money pouring in from Russia.''
	Mr. Chairman, I don't know what else we need to see to
	fulfill our responsibilities to get to the bottom of this,
	because we can't have a real conversation about foreign policy
	or the implications of our relationships with Russia, with
	Iran, with the rest of the world until we get to the bottom of
	this.
	And so while I am anxious to have a conversation about Iran
	and anxious to have a conversation about the JCPOA, I am
	imploring this committee, Republicans and Democrats, to put
	your country before party to bring these issues before this
	committee so we can get to the bottom of this. The American
	people expect nothing less, and I urge all the members of this
	committee to join those who have already asked for these
	hearings, because the American people are watching this and
	they cannot believe that there hasn't been a bipartisan effort
	in the House of Representatives to get to what has been
	unprecedented interference in our democratic institutions, that
	the sanctity of our democracy, our ability to defend our very
	way of life is at stake.
	And so I don't have a question for this panel. I thank you
	for your testimony, but I think this gets to the heart of our
	ability to continue to be a beacon to the world, a place of
	democracy, of self government, where foreign governments have
	no role in helping to pick our leaders or interfering with
	policies that we implement in America. And I thank you and I
	yield back my remaining 2 seconds.
	Chairman Royce. Mr. Scott Perry of Pennsylvania.
	Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to talk about
	the issue at hand, but I, as you know, simply can't just let
	the statements of the past remain on their own without
	correcting the record.
	And as long as credibility has been brought up especially
	by the other side of the aisle, for my whole life, for
	literally my entire life, I have watched many of my friends on
	the other side of the aisle or that side of the aisle sidle up
	to and speak glowingly of horrible dictators like Fidel Castro
	and----
	Chairman Royce. Will the gentleman yield for a minute? Just
	in the interest of comity maybe let me make this point. Mr.
	Engel and I have already indicated that the first hearing we
	are going to do is on this issue after the recess when we come
	back. So for the members here what I would just urge is that we
	have a panel of experts before us and if we can stay focused on
	the issue at hand I think that will allow us, especially with
	the time and effort and expertise that these four individuals
	have put into studying this problem, allow us to come to some
	solutions which this committee can then push.
	In the meantime, we can prepare for the upcoming hearing in
	2 weeks and we are to deal with the issue, an issue which we
	have long dealt with on this committee, but I would just urge
	that from members on both sides of the aisle so that we can get
	back on topic on something that is quite a challenge. And then
	in 2 weeks we will continue with the good work of this
	committee and hopefully in a bipartisan way. And with that I
	will yield back to General Perry.
	Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
	indulgence and I will bring this back home as quickly as I can.
	I would just point to at least most recently discounting all of
	my life in watching what I saw. Most recently, regarding Iran
	and Russia, the Obama administration failed to follow the law
	and sanction Russia for the sale of the S300 missile system and
	various other weapons system, aircraft, armored vehicles, et
	cetera--nary a word. Not a word. Russia invades Crimea--
	nothing. Nothing from that side. The full outrage and concern
	is what it is, and I would say this as an old soldier.
	Mr. Deutch. Will the gentleman yield?
	Mr. Perry. I will not yield. I just want to say this is
	complementary fashion, in complementary fashion, and it doesn't
	apply to everybody. It doesn't apply to everybody. But in
	complementary fashion, welcome to the war. With that Dr. Exum,
	thank you for your service to the country.
	I would also like to refer to the remarks of the gentleman
	from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, while we discuss the margin,
	the marginal errors of the agreement or of Iran's actions, the
	small infractions, whether it is low enriched uranium, heavy
	water stockpiling, ballistic missile activities, the purchase
	of conventional weapons, et cetera, I don't think there is any
	doubt in the room or around the world that in some fashion 10
	or 15 years from now Iran is going to be a nuclear armed with
	delivery capability nation. That is who they are going to be.
	That is what they are going to be and we are going to deal with
	that somehow.
	And I would also say in agreement with Mr. Rohrabacher, we
	are not going to go to war with Iran. That is not going to
	happen. I think the deal is horrible, I always have. It is what
	it is and we have got to find a way to move forward.
	I just want to follow up with you, Mr. Modell, with where
	Mr. Poe is headed because I was headed there already. What are
	the ramifications of listing the IRGC as a foreign terrorist
	organization with specific ties to how Treasury treats their
	transactions and the permutations of the IRGC and those
	transactions with other countries, other entities? What are the
	ramifications if that were to happen? You said you didn't think
	there would be any, it would be marginal. Can you elaborate on
	that?
	Mr. Modell. Let me elaborate on that. The part that I think
	would be not marginal at all would be as it would serve as a
	significant deterrent to foreign businesses who were looking to
	get into Iran. So the extent that we can declare them as a
	foreign terrorist organization by Treasury or by having the
	State Department continue to add the individuals to the lists
	that exist, Magnitsky List type of sanctions where we are
	pointing out corruption and we are actually saying the IRGC's
	massive commercial enterprise, buyer beware.
	So to a large extent the recovery of Iran's economy, the
	ability of foreign businesses to go in there and actually
	conduct transactions would be impacted. So perhaps I misspoke,
	but I think there would be a significant impact economically
	when you think about the extent to which the IRGC has control
	over significant sectors of the Iranian economy and to the
	extent to which such a declaration would probably cause a lot
	more heartburn among companies that are looking to get in.
	Companies that I speak to right now in a private sector
	capacity--large oil companies, Europeans, multinationals who
	are looking--the one thing that they ask is say, hey, you guys
	are based in Washington, DC. We have done a lot of due
	diligence, we think there is a way we can make a lot of money
	in Iran, however, there is still this black cloud of sanctions,
	we don't know where the U.S. is going to go. It is a
	significant deterrent even when the lawyers have signed off on
	it and even when people in leading European companies are ready
	to go back in.
	So those types of things give people real pause. So I would
	stand corrected and say it would have a significant impact.
	Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield.
	Chairman Royce. Thank you. I would remind all members that
	House Rule 17 and committee decorum requires us to confine our
	remarks to the issues under discussion and to avoid discussion
	of personality.
	And we now go to Dina Titus of Nevada. Thank you.
	Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Dr. Exum, in your testimony you talk about the four Ps
	strategy that you followed when you were at the Defense
	Department under the Obama administration--posture, plans,
	partners, and preparedness. Well, it seems to me under this
	administration our posture has become negative and hostile, our
	plans are nonexistent, our partners have all been alienated,
	and our preparedness is just a state of uncertainty.
	We have also heard President Trump when the Iranians circle
	our beautiful destroyers with their little boats and they make
	gestures at our people they shouldn't be allowed to make, they
	will be shot out of the water. We heard this confirmed by one
	of the members of this committee earlier who was calling for
	virtual combat on the Gulf coast. We also heard President Trump
	tell the leadership of Harley Davidson that nothing is off the
	table when responding to questions about Iran.
	Would you just address how this new approach, all this
	saber rattling is affecting not only our relationship with
	Iran, but with the other neighbors and potential partners in
	that part of the world?
	Mr. Exum. Thank you, Congresswoman, for allowing me to
	address this question. It is a good one. I think for me what
	worries me most about this current administration, and as I
	said in my opening statement, I think there are individuals in
	this administration, Secretary Mattis for example, who come to
	this administration with deep knowledge of the threat that is
	posed by Iran as well as the threat to our own troops and our
	other various equities within the Middle East, and so I have
	certain faith in certain individuals in this administration.
	The two things that worry me, Congresswoman, are first off
	sequencing. Strategy is often about prioritization and
	sequencing. And I see some individuals within this
	administration really eager to pick a fight with Iran. And I
	think we need to be very careful about how and when we do that
	if we elect to do that.
	Right now we still have a lot of hard fighting in Iraq, for
	example. We have cleared, with our Iraqi partners, to be clear,
	have cleared eastern part of Mosul. To clear western Mosul is
	going to take several, many more months. The Middle Euphrates
	River Valley still has a significant presence of the Islamic
	State, and we need to remain focused on that at hand. And I
	sense within this administration that there are some voices who
	are so eager to confront Iran that they may not have thought
	through how exactly they sequence it or what prioritization
	they are putting into place.
	The second thing, and this is really I think the big
	concern is just the uncertainty within this administration. I
	don't think that I will surprise anybody here on either side of
	the aisle by saying that the upheavals we have seen within this
	administration over the past few weeks have been unprecedented
	both in terms of personnel, to include the dismissal of the
	national security adviser, to also include some of the ways in
	which we have alienated some of our key partners such as--I
	mean I thought it would take some great effort to offend
	Australia, but we managed to accomplish it in the first 2 weeks
	of this administration.
	And they are a key partner. They followed us in Vietnam,
	they are active with us off the coast of the Arabian Peninsula
	in terms of maritime patrols. We depend on these partners to
	not only defeat Daesh but also to push back against the threat,
	the very real threat that my colleagues on this table as well
	the members of this committee have highlighted in terms of
	Iran's asymmetric activities.
	You know, when we interdict weapons shipments off of the
	coast of Yemen, for example, it is often not U.S. forces who do
	this. It is often our partner forces that do this. We need
	those partners, and right now there is a great deal of
	uncertainty, I think, among many of them in terms of the
	strategic direction of this administration in terms of who can
	speak for this administration, and it is worrying to me both as
	a former official, but also quite frankly just as an American
	citizen testifying before this committee today, ma'am.
	Ms. Titus. Thank you.
	Yes, Mr. Albright.
	Mr. Albright. I would like to add I am not part of the
	administration in any way, but I don't, and there may be some
	voices trying to pick a fight with Iran, but I don't think they
	are trying to pick a fight with Iran. I think they are, even
	with this idea of putting Iran on notice, I mean they, Flynn
	made clear that they want to have a policy review. They don't
	have people in place and they need to do a lot of recruitment,
	but I think, overall I think they are moving ahead rather
	deliberately. But Iran does things and they have to respond.
	Ms. Titus. Do you think we can have it both ways? We can be
	cozy with Russia and tough on Iran at the same time?
	Mr. Albright. On the Russian issue, Iran is----
	Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
	Mr. Albright. Okay.
	Chairman Royce. Thank you. We go now to Mr. Thomas Garrett
	of Virginia.
	Mr. Garrett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Chairman Royce. Mr. Garrett, let's get that microphone
	closer and make sure you have the red button on.
	Mr. Garrett. Do I get my 10 seconds back? Just kidding.
	Anybody studying the region with any sort of objectivity
	understands that the IRGC is the fulcrum of power in Iran. The
	2009 uprising failed, I believe, in large part due to what Mr.
	Sherman, my colleague from California, referenced as a
	willingness of individuals to level firearms at their fellow
	citizens. And it wasn't obviously just the IRGC, but subsidiary
	elements such as the Quds Force thereof. And so if we are
	attempting to ensure better outcomes in Iran, I think we should
	focus our efforts on the IRGC. I am not sure if it was Mr.
	Rohrabacher or Mr. Perry who initially commented on, and
	actually I think it was Mr. Poe who originally commented on
	potentially extending the Treasury Department's OFAC controls
	to implement actions wherein they would treat the IRGC as a
	sponsor of terror, but I can't think of a good reason not to do
	this except that as I understand it the JCPOA instructed a lot
	of the restrictions, a lot of the sanctions that have been
	placed on the IRGC, to be lifted, which seems to me to be
	counter to American policy in any number of arenas.
	Number one, the previous administration's failure to act in
	2015 after the Russians waited 5 years to complete the sale of
	S300 missiles to Iran created a circumstance wherein if you
	understand the capabilities of the S300 platform, any
	generation 4 aircraft carrier based aircraft really can't take
	off in the Persian Gulf safely. That is just the reality. And
	so we have no Gen-5 assets, F-35 comments withheld, in that
	capable range.
	And truly I read where we have ``a robust suite of plans
	that are real, resourced, and our forces are ready to execute
	them,'' and I wonder if we do, particularly in a world where if
	we had executed a strike with simply F-22s and B-2s, we have
	about what, 10 operational platforms of the latter.
	So if we wanted to act we couldn't, we know the fulcrum of
	power in Iran is the IRGC, and we are hamstrung by a JCPOA that
	doesn't let us attack the fulcrum of power metaphorically, not
	literally, the IRGC. And it is hard for me to fathom having
	worn a uniform and knowing Ranger Exum--I use that because it
	is more impressive than Doctor--and Mr. Perry, fought alongside
	and served alongside some of the 500 American service members
	who we estimate were killed by IEDs manufactured by the IRGC
	and their subsidiaries, which goes beyond the 283 Americans who
	died in Beirut. And I could keep going, Lebanon, the Khobar
	Towers, a plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador here on this
	soil.
	So if we want a better outcome in Iran I would submit that
	we need to function in a way that we could penalize the IRGC
	which will then destabilize the regime because the guns are
	what keep the mullahs in power. Having said that I would ask,
	and I don't have a ton of time left, if anybody can tell me if
	when we do things like send 400 million unmarked euros at a
	time when it would correlate to the release of foreign held
	dual citizens--whether it was ransom or not, the optics are
	bad, right--if that doesn't encourage the same sort of bad
	behavior? And I would point to similar activities undertaken
	not just in the Sudan and North Korea subsequent and precedent
	to that but also in Iran. Here are your foreign nationals back,
	we have our 400 million, we now have some more people.
	So I guess, you know, we have what, U.S. citizens and legal
	permanent residents to the tune of ten, eight plus two, I
	think, held in Iran now, and for us to negotiate in good faith
	I would argue is a betrayal of these folks, of my oath to
	defend the Constitution and the citizens of the nation that it
	rules over and how can we do that?
	I mean why not just cut off all activities in any
	nonmilitary way that we can with the fulcrum of power in Iran
	and refuse to do business with those who do business with these
	folks and let them choose between economic activities with the
	United States or with Iran? I think I know which way they would
	make those choices.
	So I guess this is a really convoluted compound question,
	but doesn't the JCPOA really hamstring us from attacking
	metaphorically, not literally, the axis of power, the fulcrum
	of power in Iran, the IRGC, by virtue of the elements therein,
	and therefore doesn't it actually serve to perpetuate the
	existence of the regime?
	Mr. Modell. Sorry, you just got picked at random.
	Mr. Modell. No, Congressman Garrett, I couldn't agree more.
	I think that if you are going to actually do the things that
	Congressman Rohrabacher was talking about and some of things
	that I mentioned in my testimony--that is weakening the IRGC--
	you have to focus on that.
	And I think the existence of this regime depends on the
	existence of the IRGC. They are at the center of everything.
	For them to control 25 to 50 percent of the economy and not to
	be held accountable or for businesses not to be held to a
	higher standard before doing business over there, and I think
	quite frankly the hurdles are way too low, you are actually
	contributing to the perpetuation of a regime that is
	fundamentally against us in every way.
	Mr. Garrett. Right. And Mr. Chairman, I know I am over a
	bit. Did we not with the JCPOA seek to essentially see
	hopefully regime change through a more moderate regime before
	the Iranians hit that nuclear threshold? That is really the
	goal, right? Give us time and if there is a change in the
	power, but if we don't hit that fulcrum of power there will be
	no regime change. Mr. Albright?
	Mr. Albright. Yes. Well, that was some of the talking
	points. I am not sure the negotiators necessarily believe that,
	but in a sense they were asking to kick the can down the road
	and they did.
	And on your question on the IRGC I think the impact on the
	JCPOA is do we lose the Europeans or not. I mean that is
	really, and so I think the issue for the administration is they
	are going to have to get out there and manage the relationship
	with the Europeans so if they do decide to move forward on
	listing the IRGC under the executive order as a terrorist
	organization that they don't lose the Europeans, because
	certainly it is their business that will be affected.
	But I think it can be done, but it certainly, the
	administration has to get out there and talk to them. The
	Europeans have made it clear that this upsets them, but I think
	that it can be managed.
	Ms. Bauer. Excuse me, if you would indulge me for just a
	moment. I think that you are right that sanctions diplomacy is
	very important.
	Chairman Royce. I am afraid time is expired, but we are
	going to let you put that in writing.
	Ms. Bauer. Okay.
	Chairman Royce. Let's see, Brad Schneider of Illinois.
	Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me just
	start by thanking the witnesses for your testimony here today
	and your service to our country and your work across time on
	this particularly important issue.
	Ms. Bauer, I want to emphasize what you talked about in
	your testimony. I think the three points you made are worth
	repeating. One, the necessity of taking back the narrative, the
	need to emphasize the sanctions that are still in place and to
	enforce those sanctions rigorously, vigorously to the greatest
	extent possible.
	You said in your testimony that sanctions are most
	effective when they are adopted by international community, the
	international coalition. My question, and I leave this question
	with the whole panel, what are the challenges to maintaining,
	if not strengthening, international support for sanctions and
	the opportunities to bring increasing bite to the sanctions in
	place and potential sanctions against Iran's activities not
	just around ballistic missiles but human rights and their
	activity in conventional weapons throughout the region?
	Ms. Bauer. Thank you. I think that one of the challenges to
	increasing the bite of sanctions and to rebuilding this
	multilateral coalition that we had before is that it does
	largely come down to the Europeans and the view in Europe that
	an important part of their dialogue with Iran is the commercial
	dialogue. But they are divided on this point and they in fact
	do maintain sanctions on the IRGC in Europe under their human
	rights authorities and they maintain sanctions on Hezbollah's
	military wing. So they are divided on this issue.
	I think what is important going forward from the U.S.
	perspective in more vigorously enforcing the sanctions we have
	is that we continue to do those based on conduct, because that
	will be, continuing to emphasize the ways in which Iran
	violates international norms will be something that will be
	helpful in rebuilding a multilateral coalition.
	Mr. Schneider. Mr. Albright, you said with the last
	question that there is a question, do we lose the Europeans?
	What steps would increase that likelihood, what steps should we
	be taking to make sure that we don't lose the Europeans in
	enforcing sanctions?
	Mr. Albright. Yes, I think it, and this would reflect just
	visits in Europe. I mean this when they will say, and maybe it
	is just the optics of it, the additional signal, but they will
	say that this would end business between European companies and
	Iran. I understand what Ms. Bauer said and I would actually
	defer to her, but what I clearly heard was that there is
	something going on here that this other designation would cause
	companies to pull back.
	And maybe it is not true. Maybe that will be part of the
	management is that they should be more careful in the first
	place based on having these sanctions in the IRGC. But I do
	think that the administration has to get out there and start
	discussing these things with them and not just hope for the
	best.
	Mr. Schneider. I will continue down the panel. Mr. Modell,
	you are nodding.
	Mr. Modell. No, I would just second that. I would say that
	we talk to companies all the time that, you know, have signed
	MOUs and they are on the verge of actually making the leap into
	Iran and there still is a real fundamental lack of clarity on
	their part as to what they can and cannot do. Treasury does a
	great job of laying out some of the dos and don'ts, and there
	is U.S. Government Web sites where you can go and see what you
	can and can't do in the sanctions.
	But really quite frankly it is cumbersome and it is a lot
	to get through. There is no nice easy dos and don'ts list for
	companies. I think there has to be a media offensive that
	reminds companies of the dangers of doing it. And quite
	frankly, a lot of companies have gone in there and tripped and
	fallen and have reputational risk.
	There should be some sort of a list, consumer report, some
	U.S. Government sponsored Web site that actually details bad
	experiences that companies have had in going in there so that
	other companies can reach out and say wait a minute, maybe we
	ought to think about that sounding board, consumer reports if
	you will. But a lot of companies have experiences that we
	should exhibiting.
	Mr. Schneider. Dr. Exum, I don't want to leave you out.
	Mr. Exum. Well, sanctions is not my specialty and I plead
	ignorance. I defer to the expertise of the other panelists.
	Mr. Schneider. Well, thank you. I have just a little bit of
	time left, but I think, and I had raised these concerns when
	the JCPOA was announced the need to make sure that Iran cannot
	get any closer to a nuclear weapon during the time frame of the
	JCPOA or any time thereafter and indeed make it clear that U.S.
	policy is Iran will never have a nuclear weapon. And with that
	I yield back.
	Chairman Royce. I thank the gentleman, and we go to Mr. Ted
	Lieu of California.
	Mr. Lieu. Thank you. Let me first thank Chairman Royce and
	Ranking Member Engel for agreeing to have the next hearing be
	on Russia. I think we all appreciate that. And thank you to the
	panelists for being here, for your expertise and thank you, Dr.
	Exum, for your military service.
	As you know, Iran is involved in Syria, as is Russia, and
	there are two news agencies, CNN and Reuters, reporting that
	the Pentagon is considering sending U.S. conventional ground
	forces to Syria. That would significantly alter our military
	footprint and operations in Syria. I think it is a very, very
	bad idea.
	The Trump administration has not laid out a plan for what
	they would do there. They have not set out objectives they
	would want them to achieve. The Trump administration has not
	explained who they would support in Syria nor how long they
	would be there. I would like to ask each of you, do any of you
	think it would be a good idea to send our women and men of our
	military in harm's way into Syria? And let me start with Dr.
	Exum.
	Mr. Exum. So, Congressman, you are asking all the right
	questions. If I could be so honest, I think that we would like
	to know a lot more about what these soldiers would be doing. I
	think we would want to know who they would be. I don't think, I
	mean you followed this conflict closely. You know that our
	overall strategy against the Islamic State has been by, with,
	and through local partners. So we have had forces on the ground
	in Iraq and Syria to the degree that they would enable local
	partners.
	The strategic dilemma that this administration faces
	specifically as it wants to go on Raqqa is whether or not you
	can push on Raqqa without arming and training the YPG. Doing so
	would put at risk our relationship with a NATO ally in Turkey,
	and I think that is what this administration is wrestling with.
	We made the decision when we constructed the strategy to
	counter the Islamic State which had buy-in from not only the
	civilians in the Pentagon but also all the uniforms as well
	that working by, with, and through local partners would make
	more sense, first off, because many of us are Iraq veterans and
	we know that the Iraq war cost roughly almost 5,000 U.S. lives.
	I think during my tenure at the Department of Defense the
	way in which we waged the conflict cost five, the loss of five
	U.S. servicemen. It is also less expensive in terms of
	monetarily. But more important than that strategically the
	logic is it is more sustainable on the ground. Yes, it is
	messier. Yes, it takes more time. But if local groups have a
	buy-in to the fight they have a buy-in to the victory and that
	is something that didn't happen after we defeated the
	insurgency in Iraq in 2007-2008.
	To get back to your question, deviating from by, with, and
	through could potentially, you know, I would caution the
	administration from deploying the 82nd Airborne on the ground
	in northeastern Syria. I believe that would be a mistake. I
	believe it would be costly not just in terms of money but in
	terms of lives. If by contrast you are talking about limited
	conventional forces to help you breach the outer defenses of
	Raqqa in a way that might mean that you don't have to arm the
	YPG to the extent that would really inflame the relationship
	with Turkey, if that is what they are talking about that is
	something different.
	So Congressman, I think you are asking all the right
	questions. If I am in the position of the Pentagon right now, I
	am really weighing those options and trying to think about, you
	know, which forces you are really talking about. So it all
	depends on kind of the forces that they are talking about.
	Mr. Lieu. Thank you. So the other panelists, you don't have
	to answer unless you think it is a good idea to send a lot of
	ground troops into Syria. Do any of you think it is a good
	idea?
	Mr. Exum. No.
	Mr. Lieu. All right. So I have limited time. I wanted to
	talk about Yemen, Doctor, as you have mentioned Yemen. As you
	know, Iran is involved there.
	Mr. Exum. That is right.
	Mr. Lieu. I don't have any problem with freedom of
	navigation. What I have a problem with is the United States, we
	are refueling a Saudi-led coalition of aircraft that drop bombs
	in Yemen and we don't have any idea where they drop them. That
	has been told to us. I have gone to briefings, and we don't
	know.
	And it turns out that there has been multiple airstrikes on
	civilians. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have
	documented over 70 unlawful airstrikes on wedding parties, on a
	Doctors Without Borders hospital, on schools; children, women,
	civilians are being slaughtered. These look like war crimes,
	and U.S. military should not be aiding and abetting war crimes.
	And what I want to know, Dr. Exum, is sort of your view on that
	issue.
	Mr. Exum. So Congressman, you put your finger on why I
	think the last administration was reluctant to get deeper
	involved in the conflict in Yemen. I think in some ways the
	last administration, to put it crudely, tried to be half
	pregnant. There is a strategic argument to be made for if you
	are going to get involved in the conflict then help the Saudis
	and the Emirates and their coalition win and help them win in a
	way that is compliant with the laws of armed conflict and that
	allows you to have some influence over the way they are
	involved, or you completely step away and you say that we can't
	be involved with this conflict.
	I think we tried to find a middle ground and I think that
	is where that led to some of the confusion and some of the
	problems. I will say however that we do have adversaries in
	Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, for example, the
	Islamic State in Yemen where it might make sense to partner
	with some of our forces on the ground, or some of our partners,
	the Emirates, for example, who are kind of a cut above the
	other Gulf forces in terms of their competence, and there it
	might make sense to partner with them.
	Against threats to freedom of navigation that is something
	like I said, I think it is a U.S. interest. I also think it is
	a huge interest for the Europeans, for India, for South Korea,
	for anybody pushing shipping through the Bab al-Mandeb, and so
	there should be a concerted diplomatic effort to pressure the
	Iranians with respect to the presence of some anti-ship cruise
	missiles in Yemen, and if necessary there should also be a
	kinetic response, because that is a point where that has always
	been a key U.S. interest for 50 years in terms of freedom of
	navigation and commerce around the Arabian Peninsula, and I
	think you would want to take a hard stand there.
	But I take your points regarding the broader conflict and I
	think it is one, it was a key topic of debate within the Obama
	administration, sir.
	Chairman Royce. Well, thank you. Thank you. We want to
	thank again our panel. We appreciate the time of our witnesses
	today and especially, you know, this focus of what we do in the
	light of Iran's continued ballistic missile program and its
	continued transfer of missiles to Hezbollah and the other
	activities in the region that are threatening to the countries
	in the region. And as Ms. Bauer observed we should start, I
	think, with the premise that on these violations Iran gets no
	special pass.
	And we look forward to continuing to work with each of you
	in terms of the challenges ahead, so thank you, and with that
	we stand adjourned.
	[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]


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