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	<title> - A PATHWAY FOR PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN: EXAMINING THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AFGHANISTAN STUDY GROUP</title>
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	[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
	[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]







	A PATHWAY FOR PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN:

	EXAMINING THE FINDINGS AND

	RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AFGHANISTAN

	STUDY GROUP

	=======================================================================

	HEARING

	BEFORE THE

	SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

	OF THE

	COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM

	HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

	ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

	FIRST SESSION

	__________

	FEBRUARY 19, 2021

	__________

	Serial No. 117-2

	__________

	Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Reform




	[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


	Available on: www.govinfo.gov,
	oversight.house.gov or
	docs.house.gov



	______


	U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
	43-713 PDF WASHINGTON : 2021



	COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM

	CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York, Chairwoman

	Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of James Comer, Kentucky, Ranking
	Columbia Minority Member
	Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts Jim Jordan, Ohio
	Jim Cooper, Tennessee Paul A. Gosar, Arizona
	Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia Virginia Foxx, North Carolina
	Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois Jody B. Hice, Georgia
	Jamie Raskin, Maryland Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin
	Ro Khanna, California Michael Cloud, Texas
	Kweisi Mfume, Maryland Bob Gibbs, Ohio
	Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, New York Clay Higgins, Louisiana
	Rashida Tlaib, Michigan Ralph Norman, South Carolina
	Katie Porter, California Pete Sessions, Texas
	Cori Bush, Missouri Fred Keller, Pennsylvania
	Danny K. Davis, Illinois Andy Biggs, Arizona
	Debbie Wasserman Schultz, Florida Andrew Clyde, Georgia
	Peter Welch, Vermont Nancy Mace, South Carolina
	Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Scott Franklin, Florida
	Georgia Jake LaTurner, Kansas
	John P. Sarbanes, Maryland Pat Fallon, Texas
	Jackie Speier, California Yvette Herrell, New Mexico
	Robin L. Kelly, Illinois Byron Donalds, Florida
	Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan
	Mark DeSaulnier, California
	Jimmy Gomez, California
	Ayanna Pressley, Massachusetts
	Vacancy

	David Rapallo, Staff Director
	Daniel Rebnord, Subcommittee Staff Director
	Amy Stratton, Deputy Chief Clerk

	Contact Number: 202-225-5051

	Mark Marin, Minority Staff Director
	------

	Subcommittee on National Security

	Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts, Chairman
	Peter Welch, Vermont Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin, Ranking
	Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Minority Member
	Georgia Paul A. Gosar, Arizona
	Mark DeSaulnier, California Virginia Foxx, North Carolina
	Kweisi Mfume, Maryland Bob Gibbs, Ohio
	Debbie Wasserman Schultz, Florida Clay Higgins, Louisiana
	Jackie Speier, California

	C O N T E N T S

	----------
	Page
	Hearing held on February 19, 2021................................ 1

	Witnesses

	The Honorable Kelly A. Ayotte, Co-Chair, Afghanistan Study Group,
	U.S. Institute of Peace
	Oral Statement................................................... 5
	General Joseph F. Dunford Jr. (Ret), Co-Chair, Afghanistan Study
	Group, U.S. Institute of Peace
	Oral Statement................................................... 6
	The Honorable Nancy Lindborg, Co-Chair, Afghanistan Study Group,
	U.S. Institute of Peace
	Oral Statement................................................... 8Q04
	Written opening statements and statements for the witnesses are
	available on the U.S. House of Representatives Document
	Repository at: docs.house.gov.

	Index of Documents

	----------


	There were no additional documents entered into the record during
	this hearing.


	A PATHWAY FOR PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN:

	EXAMINING THE FINDINGS AND

	RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AFGHANISTAN

	STUDY GROUP

	----------


	Friday, February 19, 2021

	House of Representatives
	Subcommittee on National Security
	Committee on Oversight and Reform
	Washington, D.C.

	The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:46 a.m.,
	via WebEx, Hon. Stephen F. Lynch (chairman of the subcommittee)
	presiding.
	Present: Representatives Lynch, Welch, Johnson, DeSaulnier,
	Speier, Grothman, Gosar, Foxx, and Higgins.
	Mr. Lynch. Again, good morning. The committee will now come
	to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare
	a recess of the committee at any time.
	I will now recognize myself for an opening statement.
	Good morning, everyone. Before we begin our first
	subcommittee hearing of the 117th Congress, I'd like to welcome
	members on both sides of the aisle and congratulate the
	gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Grothman, for returning as our
	ranking member. I look forward to working with all of you as we
	conduct meaningful oversight of the many critical national
	security and foreign policy challenges facing the United
	States.
	Since the war in Afghanistan began nearly 20 years ago,
	more than 775,000 of our brave men and women in uniform have
	deployed to Afghanistan. More than 2,400 have made the ultimate
	sacrifice, and another 20,000 have been wounded. The war is now
	the longest in our Nation's history and has cost American
	taxpayers more than $860 billion.
	On February 29, 2020, after more than a year of diplomatic
	negotiations led by U.S. special representative for Afghanistan
	reconciliation, Zalmay Khalilzad, the Trump administration, and
	the Taliban, signed a landmark agreement for bringing peace to
	Afghanistan.
	This agreement was established--excuse me. This agreement
	established a timeline for the complete withdrawal of U.S.
	military forces from Afghanistan by May 1, 2021, so long as the
	Taliban agreed to begin peace talks with the Afghan Government
	and to sever its ties with al-Qaida and other terrorist
	organizations.
	In his first public testimony before Congress on the U.S.-
	Taliban peace deal in September of last year--and that was
	before our subcommittee--Ambassador Khalilzad reported that the
	Taliban had not fully complied with their counterterrorism
	commitments under the agreement and stating, I will quote,
	``With regard to terrorism and al-Qaida in this setting, what I
	can say is that the Taliban has taken some steps, based on
	commitments they have made, positive steps, but they have some
	distance still to go,'' end quote.
	Despite these shortcomings, the Trump administration began
	a military drawdown in Afghanistan that even outpaced the terms
	of the February 2020 peace agreement. Today, 2,500 troops
	remain in Afghanistan, even as the Taliban violence continues,
	and the security situation on the ground continues to
	deteriorate.
	Upon taking office last month, the Biden administration
	announced its intent to review the U.S.-Taliban agreement,
	including whether the Taliban remains in compliance with its
	terms. The administration also stated its commitment to protect
	the historic gains made by Afghan women and girls as the peace
	process continues.
	That brings us to this important hearing, and we are
	honored to be joined today by the three co-chairs of the
	Afghanistan Study Group. I'd also like to take a moment to
	thank the nonpartisan U.S. Institute of Peace for the support
	and expertise they provided to the study group during the
	course of its work.
	In the Fiscal Year 2020 omnibus bill, Congress, led by
	Senator Graham, Senator Patrick Leahy, and the Senate
	Appropriations Subcommittee of State Foreign Ops and Related
	Programs, they tasked the independent and bipartisan
	Afghanistan Study Group to, quote, ``consider the implications
	of a peace settlement, or the failure to reach a settlement, on
	U.S. policy, resources, and commitments in Afghanistan.''
	After nearly nine months of review and consultation with
	current and former U.S. and Afghan Government officials, allies
	and partners, and other key stakeholders, the Afghanistan Study
	Group issued its final report earlier this month. The study
	group concluded, in part, that, for the first time since 2001,
	an opportunity now exists to achieve a just and durable peace
	in Afghanistan, but this will not be easy.
	And the current situation has left President Biden with few
	good options, as the study group explained in their final
	report--and, again, I quote--``On the one hand, the Taliban
	have signaled publicly that if all international forces are not
	withdrawn by May 1, 2021, as envisioned in the Doha Agreement,
	they will resume their jihad against the foreign presence and
	will withdraw from the peace process. On the other hand, a
	withdrawal may, under certain circumstances,'' excuse me,
	``under current conditions, will likely lead to a collapse of
	the Afghan state and a possible renewed civil war,'' close
	quote.
	So nearly 20 years of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan might
	very well be defined by the next three to six months, likely
	with profound consequences for U.S. national security and the
	future stability of the region.
	We are thankful for the thoughtful and deeply probing
	analysis of the Afghan Study Group, and we are thankful for the
	patriotic service of the members of that group and our
	distinguished witnesses. We look forward to their testimony.
	And, with that, I will now yield to the ranking member from
	the great state of Wisconsin, Mr. Grothman, for his opening
	statement.
	Mr. Grothman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I'm glad you're
	holding the hearing so quickly. And I'd like to thank the study
	group for showing up today, or whatever, at least for being at
	the hearing virtually.
	As we discussed at last week's markup, it is, I think,
	sometimes easier, you know, if we do have hearings in the
	Capitol, at least the option to it. We've done it on other
	committee hearings, and it seems to work out OK. Not everybody
	has to show up.
	In any event, this year is the 20th anniversary of United
	States being attacked by al-Qaida in 2001. Those brutal attacks
	took the lives of nearly 3,000 innocent Americans in New York,
	Pennsylvania, and The Pentagon.
	Days later, on October 7, the United States launched
	Operation Enduring Freedom and invaded Afghanistan, leading to
	the toppling of the Taliban's terrorist regime. The United
	States has been in Afghanistan ever since.
	Unfortunately, every time we meet to discuss ongoing
	efforts in Afghanistan, the same issues have come up. To date,
	the U.S. taxpayers spent over $1 trillion in Afghanistan,
	either supporting combat or construction. In America's longest
	war, we're just starting to see a light at the end of the
	tunnel.
	President Trump reduced the American footprint in
	Afghanistan from over 100,000 soldiers during the Obama
	Administration to just a few thousand. On February 29 of last
	year, under the strong leadership of President Trump, the
	United States signed a peace agreement to gradually withdraw
	Americans. This agreement will create a safe and prosperous
	Afghanistan by ensuring that it will not be a safe harbor for
	terrorists.
	Now, I understand, and I'll be the first to admit, that
	just packing our bags and leaving is dangerous, which is why
	we're having this hearing today. That type of withdrawal will
	create a vacuum for terrorism, and potentially set back social
	and governmental gains in Afghanistan, not to mention, I think
	it could lead to the possibility of Iran and Russia increased
	presence in the region.
	What I do believe is that it should be our goal to reduce
	our global military footprint and bring troops home. This just
	needs to be done safely and with American national security
	interests at heart.
	I want to thank you and your group for the hard work you've
	done to produce this report. The report makes specific
	recommendations and ought to advance American interests in
	Afghanistan and the region, such as clarifying the end state,
	working to promote the success of the peace negotiating
	process, and having an overarching regional diplomatic
	strategy. Each of your recommendations suggest the need for a
	safe, stable, and independent Afghanistan. It's important for
	the Biden administration to continue the hard work of President
	Trump to advance these goals for achieving independence.
	I look forward to hearing from you today.
	Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
	Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Grothman. The gentleman yields
	back.
	I will now introduce our distinguished panel of witnesses,
	all of whom are co-chairs of the Afghanistan Study Group, and
	two of whom are old friends, and I had the honor and pleasure
	of working with them in Afghanistan at various times.
	We are honored today to be joined by the distinguished
	former U.S. Senator from New Hampshire, the Honorable Kelly
	Ayotte. Kelly Ayotte represented New Hampshire in the U.S.
	Senate from 2011 to 2016, where she chaired the Armed Services
	Committee on Readiness. Senator Ayotte co-chairs the Commission
	on Health Security at the Center for Strategic and
	International Studies. She is also a board member of the Board
	of Advisors from the Center on Military and Political Power at
	the Foundation of Defense of Democracy and the Aspen
	Institute's Economic Strategy Group.
	General Joseph F. Dunford is a native of south Boston and
	Quincy. General Dunford served as the 19th chairman of the
	Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Nation's highest-ranking military
	officer. In this role, he was the principal military adviser to
	the President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security
	Council from 2015 to 2019.
	General Dunford was commissioned in 1977 and served as
	infantry officer at all levels, to include commanding the 5th
	Marine Regiment during Operation Iraqi Freedom. His experience
	of leading large organizations included serving as the 36th
	Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, the Assistant
	Commandant of the Marine Corps, and commander of all U.S. and
	NATO forces in Afghanistan. Welcome.
	Ms. Nancy Lindborg is the co-chair of the--is also a co-
	chair of the Afghanistan Study Group. Nancy Lindborg is
	president and CEO for the David and Lucile Packard Foundation,
	a position she assumed in August 2020. She is responsible for
	the overall management of the foundation and its grantmaking
	activities. She previously served as the president and CEO of
	the U.S. Institute of Peace from February 2015 through August
	2020.
	So, I want to welcome all of you, and thank you for the
	wonderful work that you have done, the patriotic service you
	have rendered to our country.
	So, before I swear in our witnesses, I should note that,
	while the U.S. Institute of Peace facilitated the work of the
	Afghanistan Study Group, the co-chairs are not affiliated with
	the Institute. However, I do wish to thank the Institute for
	the support they provided to the study group.
	The witnesses will now be muted so we can--be unmuted--
	excuse me--so we can swear them in.
	I ask you to please raise your right hands.
	Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to
	give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
	so help you God?
	Ms. Ayotte. I do.
	Ms. Lindborg. I do.
	General Dunford. I do.
	Mr. Lynch. OK. Let the record show that the witnesses have
	answered in the affirmative. Thank you.
	Without objection, your written statements will be made
	part of the record.
	Senator Ayotte, you are now recognized for a five-minute
	summation of your testimony.

	STATEMENT OF HON. KELLY A. AYOTTE, CO-CHAIR, AFGHANISTAN STUDY
	GROUP

	Ms. Ayotte. Thank you, Chairman Lynch and Ranking Member
	Grothman and members of the committee for taking the time on
	this important and difficult topic.
	We have submitted the Afghanistan Study Group's report as
	our formal testimony, representing not only ourselves, but the
	full complement of members whose congressional mandate it was
	to deliver our analysis and recommendations. It has been an
	honor to chair this study group, supported by the United States
	Institute of Peace, alongside General Dunford and Nancy
	Lindborg, and the esteemed member of--group of members who
	helped us, 12 of them, along with 26 superb senior advisors.
	Collectively, those who contributed to this report have a
	breadth of leadership experience in foreign policy, national
	security, humanitarian aid, Democratic institutions, and
	counterterrorism.
	The study group conducted 40 consultations with over 60 key
	stakeholders in Afghanistan, including U.S. officials and
	former officials, Afghan officials, Afghan members of civil
	society, and the private sector regional stakeholders, allied
	partners, multilateral organizations, as well as academics and
	activists.
	We understand and we're humble about the complexity and
	difficulty of the decisions that need to be made in
	Afghanistan. However, we believe that our recommendations,
	which were just issued in January, are particularly timely.
	This is a crucial moment for Afghanistan and the United
	States. The United States needs to decide whether we will
	continue to keep our troops in the country past May 1, the
	deadline set forth in the Doha Agreement, in order to support
	the peace process, and protect our national security interests.
	There are currently 2,500 U.S. troops in Afghanistan. That
	number has been reduced from 14,500 over the last several years
	during the Trump administration. And now, for the first time
	since 2002, there are almost twice as many non-American NATO
	troops supporting the mission in Afghanistan.
	Yesterday and the day before, NATO defense ministers met to
	discuss the future of our alliance in Afghanistan. Our NATO
	allies have been anxious to know what the U.S. will do. They
	have stood by us for two decades, and how we end our engagement
	in Afghanistan matters to our NATO allies, and may impact our
	ability to call on our partners in the future outside of NATO
	countries.
	Although we thoroughly considered other alternatives which
	we detailed in the report--and you certainly can look at that
	analysis--we recommend that U.S. troops remain beyond May 1. We
	believe a precipitous withdrawal of U.S. and international
	troops in May would be catastrophic for Afghanistan, leading to
	civil war, and allow the reconstitution of terror groups, which
	threaten the United States within an 18-to 36-month period. Our
	presence in Afghanistan has contained these groups and
	protected our homeland.
	Let me be clear. Although we recommend that our troops
	remain beyond May 1, we propose a new approach toward
	Afghanistan, which aligns our policies, practices, and
	messaging across the U.S. Government to support the Afghan
	peace process rather than prosecute a war. Our troops would
	remain not to fight a forever war, but to guarantee the
	conditions for a successful peace process and to protect our
	national security interests to ensure that Afghanistan does not
	become a haven again for terrorists who threaten the United
	States of America.
	Our report calls for a negotiated peace that ends the war
	and allows our troops to eventually come home. We believe that
	it is possible for the United States, with the engagement from
	countries in the region and our NATO partners, to negotiate an
	extension of the May 1 Doha deadline because the process got
	off to a late start, and the conditions indicated in the Doha
	Agreement have not been met.
	Achieving peace in Afghanistan requires conditionality on
	all sides. That conditionality includes the reduction of
	violence by the Taliban, and a demonstrated ability by the
	Taliban to contain terror groups in Afghanistan, and by the
	Afghan Government to deal with corruption and to accept that
	the Taliban will have some role in the future of Afghanistan.
	Sustainable peace will not be possible without an inclusive
	government.
	Chairman, if I may continue 30 more seconds? Thank you.
	Based on our experiences and consultations, it's clear that
	civil society has been greatly enhanced in Afghanistan over the
	last two decades and has an important role to play going
	forward.
	Finally, we recommend an intensified and active regional
	diplomacy to support the peace negotiations in Afghanistan
	going forward. After two decades of war, there is not a
	military solution in Afghanistan for either side, but the best
	hope to protect American interests and help preserve the gains
	made by the Afghan people, is to align U.S. policy to support
	the opportunity for a negotiated peace settlement.
	Thank you.
	Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Senator. I've been known to have a
	slow gavel, so we won't hold people to the exact second.
	But next, we will hear from my dear friend, General Joe
	Dunford, for five minutes for a summation of his testimony.
	General, you are recognized.

	STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., CO-CHAIR,
	AFGHANISTAN STUDY GROUP

	General Dunford. Chairman Lynch, Ranking Member Grothman,
	members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
	appear before you this morning, and it's an honor to join my
	fellow co-chairs and to represent the members of the Afghan
	Study Group.
	The Senator outlined our mandate, our methodology, and our
	core recommendations, and I'd like to briefly expand on her
	comments by outlining the key judgments that we made during our
	deliberations, and provide some further context on our
	recommendations.
	Based on the extensive consultations that the Senator
	mentioned with key stakeholders, the experience of the Afghan
	Study Group, as well as the senior advisors, we made key
	judgments about Afghanistan in four major areas: the security
	environment, the stability of the Afghan state, regional
	dynamics, and the current peace negotiations themselves. And I
	want to summarize a few of the more important judgments so you
	can understand the logic behind our recommended approach, but
	also the framing of the alternative pathways that the chairman
	mentioned that are included in the report. These are pathways
	that we considered, but we did not recommend them.
	With regard to security, many will point to the fact that
	the terrorist threat has been reduced, and we agree with that
	assessment, but we believe that that is because of the U.S.-
	trained Afghan forces and continued U.S. military presence.
	And, as the Senator mentioned, as a result of our
	deliberations, we believe that the threat can reconstitute
	itself in a period of about 18 to 36 months and present a
	threat to the homeland and to our allies.
	We conclude, and it will be no surprise to members of the
	committee, that the Afghan forces are highly dependent on U.S.
	funding, as well as operational support, and they will remain
	so for some time. And we also conclude that the probability of
	civil war is high in the wake of a precipitous U.S. withdrawal.
	With regard to stability of the state, our analysis and
	recommendations on stability of the Afghan state were very much
	informed by the work that led to the Afghan, or to the Fragile
	State Act, and our judgment is that Afghanistan meets the
	definition of a fragile state. But, despite very real
	challenges, with support, the Afghan Government can deliver
	minimally effective governance.
	And Ms. Lindborg is going to address further how the Afghan
	or how the Fragile State Act informed our recommendations in
	Afghanistan.
	Perhaps the most important judgments we offer concerns the
	opportunity to see enhanced regional and broader diplomatic
	effort in support of the Afghan peace negotiations, as well as
	a possible peace agreement. This issue was raised in a large
	number of our engagements. And there does, in fact, appear to
	be an end state that would satisfy all regional stakeholders,
	to include Pakistan, China, Russia, India, and others.
	And by no means, when I outline these factors, do we
	believe it would be easy, then, to take this and create an
	overarching regional diplomatic approach, but we do offer
	foundational elements for that diplomatic approach, and they
	include an Afghanistan that is at peace with its neighbors; one
	that doesn't allow its territory to be used for attacks on
	other countries; one that is not a venue for proxy warfare; one
	that is not a source of mass migration or illicit narcotics;
	and one that is interconnected with the region.
	Our judgments with regard to the ongoing Afghan peace
	negotiations include the fact that we believe our military
	presence and our diplomatic engagement, which are a physical
	manifestation of U.S. commitment, are actually foundational for
	the Afghan peace negotiations. We believe that continued
	support to Afghan state institutions throughout the peace
	process will be necessary.
	And the Senator mentioned our engagements did highlight
	that the Taliban were not meeting the conditionality of the
	February 2020 agreement, and she pointed out that that was as a
	result of not seeing a broad reduction in violence, and as a
	result of not seeing the Taliban demonstrate the will or
	capacity to prevent al-Qaida from using Afghanistan as a
	platform.
	And I want the members of the committee to know that we
	also relied on the recently released United Nations report as
	well as the January 2021 U.S. Treasury Report when we made our
	judgments about Taliban and their current relationship with al-
	Qaida.
	The third element of that, of course, is progress toward
	peace in the former peace agreement, and we haven't seen that
	progress to date.
	It's also important at this point that I highlight, with
	regard to the peace negotiations, that we've placed equal
	emphasis on the roles and responsibilities of the current
	Afghan Government in that peace process.
	Informed by these judgments, we determined our approach in
	the recommendations we made. And I want to emphasize, we did
	look at all the various pathways that we believe are available
	to President Biden before offering the recommendations that the
	Senator outlined. And we did spend as much time on the
	alternative pathways as we did on our recommendation. And we
	made every effort to give this challenge a fresh look, and we
	believe that the way that we've integrated our security,
	diplomatic and assistance recommendations, does provide new
	opportunities, even as we seek to leverage the ongoing Afghan
	peace negotiations.
	And without understating the challenges, I think each of
	the three of us would emphasize that the group was compelled by
	the argument to take advantage of the opening that currently
	exists with an emphasis on meeting our national interests,
	clarity of commitment, acting in accordance with our allies,
	conditionality, and increased emphasis on diplomacy.
	And, Chairman, I look forward to your questions which will
	allow us to examine our work and these recommendations in more
	detail. Once again, thank you very much for conducting this
	hearing on such an important and timely topic.
	Mr. Lynch. Thank you, General.
	Ms. Lindborg, you are now recognized to give us a five-
	minute summation of your testimony. Thank you.

	STATEMENT OF HON. NANCY LINDBORG, CO CHAIR, AFGHANISTAN STUDY
	GROUP

	Ms. Lindborg. Thank you. And I add my thanks to Chairman
	Lynch, Ranking Member Grothman, and members of the
	subcommittee. Thanks for this opportunity to discuss the report
	of the congressionally mandated Afghan Study Group. It has been
	an honor to serve alongside my two very distinguished co-
	chairs, and all the members of the Afghan Study Group.
	My co-chairs have ably described the core approach and key
	recommendations of the report. I will simply go beyond their
	comments to emphasize that we do believe that there is an
	important opportunity to pursue a negotiated peace that has not
	existed before, and we're clear there is no military solution,
	and, therefore, recommend this new approach that, for the first
	time, creates this clear goal of a negotiated peace; enables us
	to align our messaging policies and practices; and, as you
	heard from General Dunford, puts a heavy emphasis on
	partnership with our allies and regional diplomacy.
	These recommendations build on the work of previous study
	groups that have focused on the links between fragile states
	and violent extremism. And, as the former president of U.S.
	Institute of Peace, I was pleased to be a part of two of these
	study groups, and to witness, in December 2019, the signing
	into law of the Global Fragility Act with bicameral and
	bipartisan support.
	These studies, and the Global Fragility Act, informed our
	deliberations by underscoring that fragile states, which are
	characterized by the breakdown of the social compact between
	the state and its people, provide a breeding ground for violent
	extremism. And we learned from 9/11 that state fragility
	presents a threat to our security even when geographically
	remote, and Afghanistan certainly qualifies as a fragile state.
	So, we understand the fatigue of dealing with Afghanistan,
	so let me underscore we are not recommending a blank check to
	the Afghan Government. The report is clear about the importance
	of ensuring that not just the Taliban, but also the government
	of Afghanistan is held accountable for meeting conditions. The
	government must engage seriously in the peace negotiations, as
	well as exercise greater responsibility in curbing corruption.
	The continued corruption and lack of access to justice for
	too many of their citizens consistently results in widespread
	grievances that are easily exploitable by the Taliban. This is
	a common characteristic of fragile states that often leads to
	violent extremism.
	So, the report, therefore, lays out an approach that's
	based on the core principals of the Global Fragility Act: first
	and foremost, a shared goal across our security, development,
	and diplomacy efforts, and then focused coherent international
	support to keep key institutions functioning, in this case,
	until there is a peace agreement; working with our allies, as
	agreed upon in the 2020 Geneva donor conference that lays out
	four years of strict conditions, we should put large
	infrastructure or other expansive projects aside for now,
	continue our support for essential humanitarian assistance,
	basic services, and, importantly, support for civil society.
	The growth of civil society over the past two decades,
	which now includes a new generation of young Afghans, is a
	bright spot, and they have consistently and courageously
	elevated critical values of human rights, women's rights, and
	democracies, which we believe are fundamental to a future
	stable Afghanistan. They are the constituency demanding a
	sustainable peace.
	So, ultimately, a peaceful Afghanistan that doesn't present
	a threat to the region, or to the United States, it will
	ultimately require an inclusive, accountable government able to
	sustain a social compact with its citizens. This will take a
	long time. But first, it requires peace and a stop to the
	fighting.
	So, I will just underscore the moment that we have before
	us by focusing seriously on the peace process. We have, for the
	first time, this opportunity to align messages, policies, and
	actions, because too often in the past, we've pursued military
	victory at the same time as a peace process. We've surged while
	announcing withdrawals. We've let short-term counterterrorist
	interests undermine long-term institution building. Our
	multiple objectives pursued with multiple tools by multiple
	parts of our government bureaucracy have often undermined each
	other.
	We have confused our Afghan partners and regional actors,
	which often leads to hedging behavior that has further
	undermined our ability to achieve our objectives and withdraw
	military forces.
	So, this report calls for a new approach, calls for a
	negotiated peace that ends the war and allows our troops to
	come home with honor, recognizing that this requires effective
	conditionality on all sides, but that a negotiated peace would
	best serve American interests and help preserve the gains of
	the Afghan people over the last two decades.
	Thank you.
	Mr. Lynch. Thank you very much.
	The chair now recognizes himself for five minutes for
	questions.
	So, we're at an important crossroads right now. I do
	appreciate the report. I want to recommend to the members--so
	the report--the Afghan Study Group report is about 88 pages,
	but I thought some of the most helpful material was at the very
	end. And, you know, sort of as--not as an afterthought, but as
	an addendum.
	There are four pathway alternatives. As I understand it,
	the Afghanistan Study Group began to write this report prior to
	a time when we knew who was going to be the next President. So,
	I think it's helpful to know that, in the context of this
	report, the group did not know whether they were advising
	President Biden or President Trump. And I think that makes it a
	better report.
	I do want to say that, of the four pathways and the red-
	team analysis, you know, present very different scenarios, but
	I would recommend that members read those to understand the
	likely consequences of choosing one path versus another.
	So, my question to the panel really--and I know you've each
	taken, you know, slices of your responsibility during your
	testimony, but, OK, so May 1 comes. We know that the Taliban
	anticipates complete withdrawal. The previous administration
	pointed to a timeline-specific determination that they would
	withdraw. But, at the same time, we see that the global
	terrorism index has Afghanistan at the top of the list. It has
	had more terrorism than any other nation on the planet. Twenty
	of the largest terrorist attacks on the planet last year, six
	of them were in Afghanistan.
	We've got a pattern of assassination ongoing right now,
	major government officials being assassinated, religious
	leaders assassinated, journalists assassinated, judges
	assassinated, all personnel who are, I think, inimical to
	Taliban rule. You know, they're eliminating their opponents.
	So, my question is: We come up to May 1, and we announce--I
	guess we announce an extension of our presence there, and I'm
	concerned because, even now, even now, we have force protection
	issues, and I think General Dunford has spoken to that
	previously.
	What does it look like? What does it look like? And I don't
	expect that we have an opportunity between now and May 1 to
	negotiate an extension with the Taliban. They seem to be of a
	mind that, you know, they've been led to believe by the earlier
	administration that May 1, we're gone.
	And so tell me what that looks like? Tell me how that rolls
	out in terms of next steps if we chose that path, that we
	extend the date of withdrawal? Does it require us to put in
	more troops for force protection?
	I know that the previous Secretary of Defense, we met with
	him in Afghanistan, and he recommended that there be a minimum
	of 4,500 troops for force protection services--purposes, and
	now, we're a couple thousand below that.
	So, tell me what that looks like on May 1 if we adopt your
	primary recommendation of extending the deadline and adopting
	the four initiatives that you've recommended?
	And anyone who feels, you know, best able to answer that,
	go right ahead. I know you're all equally capable.
	General Dunford. Chairman, I'll start, and then--and let
	the other co-chairs fall in on it. I mean, that is--what you've
	got in that is the critical question. And I would say upfront
	that we have humility about our ability to predict what the
	Taliban will or won't do if we stay past the 1st of May, but
	there are some factors that we considered.
	No. 1 is, what leverage do we have over the Taliban? And
	there is three things that we look at when we think about the
	Taliban; one is they want relief from sanctions; the other is
	they want international legitimacy; and the third is that they
	recognize that, regardless of the future character of the
	Afghan Government, continued international support is going to
	be required.
	So, to mitigate the risks associated with May 1, we're not
	advocating for a unilateral declaration that we remain behind
	after the 1st of May. We're recommending that the Taliban
	actually hear that same message from other regional
	stakeholders, not the least of which is China, Russia, and
	Pakistan.
	And, so, we do think that continued negotiations with the
	Taliban to highlight the fact that we remain committed to the
	February 2020 agreement, and we've demonstrated that by drawing
	down to 2,500, we remain committed. But due to the reasons that
	my co-chairs outlined in their opening statement, we haven't
	had the time to fully implement the agreement, and the core
	conditions outlined in the agreement haven't yet been met.
	So, the mitigation is both in terms of the approach that we
	would take in conjunction with others, as well as the
	narrative, if you will, about why an extension past May 1 is
	required.
	The second question you asked is also an important
	question, which is: Do we need to increase forces if the
	Taliban don't accept an extension past the 1st of May, and if
	they then would re-initiate attacks against U.S. Forces?
	And, Chairman, we heard exactly what you heard. In the
	fall, what we were told by commanders on the ground and the
	Department of Defense was that 4,500 U.S. Forces, in addition
	to the NATO forces that are there, was the minimum level to
	address both the mission as well as protection of our forces in
	the context of the conditions that existed in the fall. And, as
	you've highlighted, those conditions have only gotten worse
	since the fall.
	So, in our judgment, 2,500 would not be adequate should the
	Taliban re-initiate attacks against the United States, and
	we've recommended that the administration engage with the
	leadership to make sure President Biden has that information as
	he makes his decision.
	But I think the important thing is that we believe that the
	impact of the May 1 decision can be mitigated, again, with both
	diplomacy, and by using leverage. Sometimes we think we don't
	have any leverage over the Taliban. They have been using
	violence to gain leverage in the negotiations, but we assess
	that the Taliban recognize that they cannot achieve their
	political objectives merely through violence, and particularly
	in those three areas that I mentioned.
	I'll stop there and see if the other co-chairs want to add
	to that.
	Ms. Ayotte. What I would just add is that the regional
	partners--some aren't partners, some are just regional
	countries--for us, have an interest. While they want us to
	leave, it's--they understand it creates a very big problem for
	them if we precipitously leave in terms of migration, in terms
	of the civil war in Afghanistan to their own interests.
	And, so, they also--in this negotiation process, it is why
	we recommend sort of a re-invigorated regional diplomacy in the
	context not just of the peace negotiations going forward, but
	in renegotiating this May 1 deadline. And we heard that with
	our consultations from the regional countries that we were able
	to connect with, including Pakistan. And, so, I think that will
	also help leverage this with the Taliban.
	Ms. Lindborg. Chairman, I would just add, thank you for
	noting the pathways that are included in the report, and I do
	commend those, because we looked very carefully at what the
	alternatives are, understanding that, you know, these are not
	great choices, but that we believe that the recommendations
	provide the best options, and enable us to test the proposition
	that this is the possibility for peace against an almost
	certain outcome of collapse and civil war were we to leave,
	without the conditions having been met on May 1.
	Mr. Lynch. Thank you very much.
	I will now recognize the ranking member, the gentleman from
	Wisconsin, Mr. Grothman, for his five minutes of questioning.
	Mr. Grothman. Thank you. We've been in a conflict with
	Afghanistan for two decades. Last fall, we had the Doha
	Agreement. I'll ask any one of you: Is it a fair
	characterization to say that, without this agreement, there
	wouldn't be peace talks now between the Afghan Government and
	the Taliban?
	Ms. Ayotte. Yes. I think we need to acknowledge that this
	was important to bring these peace negotiations forward. It's
	hard to go back and know whether it would have happened, but it
	clearly--the push toward the peace negotiations was a very
	important step by the Trump administration that brought us to
	this point.
	Mr. Grothman. When we negotiate with the Afghan--with the
	Taliban, do you feel that it is enough a monolith or whatever
	that they have the ability to stick with their side of the
	deal?
	General Dunford. Ranking Member Grothman, what I would say
	is that we believe the leadership of the Taliban can speak with
	one voice, and the evidence of that was, in the early days when
	there was an agreement to have a complete cease-fire for a
	period of time, the Taliban actually had the authority and had
	the ability to effect that cease-fire.
	So, we know that there is a degree--a high degree of
	control by Taliban leadership over all their fighters. I would
	not, my own judgment, use the word ``monolith,'' and it's not
	automatic that, if we make an agreement with Taliban
	leadership, that all their fighters across Afghanistan will
	stop fighting.
	I do think it's fair to say that we can affect a
	significant reduction of violence and set conditions such that
	the Afghan forces are much more capable of providing security
	should the character of government change.
	Mr. Grothman. You mentioned before the problems we have
	with the current Afghan Government. What do the--I guess
	because Afghanistan itself is nowhere near a monolith, what do
	the people of Afghanistan think right now of the Taliban, of
	the Afghan Government? And I talked to a guy who was over in
	Afghanistan about four years ago, who worked for me a little,
	What do they think of the United States?
	General Dunford. Yes. I can start just--my mic's open and
	then let the other co-chairs jump in. But the one thing that we
	heard universally from the Afghans--and we spent a lot of time,
	as the other co-chairs mentioned, with civil society, Afghan
	leaders, and there is a very strong consensus for peace inside
	of Afghanistan. But, to be candid, not peace at any cost.
	And they all emphasized the need to protect the gains that
	have been made in Afghanistan over the past two decades with
	regard to civil society, women, and so forth. And they also
	said that any future Afghanistan must be consistent with the
	values that are memorialized in the current constitution.
	And, with regard to--and now I'm not speaking of the
	Taliban, but I'm speaking about Afghans that are in the
	government and civil society. I think, universally, they
	recognize the important role that the United States continues
	to play in brokering a peace agreement and bringing stability
	and security to Afghanistan. I don't think it would be an
	overstatement to say that they view us as indispensable in that
	regard.
	With regard to the Taliban, I think I would just conclude
	by saying there is a high degree of mistrust across Afghan
	society about the Taliban, and about the ability to have them
	included in a future government. But this is really the gist of
	what has to occur inside of the Afghan peace negotiation is,
	they've got to come up with a framework within which there can
	be a character of government that is consistent with the values
	of the constitution, and yet, allows the political differences
	that clearly exist in Afghanistan to be settled without force.
	And I'll let the other co-chairs followup if I've missed
	something.
	Ms. Ayotte. One thing I would comment on is that the
	Afghanistan of today is different than the Afghanistan that the
	Taliban ruled 20 years ago, and that's because of civil
	society. And the notion that the members of this civil society
	and the people are going to accept that same kind of rule, I
	think, is a very different situation and that that won't be
	acceptable to them if we go back to 20 years ago.
	So, just a point that we heard over, and I'm sure many of
	you have also heard that when you traveled to Afghanistan.
	Mr. Grothman. Yes. It's kind of interesting. I was struck
	by the number of young people on social media. I mean, that, by
	itself, I would think, would dramatically change the thinking
	of the average person as opposed to the more agrarian society
	that we had 20 years ago.
	I'll narrow it down, though, because I talked to a guy who,
	as I said, worked for me. Do the average Afghans have a high or
	low opinion of the United States? Does it bother them that
	they're there? Do they like us? Do they view us as a positive
	force, or do they view us as a bunch of outsiders and they wish
	we'd get out of there?
	General Dunford. My own experience, in that regard, is it's
	not one voice. I think all Afghans, out of pride, would wish
	that they could protect themselves and not require U.S. Forces
	to be there. I think that's a fair statement.
	Clearly, those of the same ideology as the Taliban want the
	United States gone. I think, universally, the assessment of the
	rest of the Afghans, even those that want to see us eventually
	gone, recognize, that at least for the near term, and
	particularly in the context of bringing about peace and getting
	a peace agreement for the Afghan peace negotiations, they want
	the United States, perhaps, to leave at some point, but not
	precipitously.
	Mr. Grothman. OK. I'll give you another question about, in
	general, the Afghan Government.
	Mr. Lynch. The gentleman's time has expired.
	Mr. Grothman. Oh, I'm sorry.
	Mr. Lynch. That's OK. That's OK. And, if we want to go back
	to a second round, we can do that.
	But I do want to recognize the chairwoman of the full
	committee, Mrs. Maloney, for five minutes for her questioning.
	Mrs. Maloney. Thank you so much, Chairman Lynch, and thank
	you so much, Ranking Member Grothman, for your continued
	efforts on the oversight of the U.S. war in Afghanistan.
	Last Congress, under your leadership, this subcommittee
	held multiple hearings and briefings that highlighted the
	importance of U.S. support for women and girls in Afghanistan.
	In fact, you and I received a letter last week from the Afghan
	Government's chief negotiator along with four female diplomats
	on the Afghan team involved in the peace process.
	Mr. Chairman, I would like permission to enter this into
	the hearing record. In the letter, the negotiators wrote that
	our hearings, quote, ``sent a strong message that there is
	accountability and that the women and negotiators must be
	listened to, respected, and that the issues they speak about
	must be taken seriously.''
	They said, and I quote, ``The two hearings also gave us the
	assurance that we will not be alone in demanding a just and
	practical political settlement that one that guarantees equal
	rights and opportunities for all people,'' end quote.
	Ms. Lindborg, do you think public messaging from
	Washington, including during congressional hearings, sends a
	strong signal to the Taliban that the U.S. expects them to
	respect and protect the rights of Afghan women and girls?
	And thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership on
	this, and put this in the record.
	Mr. Lynch. Without objection, the lady's submission is
	accepted into the record.
	Mrs. Maloney. So, Ms. Lindborg?
	Ms. Lindborg. Great. Thank you, Chairwoman Maloney, and
	thank you for your leadership on these issues.
	I think that the letter underscores both the extraordinary
	progress of the Afghan women over the last several decades and
	the important role that they're playing now. And, absolutely, I
	think it's important for there to be continued signals and
	expressions of support for preserving those gains, and also for
	ensuring that they have a voice at the negotiating table.
	We know from research that having a voice at the table
	makes a difference in creating a more lasting and durable peace
	agreement.
	So, thank you for entering that.
	And I would--I would also note, building on the previous
	question, that women in, particular, are terrified that the
	U.S. will leave precipitously, and understand that their--that
	we haven't met the conditions yet for the peace negotiation to
	really move forward in a more effective way.
	Thank you.
	Mrs. Maloney. Thank you, and I'm also encouraged that
	President Biden's National Security Advisor recently made clear
	to his Afghan counterpart that the gains that have been made by
	women and other minority groups must be protected as part of
	the peace process.
	Nevertheless, I think we can all agree that the gains
	Afghan women have made since 2001 are fragile, and I have deep
	concerns that they may be at risk if the Taliban returns to
	power.
	The study group itself acknowledges that there is, quote,
	``realistic and widespread fear that women will be marginalized
	in the public space should the Taliban return.''
	And, in a recent report, the special IG for Afghanistan's
	reconstruction cautioned that a narrative has formed in
	Afghanistan that, quote, ``The country can either have women's
	rights at the cost of peace, or peace at the cost of women's
	rights,'' end quote.
	Senator Ayotte, if the Taliban overrun or enter a power-
	sharing agreement with the Afghan Government, do you expect an
	effort to roll back the rights of Afghan women and girls?
	Ms. Ayotte. Chairman, thank you.
	First of all, I think this is a very important issue for
	the negotiations. And we heard loud and clear from civil
	society, especially women's groups, that they did not want to
	be marginalized, and that's why the government itself does have
	women negotiators at the table.
	And just to put in some perspective, as it's outlined in
	our report, in 2001, when the Taliban were in Afghanistan, zero
	girls were educated. Now, over 3 million girls are educated.
	There are women in the government; there are women in the
	society, in the private sector.
	And so, in order for a peace agreement to be successful,
	this issue of inclusivity will have to be addressed, because I
	do not believe that the women who are engaged now are going to
	accept a government that has no role for them or where they are
	marginalized. So, this is obviously a very key issue at the
	negotiating table.
	Mrs. Maloney. Thank you.
	And, General Dunford, last, what impact would that
	ultimately have on the future security and stability of
	Afghanistan, and what is the best way for the U.S. to continue
	to insist that women's and girls' rights must be respected in
	any agreement? General Dunford?
	General Dunford. OK. Thank you, Chairwoman Maloney.
	And what I would say is that we highlighted the issue of
	women's rights and values in a future Afghanistan consistent
	with the constitution for two reasons, and it wasn't just
	because it was the right thing to do; we actually assessed that
	stability and security cannot be achieved unless we have a
	future Afghanistan consistent with the values in the
	constitution and unless women's rights are respected. And that,
	again, was not the--just the assessment of the group. It came
	from those 60 engagements that we conducted, and we heard this
	universally.
	And I believe the second part of your question is a really
	important one, is, so--well, how do we ensure that this
	happens? And this is why we believe that our facilitation of
	the Afghan peace negotiations and subsequent support for any
	peace settlement and implementation is so critical, because I
	think the United States, both with regard to resources and
	influence, can assist the Afghan Government in forming a future
	government where the character actually does respect women, and
	again, those values memorialized in the constitution.
	Mrs. Maloney. Thank you.
	In closing, thank you all for all of your work. And thank
	you, Chairman and Ranking Member. We have seen, again and
	again, that women's participation in resolving conflict is
	essential to sustainable peace. It is critically important that
	we in the United States continue to support the women and girls
	of Afghanistan and around the world.
	Again, thank you for your work, and I yield back.
	Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Mr. Lynch. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
	And the chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona,
	Mr. Gosar, for five minutes.
	Mr. Gosar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
	having this hearing this morning.
	I want to begin with part of the premise of the study
	group's findings, which is adapting the current withdrawal
	structure in place from one focused on counterterrorism and
	troop reduction to one where troop withdrawal is based on
	permanent Taliban cease-fire, and the cessation of
	indiscriminate violence against the Afghan people.
	Essentially, we're discussing war termination and banking
	the concept that U.S. involvement in a current civil war in
	Afghanistan will end when the primary threat, the Taliban, has
	committed to peace.
	My main concern here is that we're hanging our future plans
	on such an expectation that seems rather impossible. Since
	2001, United States has been attempting to meet these
	conditions with little success. In fact, this year----
	Mr. Lynch. Mr. Gosar, you might be muted. Sorry.
	I think Mr. Gosar is freezing up. Let's see if he comes
	back.
	[Audio malfunction.]
	Mr. Lynch. Mr. Gosar, you were muted or frozen for a good
	portion of that testimony, or question. I'm not sure if we can
	correct the situation.
	Mr. Gosar. Can you hear me?
	Mr. Lynch. All right. We're going to try to resolve Mr.
	Gosar's technology problem. But, in the meantime, I would like
	to go to the next Republican member, the gentlelady from North
	Carolina, Ms. Foxx.
	Ms. Foxx. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
	And I want to thank our witnesses very much for their very
	good presentation and your opening comments, and I'd like to
	wish Chairwoman Maloney a happy birthday. I thank--I don't know
	if she's still there, but I wish her a happy birthday.
	To the witnesses today--and, again, thank you all for being
	here and for your work. Your report--I'm wanting to ask the
	same question that Chairwoman Maloney asked--I'm glad she did--
	about the women in Afghanistan, and I'm pleased to hear your
	responses on that.
	Your report says that an irresponsible withdrawal of U.S.
	Forces risks a new civil war in Afghanistan. I agree that a
	withdrawal should be done responsibly, but I'm concerned that
	the threat of a civil war may not be avoidable.
	The Department of Defense lead inspector general report on
	Operation Freedom Sentinel, released this week, states that the
	Taliban have not agreed to any substantive matters in the peace
	talks and said that the group is deploying violence across the
	country to increase its leverage in the negotiations.
	Is it possible that the Taliban have no interest in coming
	to a lasting peace and that a civil war will be the ultimate
	outcome if U.S. troops leave Afghanistan?
	And I'll ask that question to General Dunford.
	General Dunford. Congresswoman, thank you for that
	question.
	Look, my short answer is, is it possible that civil war
	will result regardless? I would have to say in candor, yes, it
	is possible.
	I think what is important, though, for us to consider--and
	I think it really gets to where Congressman Gosar was going as
	well--is what's different today than has been the case over the
	past 18 or 19 years, and I think the difference is that we have
	the Taliban at Doha in discussions with the Afghan Government.
	And we have an opportunity in a short period of time to
	determine whether or not they're sincere in wanting peace, and
	we have an opportunity in a short period of time to see if
	there's a framework within which the compromise that's
	necessary for a reduction in violence and in a future
	government can be determined.
	And so, Congresswoman Foxx, that's why we offered the
	alternate pathways, because our real recommendation is: Take
	advantage of this opportunity as it exists right now and it
	hasn't existed for the last 18 or 19 years. And all of the
	other pathways that we outline in the report will still be
	available to President Biden subsequent to determining whether
	or not the Afghan peace negotiations can be successful or not.
	So, that's why we really do focus on taking advantage of
	the opportunity and testing the theory of the case. Because we
	are humble, I think, all of us, about our knowledge of what the
	future will be, but we have to deal with what the facts are
	that we know. And the facts that we know are that there is
	ongoing discussions at Doha, so let's see if we can make
	something of them.
	Ms. Foxx. Thank you.
	Senator Ayotte, your report highlights the need for
	continued economic support for the essential institutions of
	the Afghan state, including security institutions.
	I understand the need to provide support for these
	institutions to ensure stability within the country. However,
	it concerns me and it concerns my constituents a lot that we
	have been investing in Afghanistan for the better part of 20
	years and likely will for the foreseeable future.
	Can you discuss how much longer you envision the U.S. and
	our partners' aid being necessary to support Afghan
	institutions and how we can assure that that aid is being used
	as efficiently as possible?
	Ms. Ayotte. Yes. Thank you, Congresswoman Foxx.
	I think your constituents rightly are concerned about this.
	And I know that all the work done by the inspector generals
	over the years in Afghanistan have highlighted areas where we
	have invested, for example, in some of these major
	infrastructure projects that really have not borne fruit and
	have wasted taxpayer dollars. So, this is a very important
	issue to focus on.
	Yes, we will need to continue to support the Afghan
	institutions. In our report, we lay out that that should be
	done consistent with the outline of the Global Fragility Act,
	which all of you passed, and focusing really on targeted aid
	that supports the major institutions, and hold that aid as
	targeted, conditional; hold people accountable.
	And, also, in terms of the Afghan National Security Forces,
	it's going to be important that we continue to support them.
	Because without that support, obviously, the security situation
	in terms of protecting our own national security interests will
	devolve further. So, we do need to continue to do that.
	I'm also, with your permission, going to ask my colleague
	Nancy Lindborg, who has really worked very closely on this
	particular issue, to jump in, if that's OK.
	Ms. Foxx. Certainly. Thank you.
	Ms. Ayotte. Thank you.
	Ms. Lindborg. Yes. Thank you, Congresswoman Foxx. It's
	absolutely an important question. The report details how we can
	reduce the levels of assistance while providing the kind of
	focus that Senator Ayotte just identified.
	And, also, we have the opportunity to work more closely
	with our allies and our partner donors to move forward what was
	agreed upon in Geneva in November: four years of very strict
	conditions, and conditions based on holding the Afghan
	Government responsible for upholding the kind of rights and
	rule of law and reduction in corruption that are absolutely
	essential for the kind of state that can more effectively be
	stable into the future.
	We've seen that the lack of justice for particularly rural
	residents creates the opportunity for the Taliban to come in,
	exploit those grievances, and gather recruits.
	So, it's important for the security of the country to have
	the kind of assistance that promotes that better governance.
	That's the core of the Global Fragility Act.
	Ms. Foxx. Thank you.
	Mr. Chairman, I don't have a clock, but I suspect my time
	has expired, and I will yield back.
	And, again, thank the panelists, and thank you, Mr.
	Chairman, for your leadership on this.
	Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentlelady.
	The gentlelady yields back.
	The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Vermont, Mr.
	Welch, for five minutes.
	Mr. Welch. Thank you very much.
	I really appreciate the panelists and your report that is
	extremely helpful, and I thank all of you.
	And I want to particularly thank, of course, General
	Dunford for your service but also, through you, for the brave
	men and women who served us and all those who died. Thank you,
	General.
	A couple of things.
	No. 1, Senator Ayotte mentioned that the effort here is to
	promote a peace process, not a war process, is the ultimate
	resolution. But we've been there 20 years, and I've come to
	certain conclusions.
	One is, we can't trust the Taliban. That's pretty obvious.
	No. 2, we can't have confidence in the Afghan Government. It's
	been corrupt; it's been ineffective. No. 3, if we're going to
	have a process that requires us to trust the negotiated outcome
	with the Taliban, I'll lack confidence in that.
	And, General Dunford, I think you outlined areas where we
	have some leverage. And those were that the Taliban wants
	relief from sanctions, it wants international recognition, and
	it wants international help.
	So, the question I have is not so much about the May 1,
	because we know that's a somewhat subjective date, and there
	can be arguments for and against. And you've made, quite well,
	the arguments about why that might want to be delayed.
	But why not have a strategy where we just flat-out
	recognize that the Afghan Government has failed and has not
	been a reliable partner, that the Taliban is not going to be
	any trusted partner in the future, but where we utilize our
	leverage as opposed to our military, those three things you
	mentioned, with robust international diplomacy, where the
	regional countries, as Senator Ayotte mentioned, have an
	interest in stability as opposed to a refugee crisis? Why not
	focus on that and recognize that what Trump has been doing,
	bringing troops home, is overdue and made some sense?
	General Dunford?
	General Dunford. Congressman, thanks so much.
	I think you have just succinctly captured the core
	recommendation that we make. And, in fact, we don't believe
	there's a military solution. And we do believe, both with
	regard to the Afghan peace negotiation but as well as long-term
	integration that you're suggesting, that the key element of
	that has to be regional diplomacy and then broader
	international effort to bring about those conditions.
	And if there is any hope for a future government that, in
	the character of the government, actually does have some
	legitimacy and is able to do the things necessary to bring
	about peace and stability, if that's ever going to happen, it
	has to be exactly as you've outlined: through a very strong and
	concerted diplomatic effort and in conjunction with our
	partners in the region and the international community.
	So, Congressman, I guess what I would say--and I think I
	say this on behalf of the entire Afghan Study Group--what
	you've just outlined is certainly a conclusion that we drew in
	our deliberations after 10 months of talking to people and
	studying the problem.
	Mr. Welch. OK.
	One other thing. We accepted, or stumbled into, a nation-
	building goal in Afghanistan, which I think most people now
	acknowledge has not worked, as opposed to counterterrorism.
	And one of the concerns that was expressed was that
	Afghanistan would become a haven for terrorism. But I want to
	challenge that Afghanistan is any different than many other
	areas around the world where there is terrorism brewing where
	we don't have occupation or military forces.
	Why would we have that policy in Afghanistan when there are
	so many other parts of the world where we face a similar
	terrorist threat?
	General Dunford?
	General Dunford. Sure, Congressman. I think there are a
	couple factors. One is geography. And we saw what geography
	means back in 2001. And the other is the historical and
	cultural significance of the Khorasan and what that would mean
	to the global jihadist movement. And those are two factors that
	make Afghanistan different.
	I also think, Congressman--and we didn't spend a lot of
	time on this in the Afghanistan Study Group, but certainly I
	feel confident in making this assertion--when you look at South
	Asia as a whole and you look at the possession of nuclear
	weapons by two states in the region, there's no question in my
	mind that we have long-term security interests in South Asia.
	There's also no question in my mind that Afghanistan, were
	it to become ungoverned spaces, has a high probability of being
	a location of a proxy war between two states that have nuclear
	weapons.
	So, from a broader security perspective, I do believe
	Afghanistan is different.
	I take your point that we're dealing with, you know,
	extremists with the same ideology from West Africa to Southeast
	Asia. And we actually do need a global strategy to deal with
	that that focuses on the flow of resources, the flow of foreign
	fighters, and the basic ideology that unites those groups.
	But I do think there are some geographic, some cultural,
	and some historical factors of Afghanistan that do make it
	unique. And, as the chairman outlined, it's because of those
	factors that it's No. 1 on the Terrorist Index. It's because of
	those factors that there's at least two groups who aspire to
	attack the United States directly and we believe, if left
	unchecked, would have the capability to do so.
	Mr. Welch. OK. Thank you, General.
	Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
	Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentleman.
	The gentleman yields back.
	The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr.
	Higgins, for five minutes.
	Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank our
	panelists. This is a very important discussion.
	Most of my constituents, and perhaps Americans from sea to
	shining sea, grow weary of this endless conflict. And many
	historians generally agree and the archaeological record
	generally suggests that the entire region that we're
	discussing, including, of course, Afghanistan, has been engaged
	in some level of continuous war for 7,000 years, with
	essentially brief periods of relative peace breaking up that
	continuous war.
	In modern history, we've been there for 30 years. And,
	General, I would ask you, realistically, sir--you've been a
	voice of solid reason, and we thank you for your service and
	your experience and your insight here. But at what point is
	enough, enough for American engagement in this region?
	And why, if there's a presence required from American
	military force, why does that have to include actual boots on
	the ground, soldiers on the ground, given the vast power of our
	Navy and the technology and success of our rapid deployment
	capabilities? Why do we need boots on the ground in this
	region, at this point, moving forward?
	I realize that there's an opportunity for peace, but I'm
	quite sure they've had that discussion over the course of the
	last 7,000 years. Why would it work now? And why do we need
	boots on the ground there?
	General Dunford. Thank you, Congressman. You ask a really
	important question. And, as you can imagine, I've been involved
	in several similar conversations about Afghanistan for now at
	least 10 years.
	And I do understand your constituents growing weary. I do
	think that they need to understand that we've not had a U.S.
	loss of life in a year. And they also need to understand that
	we've gone from over 100,000 forces on the ground in
	Afghanistan when I was in command in 2013 and 2014 to 2,500
	forces right now, which, in the context of our grander
	strategy, is certainly, in my judgment, a sustainable level.
	But your question about why on the ground is really an
	important one. And I want to emphasize that, in our study, we
	focused on how to address our national interests, not whether
	to address our national interests.
	We know that the President, any President, can make a
	judgment to assume risk against our national interests, either
	because they conclude that we are unable to address them at a
	sufficient level of resourcing or they want to accept that risk
	and reprioritize those resources somewhere else.
	But why boots on the ground? And I've looked at this
	problem extensively. In order to be effective in conducting
	counterterrorism, you have to create an ecosystem, if you will,
	of intelligence. And we would not have the networks available
	to us from an intelligence perspective, we would not have the
	platform availability--that is, the systems that allow us to
	collect that intelligence--and we wouldn't have the ability to
	strike quickly with the resources necessary to destroy
	terrorists once the intelligence develops their location.
	So, were we to do it from outside of Afghanistan, you would
	just merely have a geology problem and a responsiveness
	problem; you would not be as effective.
	But, Congressman, I think we would not argue that a
	President could choose to accept risk. I view a presence of
	approximately the size we have right now in pursuing peace as,
	at least in the interim, equivalent to term insurance, where we
	have a sufficient presence, sustainable sufficient presence,
	both in terms of diplomacy and military forces to mitigate the
	risk of an attack against the United States.
	You know, and when does that end? Again, our argument right
	now is, let's first focus on the Afghan peace negotiation, see
	if we can set the conditions for reduction of violence such
	that it doesn't impact our interests. And then, if that doesn't
	work out, I think your constituents know that we have other
	options that the President can take in the future, you know,
	should he judge that Afghan peace negotiations are not going to
	be successful.
	I hope that answers your question.
	Mr. Higgins. Very thoroughly. General, again, thank you for
	being a voice of reason.
	Mr. Chairman, I have a second question to submit in writing
	unless we have a second round. And I yield. Thank you, good
	sir.
	Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentleman.
	The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr.
	Johnson, for five minutes.
	Mr. Johnson. Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Speier has to go
	at 12 o'clock, and so I've agreed to yield my--not yield my
	time, but allow her to go in front of me. So, if that is OK
	with the chair, I would defer to Congresswoman Speier.
	Mr. Lynch. Well, I thank the gentleman.
	The gentlelady from California is recognized for five
	minutes. Thank you.
	Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And my deep gratitude
	to Mr. Johnson for allowing me to go in front of him.
	First, to Senator Ayotte and to General Dunford and Ms.
	Lindborg, thank you for your service and for providing us this
	blueprint.
	I, like, I think, many of my colleagues, have grave
	concerns about the corruption that exists in Afghanistan that
	will not change. The fact that Inspector General Sopko has
	outlined for us in quarterly reports how money we have provided
	there has been misused should not be lost on any of us, but--
	and that the opioid trade continues at a very robust level.
	So, I don't think we change the culture in Afghanistan. I'd
	be interested in each of your thoughts on that.
	I do believe that protecting women and girls and allowing
	them to continue to progress through school is an important
	component.
	And I would share General Dunford's supposition that we're
	going to have to be there. I hate saying that, but I do believe
	that a footprint of some sort, like we have a footprint in
	Europe and other places, is going to be necessary for our own
	personal security.
	So, I would just be interested in each of your comments on
	those principles.
	Ms. Lindborg. Well, I'll give it a start. And thank you for
	the question, Congresswoman Speier. And I'm appreciating your
	dogs in the background.
	Ms. Speier. I'm sorry about that.
	Ms. Lindborg. Because my cat's going in and out.
	But you raise a really important question. And corruption,
	of course, is deeply aligned with the kind of states that are
	prone to violent extremism. And that's why it is such a key
	component of the Global Fragility Act and a cornerstone of how
	we recommend reorienting our assistance programs.
	So, part of that is ensuring that we are aligned across all
	of our capabilities--our diplomacy, our security, our
	intelligence, and our development assistance--so that we're not
	inadvertently undermining each other.
	So, the first part of my answer is that I think we can do a
	better job of promoting better accountability, especially
	working with our donor partners, who all agreed in Geneva in
	November 2020 on very strict conditions over the next four
	years, that we will coherently work with the Afghan Government
	to address corruption.
	And the second part of my answer is that ultimately it is
	going to be up to the Afghans themselves. And that's why the
	development of civil society, the ability of women to have a
	much greater role, the rise of a new generation who has very
	different expectations of their government and demand more
	accountable government and ultimately a peaceful Afghanistan,
	that will be the key. Because it has to be driven by the
	Afghans who want this less corrupt, more peaceful nation.
	And our investments to support civil society have made a
	tremendous difference over the past 20 years. And you're right,
	we will need to continue to support them. But hopefully we can
	do so in a more effective way and at reduced levels, as we
	outlined in the report.
	Ms. Speier. Thank you.
	Ms. Ayotte. I would just add to what Nancy said that I
	think we're also anticipating that the aid be more focused.
	You know, if you look at our history of some of the
	projects I think I mentioned earlier that we've supported in
	Afghanistan, really focusing the support on key institutions
	and be prepared to hold them accountable, that we will, if we
	have to in certain areas, withdraw support with the government
	if they don't take certain actions that need to be taken.
	And this I know is not an easy question, but I think the
	Global Fragility Act does provide a very important framework
	that we have not had in the past for how we should be
	supporting countries that are fragile, like Afghanistan.
	General Dunford. Congresswoman Speier, it's good to see you
	again. And as you came on the screen, I thought, the last time
	I testified before you was about 18 months ago, and I thought
	it would be my last time testifying. And I think I celebrated,
	actually, that night that that was the end of my congressional
	testimony after a decade and a half of testifying. But here I
	am back before you again.
	But in response to your question, I think it's helpful for
	us to identify what we can do and, as the other co-chairs have
	mentioned, what the Afghans can do.
	What can we do with our allies? We can mitigate the risk of
	terrorist attacks, and we can mitigate the risk of mass
	migration. But when we talk about changing culture and
	addressing some of those underlying challenges that you
	identified, from corruption and opioids and so forth, all we
	can do in that regard is afford the Afghans an opportunity to
	make changes in those areas.
	I'm very humble about our ability to externally effect the
	change in the Afghan culture that gets after those problems. I
	am more optimistic, even though still humble, about our ability
	to address our national interests.
	So, I view this as kind of a twofold problem. One is, do
	the things that we have to do that are really relevant to our
	core national interests, and then set conditions where the
	Afghans can address those challenges that are unique to
	Afghanistan and really do require long-term changes in the
	character of government and long-term changes in the Afghan
	culture so that issues like women's rights are not behaviors
	that are conditioned on our international support but are
	actually an integral part of the culture.
	Ms. Speier. Thank you.
	My time has expired, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
	Mr. Lynch. The gentlelady yields back.
	The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr.
	Johnson, for five minutes.
	Mr. Johnson. I thank the chairman. And thank you for
	holding this very important hearing.
	And I want to thank the panelists for your service to the
	Nation.
	And, in reading your report, you indicate--or you state
	that the Taliban have threatened to reinstitute jihad if all
	international troops, including and especially the U.S. troops,
	are not out of Afghanistan by May of this year.
	And that presents us with a bargain that is really
	untenable. In other words, we withdraw and then leave the
	situation to collapse and terrorism to then have a laboratory
	to explode within, or we stay the course and we do what appears
	to be nation-building, from seeing your standards for the U.S.
	being able to withdraw from Afghanistan totally.
	And so you recommend that we maintain our current force
	posture and continue with dialog with the Taliban, and I
	support that conclusion.
	What I want to ask is, you know, the Taliban get their
	financial and military support from somewhere. Where do they
	get their support from? Which countries?
	General Dunford. Congressman, I think a fair amount of
	their support comes from the drug trade. The last time I
	checked, it was in excess of 50 percent. And I don't have
	unclassified information on where the support comes from.
	We know that the Taliban have had sanctuary in Pakistan. We
	know that they have an active diplomatic effort--traveling to
	Moscow, traveling to Beijing, traveling to other countries. We
	know they travel in the Gulf. We know Iran has provided some
	material support----
	Mr. Johnson. Well, let me ask you this, General. The
	Taliban is an Islamic Wahhabi strain of Islam-based terrorist
	organization, is it not?
	General Dunford. It is a Sunni terrorist organization, yes.
	Mr. Johnson. And it's a Wahhabi-based Sunni terrorist
	organization? Is that correct?
	General Dunford. Similar ideology, yes, Congressman.
	Mr. Johnson. And the Wahhabi strain of Islam is a very
	extreme, fundamentalist strain which undergirds the Saudi
	monarchy, correct?
	General Dunford. The Saudi monarchy--I mean, Wahhabism
	obviously emanates from Saudi Arabia. It originated in Saudi
	Arabia, and there has been a historic relationship between the
	royal family, if you will, and Wahhabi religious leaders, yes.
	Mr. Johnson. Yes. And the Wahhabist strain of Islam is
	behind the 18,000-plus madrasas, or Islamic schools, that teach
	this fundamentalist strain of Islam. Isn't that correct?
	General Dunford. There's no question that the Taliban
	originates from the madrasas in Pakistan. That's correct.
	Mr. Johnson. And isn't it also true that the Taliban gets
	support from Saudi Arabia, from the Saudi Arabian Government?
	General Dunford. Yes, Congressman, I don't have any
	specific information certainly as a part of the Afghan Study
	Group that can point to any specific country as providing
	material resources to the Taliban. I'm not suggesting that's
	not true. I just can't--I can't comment on it.
	Mr. Johnson. Well, it just seems to me that if we identify
	the revenue sources of the Taliban, we can weaken them and
	maybe even eliminate them as a threat if we choke off their
	resources.
	And my suggestion is that Saudi Arabia may, in fact, be a
	major source of revenue and resource for the Taliban, and I
	think America's policy should not be at cross-purposes with
	itself. If we're supporting the Saudis, who are supporting the
	Taliban, we are at cross-purposes with ourselves.
	And those are the kinds of things that I believe we should
	look to in being able to solve this problem that we have. We
	don't want to leave Afghanistan and leave it to the Taliban to
	establish another Wahhabi-based nation, which would be a
	lawless nation. You know, drugs, terrorism would flow with
	impunity, and we would have to go back in at some point to
	protect our interests, like we had to go in after September 11
	of 2001, 20 years ago.
	So, you know, I mean, am I off base?
	General Dunford. Congressman, you're not.
	The only thing I'll tell you from my past experience is
	that, you know, identifying resources as one, you know, of the
	critical capabilities of the Taliban is something that we have
	looked at for a long time, and we've looked at trying to
	interdict those sources of revenue.
	In my experience, we've found that the sources of revenue
	for the Taliban are fairly diverse and fairly resilient. Again,
	a large part of it comes from the opioid trade inside of
	Afghanistan. But they have proven to be pretty resilient in
	their ability to develop resources. And I'm unaware of any
	single source of income that we could go after in the immediate
	future to have a big impact.
	But that's not something that--we should continue to look
	at that, for sure.
	Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
	Would any of the other panelists want to comment?
	Ms. Lindborg. Yes, Congressman. I would just add, you know,
	that one of the distinguishing characteristics of the Taliban
	is that they grew out of the more conservative Pashtun culture.
	And so it's a bit of a distinguishing characteristic from some
	of the other Wahhabi-based terrorist groups, in that their
	principal focus is on Afghanistan as opposed to looking outward
	to create a larger caliphate.
	And so, therefore, that's what makes the prospect of a
	negotiated peace possible, is that it's bringing together the
	Afghan sides and recognizing that they are--that the Taliban
	are connected to the Pashtunwali conservative parts,
	particularly present still in the more rural south, which is
	part of where they derive their ability to sustain themselves
	and some of their resources.
	Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
	Mr. Chairman, you've been more than liberal with the time,
	and I appreciate it. And, with that, I yield back.
	Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentleman. The time was well-spent.
	And just a side note. We have followed that chain of
	causation from the Wahhabi-supported and Wahhabi-sustained
	madrasas in northern Pakistan and southern Afghanistan. We have
	met with the royal family in Saudi Arabia, urging them--we
	don't have evidence that the Saudi Government is supporting the
	madrasas, but we do feel there's money coming out of the Gulf
	or maybe from members of the Saudi royal family who are
	supporting those efforts.
	So, the gentleman's target is spot-on. There are wider
	problems, as Ms. Lindborg has pointed out, with the Pashtun
	nature of this. But, like I say, the gentleman's remarks were
	well-received.
	I don't see Mr. Gosar on the board, so I'm going to go to
	the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. DeSaulnier, for five minutes.
	Mr. DeSaulnier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentleman from
	California.
	Mr. Lynch. The gentleman--I'm sorry, I'm sorry, I'm sorry.
	Mr. DeSaulnier. That's OK. You should say that I'm a native
	of the great Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Thank you, Mr.
	Chairman.
	I do want to thank all of my colleagues, first off, for the
	content and the tone of this hearing, particularly for you, Mr.
	Chairman, because you set that tone, and how constructive this
	is. And many of us yearn more for this type of focus and
	atmosphere.
	And to the witnesses, thank you so much for your careers
	and your dedication to peace and America's peace. Really a
	remarkable product here in a very complex situation that I am
	only somewhat familiar with.
	So, first to General Dunford: In a statement last weekend,
	the Taliban said: Anyone seeking extension of wars and
	occupation will be held liable for it, just as in the previous
	two decades.
	The inspector general in its most recent report said, and I
	quote, ``The Taliban is very likely prepared to resume its
	campaign of violence against the U.S. and coalition targets if
	it perceives that coalition forces have stalled or reversed
	course on the agreed upon withdrawal.''
	So, General, knowing that--and you've alluded to this in
	some of the other responses, but what is your expectation for
	what will happen? And how well can we protect not just Afghanis
	but, in particular, American forces who will remain there if
	the Biden administration suggests, as you are suggesting, that
	we revisit this accord?
	General Dunford. Congressman, thanks.
	And, you know, I would say right up front, I don't know
	whether the Taliban will accept a U.S. presence beyond the 1st
	of May, and I don't know what they'll do should we decide to
	stay past the 1st of May.
	I am compelled, again, by the areas of leverage that we
	have over the Taliban and by our judgment that they see the
	political process as the best way to achieve their long-term
	objectives. In other words, I think they are aware of the
	limitations of military force. I think they believe they can
	get leverage in the peace negotiations by increasing violence,
	and I think that's what we're seeing them do right now. I don't
	believe that they assess they can achieve their overall
	political objectives with a sustained military campaign, which
	is why they're in Doha right now and why they are talking to
	the Afghan Government.
	Should we decide to stay past the 1st of May and should the
	Taliban resume attacks against the United States, I leave it to
	those who are leading the fight right now to talk to specifics,
	but it would be my judgment that we would have to make some
	adjustments in our force posture and in our force composition
	to adequately protect our forces and continue to support the
	Afghan forces under those conditions.
	Mr. DeSaulnier. Thank you, General.
	Senator Ayotte and Ms. Lindborg, my questions originally
	were designed more around leverage and what kind of actual
	mechanisms we have. I really appreciate the recommendation that
	we don't be driven by the metric chronologically of time but of
	performance.
	Which leads me to, we know that the world is changing. We
	know now, with research and work, remarkable work, that
	neuroscientists and sociologists are working on now, that we as
	humans and cultures are only willing to accept so much change.
	We see it in our own country. And you've all alluded to the
	future and younger generations. And, of course, we've talked
	about this in regards to this region and its neighbors,
	particularly in Iran.
	So, the expectation that you can build these inclusive
	institutions and avoid the extractive institutions that
	unfortunately Afghanistan has been plagued with through its
	history, and the hope and the expectation that particularly
	younger people, who are being socialized in a very, very
	different environment from older generations, strikes me as
	really the key question and a lot to hope for. Not that we
	shouldn't, and I really think we have to. But the expectation
	that this critical mass is there, not just in the next few
	months but in the next few years, that these new generations
	can actually change what previous generations haven't been able
	to change in Afghanistan.
	So, Senator, if you could just respond to that. And maybe
	Ms. Lindborg and General Dunford, if you have any observations.
	Ms. Ayotte. Thank you, Congressman. I think you've made a
	very important observation and point.
	And it brings me back to where, when the Taliban were in
	charge, before the attack on our country and before we went to
	Afghanistan, the Afghanistan of today, 20 years later, there
	has been a growth, as we've mentioned, of civil society, of
	young people, of just the ability to use the internet and
	communicate and also robust press that was not present. And
	that's taken time, and that has caused some fundamental changes
	within the country.
	Now, it hasn't, obviously, changed the whole character of
	the nature of Afghanistan. They still have grave challenges
	with corruption and other issues. But that piece and that
	change of the configuration and more voices being able to
	actually speak out in that society does make it a very
	different circumstance for the Taliban to consider, if they
	think they're going to be able to go back and somehow govern in
	the way they did in 2001, if they want to be part of the
	government.
	And I think it's an important component of what we hope can
	be built on going forward despite all the challenges there.
	Mr. DeSaulnier. Ms. Lindborg?
	Ms. Lindborg. Yes. Thank you very much for your question
	and your observations.
	And, you know, we've learned a lot from previous decades of
	nation-building, and I think one of the core lessons is that
	people have to build their own nation. And, therefore, it will
	be the power, the energy, and the demand of this new generation
	and women who ultimately will determine what Afghanistan looks
	like. And that's the only way that change will occur.
	One of the last trips I made before the pandemic shut
	everything down was to Afghanistan, and I had a chance to meet
	with a wide swath of women, youth, faith leaders, government
	leaders, you know, really courageous human rights workers, and
	the Helmand peace marchers in both Jalalabad and Kabul. And,
	you know, there is--I think there is a palpable new energy and
	demand for peace. People are just really tired of the war. And
	they do have the ability, I believe, to make a difference in
	how this all goes forward.
	And our help to get a viable peace process supported is the
	bet that we're making with our recommendations.
	Mr. DeSaulnier. Thank you.
	General Dunford. Congressman, if I could just make one
	quick followup as the committee considers this.
	You know, when I think about the problem, I don't think
	about it as, can we effect the changes that you talked about? I
	agree with you in terms of how difficult they will be. I think
	we should look at the problem we're trying to solve as one of,
	can we reduce the level of violence and allow those changes and
	allow the political differences to be addressed in an
	environment where there's a reduced level of violence and a
	reduced terrorist threat?
	So, in other words, I have a much humbler appreciation for
	what can be achieved in the near term. And I think if we look
	at how long will it take to effect fundamental cultural changes
	and address the economy and address the character of the
	government, I do think we're talking about, you know, a long,
	long time for some of those issues to be addressed.
	What I think is more realistic is for us to come out of the
	Afghan peace negotiations with a peace agreement that actually
	does result in the reduction of violence and actually does
	allow these political differences that are very real and need
	to be addressed to be addressed in an environment where we
	don't have a terrorist threat and there's reduced violence and
	there's a political framework within which these issues are
	being addressed. That, to me, is what winning would look like.
	Mr. DeSaulnier. Well, thank you again. Really, really
	fascinating. And I really want to thank the Peace Institute as
	well. What a valuable, valuable resource.
	And, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back, but I want to thank
	you for letting me tease you about the geographic issues,
	differences between Colorado and California. And I realize, as
	a native of Massachusetts, when I lived there, I frequently got
	those states confused. Anything west of West Stockbridge was
	always confusing to me.
	Mr. Lynch. Anything west of Worcester is the same, as far
	as I'm concerned.
	Mr. DeSaulnier. The home of my alma mater, Worcester. Thank
	you.
	Mr. Lynch. Well, we are very--and I apologize to the
	gentleman from California. We are very proud of the gentleman's
	connection to Massachusetts. It was certainly California's gain
	and Massachusetts' loss.
	But, in closing, you know, we've had the presence and the
	participation of our panelists for two hours now, so I think I
	should bring this to a close, even though I have more questions
	and I would like to further discuss this.
	In closing, I want to thank our panelists for their
	wonderful work and their willingness to help the committee with
	its task. I think this study, this report, could be extremely
	helpful to the administration, and I'm sure they are weighing
	it seriously.
	I want to commend my colleagues for their participation,
	despite the weather all across the country, in this important
	conversation.
	With that, without objection----
	Mr. Grothman. Could I----
	Mr. Lynch. Is somebody seeking time?
	Mr. Grothman. Yes. This is Congressman Grothman.
	Mr. Lynch. Oh, Mr. Grothman, I'm sorry.
	Mr. Grothman. Before you break up, I'd like to thank you
	for having the hearing. I, quite frankly, wish it'd go another
	couple more hours, because I have a lot of questions to ask.
	I want to emphasize that, at least as far as me, I realize
	we have important obligations as a world power. We have a
	fraction of the number of troops there that we did a few years
	ago, and I have no problem voting if the feeling is it's
	necessary to keep those troops there years more, if that's the
	appropriate thing.
	I wouldn't mind if--it's unfortunate we have a hearing like
	this that has to be public, because, of course, people are
	listening in to what we say who might not be considered friends
	of the United States, and that makes things difficult. I wish
	we would've had some time to get into the potential roles that
	Iran and Pakistan are going to play if we left, which I think
	is relevant. And I appreciate Congressman Johnson's comments as
	to where the money is coming from and if any of the money is
	coming from people who we think are our friends.
	But I'd like to thank you for having it. If you want to do
	another one of these a month from now or two months from now,
	I'd be happy to do another one, because I'm sure I could find
	another 15 or 20 minutes of questions. But, again, thank you
	for having the hearing.
	Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentleman.
	And just so we all understand, Inspector General Sopko, the
	Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, has his
	report coming out in two weeks. It's a follow-on to many of the
	same issues we're talking about here but on a granular level
	with respect to some of the projects that Ms. Foxx identified,
	the spending of money, the corruption, all that.
	So, that will give us an opportunity to revisit a lot of
	these issues and have a wider discussion as well, so I'm
	looking forward to that. And I think that's scheduled in two or
	three weeks.
	But, with that--and I appreciate the gentleman's remarks.
	Without objection, all members will have five legislative
	days within which to submit additional written questions for
	the witnesses to the chair, which will be forwarded to the
	witnesses for their response. I ask our witnesses that if
	questions are submitted to them to please respond as promptly
	as you are able. Again I want to thank our panelists for your
	wonderful and patriotic work, this meeting is now adjourned.
	Mr. Lynch. Again, I want to thank our panelists for your
	wonderful and patriotic work.
	This hearing is now adjourned. Thank you.
	[Whereupon, at 12:31 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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