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<title> - ROOTING OUT FRAUD IN SMALL-BUSINESS RELIEF PROGRAMS</title> |
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[House Hearing, 117 Congress] |
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[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] |
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ROOTING OUT FRAUD IN |
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SMALL-BUSINESS RELIEF PROGRAMS |
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HEARING |
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BEFORE THE |
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SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CORONAVIRUS CRISIS |
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OF THE |
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM |
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES |
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ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS |
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FIRST SESSION |
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MARCH 25, 2021 |
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Serial No. 117-12 |
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Reform |
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[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] |
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Available on: www.govinfo.gov, |
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oversight.house.gov or |
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docs.house.gov |
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE |
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43-986 PDF WASHINGTON : 2021 |
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM |
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CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York, Chairwoman |
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Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of James Comer, Kentucky, Ranking |
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Columbia Minority Member |
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Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts Jim Jordan, Ohio |
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Jim Cooper, Tennessee Paul A. Gosar, Arizona |
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Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia Virginia Foxx, North Carolina |
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Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois Jody B. Hice, Georgia |
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Jamie Raskin, Maryland Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin |
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Ro Khanna, California Michael Cloud, Texas |
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Kweisi Mfume, Maryland Bob Gibbs, Ohio |
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Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, New York Clay Higgins, Louisiana |
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Rashida Tlaib, Michigan Ralph Norman, South Carolina |
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Katie Porter, California Pete Sessions, Texas |
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Cori Bush, Missouri Fred Keller, Pennsylvania |
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Danny K. Davis, Illinois Andy Biggs, Arizona |
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Debbie Wasserman Schultz, Florida Andrew Clyde, Georgia |
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Peter Welch, Vermont Nancy Mace, South Carolina |
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Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Scott Franklin, Florida |
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Georgia Jake LaTurner, Kansas |
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John P. Sarbanes, Maryland Pat Fallon, Texas |
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Jackie Speier, California Yvette Herrell, New Mexico |
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Robin L. Kelly, Illinois Byron Donalds, Florida |
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Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan |
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Mark DeSaulnier, California |
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Jimmy Gomez, California |
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Ayanna Pressley, Massachusetts |
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Vacancy |
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David Hickton, Select Committee Staff Director |
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Russell Anello, Chief Counsel |
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Senam Okpattah, Deputy Chief Clerk |
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Contact Number: 202-225-5051 |
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Mark Marin, Minority Staff Director |
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Select Subcommittee On The Coronavirus Crisis |
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James E. Clyburn, South Carolina, Chairman |
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Maxine Waters, California Steve Scalise, Louisiana, Ranking |
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Carolyn B. Maloney, New York Minority Member |
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Nydia M. Velazquez, New York Jim Jordan, Ohio |
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Bill Foster, Illinois Mark E. Green, Tennessee |
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Jamie Raskin, Maryland Nicole Malliotakis, New York |
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Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois Mariannette Miller-Meeks, Iowa |
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C O N T E N T S |
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Hearing held on March 25, 2021................................... 1 |
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Witnesses |
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The Honorable Hannibal ``Mike'' Ware, Inspector General, Small |
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Business Administration |
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Oral Statement................................................... 4 |
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The Honorable Michael E. Horowitz, Chair, Pandemic Response |
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Accountability Committee, Inspector General, Department of |
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Justice |
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Oral Statement................................................... 6 |
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William B. Shear, PhD, Director, Financial Markets and Community |
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Investment, Government Accountability Office |
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Oral Statement................................................... 8 |
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Written opening statements and the written statements of the |
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witnesses are available on the U.S. House of Representatives |
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Document Repository at: docs.house.gov. |
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Index of Documents |
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No additional documents were entered into the record during this |
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hearing. |
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ROOTING OUT FRAUD IN |
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SMALL-BUSINESS RELIEF PROGRAMS |
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---------- |
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Thursday, March 25, 2021 |
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House of Representatives |
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Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis |
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Committee on Oversight and Reform |
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Washington, D.C. |
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The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., via |
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WebEx, Hon. James E. Clyburn (chairman of the subcommittee) |
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presiding. |
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Present: Representatives Clyburn, Waters, Maloney, Foster, |
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Raskin, Krishnamoorthi, Jordan, Green, and Miller-Meeks. |
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Chairman Clyburn. Good morning. The committee will come to |
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order. |
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Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a |
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recess of the committee at any time. |
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I now recognize myself for an opening statement. |
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The Paycheck Protection Program, or PPP, and the Economic |
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Injury Disaster Loan Program, or EIDL, have been essential |
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lifelines for millions of small businesses harmed by the |
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coronavirus pandemic. More than $1 trillion has been disbursed |
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by these programs, with good reason given the scale of the |
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crisis. With so many tax dollars expended, it is vital that we |
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ensure that the money is being used for its intended purposes |
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and not diverted to fraud. |
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Unfortunately, the Trump administration failed to take |
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basic steps to prevent fraud when it implemented these programs |
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last year. Thanks to the work of this committee and our |
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oversight partners, we now know that this failure led to nearly |
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$84 billion in potential fraud, including $79 billion in |
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potentially fraudulent EIDL loans and grants and $4.6 billion |
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in PPP loans. That means billions in taxpayer dollars may not |
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have reached the small businesses that most urgently needed |
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support. |
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Last October, the SBA Inspector General found that the |
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Trump administration--I'm quoting him here--``lowered the |
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guardrails'' by removing or weakening controls in the EIDL |
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Program. Specifically, the administration ignored flags of |
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potential fraud, approved loans in batches with little to no |
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vetting, and abandoned a rule that required two SBA employees |
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to approve each loan application. According to the IG, these |
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actions increased fraud risk significantly. |
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In a staff report last year, this committee identified more |
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than 22,500 PPP loans worth $4 billion that may have been |
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subject to fraud. The SBA Inspector General has since found at |
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least $4.6 billion in potentially fraudulent loans because the |
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Trump administration refused to implement internal controls |
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that--and I quote here again--``could have reduced the |
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likelihood of an ineligible or fraudulent business obtaining a |
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PPP loan,'' end of quote. |
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As a result of the lack of controls, the Inspector General |
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uncovered tens of thousands of PPP loans that exceeded the |
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maximum loan amount that had been approved to businesses |
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registered under the program cutoff date or were mailed to |
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businesses that exceeded the program's size standards. |
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Earlier this year, GAO added PPP and EIDL to its High Risk |
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List, citing the failure to implement adequate controls or make |
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recommended improvements. |
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Former Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin asserted last year |
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that, given the need to get relief money out quickly, it was |
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inevitable that the programs ran into a lot of issues. Let me |
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be clear: That is a false choice. Americans should not have to, |
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and did not have to, choose between quickly getting aid during |
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a crisis and preventing the theft or waste of billions of tax |
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dollars. |
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While disbursing PPP and EIDL funds quickly was rightly |
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prioritized during the crisis, this committee and the oversight |
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bodies before us today all outline simple steps that the prior |
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administration could've taken to prevent oversight--or to |
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provide oversight and prevent fraud without causing harmful |
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delays. |
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The Trump administration not only ignored these |
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recommendations, but it resisted legitimate oversight by |
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removing and bullying Inspectors General and withholding basic |
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information from Congress. As The Washington Post reported |
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earlier this week, we now know that this was a widespread |
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problem in the prior administration. Today, we face the |
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challenge of fixing the resulting damage. |
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Our committee released a staff memo this morning showing |
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just how vast a challenge this is. The SBA has referred a |
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staggering 1,340,000 claims of potential fraud concerning EIDL |
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loans and advances to the agency's Inspector General. The SBA |
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Inspector General has received another 148,000 complaints on |
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its fraud hotline. The Inspector General already has more than |
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200 open investigations related to PPP and EIDL. |
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And it is not just a single inspector general playing a |
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role. Given the scope of the problem, 32 Federal and state |
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agencies have been pulled into investigations involving the |
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small-business relief programs. |
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Fortunately, the Biden-Harris administration is taking the |
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risk of fraud seriously and investing in oversight. President |
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Biden has called for, in his words, fastidious oversight of |
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pandemic relief funds and charged his administration to--and I |
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quote him here--``make sure the relief arrives quickly, |
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equitably, and efficiently, with no waste or fraud,'' end of |
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quote. |
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The American Rescue Plan will further enhance transparency |
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and accountability by investing $142 million to support |
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critical oversight by the Pandemic Response Accountability |
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Committee, or PRAC, the inspector general community, and the |
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Government Accountability Office. |
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Today, I am pleased to welcome distinguished |
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representatives of these watchdogs who are appearing before the |
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select subcommittee. With us this afternoon is Hannibal |
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``Mike'' Ware, the SBA Inspector General; Michael Horowitz, the |
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Inspector General for the Department of Justice and Chair of |
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the PRAC; and William Shear, the Director of Financial Markets |
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and Community Investment at GAO. |
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I'm also pleased to welcome the select subcommittee's |
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newest member, Mrs. Miller-Meeks. |
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I look forward to hearing how our panelists plan to use the |
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funds provided in the American Rescue Act to combat fraud in |
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small-business relief programs and how we can continue to work |
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together to ensure that our Nation's response to the pandemic |
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is effective, efficient, and equitable. |
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In the ranking member's absence, I now yield to Mr. Jordan |
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for any public opening statement he may wish to make. |
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Mr. Jordan. |
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Mr. Jordan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to you and to |
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our witnesses for appearing virtually today. |
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[Inaudible] we continue to hold only virtual hearings in |
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this subcommittee, even though four members of the majority |
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celebrated the $1.9 trillion spending bill in person at the |
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White House just two weeks ago. |
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I want to also welcome our new Republican member to the |
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select committee, Representative Mariannette Miller-Meeks from |
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the great state of Iowa. We appreciate Mrs. Meeks' hard work on |
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behalf of her constituents, especially as Speaker Pelosi and |
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the Democrats are currently challenging Dr. Miller-Meeks' |
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election. |
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Mrs. Miller-Meeks won the general, she won the recount, and |
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the state of Iowa certified her results, but her opponent |
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skipped the courts and ran straight to the Speaker and |
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congressional Democrats to try to overturn the will of the |
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people in the state of Iowa. It's wrong, what they're doing. |
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It's a dangerous game that the Democrats are playing with this |
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election. |
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Adding Dr. Miller-Meeks, we now have our second medical |
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doctor on the select subcommittee, which I think is a good |
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thing. |
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Today we're here to talk about fraud. Anyone that commits |
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fraud and steals taxpayer dollars from hardworking Americans |
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should be punished to the fullest extent of the law, and the |
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money should be recouped for the taxpayers. |
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The Trump administration harnessed the full force of the |
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Federal Government to find and prosecute fraud, particularly in |
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the PPP program. In fact, the Trump Department of Justice stood |
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up a PPP fraud task force, which brought us its first fraud |
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case within one month of the program starting. This enforcement |
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pace is unmatched in the history of the Department's white- |
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collar prosecution efforts. |
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So far, the FBI has opened 537 fraud cases, arrested 111 |
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people, and began the process of recouping millions of stolen |
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dollars. This is good. This is how the justice system is |
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supposed to work. |
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The Democrats will claim that the PPP program is rife with |
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fraud, when, in fact, it is just the opposite. Using the |
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Democrats' own statistics, over 99 percent of PPP money got to |
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the correct recipient and has been used appropriately. This is |
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a better rate than the private insurance--or, excuse me, |
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private mortgage market. |
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The Democrats will also ignore the massive successes of the |
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program. PPP supported 51 million jobs, over 80 percent of |
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America's small businesses, and saved almost 19 million jobs |
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from permanent loss. That is truly unprecedented. |
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Of course, it can't go on forever. It's time to reopen our |
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states, even the blue states. We must get people back to work |
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and get kids back to school. Just this week, the Federal |
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Reserve Board Governor in charge of community banking said the |
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economy must reopen and lockdowns must be lifted. |
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Florida reopened and was vilified. New York and Governor |
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Cuomo shut down and were praised. The facts are clear now, |
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though: Florida is successful, and Governor Cuomo is under |
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criminal investigation. Florida protected seniors, while |
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Governor Cuomo sent the virus to seniors. Florida's death rate |
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among seniors is 50 percent lower than that of the state of New |
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York's. Of course, instead of investigating Cuomo's actions, |
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Democrats rewarded him with a $13 billion bailout. |
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Contrary to the chairman's own statements, this |
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subcommittee remains focused on politics. It is past time we |
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hold in-person hearings on getting kids back to school, getting |
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vaccines to rural communities, on Cuomo's nursing-home |
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disaster, and the health crisis at our southern border. |
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Instead, this subcommittee is focused on attempting to tear |
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down a bipartisan program that kept the economy afloat during |
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the early and toughest days of the pandemic. |
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We all agree fraud is bad, but we should all agree that a |
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99-percent success record is unprecedented, and we have |
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President Trump to thank for that. |
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Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I yield back and look forward |
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to hearing from our witnesses. |
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Chairman Clyburn. Thank you very much, Mr. Jordan. |
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The witnesses will now be unmuted so we can swear them in. |
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Please raise your right hands. |
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Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to |
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give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, |
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so help you God? |
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Mr. Horowitz. I do. |
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Mr. Ware. I do. |
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Mr. Shear. I do. |
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Chairman Clyburn. Let the record show that the witnesses |
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answered in the affirmative. |
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Thank you. Without objection, your written statements will |
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be made part of the record. |
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With that, Mr. Ware, you are now recognized to provide your |
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testimony. |
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STATEMENT OF THE HON. HANNIBAL ``MIKE'' WARE, INSPECTOR |
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GENERAL, SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION |
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Mr. Ware. Thank you very much. |
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Chairman Clyburn, Ranking Member Scalise, and distinguished |
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members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to speak |
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with you today and for your continued support of my office. |
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I come before you today in the midst of a historic |
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challenge to the Nation, a challenge for which the SBA has a |
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pivotal and unprecedented role in stabilizing the U.S. economy. |
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The men and women of my office have been working diligently to |
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provide oversight of SBA's pandemic response. I am always proud |
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to represent them publicly and to speak to you about our |
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important work. We share in the Nation's grief for those lost |
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to the pandemic and are keenly aware that nothing short of the |
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public's trust is at stake in our oversight efforts. |
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SBA is managing over a trillion dollars in lending |
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authority through the PPP and the EIDL programs, with the most |
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recent tranche of lending authority being contained within the |
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American Rescue Plan Act. As with my office, the men and women |
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of SBA have been running at a sprinter's pace; however, the |
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race we are running has been more of a marathon. Nonetheless, |
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we have sought to have an aggressive and focused approach to |
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our oversight to ensure our work is properly calibrated and |
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relevant. |
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The Congress recognized that the oversight required of the |
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pandemic response was outsized for existing oversight resources |
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across government, to include my office, and we have received |
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three supplemental appropriations to increase our oversight |
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capacity. |
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Initially, we focused on the recruitment of a mix of |
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auditors, analysts, and criminal investigators to provide |
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immediate and timely insight into those programs. |
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In December, we received funding directed to oversight of |
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the EIDL Program that seeks to address the rampant fraud |
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identified by my office. These funds are being used to increase |
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our investigative staff and enhance our data analytics |
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capacity. |
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We received our most recent supplemental increase a couple |
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of weeks ago, and those funds will be used to further increase |
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our investigative capacity to combat fraud. Fraud |
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investigations will be a decade-long effort due to the |
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performance of these loans within SBA's portfolios and the |
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statute of limitations for fraud. |
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Our office will have approximately 40 percent more staff on |
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board after our hiring surges for EIDL and ARPA conclude than |
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we had before March 2020. |
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Even still, we recognized from the beginning that the level |
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of oversight required will take a whole-of-government approach. |
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We partnered with law enforcement entities across government |
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and joined multiple task forces to multiply our reach. Since |
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the outset of the pandemic response, our strategy has been to |
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prevent and deter fraud, waste, and abuse and to identify and |
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combat instances of the same. |
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The first step was the issuance of three reports sharing |
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risks and lessons learned from our past oversight work, |
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principally, that most closely related, which is of the |
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American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. These reports |
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as well as a fraud and scam alert were published before SBA |
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made the first PPP and EIDL loans. |
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Recognizing the speed at which lending was occurring in |
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both these programs, we developed innovative report products to |
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provide timely insight to our stakeholders. Our first flash |
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report was published just a little over 30 days of PPP's |
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implementation. Our next report would come out in July, which |
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found significant deficiencies in internal controls and rampant |
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fraud within the EIDL Program. We have issued 11 reports on |
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SBA's PPP and EIDL programs to date, with two more near |
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issuance. |
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While our audit work was ongoing, our criminal |
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investigators were aggressively pursuing fraud. On May 5, just |
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a little over a month after the first PPP loans, the first-in- |
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the-Nation fraud charges were announced against an individual |
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fraudulently seeking a PPP loan. We have since initiated over |
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420 investigations, and, together with our law enforcement |
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partners, the Department of Justice has announced over 100 |
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charges against individuals committing fraud against the PPP |
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and EIDL programs. |
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Now, if I may, I would like to clarify a number I mentioned |
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at a hearing yesterday before the Senate. Together with our law |
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enforcement partners and with SBA and with the financial |
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institutions, we have realized approximately $2.5 billion in |
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moneys being returned and seized that were associated with |
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fraud and suspicious activities. |
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We have received nearly 150,000 complaints on our hotline |
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since March of last year. This is over 150 years' worth of |
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complaints when compared to prior years. We have sought and |
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obtained assistance from the PRAC to catalogue complaints being |
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received outside of our online complaint submission system. As |
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we continue to address our processing backlog, we will employ |
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data analytics to further triage and guide these efforts. |
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I look forward to discussing our most recent published work |
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surrounding implementation of PPP and EIDL, but I must tell you |
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that data analytics has made a difference in our office's |
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ability to keep our stakeholders currently and fully informed |
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in a timely manner. |
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Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today, and I |
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am happy to answer any questions you may have of me. |
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Chairman Clyburn. Thank you very much, Mr. Ware. That was |
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perfect timing. |
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The chair now recognizes Mr. Horowitz. |
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STATEMENT OF THE HON. MICHAEL E. HOROWITZ, PANDEMIC RESPONSE |
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ACCOUNTABILITY COMMITTEE, INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF |
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JUSTICE |
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Mr. Horowitz. Thank you, Chairman Clyburn, Ranking Member |
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Scalise, members of the subcommittee. Appreciate you inviting |
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me to testify at today's important hearing. And we appreciate |
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the strong, bipartisan support for our work from Congress. |
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The Pandemic Response Accountability Committee, or PRAC, |
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was created by Congress one year ago and is comprised of 22 |
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Federal inspectors general working collaboratively to oversee |
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the more than $5 trillion in pandemic relief emergency |
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spending. |
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The PRAC's mission is to promote transparency and to work |
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with the IGs to ensure that taxpayer money is used effectively |
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and efficiently to address pandemic-related public health and |
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economic needs. Let me briefly highlight some of our |
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independent oversight work to date. |
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First, we've advanced transparency of the Federal |
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Government's pandemic-related spending through the launch of |
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our robust website, pandemicoversight.gov. The website makes |
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publicly available a wide range of spending data and is |
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currently the only place where certain spending data is |
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available to the public. The website also contains |
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accountability information, including information about OIG |
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audits, inspections, and investigations, as well as GAO |
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reports. |
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Second, we've issued crosscutting reports on issues that |
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transcend Federal agencies. For example, in February 2021, the |
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PRAC issued a ``Top Challenges in Pandemic Relief and |
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Response'' report highlighting management challenges facing |
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Federal agencies during the pandemic, and we recently issued a |
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report on COVID-19 testing. |
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Third, the PRAC has played an important role facilitating |
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coordination and collaboration among IGs and other oversight |
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partners, including GAO and state and local auditors. |
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Fourth, the PRAC is using the resources and tools Congress |
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gave us to enhance shared services across the IG community. For |
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example, we have, among other things, provided resources to |
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PRAC members to combat fraud in pandemic relief programs, |
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including with regard to the PPP and EIDL programs. |
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Fifth, the IG community is actively engaged in combating |
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fraud and criminal behavior. To date, the community has led or |
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participated in investigations leading to over 240 indictments |
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or complaints, 190 arrests, and 36 convictions. We're looking |
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to use all of the tools available to us--criminal prosecution, |
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civil enforcement, and suspension and debarment--to ensure that |
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those who engage in fraud and wrongdoing are held accountable. |
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Having highlighted some of our work to date, let me briefly |
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discuss some of the initiatives we have ongoing. |
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First, in order to fulfill the PRAC's mission, we need |
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better technological tools for IGs and our oversight partners, |
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including the use of advanced data analytics. To that end, the |
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PRAC is developing the Pandemic Analytics Center of Excellence, |
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or PACE, to conduct data analysis, to provide fraud-fighting |
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tools to the IG community, to enable the sharing of data |
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analytics and leading practices across our community, and to |
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broadly assist the IG community's audit and investigative work. |
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Second, the PRAC is continuing to develop crosscutting |
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oversight projects. We have three ongoing currently, and we're |
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developing more, and you will see more from us in the months |
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ahead. |
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Third, the PRAC has established a fraud task force to serve |
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as a deconfliction and coordination tool to assist IGs in their |
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investigative efforts, to serve as a coordinating body with the |
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Department of Justice and other law enforcement agencies, and |
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to allow IGs to tap into investigative resources from across |
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the IG community. |
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Fourth, we're working with OMB and Federal agencies to |
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address data gaps that we have identified and reported on. |
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Having necessary data is critical to advancing transparency and |
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accountability and to be able to assess programmatic impacts. |
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Fifth and finally, we're looking to use the Program Fraud |
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Civil Remedies Act, or PFCRA, to fight pandemic-related relief. |
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However, our ability to do so is limited and would be greatly |
|
enhanced if certain amendments were made to PFCRA. We look |
|
forward to working with Congress to enact those important |
|
changes. |
|
Thank you again for the strong, bipartisan support for our |
|
work. I would be pleased to answer any questions the committee |
|
may have. |
|
Chairman Clyburn. Thank you very much, Mr. Horowitz. That's |
|
even more perfect with your timing. Thank you very much. |
|
The chair now recognizes Mr. Shear. |
|
And let me see how perfect you can be. |
|
|
|
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM B. SHEAR, DIRECTOR, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND |
|
COMMUNITY INVESTMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE |
|
|
|
Mr. Shear. I'll try my best. |
|
Chairman Clyburn, Ranking Member Scalise, and members of |
|
the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to discuss our |
|
work on SBA's PPP and EIDL programs. |
|
SBA has made or guaranteed more than 17 million loans and |
|
grants, providing about $910 billion to help small businesses |
|
adversely affected by COVID-19. Over time, we have found the |
|
following: |
|
First, as far as PPP oversight, given the immediate need |
|
for PPP loans, SBA implemented limited safeguards for approving |
|
those loans. Because of ongoing oversight--because ongoing |
|
oversight is crucial, we recommended in June 2020 that SBA |
|
develop plans to assess PPP risk. SBA has since developed plans |
|
to review PPP loans and has recently provided us detailed |
|
information about its oversight process. |
|
Second, analysis of EIDL data. We reported in January 2021 |
|
that SBA had provided about 5,000 advances totaling about $26 |
|
billion and approved at least 3,000 loans totaling about $156 |
|
million for potentially ineligible businesses. Therefore, we |
|
recommended that SBA conduct portfolio-level analysis to detect |
|
potentially ineligible applications. |
|
Third, assessment of fraud risk. Although SBA has taken |
|
some steps to mitigate fraud risk to PPP and EIDL, such as |
|
conducting PPP loan reviews and implementing new EIDL controls, |
|
the agency has not yet conducted a formal fraud risk assessment |
|
for either program. |
|
Suspicious activity reports. From April through October |
|
2020, financial institutions filed more than 21,000 suspicious |
|
activity reports related to PPP. From May through October 2020, |
|
financial institutions filed more than 20,000 such reports |
|
related to EIDL. |
|
Department of Justice charges. From May 2020 through |
|
February 2021, the Department of Justice publicly announced |
|
charges in over 100 fraud-related cases associated with PPP |
|
loans and 30 fraud-related cases associated with EIDL loans. |
|
I'll refer to, I'm glad to be here with SBA's Inspector |
|
General. And I'll just say that, in October 2020, he reported |
|
that there were strong indicators of widespread potential fraud |
|
in the EIDL Program. |
|
The financial statement audit. In December 2020, SBA's |
|
independent financial statement auditor issued a disclaimer of |
|
opinion on SBA's Fiscal Year 2020 consolidated financial |
|
statements because SBA could not provide adequate documentation |
|
to support a significant number of transactions and account |
|
balances related to PPP and EIDL. |
|
Since June 2020, we have reported on the potential for |
|
fraud in both programs. Further, as we have reported multiple |
|
times, SBA's failure to provide us with data and documentation |
|
on PPP and EIDL in a timely manner has impeded efforts to |
|
ensure transparency and accountability for the programs. This |
|
includes delays in our obtaining key information from SBA, such |
|
as detailed oversight plans and documentation for estimating |
|
improper payments. |
|
Results of SBA's most recent financial statement audit are |
|
consistent with our findings. As a result, we included these |
|
programs as a new area on our High Risk List in March 2021 |
|
because of their potential for fraud, significant program |
|
integrity risk, and need for much-improved program management |
|
and better oversight. |
|
According to Federal internal control standards and our |
|
fraud-risk framework, managers in executive-branch agencies are |
|
responsible for managing fraud risk and implementing practices |
|
for mitigating those risks. When fraud risk can be identified |
|
and mitigated, fraud may be less likely to occur. Risk |
|
management is a formal and disciplined practice for addressing |
|
risk and reducing it to an acceptable level. |
|
In addition to our previous recommendations, we anticipate |
|
making four recommendations on fraud risk in PPP and EIDL and |
|
one on EIDL oversight in our March 2021 report, to be issued |
|
next week, on the Federal COVID-19 response. SBA agreed with |
|
the recommendations, stating it would implement fraud-risk |
|
assessments for both programs and an oversight plan for EIDL. |
|
This concludes my statement. I would be glad to answer any |
|
questions. |
|
Chairman Clyburn. Thank you very much, Mr. Shear. You did |
|
it. Thank you. |
|
Mr. Shear. Thank you. |
|
Chairman Clyburn. Let me thank all of our witnesses here |
|
today. |
|
Now, each member will have five minutes for questions. And, |
|
with that, I will now recognize myself for my five minutes. |
|
Now, as I stated earlier, the Trump administration's |
|
failure to implement robust fraud controls in the EIDL Program |
|
and PPP has led to nearly $84 billion in potentially fraudulent |
|
loans. |
|
We were making all kinds of recommendations as to what |
|
steps need to be taken, but, instead of taking these steps, the |
|
Trump administration--and I'm quoting the Inspector General |
|
here--``lowered the guardrails'' on the EIDL Program, leading |
|
to $79 billion in potentially fraudulent loans in the program |
|
alone. |
|
Mr. Ware, your report found that SBA removed or weakened |
|
existing controls in EIDL last year. Would you please describe |
|
how SBA's actions contributed to an increased risk of fraud? |
|
Mr. Ware. Thank you for that question. |
|
Well, initially, we knew--we had a feeling that this would |
|
happen. Or, more than a feeling, we knew this would happen |
|
based on our prior experience and the prior reports that we had |
|
done. And that's why we notified SBA up front that, ``Hey, this |
|
is the time where we have to strengthen our controls.'' |
|
What happened was, when they started doing the batch |
|
processing, a lot of the controls that should've gone in place |
|
up front, especially to address very, very early indicators |
|
that fraud was in place--I mean, almost immediately the banks |
|
were contacting us. We had over 5,000 contacts from banks |
|
almost off the bat. And that's where we sat down with the |
|
executives here at SBA to say, ``We have a problem.'' And |
|
that's when we started to see what was going on with the |
|
reduced controls. |
|
So, definitely, any proper control environment--any type of |
|
fraud mitigation has to begin with an internal control |
|
environment. And that was reduced up front to expedite the |
|
funds going out, which--we understood the need for the funds |
|
going out, but we were requiring that SBA strike a balance, a |
|
delicate balance, between the two. Plus, we thought the things |
|
we were asking to be done, if implemented correctly, would not |
|
slow the program down at all. |
|
Chairman Clyburn. Thank you. |
|
Now, what recommendations did you offer SBA? And please |
|
share with us what the administration's response was. |
|
Mr. Ware. So, we made quite a bit of recommendations, and |
|
they had to do with--I could probably--some specifics off the |
|
top of my head: |
|
We wanted them to assess vulnerabilities--right?--for the |
|
purpose of strengthening and implementing internal controls to |
|
address the notices of potential fraud that we had. |
|
We wanted them to create a process or a method for lenders |
|
to be able to report suspected fraud to ODA and for how to |
|
recover the funds. That was not in place. |
|
We wanted them to review all the loans that had--especially |
|
the ones that had the bank account number changed from what was |
|
shown on the original application to determine if those changes |
|
were indeed legitimate or fraudulent. |
|
And then we wanted their assistance in recovering the funds |
|
and de-obligating the funds. |
|
We just needed them to completely strengthen the internal |
|
control environment. And we offered, I mean, dozens of |
|
recommendations for how to do that. |
|
So, initially--well, it depends on what we're talking |
|
about. For the Paycheck Protection Program, the Office of Cap |
|
Access, they were on top of it, in terms of putting in these |
|
controls and getting ahead of things, which is why, to date, |
|
we've found less fraud, or less potential for fraud, than we |
|
have in the EIDL Program. Because with the EIDL Program, |
|
although some of the changes were made up front, many were not, |
|
mainly because it wasn't taken as seriously. |
|
Chairman Clyburn. Well, thank you. |
|
My time has almost expired. I'm going to yield now to Mr. |
|
Jordan and let him have 17 seconds of my time. |
|
Mr. Jordan? |
|
Mr. Jordan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
Mr. Horowitz, are Democrats the only people allowed to |
|
object to election results? |
|
Mr. Horowitz. I'm not sure how to answer that, Congressman. |
|
Mr. Jordan. Well, I mean, you're a--I've worked with you |
|
numerous times. You do great work. You're a lawyer. You're the |
|
Inspector General at the Justice Department. You're a guy who I |
|
know cares deeply about fairness. |
|
And I'm just wondering--you know, Democrats criticized |
|
Republicans for objecting to the Presidential electors being |
|
counted on January 6, 2021, but they objected to every |
|
Republican Presidential winner this century. |
|
In fact, on January 6, Mr. Horowitz, the Democrat chair of |
|
the Rules Committee objected to the counting of Alabama. |
|
President Trump won--January 6, 2017, they objected--a state |
|
President Trump won by 30 points. A member of this committee, |
|
on January 6, 2017, the lead impeachment manager, in fact, |
|
objected to the state of Florida. And on January 6, 2017, the |
|
Democrat chair of the Financial Services Committee objected to |
|
the state of Wyoming--Wyoming, a state President Trump won by |
|
40 points. |
|
And now they're trying to kick off the newest member of |
|
this committee--trying to kick--the newest member of this |
|
committee they're trying to kick out of Congress. |
|
And so, I'm just wondering, are they the only ones allowed |
|
to object, or can Republicans object as well? |
|
Mr. Horowitz. Well, Congressman, I'm sure anybody of |
|
whatever political background they want can make an objection. |
|
I'll just say, I have enough oversight issues at the |
|
Justice Department. I, fortunately, don't have oversight over |
|
the election apparatus. So, I'll stick to what I'm doing there |
|
as well as with the PRAC. |
|
Mr. Jordan. Yes. Well, I appreciate the work you do. And I |
|
just find what the Democrats are attempting to do to one of our |
|
newest colleagues, who is now a member of this select |
|
subcommittee, I just find this unbelievable, particularly in |
|
light of the statements they have made over the last several |
|
months. And so, we just wanted to raise that point. |
|
I do appreciate the work that you do and you have done for |
|
our government over the last several years, and appreciate the |
|
work you do for all the Inspector Generals in our government. |
|
With that, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you yielding me the |
|
17 seconds, but I don't need it. I have to run to another |
|
engagement. So, I will yield back the balance of my time. |
|
Chairman Clyburn. Thank you very much for yielding back the |
|
17 seconds. I'll take that to remind my friend that we might be |
|
following suit. If my memory serves, he cast a vote against our |
|
new President. |
|
Thank you. |
|
Mr. Jordan. No. The point is, Mr. Chairman, let's be |
|
consistent. If you're going to criticize Republicans for |
|
exercising our constitutional duty and doing--and objecting to |
|
the unconstitutional way some states change their election law, |
|
let's be consistent with what happened on January 6, 2017, and |
|
what the Democrats are attempting to do to the newest member, |
|
Dr. Miller-Meeks, Lieutenant Colonel Miller-Meeks, the newest |
|
member of this committee. That's my point. |
|
Chairman Clyburn. I understand your point, and I accept |
|
service. |
|
With that, the chair now recognizes for five minutes Ms. |
|
Waters. |
|
Ms. Waters. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. |
|
And I'm so sorry that Mr. Jordan, you know, takes up time |
|
on this committee, where you're dealing with, you know, |
|
substantive matters, particularly relating to fraudulency in |
|
the PPP program, with election matters that have no business in |
|
this committee. |
|
And so---- |
|
Mr. Jordan. Mrs. Miller-Meeks thinks it's substantive, I |
|
will tell you that, Madam Chair. Mrs. Miller-Meeks thinks it's |
|
substantive. |
|
Ms. Waters. Reclaiming my time, I'm not talking to you. I'm |
|
addressing the chair. |
|
Mr. Chairman, I'm going to go on with my question. And I'm |
|
hopeful that we can stay on point on the issues that you have |
|
organized thus far today in this hearing. |
|
I believe the tradeoff between speed and program integrity |
|
is a false one. Our government should be able to help Americans |
|
quickly without losing billions to fraud. |
|
Mr. Horowitz, in what ways could the Trump administration |
|
have instituted stronger controls in PPP while still issuing |
|
loans quickly and efficiently? |
|
Mr. Horowitz. Congresswoman, I think several of those |
|
points--several of those items have been identified by IG Ware. |
|
I think there could have been efforts beyond, in some of the |
|
programs--and I'll let IG Ware speak to the PPP specifically-- |
|
but, in some of the programs, simply relying, for example, on |
|
self-certification. That's an issue that we've identified as |
|
IGs--IG Ware has, others have, GAO has. |
|
There were additional steps that could have been |
|
undertaken, that recommendations were made to undertake, that |
|
would not have significantly slowed down, in our view in the |
|
oversight community, the delivery of funds to the public. |
|
Ms. Waters. I'm also concerned that the sheer number of |
|
potentially fraudulent PPP transactions presents an enforcement |
|
challenge. As highlighted in today's staff memo, of the 7.9 |
|
million PPP loans issued to date, only 242 individuals have |
|
been criminally charged. And, of the nearly $84 billion of |
|
potentially fraudulent transactions in PPP and EIDL, only $626 |
|
million, less than one percent, has been recovered. |
|
Mr. Horowitz, as a former fraud prosecutor, can you |
|
describe some of the challenges with addressing fraud on this |
|
scale through criminal prosecutions? |
|
Mr. Horowitz. It's an important question, Congresswoman, |
|
and you're exactly right. One of the substantial challenges is, |
|
with hundreds of billions and trillions of dollars out there |
|
and the scope and level of the fraud, it's going to take us |
|
months and years as we pursue it. |
|
What we're trying to do is leverage, for example, data |
|
analytics. We very much appreciate the funding that was given |
|
to us that the chairman mentioned that will allow us to |
|
undertake that effort, because it will help us focus our |
|
efforts and find the fraud more specifically. That's what data |
|
analytics helps us do. |
|
We've also set up a fraud task force and are working to |
|
help IGs like IG Ware and others across the community by |
|
leveraging the tools and looking at this, Congresswoman, as a |
|
whole-of-government approach by the IGs so that we're |
|
leveraging resources. |
|
Ms. Waters. Thank you very much. |
|
I am interested in learning whether or not there was |
|
organized crime involved in this, where operations were set up |
|
supposedly to help many of the PPP applicants, who really |
|
didn't know government, had not understood government very |
|
well, had not been involved in the past, but they went to and |
|
were directed to an organized effort that was turning out these |
|
applications for unsuspecting individuals. |
|
Have you detected any of that, Mr. Horowitz? |
|
Mr. Horowitz. You know what? I'm going to ask on PPP |
|
specifically if IG Ware wants to jump in on that, because---- |
|
Mr. Ware. Yes. |
|
Mr. Horowitz [continuing]. His agents have been on top of |
|
that issue. |
|
Mr. Ware. If it's OK. |
|
I am very aware of that. That was something we found very, |
|
very early on, that that wasn't the case. In the complaints we |
|
were getting, particularly from the banks early on, from the |
|
onset, it was that, when they asked a followup question |
|
relative to the money, the people had no idea, they never had a |
|
business, they had nothing like that. They said that they were |
|
contacted by people who they didn't know, said the government |
|
was giving out free money. |
|
We also found this on the dark web, in terms of free money, |
|
free government money to be had, where they would contact |
|
people, tell them the government is giving out this money, and, |
|
for a percentage of the money, they could have the money placed |
|
in their accounts, the persons who were contacted, and then |
|
they'll get the money and then pay the organizers behind the |
|
scheme. |
|
So, we found that that was a regular occurrence. |
|
Ms. Waters. Well, my time really is up, but I just want to |
|
say, there are a lot of the small-business people who could end |
|
up, you know, being accused of fraud. I want the big boys. I |
|
want the organized efforts. I want those who have misused this |
|
program and misled these small-business people, rather than |
|
going out and locking up and indicting a whole bunch of little, |
|
little business people who just didn't know. So, I'm hopeful |
|
that that avenue will be, you know, approached and dealt with. |
|
I yield back. |
|
Chairman Clyburn. Thank you very much, Chair Waters. |
|
The chair now recognizes for five minutes Dr. Green. |
|
Mr. Green. Thank you, Chairman Clyburn and Ranking Member |
|
Scalise. Can you guys hear my OK? |
|
Chairman Clyburn. Yes. |
|
Mr. Green. I want to thank our witnesses for being here |
|
today. |
|
You know, one year ago this week, as the pandemic struck |
|
our Nation, Congress passed and President Trump signed into law |
|
the CARES Act. At the time, we knew that the economic danger we |
|
were facing threatened to overwhelm small businesses across the |
|
Nation. Unemployment claims reached record levels---- |
|
[Audio interruption.] |
|
Mr. Green. Sorry. I'm in three different committee meetings |
|
at the same time here. |
|
The centerpiece of the CARES Act was the popular PPP |
|
program that gave small businesses access to forgivable loans |
|
to cover payroll expenses and saved millions of jobs. The |
|
program was a lifeline to small businesses hit hardest by |
|
strict lockdown orders in many cities and states. |
|
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, nearly 75 percent of |
|
all small businesses received PPP loans. This was not a bailout |
|
of special interests; it was a-broad based effort that played a |
|
critical role in saving tens of millions of American jobs. |
|
The PPP included significant mechanisms to protect against |
|
fraud and ensure taxpayer money went to the intended |
|
recipients. Leaders had to abide by existing Federal know-your- |
|
customer, anti-money-laundering, and bank-secrecy laws. |
|
Now, any program swiftly arranged to spend hundreds of |
|
billions of dollars will inevitably incur fraud. That's just a |
|
fact. But the Trump administration made serious governmentwide |
|
efforts to investigate and prosecute COVID-19-related fraud |
|
starting from day one. The DOJ Criminal Division immediately |
|
set up a team specifically to root out and prosecute PPP fraud. |
|
By September, the DOJ announced that it had initiated multiple |
|
separate PPP fraud cases. |
|
And fraud can happen in many ways, such as false |
|
information on an application, misuse of funds for personal |
|
use. And those who take advantage of a national crisis for |
|
their own corrupt ends should be held accountable. However, |
|
according to calculations from the majority on this committee, |
|
the fraud rate within PPP was lower than the fraud in several |
|
other programs, such as the Pandemic Unemployment Assistance |
|
Program and the EIDL Program. |
|
By every possible measure, the PPP was a success that saved |
|
untold millions of jobs. But these mechanisms were not in place |
|
to capture two of the most outrageous frauds from this past |
|
year. |
|
What happens when a Governor deliberately misleads the |
|
public and covers up the number of COVID-related nursing home |
|
deaths? The Attorney General of New York found that Governor |
|
Cuomo's administration undercounted nursing home deaths by 50 |
|
percent. And for months now, my colleagues and I have been |
|
calling for an investigation of Governor Cuomo and his false |
|
statements and policies, but silence from the majority. |
|
Or take another example. What of the fraud perpetrated on |
|
the American taxpayer under the false pretenses of COVID |
|
stimulus? Democrat leadership larded up a bill with handouts |
|
for special interests and their political cronies. Blue-state |
|
Governors that crushed their economies with lockdowns get |
|
rewarded with money to bail out years of mismanagement. This |
|
includes over $100 billion for schools that are closed, most of |
|
which doesn't even get paid in the near term. |
|
Ninety percent of the $1.9 trillion spending spree has |
|
nothing to do with public health. Instead, congressional |
|
Democrats viewed this as a--and I quote--``tremendous |
|
opportunity,'' end quote, to push their political agenda in the |
|
Trojan horse of a misnamed American Rescue Plan. But it's the |
|
taxpayers who will be footing the bill for generations to come. |
|
That's fraud by any definition. |
|
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield. |
|
[Audio interruption.] |
|
Chairman Clyburn [continuing]. Five minutes. |
|
Bill? Bill Foster? You are now recognized for five minutes. |
|
You need to unmute, I think. |
|
Mr. Foster. Oh, my apologies, Mr. Chairman. I was unaware |
|
of the order we're operating under. I'm happy to proceed. |
|
Chairman Clyburn. Thank you. |
|
Mr. Foster. In its January 2021 High Risk List, the GAO |
|
made recommendations to the Small Business Administration to |
|
provide greater oversight of the PPP and EIDL programs to |
|
reduce fraud in both programs, including using data analytics |
|
to identify potentially ineligible businesses. |
|
And I was encouraged to hear Mr. Ware cite the use of data |
|
analytics as one of the force multipliers that allowed the SBA |
|
and its OIG to more effectively identify fraud. |
|
Mr. Ware, can you go into some more detail about how data |
|
analytics have been used to detect fraud in the PPP and EIDL |
|
programs and what future plans are? |
|
Mr. Ware. Yes. Thank you very much. |
|
With access to the data warehouse that SBA has, |
|
particularly on the PPP side--because we are just working out a |
|
more direct relationship within EIDL--we were able to overlay a |
|
lot of the data coming in. For example, working with the Do Not |
|
Pay list with the Department of Treasury, working with the |
|
Department of Treasury on that, we were able to see that quite |
|
a bit of money went out to folks who should never have gotten |
|
paid. |
|
Using data analytics, we were also able to capture quite a |
|
bit of duplicate payments as well. |
|
And the speed by which you see law enforcement moving right |
|
now is unprecedented, as was stated earlier by--I can't |
|
remember who. But the reason it's allowed to move as quickly as |
|
it is because of access to data, transparent data, and the |
|
ability of data analysts and data scientists within our office |
|
and within the community to be able to quickly overlay |
|
information and get it in the hands of criminal investigators. |
|
Mr. Foster. Yes. |
|
Well, I'm particularly concerned about identity theft and |
|
synthetic identity fraud in the PPP and EIDL programs as well |
|
as other areas in our government. You know, fraudsters may |
|
improperly use the personal information of hardworking |
|
Americans, such as names, addresses, Social Security numbers, |
|
to fraudulently apply for pandemic relief loans. |
|
And the situation is compounded by the lack of a coherent |
|
approach to identity in this country, so that, for example, the |
|
list of bad actors who may be known to Treasury or to financial |
|
regulators or to the individual states may not be automatically |
|
known to the SBA. |
|
And, last Congress, I sponsored a bill called the Improving |
|
Digital Identity Act of 2020, which would modernize systems |
|
that provide driver's licenses and other identity credentials |
|
in our country and upgrade digital identity verification tools |
|
in citizens' interactions with government. |
|
Mr. Ware, has the SBA OIG found identity theft or identity |
|
fraud to be a problem in the PPP and EIDL programs? And what |
|
are the common forms of that fraud that you see? |
|
Mr. Ware. Right. So, we have found--identity theft is |
|
probably the most common underlying cause of the fraud that |
|
we're finding, particularly in the EIDL Program. As a matter of |
|
fact, it's really showing up itself in PPP now with the |
|
inclusion of Schedule C's. This is a major issue for us. |
|
And the way that is happening is, of course they have many |
|
of the romance-type schemes, many of the social media schemes |
|
by which people gain access to other people's identity. Most of |
|
it came to us when people were--victims received letters from |
|
SBA saying, ``There's a deferment on your loan,'' when they had |
|
never, ever applied for any type of loan. So, we've got quite a |
|
bit of that. |
|
We're up to, what, well over a million applications flagged |
|
for identity theft right now in these programs. |
|
Mr. Foster. Wow. |
|
And what are the better identity verification tools that |
|
you think would make a real difference in this? |
|
Mr. Ware. Well, it's simply verifying that the person that |
|
you're giving the money to actually exists. I honestly don't |
|
believe it's that much of a lift, but it is. I guess it could |
|
be a little bit more time-consuming. |
|
Mr. Foster. Yes. |
|
I'm struck by how other countries that have more rational |
|
systems to identify their citizens have not had the same kind |
|
of problem with, you know, fraudulent--everything from stimulus |
|
checks to other payments. |
|
And so, any conclusions that you come up with as to what |
|
tools would really make your life easier here would be very |
|
appreciated. |
|
Thank you. I'm basically out of time, so I'll yield back. |
|
Chairman Clyburn. Thank you very much, Mr. Foster, for |
|
yielding back. |
|
The chair now recognizes for five minutes Mrs. Miller- |
|
Meeks. |
|
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you very much, Chair Clyburn. |
|
And thank you to our witnesses speaking about the very |
|
important programs that were initiated in response to this |
|
pandemic. |
|
Mr. Horowitz, your oversight testimony had a link to it |
|
regarding COVID-19 testing. And this was COVID-19 testing that |
|
was done at Federal agencies, so I realize that it's limited. |
|
And it was from February to August 2020. And it indicates in |
|
that link that 10.7 million tests were completed at Federal |
|
healthcare agencies at a cost of $659.5 million. And that was |
|
underestimate because it doesn't include the VA. |
|
Would you have an idea of how much has been--how many tests |
|
or how much has been spent now on testing at those agencies or |
|
in general for all testing in the U.S.? |
|
Mr. Horowitz. Congresswoman, I don't have that with me. I |
|
can certainly followup with my colleague at HHS OIG and see |
|
what the latest data is. We cut it off at that time so that we |
|
could obviously move forward and start doing analysis. |
|
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. The reason for my question is, as a |
|
physician and a former director of the Iowa Department of |
|
Public Health, I closely monitor what's happening with the |
|
number of cases, the number of hospitalizations, the number of |
|
deaths, the number of those who recovered who would have |
|
natural immunity, and then the vaccinations, at least here in |
|
Iowa. And given everything that I have seen since the |
|
vaccination was first approved in November, which is |
|
remarkable--and then now we have a total of three |
|
vaccinations--I've seen this decline very rapidly and |
|
exponentially and feel that we're very close to herd immunity. |
|
In this most recent American Rescue Plan for COVID-19, |
|
there is allocated $47.8 billion in testing and another $7 |
|
billion to go to community health centers for testing. And it |
|
seems to me that with the decline that we're having that that |
|
amount of funding may be excessive. Do you have any, you know, |
|
suggestion or comment on that? |
|
Mr. Horowitz. So, I wouldn't be in a position, necessarily, |
|
to comment on how much money should or shouldn't have gone. |
|
I'll leave it to other policymakers to decide that. |
|
I will say that what we've found and I've seen at DOJ, for |
|
example--because I have oversight over the Federal prison |
|
system. And what we found a year ago, in the first several |
|
months of this, was, the absence of testing impaired the |
|
ability of the BOP to identify asymptomatic inmates so that |
|
they could segregate those individuals rather than simply wait |
|
for them to develop symptoms. |
|
And so, we certainly think there will continue to need to |
|
be testing available, much like there is for other diseases---- |
|
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. And I think there's more recent data |
|
that shows that there is not the transmission of asymptomatic |
|
that we originally thought there was. |
|
I'm hoping that some of this money can be used in |
|
accordance with a bill that I introduced, H.R. 1897, that would |
|
do COVID-19 testing for those migrants coming across our |
|
borders, which is not done now. |
|
So, thank so much. |
|
Mr. Ware, I'm going to direct this to you. The PPP program |
|
to the individuals, both when I was a state senator helping |
|
small businesses get PPP and then those I've talked to, has |
|
been an extremely successful program. |
|
To be eligible, an applicant had to have not more than 500 |
|
employees. And because of large chains receiving loans |
|
designated for small businesses, the SBA had instituted an |
|
affiliation rule. If the parent exerted control or had the |
|
power to exert control over the affiliates, the entirety of |
|
their employees should be counted toward that limit. |
|
So, is having affiliates using the same bylaws as the |
|
parent ``exerting control''? |
|
Mr. Ware. We have not taken a look as yet into how that |
|
works out and if it's the same or not, but---- |
|
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Or---- |
|
Mr. Ware [continuing]. We did--sorry. Go ahead. |
|
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Are having affiliates apply for |
|
accreditation from the parent company ``exerting control,'' the |
|
parent company imposing performance policies on the affiliate |
|
``exerting control,'' or the parent mandating certain services |
|
be performed at the affiliate, are those things ``exerting |
|
control''? |
|
Mr. Ware. Without the work to actually dig into it, I'm |
|
unable to answer the question at this time. |
|
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Well, Planned Parenthood across the |
|
Nation had 16,000 employees nationwide, but they got more than |
|
$80 million in PPP loans. Even their own lobbyist admitted that |
|
the rules made their affiliates ineligible when they said the |
|
CARES Act money had broad discretion to exclude Planned |
|
Parenthood. |
|
Has Planned Parenthood returned any of that money? |
|
Mr. Ware. We have not taken a look at Planned Parenthood |
|
specifically. We have a series of reviews in the queue dealing |
|
with eligibility across these programs. |
|
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you. That was going to be my next |
|
question, if there was a reviewing of the affiliation status. |
|
Thank you so much for your testimony. |
|
Thank you, Chair Clyburn. I yield back my time. |
|
Mr. Ware. Thank you. |
|
Chairman Clyburn. Thank you very much for yielding back. |
|
The chair now recognizes Mr. Raskin for five minutes. |
|
Mr. Raskin. Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this very |
|
important hearing about more than $80 billion lost in fraud and |
|
rip-offs of the taxpayers within these programs. And some of |
|
our colleagues prefer to minimize the damage, saying, oh, well, |
|
it's less than one percent or two percent. |
|
Mr. Horowitz, let me start with you. Is that the right way |
|
to look at it, to say, well, it's a small percentage of an |
|
overall amount of money, or do we look at and say, that's $80 |
|
billion that could've gone to small businesses that deserved it |
|
and people who needed the money? |
|
Mr. Horowitz. Well, I think the way we look at it from the |
|
accountability community is, could there have been steps taken |
|
that would have reduced the fraud to a greater degree, or the |
|
risks to a greater degree? And, as you've heard, GAO and the IG |
|
at SBA made important recommendations to try and do that. So |
|
that's really the issue that we look at. |
|
Mr. Raskin. And those were ignored by the Trump |
|
administration. So, I'm glad that we've got a President in who |
|
is serious about cracking down on fraud and making the |
|
government actually work for the people. |
|
I've had a number of constituents reach out to me for help |
|
after their identities were just, out of the blue, fraudulently |
|
used to obtain SBA loans for some of these criminals. One of my |
|
constituents is currently getting payment notices from the SBA |
|
on a $150,000 EIDL loan that was taken out in his name without |
|
his knowledge. He didn't know anything about it. And he got one |
|
letter saying that SBA was reviewing the case, but, otherwise, |
|
he hasn't gotten any updates or info from SBA at all about how |
|
this is going to be remedied. |
|
And so, the SBA I don't think is addressing this with |
|
serious enough concern and attention. It's one thing if there |
|
are people out there ripping off the government. OK, let's go |
|
after them, and if it takes a little time, it takes a little |
|
time. But if they're ripping off the government using other |
|
people's names, that's an emergency for my constituents whose |
|
names are being used, whose credit is being ruined, and who |
|
have a shadow cast over their name. |
|
So, Mr. Ware, is there anything that I can tell my |
|
constituents about what to expect in this situation? What steps |
|
is the SBA's Office of IG taking to respond to and remedy |
|
complaints about identity theft? And can you set up a special |
|
unit just to respond to these kinds of cases? |
|
Because, believe me, it's a dire thing in the lives of |
|
people. Imagine if your name was used by somebody else with |
|
your Social Security number to get an SBA loan. |
|
Mr. Ware. Yes---- |
|
[Audio interruption.] |
|
Mr. Ware. Thank you. I know that we're having connection |
|
problems because---- |
|
Chairman Clyburn. Yes, we are having a bit of a problem. |
|
Mr. Ware? |
|
Mr. Ware. Yes? Can you hear me? |
|
Chairman Clyburn. I hear you now. |
|
Mr. Ware. OK. Sorry. I don't know what's happening. I'll |
|
blame it on SBA's technological advances. Just teasing, just |
|
teasing. |
|
No, but if you can hear me now, I think I got the gist of |
|
the question, although on my screen Representative Raskin is |
|
completely frozen. So, I hope I got it, in terms of what is my |
|
office doing to assist the victims of identity theft. |
|
Now, clearly, we've heard countless stories and complaints |
|
involving identity theft to fraudulently obtain those loans, |
|
but it's important to understand a couple of things. |
|
We don't have principal jurisdiction on investigations |
|
involving identity theft. That belongs to the Federal Trade |
|
Commission. What we've done is work with SBA to set up a system |
|
where people could receive assistance and have moved to |
|
investigate many of these complaints. |
|
We do have a report that will be coming out very, very |
|
shortly on SBA's handling of identity theft. By ``very, very |
|
shortly,'' it's next month, by end of next month. And, at that |
|
time---- |
|
Mr. Raskin. OK. |
|
Mr. Ware [continuing]. A lot of information---- |
|
Mr. Raskin. OK. Well, I appreciate if you would followup |
|
with me on this. And we would like a way that we can get to |
|
your office the names of our constituents who are having a |
|
serious problem with this. Obviously, we want it prosecuted by |
|
the FTC, but we also want it to stop and make sure that the |
|
names of our constituents are cleared. |
|
Mr. Clyburn, if I could say one final thing--and I'm sorry |
|
about all these technical snafus we're having. Congresswoman |
|
Waters correctly pointed out that Mr. Jordan's original |
|
provocation in this hearing was an irrelevant distraction from |
|
the matter at hand. But she shows a lot more patience than me, |
|
and I want to address specifically what he said. |
|
It is true that Republicans and Democrats alike have issued |
|
technical challenges under the electoral college over the |
|
course of the last century. But only one President has incited |
|
a violent insurrection, a mob, to attack Congress and to try to |
|
overthrow the election result.And that's what he's excusing |
|
with that completely false equation of his. |
|
And, meantime, he also knows that there's a Federal |
|
statute, the Federal Contested Elections Act from 1969, by |
|
which both Republicans and Democrats have brought challenges to |
|
congressional elections. There's an entire procedure in place |
|
guaranteeing due process to people on all sides. |
|
And if he's prepared to vote to overturn an election that |
|
was decided by 7 million votes, more than 7 million votes, for |
|
Joe Biden, certainly he would accept the regularity of hearing |
|
an election contest where there was a six-vote difference |
|
between the two sides under a Federal statute. That is regular |
|
order. |
|
And I yield back to you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
Chairman Clyburn. I thank the gentleman for yielding back. |
|
The chair now recognizes Mr. Krishnamoorthi for five |
|
minutes. |
|
Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Can you hear me? |
|
Chairman Clyburn. Yes, I can. |
|
Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Very good. |
|
Well, first of all, I wanted to point out some very |
|
interesting aspects of the SBA OIG report. |
|
Mr. Ware, I noticed in the report, my staff and I noticed, |
|
that at one point you said almost 320,000 potentially |
|
fraudulent COVID-19 EIDL loans totaling almost $25 billion were |
|
disbursed to people with the same email addresses. |
|
You give one example where one applicant with one email |
|
address received 10 loans in the name of 10 different bathroom |
|
renovation companies in one city, and when you went back and |
|
looked, you couldn't find any of those bathroom renovation |
|
companies in that city. Instead, you were able to find that the |
|
email address was for a burrito restaurant which was located in |
|
that city. |
|
Just a basic question: What are we doing to make sure that |
|
folks can't apply for multiple loans from the same email |
|
address? |
|
Mr. Ware. Well, that's one of the things that we've been |
|
working hard with the Office of Disaster Assistance to fight |
|
against. And the Office of Disaster Assistance has assured us |
|
that they have a secondary review process in place to make that |
|
very assurance. |
|
We have not verified or validated that that is in place and |
|
working as yet, but--they have not provided that information to |
|
us as yet, but---- |
|
Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Let me jump in, because I think that's |
|
really important. I think the American people don't want |
|
multiple loans to be applied for from one email address or from |
|
one IP address, meaning probably one computer, or from one |
|
physical address. And so, these EIDL loans, I think, deserve a |
|
lot more scrutiny, and I hope that you are going back to check |
|
that these EIDL loans don't come from the same address, the |
|
applications. |
|
Can you rule out, given the staggering potential amount of |
|
fraud in the EIDL Program, that there was any coordination |
|
between applicants and insiders at the SBA? |
|
Mr. Ware. No, I cannot rule that out, because I know for a |
|
fact---- |
|
Mr. Krishnamoorthi. OK. I just going to--I'm going to be |
|
going through a rapid-fire series of questions here. |
|
Can you rule out that any foreign actors or entities |
|
received money through the EIDL Program? |
|
Mr. Ware. No. |
|
Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Can you rule out that--I'm from |
|
Illinois, so I have to ask this question. Can you rule out that |
|
any deceased people received money through the EIDL Program? |
|
Mr. Ware. No. |
|
Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Can you rule out that people under the |
|
age of 18 received money from the EIDL Program? |
|
Mr. Ware. No. |
|
Mr. Krishnamoorthi. What claims are being made that you're |
|
aware of under the False Claims Act, also known as qui tam, |
|
related to the EIDL Program? |
|
Mr. Ware. Well, I won't be able to speak to any of those |
|
that's active. Many of those are sealed. |
|
Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Let me ask Mr. Horowitz, our expert, |
|
probably, on this issue of whistleblowing and so forth. |
|
Is there anything that can be done to encourage folks that |
|
know about fraud within these programs, maybe even people at |
|
the SBA right now, to come forward and make a False Claims Act |
|
claim or a qui tam claim related to what I perceive to be just |
|
staggering amounts of fraud in the EIDL Program? |
|
Mr. Horowitz. Absolutely, Congressman. First, come to our |
|
website, pandemicoversight.gov. They'll see a link there to |
|
report electronically to us. They can get in contact with us |
|
through other means, but electronically is the best way to do |
|
it. |
|
We'll get on top of it, and we'll make sure that whatever |
|
IG has jurisdiction over the program they care about, we'll get |
|
it to them and we'll work together with them. |
|
Mr. Krishnamoorthi. And just let's educate people who might |
|
be viewing this. When we refer to False Claims Act or qui tam |
|
claims, the claimant, through a confidential process, if the |
|
claim is validated, could receive between 15 and 30 percent of |
|
the recovered amounts, right? |
|
Mr. Horowitz. That's correct. |
|
Mr. Krishnamoorthi. So, Mr. Horowitz, do you know how much |
|
has been recovered overall through your investigations, your |
|
collective investigations, into fraud in the EIDL Program and |
|
then separately into PPP program? |
|
Mr. Horowitz. I don't know separately as to those two |
|
programs. I know it's tens of millions of dollars overall. I |
|
could get back to you on---- |
|
Mr. Krishnamoorthi. But that's an incredibly small portion |
|
of the sizable potential amount of fraud, right? |
|
Mr. Horowitz. At this time, it is. But I would just make |
|
sure that the public is aware and assure all of you, obviously, |
|
prosecutions take time, and we are using the tools we have, |
|
whether it's criminal prosecution, civil, forfeiture, and, by |
|
the way, suspension and debarment for entities that are here, |
|
that aren't fraudulent entities themselves. They're risking |
|
their ability to do business with the government going forward, |
|
period. |
|
Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Thank you. |
|
I yield back. |
|
Chairman Clyburn. I thank the gentleman for yielding back |
|
his time. |
|
I notice that all members who are present have been allowed |
|
time to ask questions and to make comments. There are several |
|
other members who we expected to join us, but the time seems to |
|
have run out, and so we aren't going to prolong this. |
|
At this point, we usually give the ranking member an |
|
opportunity to make a closing statement, and, in his absence, |
|
whoever he may designate. But I think Mr. Jordan, who made the |
|
opening statement, indicated that he had to go off to other |
|
business, and I don't see that he's here with us. So, I'm going |
|
to now proceed to my closing statement, and hopefully we'll be |
|
able to conclude this hearing. |
|
I want to thank all of our witnesses who are here today, |
|
and we appreciate the invaluable expertise that you've shared |
|
this afternoon on how we can better identify and eliminate |
|
fraud in the pandemic relief programs. |
|
This select subcommittee is modeled after the Truman |
|
Committee during World War II. In a speech to the Senate upon |
|
the establishment of that committee, then-Senator Truman said, |
|
and I quote, ``I consider public funds to be sacred funds, and |
|
I think they ought to have every safeguard possible to prevent |
|
their being misused and mishandled,'' end of quote. I |
|
wholeheartedly agree with Truman. |
|
Unfortunately, today's hearing has made clear that the |
|
Trump administration failed to institute the necessary |
|
safeguards to prevent public funds from being misused and |
|
mishandled in key small-business relief programs, leading to |
|
the loss of billions of dollars through fraud. |
|
I agree very much with Chair Waters, whose interest it is |
|
to go after what seems to be some pretty sophisticated |
|
fraudulent activity. And hopefully we'll get to the bottom of |
|
the source of all of this and not pat ourselves on the back for |
|
sending small, unsuspecting businesses out of business or into |
|
jail. |
|
Fraud should have real consequences. Diverting funds that |
|
were intended to help Americans struggling to save their |
|
businesses, feed their families, and stay in their homes is |
|
just something that needs to be dealt with. |
|
But it is not too late to act. The Biden administration has |
|
already taken significant steps to reduce fraud by instituting |
|
stronger controls when using PPP loans. And the administration |
|
has encouraged Federal agents to work with, not against, |
|
inspectors general and congressional oversight. |
|
The Biden administration and Congress have also worked |
|
together to ensure that critical oversight bodies like the |
|
PRAC, GAO, and IG community have the resources and tools they |
|
need to do their jobs. The $142 million allocated to the |
|
oversight community in the American Rescue Plan will go a long |
|
way toward accomplishing that goal. |
|
There is much more to do to prevent fraud and prosecute |
|
those who engage in it. I look forward to using what we have |
|
learned from our witnesses today to make the small-business |
|
relief programs more effective, efficient, and equitable. Those |
|
are the standards that must be met when we are spending sacred |
|
public funds. |
|
With that, and without objection, all members will have |
|
five legislative days within which to submit additional written |
|
questions for the witnesses to the chair, which will be |
|
forwarded to the witnesses for their response. |
|
Chairman Clyburn. This hearing is adjourned. |
|
[Whereupon, at 1:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] |
|
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[all] |
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