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| <title> - A WAY FORWARD FOR VENEZUELA: THE HUMANITARIAN, DIPLOMATIC, AND NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES FACING THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION</title> | |
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| [House Hearing, 117 Congress] | |
| [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] | |
| A WAY FORWARD FOR VENEZUELA: | |
| THE HUMANITARIAN, DIPLOMATIC, AND NATIONAL SECURITY | |
| CHALLENGES FACING THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION | |
| ======================================================================= | |
| HEARING | |
| BEFORE THE | |
| SUBCOMMITTEE ON | |
| WESTERN HEMISPHERE, CIVILIAN SECURITY, | |
| MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY | |
| OF THE | |
| COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS | |
| HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES | |
| ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS | |
| FIRST SESSION | |
| __________ | |
| March 3, 2021 | |
| __________ | |
| Serial No. 117-5 | |
| __________ | |
| Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs | |
| [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] | |
| Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov, | |
| or http://www.govinfo.gov | |
| __________ | |
| U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE | |
| 43-577PDF WASHINGTON : 2022 | |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS | |
| GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York, Chairman | |
| BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking | |
| ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey Member | |
| GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey | |
| THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida STEVE CHABOT, Ohio | |
| KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania | |
| WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts DARRELL ISSA, California | |
| DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois | |
| AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York | |
| JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas ANN WAGNER, Missouri | |
| DINA TITUS, Nevada BRIAN MAST, Florida | |
| TED LIEU, California BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania | |
| SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania KEN BUCK, Colorado | |
| DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee | |
| ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota MARK GREEN, Tennessee | |
| COLIN ALLRED, Texas ANDY BARR, Kentucky | |
| ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GREG STEUBE, Florida | |
| ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia DAN MEUSER, Pennsylvania | |
| CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas | |
| TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey PETER MEIJER, Michigan | |
| ANDY KIM, New Jersey NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York | |
| SARA JACOBS, California RONNY JACKSON, Texas | |
| KATHY MANNING, North Carolina YOUNG KIM, California | |
| JIM COSTA, California MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida | |
| JUAN VARGAS, California JOE WILSON, South Carolina | |
| VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas | |
| BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois | |
| Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director | |
| Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director | |
| ------ | |
| Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, Migration and | |
| International Economic Policy | |
| ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey, Chairman | |
| JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas MARK GREEN, Tennessee, Ranking | |
| ANDY LEVIN, Michigan Member | |
| VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas | |
| JUAN VARGAS, California MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida | |
| C O N T E N T S | |
| ---------- | |
| Page | |
| WITNESSES | |
| Reyna, Mr. Feliciano Founder and Executive President, Accion | |
| Solidaria...................................................... 8 | |
| Arnson, Dr. Cynthia J., Director, the Wilson Center Latin America | |
| Program........................................................ 18 | |
| Fonseca, Mr. Brian, Director, Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public | |
| Policy, Florida International University....................... 26 | |
| Berg, Dr. Ryan C., Research Fellow, Latin America Studies, | |
| American Enterprise Institute.................................. 35 | |
| APPENDIX | |
| Hearing Notice................................................... 66 | |
| Hearing Minutes.................................................. 67 | |
| Hearing Attendance............................................... 68 | |
| OPENING STATEMENT FROM CHAIRMAN SIRES | |
| Opening statement from Chairman Sires............................ 69 | |
| RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD | |
| Responses to questions submitted for the record.................. 72 | |
| A WAY FORWARD FOR VENEZUELA: THE HUMANITARIAN, DIPLOMATIC, AND NATIONAL | |
| SECURITY CHALLENGES FACING THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION | |
| Wednesday, March 3, 2021 | |
| House of Representatives, | |
| Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, | |
| Civilian Security, Migration, and International | |
| Economic Policy, | |
| Committee on Foreign Affairs, | |
| Washington, DC. | |
| The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m., in | |
| room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Albio Sires | |
| (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. | |
| Mr. Sires. Good morning, everyone. Thank you to our | |
| witnesses for being here today. | |
| This hearing entitled, ``A Way Forward For Venezuela: The | |
| Humanitarian, Diplomatic, and National Security Challenges | |
| Facing the Biden Administration,'' will come to order. | |
| Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a | |
| recess of the committee at any point and all members will have | |
| 5 days to submit statements, extraneous material, and questions | |
| for the record, subject to the length limitation in the rules. | |
| To insert something into the record, please have your staff | |
| email the previously mentioned address. | |
| As a reminder to members, staff, and all others physically | |
| present in this room, per recent guidance from the Office of | |
| the Attending Physician, masks must be worn at all times during | |
| today's hearing. Please also sanitize your sitting area. | |
| The chair used these measures as a safety issue and, | |
| therefore, an important matter of order and decorum for this | |
| proceeding. | |
| As a reminder to members joining remotely, please keep your | |
| video function on at all times, even when you are not | |
| recognized by the chair. Members are responsible for muting and | |
| unmuting themselves. And please remember to mute yourself after | |
| you finish speaking. | |
| Consistent with H. Res. 8 and other accompanying | |
| regulations, staff will only mute members and witnesses as | |
| appropriate, when they are not under recognition, to eliminate | |
| background noises. | |
| I see that we have a quorum, and will now recognize myself. | |
| This is our first subcommittee hearing of the 117th | |
| Congress, so I want to welcome all of our new and returning | |
| members. I look forward to working with each of you, Democrats | |
| and Republicans, to advance United States interests and deepen | |
| our engagement with the Western Hemisphere. | |
| I want to recognize my friend, Juan Vargas, who will be our | |
| new vice chair. And I would like to welcome our new ranking | |
| member, Mark Green. Congressman Green and I met for the first | |
| time last week, and I am optimistic that we will be able to | |
| work effectively together on a bipartisan basis. | |
| I called today's hearing because I want to begin this | |
| Congress where we began last year, by shining a spotlight on | |
| the crisis in Venezuela. Two years ago, I chaired a hearing | |
| entitled, ``Made by Maduro,'' where we discussed the | |
| humanitarian crisis caused by Venezuela's dictator, Nicolas | |
| Maduro. | |
| Unfortunately, while international attention seems to be | |
| shifting away from Venezuela, the crisis in the country has | |
| only deepened over the last 3 years. A report issued by the | |
| United Nations last September confirmed that Maduro's regime | |
| has committed crimes against humanity. Over 90 percent of | |
| Venezuelans are living in poverty, suffering under conditions | |
| made worse by the pandemic. Over five and a half million | |
| Venezuelans have been forced to flee their homes. | |
| In April 2019, I led a congressional delegation to the | |
| Colombia border with Venezuela. I met mothers who had walked | |
| hours in the hot sun just to get a meal for their children. I | |
| heard stories about family members with chronic diseases who | |
| could not obtain the medication they needed in Venezuela and | |
| were struggling to survive. I saw firsthand the suffering this | |
| regime has caused. | |
| For me, the Venezuela crisis has never been about politics. | |
| The question I have always asked is, what can we, the U.S. | |
| Congress, do to help end the humanitarian tragedy? | |
| We have a moral obligation not to turn away from what is | |
| happening in Venezuela. I am proud that the U.S. Agency for | |
| International Development has led the way in providing | |
| humanitarian assistance to the region. | |
| I salute all those courageous Venezuelans and international | |
| aid workers who are working in the country to deliver food and | |
| medicine. | |
| I want to recognize the efforts of the interim President, | |
| Juan Guaido, and his government. They are prioritizing the | |
| needs of the Venezuelan people by pursuing an agreement for | |
| vaccine deployment and by calling for the World Food Programme | |
| to be allowed to operate in the country. | |
| I also want to applaud the Colombian Government, in | |
| particular President Ivan Duque, for his recent decision to | |
| grant temporary protective status to Venezuelans. In the face | |
| of one of the largest refugee crises in modern history, | |
| Colombia has shown tremendous generosity in providing safe | |
| haven for Venezuelans. | |
| I urge other countries to follow Colombia's example and put | |
| an end to harmful policies like deporting Venezuelans back into | |
| harm's way. | |
| I also urge Congress to urgently pass legislation to grant | |
| temporary protective status to Venezuelans fleeing the crisis. | |
| House Democrats did this in 2019, and I sincerely hope that all | |
| of my colleagues would join that effort this year to finally | |
| provide the relief that Venezuelans deserve. | |
| Ultimately, know that an end to the humanitarian crisis | |
| requires a political solution. Ranking Member Green and I will | |
| introduce a resolution in the coming days expressing our | |
| bipartisan commitment to supporting democratic aspirations of | |
| the Venezuelan people. We must pursue a solution to the crisis | |
| with the urgency it deserves. | |
| I believe the U.S. must work more closely with our allies | |
| in Latin America and in Europe to advance a coordinated | |
| diplomatic strategy. We should also be much more assertive in | |
| calling out the regimes that are helping to keep Maduro in | |
| power, including Turkey, China, and Iran, and especially Cuba | |
| and Russia. | |
| I am confident that President Biden, who has demonstrated a | |
| lifelong commitment to Latin America, will bring the | |
| international community together behind the goal of pursuing a | |
| peaceful transition that swiftly leads to free and fair | |
| elections. | |
| I look forward to hearing from the experts with us today | |
| about what the U.S. Congress and the new administration can do, | |
| in close coordination with our allies, to help the Venezuelan | |
| people in reclaiming their democracy. | |
| Thank you. | |
| And I now turn to the ranking member for his opening | |
| statement. | |
| Mr. Green. Thank you, Chairman Sires, for holding this | |
| hearing on the ongoing crisis in Venezuela. It is an honor to | |
| serve as the new ranking member of this subcommittee, and I | |
| look forward to working closely with you, Mr. Chairman, on the | |
| various issues. | |
| And I do believe that when we met the other day, we | |
| realized you and I have a lot more overlap in the way we think | |
| than the traditional right/left side of the aisle. So I think | |
| we are going to have a great time standing up for the people in | |
| this hemisphere. | |
| Today, we are discussing the political and humanitarian | |
| crisis caused by the illegitimate Maduro regime that has left a | |
| once prosperous country in political and economic shambles. The | |
| regime's socialist policies and endemic corruption have | |
| resulted in years of economic free fall, hyperinflation, and | |
| shortages in basic goods. Venezuela has a poverty rate of 96 | |
| percent that has driven almost 6 million of its citizens to | |
| seek a better life in other regions. | |
| This migration crisis has strained the resources of | |
| neighboring countries in the region, including Colombia, our | |
| closest regional partner impacted by the Venezuelan crisis. | |
| In addition to the economic crisis, the Maduro regime is | |
| among the world's worst violators of human rights, including | |
| recent accusations of crimes against humanity by the U.N.'s | |
| fact-finding mission. | |
| According to local human rights group Foro Penal, there are | |
| currently close to 330 political prisoners in Venezuela, not | |
| including the illegal detention of six American Citgo | |
| executives held on false charges and without due process. | |
| But the regime cannot carry out these atrocities alone. It | |
| has been bolstered by some of the world's most brutal regimes. | |
| The Communist regime in Cuba has successfully exported its | |
| oppressive system to Venezuela and directly supports the Maduro | |
| regime's oppressive tactics and human rights abuses. | |
| Further, the Chinese Communist Party has provided billions | |
| in loans to the regime and was recently found to be sharing | |
| technology used to surveil political opposition figures. | |
| The Maduro regime has also strengthened ties with Russia, | |
| which has provided military equipment, and Iran, which has | |
| joined Russia in helping the Maduro regime avoid U.S. oil | |
| sanctions. | |
| The regime has also built ties with the region's non-state | |
| criminal actors, including FARC and ELN, U.S.-designated | |
| criminal groups who are allowed free rein in Venezuela to carry | |
| out narcotrafficking, illegal mining, and other illicit | |
| activities. | |
| I applaud the Trump administration for leading | |
| international recognition of the interim President, Juan | |
| Guaido, and for holding the Maduro regime accountable by | |
| imposing tough and necessary sanctions on Venezuela's State oil | |
| company and individuals accused of corruption and human rights | |
| abuses. | |
| Some claim that U.S. sanctions are to blame for the | |
| country's economic crisis. But I want to be very clear today: | |
| The Maduro regime alone is responsible for the crisis and for | |
| blocking humanitarian assistance from entering Venezuela. I | |
| applaud the European Union for recent sanctioning 19 Maduro | |
| regime officials, and I strongly condemn the Maduro regime's | |
| expulsion of their Ambassador in retaliation. | |
| The United States has also led humanitarian efforts by | |
| donating more than $1.2 billion in assistance to Venezuela and | |
| its neighbors in the region to address this humanitarian | |
| crisis. And while the United States is proud to lead, I urge | |
| the rest of the international community to join us in this | |
| effort. | |
| I also applaud the brave efforts of the interim government | |
| and the democratic opposition, which has withstood violent | |
| oppression and has been illegally removed from the rightful | |
| post in the National Assembly through the Maduro regime's | |
| illegitimate elections. These brave men and women deserve our | |
| support as they seek freedom for the Venezuelan people. | |
| Additionally, I was pleased to hear that the Biden | |
| Administration will continue to recognize President Guaido as | |
| the legitimate leader of Venezuela. And while I believe there | |
| is a role for multilateralism in addressing the crisis, the | |
| United States must continue to lead these efforts. | |
| The Maduro regime's continued subversion of democratic | |
| institutions, human rights abuses, and criminal activities | |
| demonstrate their unwillingness to reform. I believe that | |
| dialog with this criminal regime cannot be possible without a | |
| clear demonstration that they are willing to negotiate in good | |
| faith. | |
| The U.S. Congress and this committee will play a critical | |
| role in overseeing U.S. policy in Venezuela and ensuring that | |
| we have a comprehensive strategy that will lead to a peaceful | |
| democratic transition for the Venezuelan people. | |
| The crisis in Venezuela does not only impact our neighbors | |
| in South America, it threatens United States national security, | |
| and we cannot afford to allow it to worsen. | |
| I look forward to the testimoneys of our witnesses today, | |
| and, Mr. Chairman, working with you. | |
| And I yield back. | |
| Mr. Sires. Thank you very much Ranking Member Green. | |
| I will now introduce Mr. Feliciano Reyna. He is the founder | |
| and executive president of Accion Solidaria, an organization | |
| that has worked since 1995 to combat the HIV-AIDS epidemic. | |
| Between 2005 and 2012, he also was president of Sinergia, the | |
| Venezuelan Association of Civil Society Organizations. | |
| Mr. Reyna has coordinated relief efforts in Venezuela | |
| through Accion Solidaria since 2016 to address the country's | |
| humanitarian crisis. He is also a board member of the | |
| International Center for Not-for-Profit Law. | |
| Mr. Reyna holds a bachelor's of architecture from Cornell | |
| University. | |
| Mr. Reyna, welcome. We welcome you to the hearing. | |
| We will then hear from Dr. Cynthia J. Arnson. She is the | |
| director of the Wilson Center'sLatin American Program. A | |
| leading expert on Latin America and the Caribbean, she has | |
| testified numerous times before the House and the Senate and | |
| has written many publications on the region, particularly on | |
| U.S. policy toward Latin America. | |
| She also served as a former foreign policy aide in | |
| Congress. Dr. Arnson holds a Ph.D. From Johns Hopkins | |
| University. | |
| Dr. Arnson, thank you for joining us today. | |
| Our third witness is Mr. Brian Fonseca. He is the director | |
| of the Jack D. Gordon Institute of Public Policy at Florida | |
| International University and an adjunct professor of politics | |
| and international relations. | |
| Mr. Fonseca is an expert on U.S. national security and has | |
| written publications focused on Russian and Chinese engagement | |
| in Latin America and Russian-Venezuelan relations. | |
| He holds a degree in international business and | |
| international relations from Florida International University | |
| and attended Sichuan University in Chengdu, China, and the | |
| National Defense University in Washington. | |
| Mr. Fonseca, we welcome you to the hearing. | |
| Finally, we will hear from Dr. Ryan Berg. He is a research | |
| fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. His research | |
| focuses on Latin America and specifically U.S. foreign policy, | |
| national security and development issues, and the region's | |
| transnational organized crime and narcotrafficking. | |
| Previously, he served as a research consultant at the World | |
| Bank, a Fulbright scholar in Brazil, and a visiting doctoral | |
| fellow at the Graduate Institute of International and | |
| Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. | |
| Dr. Berg obtained a Ph.D. In political science from the | |
| University of Oxford. | |
| Dr. Berg, thank you for joining us today. | |
| I ask the witnesses to please limit your testimony to 5 | |
| minutes, and, without objection, your prepared statements will | |
| be made part of the record. | |
| Mr. Reyna, you are recognized for your testimony. | |
| STATEMENT OF MR. FELICIANO REYNA, FOUNDER AND EXECUTIVE | |
| PRESIDENT, ACCION SOLIDARIA | |
| Mr. Reyna. Good morning, Chairman Sires. Thank you and | |
| distinguished members of the subcommittee. As a Venezuelan | |
| implementing a humanitarian action program in Venezuela, I | |
| really appreciate your invitation to address this subcommittee | |
| today. | |
| Since late 2015, Venezuela's complex humanitarian emergency | |
| has caused deprivations of the people's rights to health, food, | |
| education, livelihoods, and access to basic services, such as | |
| water and electricity. Human insecurity has forced millions to | |
| flee, unable to cope with such daily struggles here at home. | |
| Understanding the nature and broad dimension of the | |
| humanitarian emergency and its effects in widespread loss of | |
| life and human suffering continues to be necessary to properly | |
| address it, finding the means to work through the barriers | |
| imposed by the political conflict which have been an obstacle | |
| to scaling up much needed humanitarian support. | |
| In this challenging environment, over 120 national and | |
| international NGO's have partnered with the U.N. system and | |
| many others are coordinating independently to implement | |
| humanitarian programs all over the country. Venezuelan NGO's | |
| not only were the very first responders in early 2016, but have | |
| continued building capacities to provide a progressively | |
| increasing humanitarian response. | |
| Despite fear of politicization of aid delivery among donor | |
| countries, the United States continues to be the largest funder | |
| of the humanitarian response, with over 40 percent for 2020. | |
| However, even though Venezuela has the world's fourth-largest | |
| food insecure population, it had the least-financed 2020 | |
| humanitarian response plan among 34 countries in need. | |
| Despite having the world's second-largest migrant | |
| population, Venezuela's appeal for the regional migration | |
| response in 2020 was $1.4 billion while Syria's was $6 billion. | |
| Regardless of challenges, there are opportunities for the | |
| United States to scale up humanitarian support. | |
| One, promoting multilateral engagement among donor | |
| countries to address both the humanitarian emergency in | |
| Venezuela and the migrant response in the region. | |
| Two, increasing funding for local Venezuelan humanitarian | |
| and community-based organizations, allowing for longer-term | |
| funding, at least 2 years at a time, strengthening local | |
| capacities for future sustained development. | |
| Three, continuing to support initiatives, such as the | |
| agreement reached between the Humanitarian Aid Commission of | |
| the 2015 National Assembly and the Venezuelan Health | |
| Department, as well as the COVAX initiative and the | |
| Humanitarian Response Plan 2021. | |
| Four, engaging multilaterally and creatively with key | |
| actors within the Maduro government to open the humanitarian | |
| space, expand humanitarian action, and protect humanitarian | |
| workers and organizations serving people in need. | |
| Five, revising general and secondary sanctions which have | |
| an impact on the Venezuelan population already severely | |
| affected by the humanitarian emergency. Licenses for oil for | |
| diesel swaps, for example, should be extended again. | |
| Six, adopting the TPS for Venezuelans, joining the recent | |
| approval by the Colombian Government. | |
| These humane and rights-based initiatives could also become | |
| a framework for a coordinated regional response. | |
| Distinguished members of the subcommittee, humanitarian | |
| responses save lives and alleviate suffering, adhering to the | |
| ``do no harm'' principle. Finding a long-lasting, nonviolent, | |
| democratic solution to Venezuela's political conflict will take | |
| time. Without such a solution, the humanitarian emergency will | |
| continue to take its toll on the Venezuelan people, forcing | |
| many more to flee. | |
| However, we all have a moral obligation, as Chairman Sires | |
| said, to save lives today, to alleviate suffering today. We | |
| cannot wait to do so once the political conflict is solved, for | |
| it will not be solved for a while, not for the millions in need | |
| inside Venezuela, not for those forced to migrate who also | |
| suffer along the way, not for the region, which will also | |
| continue to be impacted. | |
| To save lives and alleviate suffering today and to continue | |
| contributing to a long-lasting, nonviolent, democratic solution | |
| to Venezuela's political conflict demands multilateral thinking | |
| and action by the international political, diplomatic, human | |
| rights, and humanitarian community, as well as engagement with | |
| those who control power today in Venezuela. | |
| Together with Venezuelan political party actors, | |
| multilateral thinking and action must include Venezuelan civil | |
| society organizations on the ground which have proven to have | |
| the capacities, commitment, courage to generate solutions to | |
| the humanitarian emergency, create opportunities for sustained | |
| development, and continue advocating for human rights despite | |
| threats and risks. | |
| Thank you. | |
| [The prepared statement of Mr. Reyna follows:] | |
| [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] | |
| Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Reyna. | |
| Now we will hear from Dr. Arnson. | |
| I now turn to you for your testimony. | |
| STATEMENT OF DR. CYNTHIA J. ARNSON, DIRECTOR, THE WILSON CENTER | |
| LATIN AMERICA PROGRAM | |
| Dr. Arnson. [inaudible] And notably--oops. I am--am I | |
| muted? Uh-oh. Am I muted? No, I am not muted. Sorry. Okay. | |
| The prospects of a democratic transition in Venezuela have | |
| worsened. The Armed Forces, an essential pillar of regime | |
| survival, have remained united despite multiple efforts inside | |
| and outside the country to foster divisions. Maduro's | |
| repressive apparatus remains fully intact, with murders carried | |
| out with impunity in poor neighborhoods, political prisoners | |
| tortured, raids and attacks on nongovernmental organizations. | |
| As others have pointed out, this growing authoritarianism | |
| has gone hand in hand with Venezuela's economic collapse. | |
| Because of that collapse, others have made reference to the | |
| refugee flows. The United Nations estimates that another 3 | |
| million Venezuelan migrants and refugees will leave the country | |
| in 2021. | |
| Countries in South America and the Caribbean are simply | |
| incapable of absorbing such large additional refugee | |
| populations and the threats to social cohesion and political | |
| stability should not be taken lightly. | |
| In approaching the Venezuelan crisis, the U.S. Government | |
| should establish both long-term and short-term goals. | |
| The long-term goal is the one that we all know and has been | |
| longstanding in U.S. policy, which is the democratization of | |
| Venezuela's political life via free, fair, and verifiable | |
| elections. | |
| So the question is, what are the short-term measures that | |
| can be adopted that could help lead to that outcome? | |
| First, now that the scenarios aimed at the collapse of the | |
| regime have been tried and have failed, it is important to | |
| achieve broad political agreements that offer some guarantees | |
| to the regime and its supporters in exchange for concessions. | |
| This constitutes a more fruitful strategy for stabilizing and | |
| democratizing Venezuela. | |
| As Feliciano Reyna was pointing out, humanitarian | |
| agreements can serve as stepping stones toward a more | |
| comprehensive settlement. Partial agreements build trust among | |
| the parties, and if they are successful they build faith among | |
| the population at large in the possibility of negotiated | |
| outcomes. | |
| And as we have just heard, the discussions in Venezuela | |
| over ways for access to the COVID-19 vaccines through COVAX to | |
| carry out a national vaccination campaign are a hopeful step. | |
| The U.S. Government should not lead these efforts at | |
| partial agreements, but the Biden Administration should | |
| recognize that the sectoral, the secondary, the individual | |
| sanctions, the criminal indictments, give the United States | |
| tremendous leverage in Venezuela. | |
| Prudently targeted sanctions relief in exchange for | |
| verifiable concessions, such as the release of political | |
| prisoners, an easing of the restrictions on humanitarian aid, | |
| the reform of the National Electoral Council, should be | |
| carefully considered as part of a broad strategy coordinated | |
| with Venezuelan civil society and other actors in the | |
| international community. | |
| In any negotiation, creating incentives, not just wielding | |
| sticks, is essential to bringing the parties together. | |
| Although U.S. sanctions policy allows for humanitarian | |
| exemptions, as the recent GAO report pointed out, these may not | |
| be functioning well enough to provide enough maneuvering space | |
| for humanitarian actors on the ground. Those humanitarian | |
| exemptions should be revised in coordination with Venezuelan | |
| civil society actors. | |
| The Biden Administration should also consult with a broad | |
| range not only of Venezuelan actors, but international relief | |
| organizations to clear up remaining obstacles. | |
| As others have mentioned, the Biden Administration's oft- | |
| cited preference for multilateralism in foreign policy is an | |
| asset in approaching Venezuela. Multiple international partners | |
| of the United States have worked to maintain channels of | |
| communication with all sides. These include the European Union, | |
| the International Contact Group, the Lima Group, the | |
| Governments of Norway and Sweden. | |
| All of these countries and organizations have, as a common | |
| denominator, their search for a peaceful, democratic solution | |
| to the Venezuelan crisis. | |
| And as my colleague Brian Fonseca will shortly indicate, we | |
| should not harbor illusions that the only important | |
| international actors in Venezuela are Western democracies | |
| seeking a democratic outcome. Russia, China, Cuba, India, | |
| Turkey, and Iran have played a variety of roles in sustaining | |
| the Maduro regime. But we should keep in mind that their | |
| interests are diverse, as is their relative importance to | |
| regime survival. | |
| Finally, and to reiterate the point about refugees, the | |
| United States has done a huge amount to assist South American | |
| and Caribbean countries hosting Venezuelan refugees, but much | |
| more needs to be done. In 2020, the United Nations Refugee and | |
| Migrant Response Plan received less than half of the | |
| international funding that it requested and identified to meet | |
| the needs of Venezuelan migrants and refugees across the | |
| region. | |
| And special attention, as Chairman Sires pointed out, | |
| should be given to Colombia, which hosts more Venezuelan | |
| refugees than any country in the world and which just extended | |
| temporary protective status for 10 years to the almost 2 | |
| million refugees within its borders. | |
| The United States can and must play an ongoing leading role | |
| in mobilizing resources that are sufficient for Colombia, as | |
| well as other frontline nations that are directly impacted by | |
| Venezuela's ongoing meltdown. | |
| Thank you very much. | |
| [The prepared statement of Dr. Arnson follows:] | |
| [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] | |
| Mr. Sires. Thank you very much. | |
| I now turn to your testimony, Mr. Fonseca. | |
| STATEMENT OF MR. BRIAN FONSECA, DIRECTOR, JACK D. GORDON | |
| INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY | |
| Mr. Fonseca. Thank you, Chairman Sires, Ranking Member | |
| Green, distinguished members of the subcommittee, of course | |
| including my own hometown Representative, Congresswoman | |
| Salazar. It is my privilege to address you today on the state | |
| of Venezuelan foreign relations and its short-term and long- | |
| term effects on U.S. policy. | |
| As already stated, Venezuela isin the midst of one of the | |
| worst economic contractions ever recorded, and because of that, | |
| the Maduro dictatorship continues to lean on a small group of | |
| States to remain in power. Russia, China, Cuba, Turkey, and | |
| Iran have all played important supporting roles for the regime. | |
| These countries help Maduro bypass U.S. sanctions to keep | |
| the Venezuelan economy muddling through and provide technical | |
| assistance to help stave off internal and external threats. | |
| The question before the House today is not whether the | |
| Venezuelan Government is a repressive and corrupt authoritarian | |
| regime. I believe that is clear. Rather, what can we do to | |
| alleviate the ongoing humanitarian crisis, regain influence on | |
| the ground, displace our geopolitical rivals, aid in the | |
| restoration of democratic governance, and help pave the way for | |
| a prosperous country for the Venezuelan people? | |
| My testimony will focus on Russian-Venezuelan relations, | |
| but I must point out that Russia is just one of a handful of | |
| countries vital to Venezuelan domestic and foreign policy | |
| interests. | |
| The considerations binding Russia, Venezuela, and the | |
| others are far less ideological. Instead, these countries are | |
| tied together by common authoritarian political structures and | |
| economic and political opportunism. | |
| Furthermore, these countries all share antagonistic | |
| relationships with the United States. That is, regime survival, | |
| combined with our policy position, for better or worse, | |
| encourage these authoritarian regimes to travel together. | |
| These countries also overwhelmingly prioritize their own | |
| survival well above the relationships. That leads me to | |
| conclude that these relationships--Russia-Venezuela included-- | |
| are largely transactional and vulnerable to fracturing. | |
| The Russo-Venezuelan relationship has evolved a great deal | |
| since former President Hugo Chavez and Vladimir Putin first met | |
| in Moscow in 2001. Putin saw tremendous economic and political | |
| opportunities in Venezuela, while Chavez sought to diversify | |
| its foreign relations away from the United States. | |
| In subsequent years, Russian companies invested billions | |
| into Venezuela, largely focusing on arms and energy deals. | |
| Chavez also offered Russia political and military access on the | |
| ground in Venezuela. | |
| Interestingly, much of the surge in Russian-Venezuelan | |
| engagement occurred during Maduro's tenure as Chavez's Minister | |
| of Foreign Affairs from 2006 to 2013. | |
| After ascending to office in 2013, Maduro sought to | |
| leverage his relations with Russia and others to stave off | |
| challenges from internal political opposition, offset the | |
| massive amount of money siphoned through widespread corruption | |
| and criminality, and mitigate the economic death spiral that | |
| accelerated shortly after he took office. | |
| Today, most experts would agree that Russia's direct | |
| business activities in Venezuela have not yielded the desired | |
| return on investment. Still, it maintains important economic | |
| interests; namely, energy infrastructure and enduring arms | |
| contracts. | |
| However, the lack of direct ROI has forced the Russians to | |
| focus more on the indirect economic benefits and extracting | |
| political and geopolitical value out of Venezuela, primarily, | |
| maintaining a geostrategic footprint near the U.S., portraying | |
| Russia as a global power, unsettling American policymakers, | |
| undermining Western democratic values, and scoring political | |
| points at home for Putin. | |
| In the economic context, Russia is just one of several | |
| countries vying for access to Venezuela's large proven oil | |
| reserves. There are clear indications that Rosneft and other | |
| Russian companies were taking huge losses well before U.S. | |
| sanctions. | |
| Despite their losses, Russia owned significant energy | |
| assets in Venezuela, including nearly 81 billion barrels of | |
| proven reserves via its joint ventures with PDVSA--that, by the | |
| way, it chooses to leave in the ground. | |
| One theory is that Russiais content with locking up | |
| Venezuelan oil in the ground and reducing global supply so that | |
| it can fetch a higher price for its own heavy crude on the | |
| global market. | |
| Russia exports roughly 9 to 10 million barrels of heavy | |
| crude per day. So a $5 increase in price of a barrel would | |
| generate roughly an additional $50 million a day for Russian | |
| exporters. Thus, Russia may be deriving indirect economic | |
| benefits from a deteriorated Venezuelan oil industry made worse | |
| by U.S. sectoral sanctions. | |
| In 2020, Russia oil exports to the U.S. hit a 16-year high, | |
| solidifying its place as the second-largest exporter of U.S. | |
| crude to the United States. Industry experts argue that the | |
| spike in Russian imports to the United States is driven, in | |
| large part, by U.S. sanctions against PDVSA. | |
| Oil and gas are not the only drivers of Russian economic | |
| interests in Venezuela. Military sales are also an important | |
| part of Russia's broader economic interests. Building on | |
| military sales, Russia has established important military-to- | |
| military relationships with Venezuela. Russia provides | |
| technical assistance and offers professional military | |
| educational opportunities in Russia for Venezuelan military | |
| personnel. | |
| Russia also maintains a formidable intelligence footprint | |
| in Venezuela. Although it is difficult to estimate how deep | |
| this aspect of the relationship goes or whether these | |
| relationships will be enduring, Russian military and | |
| intelligence presence in Venezuela is not in our national | |
| security interest. | |
| Still, I assess the strategic intent for Russia is not to | |
| directly challenge the U.S. military. Instead, I think it finds | |
| value in creating a low-cost opportunity to irritate the United | |
| States, but not necessarily provoke an escalatory response. | |
| Let me cover just a few recommendations, if I can, and then | |
| conclude. | |
| I mean, to be clear, there is no easy path to transition in | |
| Venezuela and there are severe limitations to what the U.S. can | |
| do now. Still, I think there are meaningful actions that we | |
| should be thinking about as the situation continues to evolve. | |
| First, we should reevaluate our sanctions and consider | |
| doubling down on targeted sanctions against individuals and | |
| reversing broader sanctions that may be hurting our national | |
| interests and the interests of the Venezuelan people. | |
| There is good reason to believe that some of our sanctions | |
| are undermining our long-term domestic and foreign policy | |
| objectives. Our sanctions should not exacerbate the ongoing | |
| crisis, erode America's reputation, or work in the interests of | |
| our global rivals. | |
| Second, we must find ways to close the important pressure | |
| release valves or else the sanctions will do little to effect | |
| change. If the dictatorship can leverage its allies and use | |
| illicit trafficking proceeds to subsidize its struggling | |
| Venezuelan economy, meaningful change will remain elusive. | |
| Third, we should consider reestablishing some diplomatic | |
| and economic access. I am not suggesting we reestablish an | |
| embassy without evaluating important concessions, but we should | |
| look to regain some diplomatic footprint. | |
| We should also create space for the American private sector | |
| to outcompete Russia, China, and others taking advantage of the | |
| U.S. absence. There is certainly a clear preference for | |
| American businesses over Russia, China, Iran, and Turkey. | |
| Finally, we should consider bolstering the governance | |
| capacity and reassure our partners in the region, especially | |
| Venezuela's neighbors Guyana, Colombia, and Peru, and consider | |
| working more closely with our international allies, especially | |
| the U.K., France, and Canada, which all maintain diplomatic | |
| relations. | |
| The fact that this is among the first hearings of the 117th | |
| Congress and the first for this committee is a testament to the | |
| importance of Venezuela to the United States and our commitment | |
| to the Venezuelan people. | |
| As I said before this committee in 2019, nature abhors a | |
| vacuum. If we do not have a presence, then China, Russia, Iran, | |
| and others antithetical to our interests and the interests of | |
| the Venezuelan people will be more than happy to fill that | |
| void. | |
| Again, thank you for this amazing opportunity, and I look | |
| forward to your questions. | |
| [The prepared statement of Mr. Fonseca follows:] | |
| [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] | |
| Mr. Sires. Thank you. | |
| Dr. Berg, you are recognized for your testimony. | |
| STATEMENT OF DR. RYAN C. BERG, RESEARCH FELLOW, LATIN AMERICA | |
| STUDIES, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE | |
| Dr. Berg. Chairman Sires, Ranking Member Green, members of | |
| the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on | |
| this timely topic today. | |
| The political and economic devastation wrought by the | |
| Maduro regime in Venezuela, Latin America's erstwhile | |
| wealthiest country, is truly unprecedented. The country has | |
| lost 20 percent of its pre-crisis population, 5 to 6 million | |
| refugees, a number that could rise to as many as 10 million by | |
| 2023, according to the International Monetary Fund. | |
| De facto President Nicolas Maduro has presided over the | |
| largest economic decline outside of war in world history and | |
| his regime is now considered a criminalized or a mafia State. | |
| Venezuela's institutions are so thoroughly penetrated by | |
| corruption and criminal interests that senior leaders, | |
| including Maduro himself, are actively participating in | |
| transnational criminal enterprises. | |
| The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, the | |
| National Liberation Army, or ELN, and Lebanese Hezbollah all | |
| have received shelter and even material support from the Maduro | |
| regime. | |
| Maduro's Venezuela represents a combustible mix of national | |
| security threats that have metastasized throughout the | |
| hemisphere, leaving the door wide open and beckoning the | |
| involvement of extra-hemispheric actors and U.S. strategic | |
| competitors that have seized on the bedlam in Venezuela to | |
| enter our shared neighborhood, sow chaos, destabilize the | |
| region, and augment their power-projection capabilities. | |
| Russia has provided the Maduro regime with a critical | |
| sanctions-busting lifeline, as well as myriad weapon systems. | |
| China has provided more than $60 billion in loans since | |
| 2007 and traded repressive digital surveillance technology to | |
| further Maduro's control. | |
| And Cuba has remade the repressive organs of Venezuela's | |
| police state in exchange for oil. | |
| Perhaps the most concerning aspect of Venezuela's slide | |
| into chaos, however, are the bonds it has forged and solidified | |
| with Russia, China, and Cuba, in many cases turning | |
| transactional relationships into blossoming strategic | |
| partnerships and even, in some cases, outright dependencies. | |
| Venezuela has become a prime example of the phenomenon | |
| known as authoritarian export or authoritarian learning, | |
| whereby authoritarian leaders share best practices in | |
| repression and adopt survival strategies based upon their prior | |
| successes in other countries. | |
| Like a family recipe, authoritarians have bequeathed to | |
| Caracas their best advice in regime survival. If not for Cuba, | |
| the Venezuelan regime would arguably not exist in its current | |
| form. And if not for Russia and China, the Maduro regime would | |
| probably have collapsed. | |
| As Venezuela's economy slips further into the abyss, | |
| however, the Maduro regime has doubled down on the narrative of | |
| a nation under siege and abdicated any responsibility for the | |
| country's collapse. | |
| I think it is critical to avoid misconstruing the realities | |
| of who is to blame here because it means misidentifying the | |
| most appropriate strategies for addressing the unique security | |
| challenges the regime poses to the region. | |
| Mr. Chairman, I would like to use the remaining time | |
| available to highlight very briefly several policy | |
| recommendations for the United States. | |
| First, pursue a policy of management, not solutionism. The | |
| Biden Administration should recognize that it has inherited a | |
| significant position of leverage, but it should resist the | |
| temptation to go big and rush into negotiations with the Maduro | |
| regime. A Hail Mary pass at this inauspicious moment could | |
| actually entrench the regime further. | |
| Second, attend to the unfolding humanitarian disaster. As | |
| we have all heard today already, this is the most underfunded | |
| humanitarian crisis in modern history. For comparison, Syrian | |
| refugees have received the equivalent of $3,150 per refugee, | |
| while Venezuelans have received a paltry $265 per refugee. | |
| Aid should be targeted to encourage and defray the costs of | |
| further integration of Venezuelan refugees in host countries | |
| such as Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and others. | |
| Third, monitor the effect of sanctions on humanitarian | |
| efforts. The Treasury Department should monitor potentially | |
| negative humanitarian consequences of our U.S. sanctions. The | |
| U.S. should seek to ensure the reliability of the humanitarian | |
| exemptions that are built into our sanctions architecture, and | |
| fine-tuning sanctions should be the first impulse, rather than | |
| simply lifting them. | |
| Fourth, avoid the siren song of negotiations until minimum | |
| conditions in the country are met. By some accounts, there have | |
| been nearly a dozen attempts to negotiate with the Maduro | |
| regime and limited progress has been made, with significant | |
| opportunity costs to the Venezuelan people. | |
| I will note that there is currently no consensus of what | |
| the minimum conditions would be for a negotiation, and major | |
| questions persist regarding objectives, timing, process, and | |
| trust-building measures with the Maduro regime. | |
| Fifth, encourage the European Union to bring more pressure. | |
| While awaiting a more fortuitous diplomatic moment, the Biden | |
| Administration should encourage the European Union to adjust | |
| its policy in a nod to reality. | |
| Quite simply, the EU's current approach is riddled with | |
| inconsistencies and the pressure setting is insufficient to | |
| meaningfully contribute to a negotiated solution and to protect | |
| human rights on the ground. | |
| Sixth, broaden the diplomatic tool kit to complement | |
| sanctions. The U.S. should employ nonsanctions instruments | |
| concurrently with U.S. sanctions to achieve the effective | |
| pressure level. These instruments include legal referrals to | |
| international tribunals, such as the current case pending | |
| against Venezuela before the International Criminal Court, and | |
| anti-money-laundering mechanisms and resource certification | |
| regimes to deter the Maduro regime's participation in the | |
| illicit economy. | |
| And seventh and last, bolster intelligence capabilities. | |
| The failed April 2019 uprising announced from La Carlota Air | |
| Base in Caracas and Operation Gideon, the failed 2020 | |
| amphibious invasion planned in neighboring Colombia by a | |
| sanctioned Venezuelan general, should prompt the incoming | |
| Director of the CIA and the intelligence community to conduct a | |
| thorough investigation of intelligence failures in the country | |
| related to the Maduro regime's authoritarian resilience and | |
| bolster U.S. intelligence assets and capabilities in Venezuela. | |
| Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to answering | |
| the committee's questions. | |
| [The prepared statement of Dr. Berg follows:] | |
| [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] | |
| Mr. Sires. Thank you to our witnesses today. | |
| Now I would like to ask unanimous consent that | |
| Representatives Omar, Steube, Malliotakis, and Wasserman | |
| Schultz participate in today's hearing after all subcommittee | |
| members have had the opportunity to participate and question | |
| any of the witnesses. Thank you. | |
| And now we will get into questions. I will start by asking | |
| questions to our members. | |
| First, I would like to say that for years I have been | |
| saying that Russia and China participate in this Western | |
| Hemisphere in order to create anarchy, in order to destabilize | |
| governments, in order to play with our closest allies. | |
| Cuba has a security apparatus in Venezuela. Russia has been | |
| selling arms. And one interesting conversation that I had with | |
| someone from the Colombian Embassy the other day told me that | |
| in 2019, 6,000 Russians visited Colombia. Last year, due to the | |
| pandemic, it dropped down to 3,000. The Colombian Government | |
| expelled three Russians recently. | |
| I can only think that having Russians visiting Colombia, | |
| 6,000, Colombiais not exactly a beach destination for the | |
| Russians, plays into this idea that Russia and China would love | |
| nothing better than to create chaos in the Western Hemisphere. | |
| So I was wondering from our members, can you comment on | |
| that? | |
| Anyone? Do not all answer at once. Just one. | |
| Mr. Fonseca. | |
| Mr. Fonseca. Chairman, I apologize. I thought when you | |
| meant members, that you were querying somebody else. | |
| No, I could not agree with you more. I absolutely think one | |
| of the primary objectives, certainly of Russia, is to continue | |
| to sort of poke a finger in the eye of the United States. | |
| Keep in mind that, as I mentioned, I think they find it | |
| incredibly valuable to have a geostrategic footprint near the | |
| U.S., and I think that is one of it. And oftentimes that sort | |
| of--this idea of reciprocity gets thrown into the discussion | |
| among experts that look specifically at Russian engagement in | |
| Venezuela, because oftentimes that reciprocity sort of pathways | |
| back to the pronounced U.S. footprint in Eastern Europe. | |
| And so oftentimes in the past you have even heard rumors | |
| about the potential tradeoffs of maybe the U.S. kind of | |
| withdrawing its support in places like Ukraine in exchange for | |
| Russia withdrawing its support in Venezuela. And, again, for | |
| now, that is all been sort of hearsay, kind of listening to | |
| people on the ground. | |
| But there is no doubt that, in the consciousness of Russia, | |
| having that geostrategic footprint is really vital, No. 1. | |
| No. 2, I also think that--and this is inclusive of--by the | |
| way, that geostrategic footprint is also inclusive of China. Of | |
| course, the United States has a tremendous footprint in Asia, | |
| notwithstanding our support to Taiwan, our military access in | |
| South Korea, Japan, in broader sort of Southeast Asia, you | |
| know, U.S. influence. | |
| But that is No. 1. So geostrategic value to having close | |
| proximity to the United States. | |
| No. 2, they both have a tremendous interest in undermining | |
| sort of Western liberal order, undermining democratic | |
| institutions around the world, and trying to strategically | |
| create space to sort of embrace their authoritarian political | |
| models. | |
| I think that sort of lends itself to destabilizing the | |
| democracies around the region. And we have seen at times in the | |
| past Russia leveraging information operations in other | |
| sophisticated technology means to be disruptive and impact sort | |
| of the political stability of partners across the hemisphere. | |
| So, Chairman, I could not agree with you more. I think | |
| China and Russia absolutely are intent on disrupting and | |
| undermining U.S. policy. | |
| Mr. Sires. Thank you. | |
| I also think that we just do not pay enough attention to | |
| the Western Hemisphere. So if we do not pay attention, the | |
| Russians and the Chinese and all the other countries that are | |
| helping Venezuela fill that void that we have in the Western | |
| Hemisphere. | |
| Dr. Arnson. Mr. Chairman, if I might add to that. | |
| Mr. Sires. Sure. | |
| Dr. Arnson. I certainly associate myself with what Brian | |
| Fonseca just said, and I agree that the influence of China and | |
| Russia in Venezuela is counter to U.S. interests. But I think | |
| that one needs to separate the kind of involvement that the two | |
| countries have had. As Brian was saying, it is geostrategic, it | |
| is an opportunity for the Russians to mess around in what they | |
| call or what they consider the U.S. ``near abroad'' in the | |
| reciprocal kind of way that Brian was mentioning. | |
| China's interests have been somewhat different. China is | |
| the largest oil consumer in the world. Venezuela has the | |
| world's largest known oil reserves. | |
| And so the relationship has been heavily focused on oil | |
| extraction, and the $62 billion in loans approximately are | |
| being repaid in oil and there has not been any new money for | |
| some time. And the loans that were given in recent years were | |
| simply to allow Venezuela to continue paying back the loans | |
| that had been initially given. | |
| There is also, I think, the case that China has reached out | |
| to the opposition at various points trying to guarantee its | |
| long-term access to Venezuela's oil resources independent of | |
| the political leadership of the country. | |
| So I see it as less committed to the survival of Nicolas | |
| Maduro and the regime overall and much more committed to the | |
| long-term survival of its interest in the oil fields. | |
| Mr. Sires. Thank you very much. | |
| Now I will recognize Ranking Member Green. | |
| Mr. Green. Thank you, Chairman. Again, appreciate your | |
| opening remarks and appreciate the witnesses' testimony. I | |
| thank all of them for being present and their participation | |
| today. | |
| I think one of America's greatest challenges is China, and | |
| I am greatly concerned with their penetration into not only | |
| Venezuela, but all of Latin America. And my comments are really | |
| to the whole slate of witnesses, whoever wants to jump in. | |
| In 2019, China specifically stated that the blackouts in | |
| Venezuela were because of cyber attacks from the United States, | |
| obviously a blatant lie. | |
| One of my questions is, how do we confront this | |
| disinformation campaign from China in Venezuela and throughout | |
| Latin America? | |
| Dr. Berg. Let me jump in on this here, Ranking Member | |
| Green. | |
| As you well stated, the cyber attack claim, of course, is | |
| spurious. Largely, the blackouts were a cause of the fact that | |
| there was not only corruption, but a failure to maintain the | |
| power grid in Venezuela. And also something, quite simply, | |
| somebody did not bother to cut the vegetation around one of the | |
| main power plants outside of Caracas, and so that vegetation | |
| overgrew some of the power lines and ended up knocking off | |
| power periodically throughout 2019, as we saw. | |
| This is an incredibly important question in terms of the | |
| disinformation environment. It is not just China. It is also | |
| Russia. It is also Cuba participating as well. | |
| And I think in this sense, the United States can do its | |
| best to try to get reliable information to Venezuelans on the | |
| ground, to members of the opposition, in especially critical | |
| periods of time. We have seen the internet knocked off grid in | |
| really important periods of time around protests, around street | |
| pressure, around moments in time when the regime felt like it | |
| was quite vulnerable. | |
| And so this is one of those areas that kind of flies below | |
| the radar, but is quite important in terms of our ability to | |
| help the opposition on the ground. Given the lack of political | |
| space in the country to organize, the reliable presence of the | |
| internet is absolutely critical. | |
| Mr. Green. One other, sort of taking that a step further. | |
| It appears that ZTE, China's big telecommunications giant, has | |
| created ID cards for the Venezuelan people, which essentially | |
| do the same thing that their social score system does--tracks | |
| their behavior, monitors their actions, can dig into their | |
| checking accounts, all of this. | |
| How do we stop that? | |
| Mr. Fonseca. So, Ranking Member Green, I think it is an | |
| excellent question. I think it underscores the point of China | |
| as the real strategic competitor in the region. And Chinese | |
| tech proliferation has been growing rapidly certainly for the | |
| last decade or so. | |
| The idea of the fatherland card, as you reference, is | |
| something that certainly we have been battling around in terms | |
| of how to--sort of how to combat that. In Venezuela perhaps it | |
| is very difficult to sort of overturn that. | |
| But I think education, continuing to sort of dominate the | |
| educational space, not just in broader Latin America, but | |
| wherever we can sort of reach in and help educate consumers on | |
| the threats and challenges associated with China tech | |
| penetration. | |
| It is important for us to disaggregate good from bad. Not | |
| all Chinese activities in the region I think should be seen | |
| through sort of a threat landscape. But I do think we have to | |
| provide education as tech penetration becomes more proliferated | |
| across the broader hemisphere. | |
| And I think this is also consistent with what Dr. Berg was | |
| saying just a few minutes ago about information operations. The | |
| Russians are incredibly sophisticated in terms of their ability | |
| to effect impact on information operations. They also have an | |
| incredibly sophisticated and forward-leaning cyber capability. | |
| In fact, lots of open reporting about that threat. In fact, | |
| the Atlantic Council's digital analytics lab has done some | |
| really good work on assessing information operations and | |
| putting out recommendations that can help undermine sort of the | |
| effect of those information operations. | |
| And part of that is about sort of credibility of the | |
| source. The United States needs to remain credible as a source | |
| across the broader hemisphere. We have to ensure that our | |
| actions do not undermine our credibility, broadly speaking. | |
| And I think we need to continue to point out and attack the | |
| credibility of Russia, and when China does it call them out as | |
| well, for proliferating just false information that affects the | |
| social, political, and economic landscapes across the region. | |
| Mr. Green. My timeis up. Mr. Chairman, I will go in second | |
| round. | |
| Mr. Sires. Thank you. | |
| Congressman Castro, you are recognized for 5 minutes. | |
| Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairman. | |
| This question is for Mr. Reyna. | |
| First, thank you for speaking to our committee about the | |
| important work that civil society organizations like yours are | |
| doing in Venezuela. | |
| I chair the subcommittee that handles international | |
| development policy, and so I want to ask you a question along | |
| those lines. | |
| As you know, on February 11, Venezuela's opposition and | |
| Nicolas Maduro agreed to cooperate to purchase and distribute | |
| COVID-19 vaccines for 6 million Venezuelans. I think this is a | |
| positive step toward fighting the coronavirus pandemic in the | |
| country. And it has been reported that about 1.4 million doses | |
| of the vaccine will come from the World Health Organization- | |
| linked COVAX initiative, while the source of the rest of the | |
| vaccines is yet unclear. | |
| So my question is, how can the United States help mobilize | |
| resources to ensure countries in need, like Venezuela, receive | |
| the appropriate amount of vaccines? And how can we ensure that | |
| there is a proper oversight and equitable distribution of those | |
| vaccines in Venezuela? | |
| Mr. Reyna. Thank you very much for your question. I think | |
| this is really important. | |
| One way in which it is possible to continue providing | |
| support in regards to health, and with vaccination | |
| particularly, is to support these efforts that the Humanitarian | |
| Aid Commission of the 2015 National Assembly has been carrying | |
| on and also being able to work with the Pan American Health | |
| Organization, as well as with the Health Department of | |
| Venezuela. | |
| I think this is one example of possibilities that still | |
| exist to provide support. And the signing of this COVAX | |
| agreement is also a show of those possibilities. So we did have | |
| a previous agreement, now this COVAX one. | |
| And the oversight and the mobilization to expand, on the | |
| one hand, and the oversight, one perhaps can be achieved | |
| through supporting the entrance into Venezuela of the World | |
| Food Programme with its logistical capacities. | |
| We are seeing huge challenge there with issues, for | |
| example, of cold chain. And since our transportation | |
| infrastructure has been also somewhat collapsed, as many other | |
| areas, then the World Food Programme can play an important | |
| role. | |
| And in regards to oversight, we are proposing to follow the | |
| model that has already been in place since 2018 by the Global | |
| Fund for HIV, TB and Malaria, Pan American Health Organization, | |
| UNH, and Venezuelan civil society, again, with the Health | |
| Ministry, to followup on the provision and distribution of | |
| antiretrovirals. | |
| It has worked well, with challenges, with difficulties. But | |
| that oversight has been in place. And there is a working group, | |
| monthly information, and followup of the results. Whenever | |
| there is a gap or difficulties, then these can be called by the | |
| activists on the ground doing that oversight. | |
| So these are the kinds of perhaps mechanisms that would | |
| deserve looking into and supporting. | |
| Thank you. | |
| Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairman, I yield back. | |
| Mr. Sires. Thank you, Congressman Castro. | |
| Congressman Pfluger, you are recognized for 5 minutes. | |
| Mr. Pfluger. Mr. Chairman thank you for an excellent | |
| hearing on a very important topic. And to all of our panelists | |
| thank you for your time. | |
| I have got a couple of questions. I will start with Dr. | |
| Arnson. Knowing that Maduro is--it will not sign any sort of | |
| deal with the World Food Program, unless he can control the | |
| distribution of that food, how do we as the United States in | |
| working with our, with our allies and partners in the region | |
| ensure that delivery of food gets to the people that need it | |
| the most and can prevent Maduro from controlling that | |
| distribution. | |
| Dr. Arnson. Thank you very much for the question, | |
| Congressman Pfluger. It is an essential principle of | |
| humanitarian assistance that it must be given with neutrality | |
| and without any regard for the political affiliation of the | |
| recipient. Up until now, the Maduro regime has maintained tight | |
| control over food distribution through this program known as | |
| CLAP, through food boxes which are woefully insufficient. And | |
| it is a form of social control. And it is obviously reluctant | |
| to relinquish that form of control. | |
| But I think what Feliciano was indicating is that on | |
| humanitarian issues involving health, there have been--there | |
| has been the possibility of reaching agreement between the | |
| opposition, the government working closely with civil society | |
| organizations. | |
| I do not know what the magic formula will be to allow or to | |
| convince the regime to allow the World Food Program to operate. | |
| I suggested in my testimony that there might be some | |
| consideration given to relaxing U.S. secondary sanctions that | |
| would permit the import of fuel, gasoline, and diesel which are | |
| in short supply. I know that that is a controversial | |
| recommendation that we should not have to offer anything to | |
| Nicolas Maduro to get him to allow the international community | |
| to feed starving people. | |
| I mean, we are talking about at a minimum 9 million | |
| Venezuelans who are either severely food insecure, or | |
| moderately food insecure, and that is the assessment of the | |
| World Food Program itself in 2020. | |
| So I think that these humanitarian agreements that have | |
| been reached over COVAX, the kind of things with | |
| antiretrovirals that Feliciano was mentioning, provide a kernel | |
| of hope that these kinds of agreements around food and food | |
| insecurity can also be reached. | |
| Mr. Pfluger. Thank you very much. | |
| And now for Dr. Berg. My question is what are the | |
| consequences to the U.S., and the region, if this crisis | |
| continues and if these criminal groups are allowed to thrive? | |
| And, specifically, to our southern border, what is the threat | |
| with this crisis, continuing the number of refugees? | |
| Dr. Berg, to you. | |
| Dr. Berg. Thank you very much, Congressman, for the | |
| question. I think the crisis has region-wide impacts. As Dr. | |
| Arnson mentioned in her opening statement, the region is not | |
| poised to be able to absorb this level of refugees we have seen | |
| so far, about 5-and-a-half million. Remember that figure that I | |
| mentioned in my opening statement from the IMF that this could | |
| rise by 10 million by 2023. | |
| And so the numbers of people and the pace which they are | |
| exiting the country is still unabated. And this really has dire | |
| consequences, not only for the stability and security of the | |
| region, but the future economic growth of the region. Many | |
| countries have difficulty not only absorbing this number of | |
| refugees, but also--look at a country like Colombia, it has | |
| taken the very commendable step of including about 1.7 million | |
| refugees into its, into its legal ranks. About 1 million of | |
| them will be affected by the temporary protective status that | |
| they granted to them. | |
| But that is going to be a Herculean undertaking, which the | |
| United States can help with because many of us do not believe | |
| that countries in the region have the capability to absorb | |
| these types of numbers on a bureaucratic level, on an economic | |
| level, on a political level. There are political ramifications | |
| as well. We have seen in some places, despite the fact that the | |
| region has had a pretty welcoming stance, a rise in xenophobia. | |
| I mentioned Colombia before. I looked at a poll the other | |
| day that said that a clear majority of Colombians were actually | |
| against the move by Ivan Duque to allow temporary protective | |
| status for Venezuelans in the country. So the regional cohesion | |
| here is at stake as well. | |
| And the last thing that you mentioned is a migratory crisis | |
| that could push north to our borders. Again, we have seen a lot | |
| of refugees in South America. As I think the next waves start | |
| to come out, we might see more and more actually traversing | |
| through Colombia, going up into Panama and into Central | |
| America, certainly more so than they are now. | |
| And, lastly, Congressman, if I can just go back to the | |
| question that Dr. Arnson answered previously about the | |
| neutrality principle and humanitarianism. Obviously, it is | |
| absolutely critical. I think that there is one cautionary tale | |
| here, and that is the agreement that was signed last summer to | |
| bring in personal protective equipment and COVID PCR tests, | |
| which were very quickly, sort of, confiscated by the Maduro | |
| regime. They were not actually spread around the country in the | |
| way that the agreement stipulated. And the opposition since has | |
| been crying foul about it. And with the regime in control of | |
| those resources, there is not much we can do at this point. | |
| Mr. Pfluger. Thank you very much. | |
| With that, I yield back. | |
| Mr. Sires. Thank you. | |
| Congressman Andy Levin, you are recognized for 5 minutes. | |
| Mr. Levin. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for holding | |
| this important hearing. To our panelists, thank you. I am going | |
| to try to ask a number of questions, so I ask you to try to be | |
| brief in your answers. | |
| A February GAO report, which I requested along with the | |
| full committee back in 2019, found that U.S. sanctions, | |
| particularly those on the oil industry, have likely contributed | |
| to the steep decline of the Venezuelan economy and suggested | |
| steps that the Treasury Department and other agencies could | |
| take to mitigate the humanitarian impacts of sanctions, which | |
| some of you have addressed very movingly. | |
| Mr. Reyna, what recommendations do you have for the U.S. | |
| Government regarding how it could provide clear guidance for | |
| financial institutions or take other steps to minimize any | |
| second-order impacts of sanctions on the operations of | |
| humanitarian organizations that are doing their best in this | |
| situation? | |
| Mr. Reyna. Thank you very much, Congressman Levin. We | |
| really welcome that report. We think it offers information that | |
| is quite important, because one may think, you know, of the | |
| impact of sanctions on issues that were already deteriorating. | |
| But to us, what is of serious concern today is impact on the | |
| Venezuelan population. And, certainly, there is some that can | |
| be--work differently. | |
| But what we have had sometimes is conversations with | |
| Treasury, for example, to give precise examples of how | |
| sanctions can put obstacles and restrict the work of | |
| organizations. I think that is--you know, having those | |
| conversations, even before imposing certain types of sanctions | |
| made--would have made sense and still makes sense to talk | |
| through them. | |
| One issue that we have faced, for example, is that--and we | |
| understand Treasury cannot impose, for example, they say issues | |
| on operations of the banking system, lets say. But they can | |
| offer certainly a more decisive kind of advice in order for, | |
| you know, the system not to prevent us from carrying on our | |
| humanitarian work, our accompanying, for example, victims of | |
| situations of lack of access to food or health. | |
| So I think that this requires perhaps sitting down, looking | |
| at particular issues and seeing how to solve them. Licenses, | |
| for example, when we were looking at them, they might take from | |
| 18 months to 24 months to get. So, again, it is not even having | |
| license to get them for organizations such as ours here on the | |
| ground. So, you know, thank you for your concerns then. | |
| Mr. Levin. Yes, I tell you what, we will be a partner with | |
| you in trying to work with the administration to help you do | |
| your work, basically. It is so important. | |
| Mr. Reyna. Thank you. | |
| Mr. Levin. Yes, the Trump administration strategy toward | |
| Venezuela relied on maximum pressure betting that sanctions | |
| would lead to a quick transition to democracy. But here in | |
| March 2021, Maduro's grip on power appears stronger than at any | |
| point since 2019. It seems that in order to work toward a | |
| democratic transition, the U.S. will need a longer-term | |
| strategy. | |
| Dr. Arnson, it is good to see an old friend. Given reports | |
| that the Biden Administration is reviewing its sanctions policy | |
| in many parts of the world, can you talk, specifically, about | |
| sanctions you think should be reassessed or advised, or how | |
| should we look at this in more detail than you may have gone | |
| into earlier? | |
| Dr. Arnson. Sure. Well, I would say that it is certainly | |
| not in the cards for the United States to be unilaterally | |
| lifting certain sanctions. But as I said in my statement, they | |
| do convey enormous amounts of leverage. The question is how | |
| they can be used in a back and forth to require verifiable | |
| steps by the Maduro government in exchange for certain forms of | |
| sanctions relief. | |
| Now, that implies that the government is actually | |
| interested in that kind of sanctions relief. There may be--it | |
| may be the case that they are more interested in the lifting of | |
| criminal indictments or, you know, the lifting of these | |
| individual sanctions that have frozen bank accounts and | |
| prohibited them from traveling to the United States in the case | |
| of the EU to the European Union. | |
| But I think it is very positive that there is a recognition | |
| at this point that the campaign of maximum pressure actually | |
| did not achieve the--either the democratic opening or the | |
| regime collapse that was hoped for. And, therefore, a different | |
| approach is needed. And I think that those consultations are | |
| under way and should be encouraged. | |
| And sanctions are, you know, an instrument in the, in the | |
| toolkit. And the United States has, because of the economic | |
| sanctions against the oil sector, the financial sector, and | |
| secondary sanctions on those who also trade with PDVSA and | |
| other Venezuelan entities give us tremendous leverage. And we | |
| should explore, you know, what combination of concession and | |
| sanctions relief should be desirable. | |
| Mr. Levin. All right. Thanks. | |
| Mr. Chairman, I see my time is up. Great hearing, and I | |
| yield back. | |
| Mr. Sires. Thank you, Congressman. We now recognize | |
| Congresswoman Salazar from Florida for 5 minutes. | |
| Ms. Salazar. Thank you, Chairman. Wonderful to be here. And | |
| it is such an important topic for the Americas, and I thank the | |
| witnesses for their time and their expertise, specifically, Dr. | |
| Fonseca who is one of the most prominent scholars in my | |
| district. So wonderful to have you here. | |
| I just want--I have a different type of questioning, and I | |
| would like to start with Dr. Fonseca just to take this to a | |
| more basic or granular topic where reality is more crude, and | |
| it is more understood. So, I am going to have--I am going to do | |
| ten questions, and I would like you to just answer yes or no if | |
| it is possible. Is it true that Venezuela went from being one | |
| of the richest countries in the hemisphere to one of the | |
| poorest? | |
| Mr. Fonseca. That is correct. | |
| Ms. Salazar. Is it true that inflation right now is over | |
| 4,000 percent? | |
| Mr. Fonseca. That is correct. | |
| Ms. Salazar. Is it true that the Venezuelans can only go to | |
| the supermarket a few days a week because there are no goods on | |
| the shelves? | |
| Mr. Fonseca. In most places, that is absolutely correct. | |
| Ms. Salazar. And is it true that the average Venezuelan has | |
| lost more than 50 pounds in the last 20 years because of lack | |
| of food? | |
| Mr. Fonseca. That is also correct. | |
| Ms. Salazar. Is it also true that Venezuela is empowering | |
| Hezbollah, the terrorist group, and that the United States has | |
| indicted members of the Venezuelan Congress just like if one of | |
| us were participating or working with the terrorist group | |
| Hezbollah? We know who that person is or who that group is. Is | |
| that true? | |
| Dr. Fonseca, did you hear me. | |
| Mr. Fonseca. I am sorry. I was muted. Yes, that is correct. | |
| Ms. Salazar. The has dog gone away. | |
| Is it true that the Venezuelan is empowering--the | |
| Venezuelan Government is empowering the terrorist group | |
| Hezbollah, and that the United States indicted a member of the | |
| Venezuelan Congress for working with Hezbollah. | |
| Mr. Fonseca. That is true. | |
| Ms. Salazar. And is it true that Venezuela is becoming a | |
| major hub for drug trafficking? And that criminal organization | |
| is their only--their only purpose is to harm the United States? | |
| Mr. Fonseca. They are absolutely a major hub for drug | |
| trafficking. | |
| Ms. Salazar. And is it true that Maduro's representative or | |
| the repressive apparatus is controlled and directed by more | |
| than 30,000 high-ranking Cuban agents like Ramiro Valdes, and | |
| they control even the Venezuelan customs office and the | |
| passport issuing office? | |
| Mr. Fonseca. There is absolutely a heavy presence. And I | |
| know you wanted a ``yes'' or ``no,'' but I am not sure that the | |
| numbers are what I am seeing as high. I think to your point, | |
| they still play a really vital, vital role in fire-walling the | |
| regime and absolutely have an important presence around Maduro, | |
| ensuring the survival of the regime. | |
| Ms. Salazar. And the Maduro is blocking at this hour the | |
| aid for food and medicine that, we, the United States are | |
| offering to give to them so they can help their people? They | |
| are blocking it and denying it? | |
| Mr. Fonseca. That is right, yes. | |
| Ms. Salazar. And, finally, is it true that 20 years ago, | |
| Hugo Chavez promised in an interview to yours truly that he was | |
| going to establish democratic socialism of the 21st century for | |
| the Venezuelan people? | |
| Mr. Fonseca. Yes, I recall that interview well, and yes, he | |
| did. | |
| Ms. Salazar. Thank you. Now, my question to you and to the | |
| rest of the panel is to what can we do as a country to help the | |
| Venezuelan people? | |
| Mr. Fonseca. I think, you know, one, we have to continue to | |
| apply pressure and, again, look for ways to allow access for | |
| vital humanitarian assistance. I think we also need to continue | |
| to reassure and support Venezuelan neighbors and those in the | |
| region that are having to absorb millions of Venezuelans | |
| fleeing the country. I think it should be noted that the--that | |
| the millions of Venezuelans fleeing the country are another | |
| really important release valve that allow the regime to muddle | |
| through by having to, you know, sort of having fewer mouths to | |
| feed in the country with an economy that continues to sort of | |
| move in a death spiral. And so I think that---- | |
| Ms. Salazar. If there is one single thing that we could do | |
| as a country to help the Venezuelan people, what would that be? | |
| Mr. Fonseca. Continue to apply pressure. I do not-- | |
| unfortunately, I do not see a short-term---- | |
| Ms. Salazar. What type of pressure? What type of pressure? | |
| Mr. Fonseca. I think we need to continue to apply | |
| diplomatic and economic pressure. We need to continue to press | |
| for the admission of humanitarian assistance in to support | |
| those--and, again, I think we need to--I know you asked for | |
| one, but I also think we need to shore up our allies and | |
| partners in the region---- | |
| Ms. Salazar. I only have 50 seconds. Why do not you let | |
| me--Dr. Arnson answer. If there is one single thing we can do | |
| as a country to help the Venezuelan people, what would that be? | |
| Dr. Arnson. It would be to work closely with our | |
| international allies, with the Venezuelan opposition, and with | |
| a broad range of actors in civil society that can come together | |
| around a common agenda, first, for humanitarian issues, and | |
| then eventually to tackle some of the more difficult political | |
| and security challenges. | |
| Ms. Salazar. Dr. Berg, one thing in 13 seconds. What could | |
| we do as a country to help the Venezuelan people at this hour? | |
| Dr. Berg. Thank you, Congresswoman. I would say to | |
| reiterate what Mr. Fonseca said, the pressure is, obviously, | |
| key. It has to be multi-dimensional. As I mentioned in my | |
| opening remarks, it is not just sanctions, but sanctions and-- | |
| and Congresswoman Levin asked a great question, previously, | |
| about sanctions and targeting. I think we can look at targeting | |
| and look at---- | |
| Ms. Salazar. What does targeting mean? I only have 14 | |
| seconds. One thing. What does targeting mean? | |
| Dr. Berg. To look at the actual targets of our sanctions. | |
| The people on whom we are putting sanctions. The theory behind | |
| the maximum pressure campaign was that sanctions would be | |
| enough to dislodge Maduro. But unfortunately the targeting of | |
| those sanctions has not been on actual military figures whom we | |
| all believe to control the security apparatus on the domestic | |
| level. | |
| So looking at targeting when it comes to our pressure will | |
| be key, Congresswoman. | |
| Ms. Salazar. Thank you. | |
| I yield back. My time is up. | |
| Mr. Sires. Thank you, Congresswoman. | |
| Congressman Vincente Gonzalez, you are recognized for 5 | |
| minutes. | |
| Congressman Gonzalez, are you on? | |
| Congressman Vargas, are you on? | |
| Mr. Vargas. Yes, I am. | |
| Mr. Sires. You are recognized for 5 minutes. | |
| Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear | |
| me? This is Juan Vargas. | |
| Mr. Sires. Okay, Juan. You are on. | |
| Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, first of all, Mr. | |
| Chairman, for having this hearing, and I also want to thank the | |
| ranking member and all of the witnesses. | |
| Two things jump out at me in this hearing, one, our failure | |
| with humanitarian aid. That seems to jump out when I hear | |
| statistics that Syrian refugees have received, literally, | |
| almost ten times as much aid as have Venezuelan refugees, that | |
| is one. | |
| And, second, our intelligence failures. It seems like that | |
| we believed that one thing was going to happen with sanctions | |
| and maximum pressure, and then it did not come about. | |
| So I can start first with humanitarian aid. I am very | |
| concerned about not only internally displaced people, but, of | |
| course, refugees, also. How can we work better with the allies | |
| that we have all been talking about, both in the region, | |
| European allies as we have said earlier, how can we work better | |
| with everybody to have a better result? Because the result | |
| right now is disastrous. | |
| I would ask that of Dr. Arnson. | |
| Dr. Arnson. Thank you very much, Congressman, for the | |
| question. I think that the United States certainly can | |
| contribute more of its own resources, but there are other ways | |
| to continue to mobilize the international community. There have | |
| been donors' conferences convened by the European Union. We | |
| should press for more. | |
| They, of course, are dealing with their own influx of | |
| refugees from Syria, from Afghanistan, from other parts of the | |
| Middle East and Northern Africa, and it is a complicated | |
| situation there as well. But we could also look to mobilize | |
| more contributions by the U.S. private sector and work in | |
| partnership with other organizations like the DFC to provide | |
| employment opportunities on the ground for Venezuelan refugees | |
| and host communities in the region. | |
| Mr. Vargas. I guess I am also very concerned about the food | |
| insecurity, in particular. I mean, I have great respect for the | |
| United Nations Food Program. As you know, they just won the | |
| Nobel Peace Prize for all the work that they are doing. But at | |
| the same time, they alerted us to all the millions of people in | |
| this world who may starve this year because of COVID and other | |
| issues. | |
| How can we work with the U.N. better knowing that what the | |
| Maduro regime has been doing to manipulate the food | |
| distribution because they want to do it? What can we do? I am | |
| very concerned about that. | |
| Dr. Arnson. | |
| Dr. Arnson. Yes, well you know, you have hit the nail on | |
| the head. I mean the greatest source of--the greatest obstacle | |
| to greater food assistance by the international community is | |
| precisely Nicolas Maduro and the rest of the Venezuelan | |
| Government. | |
| The United Nations has dramatically expanded its footprint | |
| in Venezuela over the last 2 years. There are a variety of U.N. | |
| agencies that are on the ground, the Office of Coordination of | |
| Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA, the--UNICEF and others. This does | |
| not include at this time the World Food Program. | |
| And I would note that, you know, there have been numerous | |
| efforts to take the issue of Venezuela to the U.N. Security | |
| Council. Most of those have served to just reproduce the | |
| polarization between the United States on the one hand and | |
| Russia and China on the other. But in bringing the humanitarian | |
| issue to the Security Council that did provide an opening--and | |
| there was agreement on providing this greater opening for U.N. | |
| agencies to have a presence. | |
| So the bottom line is, you know, how do you force people to | |
| do something that they do not want to do? It is very difficult. | |
| And so the question is can you offer them something which is | |
| not violating of your, you know, basic principles? Can you | |
| offer them anything in exchange? | |
| Mr. Vargas. If I can just interrupt the last few seconds | |
| that I have. What about the intelligence failure? Why have we | |
| gotten it so wrong? | |
| Dr. Arnson. Is that a question for me? | |
| Mr. Vargas. Yes. | |
| Dr. Arnson. Theories of political change are multiple. And | |
| there was the sense that by tightening the screws enough, you | |
| can create fractures in the regime, you can cause the military | |
| to divide. There were all kinds of ways in which, you know-- | |
| there was the assumption that the Maduro regime would implode | |
| or cry uncle and agree to the kinds of things that the United | |
| States and others wanted, including, you know, the Venezuelan | |
| opposition and the majority of the Venezuelan people. And that | |
| theory of change has proved false. | |
| And so I think it is to the credit of the Biden | |
| Administration that they are now looking at alternatives and | |
| looking to see what, if any, kind of, you know, negotiations | |
| that involve the opposition, that involve this big tent, civil | |
| society, you know, organizations, academia, unions, et cetera, | |
| can collectively pressure for some real change. | |
| Mr. Vargas. Thank you. My time has expired. I yield back. | |
| Thank you. | |
| Mr. Sires. Thank you, Congressman. | |
| Congressman Gonzalez, are you on the line. | |
| Mr. Gonzalez. Yes, sir. Thank you. | |
| Mr. Sires. You are recognized for 5 minutes. | |
| Mr. Gonzalez. Sorry, I had some technical difficulties | |
| there for a second. But my question is, there is--you know, | |
| American companies have seen their investment severely affected | |
| by the crisis in Venezuela. And while Venezuela's oil | |
| capabilities have severely decreased, some energy companies | |
| have played a crucial role in preventing the total collapse. | |
| How can Congress work with the private sector to protect | |
| American investment in Venezuela? And how can the private | |
| sector assist us? I chair the Oil and Gas Caucus for the | |
| Democratic Party. And I have a pretty good relationship with | |
| some of the energy companies that are down there. And they seem | |
| to have--talk about intelligence failures, they seem to have a | |
| lot of intelligence, and they seem to know a lot about what is | |
| going on. How could we better work together, or are we--and it | |
| just has not been working out--to both protect our energy | |
| investments in Venezuela? And how can they assist us in | |
| structuring policy? | |
| Dr. Berg. Congressman, if I can jump in on this one. It is | |
| a great question. So we have seen a lot of American companies | |
| and American investment in Venezuela affected by the Maduro | |
| regime, and its operations. I think--you and I are both | |
| observing energy companies, for example, trying to operate | |
| under extremely difficult conditions, under conditions where | |
| they do not have proper partnership from PDVSA with which they | |
| have to partner as a condition of being able to operate in the | |
| country. | |
| But there have been unique approaches by some American oil | |
| and gas companies to operate, basically, with the attempt of | |
| putting proceeds from those operations in say an escrow account | |
| or some way of sort of syphoning it off or kind of bracketing | |
| it off to the side and ensuring that a lot of the proceeds from | |
| that activity does not actually flow to the Maduro regime and | |
| the funding of that repressive security apparatus. | |
| And so there are creative ways in which we can think about | |
| keeping American investment there and keeping a footprint on | |
| the ground, as Mr. Fonseca said in his opening statement, while | |
| also ensuring that that money is not actually fuelling and | |
| funding the repressive apparatus there. | |
| Mr. Fonseca. Congressman, can I make one brief addition. | |
| Again, I could not agree more with Dr. Berg. And I do think we | |
| need to create space for the American private sector to out- | |
| compete Russia, China, and others and gain some access back on | |
| the ground. I cannot underscore how important, I think, to | |
| unleash the American private sector, and how that can provide | |
| consequential long-term influence in aid in ushering democratic | |
| transition at some point. | |
| The U.S. could consider the issuance of specific licenses | |
| to American companies engaged in sort of an oil for food | |
| medicine, rather than, you know, their removal of sectoral | |
| sanctions in the near term. I think this would give the | |
| American private sector some access on the ground, as well as | |
| possibly help alleviate some of the humanitarian pressures. | |
| One of the things I am most concerned about is the | |
| September 2020 Anti-Blockade Law that was passed. I think | |
| Venezuela in the near-term is going to be going, Maduro is | |
| going to be going through the process of privatizing major | |
| Venezuelan assets. And I think our adversaries are going to | |
| move in and try to consume those assets. And it might be very | |
| difficult to get them back at some point in the future, even if | |
| the hand or the pendulum swings back to the opposition. | |
| Mr. Gonzalez. That is just a huge concern. | |
| Dr. Arnson. Could I just add to that? I mean, I think what | |
| Brian Fonseca said nature earlier, of course, that nature | |
| abhors a vacuum is really true. And if U.S. companies, | |
| particularly, in the oil sector, and mostly in the oil sector | |
| are prohibited from producing, even if those assets go into an | |
| escrow fund or some other mechanism that is verifiable that | |
| does not benefit the regime, they are going to be taken over. | |
| And, you know, I think one of Maduro's survival strategies | |
| is going to be, over this next year, precisely to privatize | |
| PDVSA assets and other government assets and look for | |
| international companies to step in and run them. And we know | |
| exactly who those--who will be eager to acquire a greater share | |
| of the economic price of the country. | |
| Dr. Berg. Congressman, if I can just jump in here really | |
| quickly and piggyback on what Dr. Arnson said. | |
| One thing that I think the regime is looking at here is | |
| that during this--the political and economic crisis in the | |
| country, there are sort of three types of crudes within | |
| Venezuela: Light, medium, and heavy. The heavy crude is largely | |
| produced in conjunction with the private sector and with | |
| international companies. And that has been, if you look at the | |
| oil output in the country, some of the least affected as | |
| compared to medium and light crudes, which have been some of | |
| the most affected. And that is entirely basically produced by | |
| PDVSA the State owned oil company. | |
| So I think the regime is looking at this very clearly and | |
| saying, as Dr. Arnson mentioned and Mr. Fonseca, privatization | |
| might be the way to go here in terms of being able to increase | |
| productivity, because PDVSA is essentially beyond repair in | |
| terms of its ability to actually maintain the rigs and | |
| contribute to an uptick in oil production in the country. | |
| Mr. Vargas. Thank you so much. I yield back. | |
| Mr. Sires. Thank you. | |
| We now recognize Congressman Steube from Florida for 5 | |
| minutes. | |
| Mr. Steube. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And first I want to thank | |
| you for allowing members who are not on the subcommittee to ask | |
| questions. I appreciate that greatly, as these issues affect | |
| state of Florida that I represent in my district. | |
| My questions are directed to Mr. Berg. President Trump | |
| signed an order on his last full day in office which defers | |
| deportation of some 145,000 Venezuelans for 18 months. | |
| Venezuelans who are eligible for deferral can continue to live | |
| and work in the United States. Some of those included under the | |
| TPS program. President Trump blamed the Venezuelan socialist | |
| government and President Maduro for quote, ``The worst | |
| humanitarian crisis in the Western hemisphere in recent | |
| memory,'' Secretary of State Blinken even called Maduro a | |
| brutal dictator. | |
| The shortage and basic goods in medicine has forced these | |
| Venezuelans to flee the country. As a member of the Florida | |
| delegation, I know there is a significant number of Venezuelans | |
| in my State. What do you think the Biden Administration's plan | |
| should be regarding President Trump's order that he signed on | |
| those last days in office? | |
| Dr. Berg. Thank you for the question, Congressman, as I | |
| understand it, the deferred enforced departure was signed on | |
| the last day, but the details were left to the Biden | |
| Administration. And so from that standpoint, I would certainly | |
| encourage the Biden Administration to--not only to implement | |
| but to work out the exact details of the stay, the duration, | |
| the documentation, as well as the work permits. Because it is | |
| not in the United States' interest to send back Venezuelans to, | |
| as we have heard today at this hearing, to humanitarian | |
| disaster and a brutal dictatorship. | |
| I would also note that there is a real economic opportunity | |
| here with the number of Venezuelan migrants we have in the | |
| country. Numerous reports of late have shown just how educated, | |
| how entrepreneurial, and how dynamic this diaspora is. And so I | |
| think from an economic standpoint, particularly, from your | |
| state's standpoint where there are quite a few Venezuelan | |
| refugees, it could be a huge economic boom if done the right | |
| way. | |
| Mr. Steube. Well, Maduro has strengthened ties with--and it | |
| has been discussed already in this committee hearing--with | |
| Russia, China, Cuba, and Iran for political, economic, and | |
| military purposes. These malign, external actors prop up the | |
| regime and perpetuate the ongoing humanitarian crisis despite | |
| U.S. sanctions. What steps can the international community take | |
| that complement or support U.S. efforts to counter-support from | |
| these external actors to the regime? | |
| Mr. Fonseca. Congressman, I can take a shot at that, if | |
| that is okay. I think that is absolutely right. I think one of | |
| the things the United States, you know, needs to continue to | |
| place pressure and leverage our allies, multilateral | |
| organizations to continue to pressure, specifically, China, | |
| Russia, Iran, Turkey, and Cuba for the activities they are | |
| doing on the ground to, you know, keep the regime sort of | |
| muddling through, as well as, you know, not sort of | |
| contributing positively to alleviating the humanitarian crisis. | |
| I think we definitely need to do that. | |
| And to sort of build off of a comment, you know, that we | |
| made earlier, collectively, not having a presence on the ground | |
| allows our, you know, our adversaries, our rivals, you know, to | |
| certainly, you know, run, you know, run fairly rampant | |
| throughout the country. And so I think we need some presence | |
| back on the ground, not just sort of intel collection, but also | |
| to occupy influence space. | |
| Mr. Steube. What steps can the U.S. take to counter efforts | |
| from State actors, like Iran and Russia, to support the regime | |
| in evading U.S. sanctions, Mr. Berg? | |
| Dr. Berg. Great question, Congressman. I think one of the | |
| things that we have seen here is the regime's head-long plunge | |
| into the illicit economy, specifically, as the sources of legal | |
| activity in the country have dried up. | |
| And so I have outlined a number of recommendations, both in | |
| my oral testimony, my written, as well as in other places about | |
| certification regimes, for example, that we could--we could | |
| seek when it comes to parts of the illicit economy such as gold | |
| mining, which are very easily sort of brought into the legal | |
| economy through a number of maneuvers in countries like | |
| Colombia and in Brazil. | |
| And so those certification processes will be key. And a lot | |
| of it is just about pressure, as has been mentioned many times | |
| here, is that we have quite a bit of leverage, and we would be | |
| wise to use it for the right purposes here rather than | |
| squandering it. | |
| Mr. Steube. The Chinese Communist Party has helped the | |
| Madura regime evade U.S. sanctions and is one of regime's main | |
| financial backers and has more recently delayed Maduro's debt | |
| repayment in exchange for some shipments of oil. | |
| What does the Chinese Communist Party gain from involvement | |
| in Venezuela, and how does it reflect the nature of the Chinese | |
| Communist Party's influence in other parts of the region? | |
| Dr. Berg. Congressman, I think that China's role in, in | |
| Venezuela, as Dr. Arnson mentioned earlier, it started as a | |
| transactional economic relationship. It has now evolved into | |
| more of a geopolitical and possibly even strategic partnership. | |
| And so I know that there has been mention of the fact that | |
| there are no new loans that have been given to the country | |
| since 2017. But the fact is of the more than $60 billion in | |
| loans that were given since 2007, there is still a reasonable | |
| amount of that money that is outstanding. | |
| And so as long as China is bearing the burden--as long as | |
| Venezuelan debt remains in arrears, China in some sense is | |
| carrying the burden of this country's collapse. But | |
| nevertheless, I think for China, Venezuela at a standstill and | |
| therefore as a major liability and potential strategic threat | |
| for the region is actually to China's advantage in this broader | |
| geopolitical rivalry than a Venezuela working toward a | |
| democratic transition, possibly giving the United States an | |
| increased position or boost in their region. | |
| Mr. Steube. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. | |
| Mr. Sires. Thank you. | |
| We now recognize Congresswoman Omar from Minnesota for 5 | |
| minutes. | |
| Ms. Omar. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you for allowing me to | |
| come and be part of your committee. My colleague, Ms. Salazar | |
| from Florida asked her questions to everyone except the | |
| panelist who lives in Venezuela. | |
| So, Mr. Reyna, I would like to give you a chance to address | |
| her question. | |
| Mr. Reyna. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Omar. Perhaps | |
| not in just one issue, I have to say that aid has been coming | |
| in, not of course in the numbers that is needed. But just in | |
| our case as a small organization on the ground, in 3 years, we | |
| have brought in over 180 tons of aid and have distributed, just | |
| last year, 86 tons of aid in terms of medicines, medical | |
| supplies, and so on. | |
| My position here and my recommendation has been to engage | |
| in spite of all the reservations with some key actors within | |
| the Maduro government, as well as to continue working, for | |
| example, with the National Assembly of 2015 commission on | |
| humanitarian aid to increase the number of aid, I mean, the | |
| amount of aid coming into the country. | |
| I think that if one looks at the humanitarian situation and | |
| humanitarian impact on the lives of everyday Venezuelans, this | |
| is a must. And so I thank you for this, but I do believe that | |
| it is possible. We have been able to do this in spite of | |
| challenges, risks, and threats, and even having some of our | |
| personnel and colleagues going through, you know, difficult, | |
| risky situations, but we are still here, and we believe that | |
| this is possible. And once again, that engagement to me | |
| requires flexibility and creativity, but it is a must if we | |
| want to help the Venezuelan people. | |
| Ms. Omar. I am really grateful for the opportunity to hear | |
| directly from you. It has not been lost on me sitting here, | |
| hearing my colleagues engage on Venezuela and not having a | |
| single question addressed to you. So thank you so much. | |
| I am hoping that you can expand on a couple of points from | |
| your testimony. As you outlined the situation in Venezuela is | |
| dire, people are going without food and medicine. And, | |
| obviously, to many of us, you know, we believe that we cannot | |
| allow people to continue to suffer because of our own domestic | |
| policies. | |
| Can you tell us how your work has been impacted by the | |
| canceling of licenses for oil-for-diesel swaps, and what other | |
| sanctions are proving to be significant barriers to the | |
| humanitarian response? | |
| Mr. Reyna. Thank you. That is--there is one issue in | |
| particular that I think that is--that can be solved, I think, | |
| quickly, also, as a show of good faith between both the U.S. | |
| administration, the Biden Administration, and hopefully having | |
| bipartisan support, and the Maduro government. And this is | |
| lifting the sanctions on secondary--in the secondary sanctions | |
| on the swaps of oil for diesel. And this has quite an impact | |
| again on the population. | |
| The committee, the human rights committee in one of the | |
| States of Venezuela working with the anticorruption network | |
| stated very recently, this was just last month in February, | |
| Venezuela began 2021 with a severe shortage of diesel, the fuel | |
| used to transport heavy cargo, food stalls for public | |
| transportation, and turbo electric plants. Essential groups | |
| report diesel distribution failures since the end of 2020. For | |
| the agricultural sector, this has brought paralysis on the | |
| field. And they go on with other issues regarding that--this in | |
| particular. | |
| I think it would be quite an important step to lift the | |
| sanctions on the oil for diesel swaps and open a conversation, | |
| also in having the World Food Program coming into Venezuela | |
| with their capacity. | |
| Thank you. | |
| Ms. Omar. All right. And, then, just my last question to | |
| you--again grateful for the opportunity to ask these questions. | |
| How is the political stalemate between Maduro and Guaido | |
| impacting your ability to do your work and just the lives of | |
| Venezuelans since you are the only Venezuelan on this panel? | |
| Mr. Reyna. Thank you. I think that given the principles of | |
| humanitarian action, you know, we have worked in our own space, | |
| let's say, even though we have had, of course, conversations, | |
| for example, again with the Commission of Humanitarian Aid of | |
| the 2015 National Assembly, which is really important. I mean, | |
| if the aim is to help, it is to support the Venezuelan people | |
| suffering the consequences of the humanitarian emergency, that | |
| should be the consideration. | |
| So we have not been involved in the political conflict. It | |
| has to be solved. It needs to be addressed, definitely. But, | |
| certainly, we can find ways to have sort of a two-track kind of | |
| work. And the one that goes toward supporting the Venezuelan | |
| people suffering severely the consequences of the emergency can | |
| be worked out again, and we have shown that, a civil society | |
| organization is on the ground. | |
| Ms. Omar. Thank you. And, Chairman, I yield back. | |
| Mr. Sires. Thank you, Congresswoman. | |
| Now, we will recognize Congresswoman Malliotakis. You are | |
| recognized for 5 minutes. | |
| Ms. Malliotakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank | |
| you for allowing me to participate in today's subcommittee | |
| meeting. And I have really have found the exchange to be | |
| enlightening and a good discussion. | |
| You know, for me, it is heartbreaking to see how the | |
| wealthiest country in South America has been destroyed by | |
| corruption and socialism. People--and let's make it clear that | |
| the people of Venezuela suffer because of their own government, | |
| not for any other reason. And as a Cuban, the daughter of a | |
| Cuban refugee, it is all too familiar to me, because it is very | |
| similar to what happened in my family. But we have an | |
| obligation as the leader of the free world to help the | |
| Venezuelan people. | |
| And I look forward to working with the people on this | |
| committee to achieve that. | |
| I was pleased when the Biden Administration recognized Juan | |
| Guaido as the leader of the Nation. And--but I am--I am I guess | |
| a little upset about his announcement to reenter the United | |
| Nations Human Rights Council without having any type of | |
| concessions. And, as you know, last week at the first day of | |
| the session of the U.N. Human Rights Council, it was Nicolas | |
| Maduro who was given a platform to speak. | |
| One of the--one of the biggest violators of human rights | |
| was given a platform to speak at the United Nations Human | |
| Rights Council. And I think we have an obligation to speak out | |
| against that. | |
| And I would like to know from the panel their thoughts on | |
| how we can utilize the leverage of President Biden wanting to | |
| return to the council, and how we should be using that as | |
| leverage to try to get some accountability and to protect the | |
| human rights of not only the people of Venezuela, but of the | |
| nations that have propped up Venezuela, like Cuba, like Iran, | |
| like China, like Russia? That is my first question. | |
| And the second question is, in terms of it is good to have | |
| verbal support for Guaido, but what actions, specifically, do | |
| you think we should be taking as a nation to support him? Thank | |
| you. | |
| Dr. Berg. If I can jump in on the U.N. Human Rights Council | |
| question, that would be great. Congresswoman, that is a great | |
| question. And this exactly--this shows exactly the linkages | |
| that I mentioned in my opening statement. It was precisely the | |
| support of other authoritarian regimes, also, on the human | |
| rights council, like China, like Russia to be able to help | |
| Venezuela win from the South America region when there were | |
| really no other sort of competitors for those, for those seats | |
| on the human rights council. | |
| It was a total disgrace that Nicolas Maduro and his envoy | |
| in Geneva are giving the world lessons on human rights | |
| protections. So I absolutely share, your--your concern. And as | |
| a matter of fact AEI has done a report on reforming the U.N. | |
| Human Rights Council, which includes a number of things, | |
| actionable things that should happen before the U.S. sits in | |
| that body again. So periodic reviews of members that are on the | |
| council. So a kind of policing of one another to make sure that | |
| the body does not become a rogues' gallery of suspect States. | |
| More competitive elections. In many cases, we have | |
| elections where there are real only a few countries on the | |
| slate for--to represent their region. And so you have countries | |
| like Venezuela able to slip through because it has the support | |
| of greater powers, but also it just does not face that much | |
| competition. We have to increase the level of interest here, I | |
| think, in terms of the desire to sit on this body, and part of | |
| that is going to be shoring up its reputation. | |
| And, last, I would mention that there should be some sort | |
| of review, I think, before you are even eligible to put | |
| yourself forward for membership in this body that you sort of-- | |
| you comply with basic human rights standards. Because as we | |
| have seen, quite a few candidates in U.N. Human Rights Council | |
| elections have been extremely suspect. And so those are three | |
| sort of tangible things that I would throw out there right | |
| away. | |
| But I absolutely share your concern that Maduro and his | |
| envoys were given time in Geneva to present last week. | |
| Ms. Malliotakis. Please send me a copy of your report. I | |
| would like to read that. Thank you. | |
| Mr. Sires. I recognize now Debbie Wasserman Schultz. A | |
| tireless defender of Venezuela, and of human rights of | |
| Venezuela, for 5 minutes. | |
| Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank | |
| you for your indulgence in allowing me to moonlight as member | |
| of your subcommittee on the House Foreign Affairs Committee. | |
| Some of you may know that I represent the largest | |
| concentration of Venezuelans in the United States. My home town | |
| has so many Venezuelans that its nickname is West Venezuela, | |
| and proudly so. In my own neighborhood we are surrounded and | |
| are mixed with friends and neighbors who have family in | |
| Venezuela who have themselves fled from Venezuela. I have heard | |
| harrowing experiences shared with me repeatedly, a fight from | |
| political persecution, businesses confiscated, denial of basic | |
| food, or lifesaving medicines. And so making sure that we shine | |
| a spotlight on this plight is really critical. | |
| I want to ask Ms. Arnson and Mr. Reyna if they can talk | |
| briefly about the relief that declaring temporary protective | |
| status for Venezuela would provide the Venezuelans and the | |
| United States who fear deportation. And, specifically, if you | |
| could address why TPS, which is a legal protection that is | |
| based in statute offers better protection than DED, which was | |
| haphazardly declared in the last 16 hours of the previous | |
| President's term. | |
| And making sure, you know, from my perspective, I have been | |
| pleased to see as I--that President Biden has clearly indicated | |
| his plans to declare TPS for Venezuelans. And if you could | |
| share with us your perspective on the difference and why TPS | |
| would be preferable. | |
| Dr. Arnson. And I do not know if Feliciano wants to go | |
| first. Congresswoman Wasserman Schultz, I am not an expert on | |
| U.S. immigration law, but I think that, you know, what you have | |
| indicated in your question is true. That temporary protected | |
| status gives much greater certainty to Venezuelans that they | |
| will not be deported, but they will have not just a temporary | |
| stay of deportation, but also a number of rights to work in the | |
| United States and to have a life until such time as they may | |
| choose to return to Venezuela when the country is in a | |
| dramatically different circumstance. | |
| The deferred deportation is exactly that. It says we will | |
| not deport you. But there are many other things that go with | |
| being able to survive and live a productive life in the United | |
| States. And I think that Congress has on numerous occasions, in | |
| a bipartisan way, endorsed TPS for Venezuelans. And I would | |
| certainly support that and hope that the Biden Administration | |
| will follow through on its commitment which it made repeatedly | |
| during the campaign. | |
| Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you. Mr. Reyna. | |
| Mr. Reyna. Yes, thank you very, Congresswoman. I agree with | |
| Cindy that any status that would grant more rights to people in | |
| the United States who have migrated forcefully from Venezuela | |
| and who if coming back would really face, you know, | |
| difficulties, it is--it is the right way to go. | |
| So again, without having the total knowledge of the | |
| migration situation in the U.S., I understand from what I have | |
| read, from what I heard from colleagues that TPS would be the | |
| proper way to go. Thank you. | |
| Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you. | |
| And Mr. Reyna, I know earlier you spoke about the need for | |
| the donor community to step up globally. I am a member of the | |
| Appropriations Committee, and you know, as I said just | |
| moonlighting on the Foreign Affairs Committee today, but I | |
| curious about what more the United States should be doing. | |
| Particularly, where should we be focusing our efforts, our | |
| funding efforts within Venezuela, as well as neighboring | |
| countries like Colombia who has taken in, you know, significant | |
| refugees and migrant populations and also maybe throw in what | |
| about the rest of the international donor community? | |
| Mr. Reyna. Thank you. I believe that, again, in seeing the | |
| numbers and the extent of the situation here that there is room | |
| for much more. There are reservations because of the political | |
| situation and manipulation, for example, of humanitarian aid. | |
| But this is a risk I think that has to be taken, unfortunately, | |
| because such is the situation in Venezuela, and that does not | |
| mean that one cannot overcome, for example, a narrative or | |
| propaganda, or something like that. It can be done. | |
| And at the end, the end result is really supporting a | |
| popular | |
| [inaudible]. I think that there are others who should be | |
| coming in. Again, perhaps in a multilateral kind of reflection | |
| on the obstacles in Venezuela, why, and how to overcome. It | |
| would be possible to increase the amount of resources that are | |
| coming in. Working through the U.N. system is one way, is an | |
| important way both inside and outside of Venezuela, but also | |
| directly to civil society as has been happening so far, but | |
| perhaps this can be increased. | |
| And so are different ways in which I am quite sure that | |
| international cooperation can be increased in the case of | |
| Venezuela. Again, looking at the numbers with other countries | |
| in need, it really does not make any sense to see why is it | |
| that Venezuela is not receiving all the funding that it should | |
| receive for humanitarian aid. | |
| Thank you. | |
| Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield | |
| back. | |
| Mr. Sires. Thank you, Congresswoman. We have votes at | |
| 12:15, so we are going to go for another 10 minutes. The | |
| ranking member and I will have one more question. | |
| My question is to you, Mr. Reyna. Mr. Reyna, the reason you | |
| are a guest of our committee is because we recognize the work | |
| that you do inside of Venezuela. We recognize the risk that you | |
| take all the time. | |
| So as a recognition of your work and your effort, we want | |
| to make sure that we receive your thoughts here today at this | |
| committee. I happen to have visited Cucuta, Mr. Reyna, a couple | |
| of years ago. I have never seen anything like it. People from | |
| Venezuela work hours and hours just to get a meal. There had to | |
| be a line of about 5,000 people. There was a line for the | |
| bathroom for about 500,000 people alone. And there is a priest | |
| that through volunteers provides the meal for these people. I | |
| think that priest should be canonized because of the way he has | |
| organized and helped those people in that area. | |
| I was just wondering if your organization is involved at | |
| all in trying to help this particular part of Colombia or | |
| Venezuela at all? Are you involved, your organization, or any | |
| of your members involved? | |
| Mr. Reyna. Thank you, Chairman Sires. At Accion Solidaria, | |
| we are not working on the border, but we are part of the | |
| community of humanitarian organizations on the ground. | |
| What you are describing really is for us--this is sort of a | |
| daily happening, and it is something that, that takes you know, | |
| our time fully in terms of--I mean, even today, we are having | |
| about 80 people at our doors receiving medicines donated, and | |
| this goes to about 1,400 to 1,500 per month. But we do have a | |
| large network. | |
| Some of the organizations on the border towns are working | |
| with the UNHCR and others in order to provide support for the | |
| displaced, internally displaced, and then also working with | |
| others outside of Venezuela to provide support for refugees and | |
| migrants on the other side of the border. So---- | |
| And, again, I think, I really appreciate that you took the | |
| time to go to Cucuta to speak to the people and to see what | |
| they are going through. And, hopefully, also perhaps this | |
| would--you know, as I was saying, will lead to an increase in | |
| support, not only for what the response is here in Venezuela, | |
| but also in the region. We do need that. | |
| And the organizations that are working outside in this | |
| platform called response for Venezuelans would really | |
| appreciate such support. | |
| Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Reyna. | |
| I now recognize the ranking member. | |
| Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have heard throughout | |
| our discussion today something that made me think of a quote | |
| that I used to use when I run my healthcare company. I used to | |
| tell my physician leaders that, ``No one cares how much you | |
| know, until they know how much you care.'' | |
| And I want to make sure that both the people of Venezuela | |
| who can hear my voice today, the international community and | |
| all of our witnesses, and we want to help. We want to help. We | |
| want to help the people of Venezuela who are suffering one the | |
| greatest humanitarian crises ever and, certainly, the greatest | |
| economic collapse ever. | |
| But my concern is that if that assistance is funneled to | |
| and through the regime, it only empowers the regime's | |
| leadership. One example is Maduro's henchmen destroyed, | |
| literally destroyed resupply convoys of humanitarian aid coming | |
| in from Colombia. | |
| So my last and final question is how effective would | |
| relaxing sanctions be if Maduro is just going to seize, | |
| destroy, or misuse that aid? | |
| Ms. Arnson. If I could address that, Congressman Green. | |
| I mean, again, just to repeat, the Maduro regime is the | |
| principle obstacle to greater delivery. | |
| But as Feliciano Reyna was pointing out, there is, I think, | |
| a lot of experience in Venezuelan civil society, in the | |
| international community, in delivering aid in an apolitical | |
| fashion. And that has to be a fundamental principle. | |
| And to go to what a number of questions have touched on, I | |
| think that the scale, the resources for the humanitarian | |
| response, both inside Venezuela and outside Venezuela, for the | |
| refugees and migrants, has to be dramatically increased. | |
| And there are multiple international relief organizations, | |
| U.S. relief organizations, church organizations, USAID, State | |
| Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migrants, that | |
| are involved in this every single day, and they just do not | |
| have enough. There is just not enough funding to go around. | |
| So I would encourage people, as they look to what are the | |
| next steps to help Venezuela, to dramatically increase the | |
| amount of resources available. | |
| Mr. Green. Yes. And I was, in my preparations for today's | |
| committee hearing, surprised to see the delta between the aid | |
| to Syrian refugees and the aid to the Venezuelan refugees. And | |
| I agree with you, that disparity, I mean, we have got to | |
| recruit international partners to it, to this cause. | |
| But, again, my great concern is, whether it is an NGO or | |
| governmental assistance, it is got to get past Maduro to get to | |
| the people who need it. | |
| And I appreciate your thoughts and your comments. | |
| And, Mr. Chairman, I yield. | |
| Mr. Sires. Thank you, Ranking Member. | |
| And thank you again to our witnesses and the members for | |
| their participation in this important hearing today. | |
| The crisis in Venezuela deserves our urgent attention. I | |
| will continue to work closely with my colleagues and the Biden | |
| Administration on a bipartisan basis to pursue the peaceful | |
| return to democracy in Venezuela. | |
| With that, the committee is adjourned. Thank you to our | |
| witnesses. Thank you very much. | |
| [Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] | |
| APPENDIX | |
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| [all] | |
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