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| <title> - ASSESSING THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN SAUDI ARABIA</title> | |
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| [House Hearing, 117 Congress] | |
| [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] | |
| ASSESSING THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN SAUDI ARABIA | |
| ======================================================================= | |
| HEARING | |
| BEFORE THE | |
| SUBCOMMITTEE ON | |
| MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA, AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM | |
| OF THE | |
| COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS | |
| HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES | |
| ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS | |
| FIRST SESSION | |
| __________ | |
| March 18, 2021 | |
| __________ | |
| Serial No. 117-22 | |
| __________ | |
| Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs | |
| [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] | |
| Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov, | |
| or http://www.govinfo.gov | |
| ______ | |
| U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE | |
| 43-783PDF WASHINGTON : 2021 | |
| COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS | |
| GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York, Chairman | |
| BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking | |
| ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey Member | |
| GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey | |
| THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida STEVE CHABOT, Ohio | |
| KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania | |
| WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts DARRELL ISSA, California | |
| DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois | |
| AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York | |
| JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas ANN WAGNER, Missouri | |
| DINA TITUS, Nevada BRIAN MAST, Florida | |
| TED LIEU, California BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania | |
| SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania KEN BUCK, Colorado | |
| DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee | |
| ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota MARK GREEN, Tennessee | |
| COLIN ALLRED, Texas ANDY BARR, Kentucky | |
| ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GREG STEUBE, Florida | |
| ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia DAN MEUSER, Pennsylvania | |
| CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas | |
| TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey PETER MEIJER, Michigan | |
| ANDY KIM, New Jersey NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York | |
| SARA JACOBS, California RONNY JACKSON, Texas | |
| KATHY MANNING, North Carolina YOUNG KIM, California | |
| JIM COSTA, California MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida | |
| JUAN VARGAS, California JOE WILSON, South Carolina | |
| VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas | |
| BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois | |
| Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director | |
| Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director | |
| ------ | |
| Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa, and Global Counterterrorism | |
| THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida, Chairman | |
| GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia JOE WILSON, South Carolina, | |
| DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island Ranking Member | |
| TED LIEU, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania | |
| COLIN ALLRED, Texas ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois | |
| TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey LEE ZELDIN, New York | |
| KATHY MANNING, North Carolina BRIAN MAST, Florida | |
| WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee | |
| BRAD SHERMAN, California GREG STEUBE, Florida | |
| JUAN VARGAS, California RONNY JACKSON, Texas | |
| BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida | |
| Casey Kustin, Staff Director | |
| C O N T E N T S | |
| ---------- | |
| Page | |
| WITNESSES | |
| Nossel, Ms. Suzanne, Chief Executive Officer, PEN America........ 9 | |
| Aldosari, Dr. Hala, Scholar in Women's Health and Activist from | |
| Saudi Arabia................................................... 16 | |
| Fontenrose, Ms. Kirsten, Director, Scowcroft Middle East Security | |
| Initiative, Atlantic Council................................... 22 | |
| APPENDIX | |
| Hearing Notice................................................... 59 | |
| Hearing Minutes.................................................. 60 | |
| Hearing Attendance............................................... 61 | |
| RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD | |
| Responses to questions submitted for the record.................. 62 | |
| ASSESSING THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN SAUDI ARABIA | |
| Thursday, March 18, 2021 | |
| House of Representatives, | |
| Subcommittee on the Middle East, North | |
| Africa, and Global Counterterrorism, | |
| Committee on Foreign Affairs, | |
| Washington, DC. | |
| The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., via | |
| Webex, Hon. Theodore E. Deutch (chair of the subcommittee) | |
| presiding. | |
| Mr. Deutch. The subcommittee on the Middle East, North | |
| Africa, and Global Counterterrorism will come to order. Without | |
| objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess of the | |
| subcommittee at any point. | |
| All members will have 5 days to submit statements, | |
| extraneous material, and questions for the record, subject to | |
| the length limitation of the rules. | |
| We have been joined by the chair of the Foreign Affairs | |
| Committee, Chairman Meeks. Thank you so much for being here. | |
| As a reminder to members, please keep your video function | |
| on at all times, even when you are not recognized by the chair. | |
| Members are responsible for muting and unmuting themselves, and | |
| please remember to mute yourself after you finish speaking. | |
| Consistent with House Resolution 8 and the accompanying | |
| regulation, staff will only mute members and witnesses as | |
| appropriate when they are not under recognition to eliminate | |
| background noise. | |
| I see that we have a quorum. I'll recognize myself for | |
| opening remarks. | |
| Pursuant to notice, we are holding a hearing on human | |
| rights in Saudi Arabia. For decades, American presidents, both | |
| Democrats and Republicans, elevated human rights and advanced a | |
| values-based foreign policy, not because of altruism. | |
| Human rights and a principled foreign policy provided | |
| important advantages to the United States and strategic | |
| competition, and still does today, a competition with | |
| authoritarian rivals, from Putin's Russia to Khamenei's Iran to | |
| Xi's China. | |
| The U.S.-Saudi partnership forged in the aftermath of the | |
| Second World War is more than three quarters of a century old. | |
| It has persisted for more than 75 years through very different | |
| eras guided by very different kings and presidents because the | |
| United States and Saudi Arabia do share important interests. | |
| Working constructively and honestly with Saudi Arabia can | |
| advance U.S. interests and stability both in the Middle East | |
| and globally. | |
| However, human rights are a longtime point of contention in | |
| our relationship, and I believe that we must always ensure | |
| human rights are at the forefront of our foreign policy. | |
| The cold-blooded murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi by | |
| Saudi operatives in October 2018 and the Trump administration's | |
| response, which prioritized business opportunities over values, | |
| forced the reconsideration of the role that human rights play | |
| in U.S.-Saudi ties. | |
| The brutal murder of Khashoggi, a Washington Post | |
| journalist and Virginia resident in Mr. Connolly's district, | |
| was a rebuke to the values for which America stands. | |
| Approved by the highest levels of the Saudi government, as | |
| the recently declassified U.S. intelligence report made known, | |
| the killing undermined Americans' confidence in our partnership | |
| with the kingdom and inflicted enormous damage on the bilateral | |
| relationship. | |
| Other recent Saudi actions have tested the relationship, | |
| including the arrest and alleged torture of women's rights | |
| activist Loujain al-Hathloul, who simply advocated for the | |
| right of Saudi women to drive. | |
| Loujain was recently released but Saudi Arabia upheld her | |
| original sentence, so she still faces 3 years of probation in | |
| addition to her travel ban. Her probation also stipulates that | |
| anything perceived by Saudi authorities as political activism | |
| could result in rearrest. | |
| Saudi Arabia also imprisoned the blogger Raif Badawi, who | |
| is serving a 10-year sentence on bogus charges related to his | |
| writing and peaceful activism, Dr. Walid Fitaihi, a U.S. | |
| citizen and medical doctor who worked to build bridges between | |
| his native and adopted countries, was sentenced in December to | |
| 6 years in prison, and Dr. Bader al-Ibrahim, a journalist from | |
| northern Colorado who was targeted for his peaceful advocacy | |
| for social reforms. | |
| Saudi authorities also detained Salah al-Haidar, a writer | |
| and journalist, on baseless charges, and Aziza al-Yousef, a | |
| woman's rights activist who remains on provisional release. | |
| Both Mr. al-Haidar and Ms. al-Yousef are constituents of | |
| our colleague, Mr. Connolly, and as I mentioned earlier, Jamal | |
| Khashoggi was also a resident of Mr. Connolly's northern | |
| Virginia district, and I'd like to just take a moment to | |
| commend Mr. Connolly's tireless efforts on their behalf and for | |
| his work to uphold human rights in Saudi Arabia and around the | |
| world. | |
| Saudi Arabia is a partner, but we cannot be afraid to speak | |
| truth to our partners and we cannot sacrifice American values, | |
| especially when certain actions threaten the foundation of a | |
| relationship that advances U.S. interests. | |
| And while I acknowledge and appreciate recent Saudi reforms | |
| that provide greater rights to women and will reform elements | |
| of the Saudi judicial system, the Saudi government must take | |
| additional actions to address American concerns about the | |
| treatment of our citizens and residents. It must stop targeting | |
| Saudi dissidents and political activists, and must ensure | |
| fundamental human rights in the kingdom. | |
| Two and a half years after the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, | |
| we must reinforce this message already delivered by broad | |
| bipartisan majorities in Congress. We have passed multiple | |
| bills and resolutions calling for accountability for the murder | |
| of Khashoggi, the release of unjustly detained American | |
| citizens and Saudi political prisoners, and an improved human | |
| rights environment in Saudi Arabia. | |
| Additional measures, which we will hear about today, have | |
| been introduced in recent weeks by our colleagues on this | |
| subcommittee. Our focus must be on building a more balanced, | |
| healthy, and principled relationship with the kingdom. | |
| President Biden understands the role of values in our | |
| approach to the world. In fact, he has spent nearly 50 years | |
| advocating and implementing a principled U.S. foreign policy. | |
| The president believes, and I quote, ``The reason why we lead | |
| the world is not merely because we have the most powerful | |
| military in the history of the world. The reason we're followed | |
| is not because of the example of our power, but the power of | |
| our example, our value set. That's what's been able to persuade | |
| the world to move in the direction we want to move,'' closed | |
| quote. | |
| That's why the Biden Administration recently declassified | |
| and released the American intelligence community's assessment | |
| of the Khashoggi murder. | |
| I commend the Administration for taking this important and | |
| overdue step toward transparency, accountability, and justice | |
| for Jamal including the State Department announcement of visa | |
| restrictions and the Treasury Department's announcement of | |
| sanctions. | |
| These actions make clear the United States will not | |
| tolerate those human rights abuses, including the targeting of | |
| dissidents. But these actions should not be the last word. | |
| Congress must work with the Biden Administration on this | |
| difficult but necessary process of recalibrating U.S.--Saudi | |
| relations and ensuring that the tenor of bilateral ties always | |
| reflect our values as well as our national interests. | |
| I'd like to thank the witnesses for their testimony. I look | |
| forward to discussing this issue, which is so critically | |
| important to U.S. foreign policy, and to the protection of | |
| human rights around the world. | |
| And with that, I now yield to my friend from South | |
| Carolina, our ranking member, Joe Wilson, for any opening | |
| comments he may have. | |
| Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, | |
| Chairman Ted Deutch, for calling this important hearing on the | |
| status of human rights in Saudi Arabia, America's 75-year | |
| partner providing for stability in the Middle East. | |
| With Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's increased policy | |
| role in recent years, there's been a shift in messaging coming | |
| from the kingdom. | |
| The ongoing domestic initiatives of Vision 2030, an agenda | |
| aimed at diversifying revenue, increasing tourism, and | |
| presenting Saudi Arabia as a modern kingdom ready to do | |
| business around the globe, all are hailed as revolutionary. | |
| More still can be done, though, to accomplish the kingdom's | |
| goals of being accepted and being, again, a very appreciated | |
| ally of the United States. It seems that the image being | |
| portrayed to the world does not reflect the realities of life | |
| of the citizens of Saudi Arabia. | |
| The release of the declassified report by the director of | |
| National Intelligence confirms that a team of operatives | |
| carried out the brutal murder of journalist and Saudi | |
| government critic, Jamal Khashoggi, who was living in Virginia. | |
| In recent years, there has been increased use by the | |
| Specialized Criminal Court officially designated to counter | |
| terrorism to prosecute journalists, activists, and political | |
| dissidents. | |
| I hope our witnesses will speak to how the United States | |
| can use its policies to promote accountability for the past | |
| crimes and ongoing abuses. | |
| There have been positive developments regarding the rights | |
| of women, such as the reversal of the archaic ban on women | |
| driving, more ability for women to participate in social and | |
| cultural events, and some changes in guardianship policies. | |
| Small steps toward progress should be recognized. Sadly, | |
| these policies have been accompanied by an ongoing crackdown on | |
| activism and dissent. Reports by some female activists allege | |
| torture, imprisonment, and arbitrary charges and sexual abuse | |
| while detained. These abuses should be fairly investigated. | |
| For years, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has also pledged to | |
| address the issue of promoting extremist views toward religious | |
| minorities through its educational material. | |
| The Office of International Freedom at the State Department | |
| and organizations have indicated that the textbooks in Saudi | |
| Arabia classrooms incite hatred and rejection of other | |
| religions. | |
| Phrases that explain jihad as, quote, ``a joined battle | |
| against disbelievers,'' end of quote, have been frequently | |
| found in Saudi textbooks. I was grateful to introduce the | |
| bipartisan H.R. 554, Saudi Educational Transparency and Reform | |
| Act in 2019 with the distinguished Member of Congress from | |
| Massachusetts, Representative Bill Keating to require an annual | |
| review of Saudi Arabia's textbooks, ensuring that there is full | |
| implementation of its commitment to reform. Also, a country | |
| seeking modernity must not be involved in propagating hate in | |
| its textbooks and sowing extremist sentiments in children. | |
| I appreciate that the witnesses here are before us today | |
| and we were very grateful to have them here. Look forward to | |
| their perspectives, and it's also very important that we | |
| understand in the Middle East how important Saudi Arabia is | |
| standing firm against the murderous regime in Tehran, which has | |
| attacked the kingdom with rocket attacks over the last 2 years. | |
| And with that, I yield back. | |
| Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. | |
| I'll now recognize the chair of the Committee on Foreign | |
| Affairs, Mr. Meeks. Chairman Meeks, we're very glad to have you | |
| with us today for this important hearing and are honored by | |
| your presence, and you're recognized for any opening remarks | |
| you may have. | |
| Chairman Meeks. Well, good morning, and thank you, Chairman | |
| Deutch, for holding this timely hearing and for your excellent | |
| opening statement. I want to associate myself with it in its | |
| entirety. | |
| To our distinguished witnesses, I want to also thank you | |
| for your insights on this important topic. Saudi Arabia is a | |
| long-standing and critical U.S. partner in a complex and | |
| changing region. | |
| Our political, economic, and commercial interests intersect | |
| in important ways and many of our regional goals align. These | |
| goals are essential to the security of our country and that of | |
| our closest allies, and must be pursued together. | |
| Nonetheless, for far too long, Saudi Arabia's routine | |
| suppression of basic rights and free expression has gone | |
| unaddressed. From the lack of religious freedoms and minority | |
| rights to the act of suppression of public debate, free speech, | |
| and a criminalization of dissent, such actions are a thorn in | |
| the side of this important bilateral relationship. | |
| Though Saudi Arabia has taken steps toward reform, such as | |
| granting women the right to drive and obtain travel documents, | |
| recent years have been marred by the Saudi government's | |
| brutality against dissidents, most notably the detention and | |
| abuse of numerous peaceful protesters and a brutal killing of | |
| The Washington Post journalist and U.S. resident, Jamal | |
| Khashoggi. | |
| Despite overwhelming evidence of the Saudi government's | |
| role in this murder, the previous administration did little to | |
| ensure our relationship with Saudi Arabia remained consistent | |
| with American values. | |
| In contrast, the Biden Administration's release of the DNI | |
| report was a good step toward accountability for the killing of | |
| Mr. Khashoggi, finally following a bipartisan legal requirement | |
| the previous administration refused to comply with for over 1 | |
| year. | |
| Now, I look forward to the witnesses' testimony today and | |
| will close with this thought. We can and should maintain a | |
| strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia while being firm and | |
| clear about our values as a country, especially when it comes | |
| to the targeting of journalists, political dissidents, and the | |
| imprisonment of U.S. citizens. | |
| I look forward to hearing from the witnesses. Thank you, | |
| Mr. Chairman, and I yield back. | |
| Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Chairman Meeks. | |
| I will now introduce our distinguished witnesses. Ms. | |
| Suzanne Nossel is chief executive officer at PEN America. She | |
| previously served as chief operating officer of Human Rights | |
| Watch, executive director of Amnesty International U.S.A. | |
| She also served in the Obama Administration as deputy | |
| assistant secretary of State for international organizations, | |
| leading U.S. engagement in the U.N. and multilateral | |
| institutions on human rights issues, and in the Clinton | |
| Administration as deputy to the U.S. Ambassador for U.N. | |
| management and reform. She is the author of ``Dare to Speak: | |
| Defending Free Speech for All.'' | |
| Dr. Hala Aldosari is a scholar of social determinants of | |
| health and gender-based violence research. She examines the | |
| influence of gender norms on women's political, economic, | |
| legal, and health statuses in the Arab Gulf States. | |
| Dr. Aldosari has worked as a biomedical scientist and | |
| consultant for the Ministry of Health of Saudi Arabia and as a | |
| lecturer of health sciences. She has been selected for | |
| fellowships and scholar residencies at multiple top | |
| universities, and she was the Washington Post's first Jamal | |
| Khashoggi Fellow. | |
| And Ms. Kirsten Fontenrose is the director of the Scowcroft | |
| Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council. | |
| Previously, she served as senior director for the Gulf at the | |
| National Security Council, leading the development of U.S. | |
| policy toward the GCC, Yemen, Egypt, and Jordan. | |
| Her interagency experience includes 5 years at the State | |
| Department, leading the Middle East and Africa team in their | |
| Interagency Global Engagement Center, and she spent a year in | |
| the private sector consulting on specialized projects in the | |
| national security space. | |
| Thanks to all of the witnesses for being here today. I will | |
| now recognize witnesses for 5 minutes each, and without | |
| objection, your prepared written statements will be made a part | |
| of the record. | |
| Ms. Nossel, you are recognized for 5 minutes. | |
| STATEMENT OF SUZANNE NOSSEL, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, PEN | |
| AMERICA | |
| Ms. Nossel. Thank you, Chairman Deutch and Ranking Member | |
| Wilson, for convening this timely hearing. | |
| PEN America unites writers and their allies to celebrate | |
| creative expression and defend the liberties that make it | |
| possible. We're grateful for the opportunity to testify today | |
| on the ongoing assault on human rights and free expression in | |
| Saudi Arabia. | |
| PEN America has been vocal and active in advocating for | |
| justice following the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. In 2019, we | |
| awarded our PEN/Barbey Freedom to Write award to Saudi women's | |
| rights activists and writers Nouf Abdulaziz, Eman Al-Nafjan, | |
| and Loujain al-Hathloul. | |
| We recognize them for their fearless work exposing the | |
| deprivations of Saudi's infantilizing guardianship system over | |
| women and launched a global campaign for their freedom. | |
| While the recent conditional release of Hathloul and | |
| several other Saudi writers and women's rights activists is | |
| welcome, it must not blind us to the ongoing reality of | |
| sustained repression. | |
| Legal harassment, detention, and the threat of execution | |
| constrict the freedoms of those who dare speak out on sensitive | |
| subjects. | |
| Even those released are far from free, subject to travel | |
| bans, surveillance, and the risk of renewed imprisonment. The | |
| regime's determination to hunt down dissenters instills a | |
| fear--a sense of fear from which there is no escape, even far | |
| beyond Saudi borders. | |
| Saudi Arabia has long been one of the most restrictive | |
| countries in the world for human rights, including freedom of | |
| expression in the press. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is | |
| sometimes described as a modernizer. But his updated policies | |
| and practices must not be mistaken for true liberalization, | |
| much less any commitment to human rights. | |
| The Crown Prince has sought to consolidate his shaky hold | |
| on power by pairing social reforms popular with young Saudis | |
| with an intensifying crackdown on dissent and free speech. | |
| Measures to loosen restrictions on dress, entertainment, | |
| social media, and women's autonomy have been paired with a | |
| clamp down on the country's most potent rights advocates and | |
| dissenters. | |
| Loujain al-Hathloul is a striking example. Women were | |
| granted permission to receive driver's licenses in June 2018. | |
| But just weeks prior, she and others who had campaigned for | |
| years to secure this freedom were arrested, entering a nearly | |
| 3-year legal odyssey involving incommunicado detention and | |
| torture. | |
| The Crown Prince claimed glory for lifting the unpopular | |
| ban on driving, but went to extreme lengths to prevent those | |
| who had championed the cause from receiving credit or moving on | |
| to wage new fights for rights. | |
| Further waves of arrests of writers and activists in April | |
| and November 2019 evinced utter imperviousness to international | |
| outcry in the wake of the Khashoggi murder. | |
| The present moment represents a critical juncture to | |
| reorient U.S. policy on Saudi Arabia, making good on President | |
| Biden's promise to tip the scales in the direction of human | |
| rights. | |
| Saudi Arabia also represents an essential proving ground | |
| for an administration that aims to restore the U.S.'s | |
| legitimacy and leadership on human rights worldwide. Prisoner | |
| releases within weeks of President Biden's inauguration | |
| demonstrate the leverage the Administration can wield if it | |
| chooses to do so. | |
| After taking the crucial step of releasing the DNI report, | |
| the decision to spare the Crown Prince from sanction in order | |
| to protect other facets of the U.S.-Saudi relationship risks | |
| overshadowing the Administration's rhetoric and actions in the | |
| name of accountability. | |
| These include, importantly, the creation of a global | |
| Khashoggi ban, allowing visa restrictions for officials | |
| responsible for extraterritorial attacks on journalists. Robust | |
| further measures are now essential to ensure that neither Saudi | |
| Arabia nor the rest of the world are left with the impression | |
| that the U.S.'s commitment to human rights and press freedom | |
| will be traded away when the stakes are highest. | |
| The Crown Prince must face meaningful personal consequences | |
| for having directed the crime that shocked the conscience of | |
| the world. Otherwise, the shroud of untouchability shielding | |
| not just him but other abusive autocrats with whom the U.S. | |
| does business will stiffen with grave implications for global | |
| press freedom, free expression, and human rights. | |
| Congress should pass several bills that have been | |
| introduced to advance accountability for human rights | |
| violations in Saudi Arabia. These include the Saudi Arabia | |
| Accountability for Gross Violations of the Human Rights Act, | |
| introduced by Representatives Malinowski, McGovern, and Kim, | |
| the Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act reintroduced this year | |
| by Representative Connolly, and the Jamal Khashoggi Press | |
| Freedom Accountability Act, introduced by Representative Schiff | |
| and Senator Klobuchar. | |
| As for the Biden Administration, it should make good on its | |
| view voiced during the campaign that it would be necessary to | |
| seek a set of pledges from the Saudi government to ensure | |
| atrocities like the Khashoggi murder do not occur. | |
| They should make clear that such progress is a condition of | |
| future stable partnership with the U.S., including and | |
| particularly if the Crown Prince is to become king. | |
| The Biden Administration's commitment to rejoin the | |
| United--the U.N. Human Rights Council presents one vehicle. | |
| Saudi Arabia has been a member of the Council for 12 of the | |
| last 15 years since it was created in 2006. | |
| In running for election to the Council, the kingdom has | |
| pledged to consider joining key human rights treaties and | |
| cooperating with U.N. human rights mechanisms. But so far, | |
| these have been empty promises. | |
| In 2020, their candidacy was, thankfully, defeated in what | |
| the kingdom considered an embarrassing blow. The Biden | |
| Administration and the U.S. Congress should now push Saudi | |
| Arabia to adopt the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and | |
| the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, key | |
| human rights instruments that Saudi Arabia has never joined. | |
| Saudi Arabia should be pressed to permit entry by U.N. | |
| special procedures to carry out their work within country and | |
| to establish a U.N. Office for Human Rights in the kingdom that | |
| would help implement and assess planned legal and judicial | |
| reforms and advance further measures to uphold rights. | |
| Loujain al-Hathloul's sister Lina shared these words with | |
| us: ``Loujain was released thanks to international pressure, | |
| and the fight for her should not end here. Loujain is a symbol | |
| of Saudi Arabia's human rights defenders and giving up on her | |
| now is giving up on the fight for freedom. We thank the many | |
| Members of Congress who have raised their voices on behalf of | |
| writers, activists, and other human rights defenders in Saudi | |
| Arabia. It makes a difference and we must keep up and step up | |
| the fight.'' | |
| Thank you. | |
| [The prepared statement of Ms. Nossel follows:] | |
| [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] | |
| Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Ms. Nossel. | |
| Dr. Aldosari, welcome back to the subcommittee. You are | |
| recognized for 5 minutes. | |
| STATEMENT OF DR. HALA ALDOSARI, SCHOLAR IN WOMEN'S HEALTH AND | |
| ACTIVIST FROM SAUDI ARABIA | |
| Dr. Aldosari. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished | |
| members of the House for organizing this important event and | |
| for including my voice and voices in the region in your | |
| deliberation. | |
| I present my statement here as a citizen of Saudi Arabia | |
| who was forced into exile because of my advocacy for women and | |
| human rights in my country. I'm one of hundreds of Saudis, | |
| scholars, activists, who were forced in the last few years to | |
| seek refuge in other countries because of their writings or | |
| demands for reforms. | |
| Saudi Arabia has become one of the most repressive | |
| countries while pursuing certain legal reforms. The brutal | |
| murder, as mentioned, of Jamal Khashoggi has actually revealed | |
| the reality on the ground. | |
| Human rights in Saudi Arabia are severely limited because | |
| of the absolute monarchial system of governance. There is no | |
| political parties, independent media associational life for the | |
| civil society or any other means for peaceful safe public | |
| engagement in political affairs. | |
| The Royal Advisory Council is made up of appointed members | |
| without legislative or oversight power. Only two-thirds of the | |
| municipal council seats are open for election, and candidates | |
| are routinely disqualified if they were engaged in any public | |
| discourse on reforms. | |
| While activists and advocates for reforms are routinely | |
| targeted and silenced, the situation has become more aggressive | |
| both in scope and severity since the Crown Prince, Mohammed bin | |
| Salman, came to power in 2017. | |
| Several waves of arrests, as mentioned by my other | |
| colleagues, have targeted people of different backgrounds: | |
| religious reformers, bloggers, businessmen, Statesmen, members | |
| of the ruling family and men and women activists under various | |
| pretexts like fighting political Islam, corruption, or treason. | |
| The Presidency of State Security established by Mohammed | |
| bin Salman in 2017 reports directly to court or to Mohammed bin | |
| Salman with the authority of utilizing any institutional | |
| resources or manpower to conduct its operations without any | |
| kinds of judicial oversight. | |
| Testimoneys of several detained individuals indicate an | |
| alarming use of torture to coerce confessions or to seize | |
| personal assets. Laws on counterterrorism and cybersecurity are | |
| repeatedly cited in targeting peaceful advocates for reforms. | |
| In his 2018 mission report, the Special Rapporteur on the | |
| promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental | |
| freedom while countering terrorism expressed his concern that | |
| confessions obtained under torture were admissible and | |
| decriminalized in the specialized criminal court, and this is a | |
| quote often used to try activists and advocates for reforms. | |
| He also noted that there were 3,000 allegations of torture | |
| were formally recorded but without any kinds of persecution of | |
| officials involved. There are no safeguards against torture or | |
| ill treatment and most individuals are held incommunicado for | |
| extended periods of time. | |
| We have learned only from, you know, those who were | |
| recently released or the relatives of those who were detained | |
| about the different forms of torture used and how systematic it | |
| became as part of the State investigation. | |
| Electric shock, waterboarding, severe beatings, starvation, | |
| sleep deprivation were common practices in Saudi interrogation. | |
| In addition, the woman activist have also been exposed to | |
| sexual abuse and threats of rape and killing. | |
| They all have pointed to the role of the masked individual | |
| from the State Presidency Security and for individuals such as | |
| Saud al-Qahtani, who is an advisor or close advisor of Mohammed | |
| bin Salman and who has been cleared from any kinds of | |
| responsibility and the Khashoggi killing. | |
| So despite very good reforms to ease the restrictions on | |
| women's autonomy and women mobility, women remain vulnerable to | |
| discrimination and abuse. These reforms do not protect women | |
| from their guardians asking for--you know, revoking any kinds | |
| of rights because of this obedience or absence from home. | |
| Sponsorship system remains problematic, despite the reforms | |
| that have been in effect, and we, as a people, have come | |
| together to establish a vision for reform that puts people in | |
| exile--I mean, Saudi people in exile--have put the people's | |
| vision for reforms that centers human rights and social justice | |
| as key measures or benchmarks for any meaningful reforms. | |
| And I thank you. I do not want to speak more, but we can | |
| definitely discuss this at length in questions. | |
| Thank you. | |
| [The prepared statement of Ms. Aldosari follows:] | |
| [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] | |
| Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Dr. Aldosari. | |
| Ms. Fontenrose, you are recognized for 5 minutes. | |
| STATEMENT OF KIRSTEN FONTENROSE, DIRECTOR, SCOWCROFT MIDDLE | |
| EAST SECURITY INITIATIVE, ATLANTIC COUNCIL | |
| Ms. Fontenrose. Chairman Deutch, Chairman Meeks, Ranking | |
| Member Wilson, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for | |
| your attention to an interest in shaping the future of the | |
| U.S.-Saudi relationship. | |
| The U.S. has an opportunity now at the start of an | |
| administration that has made it clear that the U.S.-Saudi | |
| relationship will be recalibrated to set a course for the | |
| bilateral that protects and advances both human rights and U.S. | |
| strategic interests. | |
| The administration's vow to apply Global Magnitsky | |
| sanctions to employees of the kingdom who threaten Saudi | |
| activists abroad is a step in the right direction. Likewise is | |
| the travel visa ban on Khashoggi--or the Khashoggi ban, though | |
| it is a downside in the eyes of human rights attorneys that we | |
| can discuss later if you're interested. | |
| Diplomatically, President Biden's choice to limit Mohammed | |
| bin Salman, or MBS's, access within the U.S. Government to his | |
| official role as Minister of Defense sends an important | |
| deterrent message in the service of human rights. | |
| Not treating MBS as de facto head of State implies that the | |
| Crown Prince would not be safe from prosecution in American | |
| courts. Examples from recent years indicate that this pressure | |
| can result in policy changes in the kingdom within certain | |
| lanes. | |
| U.S. urging helped lead to reforms passed in 2019 to allow | |
| women to drive and travel abroad independently and to end | |
| flogging as a criminal punishment. And as mentioned previously, | |
| U.S. pressure obtained the release of Loujain al-Hathloul. | |
| The State Department has encouraged the kingdom's efforts | |
| to remove hate speech from its school curriculum since 2015. A | |
| new version was released last year, perhaps in response to | |
| legislation sponsored by Congressman Wilson. | |
| One reality check, however, the U.S. recently lost a point | |
| of leverage with MBS by releasing the unclassified ODNI report | |
| on the murder of Jamal Khashoggi so early in the | |
| Administration. A delay in the report's release might have | |
| yielded additional concessions to the U.S. act. | |
| In the bilateral relationship, the U.S.'s position is | |
| arguably stronger than the kingdom's, but the U.S. is still | |
| wise to weigh the cost of its policy decisions. | |
| Sanctioning MBS could lead to calls for sanctioning Chinese | |
| President Xi Jinping, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei for | |
| ordering and overseeing the abuses that make China and Iran No. | |
| 1 and No. 2 respectively on the U.N.'s list of the world's | |
| worst human rights abusers in 2020, ahead of Saudi Arabia's | |
| slightly less egregious position as No. 5. Sanctioning the | |
| Crown Prince is unlikely to create support for replacing him as | |
| heir apparent. | |
| After Members of Congress spoke angrily in December 2018 | |
| about MBS's role in the Khashoggi killing, third-party | |
| pollsters in Saudi Arabia registered rising support for the | |
| Crown Prince amongst young adults, his base for more than half | |
| of the population. | |
| U.S. sanctions are--I'm sorry, U.S. actions targeting | |
| Mohammed bin Salman personally with the implied aim of | |
| impacting his chances for ascension could draw retaliation from | |
| Saudi Arabia on multiple fronts. | |
| These might include reductions in foreign direct investment | |
| in the U.S., increased cooperation with China on nuclear | |
| energy, refusal to normalize with Israel, refusal to contribute | |
| to expensive regional stabilization projects that will be U.S. | |
| priorities, support to Bashar al-Assad's government in Syria, | |
| continuation of the war in Yemen, or undermining of President | |
| Biden's energy transition agenda. | |
| It's important to understand that the root of human rights | |
| abuses perpetrated by Saudi Arabia are issues perceived as | |
| existential by the increasingly narrow circle of decisionmakers | |
| in the royal family. | |
| Whether this perception is accurate or not, if Riyadh's | |
| calculus indicates that a U.S. act will cause regime | |
| vulnerability, it will not be met. New methods are necessary. I | |
| offer four pages of options in my written testimony. | |
| But for now, I would like to stress two overarching pieces | |
| that would increase the odds of any U.S. policy actuating | |
| change in Saudi Arabia. | |
| First, clearly defined red lines and consequences for | |
| violating them. U.S. administration bears the baggage of the | |
| Obama red line on the use of chemical weapons in Syria in 2012, | |
| but actual tiers of red lines with proportional responses could | |
| reduce the likelihood of the kingdom calling the U.S.'s bluff. | |
| Second, an international rise response to Saudi human | |
| rights violations like the Khashoggi murder. Citizens of | |
| multiple nations are victims of human rights abuses at the | |
| hands of Saudi actors, and there was no need for the U.S. | |
| bilateral relationship to be the sacrificial lamb. | |
| I propose for your consideration instead an international | |
| convention against harassment and harm of political dissidents | |
| abroad that commits all signatories to enact sanctions or take | |
| other steps together against violators. | |
| In closing, I'd like to note that the kingdom is a linchpin | |
| for nearly every U.S. objective in the region and some beyond: | |
| drawing down our military footprint, expanding and deepening | |
| Arab-Israeli normalization, preventing the resurgence and | |
| spread of violent extremist groups, ending the war in Yemen, | |
| containing Iranian nuclear and regional ambitions, preventing | |
| adversarial great power domination of the resources and | |
| waterways of the region, ensuring the flow of energy to fuel | |
| American lives and industry, stabilizing post-conflict zones so | |
| populations in countries wracked by war can begin to rebuild | |
| their lives, and energy transition and decarbonization. | |
| U.S. goals in the Middle East are best served by remaining | |
| closely engaged with the government of Saudi Arabia, adopting | |
| an approach that is part boot camp instructor, part parole | |
| officer, and part avuncular advisor. | |
| Demographic trends indicate that Saudi will look very | |
| different in 10 to 20 years. That could allow for a new | |
| political model. | |
| An alienated Saudi Arabia will not get there by itself. It | |
| is in the U.S. interest to shepherd that potential, lead course | |
| correction, and build a better partner. | |
| Thank you. | |
| [The prepared statement of Ms. Fontenrose follows:] | |
| [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] | |
| Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Ms. Fontenrose. | |
| Thanks to all of you for your testimony today. I will now | |
| recognize members for 5 minutes each. Pursuant to House rules, | |
| all time yielded is for the purposes of questioning our | |
| witnesses. | |
| Because of the virtual format of this hearing, I'll | |
| recognize members by committee seniority, alternating between | |
| Democrats and Republicans. If you miss your turn, please let | |
| our staff know and we will circle back to you. | |
| If you seek recognition, you must unmute your microphone | |
| and address the chair verbally. We will start and I will yield | |
| to my friend from New York first, the chairman of the House | |
| Foreign Affairs Committee, Gregory Meeks, for any questions | |
| that he may have. | |
| Chairman Meeks, you are recognized. | |
| Chairman Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. | |
| Let me ask Ms. Nossel, the Trump administration rarely | |
| raised difficult issues with the Saudis, and the United States | |
| must grapple with the question of how to address actions by | |
| partners in countries that conflict with who we are as a | |
| country, without basic values. | |
| So given the lack of effective response to public | |
| statements drawing attention to the Saudi human rights | |
| violations, what do you view as the most effective way that the | |
| United States can encourage changes in the Kingdom of Saudi | |
| Arabia? | |
| Ms. Nossel. I agree with you that the United States has | |
| leverage, must use its leverage. I think it's a combination of | |
| measures both public and private. | |
| I think it needs to be made clear that the future of this | |
| relationship depends upon demonstrable durable progress. I | |
| think it's very important to distinguish between | |
| [inaudible] really an attempt at some greater support | |
| amongst the Saudi population and particularly the youth in | |
| order to stabilize the monarchy and protect against any sort of | |
| public uprising and tamp down on opposition. | |
| So taking certain measures to sort of twist the valve and | |
| release some of the pressure that would otherwise buildup, | |
| things like allowing women permission to drive, loosening some | |
| of the strictures of the guardianship system, allowing some | |
| more access to social media. | |
| But I think the United States needs to make clear that it | |
| does not--it's not deceived into thinking that this is a | |
| liberalization agenda that's simply, you know, on its way and | |
| it's going to lead inexorably to greater freedom over time. | |
| I think it's quite the opposite. I think it's a deliberate | |
| two-pronged strategy to, on the one hand, modernize and satisfy | |
| some of that public pressure and, you know, perhaps also window | |
| dressing in terms of global perceptions of the kingdom. | |
| But that is being paired with this intensifying crackdown | |
| that is worsening the situation for freedom of expression, | |
| making life even more difficult and risky for dissidents. | |
| And so I think the United States needs to be candid about | |
| sort of seeing through that. I think there's a wish to look at | |
| the modernization methods as sort of steps in the right | |
| direction and if we can just encourage more of that we'll be on | |
| our way. | |
| I do not think that's accurate. I think we need a candid | |
| discussion about the imperative of concrete measures. I think | |
| we need to take steps of our own to ensure that they think-- | |
| they recognize we take this--these issues seriously and we're | |
| prepared to take some risks in the relationship on behalf of | |
| human rights. | |
| But we also have to insist that they--that the Saudi | |
| government commit to tangible steps, and there are all sorts of | |
| things. They know it's releasing dissidents. | |
| It's not imprisoning additional people. It's allowing the | |
| kind of discourse online that was flourishing a few years ago | |
| but now has been, you know, brutally muzzled and suppressed. | |
| And so, yes, I think there are a variety of levels. I agree | |
| with the idea of multilateralizing that pressure and engaging | |
| others in applying it so it's not just the United States alone. | |
| I think the Human Rights Council in Geneva can provide an | |
| important vehicle for that. | |
| Chairman Meeks. So what about, you know, there have been | |
| issues and questions going along as far as accountability is | |
| concerned, particularly in light of the killing of Jamal | |
| Khashoggi. | |
| Are there any other actions that you think that you would | |
| view as appropriate to ensure accountability and/or--and | |
| positive steps for reform that we--you know, that can be done | |
| here? | |
| Ms. Nossel. Yes. So, I mean, I think the two really need to | |
| be paired. I think when it comes to accountability, the obvious | |
| glaring gap is with respect MBS himself. I understand the | |
| dilemma that the Administration faces and the other equities | |
| that are at work in the relationship. | |
| But I do think this is a situation where, no matter the | |
| other measures enacted, some of which I think have been, of | |
| course, very positive--the application of the Magnitsky | |
| sanctions, the global Khashoggi ban and the application of that | |
| to 76 Saudis who were implicated not just in the Khashoggi | |
| case, but in attacks and plots against other dissidents around | |
| the world. | |
| So positive steps, but I think the rubber hits the road | |
| when it comes to MBS and if the perception is that he's gotten | |
| off scot free, that unravels the whole notion and concept of | |
| accountability in this case. | |
| And so I think it's extremely important that he not be | |
| welcomed back into diplomatic good graces anytime soon, that if | |
| and when he is it is in response to concrete, measurable, | |
| visible, and irreversible steps that we can point to to say, | |
| you know, this is a different era, and the pressure worked and, | |
| you know, he's been prompted and the monarchy has been prompted | |
| to do things it would not otherwise have done. | |
| I think the measures I referenced in my statement, the | |
| congressional measures, including Representative Malinowski's | |
| important proposal to impose a travel ban--you know, that would | |
| signify that the buck stops where it should stop and not | |
| several steps down, which is, you know, I think the perception | |
| in light of where things are today. | |
| I do think, as you say, it's not just about accountability | |
| for the Khashoggi murder, as important as that is. I think it | |
| has to go further with the broader climate of brutal repression | |
| of free expression. That's what Jamal Khashoggi lived for and, | |
| ultimately, died for. | |
| And so if we do not reach beyond, you know, this current | |
| question of accountability for this horrific heinous deed, you | |
| know, the legacy and the forces that brought it about will | |
| survive intact. | |
| And so I do not think we can count that as a success, and | |
| that's why I think we need to press for these four systemic | |
| changes. | |
| Chairman Meeks. Thank you so very much. I'm out of my--out | |
| of time. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much. | |
| Mr. Deutch. Of course. Thank you, Chairman Meeks. | |
| Next, we'll go to Ranking Member Wilson. | |
| Mr. Wilson, you're recognized for 5 minutes. | |
| Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I want | |
| to thank our witnesses for being here today. An indication of | |
| how important their testimony is how fortunate we are to have | |
| Chairman Greg Meeks participate, and so this truly indicates | |
| how important this issue is. | |
| And I have a question for each of our three witnesses and | |
| that is, how strongly is Saudi Arabia motivated to | |
| differentiate itself from Iran on human rights? On what human | |
| rights issues do you see the most potential for behavior to | |
| change due to this motivation? | |
| Any of the witnesses? | |
| Dr. Aldosari. I can talk about that. Saudi Arabia is more | |
| committed to being part of the global movement, basically, of | |
| modernization, global movement to fight radical Islam or | |
| radical movement more so than Iran on that front, and this | |
| presents a leverage for the U.S. and democratic countries to | |
| utilize, to lead by example, to push for more democratic--back | |
| for democratic change or transformation in Saudi Arabia. | |
| Saudi Arabia seems to be keen very much to be a hub for | |
| international business, to open its--to open the country for | |
| tourists. These are all things that you do not really see in | |
| Iran and they're very much, like, a closed off country and | |
| different in these kinds of issues. | |
| So I think that leverage, the leverage of global business | |
| values, global tourism, being part of, you know, those | |
| democratic countries, these are all leverages that can be used | |
| to reform certain issues inside Saudi Arabia and more so in | |
| political reforms to democratic change, which is the only, I | |
| would say, safeguard against the excesses of abuses that we're | |
| seeing and witnessing from the--from the State. | |
| Mr. Wilson. Either other witness any comment? But thank | |
| you, that was right on point. | |
| Ms. Fontenrose. I would only--I would add that, according | |
| to Human Rights Watch, the use of capital punishment declined | |
| in 2020 to 8 percent of the 2019 numbers, whereas Iran in the | |
| same year carried out the death penalty 15 times as often as | |
| did Saudi Arabia. | |
| This is not what the U.S. can claim credit for, but we | |
| assess that it was Saudis' need to differentiate itself from | |
| Iran in ways that are meaningful to Europe that may have played | |
| a role here. | |
| And I think that the areas we're seeing the most acceptance | |
| by Saudi in terms of making changes in human rights are women's | |
| issues and in terms of religious tolerance and religious | |
| freedoms. | |
| We are on the cusp of Saudi normalizing with Israel. It | |
| will probably be after a change in top leadership, but that | |
| will happen, and these are places where the U.S. can take | |
| credit for applying the pressure that has made a difference. | |
| There's quite a bit of leverage that the U.S. has in this | |
| relationship: our military presence, the presence of our | |
| expats. | |
| We have tens of thousands of people living in Saudi Arabia, | |
| and they're very aware, to my co-panelist's point about | |
| economic incentives, that if the U.S. multinational | |
| corporations pull their people other multinationals will | |
| follow, and this will very negatively impact Saudi Arabia's | |
| economic landscape. | |
| We also have leverage in terms of our court system, which I | |
| alluded to, our troop presence, arming and equipping of their | |
| security services, our intelligence sharing. There are many | |
| levers the U.S. can play with here. | |
| Mr. Wilson. And I--yes. | |
| Ms. Nossel. Yes. I mean, just to add, briefly, I think the | |
| Saudi participation in U.N. human rights mechanisms and their | |
| seeking out of a seat on the Human Rights Council four times is | |
| indicative of what my colleagues are talking about, which is | |
| this desire to be recognized on the world stage, to win | |
| diplomatic acceptance, to be welcomed in the corridors of | |
| power, you know, which is something that operates very | |
| different--you do not see that with Iran. | |
| They have, you know, positioned themselves as an | |
| international outlier with certain alliances but not-- | |
| certainly, not in the good graces of the West. And I think | |
| Saudi is very much seeking that acceptance and it is a crucial | |
| point of leverage. | |
| I think MBS is emblematic of that and, you know, in a very | |
| conflicted way. But it's clear he wants to be part of the club | |
| on the global stage, and so making very explicit what the | |
| conditions and imperatives are, you know, if he's ever going to | |
| attain that status, I think, is important. | |
| You know, I think my colleagues are correct in terms of | |
| identifying areas like women's rights, certain religious | |
| freedoms, you know, where there's more leeway. These legal and | |
| judicial reforms that have now been proposed to extend right to | |
| counsel, greater transparency in legal proceedings are | |
| important. | |
| But there is a fundamental problem, though, which is that | |
| this monarchy is shaky and MBS's ascension is shaky, and as | |
| long as that remains true, ultimately, their willingness to | |
| tolerate dissent is not going to--is going to be very limited | |
| because he recognizes that, you know, twisting the valve and | |
| allowing people to speak out and question what is being done | |
| and the decisions that are being taken, the legitimacy of his | |
| role, whether he's qualified to be in the position he's in, you | |
| know, all of those debates are existential for him. | |
| And so I think we have to be sort of forthright that, yes, | |
| making promises--progress on women's rights is essential. You | |
| know, it could ultimately burgeon into something wider. | |
| But at the same time, you know, there is that kind of | |
| fundamental disconnect between sort of the instability of the | |
| regime and the fragility of it and the unwillingness to | |
| tolerate dissent. | |
| Mr. Wilson. Thank you all, and I yield back. | |
| Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Mr. Wilson. | |
| Next, we will go to Mr. Connolly. Mr. Connolly, I said | |
| earlier I wasn't--I wasn't sure that you were on. But let me | |
| just say, again, that the work that we're doing on this--on so | |
| many issues but on this--on this topic specifically is | |
| informed, in large part, by your advocacy, your leadership, and | |
| your work on behalf of Jamal Khashoggi and your other | |
| constituents, protecting Saudi dissidents in your legislation. | |
| Thank you for all that you do for us and for the focus on human | |
| rights around the world, in Saudi Arabia in particular. | |
| And I will now recognize you for 5 minutes. | |
| Mr. Connolly. Mr. Deutch, thank you so much. What gracious | |
| remarks and what a great way to begin my day. So thank you so | |
| much, and thank you for having this hearing. | |
| Ms. Fontenrose, I want to--I want to use two words here. | |
| One is impunity and the other is leverage. We just heard how | |
| shaky, in a sense, the monarchy is and, yet we look at a Saudi | |
| government that, I think, for decades has operated with | |
| impunity with respect to the United States relationship. | |
| They know that the oil relationship, the arms sale | |
| relationship, the strategic posture of Saudi Arabia as a, you | |
| know, a counter pressure point to the Iranians and to giving | |
| the nod now and then to the Israeli relationship are all so | |
| important that we're going to have to overlook bad behavior. | |
| And, you know, for me, Chairman Deutch just mentioned, of | |
| course, the unbelievable and despicable murder of my | |
| constituent, an American resident, Jamal Khashoggi, and the | |
| dismemberment of it, and the word impunity comes to mind. | |
| The fact that anyone would even think to plan such a thing | |
| would suggest, I'm pretty sure we're going to get away with it, | |
| and, frankly, in the Trump administration, they did. | |
| And I am worried that the Biden Administration has made a | |
| calculated assessment that says the relationship is too | |
| important to just junk it, and I, certainly, do not know that | |
| we--that's our only option. | |
| So how do we counter the impunity we're dealing with and | |
| could we use the fact that there are--you know, there's | |
| instability in the royal family, including a lot of resentment | |
| against the Crown Prince. | |
| Could we use that to advantage to make him an unacceptable | |
| choice as heir to the throne and use our leverage for once in a | |
| meaningful and significant way? Or is that a stretch too far, | |
| from your point of view? | |
| I mean, sanctions and travel bans and all that are useful. | |
| But I do not know that they get to the impunity I am talking | |
| about. | |
| Your observations? | |
| Ms. Fontenrose. I agree with your assessment on the | |
| immunity and it really is at the very top levels. We hear quite | |
| often from our interlocutors at senior levels and below in | |
| Saudi Arabia that they understand that this is a problem for | |
| us. This is, certainly, not an immunity that we see across the | |
| board in the Saudi government. | |
| But I do think we have to be careful, because at a certain | |
| point when we talk about using our leverage to influence | |
| decisionmaking on succession in Saudi Arabia, we start to sound | |
| like we're talking about regime change, and that's not a game | |
| that the U.S. wants to get into again. We do not tend to do it | |
| very well. | |
| But there are some ways that we can change some of the | |
| decisionmaking at the top that would impact this impunity. | |
| Mohammed bin Salman is surrounded by an echo chamber right now. | |
| He only hears the good news, and they continue to sponsor | |
| campaigns of disinformation and misinformation globally and | |
| here that are intended to spread a narrative about how | |
| wonderful things are in Saudi, how suitable he is as a ruler. | |
| And while that's not all entirely false, it's certainly an | |
| indication that that impunity remains and that we have not | |
| really seen a mea culpa that we're looking for. | |
| Part of this is his inner circle. There are a lot of wise | |
| advisors in Saudi Arabia who were replaced in recent years. | |
| These were people we trusted, people we worked with for | |
| decades, and people who understand both how the global system | |
| works and understand America's values and our priorities. | |
| Those folks aren't there in the numbers we'd like to see, | |
| and one of my colleagues already mentioned a specific person, | |
| Saud al-Qahtani, who both the intelligence community and the | |
| policy community assessed was instrumental in some of the | |
| negative decisions that came out of the kingdom, not only the | |
| Jamal Khashoggi murder, which we assess he orchestrated and | |
| masterminded, but also in many other--many other negative | |
| decisions like civilian targeting in Yemen, like the standoffs | |
| with Canada and with Germany, like the interrogations in the | |
| Ritz. | |
| Saud al-Qahtani is sort of the Oddjob to Mohammed bin | |
| Salman's Goldfinger, and he tells him what he wants to hear. He | |
| keeps him very safe. He is not loyal to any other member of the | |
| royal family or to any other business interests because he does | |
| not come from a prominent family or a competing branch of the | |
| royal family, and that makes him incredibly loyal and, | |
| therefore, incredibly dangerous to our interests. | |
| He was removed from his place at the elbow of the Crown | |
| Prince previously, but as my colleague mentioned, when he went | |
| through a court proceeding he was found not guilty. | |
| At the time, I wrote an article saying that this finding of | |
| him as not guilty was actually a dent in the U.S.-Saudi | |
| relationship and that we would take it quite seriously. He is | |
| someone we need to make sure is removed from the decisionmaking | |
| circle in Saudi Arabia, and if that means stating a red line, | |
| then that means stating a red line. | |
| Saudi, at one point, even tried to tell us that he was | |
| dead. I mean, the disinformation to protect his role as the | |
| Mohammed bin Salman whisperer has been notable. | |
| And there are things we could do. We could ask for some of | |
| our favorite interlocutors to be reinStated. We could embed | |
| advisors, much as we do in many other nations, to help with the | |
| drafting of legislation that protects human rights. | |
| We can encourage them to build out their National Security | |
| Agency, which is actually their equivalent of our NSC, which | |
| they made a real effort to build, but because of stovepipes and | |
| because of personality politics in Saudi Arabia, it's really | |
| just been this sort of administrative function. | |
| We can work with them, hold their hand to say this is how | |
| you do interagency collaboration, interagency coordination of | |
| policy in such a way that only vetted ideas reach your senior | |
| decisionmaker, and not these crazy ideas that come from people | |
| without the policy or the international affairs knowledge to be | |
| making these kinds of recommendations. | |
| So there's some very proactive things. | |
| Mr. Connolly. Very helpful. Unfortunately, my time is up | |
| and the chairman has been gracious in allowing us to continue. | |
| But I think, bottom line, the United States needs to approach | |
| this relationship with boldness and fortitude. | |
| And thank you for your suggestions. Very helpful. | |
| Thank you, Mr. Chairman. | |
| Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. | |
| Mr. Perry, you're recognized for 5 minutes. | |
| Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm just curious, based | |
| on my good friend Representative Connolly's questioning for Ms. | |
| Fontenrose, are there--are there better options? I mean, is | |
| there any realistic option other than MBS regarding the | |
| leadership in Saudi Arabia? | |
| I mean, is there any reason for us to really be--I mean, do | |
| we have any other option or is that the--is that the best it's | |
| going to get? | |
| Ms. Fontenrose. The issue, really, is that this branch of | |
| the royal family has been consolidating power for quite some | |
| time. | |
| Previously, Saudi would share--would power share across | |
| branches of the royal family. But in recent years, this has | |
| gone almost entirely to the branch of the family headed by | |
| current King Salman. | |
| So what this means is that when you look around for other | |
| options, you're looking at people who do not have a lot of | |
| decisionmaking power right now. | |
| You're also looking at the fact that Mohammed bin Salman | |
| has consolidated his control over all of the security services | |
| and over the finances of most of the royal princes. So if they | |
| were to, perhaps, speak out against him, their families could | |
| potentially be destitute and they could, perhaps, find | |
| themselves in jail. | |
| So we have to ask ourselves are there people we would be | |
| willing to back in any way, not only in a, you know, to--as a | |
| potential replacement for Mohammed bin Salman, but also what | |
| would that do to Saudi politics writ large? | |
| What would that do to the power sharing among the branches | |
| of the royal family? Are we willing to talk about regime change | |
| in any realistic way? | |
| Do we even have the legal authority to do that? And would | |
| we be willing to ask Saudi friends to put their own lives and | |
| financial security at risk to spearhead something like that | |
| conversation? | |
| We have realized in recent years that national sovereignty | |
| and national succession are places that we can have opinions | |
| on, but it's best that we not actually put our finger on. | |
| Mr. Perry. Yes. So it sounds to me like whether we like it | |
| or not, agree with him or not, that whether he's moving quickly | |
| enough or not or whatever our disagreements are, we're going to | |
| have to work with him and resign ourselves to that fact. | |
| Does he--does he particularly--could he particularly be | |
| sensitive to international condemnation, condemnation from the | |
| United States regarding Khashoggi or anybody else? And just as | |
| a curiosity of mine, what is the--what is his viewpoint or the | |
| ruling faction's viewpoint on the Muslim Brotherhood in Saudi | |
| Arabia? | |
| Ms. Fontenrose. Mohammed bin Salman is confused by why the | |
| U.S. and the Western world are so upset about the Khashoggi | |
| killing. They understand that the way it was conducted is | |
| heinous. Most Saudis are as appalled as we are. | |
| But I will quote a conversation I had with a very senior | |
| Saudi representative who said, ``When I speak to Saudis about | |
| the Khashoggi murder, they ask, why are they so upset about | |
| this when Jeffrey Epstein died in government custody?'' | |
| That causes all of us to kind of drop our jaws but that is | |
| very realistically--it's a State-controlled media and, as I | |
| mentioned, there is an echo chamber. | |
| So while Mohammed bin Salman is very sensitive to the | |
| discussions of Khashoggi. he does believe that this is an issue | |
| that can be dealt with and that it will not necessarily create | |
| a dent in the U.S.-Saudi relationship if they can just do | |
| enough other things, but none of those things that are related | |
| to human rights. | |
| You'll notice that they have done quite a bit in terms of | |
| climate change just since inauguration. They're really trying | |
| to be a great U.S. partner and kind of erase this memory. | |
| But to my co-panelist's point, there are things we could be | |
| doing to press the human rights issue and make it more directly | |
| aligned. | |
| To your question on the Muslim Brotherhood, the Saudi | |
| regime is extremely opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood. They do | |
| consider the Brotherhood an existential threat to regime | |
| stability and to the royal family, writ large. | |
| So the Brotherhood is probably their number-one threat, I | |
| would say, equal to and in some cases above Iran. | |
| Mr. Perry. Yes, I think that's an important point, and I | |
| think there's a connection with Khashoggi in that regard as | |
| well. But I do agree with your point, you know, regarding the | |
| other measures that Saudi has taken. I'm thinking just most | |
| recently regarding COVAX. | |
| But as you also Stated, it does not--it does not absolve | |
| them of--I mean, I think they're No. 5 on the list of human | |
| rights abusers, you know, just downstream from China and Iran, | |
| essentially, North Korea, et cetera. | |
| So they're--you know, they've got a lot of work to do and I | |
| think that we absolutely need to make that a focal point. At | |
| the same time, I think that we have very, very difficult issues | |
| to deal with in Iran and China and so on and so forth and I do | |
| not want to see the committee--and this is not--you know, this | |
| is not your bailiwick, but completely focused on Saudi Arabia | |
| here. | |
| But I did listen to some of the other things that you had | |
| said that we could leverage regarding Saudi Arabia's human | |
| rights abuses, and I think we need to do that on every single | |
| occasion and keep pressing. | |
| And while we probably acknowledge things like the good work | |
| on COVAX, we absolutely need to bring up the point every single | |
| time that the human rights abuses are unacceptable and that | |
| we're going to keep highlighting them and we're going to keep | |
| pursuing them. | |
| I think you've given us a pretty good list. So I do not | |
| want to talk for the sake of talking. I appreciate your time | |
| here and everybody's time here. | |
| And I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you. | |
| Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Representative Perry. | |
| Mr. Cicilline, you're recognized for 5 minutes. | |
| Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really want to | |
| thank you for your leadership and calling this really important | |
| hearing and also acknowledge the incredible leadership of Mr. | |
| Connolly for so long on this issue. | |
| And I think as you described in your opening remarks, this | |
| is a challenge for us to ensure that we have foreign policy | |
| that reflects our values, and I think when you look at the | |
| backsliding of democracy and the rise of authoritarian | |
| leadership around the world, maybe this is no--there's no place | |
| where it's more clear than here in Saudi Arabia how challenging | |
| this is. | |
| But when you look at the age of the Saudi population under | |
| the age of 25--half of the population is in that age group--and | |
| the looming ascent of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, this is | |
| a very important time for us to figure out how we both hold the | |
| Saudis accountable for their human rights record but also | |
| ensure that we can maintain a productive relationship, and I | |
| think this is a great challenge. | |
| Ms. Nossel, I want to begin with you and that is--my first | |
| question is, you know, how urgent is this issue with respect to | |
| the suppression of dissent or the inability to criticize the | |
| kingdom in any way for the average Saudi? | |
| Is it a real issue and is it bubbling up to be something | |
| that could cause real change in the kingdom? | |
| And second part of the question is, can you recommend any | |
| specific achievable kind of free expression reforms that the | |
| U.S. might be able to press for in its engagement with the | |
| Saudis? | |
| Ms. Nossel. Sure. You know, I would say it's hard to know | |
| exactly. Of course, you know, there are no really reliable | |
| public opinion polls that are conducted within Saudi Arabia. | |
| You know, there isn't free media. There's repression online | |
| such that, you know, it's hard to reliably gauge, you know, how | |
| important this issue is to the man on the street. | |
| And I think the strategy that MBS has undertaken is to | |
| address certain issues--the ban on driving being at the top of | |
| the list, the loosening of the guardianship restrictions--that | |
| have sort of across the board support. | |
| That women's rights agenda is something that cuts across | |
| ideology, religious sectarianism, geography within Saudi | |
| Arabia. It has a lot of support in many quarters, and so I | |
| think that's why we have seen progress in that area. | |
| And I think, you know, the strategy really is to take other | |
| steps that will appease a kind of pent-up demand for more | |
| freedom. But in order to be able to sustain this very intense | |
| type control over expression and dissent that it's a kind of a | |
| bargain. | |
| I think it's important to recognize that. It's not sort of | |
| a progression where one will inexorably lead to the other. You | |
| know, first you address women's rights and then there will be | |
| liberalization when it comes to free expression and dissent. | |
| I think it's actually the two issues play off one another | |
| and that, you know, in a sense, the Crown Prince is buying | |
| himself some support to continue this crackdown and, you know, | |
| when it comes to certain officials who are more---- | |
| Mr. Cicilline. And I--no, I appreciate that. I just want to | |
| try to get in one more question. If you could--I'm sorry, I | |
| didn't want to interrupt you but I want to try to get in one | |
| more question. | |
| Ms. Nossel. Sure. | |
| Mr. Cicilline. And that is, you know, there's been a lot of | |
| reporting that's--and this is for Ms. Fontenrose--there's been | |
| a lot of reporting that Saudi Arabia is using hacking and | |
| social media surveillance to spy on and intimidate dissidents. | |
| In November 2019, U.S. authorities charged two former | |
| Twitter employees for spying on users on behalf of Saudi | |
| Arabia. | |
| And so, Ms. Fontenrose, how does technology fit into Saudi | |
| efforts to harass and intimidate activists and political | |
| opponents, and how can Congress ensure U.S. firms and | |
| technology are not being used in these efforts? | |
| Ms. Fontenrose. Technology is the primary tool in tracking | |
| and suppressing opposition, and the person I mentioned, Saud | |
| al-Qahtani, was instrumental in building Saudi Arabia's arsenal | |
| of these technological tools and continues to be. | |
| And we also note that, you know, Saudi Arabia went to the | |
| level of even harassing the CEO of a major U.S. corporation | |
| with this--with this technique. | |
| The way that this can be handled is already underway. | |
| Congress and the U.S. Government and most of the social media | |
| companies are involved in really in-depth discussions about | |
| where the limits of their authorities are and how much they can | |
| actually do in terms of personal freedom. | |
| One of the challenges is that since many of these companies | |
| are U.S. based, we allow quite a bit more in terms of personal | |
| freedom than some of these other countries would. If these--if | |
| these companies, for instance, were North Korean, they would | |
| probably be able to put quite a bit of limitation on their | |
| usage. | |
| But we have a tougher time with that conversation and | |
| that's what we're trying to work out right now. State | |
| Department is really engaged in these discussions with the-- | |
| with the community. | |
| We could, perhaps, sanction some of the organizations that | |
| do this work in Saudi Arabia. We have done that before. There | |
| was an organization--the acronym was CSMARC--that was involved | |
| in the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, and we said we would sanction | |
| the organization. We made great moves to do it, and Saudi | |
| Arabia eventually just shut the whole organization down. | |
| But we know that some of those roles have been | |
| reconstituted, and if we sanction those it makes it--it makes | |
| it then impossible for U.S. technology companies to work with | |
| them or for them to contract with providers of specialized | |
| capabilities. | |
| So that might be one step. It's sort of a simple step. But | |
| until we get to the bottom of what the government nexus with | |
| private sector is in terms of what we're allowed to allow and | |
| prohibit, that might be one of the--one of the easier ways to | |
| immediately address it. | |
| Mr. Cicilline. Thank you so much. | |
| And with that, my time is expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. | |
| I yield back. | |
| Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline. | |
| Mr. Mast, you are recognized for 5 minutes. | |
| Mr. Mast. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you | |
| recognizing me. | |
| I've enjoyed hearing the debate and the conversation today. | |
| I think it's important. It's important to recognize important | |
| partners in every region that we work with. But it's also | |
| important for us as a nation and for our citizens who we are | |
| representative of to never be allowed to be naive as to who it | |
| is that we're working with, and then we make an honest decision | |
| about how and where we will work with those individuals. | |
| And so it's in that that I'm going to bring attention | |
| just--and I will not have any questions today. I just want to | |
| bring attention to something that a number of us have made | |
| requests for and worked on as it relates to Saudi Arabia and | |
| bring it to--maybe to the attention of some of the other | |
| members of our committee who have not been on this, and ask for | |
| your consideration on this. | |
| In the previous Congress, we did write a letter to Attorney | |
| General Barr to specifically express our concerns over a | |
| decision, or more than one decision, to assert what's known as | |
| the State secrets privilege on litigation brought by victims of | |
| September 11 attacks and their families against the Kingdom of | |
| Saudi Arabia. | |
| I would like to, basically, ask that all members of this | |
| committee look into what is being considered under that State | |
| secrets privilege and that we write to Merrick Garland about | |
| the exact same issue, making sure that it is transparent for | |
| all Americans, not just what has gone on with the situation | |
| like Khashoggi but what has gone on that has perpetuated the | |
| United States of America to be at war for 20 years--you know, | |
| war that has, you know, began on our soil, has affected many of | |
| us personally, me personally, in war, many of my friends and | |
| family, and that we make every single effort to have very true | |
| and real transparency about all of those that we are working | |
| with. | |
| So in that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back my time. I know | |
| this is something that you have worked on as well. But just to | |
| say I would ask for the support of members of this committee as | |
| we sit here and discuss Saudi Arabia to also not lose sight of | |
| what is still being kept secret about September 11th to those | |
| that were most intimately affected by it. | |
| And in that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. | |
| Mr. Deutch. I thank you for your comments, Mr. Mast. | |
| And we'll yield 5 minutes now to Mr. Malinowski. | |
| [No response.] | |
| Mr. Deutch. Mr. Malinowski, we're having some trouble with | |
| your sound. Why do not--why do not we--why do not we give you a | |
| minute to work with staff to try to square that away? And, you | |
| know, we cannot hear you. | |
| If it's OK with you, Mr. Malinowski, we'll go to Ms. | |
| Manning, and then we'll come back to you. Thank you very much. | |
| Ms. Manning, you're recognized for 5 minutes. | |
| Ms. Manning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this | |
| hearing and thank you to all the witnesses. I'm assuming you | |
| can hear me. | |
| OK, great. Thank you to all the witnesses for their | |
| outstanding testimony. | |
| Ms. Fontenrose, you have articulated so clearly the | |
| complexity of our relationship with Saudi Arabia, including the | |
| importance of Saudi Arabia in the balance of power in the | |
| region and in achieving some critical U.S. goals, and your | |
| suggestion of setting clear red lines with actions for crossing | |
| those lines and the importance of acting in concert with the | |
| international community against human rights violations are all | |
| well taken, as well as your suggestion that the U.S. act as an | |
| avuncular advisor, which suggests a wonderful balanced | |
| approach. | |
| I'm interested in whether you can talk to us about whether | |
| there are carrots we can use in addition to sticks. | |
| Ms. Fontenrose. Thank you, Congresswoman. | |
| Yes, there absolutely are, and I think that's incredibly | |
| important. If we only lead with sticks, then we risk losing | |
| some of the loyalty we have from Saudi Arabia to competitors, | |
| whether adversarial or friendly, whether economic or military. | |
| So in terms of some of the--some of the carrots, things | |
| like securing Saudi Arabia against the attacks they're | |
| receiving from Iran-backed proxies, the very immediate carrot | |
| are--the end of our support for the coalition in Yemen did send | |
| a clear message to Mohammed bin Salman that there needs to be | |
| an end--a political end to the war in Yemen very quickly. | |
| But it also did embolden greater kinetic action on the part | |
| of the Houthis. If we were to offer Saudi Arabia assistance | |
| with resisting that--those attacks, that is a carrot. | |
| They are looking for ways to push back that will not anger | |
| our Congress. They are very aware that if they use air strikes | |
| there will be condemnation from the Hill. | |
| So what are other ways that we can offer them? We can offer | |
| them cyber assistance. We can offer them electronic warfare | |
| assistance in addressing the guidance systems or the launch | |
| systems of the missiles and rockets that are coming at them. | |
| We can offer them assistance with assessing their | |
| vulnerability to drones and, perhaps, assistance in identifying | |
| which counter-UAS technologies might be most useful for them so | |
| they aren't just buying haphazardly from people pitching to | |
| them and acquiring technology that, frankly, will not be useful | |
| against the threat. | |
| We can work on intelligence sharing and identifying where | |
| those attacks are coming from, and then if the Administration | |
| really wants to give them a carrot, the Administration will | |
| talk to Congress and say, we have shared information on where | |
| these attacks are coming from. | |
| We have told the Saudis it is OK for them to strike these | |
| launchers or these missile depots and we would appreciate it if | |
| you would not condemn them for these particular targeted | |
| strikes against imminent threats. | |
| So there's some very, very--not very difficult and very | |
| immediate things we can do that are carrots. Other carrots | |
| include things like welcoming them back more robustly into the | |
| international economic community. | |
| They are really trying to rebuild their previous economic | |
| power, and our insistence that they be treated as a pariah has | |
| made the international finance community a little bit hesitant | |
| to do that. | |
| They would, certainly, welcome that sort of--that sort of | |
| welcome into this conversation again, welcome back into that | |
| more robustly. | |
| That's not something we necessarily have to do, but that | |
| definitely would be a carrot and that's simply diplomatic. That | |
| does not require policy changes. It does not require | |
| legislation. It does not require resourcing. | |
| Other carrots we can give them are consulting with them on | |
| the JCPOA. Yes, we have said that we would do that, but are we | |
| really? Really taking into account their concerns about | |
| regional activities and missile programs from Iran would be a | |
| carrot for sure. | |
| Ms. Manning. Great. Let me ask you one more question. Are | |
| there steps that the U.S. can take to encourage the | |
| normalization of the relationship between Saudi Arabia and | |
| Israel to bring them into the Abrahamic Accords? | |
| Ms. Fontenrose. I do not even think we have to do much | |
| more. I think Mohammed bin Salman is on board with this. We are | |
| dealing with the fact that the current king of Saudi Arabia, | |
| who has been a wonderful partner to the U.S., is opposed to | |
| normalization until there is a political solution that is | |
| acceptable to the Palestinian camp. | |
| And it's my understanding that as long as King Salman is | |
| king, that that stance will stay solid. That is--that is, | |
| essentially a core value in Saudi Arabia and that we will see | |
| more direct movement on normalization either if Mohammed bin | |
| Salman is made prime minister or if there is--if there's a | |
| succession, and Mohammed bin Salman were to take the throne. | |
| Not necessarily upon the passing of King Salman, even prior. | |
| But I think that's where we're going to see it. I think | |
| pressure before then we'll still run up against King Salman's | |
| personal beliefs and personal wishes, and we might not want to | |
| press that from a long-standing great partner. | |
| But in the meantime, we can, certainly, work with Saudi on | |
| some things that they can do to show that normalization is | |
| coming. One is messaging to their own people. There's a big | |
| public diplomacy perception issue in much of the Arab world | |
| about normalization. | |
| They can start working on that right away. They can also | |
| start working on small economic agreements. They can start | |
| working on technical cooperation in areas of missile defense or | |
| maritime security. | |
| There are things they can do that are steps toward | |
| normalization without officially making that one of their | |
| policies. That would help set the stage, would really put them | |
| in place, and then normalization would almost look like a | |
| logical completion of a process. | |
| Ms. Manning. Thanks so much. My time is expired. I yield | |
| back. | |
| Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Ms. Manning. | |
| Before going to you, Mr. Burchett, we're going to take just | |
| a quick moment and see if Mr. Malinowski's audio works. | |
| [Pause.] | |
| Mr. Deutch. No, unfortunately not. Maybe we can---- | |
| Mr. Burchett. Mr. Chairman, if he comes back on just stop | |
| me. It's good. | |
| Mr. Deutch. We will not send you--hold on 1 second, Mr. | |
| Burchett. | |
| Mr. Malinowski, I'll try one more time. | |
| Mr. Burchett. How about that? | |
| Mr. Deutch. Great. Okay. Great. So, Mr. Burchett, we're | |
| going to you. Then we'll come back to Mr. Malinowski and---- | |
| Mr. Burchett. Mr. Chairman, in bipartisan nature, let's go | |
| back to Mr. Malinowski. He had to skip he--and I'm cool with | |
| that, Okay? | |
| Mr. Deutch. That's actually very kind of you. But we went | |
| to Ms. Manning, who's a Democrat, and keeping with our true | |
| bipartisanship nature, we're going to come back to you now, if | |
| you're---- | |
| Mr. Burchett. All right. Well, I tried, brother. I tried. I | |
| apologize. | |
| All right. Ms. Fontenrose, you mentioned in your testimony | |
| that we released Khashoggi reports too soon and missed out on | |
| additional human rights concessions. Which concessions do you | |
| think we missed out on? | |
| Ms. Fontenrose. It's my understanding, from speaking with | |
| colleagues inside the kingdom, that there was great concern in | |
| Saudi Arabia that the report might include incriminating | |
| information, and so they were keen to be very conciliatory | |
| prior to the release of the report. | |
| So it's my feeling that had the report release been delayed | |
| we may have actually had leverage to make additional requests | |
| of Saudi Arabia. So we succeeded in the release of Loujain al- | |
| Hathloul, but she has--she has peers who are still imprisoned, | |
| and it might have been possible to get some movement on those | |
| specifically. | |
| Mr. Burchett. Okay. And for the committee, is there any | |
| internal pressure on Saudi Arabia to improve its human rights | |
| practices? And that's out to anybody. | |
| Anyone? Ms. Fontenrose, do you want to try that? | |
| Ms. Fontenrose. I apologize. I thought that question was | |
| for the committee. And can you repeat it really quickly? | |
| Mr. Burchett. It was, but since you're a part of it, is | |
| there any internal pressure on Saudi Arabia to improve its | |
| human rights practices? | |
| Ms. Fontenrose. It's a great question because there is, | |
| certainly, pressure from the public who does believe that human | |
| rights improvements would improve their own lives. | |
| But that public has no leverage in Saudi Arabia. There is | |
| no mechanism by which they can express themselves in a way that | |
| will create policy change but, potentially, not endanger them | |
| as individuals. | |
| So, unfortunately, the pressure--the desire is there, but | |
| the pressure is not effective. | |
| Mr. Burchett. Okay. And this is for of the committee, so | |
| you all get ready to get on your buzzers. Do you think that | |
| Saudi Arabia will develop closer ties with our adversaries, | |
| such as Russia and China, because the U.S. pressured them on | |
| human rights? | |
| Mr. Deutch. Mr. Burchett, I think you're referring to the | |
| committee of witnesses. Is that correct? | |
| Mr. Burchett. Yes. Yes, I'm telling the witnesses. I'm | |
| sorry. Not our committee. I do not want to hear any of you all. | |
| I'm tired of hearing you all. So go ahead. | |
| Ms. Fontenrose. I can speak to that. The answer is | |
| absolutely yes. We are the priority partner for Saudi Arabia. | |
| They are very clear about that, and we have no reason to doubt | |
| that. | |
| But it is definitely true that Russia and China bring their | |
| partnership without human rights strings attached. Russia would | |
| love to replace the U.S. as the hub for security relationships | |
| in the region. | |
| They have floated a proposal to this--to this effect, that | |
| they continue to socialize, including in the recent visit of | |
| Lavrov to the--to Riyadh. And China is very happy with the U.S. | |
| being the security guarantor and locking down its economic | |
| interests. | |
| We would not expect China to come in as a guarantor of | |
| Saudi security or a protector of waterways or the like, but | |
| they'll certainly replace us as a vendor of arms and they'll | |
| also sell those arms to Saudis' enemies, which, you know, if | |
| you let Russia and China lead the way in terms of military | |
| technology in the region, you definitely have the kind of arms | |
| race that could lead to escalation. | |
| So yes, it's very real. Saudi would not like to go that | |
| way. They do not choose to go that way. But they do have other | |
| options. | |
| Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Oh, go ahead. | |
| Ms. Nossel. No, I was just going to add briefly, I think | |
| that's true but I think it should not be overStated. I think | |
| particularly when it comes to the rivalry with Iran, the | |
| partnership with the U.S. is not replaceable by either Russia | |
| or China. | |
| They're not going to serve as that kind of bulwark against | |
| their Iranian nuclear ambitions and regional ambitions. And so | |
| I think that the degree of preference for the U.S. is, we | |
| should recognize, is strong and not be too quick to assume that | |
| any antagonism is going to lead them into the arms of Beijing | |
| or Moscow. | |
| Mr. Burchett. Right. I've got--Mr. Chairman, I yield back | |
| the remainder of my time Mr. Malinowski, if he figured out his | |
| computer. If he does not, tell him to get a 13-year-old | |
| daughter because she will explain the--everything you're doing | |
| wrong with your computer and embarrass you continuously with | |
| it. | |
| So I yield. | |
| Mr. Deutch. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Burchett. | |
| Mr. Malinowski, we are ready to try again. | |
| Mr. Malinowski. Yes. How's this? | |
| Mr. Deutch. We can hear you. Does your camera work? | |
| Mr. Malinowski. It should be. Yes. | |
| Mr. Deutch. Oh. Does everyone else see Mr. Malinowski? Only | |
| I do not? | |
| Mr. Malinowski. I see Gerry---- | |
| Mr. Deutch. Oh, sorry. That's apparently--that's a problem | |
| on my end. Mr. Malinowski, I want to also, as I acknowledge | |
| you, take just a moment to thank you for your principled and | |
| strong leadership on human rights, especially on human rights | |
| in Saudi Arabia. We're grateful for your leadership, and you're | |
| recognized for 5 minutes. | |
| Mr. Malinowski. Thank you so much, and I think my daughter | |
| would probably give us the advice not to be using WebEx. But | |
| we'll set that aside for a moment. | |
| So look, I want to just jump right into what's been a | |
| really interesting exchange about leverage and our interests, | |
| and to start with Ms. Fontenrose because in your testimony you | |
| made a proposal that is very consistent with what many of us | |
| have been advocating and with what the Biden Administration has | |
| actually begun to do, and that is to draw a red line around | |
| what could be called transnational repression, authoritarian | |
| States such as Saudi Arabia reaching beyond their borders into | |
| the United States, into democratic countries in Europe, into | |
| Canada, to pursue their enemies, which is essentially what | |
| happened in the Khashoggi case but also others. | |
| At the same time, you expressed some concern about doing | |
| too much to go after the main author of the killing of | |
| Khashoggi, and I wanted to challenge you a little bit about an | |
| apparent contradiction between those two positions. | |
| I understand that there are limits to what the United | |
| States can do to challenge Saudi Arabia in terms of human | |
| rights conditions within the country. I want to try. I'm | |
| passionate about it. | |
| But that is, I think, somewhat different from the Khashoggi | |
| case. The Khashoggi case, yes, it's a human rights case. But it | |
| was also--it was also something that can be considered a | |
| hostile act against a resident of the United States of America. | |
| And if we're going to have an actual red line, as you | |
| suggested, if we are going to build a coalition, an alliance of | |
| democratic States, making clear that we have zero tolerance for | |
| that kind of activity, do not we undercut that message if we | |
| say that a relationship with a particular individual in Saudi | |
| Arabia is too important to hold that individual accountable in | |
| any way? | |
| Ms. Fontenrose. Congressman, I do not think that what we'd | |
| be saying is that the relationship with that individual is too | |
| important. We'd be saying that the relationship with the | |
| country is too important and we'd be acknowledging that because | |
| of the potential for retaliation by the individual at the top | |
| for certain actions, it would be in better serving U.S. | |
| interests not to take certain methods for responding to the | |
| Khashoggi murder. | |
| We are not without options. There are many, many options | |
| for U.S. response. So the issue is just assessing which of | |
| these will lead to the advancement of U.S. interests long term, | |
| and which would look like they were getting at Mohammed bin | |
| Salman but would, in fact, be pyrrhic victories. | |
| And so things like sanctioning him would definitely lead to | |
| retaliation against U.S. interests in many sectors, as I | |
| mentioned, even things like energy transition, and certainly it | |
| would cripple our ability to respond to post-conflict | |
| stabilization needs across the region. We do really count on | |
| Saudi Arabia writing checks. In 2018, the current coordinator | |
| for the Middle East on Biden's team at the NSC asked Saudi | |
| Arabia for $100 million to use in Syria. | |
| Without that money, we couldn't have accomplished some of | |
| what we needed--we needed to do there. And I guarantee you that | |
| Saudi Arabia is already considering the fact that that person | |
| will very likely come back and ask for more. | |
| We also are going to see needs in Iraq and in Lebanon, | |
| certainly, in Yemen and Libya. And without one of the largest | |
| powers in the region in terms of resources and political | |
| weight, that will be very difficult to do on our own unless we | |
| want to get far more involved in these conflicts. And in the | |
| short run---- | |
| Mr. Malinowski. Now, I am just going to--sorry, reclaiming | |
| my time a little bit. What I worry about is that, I mean, we | |
| have sanctioned the country. | |
| We just haven't done anything about the individual, and by | |
| sanction I'm not--I'm not in favor of economic sanctions | |
| against MBS for some of the reasons that you've laid out. | |
| What we have proposed is something that falls short of | |
| that. But I worry about the danger of reinforcing the official | |
| Saudi line, which is that the murder of Jamal Khashoggi was a | |
| crime but it was committed by everybody other than MBS. | |
| They have sanctioned the same henchmen, for the most part, | |
| that we have sanctioned in the past, and I do not want to | |
| reinforce that lie. | |
| And I do not have that much time left, but I think that a | |
| lot of the steps that you have suggested Saudi Arabia might | |
| take to harm our interests if we take the step would also be | |
| incredibly harmful to Saudi interests. | |
| Yes, China can sell them weapons. Yes, Russia can run | |
| around and propose regional security arrangements in which | |
| Russia takes part. But it's absolutely crystal clear that only | |
| the United States protect Saudi Arabia. Chinese weapons are | |
| useless to them because their own military is not what defends | |
| them. | |
| It is the United States military that defends them if | |
| anything were to happen, an Iranian attack on Gulf shipping or | |
| on Saudi Arabia itself. The Saudi military would be asked to | |
| stand down, and the United States would be protecting the king, | |
| and they know that. | |
| So I wish we could continue the exchange. But I'm out of | |
| time and I yield back. Thank you. | |
| Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Malinowski. | |
| Mr. Steube, you're recognized. | |
| Mr. Steube. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My questions are for | |
| Ms. Fontenrose. What posture should the U.S. take in its public | |
| statements about human rights and political freedoms in Saudi | |
| Arabia? | |
| Ms. Fontenrose. Excellent question. It actually allows us | |
| to followup a bit on what Congressman Malinowski was raising as | |
| well. | |
| I think it's very important that the U.S. take a very | |
| public posture on the core value of human rights, and I think | |
| this administration has already kicked that off very well by | |
| stating that. | |
| On the flip side, I think that conversations about | |
| reactions to it need to happen privately because of the | |
| psychology of Mohammed bin Salman, and I encourage you to ask | |
| for briefings from your intelligence--representing your | |
| intelligence community liaisons on this if you'd like. | |
| This is best handled in a way that does not make him look | |
| like a public pariah. But the standards and the red lines | |
| should be Stated publicly, and America's insistence on these | |
| being upheld should be Stated publicly. There needs to be sort | |
| of this establishment of accountability. | |
| And then the methods by which we are willing to assist for | |
| the--for the red lines we're drawing in terms of what the | |
| punishments will be can be private discussions. | |
| Mr. Steube. Well, and kind of related to that, your policy | |
| recommendations include trying to have a positive influence on | |
| Saudi leaders through our engagement. | |
| Are there examples of ways in which our engagement with | |
| Saudi political or military leaders has had a positive impact | |
| on promoting America's values and policies? | |
| Ms. Fontenrose. Absolutely. Specifically on military, and | |
| this is a very tactical example, but the U.N. recorded a | |
| decrease in the loss of life by civilians in Yemen between 2017 | |
| and 2019 that we think is directly correlated to the advisement | |
| of our U.S. military to the cell that does deconfliction | |
| targeting in Yemen. | |
| We also know, as you mentioned, about U.S. pressure | |
| resulting in the release of Loujain al-Hathloul, and I | |
| mentioned in my testimony that the Saudi--the assistance by the | |
| State Department and the pressure from Congress that resulted | |
| in changes to Saudi curriculum that is used globally worldwide. | |
| I think there are also additional ways that the U.S. can | |
| apply pressure diplomatically that would be well received. One | |
| is definitely staying on top of the call for the release of | |
| additional activists and dissidents. | |
| There are also other--we could ask, as I mentioned, for | |
| embedding of advisors into Saudi ministries to work on | |
| legislation, to work on the drafting of new laws and then | |
| codifying. We can recommend supporting them in their | |
| digitization efforts. | |
| We have--we have placed pressure on them in terms of | |
| improving their human rights record, but we haven't really | |
| given them tools or said specifically how to do that. Saudi is | |
| really good about responding to specific requests, not so good | |
| about responding to generic requests, often because they simply | |
| do not know where to start. | |
| So if we provide some of the capacity and we say, all | |
| right, now that you've said Insha'Allah and sort of shaking | |
| your head and said you're willing to come along, we're going to | |
| show you exactly how to get there and we're going to walk you | |
| through this. | |
| I think there--I think it's very, very, very plausible. | |
| Mr. Steube. In your testimony, you highlighted a tradeoff | |
| between sanctions blocking access to the United States and | |
| enforcing other accountability measures against human rights | |
| violators. | |
| How would you recommend we resolve this tradeoff in U.S. | |
| policy? | |
| Ms. Fontenrose. Can you repeat that one more time? I'm | |
| sorry. It kind of broke up. | |
| Mr. Steube. Sure. In your testimony, you highlighted a | |
| tradeoff between sanctions blocking access to the United States | |
| and enforcing other accountability measures against human | |
| rights violators. How would you recommend we resolve this | |
| tradeoff in U.S. policy? | |
| Ms. Fontenrose. I do not think it has to be a tradeoff. We | |
| could also choose to simply sanction businesses that Mohammed | |
| bin Salman has a stake in and, therefore, avoid the tradeoff | |
| issue at all. | |
| He is the head of the Sovereign Wealth Fund. He also holds | |
| many of the private sector companies in Saudi Arabia under his | |
| personal portfolio, and one of them, for instance, we know | |
| owned the planes that were used to transport the kill operation | |
| to and from Turkey. | |
| So we could choose to sanction businesses he's associated | |
| with instead of sanctioning himself and that might then lessen | |
| the risk of reducing U.S. access in the country and lessen the | |
| risk of retaliation and negate any tradeoff. | |
| Mr. Steube. Well, thank you for being here today. My time | |
| is almost expired. So I yield back. | |
| Mr. Deutch. Thank you very--thank you very much, Mr. | |
| Steube. | |
| Mr. Keating, you're recognized for 5 minutes. | |
| Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. | |
| When we're looking at what we can do in terms of human | |
| rights concerns and, particularly, the discussion centered on | |
| MBS and what we could do, to look at the actions he's taken | |
| without compromising our policy, it's really interesting. | |
| I've been noticing on television--I think maybe some of the | |
| people here in the committee hearing have been noticing the | |
| television--the promotions, the tourist promotions that are | |
| much more extensive than they ever were for tourism travel into | |
| Saudi Arabia, and Mohammed bin Salman took his oil interests | |
| and transferred a great deal, billions of that, toward a Vision | |
| 2030. | |
| But also, specifically on the tourism, the high-end tourism | |
| industry where the Red Sea development companies and other | |
| companies that he's been very involved with and controls to a | |
| large measure, pouring those billions of dollars into there, | |
| and the hypocrisy of these resorts and hotels and airports that | |
| he's upgrading and creating and the rules that are there in | |
| terms of women wearing bikinis or the serving of alcohol or | |
| whether--you know, whether they can even--unmarried couples can | |
| share rooms, those things are like a for-profit hypocrisy to | |
| everything else they're doing in the country as well. | |
| So my question is, given his personal focus and investment | |
| on this, given the fact that in one end, he's really being | |
| hypocritical about many of the things he's doing, particularly | |
| the things he's doing to still allow from the State standpoint, | |
| taking away human rights issues and, in particular, rights of | |
| women. | |
| What's going on on the private side? Are you aware of any | |
| private groups or private citizen groups that are interested in | |
| these human rights issues, that are interested in what's being | |
| done to hurt women's equality there? | |
| Whether there's advocacy groups, whether there's any | |
| acknowledgment of businesses that are having meetings there? | |
| What can we--are you aware of what's going on on the other | |
| side, the nongovernmental side, of approaching the violations | |
| for human rights that the Saudi government does by looking at | |
| these investments, investments, by the way, that require | |
| participation from many of the countries who are working to | |
| make sure these norms no longer exist. | |
| Anyone who wants---- | |
| Dr. Aldosari. I can talk a little bit about that. | |
| Well, the fact is, yes, there are a strong drive from the | |
| leadership toward creating something similar to the Dubai | |
| environment, a climate where it really is global and open to | |
| tourists and international business, foreign business in | |
| particular. | |
| But it wasn't very successful because of the structural | |
| problems. We have seen increased fees on migrant workers, for | |
| instance. Migrant workers represent half of the work force | |
| inside Saudi Arabia and a third of the population. | |
| Many of them do not really enjoy, you know, the freedom to | |
| change jobs or to exit. But there were some reforms allowed for | |
| some segments of the work force--not the domestic workers or | |
| the most vulnerable--to change their jobs or to leave the | |
| country without consent. | |
| So there are some policy problems to engaging foreigners | |
| inside Saudi Arabia. There are also more problematic issues | |
| when it comes to creating those futuristic cities. Those | |
| futuristic cities are aimed to be directed toward the foreign | |
| population rather than the local population. So it does not | |
| really change the situation for the local tribes. | |
| We have seen forced relocation in NEOM for the futuristic | |
| city, for instance, of al-Huwaitat tribes in which several were | |
| imprisoned--several people were imprisoned and one was killed | |
| for refusing the forced relocation. | |
| There are groups, private groups, of course, engaging in | |
| those issues. Some of them are from the people in exile, the | |
| Saudis in exile, who are meeting regularly with, you know, | |
| influential figures and influential groups. | |
| But one of the main hurdles that we face is the poor | |
| communication with officials. So these people do not have a | |
| channel of communication with their officials or with the | |
| officials who are visiting Europe and promoting these kinds of, | |
| you know, initiatives. | |
| So I would say, yes, there are private groups working | |
| toward improving the situation of human rights and highlighting | |
| those issues. But because of the atmosphere of repression | |
| inside Saudi Arabia, it's becoming more difficult for us to | |
| gather testimoneys or to get information, real proper | |
| information, on what's happening and who's most affected by | |
| this kind of---- | |
| Mr. Keating. Well, if I could interrupt. I'm sorry. But, | |
| for instance, there is a French company that's doing massive | |
| investments in this, too. We're sanctioning other companies and | |
| corporations in the world for other activities. This is a way | |
| the U.S. could approach it from a governmental standpoint, but | |
| also those of us that are concerned as U.S. citizens and people | |
| that are interested to do it in a private way--that was my | |
| point--from the outside. | |
| Because if we hurt this massive investment because of their | |
| actions in human rights and the way they treat women, then I | |
| think that might pressure him more, instead of just the veneer | |
| of these cosmetic changes that he has made. | |
| With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. | |
| Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Keating. | |
| Dr. Jackson, you're recognized for 5 minutes. | |
| [No response.] | |
| Mr. Deutch. Is Representative Jackson still on? | |
| Mr. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you | |
| recognizing me. I think that most of the questions I had have | |
| already been answered at this point. So I'll yield back the | |
| rest of my time. Thank you, sir. Appreciate it. | |
| Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much. | |
| Mr. Vargas, you are recognized for 5 minutes. | |
| Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Again, I | |
| want to thank you for holding this hearing and I particularly | |
| want to thank the witnesses for their important testimony. | |
| I also want to thank my good friend, Mr. Connolly from | |
| Virginia, for his leadership in pursuing justice for Mr. Jamal | |
| Khashoggi. | |
| But it does seem like we're in a very difficult place, and | |
| we want to continue our important relationship with Saudi | |
| Arabia. And it also seems like the Saudi royal family seems to | |
| have picked Mohammed bin Salman as their future leader. | |
| So here we are. It seems like we have a very difficult time | |
| really treating the murder of Jamal Khashoggi as a murder | |
| because we do not really believe in regime change, and if we | |
| try, we're not normally very good at it anyway. | |
| So here we are. We continue to make very strong statements | |
| about human rights, and I think we should, and certainly I | |
| believe in them. | |
| But it does seem that we're stuck in a very difficult | |
| place, treating this really like a murder because of the | |
| situation we're in. I mean, am I wrong about that, Ms. | |
| Fontenrose? | |
| Ms. Fontenrose. You're absolutely right about that. That is | |
| exactly the cognitive dissonance we're facing right now is the | |
| king in Saudi Arabia has chosen Mohammed bin Salman as the next | |
| leader of Saudi Arabia, and Mohammed bin Salman has shored up | |
| his likelihood of succession. | |
| So then the U.S. must ask itself what are our priorities in | |
| terms of not only the relationship but what we want for years | |
| to come in terms of Saudis' role in supporting our objectives | |
| in the region and elsewhere? | |
| Can we work with this person? If not, what are our options, | |
| and they're fairly limited? If so, what do we need to do? | |
| What steps do we need to take to ensure that the direction | |
| of the kingdom is such that they are a productive and helpful | |
| partner and not one that we are constantly having to turn | |
| around and rebuke and scold for massive foreign policy | |
| problems? | |
| And I think that's what we're talking about today, trying | |
| to find the ways that we can lead Saudi Arabia to this kind of | |
| change we're looking for, because if he is the king and he does | |
| survive, as his predecessors have, then we'll be dealing with | |
| him for the next 10 presidencies. | |
| Mr. Vargas. No, I agree. So in light of all that, then I'd | |
| like to ask Dr. Aldosari. You know, one of the things that I | |
| think is very, very important is, obviously, the issue of | |
| women's rights. | |
| And I've been to Saudi Arabia a few times myself on CODELS | |
| and it is glaring. I mean, it's obvious the lack of rights that | |
| women have. I mean, how can we push harder and at the same time | |
| not get people imprisoned and killed over this? | |
| I mean, I was surprised. You open up the issue of driving | |
| for women, then you arrest the women that were pushing for | |
| women to drive. I mean, what can we do? | |
| Dr. Aldosari. Exactly. So I would suggest that, you know, | |
| the U.S. uses its position--its position as an ally, as a | |
| protector, to push for those reforms, to amplify the voices of | |
| the civil society and the women activists. | |
| The women activists did not only represent a voice for | |
| reforms. They were in a place where there's very limited | |
| support and resources available for most vulnerable groups. | |
| They were able to amplify their voices. | |
| They were able to, for instance, apply for a shelter for | |
| survivors of violence. That is not very limited in terms of | |
| services and access, as the government operated government- | |
| sponsored shelters. | |
| So I think that one key thing is to establish a good | |
| support or a good relationship with the civil society in Saudi | |
| Arabia. Mostly are in exile now. They're not really active from | |
| within. Even those who were released from prison are banned | |
| from resuming any kinds of activism. | |
| But at least with the civil society of Saudi Arabia, who | |
| are in exile outside, there is a National Assembly Party that | |
| has been formed last year by some of the scholars and activists | |
| and diaspora that is calling for a democratic transition and | |
| highlighting the issues from the point of view of the people. | |
| So having, you know, informed voices from the civil | |
| society, Saudi civil society, and try to amplify their demands | |
| for reforms and amplify their voices is a good first step to, | |
| basically, push for more reforms in Saudi Arabia that is based | |
| on public needs. | |
| Mr. Vargas. Well, I have to say, again, I think that we | |
| have some leverage here because of this murder. I do think | |
| that, you know, that MBS does care about his image, and I do | |
| think that we can do the things that you said, you know, for | |
| women and the activists within and outside of the country by | |
| pushing harder and making our voice heard. | |
| Again, it's a very difficult situation. But it seems that | |
| this situation that we're in does not seem like we have a whole | |
| lot of options. | |
| I see that my time is expired, and Mr. Chairman, I yield | |
| back. Thank you. | |
| Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Mr. Vargas. | |
| Mr. Schneider, you're recognized for 5 minutes. | |
| Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for | |
| having this committee. I want to thank the witnesses and I'll | |
| start with you, Ms. Fontenrose, and I'm trying to figure out | |
| how to juxtapose two separate questions. | |
| I guess I'll start picking up what was discussed earlier | |
| about normalization. The Abrahamic Accords, the dynamic of | |
| things happening in the region and around the world that are | |
| creating, I think, a unique opportunity to promote | |
| naturalization and, certainly, the United States has a role to | |
| play in fostering that but also within Saudi Arabia. | |
| Just curious, and to all the witnesses as well, have you | |
| seen any steps within Saudi Arabia for the regime to be laying | |
| the groundwork with the people toward moving closer toward | |
| normalization, and any sense of what the public might be | |
| willing to accept or where the leadership might be willing to-- | |
| or able to move them to on what normalization might look like? | |
| Ms. Fontenrose. We have heard statements and rhetoric out | |
| of the Saudi government that are supportive of the Abraham | |
| Accords and supportive of the concept of normalization. It does | |
| appear that they are trying to prepare their population for the | |
| idea that Saudi Arabia should and could have a future | |
| relationship with Israel. | |
| There has not been any negative messaging out of Saudi | |
| Arabia about the Accords from the official government. Now, | |
| this is different than what we're hearing about from some parts | |
| of the population. | |
| Saudi does have a fairly right wing and conservative and | |
| anti-Israeli segment of their population that is of concern in | |
| terms of creating change too quickly in Saudi Arabia, what | |
| might their reaction be. | |
| But the government itself, yes, has been--has been very | |
| pro-normalization in terms of their support for the idea that | |
| Israel could be a partner for peace. | |
| Mr. Schneider. Great, thank you. | |
| Dr. Aldosari. I would just add one thing here. | |
| Mr. Schneider. Please. Please. | |
| Dr. Aldosari. I'm sorry to interrupt. | |
| There is an intelligence sharing and cooperation with | |
| Israel. In fact, the software used to hack into Jamal | |
| Khashoggi's phone and other dissidents abroad was authorized by | |
| the Israeli Ministry of Defense and sold to Saudi Arabia and | |
| used in most of the hacking attempts. | |
| So I would say that there is already an ongoing | |
| relationship with the Saudi government and the Israeli | |
| government. But there is, of course, a very strong sentiment | |
| against any kinds of normalization from the people, not | |
| necessarily because they were--they are conservative Islamist, | |
| not from an Islamic point of view only, but also from a point | |
| of standing with the Palestinians' rights of self- | |
| determination. | |
| This is not something that is mentioned in the Accords and, | |
| you know, this kind of individual normalization that would | |
| put--you know, would put no pressure whatsoever on Israel to | |
| solve the conflict with Palestinians, this is something that | |
| most of the rights groups in the region are against, not only | |
| the Saudis. | |
| Mr. Schneider. All right. Thank you for that. | |
| With the last 2 minutes I'll go a slightly different | |
| direction and, Ms. Fontenrose, I will point to--finish with | |
| you. | |
| You know, very broadly, this applies everywhere but we're | |
| focused on Saudi Arabia. How would you describe the | |
| implications for U.S. foreign policy and outcomes when we do | |
| not get the right balance on emphasis on human rights issues? | |
| And to be clear, that can be either putting too little or | |
| too much emphasis, although I have my own bias that there's no | |
| such thing as too much. | |
| What is the implications of not getting that balance right? | |
| And I think we have lost Ms. Fontenrose. | |
| Mr. Deutch. Mr. Schneider, why do not you ask the question | |
| again? I'll give you additional time. | |
| Mr. Schneider. Thank you. Ms. Fontenrose, can you hear me? | |
| [No response.] | |
| Mr. Schneider. I'm not sure if we have audio connection. | |
| Are you able to hear me, Ms. Fontenrose? | |
| Ms. Fontenrose. I apologize. I lost power for a second | |
| there. Can I ask you to repeat that? | |
| Mr. Schneider. No worries. Yes, I'll repeat the question. | |
| What I'm saying is that in foreign policy in general, but | |
| we're talking Saudi Arabia and specific to the delicate balance | |
| of the emphasis we place in our foreign policy on human rights, | |
| and, you know, clearly, it can be not enough emphasis, too much | |
| emphasis. | |
| I have my bias it is not possible to put too much emphasis | |
| on human rights. But what are the implications for foreign | |
| policy for not getting the balance right? | |
| Ms. Fontenrose. I think the--there's no negative to | |
| stressing human rights. I think the balance we need to strike | |
| is in not being the only voice calling for them. | |
| We need to make sure that it's not simply an American | |
| request but that this is an international request. You know, we | |
| want Japan, we want Europe on side with us saying that these | |
| are expectations of the global world order and we're going to | |
| need you to raise your baseline to meet them. | |
| Because otherwise, we do risk isolating ourselves. You | |
| know, it's true that we do not think any of these countries | |
| that we're talking to about human rights are necessarily going | |
| to jump into the arms of others in terms of their leading | |
| partners right away. | |
| But the more that we drive ourselves to a point where we're | |
| asking them to take great, great, great steps--you must sign on | |
| to this agreement that says that you will do certain | |
| maintenance and training and in user agreements and we're going | |
| to put ethics training into our military sales while other | |
| countries aren't doing that makes us a more expensive and a | |
| more difficult partner. | |
| And we should not lower our standards, but we should be | |
| diplomatically pressuring our partners at the least to meet | |
| those same standards, whether it's in nuclear energy or whether | |
| it's on military ethics training. | |
| Whatever it is, we shouldn't simply be focusing on the | |
| human rights violations. We should be focusing on the global | |
| voice that's calling for the rise in that standard. | |
| Mr. Schneider. Thank you. And I'll add, you know, having | |
| the consistent message and engaging with our allies not just | |
| here and there but across the board is a easier way to do that. | |
| So I thank you. I went over time. Thank you, Chairman, | |
| Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Schneider. | |
| I will now yield myself time for questioning. Thanks to all | |
| of the witnesses for your testimony. It's been a really good | |
| hearing. | |
| Dr. Aldosari, I want to focus on what you said in response | |
| to a recent question. We have had a lot of conversation today | |
| about the needs of Saudi Arabia and the Crown Prince, about the | |
| needs of America. | |
| Obviously, as we have discussed, the Saudis are concerned | |
| about Muslim Brotherhood. They're concerned about Iran. They | |
| have very real security needs. | |
| As they look out to the future, there is talk of | |
| diversifying from oil. The Crown Prince's Vision 2030 was a | |
| bold idea--women driving_there's a lot that the Saudis are | |
| thinking about and doing. | |
| We spent this whole hearing talking about the importance of | |
| American values and human rights and why we cannot separate our | |
| pressing for human rights advances with recognizing the | |
| interests that we have in Saudi Arabia. | |
| But I want to focus, Dr. Aldosari, on what you said, which | |
| is the public needs. And in your conversation with Mr. Vargas, | |
| you talked about what happens when the government jails the | |
| same people that are now able to drive. They're jailed because | |
| of reasons that they're told they have nothing to do with that. | |
| But when we look at the public needs, going forward, and | |
| the young people in Saudi Arabia, where does--where does real | |
| reform in women's rights come in? How is it viewed? How | |
| important is it? | |
| Dr. Aldosari. It's very significant now and it's actually | |
| been recognized and acknowledged by Mohammed bin Salman and the | |
| government as a very important card, basically, to--not only | |
| for the economy but also for improving the image and meeting | |
| the youth needs, the youth demands. | |
| So, as one of my colleagues mentioned, women's rights | |
| represent, you know, a consensus, basically. The drive of the | |
| woman to move rights is a consensus across different religious | |
| and different ethnic groups and even different socioeconomic | |
| status. Women are now entering the military. | |
| So there have been advances. But the problem is, again, as | |
| I said, without people able to come together to express their | |
| needs and demands and to expose what kinds of loopholes exist | |
| in the policies, it is going to be very difficult to sustain | |
| those kinds of reforms. | |
| For instance, the government said that they will enact, you | |
| know, family laws and they will codify the criminal law, you | |
| know, soon--that those things will be launched soon. | |
| But we have seen other similar countries in the region-- | |
| Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait--they do have family laws, but it is | |
| very much an institutionalizing the discrimination against | |
| women in the family and the power of the male guardians, and | |
| most important decisions of marriage, divorce, child custody, | |
| custody and assets within marriage. So it didn't really relieve | |
| the pressure from women. | |
| So I would say having women activists coming together and | |
| being able to voice those concerns and, basically, being able | |
| to mobilize their community as they used to so that the change | |
| of the norms around certain issues is vital and the--and this | |
| is something that needs to be moving as well. | |
| Mr. Deutch. Let me--let me just try to make this a finer | |
| point here, Dr. Aldosari. The changes that we have seen, the | |
| opening up to music, to dancing, things that we have been told | |
| we wouldn't see because of religious restrictions, we're now | |
| seeing, and it's important to young people. | |
| On the issue of all of--of how the laws around guardianship | |
| are viewed and interpreted, is it--can we be hopeful that given | |
| the way young people have viewed the changes that have taken | |
| place already that it is imperative that the government | |
| understand that there will have to be comparable changes there | |
| as well in the role of women? | |
| Dr. Aldosari. I think it is understood by the government, | |
| but how much or how far they're willing to go, they're not | |
| really willing to, basically, dismantle this kind of power of | |
| men over women in the family, and it has been actually voiced | |
| out by Mohammed bin Salman in one of his interviews. | |
| He said, ``We do not want to challenge the family | |
| structure, and charges against the women activists is | |
| destabilizing the foundation of the Saudi society.'' | |
| And these are very broad terms which, basically, comes to | |
| women trying to be equal to men in terms of bigger rights. The | |
| fact that men still hold women, you know, under--you know, | |
| under their power by charges of disobedience and absence from | |
| home just render all kinds of reforms and new rights granted to | |
| women useless, basically. | |
| Mr. Deutch. Thanks. And if it's OK with the ranking member, | |
| I'm going to yield myself just a little extra time to ask one | |
| more question. Thank you. | |
| Ms. Nossel, I want to ask you the same question about young | |
| people and the public needs of young people in Saudi Arabia, | |
| going forward, but this time viewed through the lens of freedom | |
| of expression, of the rights of journalists, of bloggers. | |
| Obviously, we live in an age where the world is more | |
| interconnected than ever before. Young people understand the | |
| importance of that interconnectedness. | |
| So when you look at the case of--when you look at Badawi, | |
| you look at these other cases, isn't it--can we see the needs | |
| of the public driving to such a point where our pressing for | |
| human rights and the government's need to acknowledge the | |
| demands of young people are going to coincide? | |
| Ms. Nossel. You know, I think possibly, although, you know, | |
| the government is sort of, you know, playing this game of | |
| trying to--it's a playbook, you know, that I think the Chinese | |
| have really perfected, which is that you open up on music and | |
| entertainment and social media but within very strict | |
| parameters, and that opening, you know, gives people the sense | |
| that they are able to communicate, take advantage of these | |
| technologies, enjoy some of the rewards. | |
| But anytime it verges toward actual dissent, organizing, or | |
| the expression of independent political opinion, you know, | |
| that's where the buck stops and the system is tightly | |
| controlled. | |
| I think in Saudi Arabia, you know, we do see this kind of | |
| bleeding over between the activist core and a much wider public | |
| opinion. | |
| It's evident in the area of women's rights, as Dr. Aldosari | |
| said, where it has become a consensus viewpoint. You have this | |
| crucible of activists who put themselves on the line and paid | |
| an incredibly high price in giving up their freedom to be on | |
| the forefront of that campaign. | |
| But then you see, you know, scores of Saudi women across, | |
| you know, socioeconomic, professional, religious, and | |
| geographic lines supporting it, and that has driven the | |
| government toward some change. | |
| So I think we have to be optimistic. I think we have to | |
| believe that in the long arc and, you know, I think that's | |
| important when we think about the outcome after the murder of | |
| Khashoggi, you know, whether in a few years, you know, 4 years, | |
| 8 years, we'll be able to say that there was substantial | |
| movement. | |
| I think, you know, if there is, I believe, even if we | |
| cannot see this mass pressure for free expression across Saudi | |
| Arabia, it is there. | |
| You know, I believe free expression is a universal drive | |
| and hunger that people have, and we saw it in Saudi with the | |
| burgeoning of social media, you know, over the last several | |
| years, now more repressed. | |
| So I think ultimately, yes, although we shouldn't | |
| necessarily expect--criticize about the short term. | |
| Mr. Deutch. Great. Well, thank you very much, and just | |
| invoking the word optimism in today's hearing, I think, is very | |
| much appreciated, as Ms. Fontenrose points out. | |
| Should things go the way they're headed now and, | |
| ultimately, the Crown Prince becomes the king and is the king | |
| throughout 10 presidencies--thank you for putting it in bold | |
| terms like that, Ms. Fontenrose--this is--there's a reason that | |
| we need to continue to press on human rights because this is a | |
| long game and America's voice is critically important, as we | |
| recognize both the importance of the relationship and, most | |
| importantly, the importance of our values and human rights and | |
| advancing that relationship. | |
| So to all of the witnesses, I want to say thank you for a | |
| really informative and interesting conversation. I want to | |
| thank the members for participating, and I want to thank the | |
| staff for pulling off a relatively seamless virtual hearing. | |
| Thanks to all of them as well. | |
| Ranking Member Wilson, thank you for your leadership, and | |
| with that, this hearing is adjourned. | |
| [Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] | |
| APPENDIX | |
| [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] | |
| RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD | |
| [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] | |
| <all> | |
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