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<title> - CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: HELPING CORPORATE BOARDS AND INVESTORS MAKE DECISIONS FOR A SUSTAINABLE WORLD</title> |
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[House Hearing, 117 Congress] |
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[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] |
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CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIAL |
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RESPONSIBILITY: HELPING CORPORATE |
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BOARDS AND INVESTORS MAKE DECISIONS |
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FOR A SUSTAINABLE WORLD |
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VIRTUAL HEARING |
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BEFORE THE |
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTOR PROTECTION, |
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ENTREPRENEURSHIP, AND CAPITAL MARKETS |
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OF THE |
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COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES |
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U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES |
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ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS |
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FIRST SESSION |
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__________ |
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FEBRUARY 25, 2021 |
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services |
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Serial No. 117-7 |
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[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] |
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE |
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43-994 PDF WASHINGTON : 2021 |
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES |
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MAXINE WATERS, California, Chairwoman |
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CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York PATRICK McHENRY, North Carolina, |
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NYDIA M. VELAZQUEZ, New York Ranking Member |
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BRAD SHERMAN, California FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma |
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GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York BILL POSEY, Florida |
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DAVID SCOTT, Georgia BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri |
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AL GREEN, Texas BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan |
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EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri STEVE STIVERS, Ohio |
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ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado ANN WAGNER, Missouri |
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JIM A. HIMES, Connecticut ANDY BARR, Kentucky |
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BILL FOSTER, Illinois ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas |
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JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio FRENCH HILL, Arkansas |
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JUAN VARGAS, California TOM EMMER, Minnesota |
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JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey LEE M. ZELDIN, New York |
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VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia |
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AL LAWSON, Florida ALEXANDER X. MOONEY, West Virginia |
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MICHAEL SAN NICOLAS, Guam WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio |
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CINDY AXNE, Iowa TED BUDD, North Carolina |
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SEAN CASTEN, Illinois DAVID KUSTOFF, Tennessee |
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AYANNA PRESSLEY, Massachusetts TREY HOLLINGSWORTH, Indiana |
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RITCHIE TORRES, New York ANTHONY GONZALEZ, Ohio |
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STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts JOHN ROSE, Tennessee |
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ALMA ADAMS, North Carolina BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin |
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RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan LANCE GOODEN, Texas |
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MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania WILLIAM TIMMONS, South Carolina |
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ALEXANDRIA OCASIO-CORTEZ, New York VAN TAYLOR, Texas |
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JESUS ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois |
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SYLVIA GARCIA, Texas |
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NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia |
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JAKE AUCHINCLOSS, Massachusetts |
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Charla Ouertatani, Staff Director |
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Subcommittee on Investor Protection, Entrepreneurship, |
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and Capital Markets |
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BRAD SHERMAN, California, Chairman |
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CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan, Ranking |
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DAVID SCOTT, Georgia Member |
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JIM A. HIMES, Connecticut STEVE STIVERS, Ohio |
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BILL FOSTER, Illinois ANN WAGNER, Missouri |
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GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York FRENCH HILL, Arkansas |
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JUAN VARGAS, California TOM EMMER, Minnesota |
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JOSH GOTTHEIMER. New Jersey ALEXANDER X. MOONEY, West Virginia |
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VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio |
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MICHAEL SAN NICOLAS, Guam TREY HOLLINGSWORTH, Indiana, Vice |
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CINDY AXNE, Iowa Ranking Member |
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SEAN CASTEN, Illinois ANTHONY GONZALEZ, Ohio |
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EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin |
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C O N T E N T S |
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Page |
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Hearing held on: |
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February 25, 2021............................................ 1 |
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Appendix: |
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February 25, 2021............................................ 39 |
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WITNESSES |
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Thursday, February 25, 2021 |
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Andrus, James, Investment Manager, Board Governance and |
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Sustainability Program, California Public Employees' Retirement |
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System (CalPERS)............................................... 10 |
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Green, Andy, Senior Fellow for Economic Policy, Center for |
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American Progress.............................................. 5 |
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Ramani, Veena, Senior Program Director, Capital Market Systems, |
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Ceres.......................................................... 9 |
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Ramaswamy, Vivek, Founder & Executive Chairman, Roivant Sciences. 12 |
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Toney, Heather McTeer, Climate Justice Liaison, Environmental |
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Defense Fund, and Senior Advisor, Moms Clean Air Force......... 7 |
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APPENDIX |
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Prepared statements: |
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Andrus, James................................................ 40 |
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Green, Andy.................................................. 51 |
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Ramani, Veena................................................ 83 |
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Ramaswamy, Vivek............................................. 99 |
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Toney, Heather McTeer........................................ 107 |
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Additional Material Submitted for the Record |
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Sherman, Hon. Brad: |
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Center for American Progress report, ``The SEC's Time to |
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Act''...................................................... 116 |
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CDP report, ``Pitfalls of Climate-Related Disclosures''...... 153 |
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Ceres report, ``Disclose What Matters''...................... 163 |
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Ceres report, ``Running the Risk''........................... 194 |
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Letter from Kevin Fromer, President and CEO, Financial |
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Services Forum, to Senator Menendez and Representative |
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Meeks...................................................... 237 |
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ISS Climate Scenario Analysis................................ 238 |
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ISS ESG Climate Portfolio Analysis........................... 248 |
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ISS Ethix, ``Decarbonizing a Portfolio Versus Decarbonizing |
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the Economy''.............................................. 253 |
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Letter from Rich Sorkin, CEO, Jupiter Intelligence, to |
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Chairwoman Waters, Chairman Sherman, Ranking Member |
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McHenry, and Ranking Member Huizenga....................... 256 |
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PGIM report, ``Weathering Climate Change''................... 260 |
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Letter from Fiona Reynolds, CEO, PRI, to Chairman Sherman and |
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Ranking Member Huizenga.................................... 265 |
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Letter from Lisa Gilbert, Executive Vice President, Public |
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Citizen, to Chairman Sherman and Ranking Member Huizenga... 273 |
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Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-Related |
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Financial Disclosures (TCFD)............................... 277 |
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Huizenga, Hon. Bill: |
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``Yellen Can't Save the Polar Bears,'' by Gregory Zerzan..... 351 |
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Written statement of Benjamin Zycher......................... 355 |
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CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIAL |
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RESPONSIBILITY: HELPING |
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CORPORATE BOARDS AND |
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INVESTORS MAKE DECISIONS |
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FOR A SUSTAINABLE WORLD |
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---------- |
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Thursday, February 25, 2021 |
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U.S. House of Representatives, |
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Subcommittee on Investor Protection, |
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Entrepreneurship, and Capital Markets, |
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Committee on Financial Services, |
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Washington, D.C. |
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The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:01 p.m., via |
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Webex, Hon. Brad Sherman [chairman of the subcommittee] |
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presiding. |
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Members present: Representatives Sherman, Scott, Himes, |
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Foster, Meeks, Vargas, Gottheimer, Gonzalez of Texas, San |
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Nicolas, Axne, Casten, Cleaver; Huizenga, Stivers, Wagner, |
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Hill, Emmer, Mooney, Davidson, Hollingsworth, Gonzalez of Ohio, |
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and Steil. |
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Ex officio present: Representative Waters. |
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Also present: Representative Barr. |
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Chairman Sherman. The Subcommittee on Investor Protection, |
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Entrepreneurship, and Capital Markets will come to order. |
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Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a recess |
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of the subcommittee at any time. And, in fact, I do intend to |
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declare a recess, probably around 4:15 p.m., to allow Members |
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to vote in the end of the first vote on the Floor, and resuming |
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probably a half hour later so that Members will have a chance |
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to have voted on the second vote that we expect to happen this |
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afternoon. |
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Also, without objection, members of the full Financial |
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Services Committee who are not members of this subcommittee are |
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authorized to participate in today's hearing. This is the first |
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hearing of this subcommittee in the 117th Congress, and I do |
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want to thank everyone for being here. |
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And I'd like to point out that with the Chair of our Full |
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Committee being an ex officio member of this subcommittee, this |
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subcommittee has four Full Committee Chairs as members of this |
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subcommittee, because we have the Chairs of the Financial |
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Services, Oversight and Reform, Agriculture, and Foreign |
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Affairs Committees serving with us here today. |
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As a reminder, all Members should keep themselves muted |
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when they are not being recognized by the Chair. This will |
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minimize disturbances while Members are asking question of our |
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witnesses. The staff has been instructed not to mute a Member |
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except when the Member is not being recognized by the Chair and |
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there is inadvertent background noise. |
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Members are also reminded that they may only participate in |
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one remote proceeding at a time. If you are participating |
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today, please keep your camera on, and if you choose to attend |
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a different remote proceeding, please turn your camera off. If |
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Members wish to be recognized during the hearing, please |
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identify yourself by name to facilitate recognition by the |
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Chair. |
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Today's hearing is entitled, ``Climate Change and Social |
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Responsibility: Helping Corporate Boards and Investors Make |
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Decisions for a Sustainable World.'' |
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And I have just been informed that our Full Committee Chair |
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Maxine Waters will not be joining us for an opening statement, |
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and accordingly I recognize myself for 5 minutes to deliver an |
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opening statement. I'll then recognize the ranking member of |
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this subcommittee, Mr. Huizenga, for his opening statement. |
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For hundreds of years, boards of directors and investors |
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have focused pretty much on one thing: Can the corporation pay |
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dividends? The chief measure of this was earnings per share. |
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The accounting profession for centuries has developed a system |
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to define, measure, tabulate, audit, and report earnings per |
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share. Those who defined earnings per share controlled what a |
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corporation would do, since its board would instruct its |
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executives to do whatever was legal and ethical in order to |
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achieve earnings per share. And this met societal expectations, |
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since society simply wanted corporations to create and maintain |
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profitable businesses. |
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Today, we have different expectations. In addition to |
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shareholders, we have stakeholders. All of us are stakeholders. |
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Society at large protects the corporation and its property, |
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educates its workforce and their children, and stakeholders |
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also want to know what the corporation is doing. And the |
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shareholders themselves want more information than earnings per |
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share. They especially want information about the effect on |
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climate change. |
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Keep in mind that over the last 40 years, the number of |
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weather events costing over a billion dollars has increased by |
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300 percent. So, climate change is real and it is affecting us. |
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And we know who is affected most: disadvantaged communities and |
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communities of color. For example, during Hurricane Katrina, |
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more than one-third of those residents who were forced to leave |
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their homes were African Americans, and half of those who died |
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from that hurricane were African Americans. |
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So, those looking at corporations want to know, how is the |
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corporation affected by future climate change, how will it be |
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affected, and how is its behavior designed to minimize climate |
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change? We have a host of other social issues to deal with, and |
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with each of them we want to define numerical standards. We |
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don't want an extra page or two added to the report of the |
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corporation, the 10-K, loaded with greenwash and denial |
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statements. We need to define and hopefully have numerical |
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standards and measures to tabulate. We want to change the |
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behavior of corporations, both in causing them to prepare for |
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climate change and to hopefully minimize their effect on |
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climate change. |
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And there are those who argue that this is not important, |
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it is not material, that the only things that are material are |
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things that change earnings per share by at least a few |
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pennies. First, these issues are material to shareholders; and |
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second, there is a reputational risk that will affect earnings |
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per share. So if you focus only on earnings per share, you are |
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not going to be in a position to predict future earnings per |
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share. And investors themselves are interested in these social |
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issues, not just on earnings per share. |
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Now, we can't turn the Form 10-K into a telephone book. We |
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need to be selective, and sometimes issues may arise that are |
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important that may not be as important in future years. Right |
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now, I'm working with others on getting disclosure of |
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involvement in Xinjiang Province in China, so that we will know |
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whether forced labor is part of a corporation's supply chain. |
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Hopefully, 10 years from now, that won't be an issue. But we do |
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know that climate change and the corporation's effect on other |
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environmental issues and environmental justice will be |
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important to stakeholders and shareholders in the future. |
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We do know that we want to disclose whether the corporation |
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is engaged in political contributions that are hidden from the |
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public, so-called ``dark money,'' and for those who say that is |
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not material to investors, tell me on the record whether you |
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would invest in a company that gave $20 million to the |
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Communist Party of the United States or one of its dark money |
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subordinate entities. |
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We want to focus on executive pay versus average pay, and |
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whether the corporation is paying taxes, or taking advantage of |
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tax havens. There are a host of issues that I think are serious |
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enough to require the corporations to disclose them and for |
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shareholders to want to focus on them. |
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With that, I recognize Ranking Member Huizenga for 5 |
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minutes. |
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Mr. Huizenga. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, what exactly are |
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ESGs? Many claim that Environmental, Social, and Governance |
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(ESG) investing is an investment strategy that focuses on |
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incorporating criteria into investment decisions in addition to |
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the traditional focus on investment financial returns. However, |
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ESG data criteria spans a range of issues including, among |
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others, measures of companies' carbon emissions, labor policies |
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[inaudible.] |
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Chairman Sherman. Mr. Huizenga, if you can suspend until |
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the majority of us can hear you? |
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Mr. Huizenga. Okay. Can you hear me now? I am not sure |
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what's happening. |
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Chairman Sherman. We can hear you now. |
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Mr. Huizenga. Okay. I'll pick up partway through, assuming |
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that you are dealing with the timing properly to put some time |
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back on. Correct, Mr. Chairman? |
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Chairman Sherman. You have almost 4\1/2\ minutes. |
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Mr. Huizenga. Okay. Well, this data spans a range of |
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issues, deals with what are frankly policy decisions, not |
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business decisions. And, whether the CEO and the chairman of |
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the board of directors is the same person or whether the |
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company issues dual-class shares shouldn't be the role of this |
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body. |
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It is clear that demands for ESG information have increased |
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recently. The amount of money in ESG-specific exchange-traded |
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funds went from taking in $8 billion in 2019, to $31 billion in |
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2020. According to Bank of America's global research, it is |
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estimated that the amount invested in ESG funds could increase |
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by $20 trillion over the next 2 decades. Because of these |
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increased demands, many companies have responded by voluntarily |
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increasing the amount of ESG information that they disclose. By |
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all means, companies should focus on providing meaningful |
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material disclosure that a reasonable investor needs to make |
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informed investment decisions. After all, companies and not |
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bureaucrats are best equipped to determine-- |
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Chairman Sherman. Once again, Mr. Huizenga, I wonder if you |
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can suspend, and I will ask staff to freeze the clock. Can |
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others hear Mr. Huizenga? I cannot. |
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We've frozen the clock at 3:17, and now we can hear the |
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gentleman. |
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Mr. Huizenga. I am trying to reconnect on my Bluetooth. I'm |
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sorry. I am trying to reconnect to the internet, the Wi-Fi |
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here, and make sure that's connected properly. |
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Chairman Sherman. We can hear you now. |
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Mr. Huizenga. Okay. Sorry about that. Hopefully, the |
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internet is--I am in my office. I can't do much more than be in |
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my office to get a signal. |
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So with that, individual businesses should be able to |
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create an optimized value for their shareholders and potential |
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investors. What should not happen is that the government |
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mandates ESG disclosures. As we had talked about, and maybe it |
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got cut out, doing this voluntarily is proper, but having |
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government mandates to do it should not be. |
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These disclosures only name and shame companies that we all |
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know; for some, naming and shaming what they perceive as |
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corporate brilliance has been fun and trendy and some even have |
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profited from the practice. Additionally, compliance with these |
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types of mandatory disclosures only wastes precious private |
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sector resources that could otherwise be used to create jobs, |
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increase wages, grow the company, expand capacity, and maximize |
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shareholder value. |
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To date, there is very little concrete evidence that over |
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the long term, ESG investing outperforms broad market indexes. |
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Politically-motivated disclosure requirements only increase |
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costs and add yet another hurdle for companies who are looking |
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to go public, while discouraging other companies from doing so. |
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Over the last several decades, activist shareholders, corporate |
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gadflies, and misguided politicians have hijacked the SEC to |
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operate well outside its mandate and push nonmaterial social |
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and political policies. |
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In fact, a February 2021 report from the Global Financial |
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Markets Center at Duke University School of Law goes so far as |
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to say that securities law should be rewritten so that the SEC |
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can regulate to, ``fight climate change, systemic racism, and |
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income and wealth inequality.'' This is not part of the |
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tripartite mission of the SEC. Instead of focusing on policies |
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that solve societal ills, the SEC must remain focused on |
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protecting investors; maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient |
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markets; and facilitating capital formation. |
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While some today may encourage or even embrace SEC mission |
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creed, the reality is that government-imposed mandates will not |
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lead to greater prosperity or protect investors. At the end of |
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the day, the goal should be to create an atmosphere that |
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increases capital formation, strengthens job creation, and |
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boosts economic growth. When you talk about closing the gap on |
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income and quality, that's how we do it. The subcommittee |
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should be looking for ways to make our public markets more |
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attractive, and more competitive, not examining ways to |
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increase regulatory and compliance burdens on the private |
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sector. |
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The title of this hearing says, ``Helping Corporate Boards |
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and Investors Make Decisions for a Sustainable World.'' The |
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chairman said, ``We want to change the behavior of |
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corporations.'' This is not helping, this is mandating, and not |
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all of us agree with the chairman. Some may have those |
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different expectations. So, it is amazing to me the mental |
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gymnastics that are being used to justify this path forward, |
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and what we need to do is to make sure that we are dealing with |
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policy, not social engineering, plain and simple. With that, I |
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yield back. |
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Chairman Sherman. Thank you. |
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Today, we welcome the testimony of our distinguished |
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witnesses. |
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Andy Green is a senior fellow for economic policy at the |
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Center for American Progress, and was a counsel to former SEC |
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Commissioner Kara Stein. |
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Heather McTeer Toney is a climate justice liaison at the |
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Environmental Defense Fund, and a senior advisor at Moms Clean |
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Air Force. Previously, she served as mayor of Greensville, |
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Mississippi, and as regional administrator for the EPAs |
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southeast region. |
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Veena Ramani is senior program director of capital market |
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systems at Ceres, a sustainability nonprofit organization that |
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works with investors and companies. |
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James Andrus is the investment manager of the Board |
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Governance and Sustainability Program for CalPERS, which has |
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some of my money, and I believe it is the largest institutional |
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investor. |
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And Vivek Ramaswamy is founder and executive chairman of |
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Roivant Sciences, and he is an entrepreneur and author, as |
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well. |
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Witnesses are reminded that your oral testimony will be |
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limited to 5 minutes. You should be able to see the timer on |
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your screen that will indicate how much time you have left, and |
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a chime will go off at the end of your time. I would ask that |
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you be mindful of the timer and quickly wrap up your testimony |
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if you hear a chime. And without objection, your written |
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statements will be made a part of the record. |
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Mr. Green, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. |
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STATEMENT OF ANDY GREEN, SENIOR FELLOW FOR ECONOMIC POLICY, |
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CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS |
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Mr. Green. Thank you so much, Chairman Sherman, and Ranking |
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Member Huizenga. I am Andy Green, a senior fellow at the Center |
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for American Progress. These remarks reflect my own views. |
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The problems facing our world from climate change to |
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systemic racism to economic inequality are problems that |
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investors directly face, too. Disclosure and accountability |
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aren't about subjective outcomes and preferences; they are |
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about making the economy work. Information and accountability |
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are the lifeblood of competition and the broadly distributed |
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economic opportunity that makes capitalism in America work if |
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we hold true to it. |
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Consistent, comparable, and reliable information, the |
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government's corporate accountability tools, and strong banking |
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regulation enable investors and the public to help align |
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outcomes for the long-term shared interests of all: investors; |
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companies; workers; and the public. When those outcomes are not |
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so aligned, financial crises, corporate scandals, taxpayer |
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bailouts, pollution, racism, and economic inequality occur far |
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more easily. Climate change is a systemic risk to the U.S. |
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financial system, and many ESG matters pose glowing threats |
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including existing threats to investor protection, retirement |
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security, and economic growth. |
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Climate change will destroy assets and hamstring recovery |
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and growth. The need to transition to net zero will leave |
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behind those who are laggards. As scholar Graham Steele has |
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outlined, climate's impacts on the financial system will flow |
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through and amplify existing vulnerabilities, in particular, |
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leverage, interconnectedness, and concentration. The less that |
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investors are speculative will do more to prevent what Steele |
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terms a climate ``Lehman Brothers moment,'' where working |
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families, investors, and taxpayers will be left holding the |
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bag. |
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We need equitable solutions for communities of color, |
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agricultural communities, many of which are communities of |
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color, too, and all Americans, who are similarly geographically |
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impacted. Capital can move across borders in minutes, yet |
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working families are far more bound to the communities in which |
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we all live. We need to lean against the downward pressure that |
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mobile capital can place on worker wages and environmental |
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standards, and more, both within the country and |
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internationally. |
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Laissez-faire rules, including around the capital markets |
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and financial regulations, get you concentrations of wealth and |
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economic power, and ultimately, deep distressed in the |
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political system that enabled that. Equity is only one of the |
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reasons why I feel so strongly about a focus on financial- |
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sector transparency and accountability around the emissions in |
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finances, and the labor practices, and tax risks that are |
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enabled, and other ESG issues. |
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Ultimately, it is far more equitable to hold accountable |
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the large financial firms that are financing, underwriting, and |
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trading in climate risk or labor risk in financial products and |
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bringing those finance emissions, for example, down in line |
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with the Paris Accord and the best science, that is, to smack |
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the community banks and credit unions who are serving working |
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families and farmers. Bringing down emissions across the |
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financial system will reduce the climate impacts on those |
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communities and on all of us. Getting net zero by 2050 is the |
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best way to reduce climate financial risk and protect |
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investors. |
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Similarly, holding the financial sector accountable on |
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worker empowerment, systemic risk, taxpayer and human rights, |
|
and democracy, sends powerful signals via the marketplace that |
|
we are all in this together, investors and the public. |
|
The United States has for far too long been a laggard in |
|
sustainable finance. Correcting that presents an opportunity |
|
for better markets and for American leadership in the world. To |
|
date, the subcommittee has considered a number of important |
|
bills, all of which advance sustainable finance, and which I |
|
supplemented with a range of recommendations in my written |
|
testimony. All of these areas interact with one another in |
|
multiple ways and progress across them together reinforces the |
|
effectiveness of all of them. |
|
Our history of predicting past financial consumer and |
|
investor protection crises is poor, but we have the opportunity |
|
to get it right this time. I hope we seize that opportunity. |
|
Ultimately, it is about enabling capitalism to work. Thank you |
|
very much. I look forward to answering your questions. |
|
[The prepared statement of Mr. Green can be found on page |
|
51 of the appendix.] |
|
Chairman Sherman. Thank you, and thank you for not using |
|
absolutely all of your time. |
|
Ms. Toney, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. |
|
|
|
STATEMENT OF HEATHER MCTEER TONEY, CLIMATE JUSTICE LIAISON, |
|
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, AND SENIOR ADVISOR, MOMS CLEAN AIR |
|
FORCE |
|
|
|
Ms. Toney. Thank you, Chairman Sherman, Ranking Member |
|
Huizenga, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for |
|
holding this very timely hearing to discuss the necessity to |
|
normalize climate change and social responsibility as a |
|
consideration of corporate boards and investors. I truly |
|
approximately the opportunity to testify about the very real |
|
risk to investors, markets, and communities, particularly |
|
Black, Brown, and marginalized areas that are disproportionally |
|
impacted when corporations fail to calculate the risk of |
|
climate change. |
|
I am here today in my capacity as the climate justice |
|
liaison for the Environmental Defense Fund, and as senior |
|
advisor to Moms Clean Air Force. Together, we are a community |
|
of over 3.7 million parents, members, and allies who tackle our |
|
planet's biggest environmental challenges through science and |
|
partnership, economics, and advocacy. I previously served as |
|
Administrator for the EPA's Southeast Region under President |
|
Obama, and I am also a former mayor, having served my hometown |
|
of Greenville, Mississippi, for two terms. |
|
I have recently served as a climate justice advisor to two |
|
Fortune 500 companies. But my most important job is as a mom. I |
|
am the mother of three children, ages 25, 15, and 4, and it is |
|
through this lens that I share my expertise on the impact of |
|
climate change as a risk impact to corporations. |
|
It is also with great pleasure that I sit alongside |
|
colleagues who are no strangers to this work or our |
|
organizations. This subject is not new to us. But what's |
|
unfortunate is that the warnings we all shared over 10 years |
|
ago were not heeded. Right now, today, we are experiencing in |
|
real time the devastation, physical, and financial loss borne |
|
by those most unable to stand the burden due to failures of |
|
corporations to adequately prepare and disclose their climate |
|
risk. |
|
I am going to focus on the impacts felt by what I call the, |
|
``invisible investor,'' and that's the American taxpayers |
|
invested in the infrastructure and assets of our communities |
|
nationwide. More often than not, the brunt of these expenses |
|
fall on communities most at risk to the impacts of climate |
|
change |
|
When I was mayor, I was blessed with a really good |
|
corporate partner, Mars Food, Incorporated. They operated Uncle |
|
Ben's Rice, now known as Ben's Original Rice, in Greenville, |
|
Mississippi, for over 40 years. They not only supply needed |
|
jobs to the community, but they also hold an important role as |
|
a major public asset. They occupy over 80 acres, 250,000 square |
|
feet of space and produce 100,000 tons of rice annually. It is |
|
the largest Mars Food factory in the world. Sitting right on |
|
the Mississippi River, it serves as an anchor to a majority of |
|
the African-American community that has been working hard to |
|
overcome systemic poverty for generations. |
|
During my time of public service, I had to manage not one, |
|
but two, 500-year flood events. Both events caused extensive |
|
and expensive damage to the infrastructure of the community: |
|
roads; bridges; and water systems. They were all impacted by |
|
the heavy rainfall and the incessant storms that battered the |
|
City of Greenville year after year. |
|
Quite frankly, the tax base of the City couldn't handle the |
|
existing infrastructure needs, let alone the added pressure of |
|
becoming resilient to climate impacts. It is the type of |
|
activity that would cause a major business or corporation to |
|
close up shop and move somewhere else. Nevertheless, the Mars |
|
Food climate sustainability plan took into account the asset |
|
placement, needs, preparation, and mitigation necessary to |
|
continue strong global economic growth while supporting local |
|
community needs. |
|
Their willingness to not only assess climate risk, but |
|
share the information, meant that I was prepared to account for |
|
the necessary support: street upgrades; police and fire in case |
|
of emergency; water system points of weakness; potential levee |
|
breaches; and places to point the Army Corp of Engineers to for |
|
review. All of these calculated costs added value to the |
|
company while protecting the invisible investor: the citizens |
|
of my City who, through their tax dollars, were able to defer |
|
and reinvest repairs to other places where it was needed. |
|
How I wish that same energy could have emerged in Texas |
|
with the recent winter storms and the energy debacle that arose |
|
from the complete failure of publicly-traded energy |
|
corporations to prepare, let alone disclose their climate |
|
risks. While you will certainly hear that voluntary climate- |
|
risk disclosures create a better opportunity for corporations |
|
to self-regulate, while protecting their proprietary |
|
information, the bottom line is that the astronomical rates in |
|
the deregulated system represent a failure of market |
|
incentives. It also demonstrates that some oversight is |
|
necessary to protect those most at risk from the economic |
|
fallout of these intense climate-weather events. |
|
These are the ``invisible investors,'' because the people |
|
pay a high price when there is a market crash. They cannot |
|
short-sell their stock in the community. They are not able to |
|
redistribute the loss among other assets. The invisible |
|
investors are not able to categorize the outrageously high |
|
electric and water bills as a capital loss and reduce their tax |
|
rate. |
|
How our government, corporations, and communities respond |
|
right now will determine whether or not we have learned for our |
|
historic history of systemic racism and exclusion by following |
|
the science and listening to community experts in order to |
|
create a more efficient and equitable process that saves our |
|
economy, ecosystem, and lives at the same time. I stand ready |
|
to answer any questions. Thank you. |
|
[The prepared statement of Ms. Toney can be found on page |
|
107 of the appendix.] |
|
Chairman Sherman. Thank you. |
|
Ms. Ramani, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. |
|
|
|
STATEMENT OF VEENA RAMANI, SENIOR PROGRAM DIRECTOR, CAPITAL |
|
MARKET SYSTEMS, CERES |
|
|
|
Ms. Ramani. Thank you, Chairman Sherman, Ranking Member |
|
Huizenga, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the |
|
opportunity to appear before you today. My name is Veena |
|
Ramani, and I represent Ceres, a nonprofit organization that |
|
works with hundreds of influential investors and companies to |
|
tackle the world's greatest sustainability challenges, |
|
including the climate crisis. My testimony draws from Ceres' |
|
long history in working on climate change risk management and |
|
climate change disclosure. |
|
Climate change is not only an environmental issue; it is a |
|
systemic financial risk. The physical impacts of climate change |
|
are happening all around us. Just this past year, we've lived |
|
through the worst wildfire season, the busiest hurricane |
|
season, and the hottest year on record. Combined damages from |
|
these and other extreme weather events totaled close to $100 |
|
billion in 2020. |
|
These impacts are landing disproportionately on low-income |
|
communities, rural communities, and communities of color. As my |
|
fellow panelists have reiterated, climate change, public |
|
health, and racial inequality don't exist in silos. They are |
|
deeply intertwined and, in turn, affect financial market |
|
stability and broader economic well-being. |
|
Companies are adjusting at different speeds to this new |
|
normal. Many companies are seeing and embracing the lucrative |
|
opportunities being created by the shift to a net zero economy. |
|
We've seen companies set goals, innovate, and evolve their |
|
business strategies. Actions like this remain the exception |
|
rather than the rule. In fact, last year, when Ceres assessed |
|
the climate risks of major banks, we found that more than half |
|
of their syndicated loans faced significant transition risks |
|
because many of their clients are not prepared for the shift to |
|
a net zero economy. |
|
Investors have known about the physical and transition |
|
risks for years. Most investors understand that climate is not |
|
just a financial risk; it is a material risk. But the latest |
|
understanding from the Federal Reserve and other regulators is |
|
that the climate crisis is a systemic risk that threatens the |
|
very stability of financial markets. |
|
In the face of the climate crisis, companies, investors, |
|
and regulators need to make consequential decisions, and they |
|
need to make them now. The foundation for this is starting to |
|
be laid. Companies are starting to integrate climate change |
|
into their risk management. Investors are including climate |
|
change in shareholder proposals, their dialogue with companies, |
|
and their investment analysis. Financial regulators have |
|
started to include climate change factors into their |
|
supervision of key industries. |
|
But, there's a catch. Companies, investors, and regulators |
|
don't have access to quality, actionable, and reliable climate |
|
change disclosures at scale. You cannot make good decisions |
|
without good information. To address climate change risks in |
|
financial markets, decision-makers first need information on |
|
the nature of the risks that markets face, and for this, |
|
companies need to provide information on their climate change |
|
performance, strategies, and approach. |
|
It is important to note that there has been an uptick in |
|
voluntary climate change disclosures driven by investor demand |
|
and the pioneering work done by key groups in this space like |
|
GRI, SASB, CDP, and others. But even though the volume of |
|
disclosure has grown, the quality of disclosure remains |
|
variable. Investors and regulators are still not getting |
|
decision-useful insights. |
|
Federal Reserve Governor Lael Brainard actually summarized |
|
the core of the problem just last week, when she said, |
|
``Current voluntary disclosure practices are an important first |
|
step, but they are prone to variable quality, incompleteness, |
|
and a lack of actionable data.'' |
|
The SEC has issued guidance that explains how its existing |
|
disclosure rules could be applied to climate risks, but to |
|
date, the guidance has not been strongly enforced. A clear, |
|
right, and urgent action to address the climate crisis, robust |
|
climate change disclosure, is key. Decisive action is needed by |
|
the SEC because this is fundamental to the success of |
|
companies, investors, and regulators. Ceres has called on the |
|
SEC to robustly enforce the existing interpretative guidance on |
|
climate change. And just yesterday, Acting Chair Allison Lee of |
|
the SEC issued a statement directing SEC staff to enhance their |
|
focus on climate-related disclosure. We would welcome this as a |
|
critically important step in the right direction. We also call |
|
on the SEC to build on this new focus and adopt and enforce |
|
rules for climate change disclosure. |
|
In closing, companies, investors, and regulators lack vital |
|
information on climate change, and in a very real way, they are |
|
flying blind. Again, you cannot make good decisions without |
|
good information. And given the scale of the risk and the |
|
important decisions that need to be made, climate change |
|
information does not just need to be good; it needs to be as |
|
good as possible. I thank you for your attention and I'm happy |
|
to answer questions. |
|
[The prepared statement of Ms. Ramani can be found on page |
|
83 of the appendix.] |
|
Chairman Sherman. Thank you for adhering to our time |
|
limits. |
|
Mr. Andrus, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. |
|
|
|
STATEMENT OF JAMES ANDRUS, INVESTMENT MANAGER, BOARD GOVERNANCE |
|
AND SUSTAINABILITY PROGRAM, CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' |
|
RETIREMENT SYSTEM |
|
|
|
Mr. Andrus. Chairman Sherman, Ranking Member Huizenga, and |
|
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to |
|
testify at today's hearing. My name is James Andrus, and I'm an |
|
investment manager for the Board Governance and Sustainability |
|
Program for the California Public Employees' Retirement System |
|
(CalPERS). I am pleased to appear before you today on behalf of |
|
CalPERS. We applaud and support the subcommittee's focus on |
|
building a sustainable and competitive economy. I will provide |
|
an overview of CalPERS, discuss our governing principles, and |
|
discuss climate risk, charitable political expenditures, human |
|
capital management, and board diversity. |
|
CalPERS is the largest defined benefit public pension fund |
|
in the United States, with approximately $450 billion in global |
|
assets. Ultimately, CalPERS' primary responsibility is to our |
|
beneficiaries. Since December 2019, we have considered climate- |
|
related risks to be among the top three risks to the long-term |
|
value of our portfolio. Our view aligns with the U.S. National |
|
Climate Assessment's finding that climate change exacerbates |
|
existing vulnerabilities in communities across the United |
|
States, presenting growing challenges to human health and |
|
safety, quality of life, and the rate of economic growth. |
|
Climate change is a systemic risk, so it is critical that |
|
investors can access clear disclosures of the risks it poses to |
|
long-term value creation by the companies in which they invest. |
|
Accordingly, we help lead global initiatives like Climate |
|
Action 100+, an initiative which CalPERS co-founded to engage |
|
the systemically important carbon emitters to mitigate climate |
|
risk in our global equity portfolio. However, initiatives like |
|
Climate Action 100+ are poor substitutes for policy and |
|
regulatory action. |
|
In positive international developments, the International |
|
Accounting Standards Board has issued guidance that promotes |
|
including certain climate risk items in financial statements. |
|
This is an important development, and one U.S. policymakers |
|
should consider thoughtfully. Our principles call for robust |
|
board oversight and disclosure of corporate charitable and |
|
political activity to ensure alignment with business strategy |
|
and to protect assets on behalf of shareowners. The materiality |
|
of corporate political spending was recently reaffirmed by |
|
companies themselves in the aftermath of the January 6th attack |
|
on the U.S. Capitol Building. |
|
I want to highlight Justice Kennedy's words from Citizens |
|
United v. the Federal Elections Commission, because they make |
|
clear that the Supreme Court envisioned wide disclosure of |
|
political contributions. |
|
Justice Kennedy wrote: ``With the advent of the Internet, |
|
prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and |
|
citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and |
|
elected officials accountable for their positions and |
|
supporters. This transparency enables the electorate to make |
|
informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers |
|
and messages.'' |
|
Justice Kennedy's expectation has not been fulfilled, but |
|
it is more apparent now than ever before that it should be. |
|
The convergence of the current economic, climate, and |
|
public health crises, as well as the mounting call to advance |
|
racial equity, have accelerated investors' focus on effectively |
|
managing human capital. The value of human capital management |
|
disclosures is straightforward. Businesses depend on the |
|
workforce as a source of value creation which, if mismanaged, |
|
could harm long-term performance. Researchers have found that |
|
high-quality human capital management practices correlate with |
|
lower employee turnover, higher productivity, and better |
|
corporate financial performance, producing a considerable and |
|
sustained alpha over time. |
|
There remains a substantial lack of board diversity in U.S. |
|
companies. NASDAQ has stated that the U.S. currently ranks 53rd |
|
in board gender diversity, according to the World Economic |
|
Forum. Third-party analysis shows that as many as 70 percent of |
|
NASDAQ companies' boards lack a woman or a racially diverse |
|
person. |
|
The Office of the Illinois State Treasurer published a |
|
White Paper entitled, ``The Investment Case for Board |
|
Diversity,'' which provides an extensive and comprehensive |
|
review of academic and practitioner research on the value of |
|
gender and ethnic board diversity for investors. The |
|
examination finds that the gender and racial ethnic composition |
|
of corporate boards does indeed have a material and relevant |
|
impact on company performance. |
|
Requiring standardized disclosures of relevant information |
|
is necessary to close the information gap. In line with this |
|
view, we strongly support a further comprehensive review of the |
|
disclosure requirements of Regulation S-X and Regulation S-K, |
|
with a greater focus on investor needs. We look forward to |
|
working with the subcommittee and the committee to discuss |
|
these issues as well as the policy proposals set forth in |
|
today's hearings and more proposals in the future. |
|
Thank you, Chairman Sherman and Ranking Member Huizenga, |
|
for inviting me to participate in this hearing, and I look |
|
forward to your questions. |
|
[The prepared statement of Mr. Andrus can be found on page |
|
40 of the appendix.] |
|
Chairman Sherman. Thank you. |
|
And finally, Mr. Ramaswamy, you are recognized for 5 |
|
minutes. |
|
|
|
STATEMENT OF VIVEK RAMASWAMY, FOUNDER & EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN, |
|
ROIVANT SCIENCES |
|
|
|
Mr. Ramaswamy. Thank you, Chairman Sherman, Ranking Member |
|
Huizenga, and members of the subcommittee. My name is Vivek |
|
Ramaswamy. I offer strictly my personal viewpoints and not |
|
those of any organization with which I'm affiliated. |
|
I was born and raised in Ohio. I spent 7 years as a biotech |
|
investor. For three of those years, I also attended law school. |
|
In 2014, I founded a biotech company that I led as CEO until |
|
last month, and I'm now writing a book about stakeholder |
|
capitalism, a topic that's central to today's discussion. |
|
Stakeholder capitalism refers to the idea that companies |
|
should serve not only their shareholders but also other |
|
societal interests. And big tech, big banks, and big business |
|
have roundly endorsed the idea. Milton Friedman didn't like it |
|
because it might lead companies to be less profitable, but my |
|
concerns are different. I worry that stakeholders' capitalism |
|
represents a threat to the integrity of American democracy |
|
itself. |
|
For companies to pursue societal interests in addition to |
|
shareholder interests, companies and their investors have to |
|
first define what those other societal interests ought to be. |
|
And that isn't a business judgment; it is a moral judgment. |
|
Speaking as an American, I do not want our capitalist elites to |
|
play a larger role than they already do in determining our |
|
society's core values. The answers to those questions ought to |
|
be answered by America's citizens through our democratic |
|
process, publicly through open debate, and privately at the |
|
ballot box. Personally, I don't know if that is a Republican |
|
idea or a Democratic idea. I consider it an American idea. |
|
It is puzzling to me that stakeholder capitalism is viewed |
|
as a liberal idea. Many progressives who love stakeholder |
|
capitalism abhor Citizens United precisely because it permits |
|
corporations to influence our elections and our democracy. |
|
Stakeholder capitalism is Citizens United on steroids. It |
|
demands that CEOs use corporate resources to implement the |
|
social goals that they want to push. |
|
In the pharmaceutical industry, does rejecting stakeholder |
|
capitalism mean putting profits ahead of patients? No. But |
|
putting patients first means actually putting patients first, |
|
including ahead of other social causes. It means we don't care |
|
about the race or gender of the scientist who discovers a cure |
|
to COVID-19. Or whether the manufacturing or distribution |
|
process that delivers a vaccine most quickly to patients is |
|
carbon-neutral. |
|
Conflicts of interest actually lie at the heart of this |
|
debate. In the real world, most conflicts are actually |
|
financial. If I am a public company CEO and I decide to use the |
|
corporate piggy bank to make a donation to my high school, or |
|
to the temple where I worship, that should raise a red flag, |
|
since my high school or my temple have nothing to do with my |
|
business. |
|
But why is it any different if a CEO uses the corporate |
|
piggy bank to make a donation to a climate change organization |
|
or to a specific racial advocacy group? Many CEOs did exactly |
|
that last year and they were applauded for it, but in both |
|
cases, the CEO derives a personal benefit from using the |
|
company's piggy bank to make a donation. That is a conflict of |
|
interest and I find it curious that there's no mandated |
|
disclosures about that. |
|
Many CEOs are surely going to advise you to mandate these |
|
ESG-related disclosures. My whole advice to you is this: Ask |
|
yourself what these business leaders hope to achieve for |
|
themselves in that process. Some of them may hope to distract |
|
you from other regulatory issues that pose real risks to their |
|
business. For example, in Silicon Valley, disclosing climate |
|
risks is easy. Respecting user privacy, now that's hard. When |
|
choosing between constraints on matters that relate to the core |
|
of your business versus matters that don't, self-interested |
|
CEOs are generally going to choose the latter. |
|
I also have other concerns that I would be glad to address |
|
in the Q & A. I think mandatory disclosures tend to impose |
|
burdens on companies, they tend to favor incumbents over |
|
startups, and they make it harder for startups to go public. I |
|
also think that these policies might contribute to a GSE-linked |
|
asset bubble akin to the pre-2008 housing bubble that was |
|
driven by government policy just for homeownership. But those |
|
are secondary issues. The bigger issue is the threat to |
|
American democracy itself. |
|
If we are honest, let's acknowledge that the debate today |
|
is not actually about protecting investors. It is about |
|
fighting climate change. And I'm not saying that is a bad goal, |
|
but I do think that is what is going on here. And if that is |
|
true, then I urge you to just be frank and to just say that. |
|
Protecting investors isn't the main reason. It is a |
|
justification. |
|
If the goal were to protect investors, there are many, many |
|
other disclosures you would mandate ahead of climate risks on a |
|
wide range of topics, for example, about the health and dietary |
|
practices of company employees or the social or political |
|
commitments of the company's CEO. If we pretend that protecting |
|
investors is the real reason for these climate disclosures, we |
|
risk opening that Pandora's Box. |
|
So, in closing, speaking to you as an American, I urge you, |
|
as Members of Congress, to implement your chosen policies |
|
through the front door rather than sneaking them in through the |
|
back door. Do not use companies as instruments to accomplish |
|
what you cannot get done directly as legislators. Unlike you, |
|
CEOs are not democratically accountable and that might make |
|
them a convenient solution in the short run, but in the long |
|
run you will create a monster that you cannot put back in its |
|
cage. And that is not just bad for Republicans or for |
|
Democrats; it is bad for America. |
|
Speaking as an American, I don't want to live in a |
|
corporatocracy. I don't want to live in a one-dollar one-vote |
|
system. I don't want to live in a modern version of Old World |
|
Europe where a small group of elites decide what is good for |
|
society and the rest of the world. I want to live in a |
|
democracy where everyone's voice and vote counts equally. Thank |
|
you. |
|
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ramaswamy can be found on |
|
page 99 of the appendix.] |
|
Chairman Sherman. Thank you. |
|
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning. And to |
|
the witness who just spoke, I would say that we are walking |
|
through the front door here. The SEC is part of the |
|
democratically-elected government, and we're using a |
|
democratically-elected government to try to achieve at least |
|
some corporate recognition of important social impacts. |
|
I do want to commend the SEC for just yesterday, Acting SEC |
|
Chair Allison Lee announced that she has directed the Division |
|
of Corporation Finance to enhance its focus on climate-related |
|
disclosures in public company filings. I think that is relevant |
|
even to your earnings per share investors who will want to know |
|
what risk factor the company has from climate change, but also |
|
whether it is in a position to attract investment and attract |
|
clients and enhance its reputation because it is doing |
|
something helpful for the environment. |
|
The ranking member said that ESG funds don't necessarily |
|
outperform. I'm sure that there's a lot of information in our |
|
financial statements where you could say companies that spend |
|
more on advertising don't overperform, and don't underperform. |
|
But we disclose a lot of information to shareholders, who may |
|
decide that in the future, such companies--such as companies |
|
with diverse boards will overperform in the future whether |
|
they've overperformed in the past or not. |
|
My first question is again on board diversity. Mr. Andrus, |
|
NASDAQ recently issued a proposal to require all of its |
|
companies to make certain disclosures regarding the diversity |
|
of their boards. We are considering--and I see him here, so I |
|
guess the Foreign Affairs Committee has adjourned for a bit-- |
|
Congressman Meeks' Improving Corporate Governance Through |
|
Diversity Act, which the House passed last year, and which |
|
would put in place similar requirements for all public |
|
companies. Can you tell us, as an institutional investor, what |
|
a diverse board signals to you about a company and how it |
|
affects your investment decision? |
|
Mr. Andrus. A diverse board signals that the company has |
|
considered the talents of the entire population in selecting |
|
board candidates. This is not happening currently. More than |
|
half of U.S.-based public companies have all White boards. We |
|
are 53rd in terms of gender diversity, which means that 52 |
|
countries have more women on their boards than U.S. companies. |
|
And this is the baseline from which we're working. So in order |
|
to basically consider the talents of the entire population, we |
|
need to make certain that boards do this and place diverse |
|
people on their boards. |
|
Chairman Sherman. Thank you for that answer. |
|
Ms. Ramani, in 2019, the European Commission issued |
|
guidance providing a framework for corporate climate-related |
|
disclosures. Last year, the U.K. announced that it will be |
|
putting in place the mandatory climate-disclosure risks for the |
|
London Stock Exchange. And last fall, New Zealand announced it |
|
will implement requirements based on the recommendations of a |
|
task force on climate-related financial disclosures put forward |
|
by a group convened by the G20. |
|
Do any of these, the E.U., New Zealand/G20--I know the U.K. |
|
hasn't fully filled out what their plan is--provide a good |
|
model for us to use to define and have numerical standards for |
|
the issues we're talking about here today? |
|
Ms. Ramani. Thank you, Chair Sherman. Our recommendation is |
|
to premise any rules that we create for climate change |
|
disclosure on the framework that has been offered by the Task |
|
Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD). The |
|
reason I suggest this is because the TCFD is a framework that |
|
was created largely by the financial community to essentially |
|
generate information that they could use in understanding the |
|
risk, the financial risk of climate change in terms of their |
|
own portfolios and in terms of the capital markets within which |
|
they function. That's one of the reasons that we do support the |
|
Climate Risk Disclosure Act, because it is premised on the TCFD |
|
and because it has a very appropriate focus on generating |
|
disclosure-- |
|
Chairman Sherman. Thank you. I just want to add one thing, |
|
and that is how important it is that companies disclose how |
|
much they are paying to Third-World governments for petroleum |
|
and other mineral extraction. The risk that the money is |
|
stolen, and the people of the country don't even know how much |
|
is coming in, is a terrible risk for that country. That's also |
|
a reputational risk for the petroleum company as well. |
|
Now, let's move on to the ranking member of the |
|
subcommittee, Mr. Huizenga, who is recognized for 5 minutes. |
|
Mr. Huizenga. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I'm going to |
|
briefly note that Chair Yellen, soon to be Secretary of the |
|
Treasury Yellen, said in 2017, at the Jackson Hole Conference, |
|
that the section that you are talking about, Section 1503, was |
|
the worst part of the Dodd-Frank Act, flat out. So, just to set |
|
the context there. |
|
Mr. Ramaswamy, we've had a lot of conversations here on |
|
this committee about IPOs and about investor ability to go in |
|
and be a part of the financial system. And I'm curious from |
|
your perspective as someone who has worked in the private |
|
sector extensively, and in both private and public companies, |
|
is this going to promote private companies to go public and |
|
offer up that opportunity for citizens to engage in the public |
|
sphere of finance? |
|
Mr. Ramaswamy. Look. As you are aware, in recent years |
|
there has been a trend of fewer companies going public and |
|
choosing to remain private. There's a lot of factors driving |
|
that trend, but all else being equal, added disclosure |
|
requirements are a reason why many companies choose not to go |
|
public. |
|
In my opinion, would one additional risk factor relating to |
|
climate risks singlehandedly be a deterrent for companies to go |
|
public? I don't personally think that would be the single- |
|
handed straw that breaks the camel's back. However, I do think |
|
that that opens the Pandora's Box, which opens the door to, if |
|
we're really being intellectually honest and limiting ourselves |
|
to identifying factors, risk factors that protect investors, |
|
there is a much longer list of factors that are more material |
|
to investors than the climate-related risks of a particular |
|
corporation that, if incorporated into the added disclosure |
|
regime, would collectively prevent companies from being able to |
|
successfully go public. |
|
Mr. Huizenga. Over the years, compiling mounting parts of |
|
the regulatory side has stopped that. You used the term, |
|
``corporatocracy.'' I was going to call it a, ``mercantilist |
|
government.'' I'll lay out my nerd card here and add and |
|
reference Star Wars, when Queen Amidala was talking in the |
|
senate and she was addressing the Trade Federation, the |
|
Corporate Alliance, the Intergalactic Banking Plan, the |
|
Commerce Guild, and the Techno Union. That's the direction in |
|
which it seems that we could be going here as we have |
|
executives and companies playing a fundamental role in |
|
determining society's core values and policies rather than |
|
government doing that. And I'm curious if you could expand on |
|
your experiences that shaped your concern with this? |
|
Mr. Ramaswamy. Yes. Based on my first-hand experiences, I |
|
believe that corporations accrete greater power when they are |
|
responsible not just for determining the rules of the road and |
|
the market for products and services, where to build a |
|
manufacturing plant or where to build a research facility, but |
|
also whether to prioritize climate change over prices for |
|
consumer goods or to prioritize one conception of diversity |
|
over another. Corporations then actually have not only a lease |
|
on the things that we buy in the marketplace for goods and |
|
services, but the ideas that we consume in the marketplace of |
|
ideas. |
|
And today's companies, especially in Silicon Valley, but on |
|
Wall Street and Silicon Valley included, are some of the most |
|
powerful companies in the history of the world. Even the Dutch |
|
East India Company, which had a private militia of its own and |
|
a private currency, still didn't have the ability to influence |
|
what we thought, what we prioritized in terms of our moral |
|
values, or what we could read or what we could discuss in open |
|
forums like this one. That is what today's technology companies |
|
and corporations across American control today. So, we ought to |
|
be really concerned about giving them even greater power. |
|
And I'm going to close this answer with a brief reference |
|
to something that many of you may be familiar with, which is |
|
that there's a body of law relating to Congress delegating its |
|
responsibilities to administrative agencies. The Administrative |
|
Procedure Act (APA), as many of you know, governed that body of |
|
law. But at least that puts guard rails around what the |
|
Alphabet Soup of the FEC, FDA, SEC, FTC, and so on, are able to |
|
administer. The Administrative Procedure Act says they have to |
|
at least go through certain procedures before implementing |
|
certain rules as law. |
|
When we do this with corporations using disclosures, |
|
regimes, or other tools to get corporations to implement social |
|
values that ought to be adjudicated through our democracy, |
|
there are no such constitutional guard rails. And the new |
|
alphabet soup of AAPL, AMZN, MSFT, or GOOG is not constrained |
|
by the same constitutional constraints as even the |
|
administrative agencies that you delegate your responsibilities |
|
to through the APA. |
|
Mr. Huizenga. I've been concerned about elected government |
|
at all levels seemingly having this wish to give up their |
|
constitutional responsibilities, their constitutional duties to |
|
bureaucracies and others, who then get to make tough decisions |
|
in a vacuum rather than being held directly accountable for |
|
those difficult decisions. And so, as we're closing out our |
|
time, I appreciate your view on this and I hope that we're |
|
going to be able to make sure that we're creating an atmosphere |
|
that allows more of these private companies to go public. With |
|
that, I yield back. |
|
Chairman Sherman. Thank you. I want to thank the ranking |
|
member for pointing out that Dodd-Frank was such an excellent |
|
piece of legislation that even its worst provision was a good |
|
provision. |
|
And I will now recognize Mr. Foster for 5 minutes. |
|
Mr. Foster. Thank you. |
|
Mr. Andrus, and Mr. Green, following the Supreme Court's |
|
Citizens United decision, publicly traded companies, often with |
|
deep pockets, can and do engage in significant political |
|
funding. These companies are not required to disclosure the |
|
funding of their political activities, even to their own |
|
shareholders. This means that shareholders have no way of |
|
knowing whether the companies they are investing in are engaged |
|
in political spending or what kind of spending those companies |
|
are engaged in or the purposes. For example, shareholders and |
|
CEOs are unlikely to be in the same tax brackets, so |
|
shareholders might be very interested to discover if the |
|
investments that they've made are being used by those running |
|
the company to influence politicians to shift taxes in a way |
|
that increases taxes for shareholders while dropping it for |
|
CEOs. But they have no way of knowing that. |
|
Now, more than ever, investors are also exercising their |
|
political voice with their money as are customers and |
|
consumers. And investigative investors are more sophisticated |
|
than ever and are concerned with with more than just a |
|
company's bottom line and their balance sheet. hey understand |
|
the reputational risk of having questionable political |
|
contributions made by a company in which they consider |
|
investing. |
|
So, Mr. Andrus, and Mr. Green, what sort of serious |
|
problems come up when investors are unaware that companies that |
|
they hold equity in are funding significant political |
|
activities? We can start with Mr. Andrus if that-- |
|
Mr. Andrus. There are a number of issues that come up. |
|
First, all we're asking for is transparency and the |
|
information. We're not questioning whether or not the |
|
expenditures should be made, but if made, it should be |
|
disclosed so that we would have the information so that we can |
|
make proper investment decisions. It is important to point out |
|
that investment decisions include voting decisions such as |
|
voting on boards and voting on executive compensation. So, we |
|
need that particular information. |
|
Some of the things that can happen are what we saw on |
|
January 6th, and when you unpack it, the concern is |
|
substantial. It is critical that some of those investments |
|
could lead to insurrection within our own government. I know |
|
some people downplay that, but that is a serious concern that |
|
money, i.e. shareowners' money, is being used in that |
|
particular capacity. At a minimum, it should be disclosed if |
|
companies choose to make those sorts of contributions. |
|
Mr. Foster. Okay. Mr. Green? |
|
Mr. Green. Thank you. I would very much add that right |
|
now--and this goes to the point by the witness a couple of |
|
minutes ago--these determinations are being made by companies, |
|
by elite insiders, by corporate CEOs, and a small number of |
|
other corporate elites. And the real question is about how |
|
investors' money is being utilized. So, if you don't have the |
|
transparency, you don't know whether a company's position |
|
around any number of issues, whether it is climate change or |
|
worker treatment or any number of issues, is being matched by |
|
what is going on and what types of positions they are taking in |
|
Washington. If this money was not important, why are companies |
|
spending any money engaging in the process at all? It is not |
|
charity. It goes to the deep interests of companies, and |
|
investors are the ones who ultimately are the ones whose money |
|
is at risk and they need to understand that. |
|
Mr. Foster. Thank you. And one of the biggest issues that I |
|
see personally is the potential misalignment of interests |
|
between those running the companies as individuals and those of |
|
the shareholders, that without that transparency there is no |
|
guarantee that those interests will be even approximately |
|
aligned when it comes time to invest and try to affect our |
|
political system. My time has just about expired, so I yield |
|
back. |
|
Chairman Sherman. Thank you. |
|
Mr. Stivers is recognized for 5 minutes. |
|
Mr. Stivers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it, and |
|
I appreciate all of the witnesses for their testimony. |
|
Mr. Ramaswamy, in the chairman's own words, he said at the |
|
beginning of this hearing in his statement that shareholders |
|
want this information. In your experience, don't shareholders |
|
already have the ability to get this information? |
|
Mr. Ramaswamy. Yes. You raise an important point, |
|
Congressman Stivers, which is that the distinction between a |
|
worthy disclosure and a mandatory disclosure. Just because a |
|
disclosure may be worthy to particular investors does not alone |
|
mean it ought to be a mandatory disclosure, because investors |
|
elect their corporate boards every year. A majority of |
|
investors, actually in most cases in most States, can actually |
|
amend the corporate bylaws to demand whatever disclosure it is |
|
that they want. |
|
That's not to say that there's no space for mandatory |
|
disclosures, but it is only to say that just because a given |
|
disclosure may even be worthy does not automatically mean that |
|
it has to be a mandatory disclosure because investors in |
|
particular companies are able to wield their own power to |
|
shareholders to demand disclosures in a particular case. |
|
So, first, the question is, is the information worthy or |
|
not, material for investors; and second, even if it is |
|
material, are investors able to get that information on their |
|
own? There is then the separate question of whether a |
|
particular class of disclosures is required to be mandatory and |
|
what effect that ought to have or ought not to have on |
|
decisions that Congress or the SEC makes to mandate those |
|
disclosures? |
|
On that last question, one of the arguments that I find at |
|
least intellectually persuasive is that there may be negative |
|
externalities of certain company's behaviors that ought to be |
|
internalized into their own decision-making, and that the |
|
investors who own those companies may want to know how they can |
|
internalize those negative externalities as well. |
|
And one point I'd just like to inject into this, and |
|
somebody raised January 6th earlier, I think it is an important |
|
point that the negative externalities for American democracy of |
|
a small group of institutional elites adjudicated through the |
|
corporate board room mandating and in concert with the work of |
|
the SEC mandating particular disclosures is monolithically |
|
enforcing a particular agenda that many Americans may not agree |
|
with, but not only do they not agree with it, they may not have |
|
an opportunity to have their voice heard equally. And we |
|
convert from the system of one person, one vote, instead into a |
|
system of one dollar, one vote. And I'll tell you, if I may, |
|
Congressman Stivers, to sort of share a short story to |
|
demonstrate the principle of what I mean. Before, when I used |
|
to go to temples as a kid when my parents used to take me to |
|
India, there used to be a system where every pilgrim had to |
|
wait in line, patiently wait their turn to get to the front of |
|
the temple. But today, when you travel to those temples, you |
|
can actually pay a little bit of extra money and get to the |
|
front of the line, and some of the people can pay a lot of |
|
money and get to the very front of the line. And to me, that's |
|
not the way that a religious institution is necessarily |
|
supposed to work at its best. |
|
I feel the same way about our democracy, in that with a |
|
small group of institutional leads in the corporate board rooms |
|
adjudicated through mandated SEC disclosures on top of that to |
|
be goaded into doing more of this are able to convert our |
|
system, our democracy, into a one-dollar, one-vote system |
|
instead of a one-person, one-vote system, which tells the |
|
people who show up at the ballot box every November that their |
|
vote doesn't matter as much as the vote of somebody in the |
|
corporate board room, because of the number of dollars that |
|
they control in the marketplace. |
|
And to me, the use of that market power to translate into |
|
social currency in matters that aren't corporate matters, but |
|
aren't commercial matters, but are matters relating to moral |
|
values, normative questions like how we ought to address |
|
climate change, or what conception of racial justice matters |
|
over a different one, or how we tackle issues of racial equity, |
|
those are questions that ought to be adjudicated through open |
|
public debate and spheres like this one, not necessarily |
|
through the corporate board room. |
|
And while the chairman made a good point in the very |
|
beginning, I do think that this is a further direction in |
|
goading companies to be able to take on further responsibility |
|
in mission creep in a way that has a negative externality for |
|
the integrity of American democracy itself. And if the |
|
discussion is going to sound on negative externalities for the |
|
environment, or negative externalities for other social |
|
principles that we care about, I think that at least, in that |
|
cost-benefit analysis of whether to mandate a disclosure, we |
|
ought to also take into account the possibility of a negative |
|
externality for American democracy, including Americans who may |
|
feel disaffected by decisions made by corporations privately in |
|
the board room. |
|
Mr. Stivers. Thank you. Now tell me, Mr. Ramaswamy, our |
|
republic, our constitutional republic is intentionally messy |
|
with checks and balances for the very reasons you've talked |
|
about. Could you talk about some of the problems that would be |
|
created by the fact that corporate elites could influence and |
|
implement an agenda without checks and balances? |
|
Mr. Ramaswamy. I'll share a very short funny story. I was |
|
having dinner with the CEO of a big bank about a year and a |
|
half ago, I won't say which one out of respect to him. He was |
|
asked at the dinner if he wanted to be President of the United |
|
States. And his answer, without missing a beat was, of course, |
|
he wants to be President. He just doesn't want to run for |
|
President. And everyone in the room laughed, not because what |
|
he said was so ridiculous, but because what he said was so |
|
obviously true. And I think a lot of the messiness of our |
|
democratic process is part of what makes it beautiful. We |
|
shouldn't sidestep it to get to our solutions via the simpler |
|
corporate route instead. |
|
Mr. Stivers. Thank you, Mr. Ramaswamy. |
|
I yield back the balance of my time. |
|
Chairman Sherman. I now recognize Mr. Meeks for 5 minutes. |
|
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's good to be with |
|
you for this very important hearing. |
|
My question goes to Mr. Andrus. Several Republican Senators |
|
recently sent a letter criticizing NASDAQ's decision to require |
|
its listed companies to disclose the demographic composition of |
|
their boards as they relate to race and gender. More |
|
specifically, the letter stated that such requirements were |
|
``narrow'' and ``miss the mark.'' However, that letter failed |
|
to examine why the SEC's current disclosure rules, which leaves |
|
diversity to be defined by companies, has led to vague and less |
|
useful disclosure. So my question is, why are the SEC's current |
|
diversity disclosure requirements inadequate in your opinion, |
|
if they are? |
|
Mr. Andrus. We have to discuss what they are, but |
|
basically, all a board has to do is say that they considered |
|
diversity or that they have a diversity policy. They don't have |
|
to take any real steps to diversity. And so, they are |
|
inadequate because they have done absolutely nothing to change |
|
where we are. The baseline where we are is that more than half |
|
of U.S. publicly-traded companies have all White boards. And |
|
roughly 16 percent of those companies have no women on the |
|
board. |
|
So when we are in that particular baseline and it has-- |
|
there has been a lot of talk about corporate elites or |
|
something like that, those same corporate elites that are being |
|
said to be in favor of ESG or whatnot are the ones who have |
|
basically placed us in this particular situation. We need real |
|
policy work to actually address the crisis that we are in and |
|
to actually create some board diversity. It has worked in other |
|
countries that have had gender-related policies that have been |
|
able to add women to the board. The California initiative has |
|
been very successful in adding women to the board and will be |
|
successful in adding racially diverse and LGBTQ people to the |
|
board. |
|
And so, we need a Federal response that will actually kick- |
|
start what should have happened over a decade ago when the |
|
issue was being addressed by the SEC. We know now that that |
|
response was totally inadequate. We need a more adequate |
|
response. |
|
Mr. Meeks. Thank you. And also let me ask you this |
|
question. My bill, the Improving Corporate Governance Through |
|
Diversity Act, requires more specific disclosures around board |
|
demographics, but the bill also requires disclosures around the |
|
demographics of companies' senior management. So my question to |
|
you is, is C-suite diversity as important as board-level |
|
diversity? |
|
Mr. Andrus. In some cases, the C-suite diversity is even |
|
more important than board-level diversity. We focused on board- |
|
level diversity, because that's where shareholders interact |
|
with the corporation. We have the right to vote on the boards |
|
and we monitor what the board activity happens to be, and so |
|
that has been what we have focused on. |
|
So it is very welcome that your bill also focuses on |
|
executive diversity, which is an area in which we need a |
|
substantial amount of work. And then, when we are thinking long |
|
term, it means that those companies will consider the talents |
|
of all of the people within the country, add all of the talents |
|
within the country, and in the following years we could expect |
|
to see more diversity within the C-suite, which will actually |
|
lead to even more board diversity, which is needed. |
|
Mr. Meeks. Thank you. Let me try to squeeze this in quickly |
|
to Ms. Ramani. I'm proud that the Biden Administration has |
|
reentered the Paris Climate Agreement, but let me ask this |
|
question quickly. Institutional Shareholder Services, or ISS, |
|
which is a firm well known in the industry in advising its |
|
investors on vote recommendations for board elections of |
|
various corporate matters, has set out to analyze what |
|
corporations are doing to reduce emissions. But even still, an |
|
overwhelming 250 companies in the S&P 500 Index have no target |
|
at all. |
|
Why is it so crucial for these companies to set targets and |
|
what can these companies do to not only ensure that their |
|
pledges relate to their lending and financial activity, but |
|
also to their stocks and bonds that they manage? |
|
Ms. Ramani. Thank you for the question, Congressman. We at |
|
Ceres believe that companies should set goals and adjust and |
|
evolve their business strategies for climate change to meet the |
|
financial risk of climate change. So, we very much appreciate |
|
the fact that we've reentered the Paris Climate Agreement and |
|
are looking for companies to set goals that are aligned with |
|
the signs of climate change, because those goals would then |
|
meet the risks that climate change poses to them, to their |
|
investors, and to financial markets at large. |
|
Mr. Meeks. Thank you. I think my time has expired. |
|
I yield back. |
|
Chairman Sherman. Thank you. There has been a little change |
|
in plans. We won't find it necessary to adjourn the hearing for |
|
votes, because Mr. Casten will be able to sit in, and he'll |
|
take over maybe 30 minutes after they initially call the first |
|
vote. And hopefully, he'll be able to stay with us and be our |
|
substitute Chair for 30 minutes thereafter. |
|
With that, I recognize Mrs. Wagner for 5 minutes. |
|
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
Banks and other financial firms are proactively making |
|
significant investments in renewable energy and they are doing |
|
it without the heavy hand of regulation or political pressure. |
|
That's because the free market is responding to increased |
|
interest, I think, in green energy in particular. Just this |
|
morning, Wells Fargo announced it recently surpassed $10 |
|
billion in tax equity investments in the wind, solar, and fuel |
|
cells industries. |
|
Mr. Chairman, I'd like to submit this press release for the |
|
record. |
|
Chairman Sherman. Without objection, it is so ordered. |
|
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In addition, Wells |
|
Fargo committed to providing $200 billion in financing to |
|
sustainable businesses and projects by 2030. But it is not just |
|
one firm making these substantial investments. Many of |
|
America's largest financial institutions have made multi- |
|
billion dollar sustainable finance commitments without |
|
government mandates. Instead of pushing forward prescriptive |
|
proposals on small businesses and adding additional barriers to |
|
capital formation, this committee needs to, I think, prioritize |
|
regulatory reforms that will lift up our economy and get |
|
Americans back to work. |
|
Mr. Ramaswamy, does the fact that many institutions are |
|
investing in and financing green energy projects negate the |
|
need for enhanced regulation and disclosure on ESG issues? |
|
Mr. Ramaswamy. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman, |
|
and I believe that it does. I obviously think that the market |
|
working in a particular direction sends us signals as to where |
|
additional regulation is and isn't needed. But I'd actually |
|
like to take that one step further to highlight a separate |
|
concern that I have even in the direction of the private market |
|
already and I think the private market is, in part, not |
|
operating as a truly free market, but actually in response to |
|
regulations and to regulatory incentives which already exist, |
|
which have distorted the private market already in the |
|
direction of potentially creating the early stages of an ESG- |
|
linked asset bubble. |
|
And in order to understand why, there are certain factors |
|
relating to the 2008 financial crisis that we have to take into |
|
account. I think it is instructive. I'm offering this not as a |
|
history lesson, but potentially as the early signs of a |
|
warning. The standard explanation for the subprime mortgage |
|
bubble before 2008 was that predatory lenders were greedy |
|
sharks who took advantage of the opportunity to ultimately make |
|
loans that they shouldn't have made. But in reality, the |
|
question is where all of those predatory sharks got all that |
|
money in the first place? And, of course, all of you know, |
|
perhaps better than I, that the roots of this began with |
|
government policy to spur homeownership, including through the |
|
birth of quasi government-- |
|
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you, Mr. Ramaswamy. I appreciate the |
|
history lesson here, but I have more questions. |
|
Mr. Ramaswamy. Yes. |
|
Mrs. Wagner. What would be the impact on small businesses |
|
such as those back in Missouri's second congressional district |
|
and Main Street investors with 401ks saving for retirement if |
|
we allow shareholders' capitalism and ESG disclosures to drive |
|
our markets, I think, to your point? |
|
Mr. Ramaswamy. Look, I think that a big part of the trend |
|
here is that mom-and-pop investors have in part benefitted from |
|
fee-free investment vehicles through passive index funds over |
|
the course of the last 10 years. And many of the drivers of |
|
this new ESG movement, you would know better than I, but even |
|
many of the firms who may advocate for ESG-related disclosures |
|
are actually in the traditional active management industry, in |
|
the mutual fund industry, which charge higher fees to mom-and- |
|
pop investors. |
|
Now, I think that part of what may be going on here is that |
|
making up for the absence of superior returns compared to |
|
passive index funds, we are now seeing the masquerade of |
|
morality as justifying those higher fees in the first place. |
|
Mom-and-pop investors, including older Americans, actually tend |
|
to be extremely generous, but they would rather be generous--I |
|
serve on the board of the Philanthropy Roundtable, which |
|
actually records this information, and says that elder |
|
Americans are among the most philanthropic. But they would tend |
|
to pick the causes they want to donate to on their own rather |
|
than handing it over to a mutual fund manager that ultimately |
|
picks companies that embody their own causes. |
|
Mrs. Wagner. You are absolutely correct. And would you say |
|
that these burdensome regulations have a more significant |
|
impact on younger companies compared to, let's say, larger |
|
companies? |
|
Mr. Ramaswamy. They do. I think that larger companies tend |
|
to be able to bear additional disclosure requirements and |
|
additional regulatory requirements, which actually tend to |
|
favor incumbents over start-up companies. |
|
Mrs. Wagner. And certainly as an entrepreneur and based on |
|
your experience as an entrepreneur and executive, do you think |
|
your companies would have been more or less likely to |
|
accomplish their goals in terms of producing marketable |
|
products if they were required to make ESG disclosure? |
|
Mr. Ramaswamy. Putting my companies to one side, I think |
|
that in general, all things being equal, start-up companies |
|
tend to be more poorly barren of regulatory requirements and |
|
disclosure requirements than large companies. They actually |
|
counterintuitively help large companies as a consequence. |
|
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you. I yield back. |
|
Chairman Sherman. Thank you. I'm going to ask Mr. Casten to |
|
be temporary Chair for the next 4 minutes, and I'm going to |
|
recognize Mrs. Axne for 5 minutes. |
|
Mrs. Axne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you so much for |
|
having this hearing, and I thank all of the witnesses for being |
|
here today. This hearing, of course, is all about sustainable |
|
corporate practices which can generate long-term growth both |
|
for the economy and for the company. And I want to focus on |
|
just one piece of this, which is tax avoidance, and my bill to |
|
require public country-by-country reporting. |
|
I sure don't believe that anyone thinks that shifting |
|
profits to tax havens like the $60 billion of profits booked in |
|
the Cayman Islands every year or outsourcing all of the work to |
|
a country with weak labor standards and laying off American |
|
workers are how a company wants to perform long term. |
|
Unfortunately, right now though, investors don't know if |
|
companies are using gimmicks like that or where multi-national |
|
corporations are really generating their profits. |
|
Mr. Andrus, it is good to see you again. You testified here |
|
last Congress regarding U.S. current tax disclosures, that the |
|
lack of transparency creates an information gap whereby |
|
management may be well aware of risks being taken while |
|
shareowners are being left in the dark. |
|
If you had public country-by-country disclosures of |
|
financial information like tax payments, revenues, and |
|
employees in a country, would CalPERS and other institutional |
|
investors likely consider that information when making |
|
decisions about capital allocation? |
|
Mr. Andrus. Yes, we would consider that information, and I |
|
think you placed it in the right perspective. Because it is not |
|
only returns, it is risk and returns, and we've seen abuses |
|
that could cause substantial problems for corporations in which |
|
we invest. I think country-by-country reporting would alleviate |
|
that. And it is information that is easily available to the |
|
management of the company and easily disclosed. |
|
Mrs. Axne. Thank you. I couldn't agree more. I know |
|
investors representing at least $2 trillion in assets under |
|
management have now backed country-by-country financial |
|
disclosures as a critical path to counter that risk. And former |
|
SEC Chairman Jay Clayton, in testimony before this committee, |
|
also recognized public country-by-country disclosures as an |
|
increasing part of how sophisticated investors are looking at |
|
companies. So as you can tell, support for these disclosures |
|
now extends well beyond the usual corners of sustainable |
|
investments, and includes mainstream investors, credit |
|
reporting agencies, financial analysists, small businesses, et |
|
cetera. |
|
And already, the Global Reporting Initiative an ESG |
|
standard-setter followed by more than 78 percent of companies |
|
in the DOW Jones Industrial Average, has brought its new tax |
|
standard on country-by-country reporting online this year, |
|
which is great, meaning that we can expect voluntary |
|
disclosures by corporations as soon as January 2022. |
|
But, Mr. Green, I'd like to ask you, can you explain a |
|
little of why voluntary disclosures like that won't be enough, |
|
and give us the kind of information that investors need? |
|
Mr. Green. Yes. We have had a regime of voluntary |
|
disclosure in these areas, it has been the slow-moving norm, |
|
but we have not achieved wide-ranging comparability, |
|
reliability, and consistency that investors need for the |
|
capital markets to work. Let's remember, capitalism works |
|
because lots of different investors, millions and millions of |
|
investors deploy their money based on the information they |
|
have, and when that money is deployed based on the information |
|
that everybody has money, the capital markets will yield |
|
competitive returns for all of us. |
|
When you don't have that, when the information is only |
|
available to the insiders, to those who are already in control, |
|
you are not going to have the efficiency and sustainable long- |
|
term outcomes that you need in capitalism. And that's why |
|
getting this information out there is so essential. You need |
|
mandatory standards so that you don't have holes in the market |
|
where those who have the inside information are keeping it from |
|
everyone else who would otherwise move their money somewhere |
|
else. Everyone is at risk. |
|
Mrs. Axne. Thank you for that. And I'll tell you, that's |
|
why we need action at the SEC either directly or through my |
|
bill the Disclosure of Tax Havens and Offshoring Act, to your |
|
point to establish a clear, comparable standard for all public |
|
companies. Thank you so much. |
|
I hope we can get this done to finally provide our |
|
investors with the information they need here, and to make sure |
|
that we know that businesses are generating real, sustainable, |
|
long-term growth. I know that I, and other investors, want to |
|
be able to support businesses that are keeping money in the |
|
American economy. Thank you so much. |
|
And I yield back. |
|
Chairman Sherman. Thank you. I thank Mr. Casten for |
|
stepping in as Chair for 4 or 5 minutes, and it is possible |
|
that we will get this hearing done before they close the first |
|
vote, which means that may be the only time I call upon Mr. |
|
Casten to step in. |
|
I now recognize Mr. Hill. |
|
But I'll also point out to Mr. Huizenga that at the end of |
|
the hearing, I will give him one minute for a closing |
|
statement, and after him, I will take one minute for a closing |
|
statement. |
|
Mr. Hill? |
|
Mr. Hill. Thank you, Chairman Sherman, and Ranking Member |
|
Huizenga, for arranging this hearing so that we can talk about |
|
these legislative proposals. I'd like to focus my remarks in |
|
the climate disclosure arena. It is something we've talked |
|
about in our committee several times before. Mr. Green, in his |
|
very good testimony, stated that we, meaning the United States, |
|
are not great at predicting, ``financial crises.'' He says |
|
we're very poor at those predictions, in his testimony. I think |
|
that is a fair point. |
|
And Lael Brainard, a Governor of the Federal Reserve, was |
|
quoted saying that there are varying and different approaches |
|
to current disclosures and that those could be improved. I |
|
think that's a good point. It reminds me of the ancient Chinese |
|
proverb, ``Those who have knowledge, don't predict, and those |
|
who predict, don't have knowledge.'' So, this is an imperfect |
|
science. |
|
Going back to when I was college, we were talking about the |
|
coming Ice Age in the United States. We studied that in our |
|
science courses. And then, as I was graduating in the late |
|
1970s, we were told that Denmark would be underwater due to |
|
changing climate conditions within 4 decades. So, bottom line, |
|
those events did not take place, so I think predictions in this |
|
area are challenging. |
|
And Mr. Bloomberg's task force that has been mentioned, |
|
that Mike Bloomberg runs on behalf of the G-20 and fundraises |
|
for, he says that climate disclosure should be reliable, |
|
verifiable, and objective. They should be comparable among |
|
organizations and sectors, and they should be timely. And so we |
|
can accept that as great wisdom from Mike Bloomberg on how to |
|
do climate disclosure. |
|
And what I'm arguing is we have a materiality standard. We |
|
require all companies to disclose things in their financial |
|
statements that meet those timeliness issues, and accuracy and |
|
reliability issues, and they don't go beyond that, because I'm |
|
arguing that so much of this is not as predictable as some of |
|
our friends would suggest. |
|
And I think that one example that's always given is the |
|
hurricane data and that we should be disclosing at banks the |
|
risk of greater hurricanes. But looking at NOAA's numbers since |
|
1853, there are not more, and they are not more intense in |
|
terms of making landfall in the United States. In fact, the |
|
worst one ever was in 1935, in Miami. |
|
But what is different, and I think it is relevant and I |
|
think banks do disclose it is the issue, if you look at the |
|
American Meteorological Society, they concluded that while |
|
neither U.S. landfalling hurricane frequency nor intensity |
|
shows any significant trends since 1900, growth in coastal |
|
population and wealth have led to increasing hurricane-related |
|
damage in the coastline. And the same could be true of wildfire |
|
risk out in Southern California. We are building and |
|
encroaching in areas that have natural risk, not necessarily |
|
enhanced risk. And if it is enhanced, so be it. |
|
And I think companies recognize that risk of fire and |
|
liability, and risk to residential construction in LA County, |
|
where you shouldn't be building. And we've built too much |
|
density on America's seacoast, potentially. I think if you look |
|
at that, the lender has that responsibility to disclose that |
|
kind of risk, and the property and casualty company. And I |
|
believe they do that, and I believe our existing prudence in |
|
both financial regulation and at the SEC give you that |
|
authority right now. |
|
So, Mr. Ramaswamy, I am interested as a CEO in what more |
|
could we tell the SEC? If people can't measure it, how can the |
|
SEC come up with a standard? I'm curious about your reflections |
|
on that. |
|
Mr. Ramaswamy. Thank you. I will wear my hat as someone who |
|
was trained as a scientist before going into business. And I do |
|
believe that we face a separate issue that you touched on, |
|
which is a crisis of public trust in science. That is the last |
|
thing I would want to see happen to exacerbate that crisis, in |
|
part, by overstating the certainty of our claims in order to |
|
advance a particular agenda, when acknowledging that even in |
|
the face of uncertainty, we may need to make decisions that, |
|
with the best of information available, we still need to make. |
|
I think that we ought to be transparent about that, rather |
|
than getting into what I see as a race to the bottom between, |
|
as we have less public trust in scientists, the scientific |
|
community, including in the climate community in my opinion, |
|
overstate the certainty of their claims as assuming that only a |
|
fraction of that's going to be believed, when, in fact, people |
|
believe even less of it as a consequence. So, I think you put |
|
your finger on an important issue. |
|
Mr. Hill. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman, and thank |
|
you for the hearing. |
|
Chairman Sherman. Thank you. |
|
And let's go on to Mr. Casten. |
|
Mr. Casten. Thank you. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am |
|
proud to have served as your temporary substitute Chair today. |
|
I am also proud to have worked with Senator Warren on the |
|
Climate Risk Disclosure Act and was very pleased to see Allison |
|
Lee's statement yesterday directing the Division of Corporation |
|
Finance to enhance its focus on climate relief disclosures. |
|
I just want to respond a little bit to the comments of my |
|
good friend, Mr. Hill. There is such a danger in politicizing |
|
science. This science is settled, and my goodness, let us not |
|
continue that nonsense any longer. We know that the Earth is |
|
warming and we have to do something about it. |
|
Mr. Hill also raised this question of materiality, and, Mr. |
|
Green, I just want to ask you a simple question. Who should |
|
define materiality, investors or management? |
|
Mr. Green. It's quite clear that it needs to be investors |
|
and it needs to be clear, simple, standardized disclosures that |
|
the SEC determines. It should not be left in the hands of |
|
management, where it is been for far too long, and we've seen |
|
the result. |
|
Mr. Casten. I quite agree. |
|
Mr. Andrus, as a representative of the investor class here |
|
today, if you were given the opportunity to invest in a company |
|
that didn't much care for Generally Accepted Accounting |
|
Principles (GAAP), and said they wanted to insist on voluntary |
|
disclosures for their off-balance sheet transactions, would you |
|
invest in them? |
|
Mr. Andrus. No. |
|
Mr. Casten. How about if they wanted to use voluntary |
|
disclosures for related-party transactions? Any red flags |
|
there? |
|
Mr. Andrus. Yes. There are red flags there. |
|
Mr. Casten. Okay. Can you tell me briefly, why you would |
|
like those companies to provide consistent standard |
|
disclosures? |
|
Mr. Andrus. Because, one, we want the truth. I think what |
|
this hearing is about and what we're looking for is basically |
|
information. We get that information through honest and fair |
|
disclosures. And that's only what we're looking for. And that |
|
allows us to make better investment decisions. So in answering |
|
your question, we want to make better investment decisions, and |
|
we get that by getting better information, and we get that |
|
through disclosures. |
|
Mr. Casten. Hear, hear. I now want to agree with my |
|
colleague Mr. Huizenga, but there are real problems with ESG. |
|
As a reporting methodology, I would encourage all of my |
|
colleagues, if you haven't read it, to read the Commodity |
|
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) report that recently came |
|
out, ``Managing Climate Risk in the U.S. Financial System.'' |
|
They make the very compelling argument--I think it is an MIT |
|
study--that there is no correlation between ESG rankings, even |
|
between firms that rank, not because there's a problem with |
|
ESG, but because that's a problem with voluntary disclosure |
|
methodologies. If everybody disclosed their off-balance sheet |
|
transactions in a different way, there wouldn't be a |
|
correlation. That's a problem. It is not a problem with the |
|
ESG, per se. It is a problem with voluntary disclosures. |
|
And I also just want to really emphasize something. I can't |
|
stress enough to folks on both sides of the dais, because I |
|
think all of us have maybe slipped up a little bit. This is not |
|
about naming and shaming. This is about connecting risk and |
|
reward. If I have a portfolio of investments, and I think I'm |
|
overexposed to a given commodity, or a given currency, or a |
|
given industry, or a given region, I may want to reweigh my |
|
portfolio. Maybe I like the overall asset holding I have. I |
|
want to hedge against it. |
|
Ms. Ramani, my follow-up question is for you. In the |
|
absence of consistent, mandatory disclosures of climate |
|
impacts, can you quantify the exposure that your portfolio has |
|
to a changing climate? And can you identify ways to hedge out |
|
that risk? |
|
Ms. Ramani. Was that question to me, Congressman? |
|
Mr. Casten. Yes. |
|
Ms. Ramani. Oh, that's great. Sorry. I think that in the |
|
absence of consistent, comparable, and reliable information, |
|
investors just can't do what they need to do in terms of |
|
integrating climate change into their investment analysis. And |
|
that's the problem that we have right now, Congressman. Thirty |
|
years ago when Ceres started to work on climate and |
|
sustainability disclosure, our problem was that companies were |
|
not disclosing. We've solved that problem. |
|
Right now, the issue is not with disclosure quantity. It is |
|
with disclosure quality, because there are so many standards |
|
that companies can use to talk about issues like climate |
|
change, the information they are putting out there is not |
|
consistent. Because companies have the ability to pick and |
|
choose issues, to pick and choose the way that they talk about |
|
issues, investors are not getting the information that they |
|
consider to be reliable in terms of their investment analysis. |
|
And one point that hasn't been raised here before, is that the |
|
vast proportion of climate change disclosures is not externally |
|
verified. Rules for climate change disclosure, I believe, can |
|
fix these problems. |
|
Mr. Casten. Thank you. And I'm out of time, but I really |
|
appreciate your comments because this is about market |
|
efficiency, it is about making sure that investors have the |
|
right information to understand the risks they face, and |
|
allocate against those. In other words, it is about making sure |
|
that the markets accurately price risk, and that shouldn't be |
|
partisan, and goodness knows, let's move forward on this. Thank |
|
you. |
|
And I yield back. |
|
Chairman Sherman. Thank you. Just an update, we'll be |
|
hearing from Mr. Davidson. I will then go to Mr. Cleaver, and |
|
then unless some other person who is a member of this |
|
subcommittee shows up, our final questioner will be Mr. Barr. |
|
Mr. Barr, thank you for joining us for this subcommittee, and |
|
if somebody who is actually a member of the subcommittee comes, |
|
I'm sure you'll enjoy hearing their wisdom before imparting |
|
yours. |
|
I now recognize Mr. Davidson for 5 minutes. |
|
Mr. Davidson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also thank the |
|
ranking member, and I thank our witnesses. I appreciate your |
|
testimony today and your virtual presence. Hopefully, we'll all |
|
one day be restored to physical presence. |
|
Mr. Andrus, in your opening statement, you cited a study |
|
that said companies with diverse boards are shown to perform |
|
better than those without diverse boards. If that is the case, |
|
isn't this a perfect example of a free market adjusting itself? |
|
But if other companies see this, wouldn't it be in their best |
|
interest to follow suit? Why would we need the government to |
|
tell public companies how to organize and structure their |
|
boards if the market will tell them that a diverse board is |
|
more high-performing? |
|
Mr. Andrus. We need to tell boards to diversify to ensure |
|
that they use all of the talents that are available within the |
|
country, and also, mindfully guard against the risks of |
|
operating with all White boards. So, it is not only that the |
|
boards perform better, but if you are sitting on a board, most |
|
people aren't going to step down to allow anybody else to-- |
|
Mr. Davidson. Would term limits be just as effective as |
|
these kinds of disclosure requirements? |
|
Mr. Andrus. No, they will not be. Other countries have |
|
basically gone harder on it, and demanded that women be placed |
|
on boards, and that has been effective, and that has not |
|
basically made performance weaken whatsoever. |
|
Mr. Davidson. Thanks for your answer. I do think that the |
|
market shows that diverse boards can participate. And I think |
|
that really one of the big things that I think it shows is that |
|
diverse boards aren't only encompassed by the categories that |
|
we spend so much time on. For example, I think it was a great |
|
thing that the Supreme Court finally has somebody who didn't go |
|
to an Ivy League law school. That is a form of diversity as |
|
well. |
|
And, look, I would like to just highlight from a |
|
practitioner, Mr. Ramaswamy, as you might be aware, in December |
|
of 2020, NASDAQ sent a proposed rule to the SEC that would |
|
require most NASDAQ-listed companies to have, or to explain why |
|
they don't have, at least two diverse directors. |
|
When you consider this rule, taken in conjunction with |
|
proposed ESG disclosure requirements, what are the long-term |
|
effects on our capital markets when a rogue social agenda is |
|
imposed on public companies? At some point, is it the |
|
shareholder or the stakeholder that is supposed to be |
|
represented? |
|
Mr. Ramaswamy. I would add one further example that's maybe |
|
more pertinent to your point, which is one of the largest |
|
investment banks in the world announced in January of last year |
|
at Davos, at the World Economic Forum, that it would not take |
|
any company public if it did not have at least one diverse |
|
director, when they did not define what, ``one diverse |
|
director'' even meant. It was left to the discretion of this |
|
particular investment bank. |
|
And I think one of the issues at stake here, even from a |
|
disclosure standpoint, if we're going to go down that road, is |
|
that diversity of metrics that can be measured on a checkbox |
|
form--race, gender, and so forth--are supposed to have been |
|
proxies for diversity of thought when, in fact, the diversity |
|
of thought that we bring to the board, the board room benefits, |
|
I can say from firsthand experience, from diversity of |
|
thoughts, from diversity of experiences, from diverse |
|
prospective. |
|
But we create a systemic risk of a different kind by having |
|
discharged the responsibility to create a diverse appearance in |
|
the board room that we may actually foreclose the appearance, |
|
the actual diversity of thought, that skin-deep metrics were |
|
supposed to serve as a proxy for in the first place and |
|
disclosure is going to be a very difficult measure for solving |
|
that deeper problem of entering diversity of perspectives in |
|
the board room. I think, at the very least, it would open up a |
|
Pandora's Box of seeing whether we represent diverse political |
|
perspectives in the board room or diverse social perspectives |
|
in the board room. That's going to be very difficult to capture |
|
through any disclosure regime. |
|
Yes, I worry about separately-- |
|
Mr. Davidson. Let me just ask quickly, how would you comply |
|
with the current ERISA and human resources (HR) laws to inquire |
|
as to whether you have sufficiently diversified a board? When |
|
you look at HR practices, many of the things they are looking |
|
for in these disclosures, you cannot even ask those questions |
|
appropriately in the HR setting, for example, sexual |
|
orientation? |
|
Mr. Ramaswamy. Sexual orientation is one of those examples |
|
that I have concerns with, where if you are also looking for |
|
diversity in terms of sexual orientation in the board room, you |
|
are also at odds with many HR and legal business practices that |
|
prohibit asking employees or potential directors about their |
|
respective sexual orientation. So, that's just one example of |
|
where, potentially, anti-discrimination policy may be |
|
intentional with the diversity measures even from a disclosure |
|
perspective or from a State level, for example, in California a |
|
mandated perspective that may come into tension with one |
|
another. |
|
Mr. Davidson. Thanks so much. I really appreciate your |
|
comments today, and I look forward to talking with you on this |
|
policy area in the future. I yield back. |
|
Chairman Sherman. Is Mr. Cleaver still with us? He was on |
|
my screen a second ago. If Mr. Cleaver is not there, I see no |
|
other Democrats--it is a Democrat's turn, and I see no other |
|
Democrat. |
|
I now recognize the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Gonzalez. |
|
Mr. Gonzalez of Ohio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
And thank you to our witnesses. I first want to reference |
|
something that Mr. Casten, I think suggested, that Mr. Hill was |
|
denying climate change. He certainly did not do that. He, in |
|
fact, cited multiple objective data points from government |
|
sources and pointed out the fact that climate projections have |
|
not been as accurate as some would like, but that's not climate |
|
denial. He knows I work on climate change in the Science |
|
Committee. I think it is a noble goal. But Mr. Hill was just |
|
simply stating facts. |
|
Additionally, comparing the materiality of climate |
|
disclosures and GAAP accounting, as if those are somehow the |
|
same and we have similar objective measures for both is sort of |
|
an interesting thing to suggest. |
|
But I want to actually start with something, Mr. Green, you |
|
answered earlier, and I'm glad the question was posed this way. |
|
The question was posed, ``Who is better at understanding |
|
climate risks, investors or managers?'' And you said, |
|
``Investors.'' And I think that is probably right. I am sure |
|
that we're not talking about that here. This hearing is about |
|
government mandates, not investors. |
|
And so, I will ask Mr. Ramaswamy. You said it once before. |
|
As a shareholder in a company, do you have the ability to get |
|
disclosures from public companies? |
|
Mr. Ramaswamy. Of course you can. Yes, sir. You do. |
|
Mr. Gonzalez of Ohio. Of course. Thank you. And to follow |
|
up on a point that you made earlier, I am really concerned |
|
about the legislation being considered here today, and using |
|
disclosures to address social or moral issues which, again, I |
|
agree these are all issues we need to solve. I think the |
|
question is, do we do this through financial disclosures in the |
|
Financial Services Committee or do we legislate it through the |
|
Energy and Commerce Committee and the Science Committee? |
|
What do you see as the dangers of doing it this way through |
|
disclosures and regulation as opposed to through the |
|
legislative process? I think you have stated it really well, |
|
but I would love to hear it again. |
|
Mr. Ramaswamy. To build on a couple of points that I made |
|
without repeating the points that I've already made, I will add |
|
two more to my oral opening statement, which are as follows. I |
|
think using disclosure as a low-resolution, blunt instrument to |
|
accomplish potentially worthy social goals may actually be a |
|
disservice both to the social goals as well as to the |
|
underlying actual capital formation objectives of the financial |
|
disclosure regime in the first place. I stated earlier that |
|
with respect to the latter, you would tend to favor industry |
|
incumbents over smaller startup companies. One disclosure alone |
|
isn't going to be the straw that breaks the camel's back, but |
|
collectively, if you apply an equivalent standard to include |
|
mandatory disclosures of equivalent materiality to say, |
|
climate-related disclosures, that collectively could be many, |
|
many more straws that do break that camel's back for the |
|
startup. |
|
On the other hand, you also have the inability to actually |
|
precisely allow firms, even if you are coming at the issue from |
|
the standpoint of a climate activist, for firms to be able to |
|
discharge their responsibilities simply by complying with the |
|
minimalist standards of disclosure. And I think that whether |
|
this is a conservative concern or a liberal concern, I don't |
|
know. But from both angles, I worry that disclosure is too |
|
blunt and low resolution of an instrument to actually |
|
effectuate the end itself, rather than acknowledging that what |
|
might be at issue here isn't really about protecting investors, |
|
but about dealing with the relevant social issues, doing that |
|
through the front door transparently through public debate, by |
|
the way, in a way that I believe would enhance public trust in |
|
the process of what we're actually accomplishing, rather than |
|
indirectly adjudicating these issues through the back door of |
|
disclosure and enforcing those into our public companies. |
|
There's one more concern I would like to address, but I |
|
will yield my time back to you. |
|
Mr. Gonzalez of Ohio. No, no, please. |
|
Mr. Ramaswamy. Okay. So, the other class of concerns that |
|
we haven't touched on today, that I think is important, is the |
|
risk factor on the global stage from a geopolitical |
|
perspective. Everything that we're talking about here is for |
|
U.S. public companies or for public companies that have |
|
reporting requirements in the United States. Let's acknowledge |
|
that there's a growing base of companies in China and in other |
|
parts of the world, but in China in particular, where there are |
|
no such mandatory reporting requirements and I think that this |
|
entire ESG movement is, in fact, a geopolitical boon to China |
|
in the following way. |
|
By requiring U.S. companies to own up to the negative |
|
externalities that they contribute to, but not requiring the |
|
same regime of companies abroad in China, we are creating a |
|
false moral equivalence or worse between the work of companies |
|
and actors here in the United States versus those in |
|
dictatorial regimes in places like China. And I believe that |
|
the Chinese government and other great power rivals on the |
|
world stage understand this phenomenon well; to be able to know |
|
that our greatest asset is not our nuclear arsenal, but is our |
|
moral standing on the global stage. |
|
And when the same actors and the same companies criticize |
|
both public policy here in the United States as well as their |
|
own behavior, be it Disney or the MBA or Marriott, but remain |
|
silent to true macro aggressions in China, that disparity is |
|
actually part of what undercuts our moral standing on the |
|
global stage. And so, the link between stakeholders' capitalism |
|
and geopolitics is something that, I think, hasn't been |
|
investigated enough. Thank you. |
|
Mr. Gonzalez of Ohio. I couldn't agree more, and I thank |
|
you. |
|
I yield back. |
|
Chairman Sherman. Seeing no Democrat, I will recognize |
|
another Republican, and I will commend Mr. Barr for his |
|
patience, but I will commend Mr. Steil for his decision to |
|
choose to serve on our subcommittee and recognize him first. |
|
Mr. Steil. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate |
|
you holding today's hearing. |
|
Back to Mr. Ramaswamy, I really appreciate your last |
|
comments about the importance of the United States' global |
|
competitiveness and how placing burdens on U.S.-based publicly |
|
traded companies uniquely vis-a-vis non-publicly traded |
|
companies, but most importantly vis-a-vis foreign companies |
|
places such a disadvantage on U.S. companies, and ultimately on |
|
U.S. workers and U.S. consumers. I thought that your last |
|
comment was very strong. |
|
As many of my colleagues know, and as you may know, I have |
|
been very concerned about proposals that would really erode the |
|
tried and true principle of materiality, in particular as it |
|
relates to ESG disclosures on these U.S. publicly traded |
|
companies. I would argue that our existing materiality |
|
standards actually serve investors quite well. If information |
|
on climate change, diversity, or other common ESG metrics is |
|
material, I agree, it should be disclosed. |
|
I think the question is whether or not the SEC should deem |
|
that issue itself material. And I think deeming these de facto |
|
issues material could really drive up confusion, drive up |
|
compliance costs, discourage businesses from going public, and |
|
put us at a competitive disadvantage against global |
|
competitors. And as you correctly noted, vis-a-vis China, in |
|
particular. |
|
The SEC's mission, as we are well aware, is to protect |
|
investors, facilitate capital formation, and maintain fair, |
|
orderly, and efficient markets. Mr. Ramaswamy, would you agree |
|
that mandated ESG disclosures, irregardless of materiality, run |
|
contrary to the mission of the SEC and the goal of our |
|
securities laws? |
|
Mr. Ramaswamy. I am not a securities law expert. Though I |
|
am trained as a lawyer, I think you all may be greater experts |
|
than I on that topic. But as I understand it, as both someone |
|
who has lived under the regime of the SEC as well as having |
|
studied it, I believe that the mandate of the agency ought to |
|
be constrained to protecting investors, not because other |
|
objectives aren't important, but because other agencies or |
|
other bodies may be better suited to look after the underlying |
|
content of concerns, and instead, allow the SEC to do its job |
|
well of requiring investors to have the information they need |
|
to make sound decisions and to be protected in the process. |
|
Now, I do believe that, if I may--I think that the two |
|
points I would raise is if there is a discussion about ESG- |
|
related disclosures, in that discussion has to be included the |
|
idea of a point that I raised in my opening statement, which |
|
was the nonfinancial conflicts of interest of a CEO. It is |
|
well-established that if the SEC is going to look after one |
|
class of disclosures above those of any other, it is the |
|
conflicts of interest of the people who lead our public |
|
companies versus the principal agent conflicts they may |
|
experience relative to the shareholders whom they are supposed |
|
to represent. |
|
And I worry that the social causes and even the well- |
|
intentioned social motivations of many of these CEOs including, |
|
but not limited to, Silicon Valley today are intentioned with |
|
the underlying objectives of their shareholders in ways that at |
|
least ought to be disclosed. I gave the analogy of someone |
|
donating to their high school. |
|
Mr. Steil. I am going to jump back in. This is a little |
|
challenging virtually. I only have so much time left, and I |
|
want to get you on another topic that I think is really |
|
important. You spoke, I think very eloquently, about how these |
|
nonmaterial ESG metrics could burden companies in the United |
|
States vis-a-vis international competition. I think another |
|
area that is worth noting is the impact that this has on large |
|
companies versus small companies. Large, publicly-traded |
|
companies in the United States may have large compliance teams, |
|
and large legal operations to be able to navigate through some |
|
of this. |
|
Can you speak to how these types of nonmaterial disclosures |
|
would burden some of the smaller, emerging growth publicly- |
|
traded companies in the United States? |
|
Mr. Ramaswamy. They would very much help big four |
|
accounting firms that ultimately are responsible for |
|
administering these requirements for companies that want to go |
|
public, for lawyers and investment bankers who ultimately serve |
|
as gatekeepers for taking companies public. But they would be |
|
an added cost on our already costly process for startup |
|
companies that do want to go public. |
|
And, in closing, I think that one guard rail to your point |
|
about the internationalism of this is a point for consideration |
|
for the members of this committee might be to say that at least |
|
if you are going to adopt a mandatory form of disclosure, for |
|
example, on climate-related disclosures, whether to consider a |
|
minimum constraint of whether equal foreign powers, like in |
|
China, are willing to adopt similar constraints equivalently so |
|
that we don't undermine the competitiveness of companies both |
|
large and small globally. |
|
Mr. Steil. Let me jump in for the final 10 seconds. I like |
|
your thought. We need to look at emerging growth companies in |
|
the United States, make sure we are lowering those burdens and |
|
making sure that that benefit is to United States' companies, |
|
not foreign companies. |
|
With that, I yield back. |
|
Chairman Sherman. Thank you. I request unanimous consent to |
|
submit for the record a letter from the FACT Coalition in |
|
support of Mrs. Axne's Disclosure of Tax Havens and Offshoring |
|
Act, and country-by-country tax disclosure. |
|
Without objection, it is so ordered. |
|
I see the only Member who has not spoken, and that is our |
|
friend from the Full Committee, Mr. Barr. I will recognize him, |
|
and unless another Member comes in, I will then recognize Mr. |
|
Huizenga for one minute. |
|
Mr. Barr? |
|
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to |
|
participate in this hearing. |
|
And Ranking Member Huizenga, thank you as well. |
|
And to our witnesses, thank you for the vigorous |
|
conversation. It has been interesting indeed, and very timely. |
|
I have to say I wanted to listen to the testimony because I |
|
have been very alarmed by the growing trend of politicization |
|
of access to capital. Over the last several years we have |
|
witnessed financial firms publicly commit not to do business |
|
with certain legal companies in politically unpopular |
|
industries like the fossil energy sector. |
|
And these decisions were not based on the creditworthiness |
|
or the financial soundness of the borrower, but rather were |
|
driven by a number of non-pecuniary factors. Political pressure |
|
from vocal critics, public relations pressure from activist |
|
groups, the moral judgment of corporate leadership all |
|
contributed, but none of those factors should play a role in |
|
determining which legally operating business receives a loan |
|
from a bank, or gets investments through retirement funds, or |
|
is sold a commercial insurance policy. Any decision should be |
|
explicitly and exclusively dependent on objective risk-based |
|
underwriting standards. |
|
The politicization of access to capital threatens jobs and |
|
compromises entire industries based on the misguided opinions |
|
of a select few. If you would allow me the indulgence of just |
|
making one final editorial comment before my questions, and |
|
that is, I do not believe that this ESG movement is in any way |
|
about managing climate-related financial stress. What I believe |
|
this is really about is causing financial distress for |
|
particularly politically incorrect industries. The coal |
|
industry in my home State of Kentucky being a prominent |
|
example, a victim and the workers therein a victim of political |
|
correctness and the politicization of access to capital. |
|
And these mandatory climate disclosures are not about |
|
providing material information to investors; they are about the |
|
government putting its heavy hand on the scale to discriminate |
|
against certain legally operating businesses, to pick winners |
|
and losers in the marketplace and to politicize access to |
|
capital. In case you didn't know where I stood, I did want to |
|
just make that comment. |
|
I do think individuals should have the freedom to |
|
contribute their resources to political, social, and charitable |
|
causes. I think it is fine if someone wants to invest in the |
|
ESG fund, or invest in a climate-related cause with their own |
|
dime, but that's the individual's choice. When such choices are |
|
made for shareholders by agents acting at the corporate level, |
|
using the investor's own capital, then at best, we are inviting |
|
abuse, resource misallocation, malfeasance, and inefficiency. |
|
But at worst, we are enabling a practice that looks a lot |
|
like theft, theft from shareholders and investors, the actual |
|
owners of the corporation, by corporate directors and officers |
|
either voluntarily or by government mandate, and redirecting |
|
their money and their resources away from the core mission of |
|
the company and into an unrelated political errand. That, to |
|
me, is immoral. It is offensive. |
|
Mr. Ramaswamy, in your opinion, should the moral judgments |
|
of investment managers, banks, and other financial firms |
|
dictate which legally-operated firms get financing, especially |
|
if those opinions are based on unrelated social causes? |
|
Mr. Ramaswamy. With all due respect, I do not. And I think |
|
that is a conflict of interest that I believe is more material |
|
to investors than any of the other social factors that we have |
|
discussed today. Because if there's one thing that protects the |
|
integrity of our public capital markets, it is making sure that |
|
investors are aware of the conflicts that a given CEO or a |
|
manager bears when making decisions using shareholders' |
|
capital. |
|
And if one manager is going to use shareholder capital to |
|
garnish their personal reputational brand, or burnish their own |
|
social causes at the expense of other social causes, investors |
|
ought to know about that sooner than they ought to about other |
|
broader social-related climate risks or other. |
|
Mr. Barr. Mr. Ramaswamy, last question here. In terms of |
|
investor returns, I have no issue if investors choose to |
|
allocate their money to ESG funds if there is transparency and |
|
if there is an appetite for them. But I have a problem if asset |
|
managers who exclusively offer ESG options limit customers' |
|
options to invest in fossil energy, for example, as an |
|
alternative. |
|
Do you agree that investment advisors or retirement plan |
|
sponsors should advise their clients based on what will drive |
|
the highest returns or make clients aware if non-financial |
|
factors are driving particular asset-allocation or investment |
|
advice? I do worry that investors are getting hoaxed, because |
|
asset managers are politicizing the allocations of their |
|
capital as opposed to maximizing shareholder value. |
|
Mr. Ramaswamy. I agree with your comments, and I believe |
|
that's actually a relevant area for future inquiry with respect |
|
to disclosure requirements. |
|
Mr. Barr. Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to |
|
participate today, and as you can tell, I am interested in this |
|
topic, and I yield back. |
|
Chairman Sherman. Thank you. |
|
I now recognize the Chair of the Full Committee, Chairwoman |
|
Waters. |
|
Chairwoman Waters. Thank you very much, Congressman |
|
Sherman, for holding this hearing. This is so very important |
|
with us getting into all of the ways by which we can deal with |
|
the whole issue of climate change. But I'd like to ask a |
|
question regarding the impacts of climate change on the |
|
communities of color and climate risk as an exposure. |
|
Ms. Toney, may I address this question to you? Series of |
|
segregationists and other racist policies have left communities |
|
of color, particularly Black communities, disproportionately |
|
vulnerable to the physical and health risks of climate change. |
|
For far too long, this important topic has been left out of the |
|
conversation. Reports coming from Texas show that Black and |
|
Latinx communities have been hit the hardest during Texas's |
|
historic freeze, compounding the disproportionate damage done |
|
to these same communities from increased extreme weather events |
|
like hurricanes and flooding. |
|
Drawing on your extensive experience as an environmental |
|
regulator, an environmental justice advocate, and as a former |
|
mayor of a major minority city, can you please discuss how |
|
corporate disclosures of climate risk can help communities or |
|
government better access the risk their communities face and |
|
help them take action to address these risks? |
|
Ms. Toney. Thank you, Chairwoman. Absolutely. The impact |
|
comes very hard and heavy. And it has been interesting |
|
listening to this dialogue because we have talked ad nauseum |
|
about how investors are impacted and whether or not this is a |
|
moral decision without realizing that some of the decisions |
|
that are made in the lack of disclosure is a decision in and of |
|
itself. The labor force that is working in these places, |
|
investors need to know whether or not the climate impacts of |
|
how people are actually out gathering food if it is a food |
|
company, how that happens in that particular marginalized |
|
community. And they are making these decisions right now. |
|
The companies know--for example, airlines are looking at |
|
climate to determine how the jet stream goes and how the future |
|
of infrastructure needs to be designed with respect to the air |
|
traffic ways and to the runways when we're thinking about how |
|
something like coffee beans are grown, or where water |
|
disparities are in our country. These are issues that are |
|
impacted by climate. These are issues where the labor force is |
|
often Black and Brown. These are places where the assets of the |
|
company are located in Black and Brown communities and |
|
investors need to know whether or not the climate impact and |
|
the disproportionate nature to communities of color will impact |
|
their bottom dollar. |
|
This is another important thing that I put into my |
|
testimony, and I hope everyone has an opportunity to read it. |
|
There is a study that has been done by Rice University and the |
|
University of Pittsburgh that shows specific evidence that once |
|
a climate disaster happens, White counties actually increase in |
|
terms of their average wealth, while Black and Brown counties |
|
decrease. There is an increase in the economic disparity when |
|
after climate disasters, investment is not done. And it is |
|
historic and it is systemic. This is not new to the Federal |
|
Government. HUD, FEMA, EPA, these are all regulatory agencies |
|
from the Federal Government, and the SEC is no different. So we |
|
must consider these as we talk about this issue. |
|
And last point, Chairwoman, if you will allow me, I think |
|
it is interesting to note that sometimes we tend to think that |
|
we are starting from a place of equality and we are not. Black |
|
and Brown communities are coming from the back. It would be |
|
lovely if we were all starting from a place of one person, one |
|
vote, but that is just not true. That is not our democracy. It |
|
is not our history. We are trying hard to come back and restore |
|
what should be happening and that is what the Biden |
|
Administration has said. And I think the way that they have |
|
outlined this and the way that we use climate as a bridge to |
|
equality is an opportunity that we have never had in our |
|
country and I am hopeful that we can all get on the same page. |
|
Chairwoman Waters. Wow. I love that statement, and I'm |
|
going to quote you, ``climate as a bridge to equality.'' Thank |
|
you very much. |
|
I yield back the balance of my time. |
|
Chairman Sherman. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. |
|
Ms. Toney. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. |
|
Chairman Sherman. I now recognize Mr. Huizenga for a one- |
|
minute closing statement. |
|
Mr. Huizenga. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
And, Mr. Ramaswamy, if you are still on, I'm looking |
|
forward to your book that's upcoming, ``WOKE, INC.'' Despite |
|
claims that this is not about naming and shaming, pretty |
|
clearly it is. Political spending is naming and shaming. |
|
Diversity disclosure and sexual orientation and family status |
|
is naming and shaming. Pay structure, tax structures, and just |
|
because many of us oppose government-mandated nonmaterial |
|
disclosures does not mean that we aren't concerned about these |
|
particular issues. |
|
What the main question should be is, does this make us more |
|
competitive and attractive in a global economy? Large companies |
|
may be able to handle this. But this is going to damage small |
|
and medium-sized companies, especially those startups. And this |
|
bill, these sets, this issue is dealing with U.S. public |
|
companies, not privately-held companies, not foreign companies, |
|
and it begs the question, when will the push start to include |
|
privately-held companies as well? That is the slippery slope of |
|
this issue. And with that, I yield back. |
|
Chairman Sherman. Thank you. |
|
Mr. Ramaswamy, I want to thank you for focusing our |
|
attention on how the study of the Dutch East India Company can |
|
inform modern decision-making. You point out that we want a |
|
system of one person, one vote. Unfortunately, we live in a |
|
world where a corporate board can spend millions of dollars, |
|
overwhelming buy one vote at the ballot box. McCain-Feingold |
|
was designed to present that. At a minimum, we could force |
|
disclosure. |
|
You indicate that disclosure is a blunt instrument. It is |
|
actually the least blunt instrument. The second still would be |
|
to tax or subsidize a behavior, and the most blunt would be to |
|
prohibit or require a behavior. I think it may be unfair to |
|
public companies that we force these disclosures only on them, |
|
and I will happily go down that slippery slope and say the |
|
disclosures should be of all large companies, and we might even |
|
exclude a few of the smallest public companies. |
|
And finally, I do not think it is theft when a corporation |
|
that I might be a shareholder in spends money on planting |
|
trees, weatherizing a facility or otherwise reducing its effect |
|
on global warming. I do think it is theft when the company |
|
spends its money secretly on a political cause opposed to my |
|
interest and will not even reveal it. |
|
With that, we stand adjourned. Thank you. |
|
[Whereupon, at 4:01 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] |
|
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|
A P P E N D I X |
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February 25, 2021 |
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[all] |
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