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+
+ - GAZA AFTER THE WAR: WHAT CAN BE BUILT ON THE WRECKAGE?
+
+[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
+[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
+
+
+
+ GAZA AFTER THE WAR: WHAT CAN BE BUILT ON THE WRECKAGE?
+
+=======================================================================
+
+ HEARING
+
+ BEFORE THE
+
+ SUBCOMMITTEE ON
+ THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
+
+ OF THE
+
+ COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
+ HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
+
+ ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
+
+ FIRST SESSION
+
+ __________
+
+ FEBRUARY 12, 2009
+
+ __________
+
+ Serial No. 111-1
+
+ __________
+
+ Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
+
+
+ Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
+
+ ______
+
+ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
+47-420 WASHINGTON : 2009
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------
+For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
+http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202�09512�091800, or 866�09512�091800 (toll-free). E-mail, [email protected].
+
+
+ COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
+
+ HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
+GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
+ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
+ Samoa DAN BURTON, Indiana
+DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ELTON GALLEGLY, California
+BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California
+ROBERT WEXLER, Florida DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
+ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
+BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts RON PAUL, Texas
+GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
+DIANE E. WATSON, MIKE PENCE, Indiana
+ California JOE WILSON, South Carolina
+ADAM SMITH, JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
+ Washington deg.Until J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
+ 2/9/09 deg. CONNIE MACK, Florida
+RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
+ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
+GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia TED POE, Texas
+MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
+JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
+GENE GREEN, Texas
+SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
+BARBARA LEE, California
+SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
+JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
+MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
+BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
+DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
+JIM COSTA, California
+KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
+GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
+RON KLEIN, Florida
+VACANTAs of 2/10/09 deg.
+ Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
+ Yleem Poblete, Republican Staff Director
+ ------
+
+ Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
+
+ GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York, Chairman
+RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri DAN BURTON, Indiana
+MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York MIKE PENCE, Indiana
+SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas JOE WILSON, South Carolina
+SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
+JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
+MIKE ROSS, Arkansas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
+JIM COSTA, California BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
+KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
+RON KLEIN, Florida DANA ROHRABACHER, California
+BRAD SHERMAN, California EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
+ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
+ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
+ADAM SMITH,
+ Washington deg.Until
+ 2/9/09 deg.
+GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
+GENE GREEN, Texas
+VACANTAs of 2/10/09 deg.
+ David Adams, Subcommittee Staff Director
+ Howard Diamond, Subcommittee Professional Staff Member
+ Mark Walker, Republican Professional Staff Member
+ Dalis Blumenfeld, Staff Associate
+
+
+ C O N T E N T S
+
+ ----------
+ Page
+
+ WITNESSES
+
+Mr. David Makovsky, Director, Project on the Middle East Peace
+ Process, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy......... 15
+Ziad J. Asali, M.D., President & Founder, The American Task Force
+ on Palestine................................................... 23
+Michele Dunne, Ph.D., Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for
+ International Peace............................................ 76
+Ms. Danielle Pletka, Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy
+ Studies, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
+ Research....................................................... 82
+
+ LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
+
+The Honorable Gary L. Ackerman, a Representative in Congress from
+ the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Middle
+ East and South Asia: Prepared statement........................ 4
+The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the
+ State of Indiana: Prepared statement........................... 9
+Mr. David Makovsky: Prepared statement........................... 18
+Ziad J. Asali, M.D.: Prepared statement.......................... 25
+Michele Dunne, Ph.D.: Prepared statement......................... 79
+Ms. Danielle Pletka: Prepared statement.......................... 85
+
+ APPENDIX
+
+Hearing notice................................................... 110
+Minutes of hearing............................................... 111
+Statement from the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee... 112
+
+
+ GAZA AFTER THE WAR: WHAT CAN BE BUILT ON THE WRECKAGE?
+
+ ----------
+
+
+ THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2009
+
+ House of Representatives,
+ Subcommittee on the Middle East
+ and South Asia,
+ Committee on Foreign Affairs,
+ Washington, DC.
+ The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:43 a.m. in room
+2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gary L. Ackerman
+(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
+ Mr. Ackerman. The subcommittee will come to order.
+ I want to begin by welcoming our new ranking member, the
+gentleman from Indiana, Dan Burton------
+ Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Ackerman [continuing]. Whom I have had the pleasure of
+working with before. I especially welcome his dedication and
+enthusiasm and the verve that he brings to all of his work.
+ Mr. Burton. Thank you, sir.
+ Mr. Ackerman. Pleasure working with you again.
+ On our side I would like to acknowledge one of our new
+members who is with us today, Gerald E. Connolly from Virginia,
+and welcome him to the subcommittee.
+ I would like to start with a quote, as follows:
+
+ ``Today the subcommittee had hoped to examine those
+ realistic and productive measures that the parties
+ directly and indirectly involved with the Palestinian-
+ Israeli conflict might have taken to restore a sense of
+ hope, and maybe even make some material progress toward
+ peace. But in the light of,'' I will insert here the
+ words what has occurred, ``I am not sure what is left
+ to discuss.''
+
+ The quote continues:
+
+ ``Over the past 6 years there have been many plans
+ and many envoys. And contrary to popular opinion, there
+ has not been a deficit of attention, merely a deficit
+ in performance. Commitments made to the United States
+ or between the parties have often been honored only in
+ the breach. The timing was never right. What was
+ promised was never delivered. It was always a
+ provocation, an incident, an upcoming election, a
+ crisis, an attack. And so it is again today.''
+
+That was a quote.
+ If we strike the words that I inserted, what occurred, and
+insert the words Gaza conflict, these sentences which I read at
+this subcommittee's first hearing in 2007 are, to my dismay,
+equally applicable today.
+ It only looks like we are going in circles. In fact, we are
+spiraling downward. I don't know where the bottom is, but I
+know it is there, and I know we are getting closer every day.
+It will hit with shattering force when, through malice and
+terror, through shallow calculation and venal self-interest,
+through short-sightedness and through political cowardice, the
+two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is
+finally rendered impossible.
+ The downward pressure comes from terrorism in the march of
+settlements. It comes from the firing of rockets and the
+perpetration of settler pogroms. It comes in daily images of
+destruction and the constant reiteration that they only
+understand the language of force.
+ It comes in the form of a political party that is always
+just a few months away from reform, and in the form of
+government coalitions whose chief purpose it is to avoid new
+elections. It comes in the form of promises that bloodshed is
+what God desires, and declarations that dirt and stones mean
+more than human life. It comes from tunnels in Gaza, and yes,
+from diggings in Jerusalem, as well.
+ Let me not be misunderstood. There is no moral equivalence
+between these acts, but they are all part of the same
+destructive dynamic.
+ Since the end of the Clinton administration, the basic
+outlines of the peace agreement have been clear. And in fact,
+in its waning days, the government of Ehud Olmert, like other
+departing Israeli governments, further closed the gaps, and
+added even more detail. Except now there are three sides, and
+one of those sides is looking for a very different outcome than
+the other two.
+ Hamas is the odd man out. I don't know what to do about
+that. I don't know how you make peace with half of a wannabe
+country. I don't know how you sign an agreement with an entity
+who's legal, political, and administrative bona fides are all
+in question.
+ Which brings us to Gaza, where so many of the
+contradictions of this conflict come into focus. Start with
+Hamas, a terrorist organization, an entity beyond the pale.
+They are the enemy, and no one can talk to them until they
+accept the quartet's conditions of recognizing Israel,
+repudiating violence, and accepting the PLO's agreements with
+Israel.
+ Except for years Israel has been talking to Hamas through
+Egypt, and directly to Hamas through prisoners in Israeli
+jails. And when the IDF was in Gaza in force, with reserves
+building up outside, the Israelis announced that the
+destruction of Hamas was absolutely not their goal. Hamas is a
+deadly, vicious, implacable enemy, but somehow one that they
+left in place.
+ For their part, the Fatah-led PA blasted Israel for
+violence, while quietly hoping that the IDF would cripple Hamas
+and pave the way for the Palestinian Authority's return to
+Gaza. Likewise, the PA has continuously denounced Hamas for the
+2007 coup in Gaza, and then intermittently engaged in direct
+talks to form a unity government with it.
+ And Hamas itself, the great paragon of ideological purity,
+insists in Arabic that its goal is the complete liberation of
+Palestine, which is to say the elimination of the State of
+Israel; while in English it declares that Israeli withdrawal to
+the 1967 borders would be sufficient for long-term, but not
+permanent, peace.
+ One real bright spot in all the chaos is the work of the
+U.S. Security Coordinator, Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton, who, without
+fanfare and very little money, has helped stand up a force of
+several hundred competent and disciplined Palestinian security
+forces, trained in Jordan and deployed successfully to major
+cities in the West Bank. These mostly young Palestinians have
+restored law and order in Jenin, in Nablus, and are finally
+starting to put some authority back into the Palestinian
+Authority, which for years has been leaking the stuff like a
+bucket with no bottom.
+ I think we have learned from our own awful experience in
+Iraq that between politics and security, security has to come
+first. So what can be made of the new and growing security
+dynamic in the West Bank remains to be seen. A lot will depend
+on whether Israel, in a break from years of habit, can
+recognize its own self-interest in the success of this
+Palestinian enterprise.
+ And even if that happens, and I think we really must try
+hard to help that process along, how developments in the West
+Bank can be used to reestablish a connection with Gaza is far
+from clear. And it is in Gaza that the United States, Israel,
+the PA, and Arab states have to start coming up with answers.
+ There are pressing humanitarian needs and a reconstruction
+vacuum that will surely be filled by someone, either for good
+or ill. Hamas is still in charge there. And depending on what
+polls you read and which people you talk to, is either badly
+damaged or fully in command. The war has either alienated them
+from the public, or powerfully reinforced their leadership.
+Hamas has either suffered a severe blow, or has benefitted
+immensely from merely surviving the Israeli onslaught.
+ The fact that so basic a question can still be in doubt
+should make all of us a little more circumspect in our
+assertions, and a little less confident in our understanding of
+this conflict.
+ Fortunately, we have with us today a panel with real
+expertise in the politics of Israel, the Palestinian Authority,
+and Egypt, to help us understand where the interests of the
+parties lie, and what equities they most need to protect in
+coming to grips with the future of Gaza.
+ It is our job to start answering these same questions for
+ourselves. What is it that we want? How can we achieve it? What
+has worked, and what has to be done differently? What
+assumptions have we made that haven't been borne out in fact?
+We can start today by learning from our distinguished
+witnesses.
+ I turn now to my friend, partner, Dan Burton.
+ [The prepared statement of Mr. Ackerman
+follows:]Ackerman deg.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is nice to be your
+partner. We have had our differences over the years on the
+floor and in the committee. But one thing on which we have
+always agreed has been the Middle Eastern problems; and in
+particular, the survivability of our good friend, Israel.
+ I have a statement I would like to submit for the record,
+but I would like to make a few comments, if I may.
+ When Ariel Sharon decided to give Gaza away and they
+started destroying the settlements that were in Gaza, I, for
+one, was very concerned about that, because I thought there
+were no guarantees of Israel's right to exist from the parties
+involved. And I was concerned that Hezbollah would take
+advantage, or Hamas would take advantage of the situation in
+Gaza as soon as things took place.
+ And as I watched those people being removed from their
+homes and their homes being bulldozed, it was a very
+disheartening situation. But I had great confidence in Ariel
+Sharon, and I felt like his decisions were very well thought
+out, and that this was probably a step toward a lasting peace.
+ Unfortunately, that was not the case. The minute Gaza
+became independent, Hamas started moving very rapidly by
+getting weapons in from Iran through Syria, all kinds of
+rockets and other equipment, and started their attacks on
+Israel.
+ My concern today, and what I would like to get from the
+panelists, Mr. Chairman, is what they believe the long-term
+view is from their perspective on the situation in Gaza, what
+the long-term view is from their perspective on Iran. Will Iran
+start reducing or working with the rest of the world in trying
+to stop the weapons from getting into Gaza and into Lebanon and
+Hezbollah up there? And can we expect any real movement toward
+a lasting peace?
+ We have been talking about this for as long as I have been
+in Congress. I think you and I have been in Congress 26 years,
+and we come back to the same position year after year after
+year, where there is a determination by Iran, by Syria, by
+Hamas and Hezbollah to destroy Israel and deny their right to
+exist.
+ So I would like to ask the panelists today if they see any
+light at the end of the tunnel, if they think the ending of the
+hostilities that have taken place will lead to a lasting peace
+in Gaza, and what their prognostication is about as far as Iran
+is concerned.
+ The administration has indicated they want to try to open
+up a dialogue with Iran to try to find out if there is a
+pathway to peace. But unless there is a guarantee of Israel's
+right to exist, I don't think there is going to be any
+solutions to the problems over there.
+ And so if there are administration people here today, Mr.
+Chairman, I would say I hope they will be very careful when
+they discuss these issues with the Iranians, to make sure that
+the number one question at every meeting is will you finally
+agree to Israel's right to exist, and try to work out a
+peaceful solution to these problems over there.
+ So there is an awful lot of things that are going on that
+we would like to talk about today. I know I have covered quite
+a bit of the waterfront with my opening remarks. But these are
+all inter-related, so I would like to hear what your
+perspective is on all of these issues.
+ And in particular, in closing, I would like to thank Danni
+Pletka for being here. We worked together when she worked for
+Jesse Helms on a number of issues. She is a very bright lady,
+and we are really happy to have you here today. You are now
+with the American Enterprise Institute, a very fine group. And
+I look forward to working with you in the future.
+ Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you and your
+colleagues on your side of the aisle, and finding, hopefully, a
+solution to some of these problems in the Middle East.
+ I yield back my time.
+ Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much. And without objection,
+your full statement will be put in the record, as it will for
+all other members.
+ [The prepared statement of Mr. Burton
+follows:]Burton deg.
+
+
+
+
+
+ Mr. Ackerman. I sent out a notice to each of the members
+yesterday--I hope everybody saw it--that we would allow opening
+statements, but we want to keep them to an opening comment,
+maybe for 1 minute apiece. And we will do that as we usually do
+on the subcommittee, in order of the member's appearance at the
+committee.
+ Mr. Wexler, if you would like.
+ Mr. Wexler. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I just want
+to commend you for assembling an extraordinary group today. Mr.
+Makovsky is someone I have relied upon and continue to rely
+upon, and I don't think there is any more knowledgeable voice
+in this country in terms of the Middle East and the Israeli-
+Palestinian conflict.
+ Dr. Asali, as well, I think is a uniquely powerful and
+constructive both advocate and resource for the United States
+Congress. And we all--many of us--rely upon him greatly. And
+despite Mr. Burton's wonderful comments, Ms. Pletka, we too
+welcome you and Dr. Dunne, as well.
+ Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Royce.
+ Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As one of our witnesses
+points out here today, many believe that there is a magical
+solution to the Israel-Palestine problem.
+ If only we can arrange the diplomatic talks a certain way,
+there is this feeling that it will be solved. And we have a new
+special envoy, Sen. Mitchell, who is going to spend
+considerable energy working this region. He will be working and
+reaching for peace.
+ But the idea that some type of grand bargain might be
+celebrated in the Rose Garden is very far off. Sen. Mitchell
+must contend with the fact that there are those in the region,
+Hamas and others, who do not even recognize Israel's existence.
+Israel must be replaced with an Islamic state, according to
+Hamas.
+ So this is a region of the world plagued with a growing
+extremism that will frustrate peace initiatives, and won't be
+easily or quickly reversed.
+ This hearing asks what can be built on the wreckage. I have
+yet to see the firm foundation upon which structures must be
+built, but that does not mean we don't try.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing.
+ Mr. Ackerman. The chair would like to recognize the
+presence of the chair of the full committee, Howard Berman, and
+ask the chairman if he would like to use his prerogative to--
+the chairman has waived.
+ We go next to Mr. Connolly.
+ Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
+convening this hearing today.
+ I think that it is imperative we understand the lessons
+learned from the recent Gaza conflict. Only with a more durable
+cease-fire and a commitment from Hamas to forswear violence can
+we address the long-term humanitarian needs of the people of
+the Gaza Strip.
+ I, for one, look to this week's Israeli election as
+actually an encouraging sign in the effort for renewing the
+peace process. While the closeness of the vote may present some
+challenges, the edge appears to lie with those who vigorously
+want to pursue the peace process.
+ When taken together, the election results, the current
+cease-fire, no matter how tenuous, and the commitment of
+President Obama to invest U.S. capital by engaging personally
+in the peace process, as well as his appointment of Special
+Envoy George Mitchell, are encouraging signs that we can broker
+a long-term solution in the interest of all parties.
+ I welcome today's witnesses and look forward to hearing
+from them about their recommendations for moving forward in a
+positive direction.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much. Mr. Ellison.
+ Mr. Ellison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence
+here. I have got an abundance of paper in front of me.
+ Mr. Chairman, first of all I would like to thank you for
+hosting the subcommittee hearing today. It is a privilege and
+an honor to be here, and to be a member of this very important
+subcommittee.
+ As we all know, this is a very critical time to be hearing
+about the critical topic of Gaza. I am glad that we are here to
+help move forward on the necessary rehabilitation and
+reconstruction efforts in Gaza.
+ I take this opportunity to welcome all speakers and
+witnesses to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. And I look
+forward to hearing your testimony, as well as the discussion
+and exchange of views on conflicts in Gaza, the reconstruction
+and Middle East peace.
+ And also, Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent. I
+was approached by an organization called the American Arab
+Anti-Discrimination Committee who would like to submit a
+statement, and was not able to do so. And so I ask unanimous
+consent that their statement be allowed to be put into the
+record.
+ Mr. Ackerman. Without objection.
+ [The information referred to was inserted into the
+appendix]No material followed in original deg.
+ Mr. Ackerman. deg.Thank you very much. And Mr.
+Ellison, we welcome you to the committee, as well.
+ Ms. Berkley, welcome to the subcommittee.
+ Ms. Berkley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to
+be back. And I also want to thank you for holding this hearing.
+ I was part of a Congressional delegation that was among the
+last civilians to leave the Gaza when the Israelis left. As a
+Jew, it was very difficult for me to watch other Jews being
+forcibly removed from their homes, many of whom had lived in
+the Gaza for three generations. But it was done by the Israelis
+in the interest of peace, and with the hope that the
+Palestinians would be able to demonstrate to the world that
+they were capable of self-governance.
+ We were hopeful, I was certainly hopeful, that schools
+would be built, infrastructure would be created, and that the
+Palestinians would take control of their own lives.
+ Unfortunately, the result has been quite different. Hamas
+has taken over, a terrorist organization that continues not
+only to terrorize Israel by raining rockets on innocent Israeli
+civilians from the Gaza, but raining terror on their own
+people.
+ It would be my hope, especially in the aftermath of the
+last action by the Israelis, precipitated by the continuous
+launching of rockets into Israel, that the Palestinian people
+would see that Hamas is not their future; and making a just and
+lasting peace with Israel, and recognizing Israel's right to
+exist, and securing the borders would be in the best interest
+of both people. And that would be my hope.
+ But I have become, I must say, Mr. Chairman, very cynical
+over the last few years, and hopeful that we will see a new
+day. But I am very doubtful that that will happen. And I am
+anxious to hear our witnesses talk about this issue.
+ Thank you.
+ Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Mr. Klein.
+ Mr. Klein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr.
+Burton, for calling this meeting today. And thank you to the
+guests who will present to us.
+ The Gaza Strip has obviously been a problem for many, many
+years, both when Egypt was much more involved, when Israel has
+been involved, and obviously in its own sense right now. And of
+course, the movement of weapons and missiles and rockets into
+the Gaza Strip from a number of, a number of means of getting
+through there has been a problem which has continued to present
+more difficulties.
+ Now that the general fighting has stopped at the level it
+was a couple weeks ago, obviously there are still rockets being
+fired, and this is a very fragile situation.
+ I think we acknowledge that Egypt, who has been helpful, is
+in a position where they can continue to help limit the amount
+of weapons that come in through that area. Egypt does not want
+an unstable or destabilized Hamas or region to flow into its
+areas, as well. The presenters today can comment on the role
+that Egypt continues to play, and of course, we encourage their
+continued cooperation as we go forward.
+ Thank you.
+ Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Mr. Carnahan.
+ Mr. Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
+Burton. It is great to be back in this new session on this
+committee. I look forward to working with you on the timely and
+substantive work of this committee, and really getting it right
+in Gaza is central to really making progress in the Middle
+East. And so I thank the panel for being here, and look forward
+to hearing from you.
+ Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. We also want to welcome Mr.
+McMahon, a new Member to the Congress, new member to the
+committee and subcommittee. Would you like a minute, if you
+want to take that now? You are recognized.
+ Mr. McMahon. Thank you, Chairman Ackerman. And I thank the
+subcommittee for allowing me to speak today, my first hearing
+here, first time in.
+ I would like to thank our witnesses for sharing their
+knowledge with us here today, and I hope to share the
+conclusions with my constituents back home.
+ Clearly, the humanitarian situation in Gaza is very grave,
+yet Hamas still continues to exacerbate the humanitarian
+situation by using innocent civilians to leverage power over
+this broken region to advance their political agenda.
+ I think that most of my colleagues in this room would agree
+that as the premiere nation allocating assistance to Gaza, the
+U.S. is currently in quite a predicament. If Hamas increases
+influence through circumventing the assistance and manipulating
+civilians, what is to be expected for the future of our sister
+nation, Israel, and for the region as a whole?
+ Mr. Chairman, my constituents, both Arab and Jewish alike,
+are concerned for their families in the region, and cannot bear
+for their relatives to be treated as worthless pawns.
+ Despite the severity of the situation, I remain hopeful
+that a secure peace agreement that embraces the two-state
+solution can be reached through the leadership of President
+Barack Obama and Sen. Mitchell. And I hope through efforts here
+today, we can bring humanitarian relief to all those who suffer
+in the region.
+ I hope that we reaffirm our commitment that the only future
+for Israel and Palestine is a path to peace.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield the remainder of my time.
+ Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much. We will now turn to our
+witnesses.
+ We are joined today by a truly first-rate group, each of
+whom brings years of hands-on expertise and analytical
+experience to this hearing.
+ David Makovsky is a senior fellow and director of the
+Washington Institute's Project on the Middle East Peace
+Process. He is also an adjunct lecturer in Middle Eastern
+Studies at Johns Hopkins University in the Paul H. Nitze School
+of Advanced International Studies.
+ Before joining the Washington Institute, Mr. Makovsky
+covered the peace process from 1989 to 2000 as executive editor
+of the Jerusalem Post and as diplomatic correspondent for
+Haaretz. Now a contributing editor to the deg.U.S.
+News and World Report, he served 11 years as the magazine's
+special Jerusalem correspondent.
+ Dr. Ziad Asali is president and founder of the American
+Task Force on Palestine, a nonprofit, non-partisan organization
+established in 2003, and based in Washington, DC. Dr. Asali was
+born in Jerusalem, and received his M.D. from the American
+University of Beirut Medical School in 1967. He completed his
+residency in Salt Lake City, Utah, and then practiced medicine
+in Jerusalem before returning to the U.S. in 1973.
+ Dr. Asali is also founder and chairman of the American
+Charities for Palestine.
+ Michele Dunne is a senior associate at the Carnegie
+Endowment for International Peace. She also edits the Arab
+Reform Bulletin, a monthly online journal exploring political,
+economic, and human rights developments in Arab countries. A
+specialist in the Middle East at the U.S. Department of State
+from 1986 to 2003, Dr. Dunne holds a Ph.D. in Arabic language
+from Georgetown University.
+ Danielle Pletka is vice president of foreign and defense
+policy at the American Enterprise Institute. Before joining
+AEI, she served for 10 years as a senior professional staff
+member for the Near East and South Asia on the U.S. Senate
+Committee on Foreign Relations.
+ In addition to her work at AEI, she was also a member of
+the congressionally-mandated U.S. Institute of Peace Task Force
+on the United Nations.
+ We will begin with Dr. Makovsky.
+
+ STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID MAKOVSKY, DIRECTOR, PROJECT ON THE
+ MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR
+ EAST POLICY
+
+ Mr. Makovsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member,
+distinguished members of the committee. It is an honor to be
+with you today.
+ Until post-conflict arrangements are settled, it is
+premature to reach a definitive conclusion on the recent war in
+Gaza. However, it is possible to make a preliminary assessment.
+ Israel set forward one major objective for itself at the
+start of this war; specifically, to avert Hamas rocket fire
+aimed at its southern cities. The objective of this war was not
+the toppling of Hamas.
+ Israel has also sought to restore the deterrents that it
+felt that it lost in the inconclusive 2006 war against
+Hezbollah and Lebanon. As a result, in contrast to the 2006
+war, Israel's objectives were defined more carefully.
+ One of Israel's main tactics for ensuring that its cities
+are not the targets of Hamas rockets is to target the myriad of
+smuggling tunnels along the Egypt-Gaza border that Hamas uses
+to rearm itself. As such, Israel's success in shutting down or
+destroying these tunnels will also be part of the post-war
+evaluation.
+ First, some background to this Gaza conflict. As was noted
+here, Israel removed all of its settlers and left Gaza in 2005.
+Yet, Hamas rocket fire has been relentless, especially after
+Hamas ascended to power in 2006.
+ By mid-2008, Israel and Hamas have been observing a cease-
+fire for 6 months, which expired on December 19. Israel made
+clear that it wanted to extend the cease-fire, yet Hamas fired
+200 rockets at Israeli cities.
+ There are those who argue that Hamas wanted to use rocket
+fire as a means of changing the terms of the cease-fire.
+However, Israel felt it had no choice but military action.
+ Hamas believed that by taking up positions in densely
+populated parts of the Gaza Strip in order to fire
+indiscriminately at Israeli cities, it would be immune to
+retaliation. This was not the case.
+ Israel embarked on what is called Operation Cast Lead, a
+campaign that went on for less than a month, first by air and
+then by ground, primarily in northern Gaza. While Hamas has
+sought to claim victory in the aftermath of the fighting, these
+claims are largely hollow. Its leadership was in hiding
+throughout the fighting.
+ Hamas did not offer serious opposition on the ground, a
+fact that will make it difficult for the organization to
+credibly claim that it defended Gaza, let alone scored a
+victory.
+ In contrast, Hezbollah, in 2006, offered substantial
+resistance and determined opposition to Israeli ground forces,
+employing the full range of its capabilities.
+ According to the Palestinian-run Jerusalem media
+communications center polling unit, only 35% of Palestinians in
+Gaza believe Hamas' assertion of victory.
+ Israel succeeded in degrading Hamas' ability to fire
+rockets at Israeli cities. Military analysts widely believe
+that the Israeli army was much better prepared for this
+conflict on nearly every level--planning, training, equipment,
+and force readiness--than it was in 2006.
+ Israel sustained far fewer casualties and injuries than it
+did in 2006. Arab casualties were lower in Gaza than Lebanon;
+but as I will point to later in my remarks, they were still
+considerable.
+ Although many thoughts Israel's deterrence was eroded in
+the 2006 war, Israeli officials state that it was restored
+after the current fighting with Hamas. Hamas is responsible for
+the Gaza population and manner that is not true for Hezbollah
+and Lebanon; therefore, there is hope that this deterrence will
+be sustained over time.
+ It is noteworthy that Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran were
+either unwilling or unable to assist Hamas during the conflict,
+excluding rhetorical support. This should give Hamas pause
+about the value of its alliances. Hezbollah did not open up a
+second front, contrary to speculation that it might, and this
+might be a sign that Israel did increase its deterrence during
+the 2006 war, which would be significant.
+ While Iran interpreted the inconclusive outcome of 2006 as
+a victory for its proxy, Hezbollah, and for Tehran's own
+regional influence, Iran will have to view the Gaza conflict as
+a setback. It could not believe that it gained any momentum
+with this episode.
+ Moreover, divisions surfaced within the Arab world. Egypt
+and Saudi Arabia boycotted an aborted Arab summit that they
+viewed as supportive of Hamas, and, implicitly, Iran. Egyptian
+leadership was willing to withstand demonstrations and
+criticism, and still refused to support Hamas' demand that it
+gain control of a key access point to Gaza. All these
+developments were negative from Hamas' perspective.
+ The Gaza war brought fresh international focus to the
+tunnel network between Egyptian Sinai and Gaza. The issue of
+border security has become increasingly important for Israel,
+particularly since the network is crucial to Hamas' ability to
+rearm.
+ During the recent conflict, Hamas fired 122-millimeter
+ground artillery rockets, a type of rocket that is designed by
+Iran to fit through the tunnels by hitting Gadera, 20 miles
+south of Tel Aviv. It fired many rockets, as well. One million
+Israelis are now within this rocket's range, including the
+largest city in southern Israel, Beersheba. If more
+sophisticated, longer-range rockets are smuggled into Gaza,
+Israel's international airport could come within range within
+the very near future.
+ For Israel, this international focus on the tunnel network
+is necessary, albeit not sufficient. International focus is not
+synonymous with action.
+ For example, in 2006 the U.N. Security Council Resolution
+1701 addressed the issue of arms smuggling for Hezbollah by
+calling on an embargo on weapons to Hezbollah militias,
+Lebanese militias. This provision, however, has never been
+enforced. There are estimates that Hezbollah has in fact
+tripled the number of its rockets since 2006.
+ Therefore, a more practical approach was being tried now.
+Toward the end of this war, the United States and Israel signed
+a memorandum of understanding, an MOU, that authorizes United
+States assistance to Egypt to halt the flow of arms. This
+international assistance could potentially involve the U.S.
+Navy and NATO, elements to help police international waters,
+since the grads are believed to come from transit points in
+Iran, Somalia, Eritrea and Yemen.
+ Mr. Ackerman. I am going to have to ask you to start to sum
+up.
+ Mr. Makovsky. Okay. The question will be: Will Egypt indeed
+recognize that its national security is at stake? Because this
+is not a favor to Israel, it clearly has an interest in the
+Palestinian Authority being stronger, and also weakening its
+own opposition at home, the Muslim brotherhood. And it clearly
+does not want to see Iran gain, as President Mubarak made clear
+in a speech the other day.
+ If Egypt acts, this will be the optimal situation. I fear
+if Egypt does not act, Israel will go back into southern Gaza,
+occupy the Philadelphi Corridor, as it is known, and on its
+own, try to explode these tunnels.
+ To avoid this scenario, Egypt is critical, but so is the
+MFO, the multi-national forces of the Sinai. It was put in
+place to, as an early-warning system against possible Egyptian
+attack against Israel, given the wars in the sixties and
+seventies. But given the new threats, maybe we should think of
+an enhanced role for the MFO, given the problem of tunnels.
+Like monitoring some of the main roads that traverse the Sinai;
+there are very few of them.
+ The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has been helpful.
+ Mr. Ackerman. You are going to need to conclude.
+ Mr. Makovsky. Okay. I would just conclude here by saying
+the question here of Gaza reconstruction is something that we
+will discuss. I am happy in the Q and A to discuss this, as
+well.
+ It is clear to me that the pivot point is the Palestinian
+Authority being in Gaza, and making that difference. The Arab
+world could provide assistance, but they could also provide
+assistance by delegitimizing Hamas.
+ Mr. Ackerman. Thank you.
+ Mr. Makovsky. I promise to stay in these Israeli elections
+and what next steps will be taken by Mitchell, but I will do
+that in the Q and A.
+ Thank you very much.
+ [The prepared statement of Mr. Makovsky
+follows:]Makovsky deg.
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+ Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Dr. Asali. Push your button on.
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+ STATEMENT OF ZIAD J. ASALI, M.D., PRESIDENT & FOUNDER, THE
+ AMERICAN TASK FORCE ON PALESTINE
+
+ Dr. Asali. As requested by your staff, allow me to state
+for the record that the recently signed memorandum of
+understanding mentioned in my bio between American Charities
+for Palestine and USAID is only for the purposes of vetting
+recipients of donations made by ACP. Neither I nor ACP has
+received any further gain.
+ Now I will start my testimony.
+ Mr. Ackerman. We will restart your time.
+ Dr. Asali. Thank you very much, and I will not go beyond.
+ Mr. Ackerman. We will allow you the same latitude.
+ Dr. Asali. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank you and
+the subcommittee's esteemed members for the privilege to
+testify before you and summarize my 51-page written testimony.
+ Although Hamas launched reckless and provocative rocket
+attacks against Israel, Gazans are not Hamas. They are not
+combatants, and should not be punished. As a human being and as
+a physician, I was horrified by the tragedy that has befallen
+the people of Gaza by Israel's disproportionate use of force.
+ After an estimated 1,400 deaths and 5,400 injuries, 80% of
+surviving Gazans now depend on food aid, and 51,000 need
+shelter. Their suffering must come to an immediate stop.
+ Gaza lies in ruins, but Hamas still controls Gaza.
+ Mr. Ackerman. I am afraid we cannot have any approbation,
+approval or disapproval from the audience. Everybody is welcome
+to be here, so we want to just constrain our approval or
+disapproval of any of the witnesses, or even any of the
+members. You can criticize us someplace else, but not in this
+room. Thank you.
+ Dr. Asali. Thank you. Restart the clock for me? [Laughter.]
+ Mr. Ackerman. We will not subtract our comments.
+ Dr. Asali. Gaza lies in ruins, but Hamas still controls
+Gaza. And the responsible policies of the PA and other U.S.-
+Arab allies have been undermined.
+ Mr. Chairman, the challenge now is providing essential aid
+and reconstruction to the people of Gaza without bolstering
+Hamas. Opening the crossings and implementing the Access and
+Movement Agreement of 2005 is essential.
+ Immediate humanitarian assistance should proceed unimpeded
+and without politicization, to deliver food, shelter, medical,
+fuel, and educational supplies, as well as power and
+sanitation. It should be provided and expanded through existing
+agencies, including UNRWA and international NGOs. If Hamas
+again attempts to interfere, it risks suspension of aid.
+ Reconstruction, however, takes time, and requires a new
+international mechanism that can ensure entry of construction
+materials into Gaza, secure from political interference. And
+any party blocking the reconstruction process must publicly
+bear the blame.
+ This mechanism should be structured to quickly grant
+contracts, vet recipients, and have security and logistical
+components. This must be coordinated by the new U.S. Special
+Envoy to the Middle East and composed of the Quartet, the PA,
+and the indispensable Egypt.
+ Private reconstruction should be managed through direct
+bank transfers from the PA to beneficiaries, as proposed by
+Prime Minister Fayyad, which will benefit 21,000 property
+owners at a cost of $600 million to $800 million.
+ The Palestinian partner for reconstruction can only be the
+PA under President Abbas. A non-partisan Palestinian national
+accord government could help, but it must meet the Quartet
+conditions, exert security control, and have the specific
+mandate of overseeing reconstruction and preparing for
+elections.
+ Mr. Chairman, there is no military solution to this
+conflict. And until it is resolved through two states, a secure
+Israel alongside a viable Palestine freed from occupation,
+further violence is inevitable.
+ Unless progress is made on advancing Palestinian statehood
+and quality of life through negotiations, and unless the PA and
+Fatah implement serious and genuine reform, the PA will
+continue to weaken. Without progress, anything rebuilt will be
+destroyed. Our own actions can either foster hope or feed hate.
+ Permanent status negotiations must continue, but cannot be
+sustained without expanding the space of freedom in Palestinian
+cities, and in delivering tangible improvements in access,
+mobility, and economic opportunities.
+ Settlements entrench the occupation, and are the most
+pressing political and logistical impediment to peace. All
+hopes for progress depend on an immediate settlement freeze,
+and this is where U.S. leadership must be asserted to preserve
+the credibility of the two-state solution.
+ U.S. assistance must be intensified to help the PA further
+develop the new professional security system, which has proven
+its effectiveness under very difficult circumstances. It also
+has to develop the fledgling economy unimpeded by unreasonable
+restrictions, and pursue good governance reform, transparency,
+and the rule of law.
+ A devastated Gaza, a stagnant West Bank, and a moribund
+peace process would benefit extremism. The losers then will be
+Palestinians, Israel, and the cause of peace, and most
+importantly, our own national interest.
+ Thank you very much.
+ [The prepared statement of Dr. Asali
+follows:]Asali deg.
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+ Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Dr. Asali.
+ Dr. Dunne.
+
+ STATEMENT OF MICHELE DUNNE, PH.D., SENIOR ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE
+ ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
+
+ Ms. Dunne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
+subcommittee for the privilege of testifying before you. I am
+going to be discussing the role of Egypt in this crisis. And I
+am sure the subcommittee members are aware of Egypt's mediation
+effort, and the elements of a cease-fire proposal that Egypt
+has been putting forward.
+ The basic elements are a mutually agreed-to cease-fire
+between Israel and Hamas, as opposed to the unilateral cease-
+fire that exists now; and the duration of that would probably
+be something on the order of 18 months, renewable. The
+reopening of crossings to Gaza, with some limitations as to
+what could enter Gaza. A prisoner exchange that would involve
+perhaps the release of Israeli hostage Gilad Shalit. And talks
+between Fatah and Hamas.
+ And I would like to note that there are indications in the
+press that those talks are already beginning in Cairo, between
+Fatah and Hamas representatives.
+ So what are the Egyptian interests that inform Egypt's
+actions here? I would say in the current crisis, Egypt has
+demonstrated that it has two principal interests related to
+Gaza. One of them is that Egypt wants to avoid taking on
+responsibility for the 1.5 million Palestinians living in Gaza.
+And second, Egypt is trying, through its mediation efforts, to
+restore some role for the Palestinian Authority under the
+leadership of President Mahmoud Abbas, to the extent that is
+possible.
+ Now, regarding Egypt's taking on responsibility for the
+Palestinians, there are at least two ways this could happen,
+and President Hosni Mubarak is going to try to avoid either one
+of them.
+ One possibility is that if there were a humanitarian crisis
+in Gaza, tens or hundreds of thousands of Palestinians could
+flood across the border into the Sinai, and stay on a semi-
+permanent basis. And as I am sure the members of the
+subcommittee are aware, this is not an idle fear; it actually
+happened a year ago, in January 2008, that hundreds of
+thousands of Palestinians crossed the border illegally, and it
+took Egypt about 2 weeks to get them to leave and to
+reestablish control over its international border.
+ Then there is this question of whether Egypt would take on
+some sort of a role in Gaza itself, perhaps administering Gaza
+the way Egypt did between 1948 and 1967. Now, this is not the
+official policy of Israel or anyone else; no one is asking
+Egypt to do this. But the suggestion that this might be a
+possibility has caused a lot of concern in Egypt.
+ Now, President Mubarak will resist this for a couple of
+reasons. First of all, he realizes that governing hundreds of
+thousands of Palestinians, either in Sinai or in Gaza itself,
+would be a thankless task for Egypt.
+ But he also has reason to be concerned about stability in
+his own country, should one or other of these situations be
+forced on Egypt. Sinai is already a troubled area, populated
+largely by Bedouin with little loyalty to the Egyptian state,
+and terrorists have carried out several large-scale attacks
+there in recent years.
+ The introduction of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian
+refugees there, perhaps including militants from Hamas,
+Palestinian-Islamic Jihad, would undoubtedly increase tension
+and the danger of terrorism there.
+ Inside Egypt itself, although many Egyptians have called on
+their government to extend greater diplomatic and humanitarian
+support to Gaza, actual Egyptian rule in Gaza, or rule of many
+Palestinian refugees in Sinai, would very much enflame anti-
+government sentiment in Egypt. And as I am sure the members of
+the subcommittee are aware, there is significant anti-
+government sentiment in Egypt today. Protests of one kind or
+another, mostly about domestic, economic, and human rights
+issues, have become a daily phenomenon in Egypt.
+ And the Muslim Brotherhood that is the primary opposition
+movement in Egypt supports Hamas fervently, and has been
+organizing protests against the government. There has developed
+in Egypt a sort of tradition, since the outbreak of the second
+Palestinian uprising in 2000, of protests that begin in support
+of Palestinians and criticizing Israel, and often the United
+States, and then those protests turn against Mubarak and call
+for an end to his rule.
+ Now, the second goal that I mentioned for Egypt in this
+Gaza crisis is the desire to restore the Palestinian Authority
+to a role in Gaza to the extent that that is feasible. Egypt
+takes a realist approach to Hamas. It would prefer that Hamas
+not rule Gaza, but acknowledges that at this point, it is
+impossible to ignore the group.
+ So one constant in Egyptian mediation efforts has been to
+insist, for example, on enforcing the terms of the 2005 Rafah
+Agreement, which treats the Palestinian Authority as the
+responsible authority on the Gaza side of the border. And Egypt
+would like to see the Palestinian Authority returned there, at
+a minimum to the border with Egypt.
+ Egypt has also pressed Hamas to agree to resume
+reconciliation talks with Fatah, which were going on under
+Egyptian auspices for some time, were broken off in November
+2008, and seem to be perhaps resuming now.
+ Regarding the arms smuggling issue through Rafah, Egyptian
+officials are undoubtedly aware that there is a spotlight on
+the issue now. David Makovsky mentioned that there has been
+technical assistance from the United States through the U.S.
+Army Corps of Engineers, a $23-million program that was funded
+out of United States annual military assistance to Egypt.
+ This has now been implemented in only the last week, and
+there is actual technical monitoring now by the Egyptians, with
+this assistance from the United States, of tunneling and
+underground movements through the Rafah area. And Egypt should
+be able, with this tool, to significantly improve its
+performance in preventing arms trafficking into Gaza.
+ There is a report, by the way, in the Jerusalem Post today
+that talks about that, and says that there is significantly
+stepped-up Egyptian enforcement.
+ Mr. Ackerman. You are going to have to start to summarize.
+ Ms. Dunne. Okay. The aftermath of the Gaza crisis does
+afford some opportunities for the United States and Egypt to
+strengthen their ties, which have been strained in recent
+years. United States and Egyptian goals regarding Gaza are
+largely consonant.
+ Over the longer term, however, I would like to note that it
+will be necessary for Egypt and the United States to reach an
+understanding on progress on human and civil rights inside
+Egypt as well, in order for the partnership to really flourish.
+ Thank you.
+ [The prepared statement of Ms. Dunne
+follows:]Dunne deg.
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+ Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Dr. Dunne.
+ Ms. Pletka.
+
+ STATEMENT OF MS. DANIELLE PLETKA, VICE PRESIDENT, FOREIGN AND
+ DEFENSE POLICY STUDIES, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR
+ PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH
+
+ Ms. Pletka. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Burton, for
+inviting me today. I am going to summarize my remarks, and you
+will put my full statement in the record.
+ Mr. Royce was kind enough to quote my statement--I am glad
+somebody read it--in advance. I suggested that part of the
+problem historically has been that each time a new
+administration comes to the Israeli-Palestinian problem, they
+assume that there is some magical peace that has not been
+fulfilled, some individual who will make it all work right;
+some process that we have not embraced.
+ And the truth is, of course, there simply is no magic to
+any of this, and we should stop thinking about the problem in
+those ways.
+ I would also add that the measure that we have historically
+used to discuss progress between the Israelis and the
+Palestinians has almost entirely been self-referential. We
+always talk about what we have done, and how we have made
+progress, and how everybody is at the table. And we really
+haven't measured the Palestinians' progress.
+ I would argue that perhaps we have paid more attention to
+the Israelis, but no attention to Palestinian progress on the
+ground. And when I say Palestinian progress on the ground, I do
+not mean the shape of their government or the stability of
+their government; I mean the progress of individual
+Palestinians, the general welfare of the Palestinian people.
+And in fact, the Palestinian people as a whole have made very
+little appreciable progress. To the contrary, there has been a
+great decline in standards of living, and a great flight by
+Palestinians from the West Bank in Gaza, not just Gaza I would
+underscore, but also from the West Bank.
+ Nor has the cause of peace made any great strides forward
+in recent years, including when President Bush turned his
+attention to it, when President Clinton put a great deal of
+personal effort and attention toward it.
+ There are some who are going to suggest now, in the
+aftermath of this Gaza war, that the fact that Egypt, Saudi
+Arabia, and others have turned on Hamas is a real sign of
+progress and hope for the future. And I think that we need to
+be very careful in making that judgment.
+ I think that the main motivation there is that they see
+Hamas very clearly for what Hamas is, the face of jihadism,
+which represents a threat not just to Israel, not just to the
+Palestinians, but, more specifically, to them. And I think that
+is where a lot of that antipathy comes from. Whether we can
+manipulate that or gain from it is another thing, but let us
+understand it for what it is.
+ What should American goals really be in the West Bank and
+Gaza specifically, between the Israelis and the Palestinians?
+At the end of the day, what our ambition is is what our
+ambition always has been: It is to build peace on a stable
+edifice. That edifice may or may not include a Palestinian
+state; personally, I think that it would be inevitable. But the
+fact that we have always been willing to suggest that somehow
+the fact that we want a Palestinian as progress toward peace is
+really an illusion. It is not progress toward peace. It is the
+stability of the edifice itself that is in question.
+ We cannot, I think, as we consider new ways of going
+forward, embrace relationships, a relationship with Hamas. That
+is a real danger. There are some who have suggested that the
+United States should open up talks with Hamas, much as we are
+thinking about opening up talks with the Iranian regime. That
+is not a good way forward. It is a dangerous way forward. It
+risks undermining not just the Israelis, of course, but the
+Palestinian Authority and all moderate Palestinians that have
+sought to diminish Hamas' role as it has come forward in Gaza.
+ Also in that regard, we need to be very, very careful of
+temptations to tinker in Palestinian politics. We have seen in
+recent reports talks about how we can reach out to particular
+members of Hamas, and not talk to other members of Hamas;
+thereby strengthening the moderates, and putting down the bad
+guys.
+ We have historically been extraordinarily bad at tinkering
+in politics. We are not that good at tinkering in our own
+politics; we are really quite bad at tinkering in Arab
+politics. And that is a dangerous path forward for us.
+ On the other side, Mr. Burton, you suggested that somehow
+these rocket attacks from Gaza and the war should be a reason
+to rethink the wisdom of the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. And
+I would only say that this is the Israelis' business.
+ You talked about Ariel Sharon and his decision, and I think
+that is true. There were too many in the United States who
+wanted to use U.S. influence to either push the Israelis to
+withdraw, or to foresee Israelis not to withdraw. This is an
+assessment that they must make, and in fact, they are now
+living with the consequences of that decision. It was not our
+decision to make.
+ Today, talking about Gaza, we have not talked enough about
+one of the huge sources of the problem, which is Iran. Hamas
+would not have rockets to lob anywhere if Iran did not
+continually resupply them. Yes, it is true they use the tunnels
+and sea routes and other routes, as well. But at the end of the
+day, the source of the problem is one that needs to be
+addressed by sitting down with the Iranians, as the Obama
+administration has indicated it wishes to in the coming months.
+ I see very little likelihood that this is going to be on
+the top of the agenda. On the contrary, what are we going to
+talk about? They have said very clearly we are going to talk
+about the nuclear weapons program.
+ So that is a troubling fact, deg. and something
+that I think Congress can play a strong role in pushing back to
+the top of the agenda.
+ Just a quick note on the question of aid to the
+Palestinians, because you asked me to talk a little bit about
+this. And I think that we have to recognize that the heart of
+the problem with aid to the Palestinians, but particularly to
+Gaza, lies in UNRWA, the United Nations Relief Works Agency,
+which has basically become a wholly-owned subsidiary of Hamas,
+in my estimation.
+ It is propagandist for Hamas. They have 24,000-plus
+employees. Compare that, by the way, to the U.N. High
+Commissioner for Refugees, which is responsible for refugees
+all around the world, which has less than a quarter of that
+number of employees.
+ They are based in Gaza. They do not vet the NGOs with whom
+they work. They do not vet their employees. They have allowed
+Hamas in the past to manipulate aid. It does not go to the
+purposes that we desire. And I think that it is important that
+we revisit their role and United States assistance through
+them.
+ One additional note on the role of international
+organizations that might be of interest to the Congress and
+this committee, which has spoken to this issue many times in
+the past.
+ Mr. Ackerman. I have to ask you to wrap up.
+ Ms. Pletka. I will wrap up. At the end of January, the
+Palestinian Authority granted jurisdiction to the International
+Criminal Court for the West Bank and Gaza, and the ICC has now
+opened up an investigation into Israeli war crimes in Gaza. I
+do not see that as a very productive way for the international
+community to go forward.
+ Last, in wrapping up, I think that we need to recognize
+that while Hamas has been a major problem, no one can under-
+estimate the problem that it represents. It should not force us
+to look at Fatah through rose-colored glasses. This has been
+our habit in the past. Oh, well, if Hamas is lousy, then--I am
+sorry. If Hamas is lousy, Fatah is better.
+ It is a cop-out on the part of the United States that we
+have failed to focus on governance for the Palestinians, that
+we have failed to focus on accountability, that we have failed
+to use our aid to try and deliver to the Palestinian people the
+kind of things that we would wish to deliver to ourselves: A
+responsible, accountable government that actually promises
+something that is more important to the day-to-day lives of the
+Palestinians than a Palestinian state. And that is just a
+little bit of hope for their future, and the future of their
+children.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ [The prepared statement of Ms. Pletka
+follows:]Pletka deg.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. And thank all of our witnesses.
+ The chair will reannounce that we are going to operate
+under the 5-minute rule, and the chair will be less flexible
+with the members of the committee than we were with the, with
+the panel, in order to keep things moving. And try to keep me
+to the 5-minute rule, too, whoever is running these clocks.
+ A peaceful solution, a two-state solution if you will,
+seems difficult, if not impossible, with Hamas as an active
+player and Fatah controlling the West Bank. And it seems that a
+lot of energies have been spent with all the theories of how
+you get them basically unelected. Whether you hobble them, as
+the Israelis have attempted to do, or whether you show them
+that there is a better alternative in the West Bank, it would
+seem that a lot of hope is being placed on an election that
+might take place in which they become delegitimized as far as a
+part of the government, or the government.
+ I think that is putting too many of our eggs in one basket.
+If Hamas is unelected, do they really go away? If they are a
+terrorist organization, do terrorist organizations not exist or
+function if they don't hold elective office? Because very few
+do, and we seem to be going in that direction in different
+places in the world. Or is there a different way to deal with
+this? Or how do we deal with this specifically in this case?
+ And is the problem really, as was pointed out by our last
+witness, Iranian-generated? And does that have to be solved
+before the Israeli-Palestinian-Hamas problem is resolved?
+ Historically, everybody says well, all the problems in the
+Middle East or the world or the universe, you know, would be
+solved if the Israeli-Palestinian problem went away. Do we have
+it backwards? Who would like to start? Dr. Asali. Press your
+button.
+ Dr. Asali. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There are many, many
+comments that can be said about this. Fundamentally, I think,
+the two-state solution is more or less like democracy; it is
+the worst system except for all the others. If anybody gives us
+an alternative, we would be very happy to listen to a workable
+solution. Just to say that it is not working is not enough. You
+have to have an end to the conflict; no conflict goes unended.
+ So the two-state solution has not been given enough
+support, even at the present circumstances, to improve the
+situation well enough in the West Bank, under the Palestinian
+Authority, with knowing full well that Hamas has not supported
+the two-state solution and is not inclined to go along with it.
+ The problem is------
+ Mr. Ackerman. Are you saying deal Hamas out of the two-
+state solution?
+ Dr. Asali. Yes. Hamas has been dealt out. And Hamas
+continues to be dealt out, and is not expected not to be dealt
+out. What is a problem------
+ Mr. Ackerman. That is what you are advocating, as well?
+ Dr. Asali. I am advocating that, until they accept the
+Quartet conditions. I think it makes sense, and I think the
+Quartet conditions are simply an affirmation of the commitments
+that the PLO, as the governing entity for the Palestinians, has
+made, and that should be continued.
+ What was lacking, unfortunately, was real progress,
+palpable progress by the Palestinian people on the ground, and
+this has many, many causes. But it could not have happened,
+other occupation, without the cooperation of the occupying
+powers. And it could not have happened without an improvement
+in the governing system in the PA.
+ Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Mr. Makovsky, 30 seconds.
+ Mr. Makovsky. I agree with Ziad completely with the issue
+of Hamas. They need to accept the conditions.
+ I think if your premise is that the only thing that Hamas
+cares about is power, then I am sure accommodations can be
+found. I just believe there are a lot of Islamist movements in
+the Middle East, and they have a very heartfelt religious
+ideology. And I don't think we do ourselves or them any favors
+if we short-change--I don't think we do ourselves or them any
+favors if we short-change their world view.
+ And they have been willing, I think we should listen to
+what they are saying.
+ Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Ms. Pletka, 30 seconds.
+ Ms. Pletka. I agree with David. I think it is very
+important for us to listen to exactly what they say. This is
+not just a political fight, this is an ideological fight. But
+we also have a practical battle ahead of us.
+ You ask a very hard question. One, should we put Iran
+first? And the answer to that is no, of course not. We can't
+just walk on one path. We have to chew gum and walk.
+ We need to work toward an Israeli-Palestinian solution. But
+we must prioritize the support for terrorism along with Iran's
+nuclear weapons program, or we will end up------
+ Mr. Ackerman. Thank you.
+ Ms. Pletka [continuing]. Facing this in the rest of the
+region.
+ Mr. Ackerman. Dr. Dunne, 30 seconds, because my time is
+running.
+ Ms. Dunne. Regarding Hamas, I think that our problem as the
+United States is we want Hamas to walk the road that the PLO
+walked 20 years ago. And Hamas sees very well that the PLO
+walked that road, and it failed. And so that is the difficulty
+that we face now, is to give the Palestinians some hope in
+order to------
+ Mr. Ackerman. You are saying it failed because they have no
+state?
+ Ms. Dunne. They failed for two reasons. Because they have
+no state, and because also what Ms. Pletka pointed out,
+disastrously bad governance and corruption. So they failed on
+both of those scores, and that is why we see the popularity of
+Hamas now.
+ Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Thank you, my time has run.
+ Mr. Burton.
+ Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, let me
+just say that my view on whether or not Mr. Sharon should have
+gone into, or should have given Gaza back to the Palestinians,
+that was only my opinion. I certainly would not want to ever
+try to interfere or dictate to a foreign government on the
+policies that they have. But I did think it was probably an
+error, and it did bother me a great deal.
+ You indicated that there was a disproportionate amount of
+pressure put on by the Israeli military when they went in, and
+I thought they showed a great deal of restraint. Because the
+Hamas militants were using women and children, and hospitals
+and mosques as shields against Israeli attacks, and the
+Israelis did stop so that they could minimize the civilian
+casualties.
+ There were those who said that they should have pressed on
+further, to completely destroy Hamas. But I think they showed a
+great deal of restraint, even though there were some
+differences of opinion there.
+ Mr. Makovsky, the Washington Times reports this morning
+that Bebe Netanyahu is a likely winner. What is your opinion of
+that? And can you give me an answer on why that is the position
+they have taken?
+ And Saul, are you a friend of Saul Singer's?
+ Mr. Makovsky. I know Saul very well.
+ Mr. Burton. He used to be my first foreign policy guy, so
+would you tell him I said hi?
+ Mr. Makovsky. Will do.
+ Mr. Burton. Thanks.
+ Mr. Makovsky. I would just say on the, if I could say on
+the humanitarian part of your question, I think by firing from
+civilian areas, Hamas has shown its disregard for human life.
+And that put Israel in a very difficult position.
+ I think one of the lessons Israel, though, has to take from
+this is to set up an urban core, where you have designated safe
+zones that would be manned by soldiers, so it could not be
+exploited by terrorists.
+ But that is the nature of warfare in the Middle East now,
+with these non-state actors, is using urban areas. And that
+requires I think some reorganization in Israel.
+ Mr. Burton. Okay.
+ Mr. Makovsky. According to Mr. Netanyahu's policy, my
+belief is that from what he said, and from the people around
+him who I have talked to in the last 24 hours, he is going to
+try to have a broad-based government with Ms. Livni of the
+Kadima Party, who won the most------
+ Mr. Burton. Do you anticipate that he will prevail?
+ Mr. Makovsky. If I was a Las Vegas odds maker, Congressman,
+I would have to say that he will, he will be the next Prime
+Minister.
+ Mr. Burton. Okay. Ms. Pletka, there are several high-
+profile delegations going to Syria, Congressional delegations
+going to Syria in the next couple of weeks. What do you think
+about that? Do you think this is a wise thing to do?
+ Ms. Pletka. An open-ended question. I never think that it
+is wrong for, I never think it is wrong deg.for
+Members of Congress to go on delegations to find out what
+foreign leaders are thinking.
+ The only caution that I would give is not to, not to be
+fooled by talk. We are really interested in what the Syrians
+are willing to do. Are they continuing to funnel arms to
+Hezbollah? Yes, they are. Are they continuing to interfere in
+Lebanese politics? Yes, they are. Are they continuing to allow
+killers into Iraq? Yes, they are. Have they got a burgeoning
+relationship with al Qaeda? Yes, they do.
+ Mr. Burton. Well, of course. What about Secretary of State
+Hillary Clinton has indicated that there is an opportunity for
+the Iranian Government to demonstrate a willingness to unclench
+their fists, and to begin serious and responsible discussion
+about a range of matters. And she goes on to indicate that
+there ought to be discussions.
+ What do you think about discussions with Iran from the
+State Department? And do you think that Congressional
+delegations ought to be involved in any way in discussing the
+situation in the Middle East with any Iranian officials?
+ Ms. Pletka. I think that Members of Congress should be as
+constrained as the State Department is in their discussions
+with Iranians. The United States Government and Foreign Service
+Officers and political appointees have been talking with the
+Iranians for years. Ambassador Khalilzad, Ambassador to
+Afghanistan and then to the U.N., had regular meetings with
+Iranian counterparts. Ambassador Crocker in Baghdad has been
+meeting with them.
+ I think we should not underestimate the imprimatur that the
+United States gives in having meetings with countries, and the
+seal of approval that it conveys. If it is, in fact, a change
+in position on our part, it should be accompanied by an
+expected change in position on the part of the Iranians. We
+know what we are looking for; let us see their bona fide.
+ Mr. Burton. My time is running out. Would any of the others
+of you like to make a comment on that? Mr. Asali.
+ Dr. Asali. If I might just say something in response to the
+remarks about the Israeli, what I call disproportionate--two
+things.
+ First off, a kill ratio of 100 to one or an injury ratio of
+50 to one is a statistical evidence of something
+disproportionate. But there is a humanitarian aspect that is
+way too disproportionate.
+ And also, the first reaction to the attack on Gaza was
+blamed by several Arab countries, including the head of the
+Palestinian Authority, President Abbas. It is afterwards that
+this relentless attack resulted in so much destruction, with TV
+pictures all over the place showing it, that they lost support.
+ Mr. Burton. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Mr. McMahon.
+ Mr. McMahon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
+this fascinating hearing.
+ If you could speak to the most immediate needs of the
+population of Gaza. And is there a humanitarian crisis, or is
+the situation stable or just awful? Does the United States have
+a bigger role to play in helping the humanitarian side of what
+is going on on the ground there? And do we have to then look at
+reconstruction and stabilizing the situation, as well?
+ But what is going on in the daily lives of the people
+there, and how are the conditions?
+ Dr. Asali. First off, if I may, we need to take lessons
+from what happened in Lebanon in 2006, where a promise of aid
+was never delivered after the invasion. And Hezbollah took
+charge of that process, and it changed that help that was
+extended to incredible political benefit.
+ I think this should not be lost, neither on this Congress
+nor anywhere else.
+ Secondly, the present humanitarian condition in Gaza is
+just beyond terrible. You know, there are problems with water,
+electricity, roads, housing. There are over 50,000 people
+without shelter. There is no food; there is not enough food.
+There is not enough of anything. And the convoys that are
+supposed to carry aid are still restricted by access in every
+direction in Gaza. And there is no manufacturing.
+ The life, the quality of life for the people at every
+level--the health, the education--probably is worse than
+anywhere in the world now.
+ This needs to be addressed, in and of itself, as a separate
+issue from all the other reconstruction and other developments
+that need to work be worked on apolitically. This cannot be
+politicized.
+ UNRWA, I heard some criticism about UNRWA in this panel's
+representation. UNRWA is what we have now as a main provider of
+help to Gaza. Over 800,000 people depend on the food that, and
+other help that is provided by UNRWA.
+ There are other sources, of course. But this cannot be now
+a subject of serious political conversation. Let us get the
+humanitarian situation out of hand and controlled. And here
+again, we propose that we have the Special U.S. Envoy deal with
+this issue promptly with the Quartet.
+ And we recommend the establishment of an international
+community that adds to the Quartet Egypt, which is the
+indispensable partner, and the one that can help in a
+meaningful way, and whose role has been quite positive. Plus
+the Palestinian Authority, which has to take the political
+credit for this thing in order to carry this forward.
+ Mr. McMahon. Mr. Makovsky.
+ Mr. Makovsky. Yes. I just want to pick over that very last
+point.
+ I think the key thing is that the Palestinian Authority
+needs to get the credit. You are all politicians; you
+understand the importance of the nature of credit and public
+support. And I think that this is crucial.
+ There is going to be a donors conference in Cairo coming
+up, which I think will be key. I just want to say on the issue
+of UNRWA, I would be happy to--and I hope you don't see this as
+institutional self-promotion--James Lindsay, who was the legal
+counsel of UNRWA, wrote a study for us at the Washington
+Institute, a very serious, heavily, heavily footnoted study on
+UNRWA.
+ We are not calling for the abolition of UNRWA at all. We
+just think that it should focus much more on its humanitarian
+mission. And with your permission, I would like to circulate it
+to the members of the subcommittee.
+ Thank you.
+ Mr. McMahon. Mr. Makovsky, can you speak to the human
+conditions in Gaza today?
+ Mr. Makovsky. Oh, I think that they are, you know, they are
+terrible conditions, you know. And Hamas, they brought all this
+on them because they cared more about their ideology than
+helping their own people. But I don't think that means that we
+should stand by.
+ What I would hope is that the Palestinian Authority could
+be at the access point going into Gaza. After they had been
+thrown out in 2007, there should be an international effort on
+humanitarian assistance and reconstruction. And I think we
+should all care about that.
+ Mr. McMahon. Ms. Pletka, do you wish------
+ Ms. Pletka. I wanted to say something quickly. I couldn't
+agree more with David.
+ The humanitarian situation, just to your specific question,
+there should be no disagreement about the humanitarian
+situation on the ground, nor about the urgency of getting
+assistance to the Palestinians.
+ On the other hand, I do think there is an important role
+for the Congress. And this committee and your Senate
+counterpart can play a very strong role in ensuring that
+American assistance is not manipulated or abused; that it does
+not go to terrorist organizations, directly or indirectly.
+ There are rules right now that are under consideration for
+AID that would significantly weaken the vetting process that
+goes on to NGOs and their subcontractors. Money has gone to
+terrorist groups in the past, and you can stand in the way of
+that and ensure that assistance is used effectively, not just
+for our interests, but also for the Palestinians.
+ Mr. McMahon. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Inglis.
+ Mr. Inglis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I suppose this
+question really involves something of a crystal ball for you to
+maybe assess what you think the approach would be of the new
+coalition that will be formed in Israel, and what their
+approach to the peace process would be. Or how would they
+approach Gaza.
+ Anybody want to take a stab at that? Shine up your crystal
+ball?
+ Mr. Makovsky. Well, I think the most likely outcome,
+whether Mr. Netanyahu or Ms. Livni is the next Prime Minister,
+is a broader-based government led by Likud and Kadima, those
+two parties. And you could say well, you need unity if you are
+going to move forward.
+ The issue is, how much can be done? It seems to me that at
+the outset earlier and what the chairman said in his remarks
+about building a better alternative in the West Bank is part of
+the answer. It is not the whole answer. Improving economic
+institutions that Tony Blair and Dayton have been working on,
+working on the security institutions that Three-Star General
+Keith Dayton has been working on in training and equipping
+Palestinian security forces, so Israel could pull back to the
+September 28 lines, in the year 2000 at the start of the
+Intafada.
+ You know, there will be I am sure some discussion with the
+United States and Israel over a letter that was signed in 2004
+between Secretary of State Rice and Mr. Weisglass, who was an
+aid of Mr. Sharon, about the binding settlement, you know, to
+make sure there is no expansive settlement. It has been a
+contentious issue.
+ I have a view--I don't claim it to be the view of my
+institute or of anyone else--but I believe the actual
+differences between the parties over land, despite what someone
+like, respectfully, I say, former President Carter might think,
+the differences are actually very narrow. And I think there is
+actually more of a consensus in Israel on this.
+ The Israelis are just afraid of being blown up, given the
+Qassam rockets coming out of Gaza. Because they didn't like the
+book in Gaza, they don't want to see the movie in the West
+Bank.
+ So the question is, can you construct the situation where
+that you could demarcate the line, and basically end, once and
+for all, the problem of settlements, that has been a friction
+point since 1967. And say here, here, we now know where the
+border is. This will be Palestine, this will be Israel. And it
+may move those settlers, but maybe the IDF, the Israeli army,
+will have to stand there until the Dayton mission over years
+will be able to demonstrate that it could pick up the slack,
+and a vacuum will not be filled by terrorists.
+ I think something to end this ambiguity that has been with
+us for so long--sometimes ambiguity can be constructive,
+sometimes it is destructive. And I think a focus on the
+territorial dimension of this conflict--which everyone thinks
+is at the core, and I don't--I think it has been the problem of
+not rejecting that Israel's right to exist, for the most part.
+ But I think the territorial dimension, if you separated it
+from the security dimension, in my view actually holds forth
+some promise. And it is possible--I am not here making a grand
+prediction with a crystal ball--but I think that might be an
+area that the United States and Israel could actually engage
+upon, because the differences have narrowed between Israelis
+and Palestinians on the territory.
+ The key is security, security, security.
+ Dr. Asali. If I may, I think there are two election
+contests that have just happened. One of them was one in this
+country, where there is a clear commitment of the new President
+and new administration to energetically get involved with the
+Middle East and pursue a two-state solution.
+ What happened in Israel is still uncertain, of course, in
+many ways. But the leader of Israel would have to accommodate
+his policies to the policies of the United States in order to
+continue the grand strategic relation. And it is hard for me to
+imagine that the leader of Israel would oppose the policy of
+the United States and stay in charge for very long.
+ Having said that, I think there are many things that can be
+done regardless of what happens. One is improving the political
+conversation that is taking place with the Palestinian
+Authority, and improving the security and economic situation of
+the West Bank. And part of this is to actually empower the
+Palestinian Authority by moving forward and forcefully on the
+Gaza reconstruction.
+ There is a proposal by the Prime Minister of Palestine,
+Prime Minister Fayyad, to move $600 million to $800 million
+through the banking system, a private enterprise solution to
+the present crisis in Gaza. That bypasses the difficult and
+thorny issues.
+ There is no question that the Israelis can be cooperative
+with that by allowing the money to go in. This has been another
+problem with Israel, not allowing actual money to go into Gaza.
+ So there are many things that can be done on the margins,
+as long as the policy approach remains solid toward a two-state
+solution.
+ Mr. Inglis. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Ackerman. Next, Ms. Berkley. Just so the members know
+where they stand for the questioning under the 5 minutes, we
+have switched to seniority order on the subcommittee, which is
+not necessarily the order people are sitting in right now, to
+add to the confusion.
+ Ms. Berkley, you are next.
+ Ms. Berkley. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a lot of
+questions that I would like to ask, but perhaps by way of
+speaking, and then I will ask the questions.
+ When it comes to rushing aid into Gaza and thinking that we
+are going to give credit to the Palestinian Authority, and that
+the Palestinians in the Gaza are going to rise up and be, throw
+Hamas away because they finally recognize who is helping them,
+I think is nonsense.
+ If Hamas have a whit about the Palestinian people, there
+would be peace, and there would have been a two-state solution
+long ago.
+ The reality is that there are many, many trucks getting
+through that provide aid, and have equipment and food and
+medicine for the Palestinian people living in the Gaza. And we
+already know that Hamas has been commandeering these trucks,
+and stealing the content, instead of the content going where it
+needs to be.
+ But this is nothing new, and nothing surprising. So more
+trucks going in and more aid rushing in doesn't change the
+situation on the ground.
+ Now, I agree with Ms. Pletka. Secretary Rice was sitting
+right where you were when she was, when Hamas won the election,
+and she stated that American policy was not to give any aid to
+Hamas, so the Palestinian people would realize that Hamas was
+not where their destiny lie.
+ But she said we were giving money to the NGOs. And I
+remember Mr. Ackerman asking this question, well, how do we
+track, how do we know that the money we are giving the NGOs is
+actually going to the Palestinian people. Her response took my
+breath away, because she said well, she says, we don't actually
+know, because we don't have any people on the ground ourselves.
+But we know people who know people that tell us that the money
+we are giving the NGOs is actually going to the Palestinian
+people.
+ I thought, for a Secretary of State of the only superpower
+in the world to say that was absolutely astonishing to me.
+ And I also agree with you that there is a reason that Hamas
+won this election. And it is because Fatah is corrupt and
+riddled, riddled with fraud and abuse of the Palestinian
+people.
+ And I would submit to you that the Palestinian people's
+problem has nothing to do with money. Because the Quartet,
+particularly Europe and the United States, has given billions,
+billions of dollars over the last several decades to the
+Palestinian people through their leaders.
+ And I also would submit if the Palestinian Authority wants
+additional money, and they definitely need it because the
+Palestinian people are suffering, they might track down
+Arafat's widow. Because I believe she is living very, very well
+on the hundreds of millions of dollars that we have donated to
+the Palestinian people. While she is living high on the hog,
+they are starving. And that is outrageous to me.
+ Now, I cannot understand why the Palestinian people are
+held to such a low standard. If the Palestinians are ever going
+to have a state of their own that is governable, that they can
+take their children into a new direction and a new future for
+the Palestinian people, they have to get control of their own
+destiny. And it can't be constantly with their hat in hand,
+asking for the rest of the world to keep bailing them out.
+ I submit to you that the Palestinian people have to stand
+up for themselves, take control of their own destiny, and make
+a determination of who their leaders are that are going to move
+them into a new future. It is not Fatah. Abu Mazen is a very
+weak leader that does not even command the respect of his own
+people. That is not America's destiny, and we shouldn't be
+hooking up with him. And Hamas is a terrorist organization.
+ Either way you go, the Palestinian people are the losers.
+And until the Palestinian people empower themselves, I don't
+see how we have a two-state solution, and I don't see how the
+United States partners with either Fatah, and obviously not
+Hamas, to help the Palestinian people.
+ And I am not sure if that is a question, but that certainly
+is a statement precipitated by all of your comments.
+ There is one other question that I wanted, to Ms. Dunne. I
+understand some of the measures that you suggested, and I think
+they have been tried time and time again. But one in
+particular------
+ Mr. Ackerman. Your 5 minutes are run.
+ Ms. Berkley. Thank you very much.
+ Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Wexler.
+ Mr. Wexler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We all agree that the
+United States policy vis-a-vis Hamas should be that we don't
+acknowledge, or deal with in any way, until Hamas meets the
+Quartet's principles. We agree with it; President Obama agrees
+with it; Secretary Clinton agrees with it.
+ It seems to me, then, the question becomes: How does the
+United States participate in a dynamic that either defeats
+Hamas or marginalizes it? And that, to me, is the question.
+ Now, what I have heard from Arab leaders who have dealt
+with Hamas over the last several years, and principally in the
+last several months--what I hear from them--is that, very
+consistent to what has been said here: Listen to what Hamas
+says; they are genuine in their expression of their goals. And
+the idea that there is a mechanism in which to co-opt Hamas
+from a terrorist organization into some type of constructive
+political entity is not realistic.
+ So if they are correct, and our policy remains the same, I
+go back to the original question. How, then, do we defeat or
+marginalize Hamas.
+ Before I get there, though, just a few points, if I could.
+Respectfully, Ms. Pletka, you are obviously an incredibly
+bright, informed, thoughtful person. And I agree with about 80%
+of your written testimony. But there are parts of it that I
+think undermine, in essence, the position that you take, or at
+least I think the position you take.
+ You say American policy goals should be straightforward: An
+end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict built on a stable
+edifice that may, but should not necessarily, include a state
+of Palestine.
+ Well, if the United States is ambivalent in its support of
+a two-state solution, we condemn the moderates to fail in that
+arena, it would seem to me.
+ Also, statesmen such as Abu Mazen and Salam Fayyad
+represent a new Palestine, supposedly; but rather, they are the
+old Palestine that looks better only when compared to Hamas.
+ Prime Minister Fayyad: I mean, no one is perfect, but the
+man has set up a transparent system of accountability that both
+the United States, Israel, and others believe in deeply. He is
+obviously handicapped in many different respects, but again, to
+dismiss the efforts, the ideology, and the perspective of Prime
+Minister Fayyad is quite unhelpful and undermines the goal of
+what it is we are seeking to achieve.
+ Dr. Asali, I agree with 90% of what you say. I respect you
+enormously. I would respectfully disagree as to the conclusion
+with respect to disproportionate force in the context of
+Israel's actions. To me, it is a false misnomer.
+ No nation should act with proportionate force when it is
+attacked in the manner in which Israel was attacked by Hamas
+repeatedly. And Israel was totally justified in doing what it
+did, as catastrophic as the consequences undoubtedly were.
+ But I do think you make one extremely important point. And
+I think those of us, and I would like to think I am one of
+them, who are deeply committed to the security, both
+professionally, emotionally, and personally, to the state--the
+security of the state of Israel--must say, and must say it in
+an unequivocal fashion: It is incumbent upon Israel to freeze
+settlement activity. While in and of itself that is not the
+only part of this equation, the Palestinians have enormous
+responsibilities; but the notion that Israel can continue to
+expand settlements, whether it be through natural growth or
+otherwise, without diminishing the capacity of a two-state
+solution, is both unrealistic and, I would respectfully
+suggest, hypocritical.
+ And it is incumbent, in my view, upon the new
+administration, along with many other factors, to assist upon
+that part of previous agreements.
+ So to the original question: How do we defeat Hamas?
+Please.
+ Mr. Makovsky. Congressman Wexler, you raise a very
+important point. And I would argue that we need a new paradigm
+in our relations with our Arab allies, with our friends in the
+Arab world; that we cannot let them off the hook. This is the
+core.
+ Whatever we as Americans, or what they, the Israelis, say
+about Hamas is one thing. In my view, the only people who could
+delegitimize Hamas are Arabs, are Muslims. And we need to make
+that point.
+ I would like to just quote one thing Hosni Mubarak said, a
+rare statement--it was right after George Mitchell visited
+Cairo, so maybe there is a relationship there. He was speaking
+to the Police Academy, I believe, in Egypt.
+ He says:
+
+ ``The resistance must take into account victories and
+ losses. It is responsible for the people, who in turn
+ should settle the score with resistance over the gains
+ it has achieved, but also the sacrifices, the pain, and
+ the destruction it has caused.''
+
+ Ideally, the Arab States should say it is immoral to say,
+to engage in terrorism. At minimum, they should say it is
+counter-productive.
+ In my view, until the leadership in these countries
+delegitimize what Hamas is doing, we are going to have a very
+marginal return on everything else. They are the missing piece
+of this puzzle, and I would hope that Congress, with all its
+relationships with our Arab friends in Arab capitals around the
+world, that the leadership makes this point clear in Arabic, on
+Arabic satellite television, together.
+ I feel that there is really no other alternative. This has
+been an area which has not been pushed in the past.
+ Thank you.
+ Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Mr. Connolly.
+ Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me ask the panel
+this question first.
+ In the aftermath of the Israeli military operation in the
+Gaza, is Hamas politically stronger today, or weaker?
+ Dr. Asali. Politically stronger in the West Bank, and
+weaker in Gaza, if we are to believe the statistics and what we
+hear. And it is significant in that sense.
+ There has been a war, a propaganda war, global propaganda
+war about this issue, and a fight about ideas and about images,
+et cetera, et cetera, that has been very effective. And it did
+portray the destruction in Gaza as beyond, you know, endurance
+in every way. And people were seeing that not just in the West
+Bank, everywhere. And that has definitely accrued to the
+benefit of Hamas, not just on the West Bank, also in the Arab
+world.
+ On the other hand, you can say that what we hear from
+Gaza--and this is supported by the recent surveys, there are
+two surveys in fact--the people of Gaza live there. They have
+lived what happened, and they have an understanding of how it
+started, how it was triggered at least, and they still are
+suffering the consequences. So Hamas cannot very readily
+convince them by vote.
+ And I will go back to how we can defeat Hamas. Eventually
+this has to be a democratic process. We have to believe in what
+we preach. And it is doable. Eventually the Palestinians will
+have to vote. The Palestinians must vote at some point in time
+to give legitimacy to any kind of a government that comes.
+ And this is how you, if you want to defeat Hamas, you have
+to convince them not that Hamas is offering a dead end, but
+that there is another end that actually works. That is why I
+cannot say enough about what Congressman Wexler said. You have
+to empower the people who are trying to offer the alternative,
+as you demand of them the accountability and transparency that
+you need. You cannot just say all the Palestinians.
+ If you say Hamas is terrible and Fatah is terrible, you are
+condemning the Palestinians and the Israelis, so there is my
+future.
+ Mr. Connolly. Anyone else on the panel? Yes, Dr. Dunne.
+ Ms. Dunne. I would like to note that regarding the status
+of Hamas in the Arab world, unfortunately it is in the opposite
+direction from what Mr. Makovsky suggested it should be. In
+other words, the status of Hamas has risen in the Arab world,
+and the recognition of Hamas as somehow the legitimate
+governing body at least in Gaza, and perhaps the legitimate
+representative of the Palestinians.
+ This is a very unfortunate development. But we saw, for
+example, Qatar invited the representative of Hamas to an Arab
+summit, instead of the PLO. And this is the result of the
+hopelessness about the two-state solution, the sense that it
+isn't going anywhere, and it isn't going to go anywhere.
+ And also, the weakness of the secular nationalist
+Palestinian leadership, the PLO and Fatah, which frankly has
+not been able to pull itself together in the last few years and
+represent, you know, a strong alternative to Hamas.
+ Mr. Connolly. Mr. Makovsky.
+ Mr. Makovsky. I will just say very briefly, I mentioned in
+my remarks that only 35% of Gazans believe Hamas actually won
+the war.
+ So I know people like to say that Hamas is 10 feet tall. I
+don't believe it, given those results.
+ And Michele is right about that in the Arab satellite
+television--which is a key form of communication--they did well
+with the publics. But I think it should be pointed out that
+President Mubarak, when he understood that national security
+interests were at stake, he held the line and didn't call for
+Hamas to take over the crossing points.
+ And that, to me, is the key. The key is leadership at the
+top. The public is going to say what it is going to say. And we
+should care about that, of course; but we should care no less
+that the leadership, in my view, understand and act in concert
+when vital issues are at stake.
+ Because Hamas there, and as, you know, as Danni pointed
+out, with Iranian support, this is not in the interest of any
+Arab country. They understand very well who Hamas is aligned
+to, and I think we need to encourage them to be more clear in
+public. They whisper wonderful things in private, to all of us.
+But what is important is what is said in Arabic in public to
+their own people. They could shape public opinion.
+ Mr. Connolly. Mr. Makovsky, I only have 30 seconds left.
+Could you expand a little bit? You predicted that if you were
+in Nevada, you would bet on Netanyahu putting together some
+kind of coalition government.
+ What is that going to look like? And what does that mean
+for the peace process moving forward, do you think?
+ Mr. Makovsky. I think a broader-based government, with
+Livni, the Kadima Party, and making her Foreign Minister, maybe
+giving one of her colleagues to be the defense minister; you
+know, they will cobble together a government. I think there
+will be elements more on the more left side of Israel that will
+sit it out. But I think that clearly on economic issues--and
+this shows that there has been progress. I realize that
+everyone can be very disdainful that no progress has been made.
+ Everyone now thinks it is important to build economic
+institutions in the West Bank. Well, let us see that
+practically. What does that mean? We, in the United States,
+should put forward ideas.
+ But economics is not enough. There has to be a movement on
+the political process, too. The economics won't sustain it.
+ But I think under the able leadership of Mr. Fayyad, the
+Prime Minister who has done fantastic work there, and with
+Blair and Dayton and all the other who are on the ground, we
+have some foundation to build on. And any new Israeli
+Government is going to be receptive to it.
+ But again, it is not sufficient. I accept the point on the
+settlements, and the broader process. But there is something to
+build on.
+ Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. The chair believes Mr. Ellison
+will be back in. In the meantime, we will entertain a second
+round of questions for 2 minutes from each of the members, if
+that is okay with the panel.
+ I will turn first to my ranking member.
+ Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have one
+question.
+ And Syria is the ``headquarters'' for Hamas. Is there any
+hope or any indication that discussions between Members of
+Congress or the administration with the leadership in Syria,
+that we could bring about a change in their attitude toward
+Israel and toward stability in the Middle East? And would that
+be a worthwhile endeavor, as far as stopping them from being
+conduit for weapons getting into Hezbollah and Hamas coming in
+from Iran?
+ In other words, is there any chance that we could have some
+reasonable status area if we had discussions with them on a
+multi-level basis?
+ Mr. Makovsky. Sure, if I may very briefly--and Danni Pletka
+and I might disagree on this one--but I think it is at least
+worth a conversation of a new administration with the
+authorities in Syria about peace.
+ They have to understand what this involves. It is a
+realignment of their regional foreign policy. Are they going to
+sever their military alliance with Iran? Are they going to stop
+missile flow to Hezbollah? That would be a huge windfall, if
+they are willing to do basically what Egypt did in the 1970s,
+and expel the Hamas and Islamic Jihad offices.
+ I don't think we know the answer to that. And I am not here
+to say that I know the answer, but my view is it doesn't hurt
+to have a conversation with the Syrian authorities about that.
+ Ms. Pletka. David is right, we do disagree. I think that
+the problem is not in talking. All of us have enjoyed the
+election and talking about talking to our enemies, and we are
+done with that now. But let us not fool ourselves.
+ The prospect that Bashar al-Assad is going to sever his
+relationship with Iran and his support for Palestinian so-
+called rejectionist groups, like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic
+Jihad, cut off the weaponry and everything else to Hezbollah,
+and disentangle his own government from interference in
+Lebanon--and let us not forget, that is a priority for the
+United States--means essentially that he would recast the
+entire nature of the Baathist Alawite regime in Damascus. And
+certainly I believe it is his estimation that it would be his
+downfall.
+ So what we are really saying is come and lie to us a little
+bit so we can move forward with you, and we can put in place
+the elements of this great, great game, which all the dominoes
+fall into place. And we talk to Iran, we isolate them. We
+isolate the Palestinians, we cut off Syria. I am sorry, forgive
+me, I have been doing this a little bit too long. It is not
+credible.
+ We can go in with an open mind, but for goodness sakes, let
+us not engage in fantasy.
+ Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Makovsky, in discussing reconstruction
+you noted the enormous potential of the wealthy Gulf States,
+and you urge the U.S. to seek their involvement in the process.
+ What price do you think we would have to pay them in order
+to get their whole-hearted and open-handed support? And what do
+they need to make contributions worthwhile politically?
+ Mr. Makovsky. I am not sure I know the answer. But I mean,
+they who are the biggest advocates, in theory at least, of
+Palestinian nationalism, should at least be supportive of their
+brethren. That has not often been the case.
+ The things they could do are not just in Gaza. But if they
+could just do large-scale housing construction projects in the
+West Bank, I think they would help the Palestinian Authority
+enormously.
+ And my view is we just shouldn't let them off the hook.
+They are very happy to hold our coats and see us pressure the
+parties. But I think we should just be more insistent than we
+have been in the past on their participation. That means
+economic participation; that means their political
+persuasion, deg. and their use of the public bully
+pulpit to make its views clear on which parties are bringing us
+closer to a two-state solution, and which ones are bringing us
+farther away.
+ And I think because of maybe other priorities we have had,
+and maybe the price of oil and all sorts of issues, we have not
+been energetic in dealing with the Gulf States. And I would
+hope that would change with the Obama administration.
+ Mr. Ackerman. The interesting statistics that have been
+cited as to who believes Hamas won the war, with that
+indication saying that was a more popular notion in the West
+Bank than in Gaza, I guess is because the people in Gaza have
+to live with the reality, and the people in the West Bank can
+live with the romance.
+ In a year from now, what does that poll show?
+ Dr. Asali. Well, we hope, and we hope this committee and
+this administration in general, would contribute to answering
+that question in the right direction.
+ I think a commitment to improving the situation in the West
+Bank, and here I cannot but emphasize how positive the role of
+General Dayton and his security forces buildup has been
+important in order to bolster the safety and security of the
+Palestinian people, which would in turn make it possible to
+make economic improvements. And all this within the context of
+a political horizon would be the way to point for the future
+elections if it is held, let us say 1 year from now.
+ The Palestinian people cannot but see some kind of an
+improvement on the ground if they are going to be voting the
+way you want them to vote. We hope that they would vote.
+ Settlement freeze, unquestionably, because it undercuts the
+credibility of the two-state solution. And this is a political,
+as well as a practical, step that can be taken.
+ Secondly, withdrawal from cities, and you know, David has
+already alluded to that one the 8th of September, and access
+and mobility, improvement of these things. This is not just
+talk; this is the way people live.
+ I understand pork in this country. I think we all
+understand pork in this country. Well, pork is everywhere. If
+you do not give pork to the people of Palestine, then how can
+they possibly respond to the kind of politicians and add to
+that the accusation------
+ Mr. Ackerman. This is the Muslim explaining to a Jew why
+pork is necessary? [Laughter.]
+ It works, doesn't it? I think it is the grease.
+ Mr. Makovsky. I would just add very briefly to Ziad's
+answer of two specific programs that I think, and if Congress
+would undertake to help out on the West Bank.
+ The United States Customs Service in different countries
+has a container initiative program to seal containers for
+export. In my view, if this was done in the West Bank, and
+working with the Israeli authorities as well, that the Israelis
+didn't have to worry that there are bombs and there are et
+cetera, it could fast-track Palestinian exports. And exports
+have been a huge problem.
+ The second element is biometrics at crossing points that
+could ensure that movement and access is upgraded.
+ So my whole premise is, how do you improve Palestinian
+institutions and better life, and not at the expense of Israeli
+security? I don't believe it has to be a zero-sum game.
+ And Mr. Chairman, in mentioning your remarks, I think it is
+interesting there were virtually no demonstrations in the West
+Bank during the Gaza initiative. So I think that is an
+interesting sidelight.
+ Mr. Ackerman. Were there no demonstrations? Or were they
+tamped down?
+ Dr. Asali. There were demonstrations, but they were ruly
+and orderly.
+ Mr. Ackerman. Anybody else want to answer the underlying
+question?
+ Ms. Dunne. Mr. Chairman, I would like to add a point. I
+think we need to be realistic about the need for a stronger and
+more unified nationalist leadership on the Palestinian side.
+ All of these things that we are speaking of--improving
+economic conditions, freezing settlement movement and so
+forth--all of this can help, but none of it will be enough if
+Fatah is not able to pull itself together in some way. Because
+that was one of the reasons why they lost the 2006 elections,
+in addition to the greater credibility that Hamas had in some
+ways, also Fatah was extremely disorganized. And we have seen
+that continue.
+ Despite good leadership of the Palestinian Authority on the
+ground by Prime Minister Fayyad and President Abbas, we still
+have seen a failure of political organization and unity. The
+Fatah has been trying to organize a general conference to
+renovate its leadership and so forth, and has failed to do so.
+ So this is a continuing problem that we have to be aware of
+and be realistic about.
+ Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Mr. Ellison.
+ Mr. Ellison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Makovsky, could you identify for us which
+organizations, which international aid organizations have the
+experience, the infrastructure, the wherewithal to deliver aid
+in Gaza?
+ Mr. Makovsky. I don't feel that I am qualified. I mean, a
+lot of them, I think there was just $20 million that the United
+States gave through the International Red Cross and some of the
+other NGOs. I don't think people are questioning the ability of
+these organizations so identified by the United States.
+ Mr. Ellison. I only ask you because the issue of UNRWA has
+come up. And I just want to know, do you believe they are one
+of the groups that are effective at delivering aid in Gaza?
+ Mr. Makovsky. Well, as I said before, and I will say it
+again, I feel that UNRWA has an important humanitarian mission.
+And my hope would be it would focus on its humanitarian
+mission.
+ I think there are some other parts that it has evolved
+into, that were not in its original mission when UNRWA was
+formed. And I think it has strayed into those areas. And I
+think the goal is not to abolish it, but to make it more
+effective. And I think that should be the hope.
+ Mr. Ellison. Thank you. I am curious to know your views on
+the Israeli election. Obviously things are so well settled, it
+is pretty tough to know what is exactly going to happen.
+ But in my reading and research, I have run across documents
+which seem to suggest that Mr. Netanyahu does not necessarily
+support the two-state solution. Could you give me a better
+reading of whether some of those documents that I read are
+accurate, whether they are not accurate? And if he doesn't
+support the two-state solution, what does that mean in terms of
+the U.S. policy?
+ Mr. Makovsky. I think here it is going to be what sort of
+government is configured. If there is a broad-based government,
+I think there is hope. Ms. Livni is a very passionate advocate
+for a two-state solution.
+ And to be fair to Mr. Netanyahu, who said, well, he
+wouldn't talk to Yasser Arafat, I remember when he was in the
+opposition in 1996. Well, when he won, he met with Arafat
+within 100 days of taking office. And he is the one also, when
+there was an issue of Hebron--Hebron is one of the most
+religiously charged cities--and he was the one who reached an
+agreement there.
+ So I don't think we should disqualify people. But I do
+think the constellation of power is important, and there is no
+doubt, I would have more confidence, in terms of his own rule
+as part of a broader-based government. I think if he leads a
+narrow government, frankly I am very concerned. I do not think
+this will be a walk in the park in terms of United States-
+Israel relations in the future.
+ But I don't think he wants to go that way. And he said
+publicly it would be wrong for him to go that way, and this is
+one of his biggest regrets when he was in power in the 1990s.
+ Mr. Ellison. So Mr. Asali, do you have any views on the
+same question I just put to Mr. Makovsky? So let me just
+tighten it up.
+ If Mr. Netanyahu is the Prime Minister, and given some of
+the things he is reported to have said--and I can't say he said
+them to me, so I don't know if he said them or not, I just know
+what I read--how does the position that he hasn't affirmed the
+two-state solution square with the U.S. policy embracing the
+two-state solution?
+ Dr. Asali. Well, I think I discussed this earlier about
+having two elections that matter. One of them was the election
+in the United States where President Obama is clearly committed
+to a two-state solution, and his administration is. And there
+is no doubt in my mind that the agenda of the United States is,
+should I say carries more weight than a local agenda anywhere
+when it comes to discussions about international interests.
+ I imagine that Mr. Netanyahu would have to adjust his
+thinking or his campaign rhetoric or his previous position to
+come to some terms with the President of the United States if
+he is going to have any relations that are meaningful.
+ Mr. Ellison. And Ms. Dunne, could you offer some views on
+some of the comments that Mr. Netanyahu has said, reported in
+the press? Again, I haven't talked to him, so I don't know if
+he said this, but he reportedly said he wasn't in favor of
+negotiating land for peace with Syria on the Golan. Are you
+familiar with those comments?
+ Ms. Dunne. Actually, I am probably less an expert on
+Netanyahu's statements than Mr. Makovsky.
+ Mr. Ellison. Well, let us go back to Mr. Makovsky, then.
+ Mr. Makovsky. Like, here is welcome to the Middle East, you
+know.
+ Mr. Ellison. Right.
+ Mr. Makovsky. Because Mr. Netanyahu said that, and he went
+up to the Golan Heights when he said it.
+ But the same Mr. Netanyahu, through a cosmetics executive
+by the name of Ronald Water, in 1998 actually cut a back-door
+deal. Well, it was awaiting a signature. And it was a fellow
+named Ariel Sharon who was then his Foreign Minister who
+squashed it.
+ I think there is speculation in Washington and a lot of
+capitals that Mr. Netanyahu, if he is going to surprise us,
+will surprise us on the Syria track because there the issues
+are much more clear-cut. Given what was said before about Iran
+and Hezbollah, the regional benefits, the biggest cheerleaders
+in Israel for talks with Syria are the Israeli military.
+ And given his track record in 1998 and the fact that Mr.
+Sharon tragically is not around to stop it, I don't think we
+could rule out that what Mr. Netanyahu said on the campaign
+trail and what he does in office may be two separate things.
+ Mr. Ellison. Am I all done, Mr. Chairman? Okay.
+ Now, we have now a three-state situation, not a two-state.
+What position should the United States take regarding
+Palestinian unity talks?
+ I mean, one of the interesting things that is going on here
+is that if the United States or Israel's--I mean, if Mr.
+Mahmoud Abbas said I will sign any document you put in front of
+me, he still couldn't speak for all the Palestinian people.
+What does that mean, going forward? Ms. Dunne, do you care to
+offer a view on that?
+ Ms. Dunne. Thank you, Congressman. I think you have raised
+an extremely important point, Congressman, that this lack of
+Palestinian unity, lack of unified leadership is a serious
+problem moving forward.
+ I am not an advocate of direct U.S. engagement with Hamas,
+which we consider to be a terrorist organization. But I do
+think the United States has become gradually more supportive of
+efforts by Egypt, for example, to get Fatah and Hamas talking
+to each other, and to try to work out some sort of unified
+arrangement.
+ There is the possibility of some kind of a technocratic
+type of Palestinian Government, or a government that would not
+bring senior leaders of Hamas into major positions.
+ Probably some kind of arrangement like this needs to be
+worked out so that there can be a restoration of some semblance
+of connection or unity between the West Bank and Gaza once
+again and so that the Palestinians eventually can move toward
+elections, hopefully under a situation where there is a much
+more hopeful prospect for realization of the two-state solution
+and so forth.
+ But all of this is going to take some time. And the United
+States, I also agree with what Ms. Pletka said in terms of the
+United States not really being able or being very good at
+getting in and trying to re-engineer Palestinian politics
+directly.
+ Mr. Ellison. Mr. Asali, do you want to talk on this?
+ Dr. Asali. Yes, thank you. This and many other issues have
+really been dealt with in our long document, and I recommend
+for people who have time to read it.
+ I think the idea that a unity government that would repeat
+the Mecca Agreement that would be rejected by the international
+community is a non-starter. We do not want to have a
+Palestinian Government again in a position where it is in its
+entirety rejected by the international community.
+ What can be done, and what is being considered as far as I
+know, is what is called a national accord government, whereby
+you have individuals who are supported by Fatah or Hamas or
+whatever, who would be on that, who would serve on that
+government without direct participation, either Fatah or Hamas,
+as partisans. Which would have two assignments. One is work on
+the relief and reconstruction business; two is prepare for
+elections.
+ I think this is not an entirely bad idea. I think it is
+something that most people can live with. And I think this is
+something that the Egyptians are working very hard to put
+together. We will see how this jells in the next few days in
+Cairo. And I think that the United States has to commit itself
+to the idea that a two-state solution is appropriate; that
+elections to validate whatever agreement that eventually are
+subjected to the Palestinian people through negotiations, is
+the way to go.
+ If that is acceptable, then we can make progress, I think.
+ Mr. Ellison. What progress can we make in terms of opening
+up the crossings? As I understand from things I have read from
+UNRWA, there is about 120 trucks going through the Karni
+Crossing now, and they need about 700 a day.
+ Dr. Asali. Yes.
+ Mr. Ellison. What can be done to get that, the aid flowing
+to the degree that it needs to be? Mr. Asali, do you want to
+address it?
+ Dr. Asali. First off, I just want to, I want to say that
+these are the statistics, the accurate statistics that all of
+us have. And I think there is, you know, with all due respect,
+there is a problem still with delivering these trucks. And it
+is all tied into the security issues or the explanation that it
+is a security issue.
+ We said there are two separate issues that have to be dealt
+with immediately. One is the humanitarian relief. You cannot
+have people not have enough to eat or drink, or have their
+daily needs, day-to-day life, hospital, et cetera. You cannot
+have that, and accept it, and accept any kind of political
+explanation for that. Those kinds of things have to be dealt
+with with these kinds of organizations that we talked about:
+UNRWA, CHF, et cetera, et cetera. All of them have to have
+enough.
+ And they have the statistics. They know how many trucks are
+needed. And the materials that Israel would let go through. All
+these things have to be done, and done quickly.
+ The other is reconstruction.
+ Mr. Ellison. Last one. Mr. Makovsky, if we, if Israel could
+open up those Karni Crossings, and if they had the scanning
+material that they needed to make sure there was no contraband
+coming in, wouldn't that make the security issue on the border
+easier? Because then you could assume that, you know, any non-
+humanitarian goods-and-service-type stuff in those tunnels is
+probably up to no good.
+ Mr. Makovsky. I think you raise a very good point. Once you
+make the distinction between, that it be clear that anything
+that goes through the tunnels is patently illegal, I think that
+is a very good idea.
+ I just think the Palestinian Authority should be the one
+manning those crossing points to get the credit. But I
+certainly believe humanitarian assistance, which Israel says it
+is doing, that whatever can be done is intensified.
+ Mr. Ackerman. Unless anybody has an immediate solution to
+the problem in the Middle East and the funding, this committee
+will be adjourned.
+ [Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., the subcommittee hearing was
+adjourned.]
+
+
+
+
+ A P P E N D I X
+
+ ----------
+
+
+ Material Submitted for the Hearing RecordHearing notice deg.
+
+
+
+ ----------
+
+Hearing minutes deg.
+
+
+
+ ----------
+Statement from ADC deg.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+