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+
+ - DEFENDING OUR DEMOCRACY: BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS TO PROTECT AMERICA'S ELECTIONS
+
+[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
+[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
+
+
+
+
+ DEFENDING OUR DEMOCRACY: BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS TO PROTECT AMERICA'S
+ ELECTIONS
+
+=======================================================================
+
+ HEARING
+
+ BEFORE THE
+
+ COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
+ HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
+
+ ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
+
+ FIRST SESSION
+ __________
+
+ FEBRUARY 13, 2019
+ __________
+
+ Serial No. 116-1
+ __________
+
+ Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
+
+
+ [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
+
+
+ Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
+
+ ___________
+
+ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
+
+35-094 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ __________
+
+ COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
+
+ Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
+Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Mike Rogers, Alabama
+James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Peter T. King, New York
+Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana Michael T. McCaul, Texas
+Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey John Katko, New York
+Kathleen M. Rice, New York John Ratcliffe, Texas
+J. Luis Correa, California Mark Walker, North Carolina
+Xochitl Torres Small, New Mexico Clay Higgins, Louisiana
+Max Rose, New York Debbie Lesko, Arizona
+Lauren Underwood, Illinois Mark Green, Tennessee
+Elissa Slotkin, Michigan Van Taylor, Texas
+Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri John Joyce, Pennsylvania
+Al Green, Texas Dan Crenshaw, Texas
+Yvette D. Clarke, New York Michael Guest, Mississippi
+Dina Titus, Nevada
+Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
+Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
+Val Butler Demings, Florida
+ Hope Goins, Staff Director
+ Chris Vieson, Minority Staff Director
+
+
+
+
+ C O N T E N T S
+
+ ----------
+ Page
+
+ STATEMENTS
+
+The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
+ From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
+ Homeland Security:
+ Oral Statement................................................. 1
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 2
+The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the
+ State of Alabama, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland
+ Security:
+ Oral Statement................................................. 3
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 4
+The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
+ From the State of Texas:
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 5
+
+ WITNESSES
+ Panel I
+
+Mr. Christopher C. Krebs, Director, Cybersecurity and
+ Infrastructure Security Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland
+ Security:
+ Oral Statement................................................. 8
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 10
+Mr. Thomas Hicks, Commissioner, U.S. Election Assistance
+ Commission:
+ Oral Statement................................................. 13
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 16
+
+ Panel II
+
+Mr. Alex Padilla, Secretary of State, California:
+ Oral Statement................................................. 61
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 62
+Mr. Noah Praetz, Former Director of Elections, Cook County,
+ Illinois:
+ Oral Statement................................................. 65
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 66
+Mr. Jake Braun, Executive Director, Cyber Policy Initiative:
+ Oral Statement................................................. 75
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 77
+Mr. John H. Merrill, Secretary of State, Alabama:
+ Oral Statement................................................. 78
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 80
+
+ FOR THE RECORD
+
+The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
+ From the State of Texas:
+ Letter, Brennan Center for Justice............................. 48
+The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
+ From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
+ Homeland Security:
+ Article........................................................ 93
+
+ APPENDIX
+
+Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Christopher C.
+ Krebs.......................................................... 95
+Questions From Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for Christopher C.
+ Krebs.......................................................... 95
+Questions From Honorable James R. Langevin for Christopher C.
+ Krebs.......................................................... 96
+Questions From Honorable Dina Titus for Christopher C. Krebs..... 96
+Questions From Honorable Yvette D. Clarke for Christopher C.
+ Krebs.......................................................... 96
+Questions From Honorable Michael T. McCaul for Christopher C.
+ Krebs.......................................................... 97
+Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Thomas Hicks...... 97
+Questions From Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for Thomas Hicks..... 99
+Questions From Honorable Dina Titus for Thomas Hicks............. 101
+Question From Honorable Yvette D. Clarke for Thomas Hicks........ 102
+Questions From Honorable Michael T. McCaul for Thomas Hicks...... 102
+Questions From Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for Alex Padilla..... 103
+Question From Honorable James R. Langevin for Alex Padilla....... 104
+Question From Honorable Dina Titus for Alex Padilla.............. 104
+Questions From Honorable Yvette D. Clarke for Alex Padilla....... 104
+Question From Honorable Michael T. McCaul for Alex Padilla....... 104
+Questions From Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for Noah Praetz...... 105
+Question From Honorable James R. Langevin for Noah Praetz........ 107
+Question From Honorable Dina Titus for Noah Praetz............... 108
+Questions From Honorable Michael T. McCaul for Noah Praetz....... 108
+Questions from Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for Jake Braun....... 109
+Questions from Honorable James R. Langevin for Jake Braun........ 110
+Question From Honorable Dina Titus for Jake Braun................ 112
+Questions From Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for John H. Merrill.. 112
+Questions From Honorable James R. Langevin for John H. Merrill... 114
+Question From Honorable Dina Titus for John H. Merrill........... 114
+Questions From Honorable Yvette D. Clarke for John H. Merrill.... 114
+Question From Honorable Michael T. McCaul for John H. Merrill.... 115
+
+
+ DEFENDING OUR DEMOCRACY: BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS TO PROTECT AMERICA'S
+ ELECTIONS
+
+ ----------
+
+
+ Wednesday, February 13, 2019
+
+ U.S. House of Representatives,
+ Committee on Homeland Security,
+ Washington, DC.
+ The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
+room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson
+(Chairman of the committee) presiding.
+ Present: Representatives Thompson, Jackson Lee, Langevin,
+Payne, Rice, Correa, Torres Small, Rose, Underwood, Slotkin,
+Cleaver, Green of Texas, Clarke, Titus, Watson Coleman,
+Barragan, Demings, Rogers, King, Katko, Ratcliffe, Walker,
+Higgins, Lesko, Green of Tennessee, Taylor, Joyce, Crenshaw,
+and Guest.
+ Chairman Thompson. The Committee on Homeland Security will
+come to order. I welcome the Members to the first hearing of
+the Committee on Homeland Security of the 116th Congress. I
+appreciate your flexibility and that of our witnesses after we
+rescheduled the hearing due to the services of late Chairman
+John Dingell. Our thoughts and prayers are with his wife.
+ Today the committee will hold a hearing on defending our
+democracy, building partnerships to protect America's
+elections. Election security is a National security issue and
+it must transcend party politics because it requires a unified
+effort to protect America's elections. Unfortunately, this
+hearing is long overdue. During the 115th Congress, the
+Republican Majority spent much of its time ignoring the
+intelligence and refusing to acknowledge the threat to our
+democracy.
+ Frustrated by the lack of action on this critical issue,
+Democrats on this committee and the Committee on House
+Administration launched the Congressional Task Force on
+Election Security in July 2017. The task force met with dozens
+of elections experts, secretaries of State elections, and
+National security experts to assess vulnerabilities in election
+infrastructure and determine how to address them.
+ In February 2018, the task force produced a report that
+included 10 recommendations and introduced legislation to
+implement them. That legislation is now part of H.R. 1, the For
+the People Act, which the House is expected to consider in the
+coming weeks.
+ Fortunately, since 2016, progress has been made toward more
+secure elections. The Department of Homeland Security and
+Election Assistance Commission have built stronger, more
+effective partnerships with State and local election officials.
+But it is unclear whether each agency has the resources
+necessary to meet the increasing demand for their resources.
+ Will EAC's $10 million budget provide sufficient resources
+for it to administer additional election security grants to
+States? Does DHS have the resources to provide its services to
+every State and county that requests them?
+ Congress needs to understand the existing capability of
+each agency. Now, existing capabilities can be leveraged,
+grown, and augmented. Local election officials are on the front
+lines of securing our elections, and their success depends on
+the support they receive from Federal and State governments.
+ Although some dispute that has--the election infrastructure
+local election officials oversee is vulnerable to hacking,
+cybersecurity experts have made a credible case. The Federal
+Government, especially Congress, must understand the resource
+constraints of local election officials and partner with them
+to address vulnerabilities to election infrastructure through
+grants and services.
+ The intelligence community has made clear the threats to
+our elections persist, so more work remains to be done. Just
+last month, Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats,
+warned, Russia in 2016 and unidentified actors as recently as
+2018 have already conducted cyber activity that has targeted
+U.S. election infrastructure.
+ He went on to say, we should expect adversaries and
+strategic competitors to refine their capabilities and add new
+tactics as they learn from each other's experiences in advance
+of the 2020 elections.
+ I look forward to hearing from our panel of witnesses today
+about how Congress and Federal agencies can support efforts to
+further strengthen our elections and protect them from attack.
+ I welcome our Republican colleagues' support in these
+efforts and I look forward to working with all those whose goal
+is to protect America's elections and defend our democracy.
+ [The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
+ Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
+ February 13, 2019
+ Election security is a National security issue that must transcend
+party politics, because it requires a unified effort to protect
+America's elections. Unfortunately, this hearing is long overdue.
+During the 115th Congress, the Republican Majority spent much of its
+time ignoring the intelligence and refusing to acknowledge the threat
+to our democracy.
+ Frustrated by the lack of action on this critical issue, Democrats
+on this committee and the Committee on House Administration launched
+the Congressional Task Force on Election Security in July 2017. The
+Task Force met with dozens of elections experts, State election
+officials, and National security experts to assess vulnerabilities in
+election infrastructure and determine how to address them. In February
+2018, the Task Force produced a report that included 10 recommendations
+and introduced legislation to implement them.
+ That legislation is now part of H.R. 1, the For the People Act,
+which the House is expected to consider in the coming weeks.
+Fortunately, since 2016, progress has been made toward more secure
+elections.
+ The Department of Homeland Security and Election Assistance
+Commission (EAC) have built stronger, more effective partnerships with
+State and local election officials. But it is unclear whether either
+agency has the resources necessary to meet the increasing demand for
+their resources.
+ Will EAC's $10 million budget provide sufficient resources for it
+to administer additional election security grants to States? Does DHS
+have the resources to provide its services to every State and county
+that requests them?
+ Congress needs to understand the existing capability of each agency
+and how existing capabilities can be leveraged, grown, and augmented.
+Local election officials are on the front lines of securing our
+elections, and their success depends on the support they receive from
+Federal and State governments.
+ Although some dispute that the election infrastructure local
+election officials oversee is vulnerable to hacking, cybersecurity
+experts have made a credible case it is. The Federal Government--
+especially Congress--must understand the resource constraints of local
+election officials and partner with them to address vulnerabilities to
+election infrastructure though grants and services.
+ The intelligence community has made clear the threats to our
+elections persist, so more work remains to be done. Just last month,
+Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats warned, ``Russia in 2016
+and unidentified actors as recently as 2018 have already conducted
+cyber activity that has targeted U.S. election infrastructure.'' He
+went on to say we should expect ``adversaries and strategic competitors
+to refine their capabilities and add new tactics as they learn from
+each other's experiences'' in advance of the 2020 elections.
+ I look forward to hearing from our panel of witnesses today about
+how Congress and Federal agencies can support efforts to further
+strengthen our elections and protect them from attack. I welcome my
+Republican colleagues' support in these efforts, and I look forward to
+working with all those whose goal is to protect America's elections and
+defend our democracy.
+
+ Chairman Thompson. I now recognize the Ranking Member of
+the full committee, the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Rogers, for
+an opening statement.
+ Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ I look forward to the opportunity to hear from our
+witnesses today regarding election security. The integrity of
+our elections is foundational to our democracy. All Americans
+should have confidence that voting equipment and systems are
+secure and your vote counts as they intended and that election
+results are accurately reported.
+ Last week DHS and DOJ released their findings that there
+was no evidence of any foreign interference in the 2018
+election. I believe that the tremendous work done by DHS, our
+intelligence community and State and local leaders made that
+happen but there is certainly more work that can be done.
+ Much of our focus today will be on the work we still need
+to do to secure the technology and systems behind our elections
+but we can't lose sight of a simple lesson: Foreign
+intelligence services, domestic partisans, and on-line vandals
+do not care what our laws say. They are happy to use our public
+forums against us. My home State saw liberal activists
+deliberately mislead Alabamians regarding public endorsements
+and political issues in the 2017 U.S. Senate Special Election.
+ They bragged to liberal donors behind closed doors about
+their success in manipulating Alabama voters. H.R. 1 attempts
+to address these pressing issues but the bill's provisions are
+deeply naive. As it stands, H.R. 1 is an exercise in regulating
+everything that moves near a ballot box. The problems facing
+our election systems are more complex than that. Election
+security has long been a bipartisan priority for Members of
+this committee. It is my hope that this bipartisan tradition on
+this issue will continue in this Congress.
+ We need a deliberative, bipartisan process to solve these
+issues. Unfortunately it appears our committee will not have an
+opportunity to mark up the election security provisions in our
+jurisdiction. That is unfortunate because the election security
+provisions in this bill could be improved and I know Members on
+both sides of this committee have some good ideas on how to
+make those improvements. As it stands now, much of H.R. 1's 570
+pages appear to be a political exercise.
+ That is why I am very disappointed that election security,
+an issue where we have an opportunity to work together to move
+bipartisan legislation has gotten caught up--getting caught up
+in a partisan political grab.
+ I hope that H.R. 1--when H.R. 1 stalls in the Senate, as it
+will, we will revisit the issue of election security in a
+bipartisan manner. I thank our witnesses for taking the time to
+speak to our committee about the work you are doing on the
+front lines of elections.
+ I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
+ [The statement of Ranking Member Rogers follows:]
+ Statement of Ranking Member Mike Rogers
+ I look forward to the opportunity to hear from our witnesses today
+regarding election security. The integrity of our elections is
+foundational to our democracy.
+ All Americans should have confidence that voting equipment and
+systems are secure, their vote counts as they intended, and that
+election results are accurately reported.
+ Last week, DHS and DOJ released their findings that there was no
+evidence of any foreign interference in the 2018 election. I believe
+the tremendous work done by DHS, our intelligence community, and State
+and local leaders made that happen. But there is certainly more work to
+be done.
+ Much of our focus today will be on the work we still need to do to
+secure the technology and systems behind our elections. But we can't
+lose sight of a simple lesson: Foreign intelligence services, domestic
+partisans, and on-line vandals do not care what our laws say. They are
+happy to use our public forums against us.
+ My home State saw liberal activists deliberately mislead Alabamians
+regarding public endorsements and political issues in the 2017 U.S.
+Senate special election. They bragged to liberal donors behind closed
+doors about their success in manipulating Alabama voters.
+ H.R. 1 attempts to address these pressing issues, but the bill's
+provisions are deeply naive. As it stands, H.R. 1 is an exercise in
+regulating everything that moves near a ballot box.
+ The problems facing our election system are more complex than that.
+Election security has long been a bipartisan priority for Members of
+this committee.
+ It is my hope that this bipartisan tradition on this issue will
+continue in this Congress. We need a deliberative, bipartisan process
+to solve these issues.
+ Unfortunately, it appears our committee will not have an
+opportunity to mark up the election security provisions in our
+jurisdiction. That is unfortunate because the election security
+provisions of this bill could be improved.
+ And I know Members on both sides of this committee have some good
+ideas on how make improvements. As it stands, much of H.R. 1's 570
+pages appear to be a political exercise.
+ That is why I am very disappointed that election security, an issue
+where we had an opportunity to work together to move bipartisan
+legislation, has gotten caught up in this partisan political power
+grab.
+ I hope when H.R. 1 does not advance in the Senate, we can revisit
+the issue of election security in a bipartisan manner.
+ I thank our witnesses for taking to the time to speak to our
+committee about the work you are doing on the front lines of elections.
+
+ Chairman Thompson. I thank the gentleman for his comments.
+ Other Members of the committee are reminded that under the
+committee rules opening statements may be submitted for the
+record.
+ [The statement of Hon. Jackson Lee follows:]
+ Statement of Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee
+ Chairman Bennie G. Thompson thank you for holding today's hearing
+so that the committee may learn more about how the Department of
+Homeland Security is ``Defending Our Democracy: Building Partnerships
+to Protect America's Elections.''
+ At the outset, let me congratulate you Mr. Chairman on your
+election to lead this august committee, and Mr. Rogers on his election
+as Ranking Member.
+ Chairman Thompson, your participation in the House Administration
+Committee's Subcommittee on Elections Field Hearing held in
+Brownsville, Texas last week was substantive and impactful.
+ Also, your skillful leadership in co-chairing the 115th Congress'
+Task Force on Election Security, which resulted in a report last year
+which informs our hearing this morning.
+ I look forward to continuing working with the returning Members of
+the committee and welcome an outstanding cohort of new Members on both
+sides of the aisle, who I trust will find the important work advanced
+by this committee as fulfilling and rewarding as I have since joining
+its inception.
+ I thank today's witnesses:
+Panel 1
+ The Hon. Christopher C. Krebs, director, Cybersecurity and
+ Infrastructure Security Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland
+ Security; and
+ The Hon. Thomas Hicks, chairman, Election Assistance
+ Commission.
+Panel 2
+ The Hon. Alex Padilla, secretary of state, California;
+ Mr. Noah Praetz, former director of elections, Cook County,
+ Illinois;
+ Mr. Jake Braun, executive director, Cyber Policy Initiative,
+ University of Chicago; and
+ The Hon. John Merrill, secretary of state, Alabama (Minority
+ witness).
+ I thank each of today's witnesses for bringing their expert view on
+the partnerships among Federal, State, and local agencies responsible
+for ensuring the integrity of elections have matured since 2016 and
+about the resources and support necessary to prepare for the 2020
+Presidential elections.
+ The efforts to ensure that every eligible person can register to
+vote, and cast a vote in a public election have spanned generations.
+ I have been persistent in my efforts to protect the rights of
+disenfranchised communities in my district of inner-city Houston and
+across the Nation.
+ Throughout my tenure in Congress, I have cosponsored dozens of
+bills, amendments, and resolutions seeking to improve voters' rights at
+all stages and levels of the election process.
+ This includes legislation aimed at:
+ 1. Increasing voter outreach and turnout;
+ 2. Ensuring both early and same-day registration;
+ 3. Standardizing physical and language accessibility at polling
+ places;
+ 4. Expanding early voting periods;
+ 5. Decreasing voter wait times;
+ 6. Guaranteeing absentee ballots, especially for displaced
+ citizens;
+ 7. Modernizing voting technologies and strengthening our voter
+ record systems;
+ 8. Establishing the Federal Election Day as a National holiday; and
+ 9. Condemning and criminalizing deceptive practices, voter
+ intimidation, and other suppression tactics.
+ Along with many of my colleagues in the CBC, I was an original
+cosponsor of H.R. 9, the Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta
+Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act, which
+became public law on July 27, 2006.
+ I also authored H.R. 745 in the 110th Congress, which added the
+legendary Barbara Jordan to the list of civil rights trailblazers whose
+names honor the Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act.
+ This bill strengthened the original Voting Rights Act by replacing
+Federal voting examiners with Federal voting observers--a significant
+distinction that made it easier to safeguard against racially-biased
+voter suppression tactics.
+ In the 114th Congress, I introduced H.R. 75, the Coretta Scott King
+Mid-Decade Redistricting Prohibition Act of 2015, which would prohibit
+States whose Congressional districts have been redistricted after a
+decennial census from redrawing their district lines until the next
+census.
+ The voting rights struggles of the 20th Century are now joined by
+voting rights threats posed by the 21st Century.
+ Russia an adversary of the United States engaged in repeated
+attempts to interfere in the 2016 Presidential election, which prompted
+an unprecedented all-of-Government effort to alert local and State
+election administrators to be aware of the threat.
+ Russia targeted our Presidential election according to the report,
+``Background to Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent
+U.S. Elections: The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution,''
+provided by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's
+National Intelligence Council.
+ Russia used every cyber espionage tool available to influence the
+outcome of the Presidential election by using a multifaceted campaign
+that included theft of data; strategically-timed release of stolen
+information; production of fake news; and manipulation of facts to
+avoid blame.
+ The Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) is
+suspected by our intelligence agencies of having begun cyber operations
+targeting the United States election as early as March 2016.
+ They took on the persona of ``Guccifer 2.0,'' ``DCLeaks.com,'' and
+Wikileaks as the identities that would be reported as having
+involvement in the work they had under taken to undermine our Nation's
+Presidential election.
+ Russia is blamed for breaching 21 local and State election systems,
+which they studied extensively.
+ In February 2018, special counsel Robert Mueller released
+indictments of 13 Russians, at least one of whom has direct ties to
+Russian President Vladimir Putin.
+ The 37-page indictment details the actions taken to interfere with
+the U.S. political system, including the 2016 U.S. Presidential
+election.
+ Among the charges, which include charges for obstruction of
+justice, are several especially notable details.
+ The indictment states that 13 defendants posed as U.S. persons and
+created false U.S. personas and operated social media pages and groups
+designed to attract U.S. audiences.
+ The social media profiles ``addressed divisive U.S. political and
+social issues'' and falsely claimed to be controlled by U.S. activists.
+ The defendants are also accused of using ``the stolen identities of
+real U.S. persons to post on social media accounts'' which, over time,
+became the chosen ``means to reach significant numbers of Americans for
+purposes of interfering with the U.S. political system, including the
+Presidential election of 2016.''
+ The goal of the effort was to sow discord in the U.S. political
+system, including the 2016 US. Presidential election.
+ The internet does not sleep--and nor do our Nation's on-line
+adversaries.
+ That Russia used cyber intrusions to attack United States political
+institutions to collect data to manipulate the media and the public
+with the purpose of influencing the outcome of the 2016 Presidential
+elections is now an undisputed fact.
+ The United States has enemies in other corners of the globe who
+would not hesitate to attack our election system if given the chance.
+ These foreign adversaries do not share our commitment to democracy,
+liberty, and human rights, or the precious freedoms we hold dear.
+ On January 6, 2017, Homeland Security Secretary Johnson, as one of
+his last official acts under the Obama administration, designated
+election systems as critical infrastructure, and created a new
+subsector under the existing Government Facilities Sector designation.
+ On that same day, President Elect-Trump was briefed by the
+intelligence community that Vladimir Putin had directed the cyber
+attack on the United States of America.
+ Since then, intelligence officials have continued to warn that
+foreign governments--including Russia, Iran, and China--could attempt
+to interfere in U.S. elections.
+ In March 2017, then-Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director
+James Comey testified before the House Permanent Select Committee on
+Intelligence that the Russians are not finished and that they will be
+back.
+ In February 2018, six intelligence agency chiefs issued a dire
+warning about the Kremlin's on-going efforts to influence the U.S.
+elections.
+ On January 29, 2019, the director of national intelligence
+testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that our
+adversaries ``probably already are looking to the 2020 U.S. elections
+as an opportunity to advance their interests.''
+ The House Committee on Homeland Security has the responsibility of
+providing for the cybersecurity of Federal civilian agencies as well as
+the security of the Nation's 16 critical infrastructure sectors from
+cyber and other threats.
+ The Election Infrastructure Subsector covers a wide range of
+physical and electronic assets such as storage facilities, polling
+places, and centralized vote tabulation locations used to support the
+election process, and information and communications technology to
+include voter registration databases, voting machines, and other
+systems to manage the election process and report and display results
+on behalf of State and local governments.
+ The work to secure our Nation's election system from cyber threats
+is on-going, which is why this hearing is relevant.
+ I look forward to the committee's markup of H.R. 1, the ``For The
+People Act,'' critical legislation to repair and strengthen our
+democracy.
+ While this bill's language brings much-needed improvements to
+election administration by providing a funding stream to support the
+replacement of outdated voting systems, and support for the
+administration of Federal elections there is still more that must be
+done.
+ Specifically, that we should be mindful of the provision of voting
+systems for in-person voting and allow for sufficient machines to serve
+the population that will cast ballots at each polling location during
+early voting and on election day.
+ The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) mission in
+cybersecurity and infrastructure protection is focused on enhancing
+greater collaboration on cybersecurity across the 16 critical
+infrastructure sectors and the sharing of cyber threat information
+between the private sector and Federal, State, and local partners.
+ This committee will work hand-and-glove with the House Judiciary
+and House Administration Committees as well as the Senate Committees to
+ensure that the tools applied to the current threat to our elections is
+effectively and adequately addressed.
+ We know the threats that computing devices and systems face, which
+are almost too numerous to count:
+ Bot-nets;
+ Ransom-ware;
+ Zero Day Events;
+ Mal-ware;
+ Denial-of-Service Attacks;
+ Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks;
+ Pharming;
+ Phishing;
+ Data Theft;
+ Data Breaches;
+ SQL Injection;
+ Man-in-the-middle attack.
+ The list goes on, but suffice it to say that as hard as one person
+in our Government is working to stop cyber attacks there are likely
+another thousand attempting to breach a system or device owned by a
+United States citizen.
+ During the 2016 election we learned of new threats from cyber space
+that go far beyond any that would have been considered in previous
+elections.
+ This Congress is poised to do the hard work of delving into the
+issue of Russian involvement in our national election and providing
+solutions.
+ The work today must focus on election recovery should a serious
+cyber incident occur during an election.
+ Vulnerabilities of computing systems are not limited to intentional
+attacks, but can include acts of nature, human error, or technology
+failing to perform as intended.
+ I am particularly concerned that so many jurisdictions rely on
+electronic poll books, to check-in voters before issuing them ballots,
+with no paper back-ups.
+ Finally, the use of untrustworthy paperless electronic voting
+machines without sufficient paper ballot options will come to an end
+when H.R. 1 becomes law.
+ The right and better approach to election cybersecurity is to be
+prepared and not need options for voters to cast ballots should voting
+systems fail, rather than being unprepared and needing options for
+voters to cast ballots during an election that are not available.
+ We must be steadfast in our resolve to have a strong shield to
+defend civilian and critical infrastructure networks for all threats
+foreign and domestic.
+ I look forward to the testimony of today's witnesses.
+ Thank you.
+
+ Chairman Thompson. I would like to extend a welcome to our
+first panel of witnesses. First I would like to welcome Chris
+Krebs, the director of DHS's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
+Security Agency back to testify before this panel. Director
+Krebs has been at the helm of DHS's cybersecurity activities
+since 2017 and he has been an integral player in shaping and
+developing the Department's election security capabilities.
+ Next I am pleased to welcome Mr. Tom Hicks, the current
+chairman of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, and also
+congratulate him on swearing in a new batch of election
+assistance commissioners.
+ We had the opportunity to hear from the chairman in 2017,
+when he came to speak before the Congressional Task Force on
+Election Security. I look forward to hearing about his work
+since that time. Without objection, the witnesses' full
+statements will be inserted in the record. I now ask each
+witness to summarize his statement for 5 minutes, beginning
+with Mr. Krebs.
+
+STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER C. KREBS, DIRECTOR, CYBERSECURITY AND
+ INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
+ SECURITY
+
+ Mr. Krebs. Thank you. Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member
+Rogers, and Members of the committee. Good morning and thank
+you for the opportunity to testify regarding the Department of
+Homeland Security's efforts to secure the vote. First, however,
+I would like to, once again, thank this committee for its
+leadership in establishing the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
+Security Agency, or CISA.
+ By creating our new agency and law, Congress formally
+recognized DHS's role as the leader of the National effort to
+safeguard Federal networks and critical infrastructure from
+cyber and physical threats. On behalf of the agency, once
+again, thank you. This morning, I want to update this committee
+on the progress made over the last 2 years working with the
+election community.
+ CISA's election security mission is clear, to support the
+efforts of election officials and their private-sector partners
+consistent with the Constitution, existing law, and electoral
+tradition. Since 2016 we have learned quite a bit through
+partners like the Election Assistance Commission, and thousands
+of election officials across the country, like you will hear in
+the next panel, that know elections.
+ They know their systems. They know what they need to
+conduct a successful election. Over the last 2 years, in
+focused, oftentimes humbling engagements, we have become
+partners with the election community. For the 2018 election, we
+worked with all 50 States, over 1,400 local and territorial
+election offices, 6 election associations, and 12 election
+vendors.
+ Our approach is threefold: Making sure the community has--
+the election community has the information they need to defend
+their systems, making sure the election community has the
+technical support and tools they need to defend their systems,
+and building enduring partnering--partnerships to enhance
+resilience, and advance security efforts together.
+ In 2018 we focused on building scalable, repeatable
+mechanisms to dramatically grow our information-sharing
+capabilities. The Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing
+and Analysis Center, or EI-ISAC was established. By Election
+Day, EI-ISAC had over 1,400 members, the fastest-growing ISAC
+of any critical infrastructure sector.
+ We share contextualized threat information and actionable--
+threat intelligence and actionable information that was
+enriched through our close partnership with the intelligence
+community and law enforcement.
+ More importantly, State and local election officials were
+sharing what they were seeing on their own networks. We also
+deployed intrusion detection capabilities, or Albert Sensors,
+to provide real-time detection capabilities on election
+networks.
+ As of Election Day in 2018, these sensors offered
+protections to election infrastructure and voter registration
+databases for more than 90 percent of registered voters. For
+reference, during the 2000 election, we were below 30 percent
+of coverage.
+ Second, we provide technical support and services to
+election officials and vendors. Initially, we offered our
+standard services, including cyber hygiene, scans, and risk
+invulnerability assessments that we offer Federal agencies and
+other infrastructure sectors.
+ As we refined our understanding of election officials'
+requirements, we shifted to capabilities that are quicker, less
+intrusive, and can scale to more jurisdictions. This
+scalability is critical because while our initial efforts in
+2016 were primarily targeted in State--State election
+officials, we recognize the need to increase our support to
+counties and municipalities who operate elections as well.
+ Our Last Mile Initiative sought to provide information
+customized to the local county level. This initiative provided
+no-cost tailored information on cyber safeguards, threats and
+risks, and a checklist of cybersecurity action items.
+ The final area of focus has been building enduring
+partnerships toward a collective defense. While it may seem
+mundane, governance, communications, coordination, training,
+and planning are the critical foundational elements of our
+Nation's efforts to secure our elections.
+ These efforts, and others, contributed to a secure 2018
+election. The Department of Homeland Security and the
+Department of Justice recently concluded there is no evidence
+that any identified activities of a foreign government or a
+foreign agent had a material impact on the integrity or
+security of election infrastructure or political campaign
+infrastructure used in the 2018 midterm elections.
+ While 2018 is behind us, the 2020 election season is
+already under way. We are clear-eyed that the threat to our
+democratic institutions remain, and we must continue to press
+for increased security and resilience of our election systems.
+Over the next 2 years, CISA will focus on expanding engagement
+to the local level.
+ We will continue to work with election officials to improve
+both, there and our understanding of risk. With that better
+understanding of risk, we can support efforts by election
+officials and Congress to obtain the resources they need to
+secure their election systems. Once again, thank you for the
+opportunity to appear before the committee today. I look
+forward to your questions.
+ [The prepared statement of Mr. Krebs follows:]
+ Prepared Statement of Christopher C. Krebs
+ February 13, 2019
+ Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Rogers, and Members of the
+committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify regarding the U.S.
+Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) progress in reducing and
+mitigating risks to our Nation's election infrastructure. DHS has
+worked to establish trust-based partnerships with State and local
+officials who administer our elections, and I look forward to sharing
+with you an update on our work during the 2018 midterm election cycle.
+ Leading up to the 2018 midterms, DHS worked hand-in-hand with
+Federal partners, State and local election officials, and private-
+sector vendors to provide them with information and capabilities to
+enable them to better defend their infrastructure. This partnership led
+to a successful model that we aim to continue and improve upon in the
+2020 election cycle.
+ Since 2016, DHS's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
+(CISA) has led a voluntary partnership of Federal Government and
+election officials who regularly share cybersecurity risk information.
+CISA has engaged directly with election officials--coordinating
+requests for assistance, risk mitigation, information sharing, and
+incident response. To ensure a coordinated approach, CISA convened
+stakeholders from across the Federal Government through the Election
+Task Force.
+ The Department and the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) have
+convened Federal Government and election officials regularly to share
+cybersecurity risk information and to determine an effective means of
+assistance. Since 2016, the Election Infrastructure Subsector (EIS)
+Government Coordinating Council (GCC) has worked to establish goals and
+objectives, to develop plans for the EIS partnership, and to lay the
+groundwork for developing an EIS Sector-Specific Plan. Participation in
+the council is voluntary and does not change the fundamental role of
+State and local jurisdictions in overseeing elections.
+ DHS and the EAC have also worked with election vendors to launch an
+industry-led Sector Coordinating Council (SCC), a self-organized, self-
+run, and self-governed council with leadership designated by sector
+membership. The SCC serves as the industry's principal entity for
+coordinating with the Federal Government on critical infrastructure
+security activities related to sector-specific strategies. This
+collaboration is conducted under DHS's authority to provide a forum in
+which Federal and private-sector entities can jointly engage in a broad
+spectrum of activities to coordinate critical infrastructure security
+and resilience efforts, which is used in each of the critical
+infrastructure sectors established under Presidential Policy Directive
+21, Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. The SCC has helped
+DHS further its understanding of the systems, processes, and
+relationships particular to operation of the EIS.
+ Within the context of today's hearing, I will address our efforts
+in 2018 to help enhance the security of elections that are administered
+by jurisdictions around the country, along with our election-related
+priorities through 2020. While there was activity targeting our
+election infrastructure leading up to the midterms, this activity is
+similar to what we have seen previously and occurs on the internet
+every day. This activity has not been attributed to nation-state actors
+and along with the Department of Justice (DOJ), we concluded that there
+is no evidence to date that any identified activities of a foreign
+government or foreign agent had a material impact on the integrity or
+security of election infrastructure or political or campaign
+infrastructure used in the 2018 midterm elections.
+ assessing the threat
+ The Department regularly coordinates with the intelligence
+community and law enforcement partners on potential threats to the
+homeland. Among non-Federal partners, DHS has engaged with State and
+local officials, as well as relevant private-sector entities, to assess
+the scale and scope of malicious cyber activity potentially targeting
+the U.S. election infrastructure. Election infrastructure includes the
+information and communications technology, capabilities, physical
+assets, and technologies that enable the registration and validation of
+voters; the casting, transmission, tabulation, and reporting of votes;
+and the certification, auditing, and verification of elections.
+ In addition to working directly with State and local officials over
+the past 2 years, we have partnered with trusted third parties to
+analyze relevant cyber data, including the Elections Infrastructure
+Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC), the National
+Association of Secretaries of State, and the National Association of
+State Election Directors. DHS field personnel deployed around the
+country furthered information sharing and enhanced outreach.
+ enhancing security
+ During the 2018 midterms, CISA provided a coordinated response from
+DHS and its Federal partners to plan for, prepare for, and mitigate
+risk to election infrastructure. Working with election infrastructure
+stakeholders was essential to ensuring a more secure election. CISA and
+our stakeholders increased awareness of potential vulnerabilities and
+provided capabilities to enhance the security of U.S. election
+infrastructure as well as that of our democratic allies.
+ Election officials across the country have a long-standing history
+of working both individually and collectively to reduce risks and
+ensure the integrity of their elections. In partnering with these
+officials through both new and on-going engagements, CISA will continue
+to work to provide value-added--yet voluntary--services to support
+their efforts to secure elections in the 2020 election cycle.
+ improving coordination with state, local, tribal, territorial, and
+ private-sector partners
+ Increasingly, the Nation's election infrastructure leverages
+information technology for efficiency and convenience, but also exposes
+systems to cybersecurity risks, just like in any other enterprise
+environment. Just like with other sectors, CISA helps stakeholders in
+Federal departments and agencies, State, local, Tribal, and territorial
+(SLTT) governments, and the private sector to manage these
+cybersecurity risks. Consistent with our long-standing partnerships
+with State and local governments, we have been working with election
+officials to share information about cybersecurity risks, and to
+provide voluntary resources and technical assistance.
+ CISA works with the EI-ISAC to provide threat and vulnerability
+information to State and local officials. Through funding by CISA, the
+Center for Internet Security created and continues to operate the EI-
+ISAC. The EI-ISAC has representatives co-located with CISA's National
+Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) to enable
+regular collaboration and access to information and services for
+election officials.
+ providing technical assistance and sharing information
+ Knowing what to do when a security incident happens--whether
+physical or cyber--before it happens is critical. CISA supports
+election officials with incident response planning including
+participating in exercises and reviewing incident response playbooks.
+Crisis communications is a core component of these efforts, ensuring
+officials are able to communicate transparently and authoritatively
+when an incident unfolds. In some cases, we do this directly with State
+and local jurisdictions. In others, we partner with outside
+organizations. We recognize that securing our Nation's systems is a
+shared responsibility, and we are leveraging partnerships to advance
+that mission. CISA actively promotes a range of services including:
+ Cyber hygiene service for internet-facing systems.--Through this
+automated, remote scan, CISA provides a report identifying
+vulnerabilities and mitigation recommendations to improve the
+cybersecurity of systems connected to the internet, such as on-line
+voter registration systems, election night reporting systems, and other
+internet-connected election management systems.
+ Risk and vulnerability assessments.--We have prioritized State and
+local election systems upon request, and increased the availability of
+risk and vulnerability assessments. These in-depth, on-site evaluations
+include a system-wide understanding of vulnerabilities, focused on both
+internal and external systems. We provide a full report of
+vulnerabilities and recommended mitigations following the testing.
+ Incident response assistance.--We encourage election officials to
+report suspected malicious cyber activity to NCCIC. Upon request, the
+NCCIC can provide assistance in identifying and remediating a cyber
+incident. Information reported to the NCCIC is also critical to the
+Federal Government's ability to broadly assess malicious attempts to
+infiltrate election systems. This technical information will also be
+shared with other State officials so they have the ability to defend
+their own systems from similar malicious activity.
+ Information sharing.--CISA maintains numerous platforms and
+services to share relevant information on cyber incidents. Election
+officials may also receive information directly from the NCCIC. The
+NCCIC also works with the EI-ISAC, allowing election officials to
+connect with the EI-ISAC or their State chief information officer to
+rapidly receive information they can use to protect their systems. Best
+practices, cyber threat information, and technical indicators, some of
+which had been previously classified, have been shared with election
+officials in thousands of State and local jurisdictions. In all cases,
+the information sharing and use of such cybersecurity threat
+indicators, or information related to cybersecurity risks and incidents
+complies with applicable lawful restrictions on its collection and use
+and with DHS policies protective of privacy and civil liberties.
+ Classified information sharing.--To most effectively share
+information with all of our partners--not just those with security
+clearances--DHS works with the intelligence community to rapidly
+declassify relevant intelligence or provide as much intelligence as
+possible at the lowest classification level possible. While DHS
+prioritizes declassifying information to the extent possible, DHS also
+provides Classified information to cleared stakeholders, as
+appropriate. DHS has been working with State chief election officials
+and additional election staff in each State to provide them with
+security clearances.
+ Field-based cybersecurity advisors and protective security
+advisors.--CISA has more than 130 cybersecurity and protective security
+personnel available to provide actionable information and connect
+election officials to a range of tools and resources to improve the
+cybersecurity preparedness of election systems, and to secure the
+physical site security of voting machine storage and polling places.
+These advisors are also available to assist with planning and incident
+management for both cyber and physical incidents.
+ Physical and protective security tools, training, and resources.--
+CISA provides guidance and tools to improve the security of polling
+sites and other physical election infrastructure. This guidance can be
+found at www.dhs.gov/hometown-security. This guidance helps to train
+administrative and volunteer staff on identifying and reporting
+suspicious activities, active-shooter scenarios, and what to do if they
+suspect an improvised explosive device.
+ election security efforts leading up to the 2018 midterms
+ In the weeks leading up to the 2018 midterm elections, DHS
+officials supported a high degree of preparedness Nation-wide. DHS
+provided free technical cybersecurity assistance, continuous
+information sharing, and expertise to election offices and campaigns.
+EI-ISAC threat alerts were shared with all 50 States, over 1,400 local
+and territorial election offices, 6 election associations, and 12
+election vendors.
+ In August 2018, DHS hosted a ``Tabletop the Vote'' exercise, a 3-
+day, first-of-its-kind exercise to assist our Federal partners, State
+and local election officials, and private-sector vendors in identifying
+best practices and areas for improvement in cyber incident planning,
+preparedness, identification, response, and recovery. Through tabletop
+simulation of a realistic incident scenario, exercise participants
+discussed and explored potential impacts to voter confidence, voting
+operations, and the integrity of elections. Partners for this exercise
+included 44 States and the District of Columbia; EAC; Department of
+Defense, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Cyber
+Command, and the National Security Agency; DOJ; Federal Bureau of
+Investigation; Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and
+National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
+ Through the ``Last Mile Initiative,'' DHS worked closely with State
+and local governments to outline critical cybersecurity actions that
+should be implemented at the county level. For political campaigns, DHS
+disseminated a cybersecurity best practices checklist to help
+candidates and their teams better secure their devices and systems.
+ On Election Day, DHS deployed field staff across the country to
+maintain situational awareness and connect election officials to
+appropriate incident response professionals, if needed. In many cases,
+these field staff were co-located with election officials in their own
+security operations centers. DHS also hosted the National Cybersecurity
+Situational Awareness Room, an on-line portal for State and local
+election officials and vendors that facilitates rapid sharing of
+information. It gives election officials virtual access to the 24/7
+operational watch floor of the CISA NCCIC. This setup allowed DHS to
+monitor potential threats across multiple States at once and respond in
+a rapid fashion.
+ Our goal has been for the American people to enter the voting booth
+with the confidence that their vote counts and is counted correctly. I
+am proud to say that our efforts over the past 2 years have resulted in
+the most secure election in modern history.
+ no evidence of election interference
+ The Secretary of Homeland Security and the Acting Attorney General
+have concluded that there is no evidence to date that any identified
+activities of a foreign government or foreign agent had a material
+impact on the integrity or security of election infrastructure or
+political or campaign infrastructure used in the 2018 midterm elections
+for the U.S. Congress. The activity we did see was consistent with what
+we shared in the weeks leading up to the election. Russia, and other
+foreign countries, including China and Iran, conducted influence
+activities and messaging campaigns targeted at the United States to
+promote their strategic interests.
+ election security efforts moving forward
+ Ensuring the security of our electoral process remains a vital
+National interest and one of our highest priorities at DHS. In the run-
+up to the 2020 election season, DHS will continue to prioritize
+elections by broadening the reach and depth of information sharing and
+assistance that we are providing to State and local election officials,
+and continuing to share information on threats and mitigation tactics.
+ DHS goals for the 2020 election cycle include improving the
+efficiency and effectiveness of election audits, continued
+incentivizing the patching of election systems, and working with the
+National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the States to
+develop cybersecurity profiles utilizing the NIST Cybersecurity
+Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure. We will also continue
+to engage any political entity that wants our help. DHS offers these
+entities the same tools and resources that we offer to State and local
+election officials, including trainings, cyber hygiene support,
+information sharing, and other resources.
+ DHS has made tremendous strides and has been committed to working
+collaboratively with those on the front lines of administering our
+elections to secure election infrastructure from risks. Just last week,
+DHS officials provided updates to the secretaries of state, State
+election directors, and members of the GCC and SCC on the full package
+of election security resources that are available from the Federal
+Government, along with a roadmap on how to improve coordination across
+these entities. DHS also worked with our intelligence community
+partners to provide a Classified 1-day read-in for these individuals
+regarding the current threats facing our election infrastructure.
+ We will remain transparent as well as agile in combating and
+securing our physical and cyber infrastructure. However, we recognize
+that there is a significant technology deficit across SLTT governments,
+and State and local election systems, in particular. It will take
+significant and continual investment to ensure that election systems
+across the Nation are upgraded and secure, with vulnerable systems
+retired. These efforts require a whole-of-Government approach. The
+President and this administration are committed to addressing these
+risks.
+ Our voting infrastructure is diverse, subject to local control, and
+has many checks and balances. As the threat environment evolves, DHS
+will continue to work with Federal agencies, State and local partners,
+and private-sector entities to enhance our understanding of the threat;
+and to make essential physical and cybersecurity tools and resources
+available to the public and private sectors to increase security and
+resiliency.
+ Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today,
+and I look forward to your questions.
+
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you for your testimony. I now
+recognize Mr. Hicks to summarize his statement for 5 minutes.
+
+ STATEMENT OF THOMAS HICKS, COMMISSIONER, U.S. ELECTION
+ ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
+
+ Mr. Hicks. Good morning, Chairman Thompson and Ranking
+Member Rogers and Member of the committee. I am pleased to
+appear you today to offer testimony on the pressing issue of
+how to build partnerships to better protect American elections.
+ Today's hearing comes 3 months after the 2018 midterm
+elections. Early estimates indicate that a record number of
+eligible Americans cast their vote in November. I congratulate
+the Nation's election administrators and their teams for a job
+well done, inspiring work that the staff and I saw, first-hand,
+as we travel across the Nation in the weeks surrounding the
+election.
+ This work, coupled with improved lines of communications
+between Federal, State, and local officials and Federal
+agencies that serve them resulted in no indication of foreign
+attacks on our Nation's election infrastructure.
+ The EAC is the only Federal agency focused solely on
+elections. This focus is of great value to election
+administrators and the voters they serve. The commission's
+mission and other mandates established under the Help America
+Vote Act, HAVA, are as relevant today as at any time since the
+watershed bipartisan legislation was signed into law.
+ We commissioners and the EAC staff stand ready to roll up
+our sleeves to address the unique needs of those we serve. Just
+last week, two new commissioners, Benjamin Hovland and Ben
+Palmer--Donald Palmer were sworn in, joining Vice Chair
+McCormick and myself to make up a full slate of commissioners
+the agency has had in nearly a decade.
+ Today's hearing and many of the commission's own efforts
+focus on election security, which is only one key component of
+election administration. I have attached to my written
+statement, a diagram that demonstrates the many different
+competencies that require election administrator's awareness
+and attention, knowledge of election law and election
+technology, to vote tabulation and post-election audits.
+ Election officials must operate in each of these areas with
+no room for error. That is why the EAC works to provide its
+resources to each of our competencies. That is why we partner
+with other Federal agencies to leverage their subject-matter
+expertise.
+ Some of the EAC's Federal partners include DOD, DHS,
+Department of Justice, National Institute of Standards and
+Technology, and the United States Postal Service. This morning
+I will briefly address the EAC's work to help States secure
+their elections, including efforts to swiftly and responsibly
+distribute $380 million in newly appropriated HAVA to States
+and the on-going work to test and certify voting systems.
+ In the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, Congress
+appropriated $380 million in HAVA to the States, in eligible
+territories for projects and programs to improve the
+administration of Federal elections. Within 3 months of the
+appropriation, the EAC received distributed requests for 100
+percent of the funds from all 55 eligible jurisdictions and
+States.
+ One hundred percent of the funds were quickly distributed
+to eligible States and territories to draw down. The EAC staff
+is currently exam the--examining the Federal financial reports
+regarding how States spent funds last year, the recent Federal
+furlough has slightly delayed this process.
+ But from our early assessments, we believe that about 58
+percent of the funds went toward shoring up election security
+and about 33 percent of the funds was used to purchase voting
+equipment.
+ After we complete our 2018 spending analysis, we will
+provide more specific details about the expenditures and the
+State's future plans for using HAVA funds. The distribution of
+HAVA funds is only one example of the EAC's work to strengthen
+election security. The EAC serves as a central partner with DHS
+in ensuring that--the success of our National security efforts.
+ DHS has stated that the election security for Government
+Coordinating Council, the GCC, was formed faster than any other
+similar critical infrastructure sector council today. The EAC
+took a needed early leadership role in working toward this
+accomplishment.
+ Building on that success, the EAC convened discussions
+between election system vendors and DHS for the formulation of
+the Sector Coordinating Council, the SCC. Both the SCC and the
+GCC were formulated before the 2018 election year, less than 1
+year from the critical infrastructure designation by DHS.
+ In addition, ahead of the 2018 mid-term elections, the EAC
+focused on steps our commission could take to further serve
+election officials operating in a new threat environment.
+ On multiple occasions, the EAC brought together election
+officials, lawmakers, security experts, academics, and
+Government partners, for discussion and events to tackle this
+vital issue. While taking--talking about election security at
+forums is important, so is hands-on training.
+ The EAC staff was involved in the establishment of Harvard
+University's Belfer Center tabletop exercise, which have since
+been conducted across the country. In addition, since 2015, the
+EAC has presented its election official as I.T. manager,
+training to officials representing hundreds of elections
+jurisdictions across the country and we will increase our
+efforts following the 2016 election.
+ This training is available on-line through FVAP program,
+that many more election officials can easily access to complete
+these efforts. The EAC has also produced a video and supporting
+materials to help local election officials explain the many
+levels of election security for their jurisdictions.
+ The final area I will highlight today during my testimony
+is the EAC's testing and certification program. The EAC--the
+Help America Vote Act charges the EAC with administrating a
+Federal program for setting voluntary voting system guidelines
+and testing for vendors may choose to have EAC accredited and
+monitored labs test their voting systems against those
+guidelines for certification.
+ The guidelines contain requirements for security as well as
+other important components such as accessibility, usability,
+and interoperability. These components and functions of the
+same are deliberated and developed in public working groups
+under the direction of the EAC's Technical Guidelines
+Committee, which is chaired by the director and under secretary
+of commerce for standard and technology.
+ After development and approval by the TGDC, the voluntary
+guidelines are submitted to the EAC's executive director,
+provided for the EAC's Standards Board and Board of Advisors,
+published for public comment and presented to the EAC's
+commissioners for consideration and approval.
+ Last spring, the EAC conveyed its advisory boards to review
+and comment on the adoptions of the newest versions of the
+guidelines VVSG 2.0. Both boards recommended that the EAC adopt
+VVSG 2.0. Now that a quorum--I ask for 1 additional minute or
+30 seconds.
+ [Laughter.]
+ Chairman Thompson. Granted.
+ Mr. Hicks. Thank you, sir.
+ Quorum has restored to the EAC. We anticipate that the VVSG
+2.0 will soon be posted for public comment and we will hold
+public hearings on the proposed guidelines.
+ Members of the committee, the EAC's mission includes
+supporting election officials across the country as they
+administer Federal elections and the EAC is committed to that
+work, to always seeking better ways to do it. I welcome your
+feedback and I look forward to answering questions you may
+have.
+ [The prepared statement of Mr. Hicks follows:]
+ Prepared Statement of Thomas Hicks
+ February 12, 2019
+ Good morning Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Rogers, and Members
+of the committee. I am pleased to appear before you today to offer
+testimony on the pressing issue of how to build partnerships to better
+protect American elections. As the 2020 Presidential Election
+approaches and jurisdictions across the Nation prepare to host a number
+of State and local elections in the months ahead, I assure you that
+supporting election officials in their work--including providing
+election security tools and resources--is one of the most important
+responsibilities of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, better
+known as the EAC.
+ Today's hearing comes 3 months after the 2018 midterm election.
+Voter confidence in our election system is an issue the EAC often
+publicly addressed ahead of last year's election and it is
+intrinsically tied to the topics I will discuss today. With early
+estimates indicating that a record number of all eligible Americans
+participated in the 2018 midterms, it is important to recognize the
+incredible ingenuity and care that election officials and those with
+whom they work demonstrated ahead of the midterms and continue to
+exhibit today. It is this work that shores up the very foundation of
+our democracy and instills voter confidence. EAC Commissioners and the
+Commission's staff saw this first-hand in the weeks surrounding the
+midterm election as we traveled the Nation to observe everything from
+pre-election preparations to post-election audits. In 2018, the work of
+our Nation's election administrators and their teams, coupled with a
+dramatically improved line of communication between Federal, State, and
+local election officials and the Federal agencies that serve them,
+resulted in no indication of foreign attacks on our Nation's election
+infrastructure. I am proud of the role the EAC played in that
+coordinated effort.
+ The EAC is the only Federal agency that focuses solely on
+elections, and this focus is of great value to election administrators
+and the voters they serve. The EAC's mission and other mandates
+established under the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) are as relevant
+today as at any other time since that watershed, bipartisan legislation
+was signed into law. When HAVA passed HAVA in 2002, Congress set out to
+make sweeping and much-needed reforms to the Nation's voting process.
+Congress established the EAC to serve as the Federal leader in helping
+States carry out that vision, and the Commission has done so
+successfully. The EAC has helped election officials in each State and
+U.S. territory identify and implement legally-required changes to the
+way America votes. The Commission has a strong relationship with State
+and local election leaders and the voters they serve, which makes
+progress possible and remains of great value as lawmakers consider
+additional ways to support the administration of Federal elections.
+ We Commissioners and the exemplary EAC staff stand ready to roll up
+our sleeves to address the unique needs of those we serve. Just this
+week, two new EAC commissioners, Benjamin Hovland and Donald Palmer,
+were sworn in, joining Vice Chair Christy McCormick and me to make up
+the first full quorum of Commissioners the agency has had in nearly a
+decade. While the EAC has made great strides over the years, we always
+seek to do better and to do more.
+ Certainly one of the primary focuses of our efforts, election
+security is only one component of election administration. I have
+attached a diagram to this testimony that demonstrates the many
+different competencies that require election administrator awareness
+and attention. Election officials must operate in each of these areas,
+so the EAC works on each of them. Knowledge of election law, finance,
+accessibility standards, security considerations, election technology,
+public relations and human resources are all core on-going election
+official responsibilities. As officials prepare to administer an
+election, they must be experts on mail, street file maintenance, voter
+registration, military and overseas voting, local candidates and
+campaign finance laws, project management, polling places and real
+estate, advance voting, and logistics. On Election Day and beyond,
+election officials must also direct activities such as voting and
+tabulation, canvassing, auditing, administering recounts, and carrying
+out list maintenance. Many of these topics are covered in the EAC's
+Election Administration and Voting Survey report to Congress, including
+the 2018 report that is under way now and will be delivered to you this
+summer.
+ It is worth noting that in addition to this work, the EAC provides
+voters with vital resources and assistance needed to register to vote
+and to cast ballots, and it includes administering the National
+clearinghouse of election administration information to continually
+equip our partners in Congress, State and local government, private
+industry, advocacy organizations, other Federal agencies, academia, and
+others in the elections industry with the information they require and
+rely on.
+ The EAC also works alongside Federal partners to leverage their
+subject-matter expertise to augment the EAC's whole-of-elections
+perspective with specialized products. The EAC works with these
+partners to produce EAC products, help other agencies better develop
+products for election stakeholders, and help our stakeholders
+understand and integrate these products into the context of their array
+of responsibilities. These partners include the Department of Defense,
+the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, the
+National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and the United
+States Postal Service.
+ Today I will focus my remarks on election security, one of the most
+integral components of the EAC's work. The EAC has worked diligently to
+help States secure their elections, especially in months leading up to
+last year's election. The EAC expeditiously distributed newly-
+appropriated HAVA funds to the States, assisted our Federal partners in
+establishing and managing the critical infrastructure operational
+framework, continued to test and certify voting systems, and
+highlighted and distributed important best practices in election
+administration. This work yielded substantial benefits in 2018 and
+continues as we look ahead to 2020.
+ distributing newly-appropriated hava funds
+ In the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, Congress
+appropriated $380 million in HAVA funds to the States and eligible
+territories for projects and programs to improve the administration of
+Federal elections. Within 3 months of the appropriation, the EAC
+received disbursement requests for 100 percent of the funds from all 55
+eligible States and territories, a remarkable percentage, and 100
+percent of the funds were quickly made available for the eligible
+States and territories to draw down.
+ Less than 2 weeks after these new funds were signed into law by
+President Trump, the EAC issued Notice of Grant Award letters to each
+State. Within 3 weeks of the signing, Missouri became the first State
+to request its funds. In the subsequent 10 weeks, the EAC conducted a
+webcast public forum to explain how the funding would proceed, worked
+directly with the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS)
+and the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED) to
+share information, conducted multiple webinars to further discuss how
+the funds may be used, consulted with members of the disability
+community to hear their views on use of the funds, and had frequent
+contact with each State in an effort to move the funds quickly.
+ The EAC website also provides access to a set of Frequently Asked
+Questions regarding the funds. The attached map, also on the EAC
+website (www.eac.gov), shows the amount of funds appropriated to each
+State. The EAC fulfilled its promise to get the funds to the States as
+quickly as possible, and the Commission continues to consult with
+States and territories regarding the proper use of the funds, which
+were disbursed after the States provided a short narrative describing
+plans for how the funds will be used.
+ The EAC has used the new HAVA funds not just as an opportunity to
+provide much-needed financial support to the States, but also as a
+mechanism to promote best-practice information sharing among election
+administrators. Details from the State plan documents have been shared
+with the entire election community and on the EAC website. It is
+essential that the States and territories have access to the wealth of
+ideas and innovative approaches contained in other States'
+individualized planned activities as they plan their own use of the
+funds. As we continue to work closely with the State and local leaders
+charged with spending these funds, the EAC's staff will continue to
+compile the information we receive so that the election community and
+others will have access to particulars of how the States and
+territories are expending their funds to further update and secure
+their election systems.
+ The EAC's staff is currently examining Federal Financial Reports
+regarding how States spent funds last year. The recent Federal furlough
+has slightly delayed this process, but from our early assessment, we
+believe that about 58 percent of funds spent went toward shoring up
+election security and about 33 percent were used to purchase voting
+equipment. After we complete our 2018 spending analysis, we will
+provide more specific details about those expenditures and about
+States' future plans for using new HAVA funds. I've attached to this
+testimony two charts detailing how States initially indicated they
+planned to spend funds and the percentage of total funds allotted for
+activities such as election security and updating election equipment.
+ critical infrastructure activities
+ The distribution of HAVA funds is only one example of the EAC's
+work related to election security. The EAC has been serving as a
+central partner with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in
+ensuring the success of this National security effort well before the
+2017 Critical Infrastructure designation by former Secretary Jeh
+Johnson. The DHS has stated that the election sector's Government
+Coordinating Council (GCC) was formed faster than any other similar
+critical infrastructure sector council to date. The EAC took an early
+leadership role in working toward this accomplishment, and we recognize
+it as an exemplary proof-point of how local, State, and Federal
+Governments can effectively work together toward the shared goal of
+protecting our Nation's election infrastructure.
+ Building on that success, the EAC also convened discussions between
+election system vendors and the DHS for the formation of the Sector
+Coordinating Council (SCC). Thanks to the swift establishment of the
+GCC and the well-established relationships between the EAC and election
+equipment vendors, work on the SCC began in the summer of 2017, and its
+official formation meeting took place before the end of last year. Both
+councils were functioning before the 2018 election year, less than 1
+year from the Critical Infrastructure designation by the DHS.
+ The EAC Chair serves on the GCC Executive Committee, and all EAC
+Commissioners are chartered members of the GCC. Like many members of
+the GCC, the EAC is seeking security clearances through the DHS and has
+been assured that the Department will be addressing those security
+requests soon.
+ During the last Presidential Election cycle, the EAC was a key
+player in Federal efforts to share vital security information with the
+States and educate our Federal partners about ways to best serve the
+needs of election administrators. For example, the EAC:
+ Distributed urgent security alerts and threat indicators
+ from the DHS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to
+ States and territories to help protect election systems from
+ specific cybersecurity threats.
+ Met on multiple occasions with staff from the DHS, the FBI,
+ and the White House to discuss specific and nonspecific
+ threats, State and local election system security and
+ protocols, and the dynamics of the election system and its
+ 8,000-plus jurisdictions Nation-wide.
+ Served as the Federal Government's primary communication
+ channel to provide real-time cybersecurity information to
+ election officials around the country. This information
+ included current data on cyber threats, tactics for protecting
+ election systems against these threats, and the availability
+ and value of DHS resources for protecting cyber assets.
+ Participated in and convened conference calls with Federal
+ officials, secretaries of state, and other State chief election
+ officials, local election administration officials, Federal law
+ enforcement, and Federal agency personnel to discuss the
+ prospect of designating elections as part of the Nation's
+ critical infrastructure. These discussions focused on topics
+ such as coordinating security flashes from the FBI, the
+ implications of a critical infrastructure designation,
+ education on the Nation's election system, and the dynamics of
+ successfully communicating information to every level of
+ election officials responsible for running the Nation's
+ election system.
+ Provided DHS with perspective, information, and data related
+ to the election system, introductions to officials in the
+ election community, and information that assisted the agency
+ with shaping communications in a manner that would be useful to
+ the States and local election officials.
+ Published a white paper entitled ``U.S. Election Systems as
+ Critical Infrastructure'' that provided a basic understanding
+ of critical infrastructure for election officials.
+ Contributed to multiple foundational DHS documents used to
+ structure the Elections Systems Critical Infrastructure
+ designation and sector.
+ Ahead of the 2018 Midterm Election, the EAC focused on steps our
+commission could take to further serve election officials operating in
+the new threat environment. The EAC brought together election
+officials, security officials, academics, and Federal Government
+partners for an Election 2018 kick-off summit at the National Press
+Club in January 2018. Just 1 month ahead of the mid-term election in
+October 2018, we gathered a similar audience here in the Capitol
+Visitors Center for an election readiness summit that featured, among
+others, Senators Blunt and Klobuchar, as well as high-level officials
+from DHS and the National Counterintelligence and Security Center.
+These events and others like them throughout 2018 raised awareness of
+the security preparations election officials had under way and the
+resources available to the States and localities to help with this
+critical work.
+ While talking about election security at forums is important, the
+EAC also knows the importance of training. EAC staff was intricately
+involved in the establishment of Harvard University's Belfer Center
+Table-Top Exercises, which have since been conducted across the
+country. During the past year, the EAC has also developed and presented
+its ``Election Official as IT Manager'' training to officials
+representing hundreds of election jurisdictions across the country, and
+we are working with the DHS to put this training on-line through the
+FedVTE platform so that many more election officials can easily access
+it.
+ The EAC also produced a video and supporting meeting materials to
+help local election officials explain the many levels of election
+security at their jurisdiction. The video was designed to be viewed at
+civic group meetings and election worker trainings. It can also be
+customized by jurisdictions, and some States are tailoring the video to
+their voters and processes. We plan further work in this regard. In
+addition, the EAC Commissioners continuously meet with State and local
+election officials at regional conferences across the country. These
+visits allow the Commissioners to apprise officials of best practices,
+promote resources available from the EAC and our Federal partners in
+agencies such as the United States Postal Service, the Federal Voting
+Assistance Program (FVAP) within the Department of Defense, the
+Department of Justice, and the DHS, and discuss current concerns and
+topics in election administration, such as contingency planning,
+accessibility, voter registration, and technology management.
+ On Election Day 2018, we were pleased to have our newly-hired chief
+information officer and the head of our Testing and Certification
+Program on-site with other Federal agencies and key election
+stakeholders who gathered at the National Cybersecurity &
+Communications Integration Center (NCCIC). We are proud of the role we
+played last year, and we continue to seek new ways to provide election
+security support to State and local election leaders.
+ testing and certification/voluntary voting system guidelines
+ The Help America Vote Act charges the EAC with administering a
+Federal program for setting a voluntary National standard for testing
+and certificating voting systems. This testing standard is the EAC's
+Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG), and vendors may choose to
+have EAC-accredited and monitored labs test their voting systems
+against these guidelines for certification. The guidelines contain
+requirements for security, as well as other important components--such
+as accessibility, usability, and interoperability. In fact, while
+security is a guiding consideration of certification, so is
+accessibility for voters with disabilities and voters with limited
+English proficiency.
+ These considerations are deliberated and developed in public
+working groups under the direction of the EAC's Technical Guidelines
+Development Committee (TGDC), which is chaired by the director and
+under secretary of commerce for standards and technology. This TGDC's
+membership is made up of technical and scientific experts from fields
+such as security, accessibility, voting machine production, and voting
+machine use. After development and approval by the TGDC, the voluntary
+guidelines are submitted to the EAC's executive director, provided to
+the EAC's Standards Board and the Board of Advisors, published for
+public comment, and presented to the EAC's commissioners for
+consideration and approval. Last Spring, the EAC convened its advisory
+boards to review and comment on the adoption of the newest version of
+the voluntary guidelines, VVSG 2.0. Both boards recommended that the
+EAC adopt VVSG 2.0. Now that a quorum has been restored at the EAC, we
+anticipate that the VVSG 2.0 will soon be posted for public comment, we
+will hold public hearings on the proposed guidelines, and the agency
+has the pieces in place for final consideration.
+ While the EAC has been hard at work on the newest version of the
+VVSG, the EAC has not stopped its on-going work to rigorously review,
+test, and certify voting systems. These reviews are referred to as test
+campaigns, and in these campaigns EAC accredited laboratories test
+vendor-submitted voting systems against the standards contained in the
+VVSG. Once a system successfully completes a test campaign, the results
+of the campaign are transmitted to the EAC's executive director for
+certification of the voting system to the standard against which it was
+tested. If the EAC's executive director agrees that the voting system
+has conformed with the standard, it is certified as such and assigned a
+certification number. It takes the EAC approximately 8 to 12 months to
+certify a newly-submitted voting system. If the system has already been
+certified and the vendor is making an upgrade or revising a component,
+it may take as little as a few weeks or as much as 6 months to upgrade
+or change.
+ In addition to the actual certification of the voting systems, the
+EAC's Testing and Certification Program continually conducts quality
+monitoring of all EAC-certified systems and audits the quality of the
+EAC-accredited test labs. Monitoring of the voting systems occurs
+throughout the entire span of manufacturing and life of service,
+including manufacturing facility audits, field system review and
+testing, and field anomaly reporting from manufacturers and election
+officials.
+ conclusion
+ Members of the committee, the EAC's mission includes supporting
+election officials across the country as they administer Federal
+elections, and we are committed to that work and to always seeking
+better ways to do it. The importance of election security and how the
+newly-appropriated HAVA Funds will assist States remain a primary focus
+and top priority for the commission. I am honored to support the
+important work carried out by our Nation's election administrators each
+and every day, and I congratulate them on a job well done in 2018. The
+EAC looks forward to working closely with them ahead of the 2020
+Presidential Election. I welcome your feedback, and we look forward to
+answering questions you may have.
+
+[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
+
+
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. I thank the
+witnesses for their testimony. I remind each Member that he or
+she will have 5 minutes to question the panel. I now recognize
+myself for questions.
+ Director Krebs, given the 2019 World-wide Threat Assessment
+that warned that the U.S. adversaries and strategic competitors
+probably are already looking at the 2020 U.S. elections, how
+confident are you that our election infrastructure, as it is at
+this moment, is secure against cyber attacks?
+ Mr. Krebs. Chairman, thank you for the question. I
+certainly think that, just like any other I.T. system, the
+election infrastructure bears additional securing and
+resilience measures. But I will say that compared to where we
+were in 2016, not just from a fundamental I.T. security
+perspective, but from a collaboration working across the
+different stakeholder groups, we are light-years ahead of where
+we were. Most importantly, we have greater visibility both of
+the threats that are incoming, but also how they would work
+across the ecosystem and across the infrastructure.
+ I mentioned earlier, the Albert sensor coverage that we
+have, less than 30 percent in 2016, over 90 percent in 2018,
+that gives us near-real-time visibility in what is happening
+across the networks.
+ The last thing I will add here, the area that I think we
+need to invest the most as a Nation, is ensuring auditability
+across infrastructure. It is a key tenant of I.T. security. If
+you don't know what is happening and if you can't check back
+across the system, what is happening in the system, then you
+don't really have security. So, to the extent that we can focus
+on an outcome of auditability throughout the process end-to-
+end, that is the greatest area of need in my view.
+ Chairman Thompson. So, is that a matter of software or
+training or what?
+ Mr. Krebs. Yes, sir, everything. One area that we can focus
+on, and the good news is from my understanding and I would
+defer to Chairman Hicks, every State is--that is not already on
+a paper-type ballot, whether it is hand-marked or whatever--
+every State, including the 5 that are on electronic machines
+right now, are moving toward paper.
+ Paper helps that auditability process. Then you have after-
+election audits on the backend, but it is not just about the
+voting day, it is also all the way through the voter
+registration process, making sure that you have visibility and
+understanding of what is happening in those databases.
+ Chairman Thompson. Right. So, Mr. Hicks, are you concerned
+that so much of what we use is from international sources and
+the potential for supply chain compromise is there or has that
+issue come up in your review?
+ Mr. Hicks. It has come up in our reviews but I would like
+to say that it is difficult to function in a world economy and
+not have some form of components coming from overseas. I
+believe that that is being looked at but I believe that we can
+still move forward with a secure election process because the
+EAC certifies voting systems and that is all components within
+those systems for the voluntary voting system guidelines and
+standards and we certify the labs that do that as well. So I
+have very little concern in foreign components overall because
+I have great faith in our labs and the overall structure of our
+voluntary voting system guidelines to ensure that those systems
+are functioning the way that the American people want them to.
+ Chairman Thompson. Mr. Krebs do you want to comment on
+that?
+ Mr. Krebs. Yes, sir. So I mentioned in my opening remarks
+that we have three primary areas of focus for 2020. One is
+extending to locals but the second piece is better
+understanding the risk across the election infrastructure. As
+Chairman Hicks mentioned, supply chain concerns are certainly
+in that register of risk that we are looking at but I am
+actually at this point more concerned or focusing in on basic
+cyber hygiene practices.
+ When we looked across a range of sectors and segments what
+we saw was the election community still has challenges with
+basic cyber hygiene and so what our area of focus is helping
+with patching, helping implement multifactor authentication,
+helping on phishing campaign assessments, things of that
+nature.
+ Chairman Thompson. So before I run out of time, your
+testimony indicated that all the secretaries of state had
+participated in some aspect of your resources?
+ Mr. Krebs. Yes, sir. All 50 States have engaged with the
+Department in one way, shape or form. The election
+infrastructure ISAC for instance has all 50 States as members.
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you, I yield to the----
+ Mr. Hicks. Congressman, there is one other aspect of that
+that I wanted to jump on, with--Under Secretary Krebs was
+speaking about, and one way to ensure that the systems are
+functioning the way that they are intended is through
+auditability. So once we move away from those 5 States that
+don't have paper trails associated with them, I believe that
+all States should be able to audit using some form of paper but
+also to ensure that we continue on with the Help America Vote
+Act of ensuring that those who have disabilities might not be
+able to use that paper can still vote independently and
+privately.
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you. I yield to the Ranking Member
+for 5 minutes.
+ Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Commissioner Hicks in
+your opening statement you made reference to the fact that last
+spring the EAC had distributed $380 million in fiscal year 2018
+funds to the States to improve their elections. To date, how
+many States and territories have been able to spend their
+allocation? I know you said 100 percent of it had been
+distributed but have they been able to spend it?
+ Mr. Hicks. All the States are spending that money now. They
+have up to 5 years to spend the money for--for additional
+things. It is basically an infrastructure grant. So if we look
+toward--and continuing on with infrastructure, it won't be
+built within 3 months but it would be carried on for the 5
+years the Congress appropriated that money for.
+ Mr. Rogers. You are just starting to spend it?
+ Mr. Hicks. Yes.
+ Mr. Rogers. OK.
+ H.R. 1 authorizes, and this is also for Mr. Hicks, H.R. 1
+authorizes--nearly $1.2 billion over the next 2 years to local
+election security improvements. Is it feasible for States to
+buy equipment, implement new security measures and poll
+workers, trained in time for the primaries 2 years from now?
+ Mr. Hicks. I missed part of your question, sir.
+ Mr. Rogers. Given that $1.2 billion is to be spent, can the
+States take that money and buy equipment, train poll workers,
+and implement security measures in time for the primaries for
+the 2020 elections?
+ Mr. Hicks. I believe States can do most of that. But again
+we can't just--the States can't go to Best Buy and get that off
+the shelf so most of the States are moving toward not only
+purchasing new voting equipment but also other aspects of the
+election process in terms of voter registration, election
+audits, security overall so it is not just purchasing new
+voting equipment, they are going from registration to election
+night reporting.
+ Mr. Rogers. My point is I just don't see how they are going
+to be able to get that done by the 2020 primaries and they are
+right--you are talking about next March is Alabama's primary;
+some of them are early as February or January of next year.
+Finally, you--for Mr. Hicks, you talked about certifying that
+the EAC certifies election security systems. Can you tell me
+more about that certification process?
+ Mr. Hicks. It is voting systems overall. So basically for
+voting systems, once the State decides they want to fall under
+that process of our voluntary voting system guidelines, those
+systems are sent by the vendors to those--to our test labs and
+then certified to those sorts of standards. It is the same as
+if computers or iPhones or other aspects of that, they are
+tested to a certain standard.
+ Mr. Rogers. Can you have your staff to submit to my staff--
+for the full committee staff, what those standards are,
+certification standards? I would really be interested in
+reviewing those.
+ Mr. Hicks. Well there is several of them so we just
+certified 1.1 in 2015 but for the last 4 years since I have
+been at the commission, we have been working on the 2.0
+voluntary voting system guidelines and there is a healthy
+debate going on right now between myself and the other
+commissioners when ensuring that those get out for public
+comment relatively soon.
+ Mr. Rogers. Good. Mr. Krebs, can DHS and EAC complete
+supply chain security and other qualification mandates on
+vendors required by H.R. 1 fast enough for States to know that
+what they are buying is acceptable machines in time for the
+2020 primaries?
+ Mr. Krebs. I am not sure. I have to think about the number
+of systems, the research, the requirements that would have to
+go into that. I may need to get back to you on the timeliness
+of that.
+ Mr. Rogers. My final question is these 5 States that
+currently have audit concerns, you both made reference to the
+fact they are moving toward paper. Can you tell me more about
+what they are doing?
+ Mr. Hicks. So those States are purchasing--some States are
+already in line to purchase new voting equipment, like Georgia
+overall. But some States are putting bids out to other
+manufacturers to get some sort of paper. So it is basically
+little things like buying anything. There is different models
+out there and what works best for those States is what those
+States are going to purchase. But there are other aspects of
+voting systems that are out there--optical scan machines or
+just paper-based systems overall where States are looking
+toward getting those so that they can audit those at night--
+after election night and so forth.
+ Mr. Rogers. Do you have a time line of when they expect to
+be able to get that auditability?
+ Mr. Hicks. It is an on-going thing. So the first purchase
+of voting equipment under the Help America Vote Act was more
+than 15 years ago and as I--when I say how much confidence
+folks have on computer systems that they purchase 15 years ago
+but the EAC gives guidance on maintaining aging voting
+equipment to ensure that those systems function the way they
+were designed to.
+ So I would say that it is an on-going process so it might
+not be, you know, fully completed in 2020. By 2022, 2024 as
+elections continue on, more systems will be mothballed.
+ Mr. Rogers. Thank you. I yield back.
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you. The Chair recognizes the
+gentlelady from New York, Ms. Rice.
+ Miss Rice. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Mr. Krebs, I would like
+to start with you if I could. I applaud the progress that you
+have made protecting the machinery of our elections but what I
+want to address now is another part of election protection, and
+that is protecting the campaigns and the political party
+committees from attack. Everyone is well aware of what happened
+in 2016. There was the hacking of the DNC, the DCCC, and the
+Clinton campaign, all hacked by Russia.
+ We know the subsequent use of the stolen materials have a
+profound effect on the election. We also know that in 2018 the
+NRCC was hacked, that being in the midterm cycle. Now I know
+that on our side the DCCC launched unprecedented cybersecurity
+and disinformation prevention operations. But all of that work
+was done by themselves. It was not done in coordination with
+any Federal agency--with the Federal Government at all even
+though these are Federal campaigns.
+ So I want to ask you, do you think that we should rethink
+how we are doing all this?
+ Mr. Krebs. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question. So
+during the 2018 cycle and even to today, we have worked with
+the major parties. RNC, we have conducted training--conducted
+training. DNC, we have a very good relationship with the CIO.
+We continue to work with the other committees so it is in our
+area of engagement. I take your point though that we need to
+expand and deepen and broaden that engagement. We continue to
+think about the various offerings that we have whether its
+capabilities, technical support information sharing, training,
+those are all the areas that we are continuing to push out.
+ I would encourage each of you, as you are coming up on
+another cycle, you know, please work with us, your own
+campaigns. We have capabilities that we can offer and it is
+definitely within our--it is an area of priority engagement for
+us going forward.
+ Miss Rice. So I am glad to hear you say that. I want to ask
+your opinion about whether you think using the Information
+Sharing Analysis Center, the ISAC model that you use for
+working with sectors like the energy and financial fields. Do
+you think that that would be of help here?
+ Mr. Krebs. In terms of political infrastructure and
+political campaigns?
+ Miss Rice. Yes.
+ Mr. Krebs. I don't have any reason to believe why it
+wouldn't work.
+ Miss Rice. I think that that is something that we have to
+look into because all of this is about sharing information when
+you are being hacked and what you do about getting down
+disinformation and all that kind of stuff. There were 3 States
+that did not use any part of the election assistance commission
+so this could be either to Mr. Hicks or to you, Mr. Krebs.
+Three States--Florida, Oklahoma, and Oregon chose not to use
+any part of the EAC's testing or certification program and they
+were all targeted by Russian hackers in 2016.
+ I guess my question is are we encouraging States to
+participate in the programs and I understand the tension
+between, you know, the State's rights over how their elections
+are run but there is--I guess I would ask you, do you think
+there is a role for the Federal Government to play and did the
+Government--Federal Government do enough to participate
+States--to encourage States to participate in the program
+before the 2018 cycle and how many States will be participating
+in this--in the 2020 cycle?
+ Mr. Krebs. So I wouldn't use 2016 as the baseline for how--
+what States engage, what local communities engage. I would
+instead recommend that we look at 2018. All 50 States worked
+with the Department of Homeland Security, and it is also
+important to keep laser-focused on what the Department's
+mission is; that is cybersecurity technical assistance. The
+election capabilities, that resides with the EAC and NIST and
+the others. We are very focused on cybersecurity capabilities.
+We had all 50 States, 1,400 jurisdictions, a number of election
+equipment vendors all playing ball with us.
+ The difference between 2018 and 2016 and I hope that you
+will hear this in the next panel was trust. In 2016 there was
+no relationship between the Department and EAC. There was no
+relationship between Secretary Padilla or Secretary Merrill.
+Right now, those relationships are strong and growing stronger.
+So I am very confident that going forward that we have the
+baseline of engagement and partnership in place to only
+continue to improve the security and resilience in the voting
+system.
+ Mr. Hicks. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman. There
+are two aspects that I would like to point out with--for two
+States that I went to last year. I went to Oregon and I did go
+to Florida as well. In Oregon I saw the wildfires that were
+going on and they were looking toward the EAC to get some sort
+of guidance in terms of overall aspects of running their
+elections. They're an all-paper State so they do everything by
+vote by mail. So they were--they were I think on top of things
+in terms of moving forward.
+ Florida, I had the honor of going down to visit with Bay
+County which was devastated by Hurricane Michael and to see
+their election folks basically in tears but being happy that
+the EAC was there to document their--their concerns and get
+others to see that and I hope that our staff will be able to
+have the videos that we took up relatively soon so folks can
+pay attention to that and not forget those folks as well.
+ I think that there are different aspects that the States
+have gone to, to use our services, so we do touch all 55
+jurisdictions--the 50 States and the 5 territories and the
+District of Columbia. So I believe that, as Under Secretary
+Krebs talked about, there was a lack of cooperation--not
+cooperation but communication with Federal partners before that
+but I think since the EAC's founding in 2003 that we have
+helped States improve the process. So I think that as each
+election goes on that we will continually improve that process.
+ Miss Rice. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The Chair now
+recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. Katko.
+ Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
+congratulate you on becoming Chair of this committee and I am
+looking forward to working with you and Mr. Rogers and I know
+based on past experience with you that we will continue the
+fine bipartisan work on this committee that I wish the rest of
+Congress would engage in.
+ Mr. Krebs, it is nice to meet you. I am now the Ranking
+Member of the Cybersecurity Subcommittee and in that capacity I
+think we will become well-acquainted with each other going
+forward.
+ I was heartened, Mr. Krebs, about what you said in your
+testimony today and what you said in your written testimony,
+that there has been no evidence to date that any identified
+activities of a foreign government or a foreign agent had a
+material impact on the integrity or security of election
+infrastructure or political or campaign infrastructure in the
+2018 midterms. That is a great thing.
+ But, I also kind-of took pause by what you said that
+election security has come a long way, but it bears additional
+measures. One of the things that you mentioned was
+auditability.
+ I want to make sure I understand a little bit more in
+depth, what are some of the additional measures you think we
+should be taking to makes sure that we do the best we can to
+secure our elections?
+ Mr. Krebs. So, I continue to believe and that--and
+Secretary Neilson has been consistent with this as well, but
+voter verifiable paper trails are critical elements of
+auditability. In that--after-election audit processes, and I
+don't want to stipulate to any specific type of audit, there
+are a number and variety of audits that could be implemented
+based on the systems that are in place, but those are two
+elements.
+ Mr. Katko. Mr. Hicks, is there anything you want to add to
+that?
+ Mr. Hicks. I believe that the States in 2018, when they
+submitted their request for funds to us, allocated over $20
+million to go toward the auditability of elections. There are
+many different ways to audit elections, and then as we move
+forward, the EAC has done a paper on 6 ways to do audits and I
+hope that States take advantage of those resources.
+ Mr. Katko. Now, Mr. Hicks, you also mentioned that as part
+of the process of review, you wanted to look all the way
+through the voter registration process. Could you explain the
+different steps you would like to look at as far as doing your
+audits of the election security?
+ Mr. Hicks. So, it is basically to go, and it is not just
+depending on audits, it is basically to go from voter
+registration and list maintenance to ensure that the folks who
+are on the rolls are the people who are assigned to that.
+ Many States have gone toward on-line voter registration
+through the DMVs and other aspects. Some States have gone to
+automatic voter registration, and then you go toward polling
+places to ensure that people have access to the polls to make
+sure that the ramps for those who have disabilities and
+wheelchairs and so forth can still get in there and the height
+of the machines and so forth, to the poll worker training, I
+think that is a vital part. They are the front line of defense
+that we have in terms of Federal elections.
+ There is over a million requests for poll workers in each
+Presidential year that is always coming up short and I would
+like to see for--for more people to actually volunteer to be
+poll workers.
+ Then, toward election night reporting with the Associated
+Press, and other aspects as well. So, it goes from A to Z in
+terms of ensuring that our election process remains strong and
+that voters' confidence remains high.
+ Mr. Katko. Is there anything you might add to that Mr.
+Krebs?
+ Mr. Krebs. No, sir.
+ Mr. Katko. OK, another question I have is, what--do you--
+does the size of the State matter at all, as far as compliance
+with these issues and being active participants in them, No. 1?
+ No. 2, the nation-state actors, obviously we are concerned
+about them, the Iraqs--I mean the Irans and the Russians of the
+world and others. Is there other actors outside of that arena
+that you have potential--that have potential to disrupt around
+minor elections, Mr. Krebs?
+ Mr. Krebs. So, to your first question, we have the smallest
+State and the largest State engaging with us. So, I wouldn't
+characterize any sort of participation based on the size of the
+State.
+ In terms of the landscape of threat actors, certainly the
+big four or primarily, in this case, China, Russia, Iran have
+been active in foreign interference and influence operations.
+ But, generally speaking, in terms of cybersecurity issues
+writ large, we do see more blended operations, proxies,
+cutouts, things like that, so that is on the international
+landscape. It is just getting more complex, more of a blended
+environment.
+ Mr. Katko. Mr. Hicks, want to add to that?
+ Mr. Hicks. Thank you, sir. The--I believe that it is a
+misnomer that think that it is the States, but it is mostly the
+local election officials who are running the elections and it
+is usually one or two individuals. It is not the large counties
+that are basically targeted. It is usually the person who is
+not only handling the election, but they are driving the school
+bus, they are doing payroll, they are doing nine other
+different things, and so they are targeted.
+ So, we try to offer--we try to go out to the States and
+offer training as I.T. managers for election officials to their
+State conferences, because they are not always able to come to
+the District of Columbia to get that sort of training.
+ Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The Chair now
+recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Correa, for 5
+minutes.
+ Mr. Correa. Mr. Chairman--thank you Mr. Chairman. First of
+all, let me congratulate you on your chairmanship, sir. Wanted
+to also thank you for holding this most important hearing on
+our Democratic institutions, our voting system, the integrity
+of our votes goes to the heart of our Democratic system in this
+country. Thank you very much, sir.
+ First question I have is for Mr. Hicks. That is, during the
+recent Government shutdown, secretaries of state across the
+country were notified that conversations with the Department of
+Homeland Security would be suspended.
+ Can you tell me what the effects, negative, of the
+Government shutdown were, in terms of harming the security of
+our election system, given these next elections are just around
+the corner?
+ Mr. Hicks. I think that is more appropriate question for
+Under Secretary Krebs, with his discussions with Homeland
+Security.
+ Mr. Correa. Mr. Krebs.
+ Mr. Hicks. I would add that with the Government shutdown,
+we were furloughed. I was still working myself and then we have
+hired a CIO to ensure that our infrastructure in our office
+would remain high. We still had conversations with States and
+locals.
+ As I stated in my testimony, some of our delay, in terms of
+reporting out issues, have occurred because of the Government
+shutdown and our election voting administration survey, we are
+collecting that data to hopefully have that out to Congress by
+the end of June, but I am hoping that none of that will be
+delayed because of the shutdown.
+ Mr. Correa. Thank you. Mr. Krebs.
+ Mr. Krebs. Sir, so during the shut--there was no question
+there was an impact from the shutdown. During that 35-day
+period we continued to share intelligence, threat intelligence,
+as it came in. We continued to send indicators out to those
+Albert Sensors I mentioned earlier on. We continue to conduct
+analysis based on the information we had and the intelligence
+that we had.
+ In terms of the things that we had to pause, for one,
+meeting with new secretaries of state that were sworn in
+earlier in January; that was probably my biggest regret in
+terms of missed opportunities. We also had to pause some of the
+vulnerability assessments. We have since rescheduled those, and
+those are back on the books.
+ Then just general planning, in terms of the recent National
+Association of Secretaries of State and the State Election
+Director annual conference, content development for that
+engagement did have to slow. My sense of things, though, was we
+ramped back up, I placed election security as one of the top
+priorities for CISA as we restarted after the shutdown.
+ My sense of things is that we will be back on track, if not
+already back on track, for instance, we are already in the
+planning process for another National-level tabletop exercise
+this June. Last year we had 44 States in the District of
+Columbia. This year we hope to outdo even that.
+ Mr. Correa. Very quickly, cybersecurity, as it pertains to
+the census that exercise we do every 10 years, redistricting is
+based on the census, how secure do you think that data,
+redistricting data, census data is when it comes to cyber
+threats?
+ Mr. Krebs. We do work directly with the Census Bureau on
+protecting the system, particularly the 2020. So, happy to come
+back and provide you a little bit information and the
+committee----
+ Mr. Correa. That is a critical issue.
+ Mr. Krebs. Yes, sir.
+ Mr. Correa. Mr. Hicks.
+ Mr. Hicks. That is not one that the EAC focuses on. But I
+talk to our staff and get a clear answer for you sir.
+ Mr. Correa. But I presume that it is something on--on your
+plates--something on your radar that you are looking at, again,
+security of our census data?
+ Mr. Krebs. Absolutely. Yes sir. Like I said, we do work
+closely with the Census Bureau on this--the 2020 census.
+ Mr. Correa. Quickly, post-election audits, what would such
+audits look like? Would they be the same across the country?
+ Mr. Hicks. Those would not be the same across the country.
+What works in Rhode Island might not necessarily work in
+Washington State.
+ Mr. Correa. Is that because of the paper versus no-paper
+situation?
+ Mr. Hicks. No. It is just that there is different factors
+to it; the number of people, the way that they run elections.
+Some are townships. Some are counties, and so forth. It would
+be more of the type of machines that they use, and other
+aspects of it. But I believe that it is--that all States should
+be doing some sort of audits to ensure that the confidence of
+elections remain high.
+ Mr. Correa. Thank you. Just different machines, different
+outcomes, different standards, do you see us giving States
+rights here? The ability of States to choose whatever they want
+to purchase. Are we looking at moving toward more
+standardization?
+ Mr. Hicks. No. I think that States should purchase the
+machines that work best for them. I would equate it a little
+bit to purchasing a car. You might want a different type of
+car, but all of those cars should still have some sort of
+standards associated with it.
+ Mr. Correa. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield.
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. I now recognize the
+gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ratcliffe.
+ Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for holding
+this hearing. Securing election infrastructure is and
+rightfully should be one of the central priorities of this
+Congress, and certainly a priority for the American people.
+ I will say that I don't think that Title III of H.R. 1
+adequately brings forth solutions that effectively and
+efficiently addresses the issue of hardening election security,
+much less do so in a bipartisan manner.
+ I do want to start with you, Director Krebs. Good to see
+you again. One of the things that CISA is in a unique position
+to do now is it sits between the resources, and capabilities,
+and intelligence of the Federal Government, and the innovation
+that is happening in the private sector.
+ But one of the things that I have heard often over the last
+4 years, as the Chairman of the Cybersecurity Subcommittee, is
+that the amount of actionable intelligence, or information
+coming from the intelligence community, being provided to the
+private sector through DHS is not enough, or is not good
+enough, or is not timely enough, or is, in some respects, stale
+information. You and I have talked about that. I would be
+curious in your perspective, now as the director of CISA.
+Address, for me, the progress, with respect to that issue.
+ Mr. Krebs. Sir, thank you for the question. It is for sure,
+a continuous improvement process. We are better than--today
+than we were a couple of years ago. I do want to say that--that
+this election cycle, 2018, the time between 2016 and 2018
+really was a--for us, and the intelligence community and law
+enforcement, a forcing function to improve the way we go about
+doing business both, on intelligence, analysis, sharing,
+partnering on incident response, and other surge capabilities.
+ That we are going to be able to spin that out so the
+election community is supported, but so is every other sector;
+the grid, the financial sector. Every other critical
+infrastructure sector will benefit from the progress we have
+made, specific to the election community, over the last 2
+years. So net-net, we--there is progress there.
+ In terms of the specific information sharing, the--I
+mentioned those Albert Sensors. One of the things that we
+really worked closely with the intelligence community on was
+helping the I.C. understand what the information--the network
+defense requirements were of the community--of the election
+community so that they could refine their collection and
+analysis, and then push their refinements back out into the
+network defender space.
+ We have also conducted some studies, in terms of the
+indicators that we share through our automated indicator
+sharing program. Based on those studies, 30 percent of the
+indicators that are shared are unique and they have a unique
+shelf life, about 120 days.
+ That is one of my areas of focus for the agency, finding
+where we are unique. Finding where we have value-add, and we
+are not competing or supplanting a private-sector capability,
+but really action--taking action using those intelligence
+community capabilities.
+ Mr. Ratcliffe. So when we talk about the election
+infrastructure threat landscape, we talk about needing to
+provide our Federal partners, but also our State and local
+officials and private-sector vendors with the information and
+capabilities they need to better defend that infrastructure.
+ I noticed in your testimony you talked about DHS host--
+hosting a tabletop vote exercise, really for that purpose, in
+terms of identifying some of the best practices and areas for
+improvement on cyber incident planning, preparedness,
+identification, response, recovery, all of those things. What
+is your overall takeaway from that exercise? Was it impactful,
+and how so?
+ Mr. Krebs. So my sense of things is yes, it was impactful.
+I suggest you ask the next panel whether they found that
+useful--that exercise useful. But I think the numbers prove
+that it was at least a coordinating moment. That we got 44
+States and the District of Columbia participating over 3 days,
+in the middle of primary season, that in and of itself shows
+that the community is participating.
+ We also had social media companies. We had political
+parties. We had the defense--the Department of Defense, the
+intelligence community. We believe we can do better. So, we are
+going to do the tabletop to vote exercise again, as I
+mentioned, once again this summer.
+ But again, it really reinforced, for us, that any small
+piece of information that an election official finds they
+should share because that--a bunch of small things can add up
+to a big thing. That was, kind-of, along the see something, say
+something line, really trying to reinforce that information
+sharing, both ways, can lead to better defense across the
+systems.
+ Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Director. I see my time is
+expired. I yield back.
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The Chair
+recognizes the gentlelady from Michigan, Ms. Slotkin.
+ Ms. Slotkin. Good afternoon, and good morning. Thanks for
+being here, to both of you. I agree with my colleagues. I think
+election security has got to be one of the most bipartisan
+issues. We can all agree that threats to our democracy and the
+integrity of our democracy is a threat to our National
+security.
+ If we, as a people, do not believe in our system, all
+forward progress is lost. So I think it is an extremely
+important issue. I think that there are two pieces to it that I
+am worried about. One is actual election security, right? So
+the integrity of the actual systems and you have spoken to
+that.
+ But then, there is the perception that the elections,
+particularly in 2020, may not be fair and free, right? On both
+sides, regardless of what side you are on.
+ You have talked about good work that you are doing and I
+appreciate that but if you can just give us your sense on both
+issues, what is the one issue on both issues that keeps you up
+at night? What are you most worried about on election security
+actual integrity of our system and then on the perception,
+right, because I think for all the good work you have done,
+there is a huge group of people who are just ready to say, on
+both sides, that 2020 isn't going to be free and fair which is
+a deep--deeply concerning to me. So on election security and
+the perception that they are not secure, what keeps you up at
+night for both of you?
+ Mr. Krebs. So this question lasers right in on I think the
+biggest area of discussion that we need to have in the country
+right now. So first and foremost on the security of the
+systems, we have both mentioned it several times, the committee
+Members have mentioned it, we have got to get to auditability.
+That is--that is the key, understanding what is happening
+across the process is critically important.
+ On the perception, we did a lot of work throughout the 2018
+cycle on education and awareness not just in the voting public.
+Working with the EAC and some of the election associations, we
+issued guidance, awareness materials, reinforcing that go to
+trusted sources for information on elections. Those trusted
+sources are the elected officials at the State and local level.
+Go look at the State secretary's website for information on
+when you vote, how to register, what the deadlines are. Go to
+the source. Don't listen to whatever third party, fourth party,
+whatever you have--whatever have you which plays into the
+bigger part of we have to do more awareness building in this
+country and introduce critical thinking and reinforce critical
+thinking as we are just deluged with information. It is too
+easy to just click like and forward on. We have got to have
+people thinking, where is this information coming from? Why is
+it being served up to me? That continue--will continue to be
+one of our priorities going into 2020.
+ Mr. Hicks. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman. I
+agree with Secretary Krebs but I also wanted to add a couple of
+other things. One, election interference is nothing new. It was
+mostly done, you know, since--it has been done since we have
+had elections. Whether or not that is pamphlets saying
+Democrats vote on Wednesday, Republicans vote on Thursday or
+other access to the polls, but the things that I would want to
+focus in on for our--our agency is to ensure that all aspects
+are taken care of. One being access and also access for three
+different groups. One, our military and overseas voters who--
+who don't always have access to ballot boxes and so forth. Two,
+our disabled voters who might not be able to get access inside
+the polls themselves and the third would be language
+minorities.
+ Ms. Slotkin. So I know I have a very short time and thank
+you as a military spouse for ensuring that our military can
+vote. That is a big issue for our military community. So you
+both mentioned this--and the perception--the concern that the
+perception that these aren't free and fair elections, the role
+of social media, of news, of third sources passing along the
+wrong information. Can we--can you do your jobs without the
+social media companies doing more--particularly social media
+companies doing more to identify and disclose who is actually
+paying for some of the ads that are coming through? Who are
+actually, you know, originating and spreading this information?
+Can you help me understand their role in making your jobs
+harder or easier?
+ Mr. Krebs. So transparency for certain is key. I will say
+that the social media companies deserve some credit for what
+they did, how they stepped up in the 2018 cycle. On Election
+Day we had a National situational awareness, more room, both a
+virtual presence where all States and local jurisdictions were
+plugged in but we also had a physical presence at our facility
+in Virginia and the social media companies participated.
+ Now what that allowed us to do is win election officials,
+identified disinformation, misinformation, or just flat-out
+false information that was being passed around, videos that
+have been edited but saying, look this machine is changing my
+vote. It was immediately flagged for the social media
+companies. Social media companies were able to get the ground
+truth with the election official, they were able to pull down
+that false information because it was in violation of their
+terms of service and then the election official was out and
+able to say, here is what really happened. Don't believe that.
+So they--they played a part.
+ There is always much more to do here and keep in mind that
+the adversary will continue to pivot, pivot, pivot as we raise
+defenses and block off avenues.
+ Ms. Slotkin. Thank you gentlemen. I am almost immediately
+out of time so I appreciate it.
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The Chair now
+recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Walker.
+ Mr. Walker. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Director Krebs, is
+there any evidence of foreign interference in the 2018
+elections?
+ Mr. Krebs. So as I indicated in opening and my written, the
+statement issued by the DOJ and DHS last week indicated that
+there was no attributable--there was no evidence of
+attributable activity to a nation-state actor of material
+impact on the election.
+ Mr. Walker. Thanks for covering that again. I just want to
+make sure that we are on the record with that. Is there any
+evidence of domestic interference in the 2018 elections?
+ Mr. Krebs. I would have to defer you to the Department of
+Justice on that.
+ Mr. Walker. OK. How should we or how do we define
+interference? Is it just hacking and abusing voting systems or
+does it also include false or misleading political statements?
+ Mr. Krebs. Well I believe the way the 2016 intelligence
+community assessment broke things down, at least the way I look
+at foreign interference, it is consistent with that report,
+there is hack and lead campaigns that was targeting for
+instance in 2016 the DNC releasing sensitive e-mails. There is
+the social media campaign that disinformation trying to sow
+divisiveness across the community and then third is the actual
+technical cybersecurity operations focusing on election
+infrastructure.
+ It is important to note that anyone, any actor, could do
+any of those three things. It is just a matter of capability
+and then effectiveness.
+ Mr. Walker. I want to go to Commissioner Hicks before I ask
+my question. I do want to say Commissioner Hicks, I think that
+is the best baritone voice I have heard since Lou Rawls.
+ [Laughter.]
+ Mr. Walker. I don't know, maybe you could slow jam the
+election news with Jimmy Fallon sometimes, I don't know. But my
+question is, what separates interference from political free
+speech? Can you give us a line or describe the parameters
+there?
+ Mr. Hicks. That is a difficult question but thank you for
+the compliment by the way. The election assistance commission
+focused mostly in on the administration--the administration of
+elections. So we work with the States and local officials to
+help them administer the election in a way that ensures that
+confidence remains high, that there is no interference with the
+First Amendment rights of individuals or groups but to ensure
+that our role and we stay in our lane with that.
+ Mr. Walker. So from what I am understanding, it is a hard
+line to call or it is hard to interpret. Who ultimately does
+make that decision where it crosses over in being more just
+somebody's right or somebody's free speech rights versus
+someone else who would call that interference? How do we
+describe that--how do--how do--in moving forward how do you
+interpret that?
+ Mr. Hicks. Domestically, that would be the Department of
+Justice to make that determination.
+ Mr. Walker. All right, let me get a couple more--time for a
+couple more. Going to go back to Director Krebs, director,
+there were multiple reports of campaigns being hacked in 2018.
+What did the DHS provide in assistance in these instances?
+ Mr. Krebs. So, would have to defer to the Department of
+Justice and the FBI on any specifics of their engagements,
+whether they engaged in the campaigns. We provide our resources
+as a technical cybersecurity capability to anyone that is
+interested.
+ Any information that we had or picked up through press or
+through referrals from the Department of Justice, we would
+offer our services, that would be a vulnerability assessment,
+that would be an incidence response assessment and those sorts
+of things. Those relationships, as they come about, are
+sensitive, confidential, trusted relationships. But, generally
+speaking, we continue to provide information, incidence
+response capabilities.
+ Mr. Walker. Sure. I am sure they appreciate the support,
+but this--maybe just as a yes or no, are you aware that there
+were campaigns in 2018 that were hacked?
+ Mr. Krebs. I am aware of reports of campaigns having, for
+instance, spear phishing and things like that----
+ Mr. Walker. When you say you were aware of it, did you guys
+take a look at it? I know DOJ is lead on that, but from your
+organization, were you contacted to look into this any further
+or offer support on a campaign that was hacked?
+ Mr. Krebs. I would have to go back and look at the
+specifics of any campaign. We are aware of spear phishing
+events and things like that.
+ Mr. Walker. Help me understand, when you say got to go back
+and look. You are not aware or you were aware of some? You just
+don't remember?
+ Mr. Krebs. What I am unclear on right now is our actual
+engagements with any specific campaigns. Typically on things of
+that nature that the FBI has direct lead on engagement. We come
+back--we kind-of put out the fire so to speak.
+ Mr. Walker. If we provided maybe 2 to 3 weeks, is that
+possible? I would love to have----
+ Mr. Krebs. Certainly, I would follow up, yes, sir.
+ Mr. Walker. I would appreciate that. Last question, to your
+knowledge does H.R. 1 addresses campaign security?
+ Mr. Krebs. I would have to go and dig into H.R. 1. I have
+been focusing on the election infrastructure piece. We always
+provide assistance to political campaigns, political
+infrastructure. So, whether it is included in H.R. 1 or not, we
+will always provide assistance.
+ Mr. Walker. OK, thank you so much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
+I yield back.
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes the
+gentlelady from New Jersey, Mrs. Watson Coleman.
+ Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I am concerned
+about reports that election vendors don't fix vulnerabilities
+once they have been made aware of them, and then, in fact, it
+is not just recognizing a vulnerability and then reporting it
+and not having it dealt with, but even years have been
+involved. What role does the EAC have in making sure vendors
+are taking steps to remedy vulnerabilities when they find them?
+ Mr. Hicks. If a vendor is--thank you, Congresswoman, for
+the question. If a vendor is a registered vendor with the EAC,
+they have a certain amount of time to report errors with their
+machines to us and fix those vulnerabilities.
+ Mrs. Watson Coleman. If they don't? If they don't fix them?
+ Mr. Hicks. Then we don't have enforcement authority, in
+terms of fining and so forth, but we can go toward the
+decertification of their voting equipment.
+ Mrs. Watson Coleman. Does that mean that then no one can
+purchase their voting equipment?
+ Mr. Hicks. Then it would not be certified under EAC
+standards.
+ Mrs. Watson Coleman. So, no one could purchase and use
+their voting equipment?
+ Mr. Hicks. If someone--since it is a voluntary system,
+folks could still purchase that equipment and use it.
+ Mrs. Watson Coleman. To what extent have we knowledge of
+that kind of a problem?
+ Mr. Hicks. If they are--voting machines are basically
+computers. So if there are patches that need to be made, then
+those are acknowledged and then fixed.
+ Mrs. Watson Coleman. But, to what extent do we know of it
+being a problem where a vendor has been given sufficient notice
+and still has neglected to fix these things?
+ Mr. Hicks. I have----
+ Mrs. Watson Coleman. Is that a pervasive problem? Is that a
+rare problem?
+ Mr. Hicks. I am not aware of any issues to that degree.
+ Mrs. Watson Coleman. Do you think that we need some kind of
+enforcement authority in some entity, I don't know which one it
+would be, that would compel those types of vendors to correct
+the situation?
+ Mr. Hicks. If Congress gave us that authority, then we
+would, like we have with all of the issues with the Help
+America Vote Act, we would act accordingly.
+ Mrs. Watson Coleman. I know that--I know that a lot of work
+is being done with States and secretaries of state, I am
+wondering--in my State there are 21 counties and the counties
+are basically the entities that run the elections and the
+municipalities carry out.
+ To what extent is there this guarantee that the information
+sharing, the training, the cybersecurity guidance gets down to
+those levels? What is the mechanism to do that? Or do you deal
+directly with the local and county officials that deal with the
+elections?
+ Mr. Krebs. So, specific to the cybersecurity information-
+sharing piece and the technical assistance piece, you have
+highlighted an area that we recognize needs additional
+attention. Last year the Elections Infrastructure ISAC, the
+Information Sharing Analysis Center, had 1,400 local
+jurisdictions.
+ My understanding, and the number seems to change regularly,
+but somewhere in between 8,800 and 10,000 voting jurisdictions
+across the country. Some--and that is below the county,
+precincts, voting spots, so we are looking at scalable,
+repeatable ways that we can engage each and every one of them.
+For instance, deploying or providing information, I.T. manager
+training for election officials.
+ As Commissioner Hicks mentioned, these devices, these
+voting--this voting equipment, the process, the databases, they
+are computers. So, election officials sometimes, sole officials
+end up having to be I.T. managers as well.
+ So, it is important that we provide them the support, the
+training, what to look for in terms of phishing e-mails and
+things like that, how to apply patches, how to work with
+vendors and ask the right questions. But, for us, one of our
+top priorities in the run up to 2020 is extending out from that
+1,400 and the rest of the----
+ Mrs. Watson Coleman. So the--thank you. I am sorry. The
+HAVA money that was already allocated, that is allocated, it is
+in the hands in of the various States and jurisdictions, right?
+ Mr. Hicks. There were two rounds of HAVA money. One that
+were submitted in 2003 and then the 2018 HAVA funds. The 2018
+HAVA funds have all been distributed to all the 55
+jurisdictions.
+ Mrs. Watson Coleman. So, we do we have an understanding
+about how much more money we need in order to ensure that the
+right voting machines, the appropriate voting machines that
+have the verifiability in them, would cost?
+ Mr. Hicks. The--from my travels around the country, from
+what I have heard from individual States in terms of replacing
+all the voting equipment, can run from between half a billion
+to $1 billion.
+ Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. I yield back.
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The Chair now
+recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Higgins.
+ Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am honored to serve
+on this committee again with you, sir. You are a solid patriot.
+With your leadership, and that of Ranking Member Rogers, I
+believe our committee will always move forward. Contentious,
+though, at times, we may be. We will be focused on the security
+of our homeland and we will get things done.
+ Mr. Krebs, the voting systems that we are discussing today,
+explain to America--my research says that there is somewhere
+over 174,000 voting precincts in America. Is that true?
+ Mr. Krebs. I would have to defer to Commissioner Hicks on--
+--
+ Mr. Higgins. Is that true sir?
+ Mr. Hicks. Yes, sir.
+ Mr. Higgins. So you have got a lot of voting precincts.
+Article I Section 4 of our Constitution gives a station--States
+and local jurisdictions State legislature authority,
+specifically to the time, place, and manner of holding
+elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed
+by each State by the legislature thereof.
+ So you are dealing with over 174,000 small communities. The
+voting systems we are discussing and the integrity thereof
+regarding cyber threat, is it true that most of these systems
+are--are independent? They are electronic. They are analog.
+They are not connected to the internet at all. They are--they
+are--they are in high schools and in gymnasiums across America,
+and cafeterias at elementary schools. They are rolled out,
+secured, and plugged in. They are not connected to the internet
+at all.
+ Mr. Krebs. So there is, obviously, a range of equipment out
+there from various vendors. The general best practice is yes,
+they should be air-gapped. They should not be----
+ Mr. Higgins. There you go.
+ Mr. Krebs. I use that term----
+ Mr. Higgins. I just wanted to clarify that. We are dealing
+with scores of thousands of individual voting systems, most of
+which are--are not actually connected to the internet. Now, the
+threat is real and should be--should be addressed, certainly.
+This committee will do our job regarding election security.
+ In the densely populated areas there is--obviously, a
+threat to a single precinct would be more significant,
+regarding numbers, as opposed to more rural areas. Is that
+correct?
+ Mr. Krebs. I think the threats can vary. There are
+certainly situations where a more densely populated--could pose
+a higher risk.
+ Mr. Higgins. In other words, a small percentage of error
+interference would have a greater affect on numbers in more a
+densely populated area, and a more heavily voted precinct.
+ Mr. Krebs. It is possible.
+ Mr. Higgins. So it is a landscape across our Nation that we
+must serve. In my opinion, and those of my colleagues, I
+believe on both sides of the aisle, we need to move forward
+carefully. The--the cyber threats themselves--now that we have,
+sort-of, categorized what we have got. Nation-states, rogue
+states, bad actors like Russia, Iran, China, North Korea versus
+a criminal element; organized crime.
+ How would you differentiate between the cyber attempt to
+interfere with an election by a nation-state versus a cyber
+attempt to interfere with an election by a criminal element
+within a nation-state?
+ Mr. Krebs. So at this point, I think given the way the
+threat environment has blended, and you have hybrid threat
+actors. I am not sure that there is much of a distinction
+between nation-states and criminal elements.
+ Mr. Higgins. Exactly. It--and in times past during the Cold
+War--are you familiar if you are a student of history,
+gentlemen? That rogue states, some of our enemies across the
+world attempted to influence public opinion and policy with
+pamphlets, and flyers, and illegal radio broadcasts into
+territories. Is that correct?
+ Mr. Krebs. Yes, sir.
+ Mr. Higgins. So wouldn't that take--wouldn't that reflect,
+in the modern era, using social media, and the attempt to
+influence public opinion, and perhaps elections in that way?
+ Mr. Krebs. As--as we saw----
+ Mr. Higgins. So this is nothing new, is it?
+ Mr. Krebs. Well, as we saw in 2016, there were technical
+lone network operations, as well as influence campaigns. Those
+activities--the influence campaigns, in particular, continue
+today.
+ Mr. Higgins. Right.
+ Mr. Krebs. It is not just Russia.
+ Mr. Higgins. It continues today, and we need to adapt to
+the changing time. I thank you gentlemen for doing both.
+ Mr. Hicks, as an American should--in your opinion sir, do
+you think that a voting precinct, again, of over 174,000 in our
+country that has never had an issue and have never had a
+complaint; they have the Constitutional rights to run their own
+elections. These--this would include local and State elections,
+as well as Federal, of course. Do you think a voting precinct
+that has never had an issue or a problem with their system
+should be forced by the Federal Government to spend money and
+invest in manpower, and change, and--and receive interference
+from the Federal Government? I will leave you to answer, sir.
+ Mr. Hicks. Thank you for the question. I wanted to clarify
+one quick thing, it is 8,000 jurisdictions across the country,
+and then the voting precincts are what you are referring to.
+ I wouldn't necessarily say that there has never been any
+issues with any of those voting precincts. There are issues
+with every election, as we go--move forward. That is just the
+nature of elections. But we need to address and adapt to each
+issue as they arise.
+ Mr. Higgins. Well stated, sir. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
+Thank you for your indulgence.
+ Chairman Thompson. The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady
+from New York, Ms. Clarke.
+ Ms. Clarke. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank our
+Ranking Member, and I thank you gentlemen for appearing before
+us today. As a follow-up to a question my colleague, Ms. Bonnie
+Watson Coleman of New Jersey, asked: How is DHS and EAC
+prioritizing outreach to the local governments--local level?
+ Mr. Hicks. Well, the former president of the National
+Association of State Election Directors was actually from New
+Jersey. We worked really closely with him, and all other
+States, to ensure that the process was moving forward. So it is
+a high priority for us. It is one we take seriously, but it is
+not our only priority.
+ Mr. Krebs. DHS's No. 1 priority; more State--more local
+engagement.
+ Ms. Clarke. Very well. There seem to be areas where State
+and local election officials have not yet resolved low-hanging
+fruit issues of their election security; for instance, the use
+of wireless modems to transmit election results. These
+practices needlessly introduce vulnerabilities into the
+process.
+ What do you perceive as some of the low-hanging fruit in
+securing election operations? Might stronger, more vocal
+leadership from Federal partners like DHS, or EAC, or even the
+White House, move the needle on those issues?
+ Mr. Krebs. So over the last couple of years we have
+conducted a number of vulnerability assessments, 26 plus
+jurisdictions, State and local. We have also conducted remote
+penetration testing.
+ The interesting thing that we found was that, of all of
+those assessments, the findings were generally similar;
+unpatched systems, misconfigured systems, lack of multi-factor
+authentication.
+ So what happened is we took a lot of that learning across
+those assessments, worked with the Government Coordinating
+Council, which is State, local, EAC, the intelligence
+community, law enforcement, and put together when Congress
+appropriated that $300 million to the last HAVA tranche of
+money, and provided some expenditure guidance.
+ So our sense of things is that we have been pushing out
+those best practices. But there is certainly more to do. On the
+point of the modems and I used air quotes when I said air gap
+on a lot of the equipment.
+ Yes, there is equipment still out there that has modems. It
+is only used in very discrete circumstances. Nonetheless,
+absolutely that is why I used my air quotes there. It is a best
+practice to disable or remove that capability.
+ In some cases there was simply no other alternative for
+jurisdictions in the 2018. So that capability was limited but
+left in place. Auditability can also help identify and spot any
+irregularities.
+ But my sense and understanding is going forward that
+continues to be one of those priority actions. Low-hanging
+fruit as you mentioned.
+ Mr. Hicks. Thank you again. I think that it goes from A to
+Z, from voter registration all the way to election night
+reporting. That all aspects of election should have some sort
+of security to it.
+ We have talked a lot about cybersecurity but I also think
+that physical should also remain high. Also we should continue
+with our quest to have all elections being audited because then
+it remains--the confidence of the election remains high.
+ The way that those audits are conducted can be done by each
+individual State. But I believe that, in my own personal
+opinion, that we need to ensure that we do all we can to afford
+confidence of the--the system. Because what I have said in 2016
+and 2018, if you don't vote then your vote definitely will not
+count.
+ Ms. Clarke. Well, I think part of the challenge too is at
+the local level, just the level of proficiency of the use of
+the technologies of the individuals who were employed to
+administer these elections.
+ I don't know whether you are getting a true sense of that
+across the length and breadth and depth of our Nation. But I
+can tell you that there have been a lot of senior citizens that
+have this as a preferred profession.
+ Not to disparage anyone but they tend to be a little bit
+less concerned about cyber hygiene. So I think that there just
+needs to be a consistent outreach to these local jurisdictions
+in helping folks to really be trained and vigilant around the
+work that they do.
+ Just one more question. I know that we had talked about
+five jurisdictions that have paperless voting. I wanted to be
+corrected if I am wrong, but the only record that the votes
+cast on these machines is a digital record stored on the voting
+machines themselves, which means if the machine is hacked,
+election officials have no paper ballot they can count on by
+hand to determine how the voter really voted. Is that correct?
+ Mr. Hicks. It is a lot more detailed than that because all
+these systems have more than one redundancy for back up in
+their--in their systems. So----
+ Ms. Clarke. But if it is hacked how would you know?
+ Mr. Hicks. Well, it could be stolen as well. So there is
+all aspects of machines could be--you do a forensic scan of
+those machines to ensure that the ballots are counted
+correctly.
+ Ms. Clarke. So to the best of your knowledge, were any of
+these paperless voting machines used by States in 2018
+elections running software that was out of date with known
+exploitable cybersecurity flaws?
+ Mr. Hicks. I would have to go to my staff to see what the
+actual scanning of those districts were because it is not just
+those 5 individual States. There are other jurisdictions around
+the country as well.
+ Ms. Clarke. It would be good if you could get back to us
+with that. It is very important as you talk about auditability
+that we are exact in what--how these machines can be exploited.
+ Mr. Hicks. I would also point to the fact that a lot of
+these States are moving away from machines that don't have a
+paper component to them.
+ Ms. Clarke. We want to expedite that right? Thank you. I
+yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. Chair now
+recognizes the gentlelady from Arizona, Mrs. Lesko.
+ Mrs. Lesko. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thanks for calling me a
+young lady. I really like that.
+ [Laughter.]
+ Mrs. Lesko. I got to hang around here more often. My first
+question is for Mr. Krebs and thank you both for being here.
+ You know we have talked--hit on this a little bit with Mr.
+Walker but there was a lot of media--there still is a lot of
+media out there about how the Russians allegedly interfered in
+the 2016 election and I think we found out that a lot of it had
+to do with social media misinformation.
+ To Ms. Slotkin's points that a lot has to do with
+perception, if voters believe that their votes count and they
+are not being compromised. To your knowledge, was there any
+evidence or is there any evidence that the Russians or anybody
+else hacked into the actual election system and changed the
+outcome of the election on Election Day?
+ Mr. Krebs. Ma'am, I am not aware of any evidence that they
+had access or ability to influence the casting, counting
+tabulation.
+ Mrs. Lesko. Thank you. The reason I think that is important
+is because there is a lot of confusion out there and--so we
+need to make sure that when we talk to people that we are not
+talking about actual hacking into the election system is what
+the media is talking about.
+ However, we want to prevent it in the future of course. My
+next question is actually for Mr. Hicks and this was touched on
+briefly by the Ranking Member Rogers. That was about the money
+in this bill that is going toward certain things.
+ So the Democrat's Congressional Task Force on Election
+Security recommended $300 million for States to acquire these
+paper ballot systems, conduct audits, address cyber
+vulnerabilities, provide cybersecurity training to local and
+State election officials, institute cybersecurity best
+practices, and to make other improvements to effect Federal
+election security. Through the Help America Vote Act Congress
+appropriated $380 million in grants for fiscal year 2018 for
+these purposes.
+ This bill, H.R. 1, which we are talking about today,
+authorizes $1.77 billion in grants. So why do we need to give
+States an extra $1.77 billion to do the same thing that in this
+task force they said they could achieve with $300 million?
+ Mr. Hicks. The States--from the States that I have--I have
+traveled to all 50 States in the last 4 years or so and the
+States have all indicated that elections--Federal elections
+occur every 2 years and that the replacement of voting
+equipment from the 2002, 2003 initial HAVA funds need to be
+done.
+ The money that was put into the Help America Vote Act funds
+for 2018 did not just go toward machines. They went toward
+Title I, which gave States a lot of leeway into improving the
+vote--the voting process.
+ Whether or not that was voter registration, audits,
+communications, just to--and other aspects as well.
+ Mrs. Lesko. So, Mr. Chair, and Mr. Hicks, so I don't know
+if you answered do you--why--why if it--in one report it said
+you need only $300 million but this one is $1.77 billion. Do
+you know why?
+ Mr. Hicks. I don't know why, but I believe that they were
+going toward one aspect of the process in terms of--and I have
+to read back through the report, but I would--I am assuming
+that it was one aspect of what they were looking at as opposed
+to overall with H.R. 1. Because I believe that they were just
+looking toward certain machines, but I believe that maybe H.R.
+1 covers a lot more than just the one aspect of it.
+ Mrs. Lesko. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chair, I yield
+back my time.
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much, as a point of
+clarification the $1.8 billion was for over 10 year's period of
+time, so it was not just 380--a one-shot deal. So it is in
+anticipation that upgrading will be a constant rather than just
+standing for one time.
+ Chair recognizes the gentleman from Rhode Island, former
+Secretary of State, Mr. Langevin.
+ Mr. Langevin. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Director and Mr.
+Hicks thank you very much for being here and for your testimony
+and Mr. Krebs I want to thank you also--thank you for the work
+you are doing at CISA, I am glad that agency has been
+reorganized and properly tasked, and I look forward to work
+with you, and supporting you in your work.
+ Obviously this is one of the most important issues that we
+are facing as a country, has been securing our elections from
+foreign adversaries that want to try to undermine and sow
+discord. They have got a pretty effective, well-coordinated
+campaign that we have to obviously have to get even better
+organized and I know that we will.
+ So I want to thank you and Assistant Director Manfra for
+your support, particularly in my home State of Rhode Island. I
+had attended one of the final planning meetings before the
+election with our Secretary of State Nellie Gorbea, who
+testified before this committee, along with you.
+ Also the DHS personnel in the room made vital contributions
+to that discussion, and as someone who has overhauled an entire
+State election system, I understand the challenges of having
+the best equipment and making sure that it works well. When I
+reorganized and overhauled our election system we didn't have
+to deal with the issue of course of cybersecurity and threats
+from foreign adversaries trying to undermine us.
+ So let me just say, one of the topics that came out of that
+meeting was coordination with media. We have seen how
+effectively the Russians, for example in targeting Ukraine
+elections, went right to the media and trying to sow discord
+and confusion in election processes. How have you engaged with
+local, State, and National media outlets to ensure that
+unofficial voting--vote reporting is protected from malicious
+interference?
+ Mr. Krebs. So a couple examples I think that are
+instructive of the progress we have made, particularly with the
+National media, but also local and State-level media. Two
+things, one in advance--2 weeks in advance of the election we
+held a media tabletop exercise, just like what we did with the
+State, and local election officials we brought in a couple
+dozen media representatives, sat in a room, 4 hours, walked
+through a scenario that included both technical on-network
+effects as well as social media influence operations.
+ We walked through here is what you would see, here is what
+you would hear from a State or a local election official, here
+is what you would hear from the Federal Government and what the
+Federal Government would be doing whether it was DHS, the FBI,
+the intelligence community--and help them understand what was
+going on in the background.
+ So that, if something did happen, they would have the basis
+of understanding, they would know A, who to call, but also
+rather than say, oh there was a denial-of-service attack
+against an election night reporting website. We would be able
+to have a conversation and say, actually it is not that--
+instead it is simply a configuration issue and that website
+dropped.
+ The second thing we did is on Election Day every 3 hours
+over the course of the election we had a conference call with
+National media. The same thing, we would walk through issues as
+they popped up over the course of the day.
+ Oftentimes we referred them to the local or State election
+official to address the questions, but where we could chip in
+and provide some clarification. Really the important thing was
+getting ahead of issues and dispelling any sort of doubt, or
+questions about what may be happening in the background. We
+found it to be very beneficial in terms of getting ahead of
+problems before they really started.
+ Mr. Langevin. OK, thank you. Is--another topic, as
+Commissioner Hicks mentioned on this testimony, I know that
+Representative Slotkin has touched upon this as well.
+ Obviously public confidence and the integrity of our
+elections is a vital component of our democracy and following
+the 2016 elections, American voters reported a decrease in
+confidence in the election systems, and outcomes and it is
+exactly playing to the hands of what our adversaries want to
+try to accomplish here. But election security, particularly
+cybersecurity, is certain an important aspect of increasing
+confidence, but it is not sufficient.
+ So who right now in the interagency has the role of
+coordinating protection of election integrity, and its
+perception thereof, and who--which cybersecurity is just a
+part?
+ Mr. Krebs. So in terms of the interagency process, the FBI
+and the Department of Justice have the responsibility to lead
+on countering foreign influence, and that is the social media
+campaigns, that is the direct response--the threat response
+piece. So as things bubble up, or pop up they work with
+partners to address and--immediately address head-on.
+ The Department of Homeland Security's role here is in terms
+of--is more on the lines of educating awareness, building--
+taking case studies that we saw in 2016--or even before that
+that we have seen the Russians do, that we have seen the
+Chinese do. Then pushing awareness and information out on--
+these are the sorts of things that you need to look for. Here
+are the things that you can do to ensure you are getting ground
+truth and you are getting the right information.
+ Again, going back to the elections, just as Chairman Hicks
+mentioned, it is--you need to listen to your State and local
+election official, they are the ones that have the official
+information. They are the ones that are going to tell you where
+to go, what day to vote. Don't listen to the text messages,
+don't listen to the tweets, or posts or whatever.
+ Mr. Langevin. So do you believe that--and you talk about
+who the lead is, but you believe that there should be a whole-
+of-Government approach, or should it be silos based on
+experience?
+ Mr. Krebs. So it is certainly cliche but this is a whole-
+of-Nation approach. There is a specific role for a number of
+agencies, including the intelligence community using their
+specific authorities, whether it is the Bureau and their law
+enforcement capabilities, whether it is the Department of
+Homeland Security and our unique convening capabilities.
+ One thing I will note is that when some of the social media
+companies over the course of the election took action and took
+down, whether it was Iranian activity or whatever, we were able
+to work with the FBI, work with the social media companies,
+convene the State and local election officials in a call or
+even a Classified briefing and get--and have them walk through,
+here is what happened, here is what you need to be on the
+lookout for.
+ So there is a role in this for everyone. There is a role in
+this for every American, and--and it is upon us, particularly
+the Department, to give them the awareness, the tools to be
+smarter consumers of information.
+ Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The Chair now
+recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Green.
+ Mr. Green of Tennessee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
+Member. I extensively reviewed H.R. 1 in my previous committee
+hearing on Oversight and Government Reform. I certainly believe
+that election security is critical. Ms. Slotkin did a very nice
+job of saying--speaking about it, and I am impressed. I have to
+tell you, I am very impressed with what you have done in the
+2018 cycle--essentially flawless.
+ There were no penetrations that we are aware of--and we
+have to be able to do that. We--our democracy rests on one
+person, one vote. But with regards to this H.R. 1, I am going
+to be completely upfront and say that I am disappointed by the
+Majority party because it seems to have disregarded our
+Constitution.
+ They claim the purpose of the bill is to protect our
+institutions, but they are promoting a bill that fails to
+improve security, all while thumbing the nose--or its nose to
+Federalism. Our country was not made for a few hundred people
+in Washington, DC to dictate to my State in Tennessee how we
+are going to do everything, including our elections.
+ Our founders, our Constitution, our electoral process have
+been grounded in Federalism. This bedrock is the foundation of
+our country, and it has to be protected. When power is
+concentrated in the hands of a few, tyranny inevitably follows.
+Our founders knew this; that is why they created, you know,
+three branches of Government.
+ They created separation between the Federal Government, the
+States, the local government--recall the 10th Amendment. I want
+to thank you again for the hard work that resulted in such
+success in 2018, and I, from the previous questions that were
+asked, assume you have not read H.R. 1. Is that correct?
+ Mr. Krebs. I have reviewed it, yes.
+ Mr. Green of Tennessee. You have reviewed it? OK. Can you
+tell me, then, in a more global sense, how far should the
+Federal Government be able to go in telling Tennessee how we
+run our elections? Considering specifically, what was read
+earlier from my colleague, about what the Constitution says
+concerning elections.
+ Mr. Krebs. I--so every State is different; every
+jurisdiction's different, every set of equipment's going to be
+different. I would defer to Secretary Hargett to decide what is
+best for the citizens of Tennessee.
+ But whatever I can do, as the Department of Homeland
+Security, to make his job easier--the thing I will note, and it
+has been part of the conversation throughout the morning, that
+the threat landscape is different today in 2019 than it was in
+2001, with HAVA and even before that. Back then, we were
+focused on--the Department was focused on an antiterrorism
+mission.
+ Today, we have the most active nation-state adversary
+landscape, certainly in my lifetime. That means that individual
+States, individual counties, individual precincts cannot go it
+alone against the full-frontal assault of the Russian GRU or
+the Russian FSB. So I need to be able to provide whatever
+capabilities I can so that we can assure a collective defense
+across election security.
+ Mr. Green of Tennessee. Yes, but the--the--as you have
+reviewed H.R. 1, I am sure you know that it tells Tennessee we
+can't have voter identification; it tells us we--we can allow
+voter registration to happen on the day of the election with no
+way to verify it.
+ That seems to me to be a violation of the Constitution, as
+has been read and is clearly articulated in the 10th Amendment.
+That is more than just security; that is dictating how we run
+our elections in Tennessee.
+ Quite honestly, that is offensive to us down in Tennessee.
+For Mr. Hicks, I do have a question, sir. You said there is
+about 8,000 jurisdictions, if I understood correctly. How many
+of those jurisdictions are identical? They do elections
+identical to one or the other?
+ Mr. Hicks. That would be a difficult question to answer. I
+believe that, you know, each individual jurisdiction conducts
+their elections the way that they feel best for those
+constituents in their jurisdiction.
+ But the Election Assistance Commission goes to these--once
+invited, goes to these States and jurisdictions to offer our
+assistance, whether or not that is the $380 million that
+Congress appropriated or other aspects through our clearing
+house or other aspects of it, because those jurisdictions might
+not know techniques or things that are being done in other
+jurisdictions. But we bring that to them so they can run their
+elections effectively.
+ Mr. Green of Tennessee. Well, thank you for that answer,
+and I really appreciate it. My issue isn't so much with you
+not--with your help--we want your help; it is essential to
+protecting--but dictating how we run our elections in
+Tennessee, that is a little different. That is my point. Thank
+you very much.
+ Chairman Thompson. The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady
+from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.
+ Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for this
+hearing. Along with the Ranking Member, we are appreciative for
+a hearing that indicates one of the strongest elements of
+democracy is the independent right of every American to cast
+their vote, unimpeded, unsuppressed, and unoppressed.
+ Let me ask you, Commissioner Hicks--and thank you for the
+Election Assistance Commission. In 2016, I believe then-
+Secretary Jeh Johnson joined with 16 other agencies,
+intelligence agencies, as I recall, the fall of the election to
+indicate a conspicuous engagement of Russia into the elections.
+ Let me just read a sentence--E-Deceptive Campaign Practices
+Report 2010; Electronic Privacy Information Center. They are,
+however, talking generally about what deceptive campaigns or
+attempts to misdirect targeted voters, regarding the voting
+process, or in some way affect their willingness to cast a
+vote.
+ Deceptive election activities include false statements
+about polling place opening and closing times the date of the
+election--voter identification rules or the eligibility
+requirements for voters who wish to cast a vote. I think the
+intelligence report was focused on targeting voters, misleading
+information, social media, do you believe, based on those
+intelligence reports at that time--you are aware of that
+report, elective report, in 2016?
+ Mr. Hicks. I am aware of it.
+ Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you believe the reports, first of all,
+Mr. Johnson joined in that report ahead of the Department of
+Homeland Security?
+ Mr. Hicks. I have no reason to believe that that was false.
+ Ms. Jackson Lee. So in that--and Mr. Krebs?
+ Mr. Krebs. Yes, ma'am; I agree with the intelligence
+community assessment.
+ Ms. Jackson Lee. So we know that there is, among others--
+and we certainly know that Russia is--looms large as having
+intentions to interfere with our elections. That means Federal
+elections, but Federal elections are held in States. We are a
+collective of 50 States, so we know that that--they would be
+impacted.
+ In that kind of report and the efforts that you all have,
+do you see States willing to accept your assistance, and in
+what way is the best way that you are helping States
+acknowledge their own plight, if you will, of susceptibility to
+this kind of intrusion?
+ Mr. Hicks. I believe State--thank you, Congresswoman--I
+believe States have come to the Federal Government more so than
+they were before because there was a little bit of a hesitation
+that way. But I believe that communication has improved to the
+point where States are giving their input through the
+Government coordinating council, working with vendors and other
+aspects of that through the sector-specific council to ensure
+that the election integrity remains high.
+ Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me, because my time is short, go to
+the cybersecurity for both of you to ask or Director Krebs you
+can start with this. Cybersecurity involves everything from
+large systems to small mobile devices. My question is about a
+host of technologies Classified as edge devices that may have
+internet connections. How concerned should you be about edge
+devices and election technology security?
+ Mr. Krebs. So we----
+ Ms. Jackson Lee. We could be concerned.
+ Mr. Krebs. Yes, ma'am. I briefly touched on some of those
+equipments that have modem or other telecommunications
+connectivity, best practice generally speaking is to disable or
+remove that sort of capability. In 2018 some just didn't have
+the time or the equipment to transition out. But it is
+something that across the risk profile of election
+infrastructure, it is something that we work on. We work with
+the State and local officials that have that equipment and we
+work on transitioning and road mapping to more secure systems.
+ Ms. Jackson Lee. To each of you, do you feel, in spite of
+your good works, that our election systems, State and Federal,
+are still in jeopardy of intrusion?
+ Mr. Hicks. I believe that there can always be improvements
+to be made and I believe that the work of the EAC can help with
+those improvements.
+ Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you feel that would be foreign
+intrusions----
+ Mr. Krebs. Yes. There is always progress that can be made.
+ Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me ask the Chairman to submit into the
+record from the Brennan Center for Justice a study on securing
+elections from foreign interference, ask unanimous consent.
+ Chairman Thompson. Without objection.
+ [The information referred to follows:]
+ Letter Submitted For the Record by Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee
+ February 12, 2019.
+Representative Jackson Lee,
+2079 Rayburn HOB, Washington, DC 20515.
+ Dear Representative Jackson Lee: My name is Lawrence Norden, and I
+am the Deputy Director of Democracy at The Brennan Center for Justice
+at NYU School of Law. First, please extend the Brennan Center's thanks
+to Chairman Thompson and the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security
+for holding tomorrow's hearing on Election Security, an issue of
+critical national importance. For nearly 15 years, I have led the
+Brennan Center's extensive work on election security and foreign
+interference. In 2005, in response to growing public concern over the
+security of new electronic voting systems, I chaired a task force (the
+``Security Task Force'') of the nation's leading technologists,
+election experts, and security professionals assembled by the Brennan
+Center to analyze the security and reliability of the nation's
+electronic voting machines.\1\
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ \1\ Lawrence Norden, The Machinery of Democracy: Voting System,
+Security, Accessibility, Usability, and Cost, Brennan Center for
+Justice, 46, 2006, https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/
+publications/Machinery_Democracy.pdf.
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ In the 14 years since, I have authored or co-authored numerous
+studies on the security, usability, cost, and design of our election
+systems. In 2017, with my colleague Ian Vandewalker, I co-authored
+Securing America's Elections from Foreign Interference, which looks at
+the key steps we must take to ensure our elections are secure, free,
+and fair.\2\ The report begins with a foreword from Ambassador R. James
+Woolsey, former Director of Central Intelligence, and I have attached
+it to this letter.* With the 2020 elections around the corner, I
+believe the study will be of use to the committee. I ask that this
+report be placed into the record for the hearing.
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ \2\ Lawrence Norden, Securing America 's Elections from Foreign
+Interference, Brennan Center for Justice, 2017, https://
+www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/
+Securing_Elections_From_Foreign_Interference_1.pdf.
+ * The document has been retained in committee files and is
+available at the website listed above.
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ In the coming weeks, the Brennan Center will be releasing a new
+study on the state of voting technology and the need for additional
+resources to ensure that our elections in 2020 are as secure and
+reliable a possible.
+ My colleagues at the Brennan Center and I are available to speak to
+the committee, as well as provide briefings or updates, at the
+committee's request.
+ Sincerely,
+ Larry Norden,
+ Deputy Director, Democracy Program.
+
+ Ms. Jackson Lee. And unanimous consent for E-deceptive
+Campaign Practices by the Electronic Privacy Information
+Center, unanimous consent.
+ Chairman Thompson. Without objection.**
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ ** The document has been retained in committee files and is
+available at https://epic.org/privacy/voting/
+E_Deceptive_Report_10_2010.pdf.
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ Ms. Jackson Lee. To the two witnesses just a yes or no
+answer. The help of this committee and legislative effort to
+improve your work along with funding, would that be of help to
+you, Mr. Hicks?
+ Mr. Hicks. Yes.
+ Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Krebs.
+ Mr. Krebs. Yes, ma'am.
+ Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much. I yield back.
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The Chair now
+recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Taylor.
+ Mr. Taylor. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Thank you Ranking
+Member. I appreciate the opportunity to be here.
+ So in 2011, I carried the MOVE Act Compliance Legislation
+for the State of Texas. So in 2009 on a bipartisan effort
+Congress passed the law that allowed States to do--or required
+States to do a better job of helping men and women who were
+serving in uniform outside the United States be able to vote.
+That was--that was a 4-year compliance periods so the States
+had 4 years to comply with it. One of the reasons for that was
+that it--logistically we had to change our election schedule in
+Texas and so I am sure my colleagues from Texas will recall
+that all of the sudden they were filing instead of in January
+they were filing in December and that actually required a
+Constitutional amendment that had to be passed by the citizens
+of Texas.
+ So in working on that, again on a bipartisan basis, it took
+a lot of lifting on behalf of the State to comply with that
+piece of legislation. This legislation is far more ambitious in
+what it endeavors to do. Has there been--have--have you done a
+study Mr. Krebs of what different States' laws they would have
+to change or Constitutional amendments that they would have
+to--to comply with H.R. 1? Have you done that Mr. Krebs?
+ Mr. Krebs. No, sir. We are focused on the technical
+aspects.
+ Mr. Taylor. OK, and Mr. Hicks, have you done that? Have you
+analyzed what Constitutional amendments or statutory changes
+would be necessitated by H.R. 1?
+ Mr. Hicks. We have not.
+ Mr. Taylor. OK. I certainly hope if this is a serious bill,
+if this is something we actually think will be passed into law
+that we have thought about at some level what we are going to
+have to do at the State level because we cannot comply with
+this at the State level unless we have really thought about it.
+I--I hope this isn't a show bill.
+ So Commissioner Hicks, in terms of ballot stuffing of
+yesteryear, right? So we--we had ballot stuffing with paper
+ballots, is--with the paper ballot provision in H.R. 1 return
+us to the system of paper ballots? I mean is that--is that what
+we are doing? We are kind-of going back in time?
+ Mr. Hicks. I guess I would need to read back through it
+because I don't--I don't interpret it that way.
+ Mr. Taylor. So the way I read it is that it requires paper
+ballots. Is that--is that not what you--what you understand?
+ Mr. Hicks. For auditability.
+ Mr. Taylor. Right. So for time--for auditability and I
+think this is an important distinction that we should let out
+here. So time now, in my county, we have electronic machines
+that print out on an individual machine-by-machine basis an
+audit of every vote so that that can be gone through and done
+with an audit. So the machines are auditable through a paper
+trail, not of the ballot itself but of what it--of ballots that
+are cast on that particular machine if that makes sense.
+ So as I understand this bill, everybody has got to stop
+using those machines and start buying new machines that are all
+paper ballots. That is my understanding.
+ Mr. Hicks. That is not my understanding because there are
+some machines that might have a paper trail associated under
+glass but it would be the verifiability of the voter to verify
+that piece of paper.
+ Mr. Taylor. Are there enough machines that will be
+manufactured between now and the beginning of the primaries in
+less than a year that we could actually implement this bill?
+ Mr. Hicks. I would need to talk to the vendors to see their
+capabilities of manufacturing those machines.
+ Mr. Taylor. So we don't know if it could--it is even
+physically possible to generate the number of machines that
+will be required with this. I know there is funding in this
+legislation but I am just unclear of whether or not it is even
+possible to logistically have all the machines in place.
+ Mr. Hicks. I would have to talk to the vendors themselves.
+ Mr. Taylor. You don't know. Does anybody--Mr. Krebs, do you
+have any idea?
+ Mr. Krebs. I don't know but I assume if there is money to
+be made they will figure out a way to do it.
+ [Laughter.]
+ Mr. Taylor. Well and I think and just as a practical--on a
+practical level so actually in my home county in Collin County,
+Texas, I was actually an election judge before I was elected to
+the legislature and in that process I saw what happens when
+there are not enough voting machines.
+ You have very long lines, people get discouraged and they
+don't vote and so you have reduction of participation which is
+really--it is a really disappointing event.
+ It is a very sad thing when people show up to vote, they
+wait for an hour, they can't actually vote because there aren't
+enough machines. Is--what--what provisions do we have in this
+legislation that would protect from that scenario because it
+seems like we are setting up in this rush to try to get a bill
+out the door to provide funding with very limited amount of
+time to put it together, so to speak, that we would make sure
+that we have enough voting locations that we don't have people
+lining up and then saying I am not going to participate, I am
+not going to vote.
+ Mr. Hicks. I think States have done a great job of moving
+toward Election Day being the last date to actually cast their
+ballot. Some States have moved toward early voting or vote
+centers or absentee voting as well to alleviate the charge of
+having Election Day where 100 million people are trying to show
+up at the polls.
+ Mr. Taylor. Thank you. Thank you Mr. Chairman, I yield
+back.
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. Let me, for the
+record, indicate for the Members and the witnesses, we are
+technically here for only Section 3 of H.R. 1 bill. Some of the
+questions have gone to other sections of the bill and I would
+like for us to talk specifically about Section 3, which is our
+jurisdiction. Yes, so I am--I just--I understand the interest,
+but I don't think the witnesses are prepared to address some of
+the questions that have been offered by the committee at this
+point and that is just to make sure that we are all on track.
+ We now recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Rose.
+ Mr. Rose. Chairman, thank you, and that is Staten Island,
+Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Thompson. There is a difference.
+ [Laughter.]
+ Mr. Rose. Mr. Krebs, how you doing? I am the incoming
+Subcommittee Chair of Intel and Counterterrorism, so I look
+forward to working with you and I think you hit the nail on the
+head earlier, that it is clear that there are state actors,
+non-state actors that are probing the homeland across the board
+to figure out where our vulnerabilities are. As they conduct
+that probe, our electoral systems are one of the things that
+they are analyzing.
+ So, in line with that I want to get a sense of, when you
+are working with local and State actors, who are you talking
+to? Is it the Terrorism Task Force, is it the Fusion Center, is
+the secretary of state, is it the Governor, is the law
+enforcement entities? If it is all of the above, how do you do
+that and what systems are in place to coordinate that type of
+multifaceted action?
+ Mr. Krebs. It is all of the above and even more, the
+Homeland Security advisers and Adjutant Generals and things of
+that nature. My team, the Cyber Infrastructure Security Agency,
+which you rightly point out, this election security issue is
+not just about cybersecurity threats, there are also physical
+securities threats, there are insider threat, their access to
+machines, manipulation to machines on device that we need to be
+thinking about. So, we approach this as a cyber and physical
+security.
+ But, more broadly, form a counterterrorism perspective--the
+thing I have learned over the last couple years is that
+secretaries of state are their natural risk managers. They have
+to plan for the hurricane. Look at what happened in the
+panhandle of Florida in the last election cycle. They have got
+to anticipate any nature of threat, and so, as we work through,
+we do active-shooter training and those sorts of activities.
+ We have mechanisms in place, including, my team has over
+140 security advisers out in the field that work day in, day
+out with infrastructure owner/operators, with these officials,
+they conduct training, they do walk-throughs, they do security
+facility assessments to--in a lot of cases they provide reports
+back to the facility owner/operator with suggested
+improvements.
+ Mr. Rose. So, but just to push you for a second on this, my
+understanding then is that there--you don't have an entity that
+you are reaching out to, to coordinate this at the State and
+regional level. That it is incumbent upon you all, with these
+140 folks, to be reaching out to all of these local entities
+and it seems, from our perspective, that this is rather
+disparate.
+ Mr. Krebs. So, specific to elections, we have developed
+communications protocols after some of the missteps of the
+2016--post-2016 notifications where we have a coordination
+protocol, where we work with the State--the chief election
+official, the homeland security advisers, and so that is
+typically our point of entry for--specific to elections.
+ Mr. Rose. OK, it would be great to see that.
+ Mr. Krebs. Yes, sir.
+ Mr. Rose. Then just last, at the Federal level, you
+mentioned that you have convening responsibility, but who is
+actually in charge of this interagency process? Who's at the
+head of the table when all these folks are gathered together
+and who has that statutory authority to actually make sure that
+we are getting the job done here?
+ Mr. Krebs. So, there are a couple different levels of this
+conversation. There is a policy coordination piece that the
+National Security Council, Ambassador Bolton leads. There have
+been a number of convening meetings and what-not, all the way
+up to the principle committee meetings with the President.
+ Then at the operational level, there is a working group
+that brings together the Department of Defense, the EAC is
+involved, the DNI.
+ Mr. Rose. Are you in charge of the working group?
+ Mr. Krebs. Am I? No, sir. I am in charge of the
+cybersecurity expertise and technical support to election
+officials, that is my role.
+ Mr. Rose. Who would be in charge of the working group?
+ Mr. Krebs. There are a range of responsibilities and there
+is law enforcement actions, that is naturally the FBI, there is
+intelligence assessments, that is naturally the Director of
+National Intelligence, there is the cybersecurity piece, that
+is me. This again goes to the whole-of-Nation, the whole-of-
+Government approach. There is no one agency that has all of the
+tools and capabilities that are needed to push back on this.
+ Mr. Rose. OK, all right. Thank you. I yield back my times.
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The Chair now
+recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Crenshaw.
+ Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you both
+for being here. I am pleased that this committee is meeting to
+discuss the integrity of our elections and how to strengthen
+the cybersecurity of our election infrastructure.
+ I will say, that election integrity is multifaceted, there
+is a lot of aspects to it. It is not just the cyber side, but
+it is also the voter fraud side, including voter I.D. laws and
+how to prevent fraud by vote by mail.
+ I would say it is unfortunate that this is not a mark-up
+process and it is also unfortunate that this part of the bill,
+which I think we could reasonably come to a bipartisan solution
+on, is attached to a much larger bill that is poisonous and
+will certainly not make it past the Senate.
+ I want to ask you both, could you clarify what role you had
+in crafting this particular legislation?
+ Mr. Krebs. So, in the last Congress we certainly provided
+technical assistance on aspects that got rolled into it, but
+suggestions on what DHS needs, what DHS does.
+ Mr. Crenshaw. OK.
+ Mr. Hicks. I spent 11 years as a House staffer. If the
+committee wants to come and ask my opinion, I am more than
+willing to give it.
+ Mr. Crenshaw. OK, but you were not consulted prior to this
+hearing on what should be in this section of the bill?
+ Mr. Hicks. The committee--Chairman Thompson and then-
+Chairman Brady invited me to speak before their Task Force and
+I gave input there on various aspects.
+ Mr. Crenshaw. Is there anything missing from this section
+of the bill that would you recommend go in it? Are there new
+authorities or capabilities that--and I think this is directed
+to you, Director Krebs, that DHS would need that are currently
+not in it?
+ Mr. Krebs. So at this point, again, I think the Department
+has, generally speaking, the authorities we need to engage and
+support the election officials.
+ Mr. Crenshaw. One of the key provisions in this bill, it
+includes the expiration date on funds. It is asking us to spend
+a lot more money very rapidly; I want to get a sense of how
+realistic that is from you all. Given the slow pace of
+upgrading election infrastructure, do you think that States
+would need more time and flexibility on this, given your
+experience working with them?
+ Mr. Hicks. I believe that the Chairman had talked about
+that this would go over for 10 years and in that cycle there
+would be 5 Federal elections, allowing for States to make
+improvements overall.
+ If the--I believe that the provision was put in there
+because of the original HAVA provisions that allowed States to
+use those funds in perpetuity. So this gives them a deadline to
+actually spend the money similar to the 2018 provision, which
+only allowed for 5 years.
+ Mr. Crenshaw. Do you have anything to add?
+ Mr. Krebs. Sir, our role is to help the election officials
+spend the money in the most risk-based and security-formed
+manner.
+ Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you gentleman, I yield.
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The Chair now
+recognizes the gentlelady from Illinois, Ms. Underwood.
+ Ms. Underwood. Thank you Chairman Thompson for calling this
+important hearing, and it is a hearing that central to
+protecting our democracy and I thank the witnesses for
+testimony here today. My own State of Illinois was a target
+during the 2016 Presidential elections where the information of
+the 76,000 Illinoisans were compromised by Russian hackers.
+ So while I am relieved to hear from you that there are no
+known harms that were caused in 2018's midterm elections by
+nation-state actors, for me, and I think those on this panel it
+is critical that State, Federal, and local governments continue
+to collaborate to strengthen election security and landscape of
+these ever-evolving threats. Now my colleague Congresswoman
+Slotkin pursued a line of questioning with you regarding social
+media and some of the threats that you all have recognized.
+ My follow-up question, at the end of your response sir, Mr.
+Krebs, is that you said that the enemy was changing tactics and
+so what should we be looking for in 2020 to ensure that we are
+continuing preparedness particularly at the State and local
+levels?
+ Mr. Krebs. That is exactly the question, what do we need to
+be prepared for? We have a habit of defending against the last
+attack, and so we can close out the last avenue of attack, we
+can patch vulnerabilities, we can configure systems more
+security. But if we have seen anything, the adversary gets
+ahead of us, anticipates.
+ So what we are working through right now is what could an
+advanced actor do? I--this is a personal perspective, but I
+tend to think that they could look back and exploit, hey, we
+were in that system--we are in there again. But they might not
+really be there.
+ Ms. Underwood. Right.
+ Mr. Krebs. So they--and one way to look at it is the
+Russians in some cases are living rent-free in our heads, and
+so how are they going to take that to their advantage without
+actually being on-network, but using their media--social media
+tools, their influence campaigns. So staying ahead of them and
+their ability to spread false information--it is working with
+social media, it is working with the traditional media in a
+content-neutral way.
+ But getting ahead and anticipating the things they may try
+to push, but most importantly and this again goes to that
+whole-of-Nation approach. What can we do to better inform the
+American people of the risks that are being presented to them
+and information that is being presented, again to make them
+more informed consumers?
+ Ms. Underwood. More concretely then, you perceive social
+media to continue to be a significant threat heading in to
+2020?
+ Mr. Krebs. I see from a cost----
+ Ms. Underwood. OK.
+ Mr. Krebs. Effectiveness and risk perspective, that is
+probably--it is cheap to do, it is highly effective in terms of
+broad impact, and it is comparatively low-risk compared to on-
+network activity. So I think that it is going to remain a tool
+in their toolkit, they continue to do it to this day. What is
+most concerning is more actors, including the Iranians and
+others are getting in to that game, following the lead of the
+Russians.
+ Ms. Underwood. Sure. One of the trends that we have seen,
+at least in Illinois is the rise in popularity of early voting,
+taking advantage of vote by mail or, as we call it, vote at
+home. So wondering about any specific threats obviously social
+media is probably less relevant in that stage of voting in an
+election, so just wondering if you had any specific threats
+that you might want to make this committee aware of?
+ Mr. Krebs. I am not aware of any specific threats to early
+voting, the thing I will note though is early voting provides
+us earlier opportunities to spot anomalies through the auditing
+process and other security fall-back measures. So in some
+cases, it actually advantages the defender.
+ Ms. Underwood. In your experience every jurisdiction is
+engaging in that auditing process throughout the early vote
+period?
+ Mr. Krebs. I am not sure I have enough information to say
+that conclusively.
+ Ms. Underwood. Where would we go to find that out?
+ Mr. Krebs. In part, we would need to work with EAC through
+some of their mechanisms.
+ Ms. Underwood. OK, thank you so much. I yield back, sir.
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The Chair now
+recognizes the other gentlemen from Mississippi, Mr. Guest.
+ Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will follow up a
+little bit to what Congressman Taylor had talked about earlier.
+In section 3001 of this act it says that it amends the Help
+America Vote Act of 2002, to create a grant program for States
+to replace current voting machines with paper ballot systems,
+for security improvements before the 2020 general Federal
+election. Mr. Krebs, do you know what percentage of voting
+systems would have to be replaced to meet that requirement?
+ Mr. Krebs. Specifically no, but I know that 5 States and--
+83 percent of another very large State need to go through that
+process.
+ Mr. Guest. So would the other 45 or 44 and a percentage of
+the State that is not in compliance--would those current voting
+systems comply with what we are seeking to do here?
+ Mr. Krebs. I would have to do a little bit deeper research
+on there, but I do know that of those other States that may be
+nominally in compliance, there are still legacy machines that
+are outdated and some of them may not be supported by the
+vendor. It is a good thing to refresh and retire legacy
+systems.
+ Mr. Guest. OK, but as far as a percentage of systems that
+would need to be replaced, you do not have a percentage to give
+us today?
+ Mr. Krebs. Not--not with me sir, I would have to work with
+the----
+ Mr. Guest. Mr. Hicks, do you have any idea?
+ Mr. Hicks. I could talk to our staff to figure out what the
+exact percentage is, but I don't have a direct percentage right
+now.
+ Mr. Guest. Do you have an estimate on the cost to comply
+with section 3001, Mr. Krebs?
+ Mr. Krebs. No, sir.
+ Mr. Guest. Mr. Hicks.
+ Mr. Hicks. The earlier testimony before the Senate Rules
+Committee, that question was asked about replacing aging voting
+equipment in non-compliance would be in this bill, I believe
+that to be between $500 million and $1 billion.
+ Mr. Guest. I know there was previous testimony that at
+least 45 States currently used paper ballots--and this may have
+been testified to earlier and I may have missed it--outside of
+Georgia what were the other 4 States that do not currently use
+paper ballots?
+ Mr. Hicks. South Carolina, Louisiana, I believe New
+Jersey--and I would have to get the rest of that--and Delaware,
+yes.
+ Mr. Guest. Then Mr. Krebs you said that there was another
+State that was partially in compliance with using paper
+ballots----
+ Mr. Krebs. Pennsylvania----
+ Mr. Guest. Pennsylvania.
+ Mr. Krebs. Yes, sir.
+ Mr. Guest. What percentage of Pennsylvania did you say does
+not currently use paper ballots?
+ Mr. Krebs. I would have to get back to your with specifics,
+it is somewhere around the 80 percent number. I will note that
+all 5 States that are--don't have paper trails right now, and
+the State of Pennsylvania are all on a path toward voter
+verifiable paper trail. These are good things, this is a good
+trend.
+ Mr. Guest. Of those States that we have just talked about
+that are on that path, do we have any idea as to whether or not
+they will have paper ballots for the 2020 election cycle?
+ Mr. Hicks. I would--I don't know if all 5 of those will be
+but I know that they are on that path to comply with that. But
+I would also say that whatever path they take to ensure that
+those folks who have disabilities can still vote independently
+and privately as prescribed by the law in the Help America Vote
+Act.
+ Mr. Guest. Then finally, Mr. Krebs, in your report on page
+6 you say that our voting infrastructure is diverse subject to
+local control and has many checks and balances. Do you believe,
+Mr. Krebs, that elections should remain under local control?
+ Mr. Krebs. Yes, sir.
+ Mr. Guest. Do you--do you Mr. Hicks, do you also believe
+elections should remain under local control?
+ Mr. Hicks. States and localities are the ones that run
+elections.
+ Mr. Guest. Thank you. I yield back Mr. Chair.
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The Chair now
+recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green.
+ Mr. Green of Texas. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
+your leadership and allowing me to serve on this committee
+under our leadership. I am a person who loves his country and I
+love my State but I have heard this 10th Amendment argument
+before. Lonnie Smith was a dentist in Houston, Texas. He wanted
+to vote and there was a white primary. Smith versus Allwright,
+1944, went to the Supreme Court of the United States of
+America. Lonnie Smith prevailed; that ended white primaries.
+ The 10th Amendment argument has been used consistently by
+some States who deny rights. Texas is one such State. I love my
+State but Texas has been a bad actor for decades. I love my
+State. My State currently has a poll tax in contravention of
+the 24th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of
+America. Talk about this photo I.D. and we will give you an
+I.D. if you can't afford it, if you are indigent.
+ Well I tested that system and voted without my proper I.D.
+and had some time to secure the proper I.D. The State of Texas
+will accord you an I.D. at no cost if you are from Texas
+because in my case I am from Louisiana. I had to get my birth
+certificate from Louisiana to get my I.D. in Texas and I had to
+pay a fee for that; clever ways to disenfranchise.
+ So I thank God for the Federal Government and the stand
+that has been taken over the years to protect the rights of
+people in States. I don't think that is in contravention of the
+10th Amendment.
+ Now, to my question, you said Mr. Hicks that the States are
+moving toward some sort of paper component, I believe is the
+phraseology that you utilized. Paper trail is what people at my
+level of life would probably say, ``Why are they doing that?''
+What is the rationale for moving to paper verification?
+ Mr. Hicks. It is a little bit of two things. One, I believe
+it is confidence to ensure that the--if there is an audit being
+done that there is some sort of physical trail that people can
+point to and do a physical count of that. The other is I
+believe just moving back toward confidence as well.
+ Mr. Green of Texas. Confidence and the level of confidence
+that we aspire or that we desire to have, is that one that
+would give us a belief that if there has been some sort of
+intervention, we will be able to detect it and that paper--
+verifiable paper may be of assistance?
+ Mr. Hicks. There could be.
+ Mr. Green of Texas. If this is the case that verifiable
+assistance by way of paper is something that is of value, can
+you give me a good reason why we would oppose having verifiable
+paper given that States are moving toward it and given if there
+is some value in it, why would we oppose it? What is a good
+reason to desire a system that doesn't have this type of
+verification?
+ Mr. Hicks. The biggest reason that I have heard over the
+years is those folks who have disabilities who may not have the
+dexterity functions to handle that paper and to verify it. So
+if I am without sight, I can't verify a piece of paper
+physically. I think the technology is moving toward allowing
+folks who have sight disabilities to be able to verify that but
+they still would have to physically use that paper. I believe
+that we have come a long way since the 2000 election in terms
+of technology and moving forward.
+ For instance back in 2000, everyone in this room probably
+has a smart phone. No one had those issues. So as we move
+forward with technology to allow for people to cast their
+ballots and so forth, the other aspect of that is people who
+live overseas and are in combat areas where they might not have
+access to a fax machine to fax that back or the ability to get
+that piece of paper back. But to ensure that our military and
+overseas folks still have a way to cast their ballots for the
+rights they are defending for us all.
+ Mr. Green of Texas. Thank you. Persons who need assistance
+in polling places, we currently allow that. If you need some
+sort of--if you are visually impaired we allow you to be
+assisted and there are ways to deal with our military personnel
+in foreign places, distant places. The empirical evidence seems
+to indicate that there is more value in having it than not. Is
+that a fair statement?
+ Mr. Hicks. Yes.
+ Mr. Green of Texas. All right, thank you Mr. Chairman. I
+yield back.
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The Chair now
+recognizes the gentlelady from Florida who comes from a State
+that has some minor experience in voting issues. Mrs. Demings.
+ Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman and thank you
+again to our witnesses for being here with us. Everybody in
+this room clearly understands the deep, dark, ugly history that
+our great Nation has as it pertains to voter suppression and I
+would think that this committee would lead the effort in making
+sure that we have a system that allows citizens of this country
+to be able to exercise their right to vote. That I would
+believe in this country that we would ensure that race, gender,
+economic status, or ZIP code would never again be--to a
+person's right to vote. So I want to thank you--the two of you
+for what you do to make our process fair.
+ I am from Florida and let me just say I am not offended
+when Florida people all over this Nation question what in the
+heck is going on in Florida? I am not offended by it because I
+am committed to making sure that we get the process right. We
+can never underestimate the--how important the cooperation is
+between Federal, State, and local governments are to making
+sure that this process is right. In the November's election, 20
+States, including my home State of Florida, elected new
+Governors, and while several others elected or appointed new
+secretaries of state.
+ So as we prepare for the 2020 election and using what
+happened in 2016 kind of as a tool that we will not forget,
+looking at the vulnerabilities and the experiences of 2016, I
+will ask both of you, what outreach have you participated in to
+secretaries of state, to new executive officers or Governors to
+make sure that they are prepared for the 2020 process?
+ Mr. Hicks. Thank you, Congresswoman. That is a great
+question. We work very closely with the National Association of
+Secretaries of State, and I actually participated in their
+winter conference 2 weeks ago, where I met several of the new
+secretaries myself. We also work with the National Association
+of State Election Directors who also had their conference a
+couple of weeks ago, here in the District of Columbia, where I
+have met several of those new folks.
+ We work very closely with them to find out what sort of
+assistance the EAC can have. In 2018, we held a summit in--at
+the National Press Club where it was well attended, broadcast
+on C-SPAN, where we talked to people about preparing for the
+2018 election.
+ One month before the 2018 election, in October we held a--
+another summit in the Congressional Visitor's Center where
+Members of Congress and others were able to kick the tires on
+voting machines, and hear from election officials, themselves,
+about how they were preparing for the election coming up.
+ I believe that the EAC is looking to hold additional forums
+this year, and next year, with disability groups, and State
+election officials, and others so that we can continue our
+partnership. I believe that we have come a long way from when
+folks were not looking favorably upon the EAC. I would ask that
+you talk to--or ask the question to the secretaries of state.
+ I might be a little worried about this, but--about how we
+are doing, and move forward. There are other things that we can
+do to improve the process. But at the end of the day, this is a
+partnership where we hope to do what is best for the American
+people, and ensure that the confidence remains high.
+ I journeyed to your State in--in December to go down to Bay
+County and talk to folks, and find out what actually happened,
+and how they prepared for the election, since they were--things
+were destroyed. They were cleaning out voting equipment with
+toothbrushes, basically. But they still pulled the election
+off. We want to be able to provide them resources, not just
+monetarily, but advice on how to prepare for 2020, and moving
+forward.
+ Mrs. Demings. Thank you. Director Krebs.
+ Mr. Krebs. Briefly, I have the advantage of having a field
+force, 140 folks out in field. Their top priority, as these new
+secretaries were being sworn in, was to get meetings on the
+books. Unfortunately, some of those meetings were disrupted by
+the shutdown. But those are back on the books. We are engaging
+full speed ahead.
+ Mrs. Demings. Great. Thank you so much. Mr. Chairman, I
+yield back.
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The Chair now
+recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Reverend Cleaver.
+ Mr. Cleaver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you for being
+here today. I--this is not a trick question, but I would like
+for both of you, if you could answer the question. Do you think
+that we have an election process that is equal in this country?
+ Mr. Krebs. I am sorry. Could you repeat the question?
+ Mr. Cleaver. Is the--are the elections in the United States
+of America equal? If we have a Presidential election, are all
+votes equal?
+ Mr. Hicks. One person, one vote. So every vote counts
+equally.
+ Mr. Cleaver. Yes.
+ Mr. Krebs. I would agree with that.
+ Mr. Cleaver. Would you agree with that?
+ Mr. Krebs. Yes, sir.
+ Mr. Cleaver. So, everybody who votes should have equal
+access to the voting booth?
+ Mr. Krebs. Every eligible voter should have access to a
+ballot. Not necessarily going into a voting booth, as well. But
+have access----
+ Mr. Cleaver. That is good. That is fine. That is OK.
+ Mr. Krebs. Yes sir.
+ Mr. Cleaver. OK. I don't think--I don't think elections are
+equal. I think I can prove it rather easily. If you live in
+Oregon you can vote on Sundays. You can register all the way up
+to the election. If you are in South Carolina--and I even think
+Florida, you can vote on--on Souls to the Polls, where you vote
+on Sundays.
+ In Missouri you can't do that. In the neighboring State of
+Kansas, you can't do that. In Iowa you can't do that. So
+something is not right, in terms of having equal access to the
+ballot--I mean, to the voting precinct. Some people have a
+greater opportunity to vote--vote than others. Am I wrong or am
+I right? Thank you. No, go ahead.
+ Mr. Hicks. I was going to say that I believe that there--if
+Congress wants to give the EAC more direction on how to improve
+the process, then we are more than willing to help it. I
+believe that States are moving toward early voting.
+ I believe that States are moving, with the $380 million, to
+refine voter registration processes. We will continually work
+with States to improve the process. The U.S. Postal Service
+does a great job, in terms of vote by mail. But I think there
+are other aspects that we all can improve upon.
+ Mr. Cleaver. But you do understand that does some vote--
+some States fighting it?
+ Mr. Hicks. Yes.
+ Mr. Cleaver. So am I right or am I wrong, Mr. Krebs?
+ Mr. Krebs. Sir, my job is regardless of the jurisdiction,
+whatever the--whatever the system is, that that vote is being
+cast and counted, and it is done in a secure and resilient
+manner.
+ Mr. Cleaver. OK. I understand. I appreciate it. That is--I
+like that, a good American. OK, I will declare I am right.
+ [Laughter.]
+ Mr. Cleaver. I think I can prove it, empirically, that we
+don't all have equal access to the voting booth. OK. The other
+thing--our conduct is always based on cost. We do something,
+there is a cost to it, or for the most part there is a cost to
+everything.
+ I am wondering, we all have been told by our intelligence
+agencies that Vladimir Putin ordered interference with our
+elections. We have been--this is a direct quote, they will be
+back in 2020, FBI. In your opinion, Mr. Krebs, has--have the
+Russians paid a price for interfering with our elections?
+ Mr. Krebs. There has certainly been a significant amount of
+pressure and pain put upon the Putin administration, sanctions,
+other diplomatic actions, and a number of indictments against
+GRU actors. We will continue to push them, we will continue to
+defend.
+ My mission is to help State and local officials protect
+their networks, defend their networks and that is what we focus
+on every single day.
+ Mr. Cleaver. Mr. Hicks.
+ Mr. Hicks. Our middle name is assistance and so we want to
+help as much as we can.
+ Mr. Cleaver. OK. I am not sure that they--that they paid a
+high enough price for doing what they have done but my
+suggestion here is that they will come back again because the
+price wasn't high enough.
+ All those people who have been indicted, all they have to
+do to avoid going to jail is to--is never coming back to the
+United States or not being caught visiting another country with
+which we can have access to an arrest. Anyway, Mr. Chairman, I
+appreciate the opportunity. I yield back.
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. I thank the
+witnesses for their testimony. I now call up the second panel.
+ I welcome the second panel of witnesses. First I--let me
+thank all of you for being so patient. I woul like to welcome
+our California Secretary of State Alex Padilla to the panel.
+ Secretary Padilla has been a leading voice on election
+security and has done a number of innovative things in
+California to train up officials at the local level, raise
+public awareness about misinformation, and make the most of
+Federal partnerships.
+ Second we will hear from Noah Praetz. OK. There is an issue
+with a Mississippian and an Alabamian in pronunciation. Who
+until very recently served as the director of elections for
+Cook County, Illinois where he oversaw elections in one of the
+largest counties in the United States.
+ Third, I am excited to hear from Mr. Jake Braun, the
+executive director of the cyber policy initiative at the
+University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy and also a
+co-founder of a DEFCON Voting Machine Hacking Village, the
+world's only public third-party inspection of voting equipment.
+ The research we have seen come out of DEFCON has been
+instrumental in helping us understand our vulnerabilities and
+help us move the conversation on election security forward.
+ Finally, I now recognize a Ranking Member Mr. Rogers to
+introduce Mr. Merrill, our minority witness today.
+ Mr. Rogers. Yes, I am very happy to have Secretary Merrill
+with us today. He is in his second term as Alabama Secretary of
+State and is one of--if not one of, he is the hardest-working
+politician in Alabama. He has done such a fine job and I am
+happy to have him here with us today.
+ Chairman Thompson. Without objection, the witnesses' full
+statements will be inserted into the record. I will now ask
+each witness to summarize his statement for 5 minutes beginning
+with Mr. Padilla.
+
+ STATEMENT OF ALEX PADILLA, SECRETARY OF STATE, CALIFORNIA
+
+ Mr. Padilla. Thank you Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rogers,
+and Members of the committee. The defense of our Nation's
+elections must be a top priority for all of government;
+Federal, State, and local. After all, our democracy is under
+attack.
+ Elections officials have taken seriously the warnings from
+intelligence agencies. Our elections have been and will
+continue to be targeted by bad actors both foreign and domestic
+who seek to disrupt and undermine public confidence in our
+democracy.
+ We know these threats to be real because we see them every
+day. If we agree that defending the integrity of our elections
+is a matter of National security, then we must act accordingly.
+ Yet, despite the warnings and advice, our National response
+has been lacking. I have been to discuss what the Federal
+Government can do to help and to share what we are doing in
+California to better secure our elections.
+ I will begin by recognizing that both DHS Director Krebs
+and Senior Advisor Masterson are tremendously valuable
+partners. They have honored their commitment to timely
+communication with us when issues or concerns arise.
+ I will note that the importance of this partnership
+underscores the danger of unnecessary Government shutdowns.
+With the 2020 elections quickly approaching, our collaboration
+must not be interrupted. Now this partnership is only one
+component of a comprehensive defense strategy. We must also
+invest in election administration.
+ The last time Congress approved new funding for elections
+was 17 years ago through the Help America Vote Act. The
+investments made as a result were buying in large equipment and
+technology that are now 20 years old.
+ Today it is not uncommon for elections officials to be
+searching on-line for replacement parts for voting systems that
+are no longer supported by manufacturers. Others are stuck
+utilizing old operating systems that cannot be patched or
+updated with the latest security software.
+ So if we truly value our democracy, then we must commit
+consistent Federal funding for elections administration and
+security. Yes, Congress did appropriate $380 million last year
+in grants to States, but that wasn't new money, and it
+certainly wasn't enough. Last year's appropriation was the last
+of butterfly ballot, hanging chad, money that was never
+intended for modern-day cyber threats.
+ Next, Congress has the opportunity to make the best
+practices for election security the National standards. Among
+them, rigorous testing and certification of our voting systems,
+requiring logic and accuracy testing of systems before every
+election, requiring paper ballots and a voter-verified paper
+trail, requiring voting systems to be kept off-line and
+requiring post-election audits after every election.
+ This is a proven framework for securing elections and for
+improving voter confidence. You see, if a voter begins to think
+that their vote may not be counted or may not be counted as
+cast, and they choose to not participate in an election as a
+result of that doubt, that is a form of voter suppression.
+ Now these policies have served California well for years,
+but since 2016, we have done more. We have established these
+partnerships with DHS, FBI, the EAC, as well as State and local
+agencies, to better coordinate in the event of a threat or
+incident. We have engaged in security trainings, table-top
+exercises, and information sharing.
+ We have upgraded our State technology infrastructure and
+established an office of election cybersecurity and an office
+of enterprise risk management. We have dedicated staff to
+monitoring social media for erroneous information about voting.
+We have launched the public education campaign to raise
+awareness about election misinformation.
+ We have created a web portal with resources for voters,
+including the ability to verify their registration status, find
+their polling place and to report suspected misinformation.
+Finally, we piloted a voter status alert tool which notifies a
+voter whenever their voter registration record is updated.
+ We plan to deploy this tool State-wide, in time for the
+2020 elections. Thankfully, the 2018 election went smoothly,
+but we know that those who seek to undermine our Democracy will
+continue to try with increased frequency and sophistication. It
+is not enough to keep up with nefarious actors; we must stay
+ahead.
+ This requires us to continue to work together, to implement
+the best standards, and to make the necessary investments.
+Thank you for this opportunity; I look forward to your
+questions.
+ [The prepared statement of Mr. Padilla follows:]
+ Prepared Statement of Alex Padilla
+ February 12, 2019
+ Good morning and thank you Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member
+Rogers, and Members of the committee for the opportunity to be before
+you today.
+ And thank you for convening this hearing to discuss our Nation's
+election security readiness. For me, and for my colleagues in State and
+local government, this conversation could not be any more urgent.
+ The defense of our Nation's election systems and infrastructure
+must be a top priority for all of government--Federal, State, and
+local. After all, our democracy is under attack.
+ Elections officials throughout the Nation have taken seriously the
+warnings we have received from Federal intelligence agencies--that our
+elections have been and will continue to be a target for bad actors,
+foreign and domestic, who seek to disrupt our democratic process and
+undermine public confidence in our elections.
+ Elections officials know these threats to be true, because we see
+them every day. For example, in California, our internet-facing systems
+are pinged or scanned constantly. This activity is the equivalent of
+someone walking through a neighborhood, checking doorknobs, looking for
+unlocked doors. While these are not hacks or breaches, those conducting
+this unauthorized activity certainly have intentions.
+ If we agree that the integrity of our elections is a matter of
+National security, then we must act accordingly and recognize that
+elections officials are on the front lines. We are the first responders
+to attacks on our democracy.
+ Yet despite consistent warnings and evidence, our National response
+is severely lacking.
+ Most critically, we must rethink how we fund and administer
+elections.
+ In my testimony today, I will discuss what the Federal Government
+can do to further support States and local jurisdictions, and I will
+share what we are doing in California to better secure our elections.
+ I want to start by saying that DHS Director Chris Krebs and DHS
+Senior Advisor Matt Masterson have become tremendously valuable
+partners. They have demonstrated their commitment to quality and timely
+communication and coordination with State and local elections officials
+when issues or concerns arise.
+ When potential threat information has surfaced, they have reached
+out to us. When we read or hear of new threats, they are there to
+inform us of potential exposure.
+ The importance of this partnership underscores the danger of
+unnecessary Government shutdowns. During the recent shutdown,
+secretaries across the Nation were notified that email responses and
+phone contact with DHS personnel would be suspended or delayed. As the
+2020 election cycle is already ramping up, we cannot afford to lose
+critical contact with our Federal partners.
+ Partnership with DHS and other National security agencies is only
+one necessary component of a comprehensive defense strategy.
+ Let's be honest, elections are underfunded and are too often a low
+priority for Federal, State, and local governments. The last time
+Congress approved new funding for elections was through the Help
+America Vote Act (HAVA), 17 years ago, in the wake of the 2000
+Presidential election. And the investments made as a result of HAVA
+were by and large in equipment and technology that is now 20 years old.
+ Members of the committee, you would not settle for 20-year-old
+technology and reliability on your cell phones; our voting systems
+should be no different.
+ The lack of sustained investment has resulted in outdated election
+infrastructure and understaffed elections offices. Across the country
+there are many elections officials in counties with small populations--
+and therefore small budgets--that don't even have their own IT staff.
+ In addition to being outdated, voting equipment in many
+jurisdictions is at or beyond life expectancy. As we meet here today,
+there are some elections officials searching on eBay for replacement
+parts for systems that are no longer supported by manufacturers. Others
+are utilizing operating systems that are so old, their vendor no longer
+provides tech support--meaning some voting machines cannot be patched
+or updated with the latest security software.
+ Simply put, too many elections officials are ill-equipped to defend
+against 21st Century threats.
+ We often say that our budgets are a reflection of our values.
+ If we genuinely value our democracy, then we must commit consistent
+Federal support for election security and administration.
+ Members of the committee, respectfully, last year's appropriation
+of $380 million in cybersecurity grants to States was not new money,
+and it certainly was not enough. The $380 million was simply the final
+appropriation of HAVA funds. That was the last of the butterfly ballot
+and hanging chad money. That was not 2016, 2018, or 2020 cyber threat
+funding.
+ In addition to funding, Congress also has a tremendous opportunity
+to make the proven best practices for election security the National
+standard.
+ Among them:
+ Rigorous testing and certification of voting systems with
+ up-to-date security standards;
+ Requiring testing of voting systems for logic and accuracy
+ before every election;
+ Paper ballots and a voter-verified paper trail, for
+ auditing, recount, and manual tally purposes;
+ Keeping elections infrastructure off-line;
+ Post-election audits after every election.
+ I suggest to you that this is the proven framework for better
+securing our elections as well as improving voter confidence.
+Deficiencies in our election security infrastructure can jeopardize
+public confidence in our democracy. If voters begin to think that their
+vote may not be counted, or may not be counted as cast, and they decide
+to not participate in an election as a result of that doubt, that is a
+form of voter suppression.
+ These are just some of the best practices that have served
+California well since long before the 2016 election.
+ And in response to the 2016 election, we doubled down on our
+efforts.
+ We established intergovernmental partnerships with the U.S.
+Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
+the Elections Assistance Commission, the California Department of
+Technology, the California Office of Emergency Services, the California
+Highway Patrol, and county governments to ensure coordinated responses
+to cyber threats and incidents.
+ My office has engaged local elections officials in cybersecurity
+trainings, table-top exercises, and information sharing. And I
+personally visited fusion centers in all regions of California to
+better position ourselves to coordinate in the event of a threat or
+incident.
+ We upgraded our technology infrastructure and established both an
+Office of Election Cybersecurity and an Office of Enterprise Risk
+Management within our agency.
+ Another lesson I've taken to heart is that your technology is only
+as strong as the staff that uses it. Cybersecurity tools are just that,
+tools--tools for our staff to utilize. This is why we have invested in
+specialized staff dedicated to cybersecurity and trainings for
+elections staff at the State level and with our local partners.
+ As part of our strategies in the new Office of Election
+Cybersecurity, last fall we launched ``VoteSure,'' a first of its kind
+in the Nation public education campaign to increase voter awareness
+about election misinformation on-line and to promote official, trusted
+election resources. The campaign included the launch of a new web
+portal with a variety of tools and resources for voters including the
+ability to verify registration status before going to vote, reliable
+polling place look-up tools, and a dedicated email address for voters
+to report suspected misinformation. And in a first-in-State history
+effort, we emailed official election information and resources directly
+to voters.
+ In the days leading up to the 2018 General Election, our staff
+identified nearly 300 Facebook posts and Tweets with inaccurate and
+misleading information about the voting process. We reported them to
+their respective social media companies for review. Ninety-eight
+percent of the posts and tweets we reported were promptly removed by
+their respective platforms for not meeting their standards.
+ Our office also piloted a new voter status email alert program in 7
+counties--Madera, Napa, Orange, Sacramento, San Mateo, San Bernardino,
+and Solano--for the 2018 General Election.
+ This new system automatically notifies voters whenever we have
+received a new registration or update to their registration record
+through our on-line voter registration website or a paper voter
+registration form. We plan to expand the program State-wide ahead of
+the 2020 elections.
+ California's share of last year's HAVA appropriation was $34
+million. Funds in the current year's budget is helping counties with
+costs of upgrading security of their connection to our State-wide
+centralized voter registration database, known as VoteCal, and polling
+place accessibility.
+ At the State level, we are using a portion of the funds for:
+ Support of county efforts associated with cybersecurity
+ risks and infrastructure needs related to the State-wide voter
+ registration system, including important activities such as
+ security assessments, penetration testing, and staff training.
+ Support for county improvement of polling place
+ accessibility and administration of elections.
+ Support for county vote center implementation, which
+ includes costs associated with new voting technology like
+ ballot on demand, electronic pollbooks, remote accessible vote
+ by mail systems and voting systems.
+ Enhancements to VoteCal State-wide voter registration
+ system.
+ Development of security training curriculum and training of
+ counties.
+ Support and guidance for counties implementing risk limiting
+ audits.
+ By all accounts, 2018 was a success. In California, voters
+responded with record-high voter registration and the highest voter
+turnout in a midterm election since 1982. And the election went as
+smooth as we could have hoped for.
+ But, the threats to our elections are ever-evolving. And those who
+seek to undermine our democracy will increase their efforts both in
+frequency and sophistication.
+ My colleague, Minnesota Secretary of State Steve Simon, puts it
+best, ``Election cybersecurity is like running a race without a finish
+line.'' It's not enough to keep up with nefarious actors who seek to
+undermine our democracy, we need to stay ahead.
+ To do that, we must constantly be learning, scrutinizing, testing,
+and upgrading our security--and that requires Federal, State, and local
+entities to keep working together and to make the necessary
+investments.
+ Thank you again for your work to address these issues head on. I
+appreciate your leadership and look forward to answering your
+questions.
+
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. Next, we will hear
+from Mr. Praetz, who will--until very recently, served as the
+director of elections for Cook County, Illinois.
+
+ STATEMENT OF NOAH PRAETZ, FORMER DIRECTOR OF ELECTIONS, COOK
+ COUNTY, ILLINOIS
+
+ Mr. Praetz. Thank you, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member
+Rogers, distinguished Members. My name is Noah, and I was
+director of elections in Cook County, Illinois. I speak to you
+from that experience today, and it is a real honor to do so.
+ You know, when election officials certify results, they
+bestow, not just power, but legitimacy that comes from the
+essential American belief that our elections reflect a trusted
+and true accounting of the votes. We secure that legitimacy by
+protecting two--two virtues, truth and trust, along two
+different fronts, infrastructure and information.
+ Truth can be protected with policies and practices that
+ensure a fair and accurate account. Trust is protected by
+continuing to deliver services to our voters as expected.
+Election officials have been security votes in voter records
+for a very long time. When I started, prior to 2000, we served
+mostly as logistics managers--kind-of like wedding planners
+making sure the right list of people came together at the right
+place with the right stuff.
+ After Bush v. Gore, a whole new era was foisted on us with
+voting technology, new rules--and we become I.T. managers. Now,
+since 2016, we must become cybersecurity managers. Spurred by
+the need to defend against foreign adversaries, Federal and
+State officials have been working very successfully to find a
+good balance of Federal involvement in elections, without
+trampling on authority that the States zealously guard.
+ State election officials who protect State-wide voter
+registration lists everywhere and more systems in some States
+and are often the spokespeople defending our institution
+deserve great credit, particularly their lead blocking in 2016,
+but also their leadership in the lead-up to 2018, when
+accepting the premise that we are a target and that we are
+vulnerable.
+ The Federal agency, led by Director Krebs and with
+Masterson's help, charged with providing direct support in this
+area, has also met the continuing demand for information and
+for services.
+ Election officials remain committed to the security effort
+even though there were no known impactful attacks against us in
+2018, because we believe that good news is probably more a
+function of our adversaries not engaging than it is a result of
+our significant efforts over the last 2 years.
+ At the risk of being overly broad, I wish to underscore
+that local election officials are the ones who control, secure,
+and run elections. One hundred and eight in Illinois; and over
+8,000 nationally are on the front lines. We deploy a variety of
+connected digital systems--poll books, voter registration
+systems, informational websites, election results websites,
+Election Day command centers, not to mention voting systems.
+ Each of these are a ripe target. Most local election
+officials are city or county officers, 2 or 3 people, and they
+are facing down shadowy, powerful adversaries; kind-of like
+Andy in Mayberry sent to repel an invading army. Locals need
+advice, support, and resources, for modern defendable
+technology and routine hand-counted audits, which can give
+confidence that the digital results are accurate.
+ But second, and I think more critically today, they have a
+pressing need for top-notch personnel with the skills to
+navigate the current cyber battlefield. In Cook County, we
+undertook significant efforts in securing the infrastructure
+and helping raise awareness within the ecosystem.
+ We concluded that, to decrease the likelihood of a
+successful attack, each local election official must have
+access to an election security officer. We suggested this be
+handled by a brigade of cyber-navigators, supporting local
+election officials. These navigators would adopt the mantra of
+defend, detect, recover.
+ They help improve defenses, following specific
+recommendations already out there from the Center for Internet
+Security or the Defending Digital Democracy program at Harvard.
+They establish breach detection techniques and they help
+develop recovery plans for when attackers do successfully
+penetrate the first or second line.
+ To accomplish this, navigators secure free support on
+offers from Homeland Security, State governments and companies
+like Google, Cloudflare, and Microsoft. They work with State
+and county I.T. staff, and critically, they will work with the
+deeply-embedded election vendors who are strategic partners
+that provide locals with much of their current support.
+ Incidentally, Illinois lawmakers spent the HAVA funds you
+released on a navigator program, with $7 million allocated to
+support each county, 108, more or less equally, with human
+expertise--9 navigators, each supporting about 12 counties and
+serving as their election security officer.
+ The remaining HAVA funds were to be spent with some
+recognition that bigger counties, like Cook County, are likely
+more high-value targets. Voters should feel broadly confident
+that we have resilient systems and that election officials are
+taking this problem very serious. But they should also
+understand that without continued investment, and people and
+products, the possibility of a successful attack increases.
+ Some losing candidates are already apt to call their
+defeats into doubt. A new digital breach, no matter how far
+removed from the vote counting system, could turn sore losers
+to cynicism, disbelief, even revolt. That is the reaction our
+adversaries are looking for.
+ The bottom line is we cannot eliminate every chance of
+breach. We can make sure that successful attacks are rare, and
+we can provide assurances that we are prepared to recover
+quickly when they happen. We do this with support at the local
+level. Thank you.
+ [The prepared statement of Mr. Praetz follows:]
+ Prepared Statement of Noah Praetz
+ February 12, 2019
+ biography
+ Noah Praetz was the director of elections working under Cook County
+Clerk David Orr and then under Clerk Karen A. Yarbrough. He was
+responsible for the overall management of elections in Cook County,
+Illinois, one of the largest jurisdictions in the country serving 1.6
+million voters.
+ He started as temporary worker hired to do data entry prior to the
+2000 Presidential election. In 2007 he became deputy director and in
+2013 he was appointed director.
+ Mr. Praetz currently runs an elections consulting practice. He
+teaches election law at DePaul University College of Law. He is an
+advisory board member at the University of Chicago's Cyber Initiative.
+ Mr. Praetz was on the executive committee of the Government
+Coordinating Council representing the local election officials as
+Homeland Security sought guidance on how best to support the election
+community. He was the treasurer of the International Association of
+Government Officials. He was also co-chair of the Election Center Cyber
+Security committee. He was active in the Illinois Association of County
+Clerks and Recorders. He has presented on election security,
+sustainability, election day management, on-line registration, voter
+registration modernization and other election-related items.
+ executive summary
+ Election officials have been securing our Nation's votes and voter
+records for a very long time. We have been securing digital
+infrastructure for a more than a decade. But the changed environment
+and the expectation of continued sophisticated attacks forces them to
+up their game.
+ Spurred by the need to defend against foreign enemies, Federal and
+State officials have been working successfully to find a good balance
+of Federal involvement in elections, without trampling on authority
+that the States zealously guard. Good progress is being made.
+ However, even as the community of election officials appreciate
+that election 2018 was free of any known incidents, they largely
+recognize that those successes are probably less a function of their
+efforts than they are a function of our Nation's adversaries' probable
+choice to hold back. The fundamentals of election security, and the
+investments neeeded to ensure improved security, have not changed since
+the summer of 2016.
+ Broadly, the fundamentals are these, local election officials are
+the ones who control, secure, and run elections. Locals--108 in
+Illinois and over 8,000 Nation-wide--are on the front lines of this new
+battlefield. Locals control almost the entire election infrastructure.
+Locals are the entities most in need of support and attention. Locals
+need help to fortify themselves, and our most important institution,
+against the high-probability threat actors they've been warned of. The
+States, with partnership from the Federal Government, are the entities
+that are now, and will continue to be, the leaders needed to support
+the security efforts to the local election officials.
+ While in Cook County we studied and undertook significant efforts
+at securing the infrastructure and helping raise awareness within the
+ecosystem. We concluded that to decrease the likelihood of successful
+attack on digital services, each local election official must have
+ready access to a savvy dedicated partner--an election infrastructure
+security officer. Most locals don't have that capacity today.
+ Local election officials cannot master this problem without direct
+support of skilled experts. We suggested this be handled by a brigade
+of digital defenders, or what the Government coordinating council calls
+``cyber navigators,'' supporting local election officials into the
+future.
+ These ``navigators'' should adopt the mantra of Defend, Detect,
+Recover. They need to accomplish these three vital goals. They can help
+improve defenses within election offices, following the specific
+recommendations of Center for Internet Security or Defending Digital
+Democracy--we believe they'll quickly bring up the floor of the
+elections security ecosystem. They'll also establish detection
+techniques. And they'll develop recovery plans for when attackers
+penetrate the first and second line.
+ To accomplish this, the ``Navigators'' will secure free support on
+offer from public and private organizations, like Homeland Security,
+State governments, and companies like Google and Cloudflare. They will
+also work with outside vendors who provide much of the elections
+infrastructure and support to local officials. Third, they will build a
+culture of security that can adapt to evolving threats through training
+and constant re-assessment.
+ Voters should feel confident that we have resilient election
+systems, with paper ballots and good audits almost everywhere. But
+voters should also understand that without continued investment in
+people and products the possibility of a successful attack increases.
+As does the likelihood that losing campaigns may cultivate cynicism
+about the integrity of our elections for their own purposes. Democracy
+is not perfect. As Churchill said, it is the worst form of government
+except for all the others. We need to protect it. We will regret it if
+our democracy is damaged because we looked away at a critical moment.
+ testimony
+ Thank you, Chairman Thompson and Ranking Member Rogers, as well as
+all Members. It is an honor to be here. I am reminded as an election
+administrator that when we certify results we are an essential part of
+the process that bestows not just power, but legitimacy. And that
+legitimacy attaches because of the essential American belief that our
+elections reflect a trusted and true accounting of each election. I
+speak to you today in support of efforts to ensure that legitimacy
+remains the key virtue in our elections.
+ My name is Noah Praetz. Two weeks ago I stepped down as director of
+elections in Cook County, Illinois where I worked for Cook County Clerk
+David Orr, and recently Clerk Karen Yarbrough. I began my career in
+2000 and during that time our office tried to lead on technology and
+security--using applied forensics in elections; creating widely-
+circulated cybersecurity checklists in advance of the 2016 elections;
+and publishing the first white paper written by election officials in
+the wake of the 2016 attacks. Recently, I helped the Center for
+Internet Security (CIS) adapt their digital security expertise to the
+unique context of elections and also spent a little time talking to the
+Defending Digital Democracy program at Harvard's Belfer Center (DDD).
+As co-chair of the Government Coordinating Council (GCC) that the
+Department of Homeland Security created to help address election
+security, I worked with Federal, State, and local leaders in elections,
+technology, intelligence, and law enforcement.
+ In the past 18 months I have testified before the U.S. Senate Rules
+and Administration committee once. On two occasions I testified before
+the United States Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and on two
+occasions I testified before Illinois legislative committees. I have
+presented before the numerous meetings of election officials from
+Illinois and from around the country. Every time, I strive to deliver
+the same message:
+ The threats to election infrastructure are real.
+ Elections are largely run and secured locally, so security
+ efforts, let by the States and augmented by the Federal
+ Government, need to be concentrated locally.
+ As election officials, we must accept the conclusion of the
+intelligence community--our elections were attacked and are vulnerable.
+And while enemy hostile probes of our news and influence systems appear
+to have been more successful than those on election administration, we
+have to expect the attacks will evolve. We, as election administrators,
+must defend our section of the line--by securing all elements of our
+voting infrastructure.
+Cybersecurity--One More Sword to Juggle
+ Prior to 2000, election administrators served mostly as wedding
+planners, making sure the right list of people came together in the
+right place with the right stuff. After Bush v. Gore, the Help America
+Vote Act (HAVA) heralded in new era of voting technology, and we became
+legal compliance and IT managers. We've been working to protect digital
+technology since then. But the 2016 election showed irrefutably that
+sophisticated attacks are to be expected and that we must also be
+cybersecurity managers.
+ Foreign governments, foreign non-state actors, and domestic
+troublemakers have the capacity and desire to corrode the essential
+public belief that our election outcomes are true and reliable. To very
+different degrees, this threat applies to both preliminary returns
+announced on election night and to official, final results. Beyond
+corrupting election results, the threat also reaches the large variety
+of systems used to run seamless elections.
+ Therefore, the new security mantra, or security framework, for
+local election officials must be ``defend, detect, recover.''
+ Security isn't just about defense. Perfect defense is difficult or
+even impossible. I could cite a list of our best companies and
+Government entities that have been breached despite significant
+defensive investments. Instead, the challenge of security is to ensure
+no attack exceeds our resilience--our ability to detect and recover--
+whether that requires restoring lost data or even recounting ballots--
+to establish election results that are trusted and true.
+ Because State laws vary, local election officials confront a
+different security matrix in each State, affecting their ability to
+defend, detect, and/or recover. States with great audits (detection)
+and paper ballots (recovery) are much more resilient by definition; and
+the burden of defending their voting system perfectly is consequently
+much lower. On the other hand, States without great audits and without
+paper ballots place the unenviable burden of perfect defense on their
+local election administrators.
+ In 2017, Cook County Clerk David Orr and I published a white paper
+called ``2020 Vision: Election Security in the Age of Committed Foreign
+Threats.'' It is included at the back of this testimony. But I want to
+acknowledge that different bodies of this Congress have already taken
+action that broadly agrees with our vision and I commend that work.
+Elections are Secured Locally
+ I have tremendous appreciation and respect for State election
+officials and their responsibilities and efforts. They are often the
+mouthpiece of our institution and responsible for managing the
+regulatory framework. For the past 16 years many have also managed
+their State's voter registration systems. In some States they take a
+far more active role in protecting other parts of the infrastructure.
+And it was States that were the named targets in 2016. But let there be
+no mistake--local election officials are on the front lines of this new
+battlefield: 108 in Illinois and over 8,000 Nationally. So, by and
+large, local election officials secure the Nation's election
+infrastructure. Locals install, store, monitor, test, deploy, run, and
+audit the voting machines and software. Locals install, store, monitor,
+test, deploy, run, and audit the electronic pollbooks. It is locals who
+manage warehouses, informational websites, voter databases, polling
+places, GIS Systems, results reporting systems, military voting
+systems, command centers, and the myriad digital services we rely upon
+in modern American elections. It is a local job to defend these
+systems, to institute controls that would detect breach, and to deploy
+mitigation strategies that can guarantee election processes and results
+that are trusted and true. It is their job to ensure recovery.
+ Most of us are county officers, and we are facing down powerful,
+shadowy adversaries, like Andy of Mayberry sent to repel an invading
+army. We need advice, support, and resources--first, for better
+technology and routine hand-counted audits which can give additional
+confidence that digital results are accurate. Second, and most
+critically today, we have a pressing need for top-notch personnel with
+the skills to navigate the current cyber battlefield. Our country's
+local election officials need direct human support as we work to defend
+ourselves against the onslaught of digital threats we've been warned
+about.
+Cook County Efforts
+ Since the summer of 2016 we stepped up our efforts to protect
+ourselves and to protect the broader ecosystem: We introduced
+additional hand-counted audits to our State-mandated 5 percent machine
+re-tabulation. And we are pushing State legislation to add additional
+audits to election results--in the form of Risk-Limiting Audits.
+ We did a complete mapping of all our systems and conducted a point
+analysis of potential vulnerabilities. We have documented all defensive
+measures employed and created a list of those we hope to employ going
+forward. We also documented all methods of detecting breach, as well as
+those we hope to employ in the future. Finally, we are developing our
+recovery plans for any breach at any point on any system. Before
+November of this year, we will practice every recovery method.
+ We began installing new election equipment that will be easier to
+defend and will make detection and recovery significantly easier.
+ We introduced State legislation to help local election officials
+bring in more expertise and cyber monitoring capability.
+ We worked to create a communication structure in Illinois with
+Federal, State, and local cyber experts, technology experts, law
+enforcement officials, and election officials.
+ We teamed with our neighbors at the Chicago Board of Elections to
+hire an election infrastructure and information security officer.
+ We worked with MS-ISAC to get rapid intelligence on vulnerabilities
+and specific threat information to our networks. And we have pushed our
+colleagues around the State to join it and the elections ISAC.
+Additionally, we have gotten threat briefings from DHS and FBI.
+ We worked with DHS to conduct cyber scans of our websites--and to
+run a full risk and vulnerability assessment. And let me say that I am
+glad the folks working for homeland security are on our team. I firmly
+believe if every election official, State or local, undertook a similar
+effort, there would be a deafening roar from my colleagues for more
+resources to procure modern technology and institute modern controls.
+ We worked with the folks at DEFCON on some of their activities
+related to training election officials on the defense of networks.
+ I co-chaired the newly-created Government Coordinating Council
+(GCC) set up with DHS to help drive Federal policy and resource
+allocation. I sit alongside the chairman of the Election Assistance
+Commission (EAC), the president of the National Association of
+Secretaries of State (NASS), the president of the National Association
+of State Election Directors (NASED), and from DHS deputy assistant
+secretary, Infrastructure Protection, National Protection and Programs
+Directorate (NPPD). In that role I tried to continually push for the
+advancement of local official's concerns.
+ In all efforts we learned that coordinating efforts is critical to
+our individual and ecosystem success.
+Coordinated Efforts
+ There has been a tremendous amount of attention on the States, and
+their relationship to the Federal Government and it's great to see that
+relationship mending and great information starting to be shared
+between the two groups. On the GCC we have worked hard to refine a plan
+for securing our sector as well as protocols for sharing information
+throughout the ecosystem. We are working with the private-sector vendor
+community to ensure we have a common approach to protecting the sector.
+ Federal Government agencies now know how to communicate to the
+State-level election professionals and vice versa. What remains
+unfulfilled is the assurance that the information can get all the way
+down to the local level and that the locals are prepared to digest the
+information and take necessary action.
+ It is time to ensure that the successful effort to normalize
+relations with State officials be duplicated with local election
+officials. Like an iceberg, the mass, and indeed most of the risks to
+the Nation's election infrastructure, lies below the surface. And its
+security lies in the hands of women and men who run elections at the
+local level.
+ Given concerns with Federalism, the most likely path for
+successfully fortifying local election officials is through State
+government and State election officials. But it's important that they
+envision their job as helping ensure locals are resourced appropriately
+and meeting important security metrics. I have no doubt that our State
+officials are up for the challenge and I look forward to assisting our
+industry mature in this direction quickly.
+Increased Stable Investment & Short-Term Spending
+ We have looked to our State and Federal funders and regulators to
+fortify locals on this battlefield. Given the costs of regular
+technology refreshes and support for human resources with cyber
+capacity, the needed investment is very large. And locals need a signal
+that they can invest now for security and not squirrel away recent
+money for some future episode.
+ Nevertheless, the recent investment is greatly appreciated.
+Congress just released $380 million to combat the election
+cybersecurity threat. And that is an important start. It may be
+necessary for the States, Federal Government, and locals to
+collectively invest that much annually. Meanwhile, Americans justly
+concerned about the costs need confidence this money will be spent
+well. In my mind there are two top priorities. First, a handful of
+States and counties still have paperless voting systems. These should
+be replaced as soon as possible.
+ Second, everywhere, we must improve the security capacities of
+local election offices. Most are run by a just handful of incredibly
+dedicated and hardworking heroes. But a handful of people making
+critical security decisions are outmatched against the threats we've
+been warned of.
+ In a local newspaper last year we called for a brigade of digital
+defenders to be deployed to serve election offices around Illinois and
+the Nation, starting now and working through the 2020 Presidential
+election and beyond. Recently, the Government Coordinating Council,
+comprised of the leadership of America's election organizations,
+suggested a similar construct, suggesting that States employ ``cyber
+navigators'' to help fortify local election officials.
+Illinois Approach
+ In Illinois we formulated a loose security group consisting of
+representatives of Homeland Security, FBI, the Illinois State Police
+and their Cyber Team, Illinois Information Security Office, the
+leadership of the local election official associations, and the State
+Board of Elections. Originally our some of local officials and the
+State Board of Elections had desired to pass through the HAVA funds to
+the local election officials based largely upon voting age population.
+But as our group and State legislators digested the cybersecurity
+problem, we recognized that such a distribution would not be effective
+in fortifying most of the locals. First, regardless of the number of
+voters served, all 108 election officials had nearly identical cyber
+footprint, in that they had the same number of networked-attached
+digitally exposed systems. Second, the larger offices already had some
+capacity to tackle this problem--whereas the smaller offices are
+squeezed so tightly they can barely comply with the current
+requirements, let alone secure the entire elections threat surface
+area.
+ After the GCC issued guidance suggesting ``Cyber Navigators'', the
+State legislature mandated that at least one-half of the HAVA funds
+just released be expended on a ``Cyber Navigator'' program to be
+administered by the State Board of Elections. The State Board is likely
+to get help fulfilling this mandate from other organizations with cyber
+expertise. By and large, local election officials supported the bill.
+And our State board is eminently capable of fulfilling the mandate.
+ These ``Navigators'' need to accomplish three vital goals. First,
+they should work to institute the election security framework--defend,
+detect, recover. They can help improve defenses within election
+offices, following the specific recommendations of CIS. We believe
+they'll quickly bring up the floor of the elections security ecosystem.
+Appropriately supported, we can see massive improvement very quickly.
+There is low-hanging fruit, but even low-hanging fruit needs to be
+plucked. They'll also work to support locals' efforts at instituting
+detection techniques and recovery plans. Second, the ``Navigators''
+will do the work necessary to secure the free support being offered by
+public and private organizations, like the Department of Homeland
+Security, State resources, Google and Cloudflare, or the Elections
+Information Sharing & Analysis Center; they will also work with the
+outside vendors who provide much of the elections infrastructure and
+support to local officials. More importantly, they will help build a
+culture of security that adapts to the evolving threats we face through
+training and constant assessment efforts. Illinois' 108 local election
+offices will mature quickly with this reinforcement. As specific
+mitigations and upgrades are identified by Navigators, the State Board
+should be positioned to quickly provide that investment.
+ It is expected that the State Board of Elections will take some
+small portion of the remainder of the HAVA funds to support their own
+infrastructure, naturally, since they manage and maintain the State-
+wide voter database. Everything else shall be distributed to the local
+election officials to invest as they see fit, subject to the
+guidelines. I'll note that our legislature sought to compel
+participation in the Navigator program by making receipt of future
+grants contingent upon local official participation.
+ In Illinois, we recognized that this is inherently a local problem.
+But we also recognize that locals cannot solve this problem themselves.
+This coordinated, managed approach assures appropriate assessment and
+remediation efforts can be efficiently implemented. We are utilizing
+existing expertise from other areas of Federal, State, and local
+government as force multipliers. And we are excited that our State
+Board of Elections is taking on this new mandate and moving quickly to
+implement it.
+ This massive reinforcement effort can be accomplished here and
+Nation-wide. And it can be done now. It will require the States to cut
+through the red tape that can delay action. This may mean relying on
+existing contracts, or even emergency procurements. But States must do
+whatever they need to do to get the army of ``Navigators'' on the
+ground this summer. After all, the danger is not hypothetical. We're
+bracing against the renewed attacks we've been told to expect.
+Supporting a Resilient Public
+ One job of an election administrator is to conduct elections so
+that losing candidates accept the fact that they lost fairly. Anything
+that hinders our ability to do that decreases confidence in the system.
+And undermines our ability to bestow legitimacy--not just victory.
+ Election officials deploy a variety of networked connected digital
+services, such as voter registration systems, and unofficial election
+results displays. Each of these is a ripe target for our adversaries. A
+successful attack against those services may not change a single vote,
+but could still damage public confidence. This is particularly true in
+a time of great public suspicion, exacerbated by a disappointing
+proliferation of gracelessness and grandstanding.
+ Our public confidence is already weaker than it should be.
+Vacillating voting rights rules, no matter how marginal the effect, are
+disconcerting to many people, naturally suspect given our history.
+Additionally, some media, activist groups and politicians have acted in
+ways that ultimately prey on Americans' insecurities about their most
+cherished institution, either through outlandish claims of fraud, or
+overstated claims of suppression. Such actions have done a disservice
+to the institution we serve and consequently to our ability to bestow
+not just victory, but legitimacy. We must be very careful to calculate
+not just the relative effects on power that election rule changes can
+have, but also the relative effects on legitimacy. Or put another way--
+will losers be more or less likely to accept that they lost fairly.
+ Some losing candidates are already apt to call their defeats into
+doubt. A new digital breach--no matter how far removed from the vote
+counting system--could turn sore losers to cynicism, disbelief, even
+revolt. That's the reaction the enemies of the United States want.
+ In fact, in the face of direct targeting of a State or local
+election office it is very possible that there will be some service
+disruptions--most likely to the network connected digital services like
+election results websites.
+ The bottom line is we can't eliminate every chance of breach, but
+we can make sure that successful attacks rare. And we can provide
+assurances that we are prepared to recover quickly when they happen. We
+can do this with support at the local level. I support Federal efforts
+like the Secure Elections Act. While I would always advocate for more
+local participation, in the current environment, doing something
+imperfect now is greatly superior to doing something perfect at some
+point in the future.
+ As Americans, we get to choose how we want to respond to potential
+disruptions. The damage of a foreign attack on our elections
+infrastructure will be greatly diminished if the targeted institution
+is also being supported internally with respect.
+ Thank you for the opportunity to appear today. I look forward to
+your questions.
+ Attachment.--White Paper
+ 2020 vision: election security in the age of committed foreign threats
+Sponsored by: Cook County Clerk David Orr
+Authored by: Noah Praetz, Director of Elections
+ December 2017
+ The entire National security establishment admonishes that threats
+to our election infrastructure are real. Foreign governments, foreign
+non-state actors, and domestic troublemakers have the capacity and
+desire to corrode the essential public belief that our election
+outcomes are true and reliable. To very different degrees this threat
+applies to both preliminary returns announced on election night and to
+official, final results.
+ Beyond results, the threat applies to the large variety of systems
+used to run seamless elections. These include electronic and paper
+pollbooks; voter registration and election management systems; websites
+with voter tools and public information; and a variety of other
+subsystems such as: GIS, ballot printing system, mail ballot
+preparation and processing system and a variety of essential election
+support systems like election day control centers.
+ Local election officials--nearly 9,000 of them in the country--are
+the shock troops on this new battlefield. They desperately need
+resources, including Federal Government resources.
+Policymakers and funders must act now to ensure election security
+ The new security mantra for local election officials is ``defend,
+detect, recover.''
+ Perfect defense is difficult or even impossible. Instead the
+challenge of security is to ensure no attack exceeds our resilience--
+our ability to detect and recover--whether that means restoring lost
+data or even recounting ballots to establish election results that are
+trusted and true.
+ Each State has a varying security matrix to operate in; their mix
+of ability to defend, detect, and recover. States with great audits
+(detect) and paper ballots (recover) are much more resilient by
+definition; and the burden of defending their voting system is
+consequently much lower. On the other hand, States without good audits
+and without paper ballots place the unenviable burden of perfect
+defense on their election administrators.
+ Below is a challenging, comprehensive, yet achievable list of
+actions to protect the integrity of these multiple systems. Make no
+mistake, this will be a painful and expensive undertaking. But the
+protection of our foundational institution requires this sacrifice.
+ responsibilities of policy makers and funders
+Defend
+ Increase the defensive capacity of local and State election
+officials by:
+ 1. Supporting a digital network for all local election officials
+ that will facilitate rapid sharing of threats and incidents, as
+ well as supporting increased training and resiliency;
+ 2. Financing an Election Infrastructure and Information Security
+ Officer (EIISO) (or consultant) servicing every local and State
+ election official in the country;
+ 3. Ensuring that threat and incident information known to
+ Government is shared appropriately throughout the election
+ ecosystem.
+Detect
+ Increase the catastrophic breach detection capacity by
+incentivizing:
+ 1. The use of modern public audits of all elections;
+ 2. The use of modern voting technology that captures a digital
+ image of each ballot that can be tied to the original ballot
+ and the cast ballot record;
+ 3. The use of monitoring sensors on the networks of all willing
+ election officials.
+Recover
+ Eliminate even the most remote possibility of an undetectable
+catastrophic breach by replacing all paperless voting systems that
+currently serve nearly 20 percent of the country.
+ Release election officials from their burden of being perfect every
+single time!
+ potential approach for election officials and their election
+ infrastructure and information security officer
+Defend
+ Get experts into the office. Engage outside cybersecurity
+ resources & professionals. No election offices can handle this
+ problem on their own. Inside most elections offices, there
+ simply is not the complete capacity to accept the threat,
+ assess the vulnerability, digest recommendations, manage
+ mitigations, and perfect recovery.
+ Utilize as many free local, State, and Federal (DHS, CIS,
+ and MS-ISAC) tools as possible.
+ If Government resources are unavailable, or
+ underwhelming, hire private firms or partner with academic
+ institutions.
+ Collaborate with resources inside local, State, and
+ Federal Government because we are not alone in facing this
+ type of threat include the fusion centers.
+ Bring in outside resources to partner with information
+ technology and information security teams, with a focus
+ solely on election security.
+ The reality is that most election officials share their
+ internal information technology and security resources with
+ every other county office engaged in critical activities,
+ such as health and public safety. It can be nearly
+ impossible to get the attention necessary for election
+ security unless it is the primary focus of those resources.
+ Understand and limit the threat surface area; or all
+ possible points of vulnerability for malicious attack.
+ Inventory all election-related systems: e.g. voting machine
+ and vote counting system; e-pollbook system; voter
+ registration/election management system; mail ballot delivery
+ and processing system; and on-line systems such as voter
+ registration, mail ballot request tools, voter information
+ look-up.
+ Map how systems work and data flows, and mark every single
+ point of vulnerability.
+ Limit the threat surface area by making policy decisions
+ that reduce points of vulnerability wherever possible (this is
+ about managing risk, not eliminating it.)
+ Employ defense tactics and policies for each system--on-line
+ or not.
+ Implement the Center for Internet Security's top 20 cyber
+ controls. Do the top 5 first. These include:
+ 1. Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Devices; 2. Inventory
+ of Authorized and Unauthorized Software; 3. Secure
+ Configurations for Hardware and Software; 4. Continuous
+ Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation; 5. Controlled Use
+ of Administrative Privileges; 6. Maintenance, Monitoring,
+ and Analysis of Audit Logs; 7. Email and Web Browser
+ Protections; 8. Malware Defenses; 9. Limitation and Control
+ of Network Ports; 10. Data Recovery Capability; 11. Secure
+ Configurations for Network Devices; 12. Boundary Defense;
+ 13. Data Protection; 14. Controlled Access Based on the
+ Need to Know; 15. Wireless Access Control; 16. Account
+ Monitoring and Control; 17. Security Skills Assessment and
+ Appropriate Training to Fill Gaps; 18. Application Software
+ Security; 19. Incident Response and Management; 20.
+ Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises.
+ Employ election system-specific defense and detection
+ tactics across specific systems.
+ These can include all the hardening options that systems
+ may have, such as locks, seals, chain of custody, advanced
+ authentication, etc.
+Detect
+ For each vulnerability point identified in the mapping
+ process, consider a method of detecting whether something
+ anomalous has happened; or brainstorm the first place such an
+ intrusion might be detectable.
+ Validate everything; every available log should be checked
+ including: Seals, time sheets, cameras, swipe cards, login
+ data, registration statistics, etc.
+ Behavioral analysis tools and procedures can and will
+ point out what is going on. For example, voter registration
+ follows a natural pattern year over year. Identifying the
+ pattern and watching for anomalous behavior works.
+ Use forensics when possible.
+ A forensics analysis of the software system employed can
+ offer a high level of confidence that it is operating as
+ certified. This is particularly true in the voting system
+ environment. Comparing snapshots of deployed software with
+ a clean reference copy during a live election is a powerful
+ verification technique.
+ Conduct public audits of the election results that allow for
+ a visual comparison of the cast ballot record with the ballot
+ itself.
+ Be transparent and brace for public scrutiny.
+ Crowdsourcing the election brings the greatest confidence,
+ but also the greatest public scrutiny. ``Sausage making''
+ will be on full display. Consider publishing ballot images
+ scrubbed of identifying marks. In the short run this can
+ create volatility, and people may scrutinize the office and
+ the software used, but ultimately the confidence levels
+ will be increased.
+ Work to investigate audit styles that bring the highest
+ level of confidence to the most stakeholders. Consider the
+ use of sophisticated yet efficient testing algorithms, such
+ as risk-limiting audits.
+Recover
+ For each vulnerability point, assume a successful breach and
+ determine how to recover.
+ Where possible, make policy decisions and investments that
+ yield the clearest path to recovery.
+ For example, on electronic voting machines: After removing
+ paperless systems consider that ballot marking devices are
+ better than machines with paper audit trails. Digital
+ scanning devices that create images of ballots are better
+ than scanning devices that don't.
+ Build in redundancy that doesn't rely on technology.
+ For example, paper pollbooks backup electronic pollbooks.
+ Emergency paper ballots backup corrupted (or just
+ malfunctioning) touch-screen or ballot marking devices.
+ Practice recovery with professional staff, advisors, and
+ vendors by running drills and exercises. Theory is only theory.
+ Practice makes it real.
+ local election officials need support
+ It must be underscored--local election officials are the front-line
+troops in this battle. Those who control Federal, State, and local
+spending must provide local election officials with resources to do
+their job in this environment. Those who drive State election policies
+must make choices to fortify local officials for their new cyber
+mission.
+ Election officials are serving valiantly and professionally. They
+are talented and capable. They are holding the line. But they are
+operating with limited resources under sometimes unfair burdens placed
+upon them by policy makers in their respective States. Like good
+servants, they will say they can continue to hold the line. And they'll
+mean it.
+ But they need to be asked to hold a reasonable line. And holding a
+line that requires perfect defense every time is not reasonable.
+ It is impossible to defend against every conceivable attack. But if
+we detect breaches and recover from them quickly, we will survive any
+incident.
+ And so will faith in our democracy.
+
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. With much
+excitement, we have been anticipating Mr. Braun's testimony.
+
+ STATEMENT OF JAKE BRAUN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CYBER POLICY
+ INITIATIVE
+
+ Mr. Braun. Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Rogers, and
+distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for the
+opportunity to speak to you today on this important issue. I
+also want to thank my co-panelists, Secretary Padilla, Noah
+Praetz, Secretary Merrill, they have led this Nation in
+securing elections and have become a model for other election
+officials around the country to follow.
+ So with that, I am Jake Braun. I am the executive director
+of the University of Chicago, Cyber Policy Initiative at the
+Harris School of Public Policy. I am neither a technologist nor
+an election administrator, however, I have been working this
+issue for about 15 years from 3, kind-of, distinct vantage
+points.
+ A few years ago, I worked on voter protection issues for
+multiple Presidential campaigns. Then, during my time at DHS I
+worked on this issue from both the Homeland and National
+security perspective.
+ Then most recently, I co-founded the DEF CON Voting Machine
+Hacking Village. DEF CON is the largest hacker conference in
+the world and the Voting Village, as we like to call it, is the
+only public, third-party assessment of voting equipment on the
+planet that we are aware of.
+ One thing that has become clear to us, clear to me, as I
+have worked on these issues from these different--very
+different perspectives over the years, is that this is a
+National security issue. This is not, kind-of, an election
+administration nuisance.
+ What I would argue that the committee is solving for here
+is, they are not solving for dangling chads, they are solving
+for: How do we stop an existential threat to the United States
+from undermining our elections? So let me give you a few kind-
+of key findings from the most recent DEF CONs that help
+elucidate that point.
+ So thing one, the supply chain for the equipment, both the
+software and the machines is global. Many of these parts are
+made in places--nations that are unfriendly to the United
+States, like China.
+ Hackers--nation-state hacks could put malware on firmware
+for these machines and other devices used to implement
+elections, and hack whole classes of machines all across the
+United States, all at once and never have to leave the Kremlin.
+That is not something that any local election official can be
+expected to deal with on their own. That is a National security
+issue and, therefore, Congress must act to support them.
+ Second, both DEF CON, the Senate Intelligence Committee,
+and OAS, which is the National--or global head of website
+security, have identified nearly identical threats to website
+attacks across the country. On top of that, as was stated
+previously in this hearing, there are multiple States that
+don't have paper trails, much less audits in place to re-
+engender trust if there was an attack on their elections. So it
+may be simply an attack on election reporting website that
+undermines trust in an election, especially in States like
+those without paper trails and audits.
+ On top of that, there has been reports since 2016 that
+Russia has actually hacked election results-reporting websites
+in the United States already. On top of that, we know that
+Russia did this in the Ukraine, where they coupled their
+attacks on the election reporting websites with fake news they
+put out saying that their candidate had won, when, in fact, he
+had not.
+ This--all of this together, fighting back an onslaught of
+attacks from both the cyber and media perspective from a
+nation-state is something that no local election official can
+be expected to do. That is a National security threat and,
+therefore, Congress must act to help State and locals deal with
+it.
+ Finally, the cyber industry itself is--I mean, sorry--the
+election industry itself is cyber immature, as we may say.
+Meaning that, oftentimes, even when vulnerabilities are told to
+vendors, they don't get fixed.
+ For example, back in 2007 there was a vulnerability
+disclosed to a vendor and--for a specific machine. This machine
+is used in 23 States, counts millions of ballots in a National
+election, often thousands of ballots locally at a particular
+jurisdiction. We went back and looked at that same machine at
+DEF CON last year, and that same vulnerability still persisted.
+So over a decade later, the vulnerability's still not been
+fixed.
+ To be clear, the--the attack that was used on this machine
+is attack to be--could be carried out remotely by foreign
+hackers on foreign soil. It is an attack that can jump the
+erroneously-named air gap, and take over a machine completely
+to delete or add whatever types of votes you would want.
+ By the way, this all may sound very hard, however, most of
+these attacks were done by hackers that are generalists, with
+no previous access to the machines, no knowledge of the
+machines and no specialized training on how to attack these
+machines.
+ OK. So that is all the bad news but there is--there is a
+few good things to highlight here. One of those things is the
+security measures in this bill, they are very good.
+ I think that my colleagues have highlighted some incredibly
+important things like audits, paper trails, improving cyber
+hygiene, money to State and locals who desperate need it to
+improve their cyber hygiene posture.
+ But there is also a few other things; No. 1, there is money
+for R&D. The current state of the machines Nationally is such
+that they are essentially un-securable and we desperately need
+new machines around the country. However, the market for
+machines is such that the margins are so slim for the vendors
+that they will never be able to put the money needed into R&D
+to create machines of the future that can secure our elections.
+So Congress, thus, needs to help with that.
+ No. 2, there is a very innovative bug bounty program in
+there, which I think creatively helps solve the cyber work
+force problem, which is a very serious problem. Then, finally,
+there is vulnerability disclosure component to it.
+ So thank you very much. I am happy to answer any questions.
+ [The prepared statement of Mr. Braun follows:]
+ Prepared Statement of Jake Braun
+ February 12, 2019
+ Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Rogers, and distinguished Members
+of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today
+on this important issue.
+ I would also like to thank my co-panelists, Secretary Padilla and
+Noah Praetz. They have led the Nation in securing their elections and
+have become a model for other election officials around the country to
+follow.
+ My name is Jake Braun and I am executive director for the Cyber
+Policy Initiative at the University of Chicago Harris School of Public
+Policy.
+ I am also co-founder of the DEF CON Voting Machine Hacking Village.
+DEF CON is the largest hacker conference in the world and the Voting
+Village is the only public, third-party inspection of voting equipment
+in the world, that we are aware of.
+ Moreover, for the last 2 years, I have worked with leaders in the
+National security establishment to release an annual report on the
+National security implications of our findings at DEF CON. The reports
+have won multiple awards and our efforts have been hailed by people as
+diverse as President Trump's former White House Cyber Czar, Rob Joyce;
+then-Chairman of the Cyber Caucus, Congressman Will Hurd; and
+Congresswoman Jackie Speier; as well as a bipartisan group of Senators
+from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, led by Senators
+Harris and Lankford.
+ The main question relevant for this committee is whether any of our
+findings are useful to the legislation you are now considering. The
+answer, in my estimation, is emphatically yes.
+ To that end, I have one overarching finding I want to highlight as
+well as a few key vulnerabilities which clarify the importance of the
+finding. Finally, I would humbly like to make a couple recommendations
+as to how these problems can be addressed.
+ The overarching finding is that attacks on our election
+infrastructure are NOT solely an election administration nuisance but
+rather a National security threat. Time and again this conclusion
+manifests itself in our research. This threat is not about how to
+eradicate hanging chads. This is about our National security apparatus
+marshalling its resources to do what our Nation expects it to do, which
+is protect our country from existential threats to the United States. A
+county clerk or secretary of state is not equipped to defend our
+democracy from nation-state hackers. These nation-state adversaries may
+attempt to change vote totals or they may simply try and erode our
+confidence in the integrity of American elections. Either way, this is
+a National security threat and thus Congress must act.
+ Let me give you a few examples of specific key findings that draw
+us to the conclusion that this is a National security threat:
+ 1. The voting machine supply chain is global and parts are made in
+ nations unfriendly to the United States, like China. If an
+ adversary were to infect the firmware made at a plant in China
+ or elsewhere, which we know has happened with other products,
+ whole classes of voting machines could be hacked all at once on
+ Election Day from the Kremlin. No election clerk or secretary
+ of state alone can defend against these global supply chain
+ issues. This is a National security threat and thus Congress
+ must act.
+ 2. Second, we have highlighted well-known vulnerabilities in
+ websites. The global leader on website security, The Open Web
+ Application Security Project (OWASP), and the 2018 report by
+ the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence have highlighted
+ similar threats to election websites. The bottom line is no one
+ can defend a website from a determined nation-state actor. Just
+ ask the top 25 banks in the country who collectively spend
+ billions on security but failed to stop members of the Iranian
+ Revolutionary Guard from attacking their websites consistently
+ over the course of 2 years. Further, since 2016, the media has
+ reported successful attacks on election websites in the United
+ States by Russia. Russia also executed an attack against
+ Ukraine's Central Election Commission website in 2014, rigging
+ the website to announce the Russian-supported candidate won.
+ Ukrainian officials detected the breach before the election
+ results went live, but Russian media still erroneously named
+ their candidate the winner. In U.S. States where there are no
+ paper audits possible, hacking a website may be all that's
+ necessary to cast doubt on an election's integrity. Moreover,
+ no clerk or secretary of state alone can defend themselves
+ against a multi-layered cyber and media campaign to cast doubt
+ on the integrity of a National election. Rather, this is a
+ National security threat and thus Congress must act.
+ 3. Finally, perhaps the most disconcerting ``flaw'' we found is
+ that vendors don't fix vulnerabilities when they are disclosed
+ to them. A significant flaw with the M650 machine, which was
+ used in 23 States as of 2018, was disclosed to the vendor in
+ 2007. However, to our knowledge the vendor neither told its
+ customers about the flaw nor did they fix the flaw at the time
+ it was disclosed. Nor did they fix it after the 2016 elections
+ when they supposedly started taking security much more
+ seriously. Nor did they fix it, to our knowledge, after we
+ pointed it out again at DEF CON in 2018. To be clear, this
+ attack would allow an attacker, through a remote hack that
+ could be carried out from abroad, to jump the so-called ``air
+ gap'' and hack into a voting tabulator processing ballots for
+ key counties in battleground States. This attack could flip the
+ Electoral College and determine the outcome of a Presidential
+ election. Obviously no clerk or secretary of state alone can
+ defend against adversaries who can change large number of votes
+ without needing physical or network access to the machines.''
+ Clearly, this is a National security threat and thus Congress
+ must act.
+ One might think these attacks sound pretty hard to carry out.
+However, most of these attacks and dozens of others we found were
+carried out by generalists with no specialized training on election
+equipment or previous knowledge of the machines or networks.
+ Some have claimed that the setting at DEF CON does not represent a
+real election environment, thus diminishing the utility of our
+findings. However, as said at the outset, DEF CON is the only public,
+third-party inspection of election equipment, so it's the best we have
+for now. Further, as former White House Cyber Czar Rob Joyce, said,
+``We know our adversaries have a room just like the one at DEF CON.''
+By which he meant that our adversaries are researching all the voting
+equipment we have and more because they don't have to get the machines
+legally, like we do at DEF CON. However, they aren't doing the research
+3 days a year, they are doing it 365 days a year. They also don't
+disclose the vulnerabilities they find, like we do. Yet they are
+looking for the same flaws we are: Hacks that are quick, remote, and
+scalable.
+ So what can be done about these problems?
+ First, I would encourage you all to study the recommendations of a
+new report on election security from the National Academies of
+Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. Their recommendations are
+comprehensive and sound.
+ Second, pass this bill. The measures in the H.R. 1 proposed
+legislation provide for auditable paper trails and local implementation
+of at least the top 5 of the 20 Critical Security Controls, as well as
+funding for cyber assessments and remediation. Congress must support
+State and local administrators' efforts by providing funding and
+assistance to implement cyber best practices that reduce America's
+vulnerability to these clear threats to our election infrastructure.
+ Finally, the election industry desperately needs funding for R&D to
+build voting equipment that can stand up to these modern threats. The
+current equipment is essentially unsecurable. The vendors will never
+have the enough money to fund the R&D necessary to develop equipment
+that can defend against nation-state attackers. H.R. 1 provides R&D
+funding for voting technology of the future, and I would strongly
+encourage the committee to keep that funding in whatever version
+hopefully passes.
+ Again, not solely an election administration nuisance but rather a
+National security threat. Thus Congress needs to act and fund a
+solution. I thank you for your efforts to pass this critically
+important legislation.
+
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much for your testimony.
+ I now recognize, Mr. Merrill, to summarize his statement
+for 5 minutes--or do the best you can do.
+
+ STATEMENT OF JOHN H. MERRILL, SECRETARY OF STATE, ALABAMA
+
+ Mr. Merrill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I will. I appreciate
+that. I am honored to be with you. Ranking Member Rogers, thank
+you so much for the invitation to come and share with you all
+today.
+ I am John Merrill. For the last 4 years and 25 days, I have
+had the privilege to serve as Alabama's secretary of state. In
+our State, as in 35-plus other States in the Union, the
+secretary of state is the person that is responsible for the
+election system in that particular jurisdiction.
+ I think it is important for you to know some of the things
+we have done in Alabama and some of the thoughts of some of the
+people that I represent that have similar positions to the one
+that I hold.
+ As far as secretary of state's role is concerned; we have
+pre-election, Election Day, and post-election activities that
+we are responsible for. We coordinate all voter registration
+efforts in our State, we certify the ballots, we also monitor
+and enforce campaign finance laws at the State level.
+ We ensure participation in the election's process through
+awareness campaigns. We have Election Day and election night
+reporting systems that we have created and compile and certify
+election results. We also engage in partnerships with our
+public and private partners and independent partners in
+different ways.
+ We work with our county and municipal governments as well
+as Federal agencies when it is appropriate including but not
+limited to the election's systems commission, the Department of
+Justice, the National Guard, the Department of Homeland
+Security.
+ Our relationship with those entities has improved over the
+last 3 years since we had this type situation first introduced
+to us. In our preparation for the 2018 election cycle, we
+concentrated in the areas of cybersecurity, election integrity,
+which also includes enforcing the laws, and we use paper
+ballots in Alabama. We are going to continue to do that and by
+Federal law, anybody has to retain the Federal ballots for a
+period of not less than 2 years. That is the Federal law
+already. Voter confidence and voter participation is
+extraordinarily important.
+ Now we have heard a lot of different things today. But one
+of the things I think is so important for us to remember and to
+acknowledge and this has come from the Department of Homeland
+Security most recent report that there was no breach of any
+incident in the tabulation that occurred in the 2016 general
+election.
+ That has been researched, it has been documented, and no
+breach has occurred and no tabulation change occurred in any
+election in any State in the Union in the 2016 cycle. I also
+think that it is important to know that there is some serious
+concerns and issues with H.R. 1 in our opinion.
+ No. 1, significant Federal overreach has been indicated
+through the introduction of this legislation and it appears to
+provide certain things that need to be done but the lack of
+resources in order to be able to do those effectively.
+ So they are strictly underfunded or unfunded mandates. No.
+2, there are many prescriptive requirements that have been
+indicated that States that would accept these funds would face
+significant difficulty in enacting those new programs without
+the resources necessary to do that.
+ They include but are not limited to some things that are
+already on-going in our State and other States in the Union,
+which are electronic poll books, paper ballots, automatic voter
+registration, audits, same-day registration. Those things are
+strictly prescribed that they need to be adhered to regardless
+of what the local jurisdiction would like to do. No. 3, the
+amount of time that the States have to meet the requirements is
+not something that is going to be able to be met.
+ One of the questions was asked earlier is that something
+that is going to be able to be adhered to and the answer to
+that question is no. If you want to know why it is because at
+the Federal level and at most State levels they move at the
+speed of Government and if you move at the speed of Government
+you know why it is not going to be done. You have to create
+RFPs and other things but we can talk about that later if you
+are interested.
+ As far as--the most important thing that I could share with
+you about a good election security bill, it would be one that
+would create the necessary resources to the States without
+creating unfunded or underfunded mandates and strangling
+restrictions that would introduce Federal overreach. I yield
+back the balance of my time.
+ [The prepared statement of Mr. Merrill follows:]
+ Prepared Statement of John H. Merrill
+ February 13, 2019
+ My name is John Merrill, and I am Alabama's 53rd secretary of
+state.
+ Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to address
+how we, as the States' chief State election officials, work diligently
+each and every day in our State, and with our counties, municipalities,
+and other local jurisdictions to ensure we elect our leaders in free,
+fair, and accessible elections. This work can be complimented by
+effective partnerships at the Federal level, like those we have today
+with the Elections Assistance Commission (EAC), and the Department of
+Homeland Security (DHS), the National Guard, the Federal Bureau of
+Investigation (FBI), and other groups and associations like the
+National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS).
+ My goal as Alabama's 53rd secretary of state is to ensure that each
+and every eligible U.S. Citizen that is a resident of Alabama is
+registered to vote and receives a photo ID.
+ During my time as Alabama's secretary of state, my team and I have
+changed the paradigm for voting in the State of Alabama. Since I took
+office on January 19, 2015, we have worked with notable Alabamians,
+local officials, interested agencies, key communicators, and interested
+citizens to encourage voter registration and voter participation. The
+results are that we have registered 1,199,909 new voters, which brings
+our total number of registered voters to 3,473,030. Thirty of our 67
+counties use electronic poll books, which expedites the check-in
+process and offers greater security for the voter and greater
+efficiencies and accountability for the poll worker. Our stated goal is
+to have electronic poll books in every county in the State by 2022. As
+a part of our efforts to ensure voter integrity, we have worked to
+secure 6 convictions of criminal activity related to voter fraud and
+will continue to document, investigate, and prosecute those
+individuals' intent on disrupting our democratic institutions for
+personal or political gain.
+ All of these efforts have helped our citizens become more involved
+and engaged in the process to elect officials that represent them in
+local, State, and Federal positions. We have broken every record in the
+history of the State for voter participation as Alabamians have turned
+out to vote in record numbers. In March 2016, we set a record for voter
+participation in a Presidential preference primary with 1.25 million
+Alabamians casting a ballot. In the General Election on November 8,
+2016 with 2.1 million Alabamians casting a ballot. Alabama then broke
+the record for participation in a Special Election during the 2017 U.S.
+Senate Special Election, held on December 12, 2017, with 1.3 million
+Alabamians casting a ballot for their choice for the next U.S. Senator
+from Alabama. Most recently, we broke the record for turnout in a non-
+Presidential general election year during the 2018 General Election
+with more than 1.7 million Alabamians going to the polls.
+ In Alabama, we are making it easy to vote and hard to cheat.
+ As we prepared for the 2018 General Election, we worked to ensure
+our systems were protected by requiring 2-Factor Authentication for any
+State or local user who accesses the voter registration system. We
+secured our networks and our election night reporting system with
+resources provided through the Department of Homeland Security, our
+local information systems team, and other third-party vendors. Our work
+to conduct elections efficiently and effectively is supported both by
+the Elections Assistance Commission and the Department of Homeland
+Security. The EAC provides guidance and support, as we prepare our
+local election officials to administer their elections. Our
+relationship with DHS is a relatively new one, but it is one that has
+been home to significant growth over the last 2 years. Prior to the
+Senate Special Election in December 2017, we had very little
+interaction with DHS. However, as that election approached, we were
+able to work closely with DHS to ensure our systems were secure. We
+wanted to make sure that any vulnerabilities that we could identify
+were resolved and any new issues were mitigated before they disrupted
+an election in Alabama. We have also hosted a team from DHS on-site
+with us throughout election day to ensure issues are resolved in real
+time.
+ The most significant support that the Federal Government has
+provided to my State has been access to Federal grants and other
+resources to modernize and to increase the accessibility of our State's
+voting systems. Additional funding is imperative to ensure voting
+equipment can remain up-to-date and voting systems can remain secure to
+protect the data of those citizens.
+ Another area in which I have continued to advocate is for the EAC
+to provide guidance, testing, and verification of vendors, equipment,
+and systems much like the Federal Government does for other aspects of
+our Nation's critical infrastructure.
+ The impact of the enactment of H.R. 1 could possibly damage the
+credible elections process we have worked hard to build in Alabama by
+creating a series of administrative concerns for the State to enforce.
+ Title I of this bill creates significant concerns for me and the
+people of our State. This bill makes any process currently in place in
+our State to update and maintain the voter registration system illegal,
+while expanding the process of voter registration. Empirical data shows
+that no State in the union has done more, per capita, in the past 4
+years to increase voter registration than Alabama. This bill would
+create massive errors in the States' voter rolls and would be a
+disservice to voters that often benefit from the reminders sent from
+election offices encouraging them to update their registration
+information.
+ In Alabama, more than 94 percent of the eligible population is
+registered to vote. Therefore, our biggest responsibility when it comes
+to maintaining the voter registration system is to keep voter
+information accurate and current. Providing awareness efforts and
+teaching our citizens how to effectively participate in their
+democratic institutions is a much more effective method to get voters
+to the polls. That is exemplified in Alabama and was reconfirmed
+through a recent ruling from the Federal court on Alabama's photo voter
+ID law and its implementation. The judge in that case wrote that if
+every State in the union did what Alabama has done, then every State
+could have photo voter ID in their State because Alabama makes it so
+easy to be able to vote.
+ Title V of this bill is troubling, as it amends the Federal
+Election Campaign Act of 1971 to turn the Federal Election Commission
+(FEC) into a powerful, Government tool that provides a balance to big
+money donors and distribute resources to candidates unable to raise
+funds from those donors. However, this bill will not have the desired
+impact that the authors intend. The bill attempts to provide this
+balance to candidate fundraising by giving power to the FEC to
+redistribute tax-payer money to citizens that qualify and by providing
+matching funds to candidates who only accept small-dollar donations.
+This change would transform campaign financing and would enact into law
+excessive Federal intervention in a system that, is by law, to be
+administered by the State.
+ Under this bill, if the Commission finds, by themselves, that a
+candidate has failed to comply with any of the requirements of this
+program, the commission has the ability to simply revoke the
+certification of a candidate. This revocation could come in the middle
+of an election cycle allowing the FEC to become a partisan tool to be
+used as a weapon to completely eliminate a candidate's ability to
+campaign. This bill has the potential to make the FEC one of the most
+powerful entities in the U.S. Government.
+ A candidate that has been revoked by the FEC would then be unable
+to receive public funds and may have to repay all the resources
+received by their campaigns into an account the FEC controls to then
+use to conduct further audits or, if used improperly, to conduct
+unmitigated harassment of candidates they disagree with based on
+partisan, political, or philosophical differences. Past experiences
+involving the Internal Revenue Service indicate that this is not only
+plausible but likely.
+ By taking the ability to financially support a candidate away from
+the electorate, the most important person in our Nation--a citizen of
+the United States--and placing it with the Federal Election Commission,
+brings us one step closer toward the Federal Government dictating
+winners and losers in elections.
+ The most important feature to a good election security bill is to
+create one that provides necessary resources to the States without
+creating unfunded or underfunded mandates and strangling restrictions
+through Federal overreach.
+ United States Senators and Members of Congress that are unwilling
+or unable to consider the fact that each State has unique laws and
+circumstances with different levels of resources must understand that
+they are creating an ineffective system that will create additional
+hardships for the entities responsible for administering and conducting
+elections in their State, and potentially cause unnecessary damage to
+the credibility and security of our electoral process. State leaders
+must be given the opportunity to build their system around their
+State's laws and citizens regarding elections as is indicated in the
+United States Constitution.
+
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. Let me thank all
+the witnesses for their testimony and we have about 20 minutes
+to kind-of run this before they call votes so we are going to
+move very fast.
+ Mr. Braun, when you brought--who did you bring to the
+attention of that there was some vulnerabilities in equipment
+and you found that going back later the vulnerability was still
+there. Who do you make aware of that vulnerability?
+ Mr. Braun. Sir, we--we put it in a report that we released
+both to the press and to--we actually released it here on
+Capitol Hill in our building and gave it to multiple
+stakeholders in Government as well as the private sector. We
+dispersed it widely.
+ Chairman Thompson. OK. Did you make it available to DHS?
+ Mr. Braun. Yes, we sent them advanced copies as well as the
+final copy.
+ Chairman Thompson. OK. Did you get a comment back from them
+in any way?
+ Mr. Braun. I did not, sir.
+ Chairman Thompson. OK. Thank you. Mr. Merrill.
+ Mr. Merrill. Yes, sir.
+ Chairman Thompson. Did you apply for any of the funds from
+the Election Assistance Commission?
+ Mr. Merrill. Yes, sir. To get our balance from the original
+HAVA appropriation we did so.
+ Chairman Thompson. How much did you get?
+ Mr. Merrill. About $6.2 million for the State of Alabama.
+ Chairman Thompson. Could you have done what you did without
+that money?
+ Mr. Merrill. Well, we have. Congressman, we have not spent
+a dime of that money yet because the things that we are
+planning on introducing, the continuation of the purchase for
+electronic poll booths, which we have 30 of our 67 counties
+that are currently using it and the introduction of additional
+audit procedures that will be in place that will cost us some
+resources.
+ Some other things that we are doing in the area of
+cybersecurity where we have to provide an appropriate match for
+that purpose. Everything that we have done so far and we have
+done a number of things, as a matter of fact, if you will let
+me just mention some of these.
+ Chairman Thompson. No. No. You just answer my question.
+ Mr. Merrill. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
+ Chairman Thompson. You got $6.2 million right?
+ Mr. Merrill. That is correct.
+ Chairman Thompson. You anticipate to spend it?
+ Mr. Merrill. We going to spend it.
+ Chairman Thompson. OK. That is what--that is what I am
+trying--trying to get at.
+ Mr. Merrill. Yes, sir.
+ Chairman Thompson. So--so you saw the need for additional
+resources.
+ Mr. Merrill. Congressman, I always see the need for
+additional resources.
+ Chairman Thompson. OK. Mr. Padilla, could you tell us how
+much California received?
+ Mr. Padilla. California's share of last year's
+appropriation was about $34 million. It is pretty much being
+spent if it is not already been spent in the current fiscal
+year budget. It is in a number of areas.
+ Some of it is in hardware; software upgrades to our
+VoteCal, which is our centralized voter registration database,
+others for security improvements and counties' access to that
+same database.
+ We have dedicated some of the funding per EAC DHS
+recommendation on training. Cyber training is as important as
+cybersecurity to make sure staff at the State and at the local
+level are practicing all the best cyber hygiene practices as
+well.
+ I want to make a special comment on the timing of this
+because I have heard this about the Q&A of the first panel. Is
+there enough time, is there enough time, is there enough time
+as if--sounds like an argument to not move forward with
+offering States additional resources.
+ There are ways to expedite how that money gets from the
+Federal Government to the State government down to the locals
+who need it the most. You know first of all, Florida 2000
+triggered HAVA. HAVA was 17 years ago and the final
+disbursement of those dollars was just last year.
+ The Federal Government can move more quickly and
+appropriate and not just approving but appropriating the monies
+to States. The 2016 election kind-of revived a lot of these
+conversations. Yet, it wasn't until April 2018 that those final
+HAVA dollars were moved. So the Federal Government can move a
+little bit quicker. At the State level we have learned how to
+accelerate that--that money the investment added to local level
+by entering into contracts with counties to move their money to
+on a reimbursement basis. So the fact that the check is not in
+hand should not hold up counties being able to make the
+investments that they need to make.
+ Once they know that they can count on being reimbursed, a
+lot of counties are willing to move more quickly and bring
+those security benefits to the elections.
+ Chairman Thompson. So, thank you very much. Mr. Braun,
+supply chain is important also. I mentioned it to the last
+panel and I was given this assurance that we are in a global
+economy and everything was fine. I heard a little something
+from your comment. Can you elaborate on that?
+ Mr. Braun. Sure. This is kind-of a known thing that Russian
+hackers as well as other nation-states hack parts in the supply
+chain all the time. I think anybody who questions whether
+supply chain or remote hacks are possible just look at Stuxnet.
+Those centrifuges were buried in concrete vaults underground in
+the desert and folks were still able to get in there and take
+those out. Anybody who thinks that undermining our institutions
+and our democracy is any less of a strategic importance to
+Putin than taking out the Iranian nuclear program was to those
+who did that is very mistaken----
+ Chairman Thompson. I agree so have to on that end pay close
+attention to who's providing the equipment for our elections.
+ Mr. Braun. Without question there needs to be assessments
+of the parts and where they came from and inspections of them
+and a whole regime put in place for that.
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you. I yield to the Ranking
+Member.
+ Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What I have been
+making the point in my earlier questioning and trying to
+emphasize is as Secretary Merrill said, he hasn't spent any of
+his money yet and Secretary Padilla said he started spending
+it. It just takes time. This money is not going to fix anything
+just in 1 year. It is going to be a process. In most cases it
+is going to take several years and that has been my only point.
+ Secretary Merrill, the purpose of this hearing is to review
+H.R. 1 even though we are not going to be marking it up. Is
+there anything in H.R. 1 that you can find helpful to you in
+securing elections?
+ Mr. Merrill. No, Congressman, there are some things that we
+find restrictive because of what we would have to do to adhere
+to certain guidelines that are in the bill that are associated
+with the allocation that would accompany it.
+ Mr. Rogers. If we were marking it up, which we are not,
+what would you suggest we do to improve it?
+ Mr. Merrill. Well one of the things that I would encourage
+the Members to do is to make an appropriation that establish
+some level of guidelines but did not have strict adherence that
+had to be met so that the local State or the local jurisdiction
+would be able to purchase equipment or be able to purchase
+services or be able to purchase types of products that were
+necessary for them to administer their elections in a way that
+they saw fit and in a way that was best for them.
+ Because in my mind, it is always best to make those
+decisions at the local level as opposed to the National or the
+State level going down to the local jurisdiction.
+ Mr. Rogers. Secretary Padilla, the same question. What
+would you do if we were marking up H.R. 1 to improve it, if
+anything?
+ Mr. Padilla. I appreciate the opportunity. So there is an
+element to H.R. 1 that establishes not just time tables for
+EAC--or excuse me--DHS testing and certification of voting
+systems prior to their being used by States. That element fails
+to recognize there is a handful of States, California being
+one, that has established testing and certification at the
+State level where we statutorily require our 12 State standards
+to meet or exceed the Federal guidelines.
+ So an allowance for those States to test at the State
+versus requiring a duplicative Federal testing or certification
+and as long as the time table suits us in terms of properly
+administering the elections, that flexibility will be helpful
+as well.
+ Mr. Rogers. Let me ask this, you heard Mr. Higgins earlier
+in the questioning and the previous panel emphasized that there
+are scores of thousands of voting locations around the country.
+When you get the HAVA funds, and this is for Secretary Padilla
+or Merrill, do you prescribe standards that counties must
+adhere to for you to fund their purchase of equipment or
+training?
+ Mr. Merrill. Yes, sir, actually that is done, Congressman,
+in the legislation that was approved when HAVA was first
+adopted. One of the things that we discovered was that that was
+not always being adhered to whenever that appropriation came
+and it was approved at the State level. So we have made sure
+that we even had training and we provided training to our local
+jurisdictions as well.
+ Mr. Rogers. You just don't write a check to the local city
+or county.
+ Mr. Merrill. Certainly not. Certainly not.
+ Mr. Rogers. You say that is a Federal requirement?
+ Mr. Merrill. Yes, sir. There are certain guidelines that
+were established in the HAVA appropriation that said these are
+permissible expenses and if you go outside of that then
+somebody should be held liable for that. That has not happened
+in the past.
+ Another frustration that we have experienced is when those
+additional dollars came, they were complimenting what happened
+in 2003. Well what happened in 2003, and of course that--that
+was your first session in the Congress, was that there was no
+deadline on when those funds had to be expended at the State or
+local level.
+ We have a number of counties in our State that received an
+appropriation 15 years ago and that money is still sitting in
+their bank account. Now it looks good to those people that live
+in that county but those resources are not spent--they are
+supposed to be used to benefit all of the constituents that
+live in that county in that particular jurisdiction. In our
+instance in the 2,401 individual jurisdictions where we have
+voting precincts.
+ Mr. Rogers. Mr. Braun----
+ Mr. Padilla. If I may--if I may add?
+ Mr. Rogers. Certainly.
+ Mr. Padilla. So similarly and in agreement that the
+guidelines that are established at the EAC or at the Federal
+level as those monies move. We mentioned earlier how this
+contract reimbursement basis with counties allows the
+investments to be made earlier. It also provides to those
+contract reviews an additional point of compliance, if you
+will, or a verification that indeed the expenditure is being
+made or consistent with those Federal requirements.
+ Mr. Rogers. Right. Mr. Braun, we all know that Russia has
+been meddling in our elections by disinformation for decades
+and just like they do countries all around the world for
+decades particularly in eastern and western Europe. But you
+made a point a few minutes ago that the Chairman addressed but
+you said that there have been instance--and my understanding
+there have been no incidents of hacking in the 2016 or 2018
+elections but you said that there have been some incidents
+prior to that where Russia had hacked some machines in this
+country. Can you expand on that please?
+ Mr. Braun. It was actually a website I was referring to.
+Vox Media reported, I believe it was actually 2017 instance
+where Russian bots I think took down an election reporting
+website in Tennessee.
+ Mr. Rogers. OK.
+ Mr. Braun. Multiple Federal sources were cited in the
+report.
+ Mr. Rogers. Thank you very much. I yield back.
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The Chair yields to
+the gentlelady from New York, Miss Rice.
+ Miss Rice. Thank you Mr. Chairman and thank you all for
+coming today. Over the past couple of weeks I have heard some
+people refer to H.R. 1 as a Federal takeover of our elections.
+But I hope that everyone on Panel II would agree that the
+Federal Government has a Constitutionally-protected role in
+advising and helping to administer elections.
+ I think 2016 should have established that once and for all.
+I think the previous panel, both Mr. Krebs and Mr. Hicks, laid
+out the fallacy of that claim by showing that they were able to
+build relationships with States and localities to work together
+without infringing upon the State's ultimate ability and right
+to set election standards in their own States.
+ My concern is the--what--and this is to everyone on the
+panel, what are States doing to work with social media
+companies to combat wide-spread disinformation campaigns
+targeting our elections? What do you think the Congress and the
+Federal Government can do to better prepare States and local
+election officials for these dynamic hybrid warfare attacks?
+ Mr. Merrill. Outstanding question. I will tell you this. I
+don't think--well, there is nobody at this table that has had a
+higher-profile situation than we did in Alabama when Senator
+Jones was elected December 12, 2017.
+ I attended a presentation that was made by Facebook and
+Twitter in February 2018. They were talking about all they had
+done to help folks, and how they had made it easier for people
+to understand when bots were removed, and how it was helping
+the electoral process.
+ I said to them--after I waited patiently in line, I said,
+now friends, let me say this to you. I said, if you will tell
+me what you did to help us in Alabama, we will both know
+because they were talking about what they done in ours,
+specifically. They didn't do anything to help us.
+ Now, subsequently, we came to Washington and had a meeting
+with Facebook, and talked to them about what they could do, and
+how they could be more helpful. One of the things they have
+introduced now is that whenever you get ready to purchase an ad
+on Facebook, they communicate with you directly through a card
+that is mailed to a particular location so you know if that
+individual is making the purchase as a United States Citizen.
+ There are other mechanisms that they have put in place that
+I think are appropriate now. But we have got to have some
+cooperation with the people at the social media level. That
+will enable us to be more effective.
+ We were actually able to have ads removed from YouTube and
+Google because of the work that we did, but we had a difficult
+time with Facebook. Twitter was also very supportive in what
+they did to help us.
+ Mr. Padilla. In my oral remarks I made reference to the
+creation of an Office of Election Cybersecurity, as well as
+Office of Enterprise Risk Management in California. In my
+written remarks, I expand on that a little bit. Some of the
+initiatives within the election cybersecurity effort included:
+We branded a voucher. We put up a specific web portal with a
+lot of important voter tools, the find your polling place,
+verify your registration status, and a dedicated email address
+for the public to report suspected misinformation.
+ In addition to that, some of our additional State funding
+allowed us to hire staff strictly dedicated to social media
+monitoring. Not to censure candidates or campaigns, but to
+specifically look for erroneous information about the election
+or the voting process.
+ Some are to--a lot of secretaries benefited from a mass
+conversation--the National Association of Secretaries of State
+conversation with representatives from Facebook, and Twitter,
+and others. I mean, we have the benefit that they are based in
+California. So we have a little bit quicker access to them.
+Creating specific protocols for being able to report to them,
+where these specific complaints, kind-of, jump to the front of
+the line for review because, you know, if you submit something
+on Election Day, you can't wait for 7 days for it to be
+addressed.
+ We--we ended up reporting close to 300 who we felt were
+misleading or inaccurate posts, tweets, et cetera, 98 percent
+of which the social media companies, themselves, took down
+because it violated their policies. So it is one example of
+monitoring, reporting, and relationship.
+ Mr. Praetz. If I might? We have looked at this as, sort-of,
+defending our institution on two fronts; one is mis- and
+disinformation front. It is a place where as election officials
+we don't have a tremendous amount of control.
+ Then, there is the other front, which is the infrastructure
+front, which is the place where we have 100 percent control on.
+So that is where a lot of our focus has been. But there is a
+bit of overlap, and it comes in the form of information about
+where people vote, when you vote, what you need to vote, I.D.
+requirements, things like that.
+ So, it is really key that, as election officials, as more
+and more folks drive voters back to the trusted sources, like
+us, that we remain trusted sources and are providing fully
+accurate information.
+ That means that we have got to, sort-of, up the notch again
+on the infrastructure that we are protecting. One other note is
+that we have got to expand the services we provide. I think
+social media steps in where they think there are gaps, in terms
+of driving registration outreach, or driving--showing up at the
+polling place outreach.
+ They are filling gaps that they perceive in the
+administration of elections. To the extent that we don't fill
+those ourselves, there are going to be third-party providers
+that continue to do so. That--that can result in challenging
+relationships because sometimes the information they rely upon
+can be inaccurate.
+ Miss Rice. Go ahead. Mr. Braun.
+ Mr. Braun. Congresswoman, thank you for that question
+because I think it hits on the head of--of how this is such a
+National security problem. At the University of Chicago, we
+spend a lot of time trying to update concepts like nuclear
+deterrents or cyber deterrents, which has really not happened
+yet in the National security world.
+ I think that the point that you are making, it is nearly
+impossible for us to stop Russia from doing something like they
+did in the Ukraine where--imagine election night 2020 and 12
+battleground State websites are down because they have hacked
+the websites. Then, Russian media is announcing that their
+preferred candidate had won the election. It would be chaos.
+ We can't really stop it from happening without a strong
+deterrence regime. That is not in place yet. I--and it is
+something that, you know, the National security establishment
+really needs to think through, and implement. Thank you.
+ Miss Rice. Mr. Braun, I couldn't agree with you more. Let
+me just end with this thought. Everything that I have heard
+today over the past 3 hours and 15 minutes, I hope has
+established, in all of our minds, the need to address this
+issue from a non-partisan stance because this gets to the very
+heart of maintaining the democracy. That, whether you are a
+Republican or a Democrat, you love and you want to maintain.
+ I really hope that, thanks to smart brains like you, and
+the prior panel, and hopefully the--the commitment of everyone
+on this committee, and throughout this body, we recognize how
+important it is to maintain the integrity of our democracy.
+Thank you and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you. The Chair recognizes the
+gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Higgins.
+ Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is interesting to
+have my colleague, Miss Rice, mention that--the smart brain in
+the room mentioned by the smartest brain in the room.
+Gentlemen, thank you for your service. My question is going to
+be to both secretaries of state, Secretary of State Padilla and
+Merrill.
+ I had mentioned in an earlier round of questioning that
+there were over 174,000 precincts, Mr. Chairman, voting
+precincts in America. My brilliant staff has advised me the
+actual number is 178,217 in the 2016 voting cycle. That is
+just--this is a tremendous endeavor.
+ Our goal here in this committee is--is shared on--from both
+sides of the aisle, we want every legal vote to have access to
+the poll, easy and fair access to the poll and we want their
+vote to be accurately counted, whether they are Democrats,
+Republicans, or anything in between. We have that same goal.
+You, gentlemen, have the incredible task of ensuring that that
+happens in your individual States.
+ The--your colleague from the State of Texas, secretary of
+state has stated that in Texas it has been identified 58,000
+non-U.S. citizens who are illegally in the country voted in one
+way or another in elections over the last two decades.
+ May I remind all of us that sometimes even Federal
+elections are determined by very, very few number of votes. Our
+colleague Will Hurd from Texas 23rd district, his election was
+determined by 926 votes. So to say that it is a--that it is a
+small problem is not a--I don't think it is intellectually
+sound, when--when that is--when that response is measured
+against elections that are determined by very few votes.
+ So Secretary of State Padilla, is seems to me, since we are
+dealing with Title III, election security. That is our
+jurisdictional authority in this committee. Security has--as
+it--to establish a perimeter. That you want to control access
+to that perimeter first and then control action within that
+perimeter.
+ So how do you, good sir, in California, how can--how do you
+guarantee the citizens of your State that access to a
+controlled voting environment or precinct is limited to a legal
+vote? I--and, sir, I will be asking you the same question.
+ This is--this is a spectrum beyond the control of the
+action. We spent a lot of time talking about how we confirm the
+accuracy of a vote and cyber interference, et cetera. How do we
+control legal access to that voting perimeter, good sir, in
+your State?
+ Mr. Padilla. I very much appreciate the question. I know
+Congress at times deals with public safety issues and debates
+about the balance between public safety and civil liberties. I
+put that out there just as a framework to consider when it
+comes to elections. We value security and we value
+accessibility, right? Those two are not mutually exclusive.
+ Mr. Higgins. They are difficult, yes.
+ Mr. Padilla. So when it comes to the security of the voting
+process and the actions taken within, just look at the data. I
+mean, there have been numerous reports, numerous studies,
+numerous investigations that, when it comes to the baseless
+allegations of massive voter fraud, show that voter fraud is
+exceedingly rare.
+ So the safeguards are working, by and large. Does that mean
+that we should not take it seriously? No, we do take
+allegations very seriously. But the measures that have been--
+technology and otherwise----
+ Mr. Higgins. Intelligent response. So let me give time to
+your--to your colleague from Alabama. Before he answers, let me
+state that what we seek is reassurance at the State and the
+local level as we are dealing with 178,000 precincts that legal
+access to that voting environment is recognized as a security
+concern, if we are talking about jurisdiction over the security
+of the--and the sanctity of our elections in America. This is
+certainly--any reasonable man or woman would recognize this.
+Sir, in Alabama, how would--how would you handle that?
+ Mr. Merrill. Congressman, 2,401 of those are in Alabama and
+I want to share this with you, too. I want to be perfectly
+clear about this----
+ Chairman Thompson. You have 10 seconds.
+ Mr. Merrill. OK. The only people that need to be voting in
+U.S. elections are United States citizens.
+ Mr. Higgins. Well, that would--that indentify the legal
+access.
+ Thank you, gentlemen, for your service to your country. Mr.
+Chairman, I yield.
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The reason I said
+that, Mr. Secretary of State, they have called votes and we
+trying to finish----
+ Mr. Merrill. Yes, sir.
+ Chairman Thompson. That is the good news. The bad news is
+all the questions going forward will be yielded to 2 minutes.
+ Mr. Correa.
+ Mr. Correa. Mr. Chair, just a quick question. Mr. Padilla,
+Mr. Merrill, H.R. 1, help or not help with voter system
+integrity?
+ Mr. Padilla. Help. Additional resources on the table that
+are desperately needed, we have offered under our previous
+question some specifics on how to maybe improve upon the
+language to make it even more strategic for State investment.
+ Mr. Merrill. Congressman, it has a potential to, but not in
+the current form.
+ Mr. Correa. Thank you.
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
+ Chair yields to the gentlelady from Arizona, Ms. Lesko.
+ Mrs. Lesko. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
+ Very quickly I am just going to ask one of the questions
+and it will be to you, Mr. Merrill. Section 1302 of this bill
+H.R. 1 criminalizes false statements or misinformation
+regarding elections and candidates.
+ Much of how, in this bill it determines if a person is in
+violation of these provisions is to their intent. The penalty
+written in the bill is a fine of up to $100,000 or up to 5
+years in prison, or both.
+ I guess, my question is and--how are we going to
+determine--who's going to be the arbitrator and determining if
+something is misinformation or not? I know, I can tell you in
+my election, my opponent did a lot of misinformation about me.
+Are they going to be a criminal now as well?
+ Mr. Merrill. Well, Congresswoman, I want to make sure
+that--that you know this. We take voter fraud, which that would
+be a part of voter fraud, very seriously in our State.
+ Since I have been the secretary, we have had 6 convictions
+and we have had 3 elections that have been overturned. Prior to
+the time that I became the secretary, we had not had an
+incident of occurrence that was reported, identified,
+investigated, and prosecuted.
+ I brought a sheet, if you would like to have it I will be
+happy to share it with you, we have had 874 unique instances
+reported in our office since we have been there and all but 4
+have been fully taken care of in one way or the other. I have
+got a way to show you what we have done on that.
+ I think it is important to know that we have a number of
+prosecutors in our State that are not really interested in
+advancing investigations into voter fraud because they think
+the penalties are too stiff. So the penalties that are outlined
+in the code section that you just identified, I don't know that
+they are really commensurate with what the crime may be.
+ So I think there is a number of people who may be concerned
+about the implementation of that at any level.
+ Mrs. Lesko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, perhaps I had got
+misinformation. The information I got was on that particular
+section. It also included like misinformation like you would
+put out on Facebook or something like that, and it would
+criminalize it. So perhaps I am wrong, because that would be
+concerning to me. Thank you.
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. Will the gentleman
+provide that----
+ Mr. Merrill. Oh, yes----
+ Chairman Thompson. Document for the--for the committee.
+ Mr. Merrill. I can be--I can do so, sir.
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. I yield 2 minutes
+to the gentlelady from California, Ms. Barragan.
+ Ms. Barragan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I first want to
+thank everybody for being here. I have a bias here; I am from
+California. Thank you, Secretary Padilla, for everything you
+are doing. In 2016, several media reports claim that 21 States
+had been targeted or hacked. Was California one of them, and if
+so, what happened?
+ Mr. Padilla. So California was not hacked, if you are
+talking about a hack or a specific type of breach. You know,
+the question brings to mind another valuable lesson that to
+think all secretaries have learned and local elections
+officials have learned in our partnership with DHS and others.
+ We talk cybersecurity and we reference cyber hygiene
+earlier, but cyber vocabulary is also critical. When there is
+an incident, it is important to be specific and precise about
+what has or has not happened, right. We don't want to downplay
+incidents because that would be irresponsible for, you know,
+accountability to the public, but we also can't blow it up
+either.
+ So, the stories that came out in 2016, about 21 States,
+from my understanding, California was on the list of States
+that were ``scanned'' by entities that trace back to agents of
+the Russian government. So what is scanning? You know, scanning
+has been described in lay terms as the equivalent of somebody
+in the neighborhood shaking doorknobs to see if the doors are
+locked, right.
+ You are looking for vulnerabilities that scan in and of
+itself; it is not compromising a system--it is not flipping
+votes--it is not a theft of data. So, frankly, scanning is
+very, very common in this day and age, given the technology
+that we all depend on now, not just in the election space, you
+know, across industries. So that is a long way to answer your
+question. California was on that list, but we know what it was;
+we know what it wasn't, and our integrity of our missions are
+intact.
+ Ms. Barragan. Thank you. I will yield back, given the short
+time.
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. I am sure
+Congressman Cleaver appreciates it. You have 2 minutes.
+ Mr. Cleaver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Merrill----
+ Mr. Merrill. Yes, sir.
+ Mr. Cleaver. Gave us a short answer, if you can. You kind-
+of confused me. Were you--were you suggesting that there were a
+lot of--much more voter fraud in the State of Alabama, but you
+didn't--that was another attempt to prosecute because it was
+this--the penalties were too stiff?
+ Mr. Merrill. Yes, sir. We have some; actually, I have two
+incidents that I could share with you just briefly. One, 119
+absentee ballot applications were mailed to one location and
+nobody lives in that home. In another jurisdiction, 109
+absentee ballot applications were mailed to the mayoral
+candidate's mother's home, and neither one of those had been
+prosecuted yet.
+ Mr. Cleaver. Were there many--many more?
+ Mr. Merrill. Sir?
+ Mr. Cleaver. Were there many more of such cases?
+ Mr. Merrill. Oh, yes sir. Yes, sir; we have them
+frequently. They are not just related to certain parts of our
+State either.
+ Mr. Cleaver. No, that was just interesting, because most of
+the----
+ Mr. Merrill. Yes, sir.
+ Mr. Cleaver. Studies showed that we didn't have a lot of
+mass votes in----
+ Mr. Merrill. Yes, sir. The main instances kind-of that we
+see are in the area of absentee balloting, not in walk-up, in-
+person voting.
+ Mr. Cleaver. OK. But my final question; I want you to tell
+me whether or not I am right. Our elections equal--we have
+8,000 voting jurisdictions--8,000. Forty-three States use
+electronic voting machines--and I go on to list a lot of
+different things that are different. So, you can't--I am having
+difficulty. I went to--somebody already tried to--you have--
+when you do--you have to make things match.
+ So, I can't fit it. If all these things were having--all
+these different States and territories are doing things
+differently, how can we all be equal? Anybody? Am I right or am
+I wrong? Am I right or wrong?
+ Mr. Padilla. If your premise is, look, this is the United
+States of America, and if you are 18 years or older and a
+citizen with minimal exceptions, you have the right to vote,
+exercise that right vote without any--without any unnecessary
+obstacles, then it is, how we achieve those in each State?
+ Do some States have easier ways to be a registered voter if
+you are eligible? Yes, some have better than others. Do some
+States offer more options for when, where, and how to cast a
+ballot? Unfortunately, yes; some States do better than others.
+My work in California is to try make California, you know, the
+leader of the pack when it comes to, yes, being secure, being
+as accessible and voter-friendly as possible.
+ Mr. Cleaver. Thank you.
+ Chairman Thompson. Thirty seconds for the gentleman from
+Alabama.
+ Mr. Merrill. Yes, sir. Congressman, one of the things that
+I wanted to share was that, since January 19, 2015, we have
+registered 1,199,909 new voters; we now have 3,473,030
+registered voters.
+ We have exceeded and surpassed any voter registration and
+voter participation records in the history of our State. In
+that period of time, we have done more per capita than any
+State in the union, to ensure that all of our eligible citizens
+are registered to vote and have an I.D.
+ Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. Thank you,
+gentleman from Missouri, for his question.
+ Let me thank all of the witnesses for your expert
+testimony. We will probably have some additional questions for
+you--for you to respond back to us. I would like unanimous
+consent to--to the record, that final report on a Democratic
+Congressional Task Force*** on election security and article on
+voting participation. Without objection.
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *** The document has been retained in committee files.
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ [The information follows:]
+ Article, www.vox.com, ``Civil rights leaders fought to make voting
+ easier. An Alabama Republican didn't get the memo''
+John Merrill thinks guaranteeing people the right to vote ``cheapens''
+ the civil rights movement's fight to, well, vote.
+By Victoria M. Massie, @vmmassie, Nov 3, 2016, 5:10pm EDT
+ Alabama Secretary of State John Merrill says that automatically
+registering people to vote ``cheapens'' civil rights leaders' efforts
+to maximize people's rights to, well, vote, Slate reported.
+ In an interview published Wednesday by Answering the Call, a voting
+rights initiative, Merrill was asked to explain why he opposes
+automatic voter registration, a move that could help fix America's
+paltry voter turnout rate.
+ Merrill didn't waver. First he name-dropped ``civil rights
+pioneers'' like Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and Rosa Parks, noted his
+friendship with Rep. John Lewis (D-GA), and touted the fact his
+daughter interned for African-American Congress member Terri Sewell (D-
+AL). Then Merrill argued that granting people the right to vote
+``cheapens'' these people's work by rewarding folks who are ``too sorry
+to get up off of their rear to go register to vote'':
+
+``These people fought--some of them were beaten, some of them were
+killed--because of their desire to ensure that everybody that wanted to
+had the right to register to vote and participate in the process. I'm
+not going to cheapen the work that they did. I'm not going to embarrass
+them by allowing somebody that's too sorry to get up off of their rear
+to go register to vote.''
+
+ To make his point abundantly clear, Merrill compared automatic
+registration to ``giving [people] a trophy because they've played on
+the ball team.''
+ For Merrill, automatic voter registration feeds into the taboo
+notion of entitlements, rewarding people with services when they didn't
+put in the initiative to earn them.
+ There's just one problem: American citizens who are at least 18
+years old should be entitled to the right to vote if they meet the age
+and citizenship requirement.
+ Rather, the major barrier standing between people and the polls
+tends to be policies trying to keep select groups far away, as civil
+rights leaders demonstrated half a century ago.
+ Despite having the constitutional right to vote, African Americans
+in Southern States like Alabama faced insidious Jim Crow-era policies
+like poll taxes and literacy tests that were damn near impossible to
+pass. In 1965, a 25-year-old Lewis and other civil rights activists of
+the time were brutally beaten by Alabama State troopers for attempting
+to March from Selma to Montgomery for that right.
+ The slew of voter ID laws passed to the fix nonexistent voter fraud
+that dubiously suppresses voters of color is one of the latest 21st-
+century examples. Others include some States like Alabama denying
+felons and people with mental disabilities the right to cast a ballot.
+ Historically, the right to vote has never been about effort. It's
+been about access, and is likely one of the reasons Lewis has been a
+fierce advocate for automatic voter registration--even if he's
+allegedly Merrill's pal.
+ Merrill's dog-whistle politicking about ``entitlements'' doesn't
+change that.
+
+ Chairman Thompson. I thank the witnesses for their valuable
+testimony and Members for their questions. The Members of the
+committee, as I indicated, may have additional questions for
+the witnesses, and we ask you respond expeditiously, in
+writing, to those questions.
+ Hearing no further business, the committee stands
+adjourned.
+ [Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
+
+
+
+ A P P E N D I X
+
+ ----------
+
+ Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Christopher C. Krebs
+ Question 1. You testified that disabling or removing wireless
+modems from voting systems is a best practice recognized by DHS. Has
+DHS communicated this best practice in writing to election
+administrators? Can DHS share any written material on this?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 2a. You testified that all 13 States that currently use
+paperless voting systems as their primary voting equipment in at least
+one jurisdiction are on a path to transition to voter-verified paper
+ballots throughout their States.
+ Please confirm this is accurate.
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 2b. Please provide an estimated time line (rough) for each
+State to complete the transition to paper ballots.
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Questions From Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for Christopher C. Krebs
+ Question 1. Are we taking a fail-safe approach to determining which
+election systems or processes are critical to the successful conduct of
+a public election?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 2. Would you consider State-wide Centralized Voter
+Registration Databases a critical system to the administration and
+conduct of any public election?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 3. What fail-safe measures are in place to assure that if
+the voter registration database is compromised and thereby make data
+records untrustworthy; or rendered unavailable for early voting or on
+election day the casting of ballots will continue?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 4. How many States have plans in place to hold or continue
+an election should their voter registration databases become
+compromised?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 5. How many States and jurisdictions within each State use
+electronic poll books?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 6. Are there instances when electronic poll books have
+failed to operate as intended?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 7. What recovery plan is in place should a polling
+location's electronic poll books fail or for periods of time not
+function?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 8. How well does same-day voter registration during early
+voting and on election day create meet fail-safe objectives for the
+successful conduct of a public election?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 9. Are you providing any guidance on security and wireless
+non-voting system technology?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 10. Do election administrators plan for 100% voter
+participation during early voting or on election day? If not, why not?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 11. Are there best practices that should be used to
+determine the number of ballots and ballot marking technology, or
+voting machine that should be provided to support voting?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 12. Are there best practices to address when a natural or
+man-made event makes a polling location unavailable for voting?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 13. How does allowing voters to vote at locations other
+than at a single voting location impact the ability of election
+services to serve voters in a county or State?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Questions From Honorable James R. Langevin for Christopher C. Krebs
+ Question 1a. How have you engaged local and State media outlets to
+ensure that unofficial vote reporting is protected from malicious
+interference?
+ How many affiliates has CISA worked with?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 1b. How have you coordinated defense or information
+sharing related to the defense of State and local media outlet
+networks?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 1c. How have you coordinated dissemination of information
+regarding attempts to interfere with other aspects of elections?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 2a. Have you observed any change in public confidence as a
+result of efforts to increase election security?
+ How does DHS/CISA assess confidence in election integrity?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 2b. What outcomes does DHS/CISA use to determine success
+in protecting elections?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 3a. Does DHS have any outstanding requests for risk and
+vulnerability assessments from States or local election officials? Is
+there a wait for new assessments?
+ Have States/localities been implementing the policies that DHS
+recommended based on these assessments?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 3b. How often does DHS/CISA conduct reassessments of
+jurisdictions? How often does CISA recommend refreshing RVAs?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Questions From Honorable Dina Titus for Christopher C. Krebs
+ Question 1. In my home State of Nevada there have been thousands of
+attempts by various actors to breach our voter registration database.
+Fortunately, our State and local election officials have managed to
+thwart every single one of these attacks. They have utilized Albert
+sensors to identify suspicious IP addresses and known malware
+signatures and alert the appropriate authorities. How important is it
+that each State deploy these Election-system sensors?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 2. Acknowledging the importance of coordinating Federal,
+State, and local election security efforts, what kind of barriers exist
+that slow or prevent the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis
+Center from coordinating with local and State IT personnel to inform
+them about the types of attacks that occur and where they came from so
+local officials can better prepare for future attacks?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 3. What sort of obstacles have you experienced when trying
+to share sensitive information about imminent threats with State and
+local election officials?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 4. H.R. 1 aims to create channels for interagency
+collaboration by, among other things, requiring DHS, EAC, the
+intelligence community, the State Department, and other Federal
+partners to develop a comprehensive National strategy to protect our
+elections and our democratic institutions, perhaps through broad
+initiatives around media literacy or studying the effects of influence
+campaigns. Who is responsible for convening and coordinating
+interagency efforts to secure elections, and to what extent is there
+leadership from the White House?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Questions From Honorable Yvette D. Clarke for Christopher C. Krebs
+ Question 1. In November 2018, Senator Ron Wyden wrote to DHS,
+asking the agency to ``forensically examine paperless voting machines
+used in the November 6, 2018 general election for signs of tampering or
+other manipulation by foreign governments or other malicious actors.''
+On December 18, 2018, DHS responded to Senator Wyden, stating that
+``under our existing authorities, DHS cannot mandate that States submit
+to comprehensive forensic examinations of their voting machines.'' But
+last week, the DOJ and DHS issued a public statement saying there was
+``no evidence to date that . . . a foreign government or foreign agent
+had a material impact on the integrity or security of election
+infrastructure or political/campaign infrastructure used in the 2018
+midterm election.'' If DHS didn't have the authority to examine
+paperless voting machines used in the November 2018 election for
+evidence of hacking, which is what you informed Senator Wyden in your
+letter, what is the basis for your public statement last week saying
+there is no evidence that foreign governments hacked our election
+infrastructure?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 2. Last year, the FBI uncovered that a Russian oligarch,
+with close ties to President Putin, had acquired an ownership interest
+in a vendor which hosted State-wide election data for Maryland.\1\
+Until the FBI alerted them, State election authorities were unaware of
+the vendor's ties to Russia. Even if no tampering occurred, this raises
+important questions about foreign ownership of firms providing
+election-related services. To the best of your knowledge, is the
+Federal Government undertaking any efforts, other than the CFIUS
+process, to assess potential existing foreign ownership of firms that
+produce voting machines or provide other election-related services? If
+so, please describe these efforts. If not, do you believe foreign
+actors may seek to invest in this sector with the intent of interfering
+in our elections?
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ \1\ https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/politics/bs-md-
+election-russia-20180713-story.html.
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Questions From Honorable Michael T. McCaul for Christopher C. Krebs
+ Question 1a. Foreign states, including Russia and other malicious
+actors have and will continue to attempt to interfere with U.S.
+elections. In fact, I encouraged, in a Classified space, both the Obama
+administration and the Trump administration to call out Russia for
+their targeted attacks on our Nation. Their activities have injected
+chaos and doubt into foundation of our democracy. An issue of this
+gravity requires Congress to act in a deliberate and bipartisan manner.
+Now, all eyes are on 2020.
+ What do you see as the major vulnerabilities in our election
+security as we look to the future? How do we address these?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 1b. Can you outline the major lessons learned and the
+steps your agency has taken to effectively provide Federal assistance
+to the local election level?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 2a. Last Congress, my bill, the Cybersecurity and
+Infrastructure Security Agency Act, was signed into law to streamline
+National Protection and Program's Directorate's (NPPD) efforts to
+execute cybersecurity and critical infrastructure missions and
+establish it as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (CISA).
+ How has CISA been effective at combatting cyber threats? What are
+the major successes?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 2b. What do you anticipate are the upcoming roadblocks and
+how can Congress be helpful?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Thomas Hicks
+ Question 1a. In response to questioning from Congresswoman Clarke,
+you testified that it is possible to audit a Direct Recording
+Electronic (DRE) voting machine to determine if the system has been
+hacked. Yet that appears inconsistent with the findings of research
+performed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
+at the request of the EAC.
+ Is there new research that suggests it is possible to audit DREs?
+ Answer. All voting systems certified by the U.S. Election
+Assistance Commission (EAC) to meet the Voluntary Voting System
+Guidelines (VVSG) are required to have redundant memory. All voting
+systems, including Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines,
+are required to have two, separate sources for memory. A comparison
+audit of these two separate sources of memory, including a DRE's
+internal memory that stores voting results, could identify
+discrepancies, and thus reveal that a system had been compromised.
+ With that stated, because both sources of memory for DREs without
+VVPATs are electronic, it is fathomable that a sophisticated attack
+could alter both sources of memory to make them identical and cause
+alterations to the data to be undetected. The EAC recognizes the
+possibility of this threat is real, which is why the VVSG 2.0 has
+Principles and Guidelines requiring software independence. At the
+moment, paper is the best way to audit a voting system, but all systems
+utilizing paper must comport with HAVA's mandate for all voters to be
+able to cast their ballot privately and independently.
+ The EAC is not aware of new research to this point, however the
+Commission is aware that jurisdictions have in the past conducted
+parallel audits with DREs to ensure votes are being tallied accurately.
+ Question 1b. What is the source of that information?
+ Answer. Vendors have identified this process, and the EAC is aware
+that the University of Connecticut's Center for Voting Technology
+Research has numerous post-election audit reports that utilize such
+data.
+ Question 1c. Should this new research override NIST's findings?
+ Answer. No. This research should not be depicted as contrary to the
+findings of NIST. In order to meet the National standard set by the
+Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG), all tabulators, including
+DREs, are required to have redundant memory that can be independently
+verified in order to meet the National standard set by Voluntary Voting
+System Guidelines (VVSG). However, it is also feasible that such a
+system could be compromised via a significant attack that would alter
+both sources of electronic data. This is why the VVSG 2.0 recommends
+software independence. It is also why election offices customarily
+follow the principle known as ``Defense in Depth'' by building in
+multiple layers of security to prevent such an attack from happening,
+assess damage created by such an attack, and mitigate the fallout if a
+system was compromised.
+ Question 2a. You testified that you had little concern regarding
+the risk of corruption of voting systems through the supply chain
+because of the EAC Testing and Certification program. But the EAC
+Testing and Certification program which lacks Full Formal Verification
+(FFV) or full source code review. Moreover, the EAC Testing and
+Certification Program does not evaluate voter-registration systems, e-
+poll books, election night reporting systems, and other critical
+components that run elections.
+ Can you elaborate on how the EAC Testing and Certification Program
+is capable of detecting supply chain corruption in voting systems
+without FFV?
+ Answer. When the Help America Vote Act of 2002 established the U.S.
+Election Assistance Commission, it also created the EAC's Testing &
+Certification Program to certify, decertify, and recertify voting
+system hardware and software, as well as accredit test laboratories.
+The Testing & Certification Program has a very specific mandate that
+defines its work as helping to develop guidelines for, and certifying,
+voting equipment. This mandate does not include voter registration
+systems, e-poll books, and election night reporting systems.
+ To the question of risk management in the supply chains of systems,
+the EAC test labs review the source code, hardware, and software
+components of all voting systems tested under the EAC's Testing and
+Certification Program. The EAC maintains an on-going Quality Monitoring
+Program to identify and correct issues in the field. Additional details
+on these programs are included below.
+ The EAC's Testing and Certification Program conducts a full review
+of vendor-developed hardware, software, and source code for every
+system it certifies. Also required by the VVSG is a technical data
+package (TDP) that includes an approved parts list and/or the bill of
+materials documentation.
+ After a voting system is certified, there is a process for on-going
+validation and verification through the Quality Monitoring Program.
+This is an audit and analysis of issues reported from the field, issues
+discovered by the vendors from their internal testing, and quality
+audits that are performed on the voting system manufacturers. Also, as
+manufacturers have hardware that reaches the end of its useful life,
+they are required to submit engineering change orders to update the
+approved parts list and/or bill of materials. In accordance with the
+system certification, these engineering change orders must be approved
+by the EAC before the vendor can implement the new parts into their
+manufacturing process.
+ That being said, the EAC's Testing and Certification Program cannot
+mitigate all supply chain threats. As with all security, including
+cybersecurity, there is not one mechanism that can thwart all threats.
+This is why the election community should focus on building resiliency
+and security through the principle of ``Defense in Depth.''
+ The EAC's Testing and Certification Program does, however, provide
+built-in layers of security for supporting the methodology of ``Defense
+in Depth'' for mitigating the supply chain threats for EAC-certified
+voting systems via the mechanisms previously described. The EAC also
+recommends and assists jurisdictions in working with Federal partners
+so they can benefit from the ``whole of Government'' approach to
+securing our Nation's election systems.
+ For example, the EAC has played an instrumental role in providing
+opportunities for State and local election officials, as well as
+election vendors and other key stakeholders, to interact with
+Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials following the
+designation of elections as part of the Nation's critical
+infrastructure. The Commission led the establishment of the Government
+Coordinating Council for the Election Infrastructure Subsector (GCC)
+and the Sector Coordinating Council (SCC). Both councils were
+functioning within 1 year of the critical infrastructure designation.
+OHS has said that the GCC was formed faster than any other similar
+critical infrastructure sector council to date.
+ Since then, the GCC has launched an Information Sharing and
+Analysis Center (ISACs) that allows election officials to receive
+timely notifications of potential threats, real-time monitoring of
+malicious activity on their networks and access to cybersecurity
+experts. Such working groups are exemplary proof-points of how local,
+State, and Federal governments can work together toward the shared goal
+of protecting our Nation's election systems.
+ Question 2b. Please explain how the EAC Testing and Certification
+Program is capable of detecting potential corruption by vendors
+servicing and programming systems that have already been certified.
+ Answer. The EAC's Testing and Certification Program cannot mitigate
+all supply chain threats; not even for threats to the one system of the
+elections process it oversees, which is the voting systems. As with all
+security, including cybersecurity, there is not one mechanism that can
+thwart all threats, which is why election officials should focus on
+building resiliency and security through the principle of ``Defense in
+Depth.'' The EAC's Testing and Certification Program does, however,
+provide built-in layers of depth for mitigating the supply chain
+threats for EAC-certified voting system via the mechanisms detailed
+below.
+ All voting systems tested under the EAC's Testing and Certification
+Program go through a full review of all vendor-developed source code.
+The software and hardware, as certified, has been validated and
+verified to be programmed for its intended use. Also required by the
+VVSG is a technical data package (TDP) that includes an approved parts
+list and/or the bill of materials documentation.
+ Additionally, after a voting system is certified, there is a
+process for on-going validation and verification through the Quality
+Monitoring Program. This is an audit and analysis of issues reported
+from the field, issues discovered by the vendors from their internal
+testing, and quality audits that are performed on the voting system
+manufacturers. Also, as manufacturers have hardware that becomes end of
+life, they are required to submit engineering change orders to update
+the approved parts list and/or bill of materials. In accordance with
+the system certification, these engineering change orders must be
+approved by the EAC before the vendor can implement the new parts into
+their manufacturing process.
+ Question 2c. Please explain how the EAC Testing and Certification
+program is capable of protecting voter-registration databases, election
+night reporting systems and e-poll books from supply chain corruption?
+ Answer. These particular systems are outside of the scope of the
+EAC's Testing and Certification program as detailed in the Help America
+Vote Act. It should be noted that a number of States have independent
+certification programs for electronic poll books and provide their own
+certification testing requirements for e-poll books and voting systems.
+In addition, States and local election agencies have resources to
+protect voter registration databases and other technology, including
+servers. For example, voter registration databases are periodically
+audited by State or independent experts.
+ Questions From Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for Thomas Hicks
+ Question 1. Are we taking a fail-safe approach to determining which
+election systems or processes are critical to the successful conduct of
+a public election?
+ Answer. State and local election officials would likely tell you
+that each of their election systems and processes play a critical role
+in the administration of successful elections, which is why they invest
+time and resources into contingency planning and establishing practices
+that ensure eligible voters have the ability to successfully cast their
+ballot. For example, the availability of provisional ballots at the
+polls is the ultimate fail-safe step that election officials offer on
+Election Day to ensure that eligible voters impacted by unforeseen
+circumstances or issues are able to cast their ballots and have them
+counted. In addition, election officials often have contingency plans
+in place that include roving technicians who are able to quickly
+identify and resolve issues with voting equipment or provide
+replacement voting systems if there is a failure. Another example of
+State and local election leaders creating fail-safe processes is the
+usage of audits to verify election results and confirm that election
+systems functioned properly to produce an accurate result.
+ Question 2. Would you consider State-wide Centralized Voter
+Registration Databases a critical system to the administration and
+conduct of any public election?
+ Answer. Yes. Voter registration databases play a critical role in
+the administration of elections. State and local election leaders
+secure these systems by implementing controls to maintain
+confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system and its
+data. Each election office has its own procedures and requirements for
+how these systems are managed, but the EAC does provide best practices
+regarding these systems.
+ Question 3. What fail-safe measures are in place to assure that if
+the voter registration database is compromised and thereby make data
+records untrustworthy; or rendered unavailable for early voting or on
+election day the casting of ballots will continue?
+ Answer. The availability of provisional ballots at the polling
+place is a key fail-safe measure to ensure that voters have the ability
+to participate in an election should voter registration databases not
+be available for any reason. In addition, jurisdictions frequently
+conduct a back-up of their voter registration database so, if a problem
+detected, the administrator is able to retrieve the back-ups to a
+specific date and time to review and began remediation if necessary.
+ Question 4. How many States have plans in place to hold or continue
+an election should their voter registration databases become
+compromised?
+ Answer. State and local election leaders across the Nation have
+contingency plans in place for events that could impact Election Day,
+including a compromised voter registration database. The availability
+of provisional ballots at the polls is a safeguard that ensures an
+election can still take place under these circumstances. In addition,
+election jurisdictions typically have a back-up of their voter
+registration list at the local level, and many election officials
+provide paper back-ups at polling places or election offices.
+ Question 5. How many States and jurisdictions within each State use
+electronic poll books?
+ Answer. According to the 2016 EAC's Election Administration and
+Voting Survey (EAVS), from 2012 to 2016, there was a significant
+increase in the use of electronic poll books Nation-wide. The number of
+in-person voters checked in with e-poll books more than doubled during
+this time span, increasing 110 percent from 19.7 million to 41.4.
+million voters. The EA VS also found that 32 States, the District of
+Columbia, and U.S. Virgin Islands reported using e-poll books in at
+least one jurisdiction in the 2016 election. Five States used e-poll
+books State-wide.
+ Question 6. Are there instances when electronic poll books have
+failed to operate as intended?
+ Answer. The EAC is aware of some specific instances reported in the
+media, but the Commission does not track such data related to
+electronic poll books. State and local election administrators are
+better positioned to provide detailed responses to this question.
+ Question 7. What recovery plan is in place should a polling
+location's electronic poll books fail or for periods of time not
+function?
+ Answer. Typically, as part of election officials' on-going
+contingency planning efforts, jurisdictions using electronic poll books
+prepare a paper back-up system in the event of an issue with the
+electronic poll books. Some jurisdictions may send the paper back-up to
+the polling place with the e-poll books, while others send them only if
+needed. The issuance of provisional ballots is one way that election
+officials ensure that voters have the ability to cast their ballot when
+electronic poll books fail. State and local election administrators
+develop and implement their own recovery plans and are better
+positioned to provide detailed responses to this question.
+ Question 8. How well does same-day voter registration during early
+voting and on Election Day create meet fail-safe objectives for the
+successful conduct of a public election?
+ Answer. Same-day voter registration is a policy choice made by the
+States. Its potential impact on the successful administration of an
+election is a question better posed to the election officials charged
+with carrying out elections.
+ Question 9. Are you providing any guidance on security and wireless
+non-voting system technology?
+ Answer. The EAC, often in conjunction with DHS, provides election
+officials training on election technology and security. In that
+training, the EAC highlights the best practice of disconnecting all
+portions of the voting system from the internet. Further, that training
+highlights best practices for securing systems that are networked, such
+as two-factor authentication, implementing integrity checks such as
+digital signatures and hashing, as well as the utilization of
+encryption.
+ In addition, the EAC has issued best practices and checklists for
+securing networked systems, such as election night reporting systems,
+as well as how to protect data that is on network systems. These
+resources include the EAC's Checklist for Securing Voter Registration
+Data and other handbooks, playbooks, and best practices documents.
+ Question 10. Do election administrators plan for 100 percent voter
+participation during early voting or on Election Day? If not, why not?
+ Answer. Election administrators forecast turnout across advance
+voting sites, by mail, and at polling locations. This forecasted mix
+allows election administrators to ensure proper resources are applied.
+Overall, election administrators plan to ensure that each and every
+voter is provided the ability to cast a ballot. In addition, States
+have laws and regulations to guide the number of pre-printed ballots
+required for election day, and many States also have in-house or
+polling place ballot-on-demand systems to provide additional ballots as
+needed.
+ Question 11. Are there best practices that should be used to
+determine the number of ballots and ballot-marking technology, or
+voting machine that should be provided to support voting?
+ Answer. State election offices often create guidance and procedures
+for local jurisdictions to follow. The EAC provides tools that can be
+used as part of this process, most notably the EAC's Election
+Administration and Voting Survey interactive portal that allows
+jurisdictions to compare their own election data with that of
+jurisdictions with similar characteristics. In addition, there are on-
+line tools available to assist election officials seeking to identify
+the number of voting systems and check-in stations they need to
+mitigate the chance of lines.
+ Question 12. Are there best practices to address when a natural or
+man-made event makes a polling location unavailable for voting?
+ Answer. Yes. Contingency planning is a key function of election
+administration. Election officials must prepare for the unexpected and
+have plans in place to conduct elections when disaster strikes. The EAC
+is committed to helping election officials prepare for everything from
+wildfires and hurricanes to terrorist threats and electricity outages.
+In fact, the Commission has launched a new initiative to more
+rigorously engage election officials who can help to shape the
+Commission's more robust suite of services and resources for election
+administrators who face natural or man-made disasters.
+ Question 13. How does allowing voters to vote at locations other
+than at a single voting location impact the ability of election
+services to serve voters in a county or State?
+ Answer. The impact of these procedures is different in the States
+and jurisdictions that may offer these services, and, therefore, the
+State election offices would be the best source to answer this
+question.
+ Questions From Honorable Dina Titus for Thomas Hicks
+ Question 1. In my home State of Nevada there have been thousands of
+attempts by various actors to breach our voter registration database.
+Fortunately, our State and local election officials have managed to
+thwart every single one of these attacks. They have utilized Albert
+sensors to identify suspicious IP addresses and known malware
+signatures and alert the appropriate authorities. How important is it
+that each State deploy these Election-system sensors?
+ Answer. Every State and local election official has the duty to
+securely protect their election systems. Nevada's election officials
+have availed themselves to many security-focused services provided by
+the OHS. The EAC recommends that it all States use the Federal
+resources available--including those provided by the OHS and those that
+might be funded as part of the $380 million in HAVA Funds passed last
+year by Congress and administered by the EAC--to address election
+security threats.
+ Question 2. Acknowledging the importance of coordinating Federal,
+State, and local election security efforts, what kind of barriers exist
+that slow or prevent the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis
+Center from coordinating with local and State IT personnel to inform
+them about the types of attacks that occur and where they came from so
+local officials can better prepare for future attacks?
+ Answer. Because OHS manages the Election Infrastructure Information
+Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC), this question would best be
+answered by OHS.
+ Question 3. What sort of obstacles have you experienced when trying
+to share sensitive information about imminent threats with State and
+local election officials?
+ Answer. For the most part, the EAC has not experienced obstacles
+when charged with sharing information about imminent threats with State
+and local election officials. This is something the EAC did even ahead
+of the 2016 election and prior to DHS's decision to designation
+elections as part of the Nation's critical infrastructure. That said,
+the delay in issuance of security clearances for the EAC Commissioners
+remains an issue that hopefully will be resolved quickly to allow the
+EAC to receive and share sensitive information when necessary.
+ Question 4. H.R. 1 aims to create channels for interagency
+collaboration by, among other things, requiring DHS, EAC, the
+intelligence community, the State Department, and other Federal
+partners to develop a comprehensive National strategy to protect our
+elections and our democratic institutions, perhaps through broad
+initiatives around media literacy or studying the effects of influence
+campaigns. Who is responsible for convening and coordinating
+interagency efforts to secure elections, and to what extent is there
+leadership from the White House?
+ Answer. The DHS Government Coordinating Council (GCC), of which the
+EAC Commissioners are members, is the primary body to share information
+related to securing elections. Aside from that body, under the Help
+America Vote Act, the EAC is the only Federal agency authorized to
+assist election officials with all aspects of elections, including
+security.
+ Question From Honorable Yvette D. Clarke for Thomas Hicks
+ Question. Last year, the FBI uncovered that a Russian oligarch,
+with close ties to President Putin, had acquired an ownership interest
+in a vendor which hosted State-wide election data for Maryland. Until
+the FBI alerted them, State election authorities were unaware of the
+vendor's ties to Russia. Even if no tampering occurred, this raises
+important questions about foreign ownership of firms providing
+election-related services. To the best of your knowledge, is the
+Federal Government undertaking any efforts, other than the CFIUS
+process, to assess potential existing foreign ownership of firms that
+produce voting machines or provide other election-related services? If
+so, please describe these efforts. If not, do you believe foreign
+actors may seek to invest in this sector with the intent of interfering
+in our elections?
+ Answer. The EAC agrees that the question of foreign ownership is an
+important one. As such, foreign interference in elections should always
+be treated as a credible threat. That's why the Commission's Testing
+and Certification Program provides built-in layers of security and
+quality assurance on voting system manufacturers, including a
+registration process that requires disclosure of ownership and on-going
+quality monitoring audits. Since the EAC cannot mitigate all threats
+from its registered voting system manufacturers, it recommends that
+election officials focus on building resiliency and security through
+the principle of ``Defense in Depth'' and by taking advantage of
+resources offered by Federal partners.
+ As a clearinghouse of information on best practices in election
+administration, the EAC has also provided officials with real-life
+examples of how to mitigate threats potentially posed by foreign
+ownership. For example, the EAC has posted security language from a
+Request for Proposal requiring voting equipment vendors, and their
+parent and holding companies, to be based in the United States. Our
+office, in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
+has also offered election officials training on election technology and
+security, including best practices for contracting and the selection of
+vendors.
+ Questions From Honorable Michael T. McCaul for Thomas Hicks
+ Question 1. Voting machine challenges remain a chronic problem. How
+can local officials who are the center of gravity for running and
+securing elections ensure electric voting machines are secure?
+ Answer. The goal of every election official is to ensure not only
+voting machines, but the entire election system, is secure. Security
+has always been at the heart of what election officials do. Each State
+and jurisdiction has measures in place to ensure security in all phases
+of the election process. Every jurisdiction is different. This is one
+of the great strengths of our election system--that there is no one
+central point of access that could render the system vulnerable to a
+massive attack.
+ Since the EAC's inception, our HAVA-mandated Testing &
+Certification Program has been a critical first step in the process of
+maintaining the reliability and security of the voting systems used in
+our Nation's elections. The Commission also produces guidelines and
+checklists, posts Requests for Proposals, elevates best practices and
+administers an IT Management course to help election officials take a
+holistic approach to securing their election systems. Through our
+partnership with the National Institute of Standards and Technology
+(NIST), the EAC has also maintained the Voluntary Voting System
+Guidelines (VVSG), which sets the National standard for voting
+equipment around the country.
+ However, as stated above, the EAC is not the only security solution
+for election officials. As secure voting systems must have many layers
+of security and resiliency built into every component, election
+officials must also have a ``Defense in Depth'' in terms of
+partnerships and resources they can draw from to secure their systems.
+ Question 2. What incentives are in place for election equipment
+companies to improve their security?
+ Answer. The best incentive for election equipment companies to
+improve security is in response to a requirement by their customers,
+State and local election officials who administer elections. The EAC
+produces guidelines and checklists, posts on-line sample Requests for
+Proposals, elevates best practices, and administers an IT management
+course to help election officials take a holistic approach to securing
+their election systems, including making sure best practices are
+required of their contractors and vendors in addition to their own
+election staff.
+ Another incentive for election equipment vendors is the EAC's
+Testing and Certification Program. In order for a voting system vendor
+to have the ability to submit a voting system to be tested and
+certified by the EAC, it must first become a registered manufacturer.
+This requires disclosure of ownership, as well as on-going quality
+monitoring audits. The Testing and Certification Program also oversees
+the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG), which the EAC maintains
+with our partners at NIST. The VVSG are a set of standards against
+which voting systems can be tested to determine if the systems meet
+those standards. Some factors examined under these tests include
+functionality, accessibility, accuracy, auditability, and security
+capabilities. These principles, and the best practices disseminated as
+part of the EAC's Clearinghouse function help set and maintain the
+standard for voting equipment around the country.
+ Questions From Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for Alex Padilla
+ Question 1. Are we taking a fail-safe approach to determining which
+election systems or processes are critical to the successful conduct of
+a public election?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 2. Would you consider State-wide Centralized Voter
+Registration Databases a critical system to the administration and
+conduct of any public election?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 3. What fail-safe measures are in place to assure that if
+the voter registration database is compromised and thereby make data
+records untrustworthy; or rendered unavailable for early voting or on
+election day the casting of ballots will continue?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 4. How many States have plans in place to hold or continue
+an election should their voter registration databases become
+compromised?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 5. How many States and jurisdictions within each State use
+electronic poll books?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 6. Are there instances when electronic poll books have
+failed to operate as intended?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 7. What recovery plan is in place should a polling
+location's electronic poll books fail or for periods of time not
+function?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 8. How well does same-day voter registration during early
+voting and on election day create meet fail-safe objectives for the
+successful conduct of a public election?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 9. Are you providing any guidance on security and wireless
+non-voting system technology?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 10. Do election administrators plan for 100 percent voter
+participation during early voting or on election day? If not, why not?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 11. Are there best practices that should be used to
+determine the number of ballots and ballot marking technology, or
+voting machine that should be provided to support voting?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 12. Are there best practices to address when a natural or
+man-made event makes a polling location unavailable for voting?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 13. How does allowing voters to vote at locations other
+than at a single voting location impact the ability of election
+services to serve voters in a county or State?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Questions From Honorable James R. Langevin for Alex Padilla
+ Question 1. Our system is only as strong as its weakest link, and
+we need to ensure everyone has this ``cyber hygiene'' knowledge. Have
+you found that there's a general lack of knowledge of security
+vulnerabilities and best practices at the staff level?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 2a. Have the trainings you've conducted for staff been
+productive?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 2b. What are some lessons learned from these trainings?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 3. The risk and vulnerability assessments offered by DHS
+can be extremely valuable for States and localities. Have you found
+these assessments for States and local election officials to be useful
+as you work to secure your election systems, and have you implemented
+DHS's recommendations?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 4. Do you have the resources you need to implement the
+recommendations, and if not, what more do you need to do so?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question From Honorable Dina Titus for Alex Padilla
+ Question. When speaking with State and local election officials in
+Nevada, I have heard that while urban areas like Las Vegas may have the
+IT workforce available to recruit individuals to implement new
+cybersecurity measures like Albert sensors, rural areas have been
+struggling to find trained personnel. Have you experienced this
+shortage in other parts of the country, and do you believe further
+investment in STEM education is necessary to effectively mitigate this
+skills gap and secure our most vulnerable election sites?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Questions From Honorable Yvette D. Clarke for Alex Padilla
+ Question 1a. Last year, the FBI uncovered that a Russian oligarch,
+with close ties to President Putin, had acquired an ownership interest
+in a vendor which hosted State-wide election data for Maryland.\1\
+Until the FBI alerted them, State election authorities were unaware of
+the vendor's ties to Russia. Even if no tampering occurred, this raises
+important questions about foreign ownership of firms providing
+election-related services.
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ \1\ https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/politics/bs-md-
+election-russia-20180713-story.html.
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ To the best of your knowledge, does your State have any election-
+related contracts with vendors backed by Russian or Chinese investors?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question 1b. What measures, if any, does your State undertake to
+assess foreign ownership of election vendors prior to signing contracts
+with them?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Question From Honorable Michael T. McCaul for Alex Padilla
+ Question. Foreign states, including Russia and other malicious
+actors have and will continue to attempt to interfere with U.S.
+elections. In fact, I encouraged, in a Classified space, both the Obama
+administration and the Trump administration to call out Russia for
+their targeted attacks on our Nation. Their activities have injected
+chaos and doubt into foundation of our democracy. An issue of this
+gravity requires Congress to act in a deliberate and bipartisan manner.
+Now, all eyes are on 2020. How has the cooperation with DHS and
+Director Krebs strengthened California's election security?
+ Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
+ Questions From Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for Noah Praetz
+ Question 1. Are we taking a fail-safe approach to determining which
+election systems or processes are critical to the successful conduct of
+a public election?
+ Answer. Most election systems and processes are managed at the
+local level and therefore the fail-safe approach is often determined
+and implemented locally, though often State-wide guidance is provided.
+Election officials do try and ensure business continuity and therefore
+they do build in redundancies to many processes. However, there are
+large variations in the degree to which election officials are able to
+identify critical path systems, prioritize efforts, and build in
+sustainable redundancies.
+ Prioritizing the most critical systems is incredibly important.
+Most foundationally people need to be able to vote and administrators
+need to be able to count those votes accurately. Voter Registration
+System and Voting Systems are therefore the two most critical systems,
+without which elections could not be run. However, within those two
+umbrella systems, and around the edges, election officials rely on a
+variety of other system to aid in the seamless efficient administration
+of elections. Successful attacks on any of those systems can have a
+detrimental effect on the voter experience--and therefore in their
+level of trust. Some of these others connected systems that election
+officials rely upon to deliver expected services include:
+ Voting Systems for casting and counting votes, as noted
+ above
+ Voter Registration Systems for managing the list of voters
+ and what they are--entitled to vote upon, as noted above
+ Election Management Systems for handling data necessary to
+ facilitate the two above and to facilitate the various other
+ duties
+ Electronic Pollbook Systems
+ Ballot Printing Systems
+ Ballot Envelope Scanner
+ Election Day Command Centers
+ Election Information Websites
+ Election Service Websites--registration--ballot requests w/
+ or without marking--sample ballots
+ Election Night Reporting Websites
+ Election Auditing Tools
+ Other miscellaneous tools.
+ Question 2. Would you consider State-wide Centralized Voter
+Registration Databases a critical system to the administration and
+conduct of any public election?
+ Answer. Yes, I consider a State-wide voter registration database to
+be a critical system to the administration of elections. However, the
+particular level of criticality can vary depending upon whether the
+State has a centralized singular top-down voter database construction,
+or a diffuse, bottom-up construction. In Illinois the system was
+considered ``bottom-up'' meaning each county had their own primary
+database.
+ Question 3. What fail-safe measures are in place to assure that if
+the voter registration database is compromised and thereby make data
+records untrustworthy; or rendered unavailable for early voting or on
+election day the casting of ballots will continue?
+ Answer. One fail-safe operation available Nation-wide is the use of
+provisional ballots that can be counted after the election in the event
+voter data in the over registration database is not 100% accurate at
+point of service. Additionally, some States, like Illinois, offer same-
+day registration (SDR) options. SDR as a service offering and fail-safe
+process also offers a significant amount of resiliency. There are
+policy decisions that can impact business continuity when the software
+is not operating as expected. However, there is wide latitude and
+variance in how these fail-safe programs are managed and
+consequentially in how impactful such a major event would be. For
+example, in Cook County we implemented a registration process that was
+only marginally longer than a normal check-in process and believed we
+could have managed a significant data problem without equally
+significant impacts on lines and voter expectations. However, to do so
+we relied on electronic pollbooks (e-pollbooks). Were the e-pollbooks
+rendered inoperable entirely, the tertiary paper-based backup would
+have had a significant negative impact on the amount of time voters
+would have had to wait in line to check-in.
+ Question 4. How many States have plans in place to hold or continue
+an election should their voter registration databases become
+compromised?
+ Answer. I do not know how many places have a specific detailed plan
+for this type of occurrence. But every State and local election
+official knows how to administer provisional ballots and many times in
+large numbers. Whether most are outfitted for wholesale failure of the
+primary voter registration system is unlikely. In Cook County we could
+have likely handled a wholesale data failure given our use of
+electronic poll books and streamlined registration process. However,
+should we have had to revert to our back-up paper provisional and
+registration system there would have been significant service impacts.
+ Question 5. How many States and jurisdictions within each State use
+electronic poll books?
+ Answer. I do not know Nation-wide. In Illinois there are between 20
+and 30 election jurisdictions that have electronic poll books,
+including all counties with over 100,000 voters. This accounts for over
+83% of the State's registered voters.
+ Question 6. Are there instances when electronic poll books have
+failed to operate as intended?
+ Answer. I'm sure there are many cases of them not operating as
+expected or intended. They are computers operated by humans. And while
+the root cause most often comes back to user issues, the effect on a
+voter is the same. We certainly had sporadic episodes of having to
+revert to our back-up systems and even our paper registration books.
+This occurred in far fewer than 1 percent of our precincts and the
+issues was resolved at some point during the day in almost every case;
+the digital services and data became reliable once again.
+ Question 7. What recovery plan is in place should a polling
+location's electronic poll books fail or for periods of time not
+function?
+ Answer. Recovery plans are different everywhere. In suburban Cook
+County we had a number of back-ups. First, if the specific primary e-
+poll book software was inoperable, but the device worked, we utilized a
+redundant digital file of voters. We were able to do this because we
+capture actual signatures for every voter on paper and kept a full
+paper record. If the device failed entirely or workers felt most
+comfortable with paper back-ups we had a printed version of the poll
+book for emergency use. And finally, there was a process for Election
+Day Registration or Provisional Voting which guarantee all voters cast
+a ballot.
+ Question 8. How well does same-day voter registration during early
+voting and on election day create meet fail-safe objectives for the
+successful conduct of a public election?
+ Answer. Same-day voter registration relieved a tremendous amount of
+pressure in Cook County on election day and during early voting. It
+allowed for instant correction of operational voter registration
+mistakes (things like typos, and jr/sr problems, which always occur at
+some small rate) and provided a large fail-safe process for malicious
+activities.
+ Question 9. Are you providing any guidance on security and wireless
+non-voting system technology?
+ Answer. Cook County issued no guidance to other election officials
+other than the white paper that was attached to the testimony I
+delivered. It did not include a prohibition on wireless. In fact, Cook
+County used wireless technology in different contexts. While there was
+increased marginal risk Cook County accepted it because of the
+significant operational & voter list maintenance advantages. Ultimately
+the team believe that it had the ability to mitigate the potential
+security consequences through back up plans and solid audits.
+ The e-poll books communicated wirelessly with the central servers.
+Aside from embedded security like encryption, because Cook County had
+same-day registration, the team believed that the downside risk
+increase due to this communication method was covered for, and
+therefore Cook chose to allow wireless communications between e-
+pollbooks and the central office.
+ Cook County also transmitted encrypted unofficial election results
+from the precincts. However, before publishing those results Cook
+County validated that the results were not being systematically altered
+in any way during the transmission process. And before certifying the
+official results Cook County validated that the transmitted results
+matched the precinct printed results 100% of the time. In an
+environment where there are audits and auditable materials, the level
+of acceptable risk changes. It was the team's judgment that the
+decision to utilize technology to solve some operational and trust
+problems was acceptable even if they increased risk marginally to other
+areas. But it was only acceptable because Cook County believed they
+would find and be able to correct exploitation of those risk areas.
+ Question 10. Do election administrators plan for 100% voter
+participation during early voting or on election day? If not, why not?
+ Answer. In Cook County voters voted early on touch screens with
+audit trails and Cook County could accommodate 100% turnout,
+technically. However, Cook understood that they only had to outfit
+themselves for around a 30% voting in that early voting time period.
+With respect to printing paper ballots and resourcing with machines and
+staff, some officials do plan for complete turnout. Others do not. In
+Illinois officials are technically required to print ballots for 110
+percent of the registered voters on election day. Many don't however,
+because they subtract the number of people using vote by mail and early
+voting, and they also rely on historical numbers as a valid offset.
+Finally, the ability to vote people on the ADA touch-screen devises
+offers some bandwith protection if turnout is full. Paper ballots are
+not cheap and in odd-year local elections or in even-year primary
+elections, with an expected turnout of maybe 30 percent, it has
+historically not been viewed as imprudent to try to do some surgical
+targeting of ballot printing numbers.
+ Question 11. Are there best practices that should be used to
+determine the number of ballots and ballot-marking technology, or
+voting machine that should be provided to support voting?
+ Answer. Yes. The best practice is to guarantee you can meet the
+highest foreseeable demand at any location during any election. There
+are available wait time calculators to maximize the resource
+allocations. The Presidential Commission on Election Administration
+collected and published these resources.
+ Question 12. Are there best practices to address when a natural or
+man-made event makes a polling location unavailable for voting?
+ Answer. The Election Assistance Commission (EAC) provides some
+clearinghouse information in this area. More would be valuable. And I
+believe it is an upcoming effort of the agency. These are problems we
+have been dealing with since the beginning of the republic. And taking
+``Super Storm Sandy'' as an example it is evident that election
+officials have been exceedingly resourceful during this type of event.
+ Question 13. How does allowing voters to vote at locations other
+than at a single voting location impact the ability of election
+services to serve voters in a county or State?
+ Answer. Increasing voting locations opportunities increases the
+inherent resiliency of a system by distributing the available access
+points such that there is no single point of failure that would
+absolutely disenfranchise any one individual. But there are certainly
+some voter costs associated with travelling further than expected to
+vote on election day. Its also important to note that there are
+marginal tradeoffs with changing the voting model away from precincts.
+Some advocates and election officials believe that strong local
+oversight at the precinct level provides the best election day
+assurance against nefarious behavior by the very rare but committed bad
+acting campaign or voter. Further, some security activists believe they
+have the best chance of validating data and monitoring voting behavior
+when elections are managed in digestible chunks, like in the precinct
+unit.
+ Questions From Honorable James R. Langevin for Noah Praetz
+ Question 1. Our system is only as strong as its weakest link, and
+we need to ensure everyone has this ``cyber hygiene'' knowledge. Have
+you found that there's a general lack of knowledge of security
+vulnerabilities and best practices at the staff level?
+ Answer. In the past 2 years the overwhelming majority of the
+profession has grown to fully accept the premise that we rely on
+technologies and people that are inherently vulnerable. This has been a
+sea change in our industry. However, there remains a tremendous
+disparity in the degree to which election officials and their staff
+will, or can, make the changes necessary to increase their security
+posture to the highest levels. While there remains plenty to learn, the
+biggest issue will always remain the operationalization of best
+practices.
+ Question 2. The risk and vulnerability assessments offered by DHS
+can be extremely valuable for States and localities. Have you found
+these assessments for States and local election officials to be useful
+as you work to secure your election systems, and have you implemented
+DHS's recommendations?
+ Answer. The Risk and Vulnerability assessment conducted by DHS at
+Cook County was tremendously valuable. Though Cook took the security
+issue seriously for a long time we were still very surprised by what
+committed, skilled, security tradespeople were able to accomplish on
+the networks. The findings set the table for years of modernization and
+transformation. It is critical to note that even with their findings,
+Cook County was forced to layer the optimal situation on top of the
+election calendar, resource constraints, probability of a successful
+attack, and the consequences/risks of operational disruption due to
+change and regression testing oversites. There are many risks, and
+election administration is a matter of risk management, cyber and
+otherwise.
+ Question 3. Do you have the resources you need to implement the
+recommendations, and if not, what more do you need to do so?
+ Answer. There were certainly resource deficiencies in Cook County.
+Those deficiencies are worse almost everywhere else. The demand is not
+just for modern defensible technology, though that is in short supply.
+There is a dearth in human skill necessary to operationalize
+recommendations. Cook County long argued that every election official
+should have access to an Election Infrastructure Security Officer. For
+giant counties like Cook, they could hire their own. But that would
+cost nearly a billion dollars a year to replicate Nation-wide--an
+impossible and unnecessary investment. A huge security leap could be
+accomplished by providing the same single human resource across
+multiple local election official agencies. In Illinois this was handled
+by a team of ``cyber navigators'' who have essentially adopted a dozen
+counties and are helping them mature their election security. The
+navigators are helping them operationalize the recommendations, not
+just form DHS, but also from CIS and Belfer. They are helping them
+procure free services and manage vendors. The key is to do the basics
+now and utilize the best available shared resources and free resources
+from the private and public sector.
+ Question From Honorable Dina Titus for Noah Praetz
+ Question. When speaking with State and local election officials in
+Nevada, I have heard that while urban areas like Las Vegas may have the
+IT workforce available to recruit individuals to implement new
+cybersecurity measures like Albert sensors, rural areas have been
+struggling to find trained personnel. Have you experienced this
+shortage in other parts of the country, and do you believe further
+investment in STEM education is necessary to effectively mitigate this
+skills gap and secure our most vulnerable election sites?
+ Answer. There is no question that there is a skilled professional
+gap between the workforce needed and that available. This runs not
+simply through elections Nation-wide, but through the all sectors of
+country. There are millions of jobs in the field unfiled because the
+workers are not yet available. The demand will continue to grow. And
+the supply must grow to meet the demand. Given that the cyber risk is
+top of list from a National security perspective, it would seem
+appropriate to throw everything including the kitchen sink at it.
+ Questions From Honorable Michael T. McCaul for Noah Praetz
+ Question 1a. Mr. Praetz, I share your assessment that we must
+expect the attackers' methods aimed at our election system will evolve.
+You described the large role that local officials play in running and
+securing elections and the critical public partnership.
+ How can the Federal Government best support these efforts without
+the all-too-common Federal overreach?
+ Answer. Overly proscribing tactics and specific actions to be taken
+can create overreach or the perception thereof; and can lock in actions
+that won't likely remain necessary or valuable over time. However, the
+Federal Government could provide investments in the area to the States
+and local election officials while simultaneously demanding some set of
+measurable progress to prove the investment is worthy of the taxpayers'
+sacrifice. I laid out my navigator program support. The Federal
+Government could invest in such a program without proscribing how the
+States do it--the model can be different everywhere--and the laboratory
+effects of those differences highly valuable overtime. However, there
+are some areas where prescription is more important, particularly
+around ballot audits. Some level of hand-auditing seems necessary to
+prove up that the machines are reading them correctly. That's not to
+exclude additional audits that may be superior to a small hand-counted
+audit in a vacuum.
+ Question 1b. How will Federal mandates from Washington address the
+problems you outlined and not just add more bureaucracy?
+ Answer. A program initiated by the Federal Government which aims to
+support the protection of the critical infrastructures is necessary. As
+you rightly note, finding the right balance is critical. Investing in
+principles is important. My top three principles are (1), sustained,
+skilled human partnerships with local election officials; (2),
+investment in technology that is easier to defend and provides the
+services voter expect; (3), investments in audits that can prove
+conclusively that trusted and true results are attainable even in the
+event of software failure. Providing some administrative autonomy to
+the States and local election officials in satisfying the principles
+can help those Government bodies own the principles and the management
+of the project. Retaining some requirements and measurements ensures
+that the States are accountable for the Federal tax investment.
+ Questions from Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for Jake Braun
+ Question 1. Are we taking a fail-safe approach to determining which
+election systems or processes are critical to the successful conduct of
+a public election?
+ Answer. No.
+ Question 2. Would you consider State-wide Centralized Voter
+Registration Databases a critical system to the administration and
+conduct of any public election?
+ Answer. Yes. It is also important to note that the local
+jurisdictions' voter registration databases are nearly as important as
+those at the State level.
+ Question 3. What fail-safe measures are in place to assure that if
+the voter registration database is compromised and thereby make data
+records untrustworthy; or rendered unavailable for early voting or on
+election day the casting of ballots will continue?
+ Answer. To my knowledge, there are no fail-safe technology measures
+to accomplish this. Many election officials regularly back up their
+systems and/or use an auditing regime to increase the likelihood that
+they will be able to detect an attack and restore data that were
+deleted or changed. However these procedures are not foolproof and
+their implementation at the local level is just as important as at the
+State level, yet far from uniform. That being said, same-day voter
+registration would likely be a sound defense against this attack.
+ Question 4. How many States have plans in place to hold or continue
+an election should their voter registration databases become
+compromised?
+ Answer. I do not know. However, local laws are, in general, unequal
+to the threat State and locals are facing.
+ Question 5. How many States and jurisdictions within each State use
+electronic poll books?
+ Answer. According to the Brennan Center for Justice, at least 34
+States plus Washington, DC used electronic pollbooks as of 2017.\1\
+While it is is possible that some of those States have chosen to
+discontinue their use due to the 2018 DEF CON report, our preliminary
+research suggests the opposite. With updated information from State
+action taken over the last 2 years, there are now at least 41 States
+that have implemented the use of electronic pollbooks, conducted a
+pilot program for their use, or approved funds to purchase them for
+future use. There is no up-to-date accounting for how many
+jurisdictions within each of those States uses electronic pollbooks, as
+of 2018. The Brennan Center reports that 5 of the 34 States using
+electronic pollbooks in 2017 were using them State-wide.
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ \1\ ``VRM in the States: Electronic Poll-books.'' Brennan Center
+for Justice, February 6, 2017. Accessed March 14, 2019.
+www.brennancenter.org/analysis/vrm-states-electronic-poll-books.
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ Question 6. Are there instances when electronic poll books have
+failed to operate as intended?
+ Answer. Yes. In our research at DEF CON, untrained hackers (with no
+specialized skills or previous access to the machines) found that such
+devices are vulnerable to hacks via wireless networks, bluetooth, or
+cellular connections. These vulnerabilities give hackers the ability to
+compromise such connections and intercept communications between the
+jurisdiction's main database and a cloud backup service, such as Amazon
+Web Service (AWS). If attackers can gain access to this cloud backup,
+they can view the database and potentially control functions along the
+line of communication. As a result, a single compromised connection in
+a single polling place could result in unrestricted access to the
+entire jurisdiction's voter registration database--thereby compromising
+names, birth dates, addresses, social security numbers, driver's
+license numbers, addresses, and voting history linked with the
+individual's signature. In 2017, just such a security lapse was
+discovered in Illinois when a cybersecurity analyst discovered a
+database containing sensitive information for more than 1.8 million
+Illinois voters that was downloadable from a publicly-available AWS
+storage site controlled by ES&S, one of the major election equipment
+vendors in the United States.\2\
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ \2\ O'Sullivan, Dan. ``The Chicago Way: An Electronic Voting Firm
+Exposes 1.8M Chicagoans,'' Upguard (blog), December 13, 2018, https://
+www.upguard.com/breaches/cloud-leak-chicago-voters.
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ In addition, software vulnerabilities have been discovered by DEF
+CON researchers in a line of Diebold electronic poll books, ExpressPoll
+5000, which was purchased and is currently operated by ES&S.
+Investigators at DEF CON discovered that not only were administrator
+and root passwords to the pollbook's system stored without encryption,
+but they could directly access and modify election parameters using a
+free, widely available program called SQL Lite.\3\
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ \3\ University of Chicago Harris Cyber Policy Initiative. DEF CON
+25 Voting Machine Hacking Village: Report on Cyber Vulnerabilities in
+U.S. Election Equipment, Databases, and Infrastructure. Chicago: The
+University of Chicago Harris Cyber Policy Initiative, 2017. Accessed
+February 26, 2019. https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-26/
+DEF%20CON%2026%20voting%20vil- lage%20report.pdf, The University of
+Chicago Harris Cyber Policy Initiative. DEF CON 26 Voting Village:
+Report on Cyber Vulnerabilities in U.S. Election Equipment, Databases,
+and Infrastructure. Chicago: The University of Chicago Harris Cyber
+Policy Initiative, 2018. Accessed February 26, 2019. https://
+www.defcon.org/images/defcon-26/DEF%20CON%2026%20-
+voting%20village%20report.pdf.
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ The biggest concern with compromising these devices is not just
+corrupting data but also the multi-hour long lines for Election Day and
+early voting it could cause as confused poll workers try to sort out
+who can vote and who can't. These lines would further add to a sense
+that the system doesn't operate properly or is ``rigged'' against the
+voter's preferred candidate.
+ Question 7. What recovery plan is in place should a polling
+location's electronic poll books fail or for periods of time not
+function?
+ Answer. To my knowledge, such recovery plans vary dramatically
+across jurisdictions. In previous elections, we advocated strongly to
+have paper-based back-up poll books kept on-site in case there was a
+problem with the machines. However, we often met strong resistance in
+adopting even this simple fix.
+ Question 8. How well does same-day voter registration during early
+voting and on election day create meet fail-safe objectives for the
+successful conduct of a public election?
+ Answer. Same-day voter registration may be the only nearly fail-
+safe option available today for mitigating voter registration database
+and e-poll book attacks.
+ Question 9. Are you providing any guidance on security and wireless
+non-voting system technology?
+ Answer. I am sorry, I do not understand the question.
+ Question 10. Do election administrators plan for 100% voter
+participation during early voting or on election day? If not, why not?
+ Answer. No. Election administrators use several methods to predict
+voter turnout, including looking at past voter history; consulting
+turnout tables, which calculate a probability that an individual will
+turn out to vote, based on her age and previous voting history; and
+building regression models.\4\
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ \4\ Malchow, Hal. ``Predicting Turnout in a Presidential
+Election.'' Campaigns & Elections 25 (2004): 38-40.
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ Question 11. Are there best practices that should be used to
+determine the number of ballots and ballot marking technology, or
+voting machine that should be provided to support voting?
+ Answer. Yes. There is a tool maintained by MIT (here) that can help
+an election administrator determine the optimal assets needed for a
+precinct to administer an election.
+ Question 12. Are there best practices to address when a natural or
+man-made event makes a polling location unavailable for voting?
+ Answer. Not to my knowledge. However, in past elections we
+encouraged election administrators to treat as an ``emergency'' any
+polling place with a line over 30 minutes long.
+ Question 13. How does allowing voters to vote at locations other
+than at a single voting location impact the ability of election
+services to serve voters in a county or State?
+ Answer. Multiple locations provide voters various options to
+increase ease of voting. It has worked well with early voting but would
+provide challenges for Election Day voting, especially as it may
+necessitate more internet connections to devices being used to find
+people in the registration database.
+ Questions from Honorable James R. Langevin for Jake Braun
+ Question 1. What can be done to improve the relationship between
+the cybersecurity research community and the election system vendors
+and ensure that the work of voting security researchers is not ignored
+by vendors?
+ Answer. First, vendors can eliminate restrictions on third-party
+security testing from their contracts. It's ridiculous that in order to
+buy election equipment, local election officials have to sign away
+their rights to have independent audits of equipment that they own. It
+also creates significant risk for security researchers who want to work
+with election officials, all of which is unnecessary.
+ Second, vendors could donate or sell voting equipment for us to
+inspect at DEF CON and other such events. Fortunately some of the
+vendors now seem interested in participating in events like DEF CON.
+Further, there are many local election officials who have expressed
+interest in holding cyber assessments of their systems, including
+machines and software from the vendors but have not pursued such
+efforts from fear of lawsuits from the vendors. Vendors should allow
+and even facilitate this type of activity instead of quash it. The
+industry needs all the help it can get with security and as NSA's Rob
+Joyce said, ``Head-in-the-sand security is not security at all.''
+ Possibly the best way to improve relations with the vendors and
+research community is to fund the development and piloting of open-
+source voting software. Open-source voting software would allow all
+interested security researchers to audit and suggest security
+improvements to our election systems 365 days a year, not just the 3
+days of DEF CON. In fact, DHS recently posted an RFP for grants to
+vendors and researchers, requesting bids for building a ``voting system
+of the future,'' which could have included open-source voting
+equipment. Unfortunately, for an undisclosed reason, that RFP was taken
+down and no one was allowed to bid on it. DHS should repost that RFP
+and solicit bids to build an open-source voting system.
+ Further, I applaud DARPA's recent announcement of significant grant
+dollars being disseminated to researchers to build a secure, open-
+source voting system. In a welcome departure from the stance of current
+vendors, the firms who received the DARPA funds have already reached
+out to DEF CON attendees to engage us early in the process.
+ Question 2. Our system is only as strong as its weakest link, and
+we need to ensure everyone has this ``cyber hygiene'' knowledge. Have
+you found that there's a general lack of knowledge of security
+vulnerabilities and best practices at the staff level?
+ Answer. As of 2017, there was a 350,000-person shortage in cyber
+professionals Nationally.\5\ That number is projected to grow to more
+than 3.5 million world-wide by 2021.\6\ It is nearly an impossible task
+to hire the cyber professionals necessary to put in place the basic
+cyber hygiene necessary to protect a network much less train the lay
+people on staff as to their basic hygiene. Moreover, misconceptions as
+to election officials' relative security, caused in part by words
+erroneously used by the vendors like ``air-gapped,'' further lead to
+confusion or a false sense of security.
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ \5\ ``Cybersecurity Jobs Report 2018-2021.'' Cybersecurity
+Ventures, May 31, 2017. Accessed March 13, 2019. https://
+cybersecurityventures.com/jobs/
+ \6\ ``Cybersecurity Jobs Report 2018-2021.'' Cybersecurity
+Ventures, May 31, 2017. Accessed March 13, 2019. https://
+cybersecurityventures.com/jobs/
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ Question 3. The risk and vulnerability assessments offered by DHS
+can be extremely valuable for States and localities. Have you found
+these assessments for States and local election officials to be useful
+as you work to secure your election systems, and have you implemented
+DHS's recommendations?
+ Answer. I think these assessments have been invaluable in assisting
+election officials to understand the depth and breadth of their risk.
+The assessments also help dispel misconceptions promulgated by industry
+as to the level of security each jurisdiction has achieved. The most
+important improvement to make in the assessments is to increase the
+number of them for local election jurisdictions, as they are the ones
+who administer elections.
+ Question 4. Do you have the resources you need to implement the
+recommendations, and if not, what more do you need to do so?
+ Answer. I believe this question is for the election officials.
+However, in general, I believe the EAC money was an order of magnitude
+lower than what is needed to begin to effectively mitigate this
+problem. All the voter registration databases in the country should be
+moved to one or more secure, American-owned and -operated clouds like
+AWS, Google, or Microsoft (among others). Second, touchscreen voting
+machines should be banned (except for use by the disabled) in favor of
+paper ballots counted by secure optiscan machines. The DHS assessment
+teams should be quintupled so that all 50 States and the top 30 largest
+local jurisdictions (which vote nearly 85% of the U.S. population) can
+be assessed biannually, and the other nearly 8,000 jurisdictions can
+get at least a remote assessment once every other year. Further, these
+teams should help train local IT staff to plan and implement
+remediation plans based on the DHS assessments, especially including
+election night reporting website security and breach protocols.
+Finally, funding should be allocated for DHS to disseminate grants for
+research and development on building the voting machines of the future.
+ Question From Honorable Dina Titus for Jake Braun
+ Question. When speaking with State and local election officials in
+Nevada, I have heard that while urban areas like Las Vegas may have the
+IT workforce available to recruit individuals to implement new
+cybersecurity measures like Albert sensors, rural areas have been
+struggling to find trained personnel. Have you experienced this
+shortage in other parts of the country, and do you believe further
+investment in STEM education is necessary to effectively mitigate this
+skills gap and secure our most vulnerable election sites?
+ Answer. As of 2017, there was a 350,000-person shortage in cyber
+professionals Nationally.\7\ That is projected to grow to more than 3.5
+million world-wide by 2021.\8\ It is a LITERALLY impossible task to
+hire the cyber professionals necessary to put in place the basic cyber
+hygiene necessary to protect an election system. They simply can't
+compete with industry and the Federal Government for the workforce.
+Moreover, misconceptions as to election officials' relative security,
+caused in part by words erroneously used by the vendors like ``air-
+gapped,'' further lead to confusion or a false sense of security. While
+further investment in STEAM is undoubtedly critical to solving this
+problem long-term, those investments could take a decade to bear fruit.
+We should still make the investments.
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ \7\ ``Cybersecurity Jobs Report 2018-2021.'' Cybersecurity
+Ventures, May 31, 2017. Accessed March 13, 2019. https://
+cybersecurityventures.com/jobs/
+ \8\ ``Cybersecurity Jobs Report 2018-2021.'' Cybersecurity
+Ventures, May 31, 2017. Accessed March 13, 2019. https://
+cybersecurityventures.com/jobs/
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ However, we must find creative ways to ``hack'' the work force
+problem for election officials. HB1 has a creative solution with its
+provision for a bug bounty program, akin to ``Hack the Pentagon,'' that
+crowdsources security for local election officials. Further, specifying
+that some of the R&D funding in HB1 be allocated for development of
+open-source voting equipment, would enable thousands of security
+experts to audit the code of voting equipment and suggest fixes. Open-
+source equipment offers an inexpensive, persistent, and adaptable
+opportunity to dramatically increase the cyber workforce without local
+election officials being required to recruit, hire, and retain cyber
+professionals. Finally, outsourcing voter registration database
+security by providing State and local election administrators grants to
+migrate their data to a secure, American-owned and -operated cloud like
+AWS, Google, or Microsoft would remove database security burdens from
+local election officials and assign it to organizations who can afford
+to recruit and retain the best security professionals in the business.
+ Questions From Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for John H. Merrill
+ Question 1. Are we taking a fail-safe approach to determining which
+election systems or processes are critical to the successful conduct of
+a public election?
+ Answer. No. The Alabama Secretary of State's Office believes that
+the only effective method to determine which election systems are
+critical to the process is with direct guidance and input from the
+Secretaries of State.
+ Question 2. Would you consider State-wide Centralized Voter
+Registration Databases a critical system to the administration and
+conduct of any public election?
+ Answer. State-wide Centralized Voter Registration Databases are the
+most critical component to the current democratic institutions that we
+have created for the people of this country to voice their political
+preferences. These provide detailed information that allows Secretaries
+of State to effective plan an election for the people of their State,
+county, or local municipality.
+ Question 3. What fail-safe measures are in place to assure that if
+the voter registration database is compromised and thereby make data
+records untrustworthy; or rendered unavailable for early voting or on
+election day the casting of ballots will continue?
+ Answer. There is no true fail-safe to ensure that a compromise does
+not occur; however, a systematic approach to augment any system or user
+data damage can only be accomplished with daily system back-ups,
+additional layers of security including two-factor authentication, and
+verification that even in the event of total loss of access or systems
+locally would not eliminate the existence of those records and that can
+be restored to a system without any down time.
+ Question 4. How many States have plans in place to hold or continue
+an election should their voter registration databases become
+compromised?
+ Answer. Alabama does.
+ I am unable to answer this question, but I am hopeful that each and
+every State has a plan in place should their voter registration
+databases be compromised.
+ Question 5. How many States and jurisdictions within each State use
+electronic poll books?
+ Answer. As Alabama's Secretary of State I can only speak for
+Alabama and at this time there are 30 of 67 Alabama counties utilizing
+the electronic poll book systems.
+ Question 6. Are there instances when electronic poll books have
+failed to operate as intended?
+ Answer. With a few minor exceptions electronic poll books have
+worked as intended. Those minor exceptions have involved age-related
+camera issues where the camera used to scan barcodes was not strong
+enough to pick up the driver's license barcode in low light and another
+issue occurred when a county employee failed to complete all of the
+steps to load a voter's list onto the system.
+ Question 7. What recovery plan is in place should a polling
+location's electronic poll books fail or for periods of time not
+function?
+ Answer. The Secretary of State's Office recommends that every
+county retain a paper copy of that precinct's poll list at each polling
+site, but ultimately that is left up to the discretion of the Judge of
+Probate in each county.
+ Question 8. How well does same-day voter registration during early
+voting and on election day create meet fail-safe objectives for the
+successful conduct of a public election?
+ Answer. In Alabama it does not meet or create fail-safe objectives,
+it simply creates a system without security mechanisms and attempts to
+pass it off as a solution.
+ Question 9. Are you providing any guidance on security and wireless
+non-voting system technology?
+ Answer. We provide guidance and require cybersecurity and ethics
+training to all the State and county users that work in the Secretary
+of State's Office or have access to the voter registration system.
+ Additionally, Alabama's system utilizes paper ballots which once
+voted are retained for at least 22 months following an election, as
+required by Federal law.
+ Question 10. Do election administrators plan for 100% voter
+participation during early voting or on election day? If not, why not?
+ Answer. In Alabama, electronic voting machines must be placed at
+each polling location based on the number of voters assigned to that
+polling place (2,400 voters per machine). So, pertaining to machines,
+there is no projection involved. It is a set number.
+ Regarding the printing of ballots and ballot styles, some counties
+choose to print the exact number of ballots for voters assigned to that
+polling location, and some counties prefer to project the turnout,
+obviously leaning towards the highest projected turnout number to
+ensure enough ballots. The reason some counties would not print one
+ballot per voter is due to the cost of ballots.
+ It is also important to have an understanding with the local ballot
+printing vendor that they will deliver, in-person on election day,
+additional ballots to any polling place that is getting low. This has
+happened in the past in Alabama, and the vendor has done their part to
+ensure enough ballots. Some States may not have the ballot printing
+vendor in their State and would be forced to print one ballot per
+voter.
+ Question 11. Are there best practices that should be used to
+determine the number of ballots and ballot marking technology, or
+voting machine that should be provided to support voting?
+ Answer. In Alabama according to State law and administrative rule,
+an electronic voting machine must be assigned for every 2,400 voters in
+each polling place. Working with vendors to determine the number of
+voters that should be associated with a machine for proper flow on
+Election Day is a must, as well as the number of ballots and ballot
+styles should be printed for that polling place.
+ Question 12. Are there best practices to address when a natural or
+man-made event makes a polling location unavailable for voting?
+ Answer. The best practice is preparation. In Alabama, County
+Commissions should identify emergency back-up polling locations in each
+area in the case that one or more assigned polling locations is
+damaged. In the case in which a polling place must change, the county
+would need to hold an emergency meeting, designate the new polling
+place(s) to be used and the electronic voting machines to be placed in
+those polling places, and provide the list of new polling places to the
+judge of probate and board of registrars. Immediately upon changing the
+polling place, the county must notify all affected voters and publicize
+the change via newspaper and any/all other effective means of
+communication including social media.
+ Question 13. How does allowing voters to vote at locations other
+than at a single voting location impact the ability of election
+services to serve voters in a county or State?
+ Answer. Alabama State law requires voters to vote at the polling
+place assigned to them. Also, in Alabama, electronic voting machines
+must be placed at each polling location based on the number of voters
+assigned to that polling place (2,400 voters per machine).
+ The preparation and planning for the number of voting machines,
+ballots, ballot styles, poll books and electronic books, election
+workers, election supplies, parking and disabled ballot marking devices
+per polling place is one of the most important aspects of an election.
+Understanding the number of voters assigned to a specific polling place
+and planning resources around that number is vital in our election
+preparation.
+ Questions From Honorable James R. Langevin for John H. Merrill
+ Question 1. Our system is only as strong as its weakest link, and
+we need to ensure everyone has this ``cyber hygiene'' knowledge. Have
+you found that there's a general lack of knowledge of security
+vulnerabilities and best practices at the staff level?
+ Answer. No. We have an outstanding team here at the Alabama
+Secretary of State's Office, however, it is difficult to hire staff
+that we can compensate based on the current salary schedule that is
+available from the private sector.
+ Question 2. The risk and vulnerability assessments offered by DHS
+can be extremely valuable for States and localities. Have you found
+these assessments for States and local election officials to be useful
+as you work to secure your election systems, and have you implemented
+DHS's recommendations?
+ Answer. We have utilized the assessments from DHS on more than one
+occasion to review our system and to ensure that any vulnerabilities
+that existed were resolved prior to an election.
+ Question 3. Do you have the resources you need to implement the
+recommendations, and if not, what more do you need to do so?
+ Answer. In all of the instances reported to the Secretary of
+State's office we have had the resources to implement the
+recommendations that were made from the cyber assessments. However,
+many of those would not have been possible without the grant funds
+already allotted to the Secretary of State's office.
+ Additionally, recently DHS has begun to undertake a review of
+county offices. Many of those recommendations will be for things that
+are much more expensive, and many are hesitant to schedule their review
+because they know they will be made aware of a large number of issues.
+ Question From Honorable Dina Titus for John H. Merrill
+ Question. When speaking with State and local election officials in
+Nevada, I have heard that while urban areas like Las Vegas may have the
+IT workforce available to recruit individuals to implement new
+cybersecurity measures like Albert sensors, rural areas have been
+struggling to find trained personnel. Have you experienced this
+shortage in other parts of the country, and do you believe further
+investment in STEM education is necessary to effectively mitigate this
+skills gap and secure our most vulnerable election sites?
+ Answer. Investment in education in rural areas is something that
+would benefit the people of those locations but that would help solve
+the problem in the long term. Short-term solutions to this problem
+require additional resources and smart hiring processes.
+ Questions From Honorable Yvette D. Clarke for John H. Merrill
+ Question 1a. Last year, the FBI uncovered that a Russian oligarch,
+with close ties to President Putin, had acquired an ownership interest
+in a vendor which hosted State-wide election data for Maryland.\1\
+Until the FBI alerted them, State election authorities were unaware of
+the vendor's ties to Russia. Even if no tampering occurred, this raises
+important questions about foreign ownership of firms providing
+election-related services.
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ \1\ https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/politics/bs-md-
+election-russia-20180713-story.html.
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ To the best of your knowledge, does your State have any election-
+related contracts with vendors backed by Russian or Chinese investors?
+ Answer. To the best of my knowledge the State of Alabama does not
+have any vendors backed by Russian or Chinese investors.
+ Question 1b. What measures, if any, does your State undertake to
+assess foreign ownership of election vendors prior to signing contracts
+with them?
+ Answer. The Alabama Secretary of State's office reviews all the
+financial documentation associated with each company before entering
+into a contract with them. Additionally, we require all business that
+do business with us to be registered with the State of Alabama before
+we enter into an agreement for services. The contract for Alabama's
+current voter registration system is about to be put up for bid again
+and will include requirements for all companies to disclose any foreign
+ownership or investment in their company before they are considered by
+the office for use in Alabama.
+ Question From Honorable Michael T. McCaul for John H. Merrill
+ Question. Foreign states, including Russia and other malicious
+actors have and will continue to attempt to interfere with U.S.
+elections. In fact, I encouraged, in a Classified space, both the Obama
+administration and the Trump administration to call out Russia for
+their targeted attacks on our Nation. Their activities have injected
+chaos and doubt into foundation of our democracy. An issue of this
+gravity requires Congress to act in a deliberate and bipartisan manner.
+Now, all eyes are on 2020. How has the cooperation with DHS and
+Director Krebs strengthened California's election security?
+ Answer. The Alabama Secretary of State's Office has benefited from
+the increased relationship with the Department of Homeland Security.
+This relationship has allowed us to secure our systems by implementing
+a multitude of security equipment and tools to strengthen the States'
+election systems. Additionally, DHS has provided a team from the
+Department of Homeland Security that has been present with our IT staff
+on election day to provide direct contact in the event of a breach or
+other system problem.
+
+ [all]
+