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+ - ON THE EVE OF THE SUMMIT: OPTIONS FOR U.S. DIPLOMACY ON NORTH KOREA
+
+[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
+[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
+
+
+ ON THE EVE OF THE SUMMIT:
+ OPTIONS FOR U.S. DIPLOMACY ON NORTH KOREA
+
+=======================================================================
+
+ HEARING
+
+ BEFORE THE
+
+ SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND
+ THE PACIFIC AND NONPROLIFERATION
+
+ OF THE
+
+ COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
+ HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
+
+ ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
+
+ FIRST SESSION
+
+ __________
+
+ FEBRUARY 26, 2019
+
+ __________
+
+ Serial No. 116-6
+
+ __________
+
+ Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
+
+[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
+
+
+Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,
+
+ or http://www.govinfo.gov
+
+
+ __________
+
+
+ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
+35-364PDF WASHINGTON : 2019
+
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office,
+http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,
+U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free).E-mail,
+[email protected].
+
+
+
+ COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
+
+ ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman
+
+BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
+GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Member
+ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
+GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
+THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina
+KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
+WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TED S. YOHO, Florida
+DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
+AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
+JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
+DINA TITUS, Nevada ANN WAGNER, Missouri
+ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York BRIAN MAST, Florida
+TED LIEU, California FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
+SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
+DEAN PHILLPS, Minnesota JOHN CURTIS, Utah
+ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota KEN BUCK, Colorado
+COLIN ALLRED, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas
+ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
+ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
+CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
+TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
+DAVID TRONE, Maryland MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
+JIM COSTA, California
+JUAN VARGAS, California
+VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
+
+
+ Jason Steinbaum, Democrat Staff Director
+
+ Brendan Shieds, Republican Staff Director
+
+ ------
+
+ Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and Nonproliferation
+
+ BRAD SHERMAN, Chairman
+
+DINA TITUS, Nevada TED YOHO, Florida, Ranking Member
+CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
+GERALD CONNOLLY, Virgina ANN WAGNER, Missouri
+AMI BERA, California BRIAN MAST, Florida
+ANDY LEVIN, Michigan JOHN CURTIS, Utah
+ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia
+
+ Don MacDonald, Staff Director
+
+
+ C O N T E N T S
+
+ ----------
+ Page
+
+ WITNESSES
+
+Richardson, Honorable Bill, Former Governor of New Mexico, U.S.
+ Ambassador to the United Nations, Secretary of Energy, and
+ Member of Congress............................................. 10
+Cha, Dr. Victor, Senior Adviser and Korea Chair, Center for
+ Strategic and International Studies............................ 16
+
+ APPENDIX
+
+Hearing Notice................................................... 47
+Hearing Minutes.................................................. 48
+Hearing Attendance............................................... 49
+
+
+ ON THE EVE OF THE SUMMIT: OPTIONS FOR U.S. DIPLOMACY ON NORTH KOREA
+
+ Tuesday, February 26, 2019
+
+ House of Representatives
+ Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and
+ Nonproliferation
+ Committee on Foreign Affairs
+ Washington, DC
+
+ The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in
+Room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brad Sherman,
+(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
+ Chairman Sherman. The consensus here seems to be that we
+can start. I know that Ranking Member Yoho will be watching
+this on video and on his--yes, on the way, and I am confident
+that my opening statement will take longer than it takes him to
+get here.
+ I want to welcome all of our colleagues to this first
+subcommittee meeting of the congressional session for the
+Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and Nonproliferation.
+ We could not ask for a more timely hearing with the
+president in Vietnam and Kim Jong-Un having just arrived there
+by train.
+ We could not ask for a more distinguished panel, including
+Governor Bill Richardson, who is famous for negotiating, and
+negotiating successfully, with North Korea, as well as Victor
+Cha, who has negotiated with the North as well.
+ I and the ranking member will give opening statements for 5
+minutes and then whichever subcommittee members wish to make an
+opening statement will be allocated 2 minutes.
+ Whether we are safer now than we were in June 2018 when the
+Singapore Summit was held and what can be done in Hanoi that
+will make us safer, these are the two questions that we ought
+to address.
+ In the first year of his presidency, President Trump
+ratcheted up the rhetoric to an extreme level--``little rocket
+man,'' et cetera. This rhetoric was matched by the North Korean
+rhetoric and there were some that worried that it could lead to
+a kinetic war.
+ Trump stopped the extreme rhetoric. Now things are calmer--
+that dialing things up and then dialing them back is hardly a
+great accomplishment. The facts are these. When Trump took
+over, North Korea had yet to demonstrate a hydrogen bomb.
+ Now they have. During the Trump presidency, 20--the North
+has created enough fissile material for perhaps 20 additional
+bombs, perhaps eight additional bombs worth of fissile material
+created just since the Singapore Summit.
+ I am not sure we are safer. Now, we have had a period
+without testing. But that is hardly unusual. The North
+conducted no nuclear tests from 1994 to 2002 and from 2007 to
+2013 they suspended their missile testing from 2009 to 2013. So
+a pause in testing of merely a year is not unusual.
+ What is unusual is this. In the past, pauses in testing may
+have slowed down their program. Whereas now Kim Jong-Un said
+last April he does not need any additional tests. He has
+already developed his hydrogen weapon and his ICBM.
+ Several hostages have been released by North Korea. But we
+have with us a witness who was able to secure the release of a
+like number of hostages without making concessions to the North
+Korean government and the remains of several service members
+have been turned over to the United States.
+ But, once again, we have a witness here who did that
+without making any concessions. Perhaps you should write a book
+called ``The Art of the Deal.''
+ But, more importantly, much larger numbers of the remains
+of our servicemen were turned over to us during the Clinton and
+Bush Administrations.
+ We have made enormous concessions to North Korea. First,
+Kim has stood on the same level as the most powerful man in the
+world. Second, we have weakened our sanctions in two ways.
+First, the very act of the summit signals to businesses around
+the world that they can do business with North Korea.
+ And second, we have not sanctioned major Chinese banks. Mr.
+Yoho and I, with him as chairman, both in 2017 and again in
+2018, of this subcommittee sent letters to the administration
+demanding that the major Chinese banks be sanctioned, not just
+the tiny ones, and we have received no substantive response.
+ There has been substantial leakage in our sanctions and the
+change in atmosphere caused by the summit is a major reason for
+that. We have weakened the U.S.-South Korea military defense
+capacity. During the Obama Administration, we had three to four
+major exercises per year.
+ We have had zero major exercises with South Korea since
+Singapore and the one--there is one that is scheduled for the
+future that may or may not happen. In any case, it has been
+scaled down.
+ As General Abrams, the commander of U.S. forces in Korea,
+stated, ``this suspension has led to a denigration of the
+readiness of our force. So we have made massive concessions
+while getting nothing in return that makes us safer. Nothing."
+ I believe--and I see I have gone into overtime a bit here
+so I will be as quick as possible--I believe we need tougher
+sanctions, starting with those two big Chinese--the two letters
+that we sent focusing on several Chinese banks--large Chinese
+banks. That would send a signal that it is not business as
+usual or even business under the table with North Korea.
+ Second, and I realize this is somewhat controversial, we
+ought to define down our definition of success. I do not think
+we are going to get CIVD--complete irrevocable verifiable
+disarmament--of all nuclear weapons.
+ But we would be much safer if North Korea had a limited
+number of nuclear weapons that were highly monitored. If we
+were in that circumstance, North Korea would not be in a
+position to sell fissile material or nuclear weapons.
+ We would limit the amount of damage that they could do and
+we could move ourselves to a safer position that we have now.
+That is certainly much better than seeing new fissile material
+created every day, even while the summit is ongoing.
+ With that, I yield to the ranking member.
+ Mr. Yoho. I appreciate it and I thank you.
+ Governor Richardson, good seeing you. Dr. Cha, good seeing
+you again. I had the good fortune of having breakfast with Dr.
+Chung-in Moon this morning, who is the advisor of Moon Jae-in,
+and his take was a little different.
+ He thought things were moving along very well and he was
+very impressed with President Trump and what he is doing.
+ But let me go to my notes. Good morning, and thank you,
+Chairman Sherman, for calling this hearing. Members on both
+sides of the aisle share similar national security concerns and
+oversights priorities in regard to the ongoing nuclear
+diplomacy discussions between the U.S. and North Korea.
+ This important issue is fitting for our first subcommittee
+hearing of the 116th Congress. I look forward to continuing the
+strong bipartisanship and cooperation that this committee has
+displayed in the 115th Congress.
+ As you said, we are on the letter together and we are going
+to continue to hold the administration accountable. This
+committee worked--this committee works respectfully together,
+even in some areas we may have disagreements.
+ Over the next 2 days, President Trump will conduct a second
+summit with Kim Jong-Un, the totalitarian leader of North
+Korea. The word historic is often used to describe this summit.
+That much is true.
+ U.S.-DPRK diplomacy has never before taken place at the
+heads of States at this level. We should not forget that when
+President Trump took office, President Obama warned him that
+the Korean Peninsula would present him his most urgent security
+challenge.
+ However, over the course of President Trump's first term,
+we have moved from the brink of war to a period of diplomacy.
+Again, the heads of two States, first time ever.
+ As this administration moves forward, let us not forget who
+Kim Jong-Un is. He is No. 3 in a family lineage hierarchy that
+has held to deity stature. He has allowed his citizens to
+suffer while chasing his nuclear ambitions.
+ He is a dictator who has executed over 140 members of the
+elite military that surrounded his father and grandfather,
+including his own uncle.
+ He ordered the assassination of his brother in Malaysia
+using VX nerve gas. He also threatened the U.S. with nuclear
+annihilation and he sent medium-range ballistic missiles over
+Japan and proudly claimed that he would target our territory in
+the South Pacific--Guam--and the mainland, if so desired.
+ So, yes, this is a historic second summit. But we must
+call--but we must call for extreme caution as we move forward.
+Keep in mind, three previous administrations have attempted to
+solve the North Korea dilemma and failed, allowing the Kim
+regimes to advance their nuclear programs and capabilities.
+ Unfortunately, one fact outside of the White House control
+remains unchanged. The Kim regime does not deal in good faith.
+Kim Jong-Un appears to be using the same play book as his two
+predecessors used before, which is to promise peace,
+denuclearization in exchange for sanction relief. Once this is
+granted, the DPRK continues their deceit and lying and
+continuation of a dangerous nuclear program.
+ We need to note that nothing has occurred since the
+Singapore Summit in 2018 in terms of denuclearization. I am
+extremely concerned that any concessions presented by the
+DPRK's diplomatic outreach are hiding equally significant
+risks.
+ The president and his team have a giant task at hands. The
+facts show us that North Korea has not taken any meaningful
+action to dismantle its nuclear or missile programs.
+ There has been no disclosure of the number of nuclear
+bombs, ICBMs, or even clear definition of what denuclearization
+means to all sides. Much work needs to be done during this
+second historic summit.
+ Meanwhile, Kim Jong-Un's international standing has never
+been higher, as you pointed out, Chairman Sherman. Kim's
+diplomatic gambit has led South Korean President Moon to
+embrace him as a partner in the shared dream for peace and
+reunification that has given him the pretext of strategic
+coordination with China and a personal relationship with Xi
+Jinping.
+ Kim will also visit Vladimir Putin in Russia later this
+year. Kim's diplomacy has cost him nothing but has short-
+circuited the unanimous U.N. sanction campaign. Although Putin
+and Xi were never reliable partners in pressuring North Korea,
+Kim has shown he can leverage China-Russia relationships
+against U.N.-led sanctions and U.S. maximum sanction strategy,
+and our goal is to hold the administration accountable.
+ The goal of this committee is to facilitate the summit to
+allow this administration to be successful where previous
+administrations came up short.
+ I believe our combined intentions are to hold the
+administration accountable and make sure sanctions are not
+relieved until we get significant assurance and verification
+that the actions of Kim Jong-Un are sincere in bringing
+denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
+ We are privileged to be joined by the two witnesses who
+have personally sat across from North Korean counterparts at
+sensitive talks and I thank them both for being here with us
+today.
+ Today's hearing will be a valuable opportunity for this
+subcommittee and the members to develop an understanding of the
+specifics of this week's summit and what expectations are
+reasonable and what we should realistically expect and how to
+measure success.
+ And I yield back. Thank you.
+ Chairman Sherman. Who seeks to give an opening statement?
+ The gentleman right here. I see the gentleman from
+Virginia.
+ Mr. Connolly. I thank the chair, and I want to welcome our
+panelists and especially my old friend, Governor Bill
+Richardson, who has a distinguished career but maybe the most
+important part of his career was he served as a staffer on the
+Senate Foreign Relations Committee--a great place from which to
+launch a career.
+ You know, Mr. Chairman, all of us, while our president is
+overseas at a summit negotiating with one of the most notorious
+dictators in the world, we wish him well. We want our president
+to succeed.
+ Nothing would be better than to have success in
+denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula once and for all and
+setting the North Korean regime on a peaceful path for
+prosperity and coexistence with its neighbors, especially South
+Korea.
+ However, it is important that we approach negotiations
+clear-eyed, and I worry, as do many Americans, I think, that
+our president arrives in Hanoi in a very weakened position and
+because he does not do preparation, he does not read briefing
+papers, he does not like even briefings verbally, that he
+enters into these negotiations maybe with positive spirit but
+not with great preparation, and what could go wrong with that
+when you are up against Kim Jong-Un?
+ And one trembles a little bit at the answer to that kind of
+rhetorical question. And so I think it is really important that
+we be very clear about what our goals are and that there be no
+fudging and that there be, frankly, no further concessions to
+the North until we see specific reciprocation on the table.
+ And so I hope for success but I think we have to prepare
+for the worst. I yield back.
+ Chairman Sherman. Mr. Bera.
+ Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank both you,
+Governor Richardson and Dr. Cha, for your service to our
+country along with the men and women that we have serving our
+country all around this world as we speak.
+ I was at that same breakfast with the ranking member and we
+had--with Dr. Moon as well as our former Ambassador, Ambassador
+Stephens, who has a long history on the Korean Peninsula.
+ The one takeaway that, you know, I think they left us with
+is, I think, as my colleague, Mr. Connolly--let us go into this
+open eyed, but let us also understand realistic expectations of
+what we might be able to get out of this and I think those
+realistic expectations are maybe that the parameters that allow
+you then to say, OK, here is what the steps are, moving
+forward, as opposed to coming out with any concrete deal, et
+cetera, and I think they both--Dr. Moon and Ambassador
+Stephens--said that would be a realistic successful goal if
+there were the framework and the parameters of how you now
+proceed and, you know, what those next steps are, again, not
+with any promises, et cetera, but the next steps in what a
+dialog would be.
+ I will be very interested in both of your expertise on the
+Peninsula on what you think those parameters would be and what
+a successful outcome of this meeting over the next few weeks.
+ And with that, I will yield back.
+ Chairman Sherman. I recognize the gentlelady from Virginia.
+ Ms. Spanberger. Thank you to the chair. Thank you, Governor
+Richardson. Thank you, Dr. Cha, for being here.
+ The North Korean regime continues to pose a serious
+security threat to the United States, our interests at home and
+abroad, and ahead of the week summit in Hanoi we must also
+recognize how North Korea's belligerent and destabilizing
+behavior endangers our longstanding allies in the region and
+threatens our own country.
+ I am always in favor of pursuing diplomatic negotiated
+solutions. However, Kim Jong-Un has repeatedly demonstrated
+that he cannot be trusted and we should always view his
+intentions with incredible skepticism.
+ As the United States weighs its diplomatic, economic, and
+deterrence options to push back against North Korean aggression
+and promote peace on the Korean Peninsula, we need to pursue a
+smart tough strategy informed by U.S. intelligence that
+protects the lives of U.S. service members in South Korea and
+actually limits North Korea's nuclear capabilities.
+ Additionally, we need to avoid any concessions that could
+jeopardize the safety of our allies and we cannot ignore
+Pyongyang's long record of atrocious crimes committed against
+its own people.
+ As talks proceed, I will keep fighting to prevent American
+communities from living under the potential threat of North
+Korean missiles, nuclear weapons, and cyber aggression, and I
+will continue to voice my support for increased U.S. diplomatic
+engagement and improved coordination with our allies that
+protects U.S. interests and recognizes the true threat that is
+currently posed by the North Korean regime.
+ Thank you. I yield back.
+ Chairman Sherman. Seeing no other requests for time, I will
+introduce our first witness. Since 2010, Governor Richardson
+has operated the Richardson Center for Global Engagement, a
+foundation focusing on conflict resolution, prisoner release,
+and environment protection.
+ In his long and distinguished career, he served as Governor
+of New Mexico, secretary of energy, a U.S. Ambassador to the
+United Nations, and as a member of this House for 15 years,
+overlapping my service in the House by exactly 1 month before
+he went on to serve as our Ambassador to the United Nations.
+ As Gerry points out, Governor Richardson started working in
+the Senate and then came to the House, showing tremendous
+upward trajectory.
+ He has regularly served as an official and unofficial
+interlocutor with North Korea for more than two decades. During
+this time he has visited North Korea eight times, once with Dr.
+Cha, securing the release of four Americans being held hostage
+in North Korea and helping to bring home the bodies of seven
+American service members who died in North Korea.
+ We are honored to have you and very pleased to have you as
+the summit begins to open, Governor Richardson.
+
+ STATEMENT OF MR. RICHARDSON, FORMER GOVERNOR OF NEW MEXICO,
+U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS, SECRETARY OF ENERGY, AND
+ MEMBER OF CONGRESS
+
+ Mr. Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I just want to
+state that some of my best years working were as a member of
+this House, although I was not privileged to serve on this
+committee.
+ It is good to see former friends, good friends--Congressman
+Connolly, Congresswoman Titus, and you, Mr. Chairman. I have
+not had the pleasure to speak to others here.
+ But I will tell you I have been here long enough to say
+that I saw Mr. Levin come in and I was elected to Congress in
+1982 with Mr. Levin's father, which shows you how long I have
+been around.
+ And it is great to be with Victor Cha. There is probably
+nobody in this country that knows the Peninsula better than Dr.
+Cha, and you are right, Mr. Chairman--we went together to North
+Korea and brought back the remains of seven of our service
+members.
+ The first summit between the president and Chairman Kim in
+June 2018 produced a good moment for both leaders. They struck
+a personal relationship, an aspirational joint statement, a
+couple of outcomes such as the repatriation of remains of U.S.
+servicemen, and I think the president does deserve credit for
+taking the meeting with Kim Jong-Un.
+ The region is--the region is less tense. There is more
+diplomacy. There is considerable, I would say, better
+atmospherics in the entire region.
+ However, the last summit failed to produce what I think is
+a workable framework for negotiations and, like other summits,
+there was little or no staff work on substance prior to the
+meeting.
+ As a result, following the summit, the two sides did not
+have a roadmap on how to proceed and what we saw was this
+organized efforts to get to a framework with both sides
+positioning but without any progress.
+ I think Chairman Kim has made it very clear that his
+preferred negotiating partner is President Trump, not Secretary
+of State Pompeo, not the chief negotiator, Stephen Biegun, or
+working level teams.
+ This is why once a second summit was announced,
+negotiations and communications between the two sides were
+revived. By the way, I think that the special envoy for North
+Korea, Stephen Biegun, is a very skilled negotiator who has
+worked with many Members of Congress and I would recommend the
+subcommittee calling him for briefings after the summit.
+ So what we have is a situation where I think these latest
+talks, unfortunately, the whole issues of disarmament--arms
+control, which are key--have yielded a bit to what is called
+peace diplomacy, which is good.
+ But the main focus, I believe, and accomplishments should
+have been the dismantling of nuclear weapons, WMDs, of
+missiles, and my sense is that the summit will fall short in
+that area.
+ We should be clear about what our expectations of what is
+possible, what is not, and what would be the cost of an
+agreement with the North Koreans.
+ Point No. 1--chances that the North Koreans will get rid of
+their existing stockpiles are very slim or nonexistent. They
+believe that these weapons are the reasons we are negotiating
+with them and the only reason we have not yet overpowered them
+militarily.
+ Point No. 2--we can expect and demand the North Koreans
+cease all further development of nuclear weapons, WMDs, and
+ballistic missiles and have clear means for verification of
+dismantling such capability.
+ No. 3--we can expect and demand that North Koreans cease
+any further testing of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles
+and have verification of the dismantling of launch and test
+sites.
+ Point No. 4--we can expect and demand the North Koreans
+cease any proliferation of operations they have on nuclear
+technology, WMDs, and determine the means to verify this.
+ In return--point No. 5--the North Koreans are going to
+demand the removal of sanctions, the end of the war, the
+normalization of relations, and the reduction of military
+presence on the Peninsula.
+ So an agreement with these guidelines I believe might be
+possible, should be gradual, but broken into smaller reciprocal
+steps. Thus, a successful second summit between the two leaders
+should produce what the first summit failed to do:
+ One, a detailed framework for negotiations including time
+lines, terms of reference, and routine schedule of summits.
+ No. 2, set times for ongoing negotiations, both working
+level, high level, and perhaps additional Presidential summits.
+ Considering Chairman Kim's preference to negotiate directly
+with the president, Presidential summits should not be ruled
+out as long as good preparatory work is done and I am not sure,
+because of the president's diplomatic style, that we are
+heading into this summit with the best preparations.
+ Last, terms of reference for negotiations, general guiding
+principles for final agreement, definitions, and constraints,
+as well as time lines and benchmarks for the negotiation
+process.
+ No. 2--and this is very important--an agreed pathway to
+recover and repatriate remains of U.S. servicemen. As the
+chairman pointed out, we got some but there are many, many
+more, and since this is a mutual interest of both sides, it is
+an easy and very powerful outcome for the summit.
+ Many of you, I am sure, have relatives or have constituents
+that are affected directly with the remains of our soldiers and
+very compelling families that have come together to organize
+and ask that the U.S. administration, over the years, try to
+bring back the remains of several thousand of our men and women
+that have been in North Korea.
+ No. 3, a mechanism and safeguards to mitigate risk of
+conflict if a crisis in negotiation occurs. This can happen by
+establishing a hotline between the leaders or mitigating
+contact group to include regional stakeholders.
+ But there are other gestures the United States can offer
+that are short of policy concessions, which can be highly
+symbolic and motivating for the North Koreans, recommitment to
+the aspirational joint statement of the June summit.
+ The summit would be a failure, in my judgment, if the
+following is not produced:
+ One, failure to produce a practical and detailed framework
+for negotiations, failure to define benchmarks in terms of
+reference--without such framework, negotiations are going to
+fizzle once again until the next summit is announced;
+ No. 2, failure to establish a roadmap for recovery and
+repatriation of remains; and three, ambiguity and no record of
+agreements and understandings reached between the two leaders
+during their one-on-one meeting.
+ So finally, Mr. Chairman, here is my concern. I stated the
+first one, that the disarmament talks yield and not produce
+concrete denuclearization agreements.
+ The danger I see with North Korea is they do not want to
+denuclearize. We have different definition of denuclearization.
+My worry, too, is that somehow we will not get in this summit
+an inventory of all the nuclear weapons, fissile material that
+North Korea has.
+ They are very concerned--the North Koreans, having talked
+to them for years--that if they disclose where these sites are
+that we are going to bomb the sites, quite frankly, and they do
+not want to disclose. But that is essential for any kind of
+verification or arms control agreement.
+ So my concern is that on the issue of arms control and
+disarmament there is going to be a very low bar for success
+such as destroying the nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, which I
+have been to that reactor. I think that has been promised
+several times. I am not sure how operational it is, and Dr. Cha
+probably has better information than I do.
+ Also, there have been some sites that have been allegedly
+missile sites terminated. I am not sure if even verifying those
+sites or that one or two sites that that is significant
+disarmament initiative on the part of North Korea.
+ Another concern I have is that the negotiating partners in
+the past that we have had--Victor, myself--have been the
+foreign ministry and, generally, the foreign ministry of the
+North Korean Republic--the DPRK--they are pragmatic.
+ You can deal with them, on prisoners, on human rights,
+issues relating to remains, especially the Korean People Army--
+the military--which, in my judgment, is quite flexible.
+ Our negotiating partners are the intelligence people now,
+the spy chief, and I am not sure that diplomacy wise they are
+necessarily the most flexible. That concerns me, too.
+ So at the very end, in conclusion, here is my worry--that
+yes, some positive statements come out of the summit, some
+positive initiatives such as perhaps some joint searches for
+remains of our soldiers to sites that are being looked at for
+joint excavation of remains.
+ Two, a liaison office. All right. That is good. That is
+good that we talk. That is good that we have operations in
+North Korea. But the North Koreans may not agree to it because
+they think that that is a way that we spy on them.
+ Three, human rights issues relating to North and South,
+investments, economic development, development of joint
+economic facility between North and South, family reunification
+for North and South. That is good.
+ But my concern is that the true goal of denuclearization,
+which is the issue of dismantling weapons of mass destruction--
+missiles, nuclear detonations, nuclear--will not happen. Maybe
+a freeze. All right. That is better than nothing.
+ But those are my concerns, Mr. Chairman. I want the
+president to succeed. You know, this is probably our most
+dominant national security threat that we have.
+ But I do not think the threat is diminished.
+ [The prepared statement of Mr. Richardson follows:]
+
+
+[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
+
+ Chairman Sherman. Thank you, Governor. I think we all want
+the president to succeed.
+ Dr. Victor Cha is a senior advisor and Korea chair at the
+Center for Strategic and International Studies here in
+Washington, DC. He is also a professor in government and
+international affairs at Georgetown University.
+ Between 2004 and 2007 he served as director for Asian
+affairs at the National Security Council at the White House. He
+was responsible primarily for our relations with Japan, the
+Korean Peninsula, and the Pacific nations.
+ Dr. Cha was also the deputy head of the delegation for the
+United States at the Six-Party Talks in Beijing.
+ Dr. Cha.
+
+ STATEMENT OF MR. CHA, PH.D., SENIOR ADVISER AND KOREA CHAIR,
+ CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
+
+ Mr. Cha. Thank you, Chairman Sherman, Ranking Member Yoho,
+members of the committee. It is a pleasure to be here with you
+today as well as with Governor Richardson.
+ The last time I saw you I think we were in Pyongyang
+together a little while--a few years back. But it is really
+good to be here with the Governor.
+ Let me first say that I think President Trump deserves
+credit for a couple of things. The first is that he stepped
+away from the fire and fury posture of 2017.
+ Second is that he has invested in summit diplomacy based on
+the theory that there is only--the reality that there is only
+one person in North Korea that makes the decision. That is the
+leader of North Korea. So you have to talk to them.
+ Three, he is really invested a lot of capital into try to
+building a personal relationship with the North Korean leader.
+And so I think, as everybody said here, we want him to succeed
+this week.
+ But what I want to do is focus my comments on five numbers
+that I think we need to take into consideration with regard to
+what is going to happen this week, because there are a lot of
+opinions here and around town on North Korea and not a lot of
+data. So I am going to bring some data points to the
+discussion.
+ The first is 1963, and 1963 is important because it is when
+North Korea started landscaping the ground for where they would
+build the Yongbyon nuclear complex. So this was not a program
+that started after the end of the cold war when they lost the
+support of the Soviet Union and China.
+ They had been building this program for well over half a
+century. So I think as many of us clearly believe, I do not
+think they are fully going to denuclearize.
+ The second number is 20. That refers to the number of
+undisclosed missile bases in North Korea--short-range, medium-
+range, and intermediate range ballistic missile bases.
+ North Korea can close facilities without denuclearizing.
+They can close facilities that they no longer need, things from
+their past, and they can promise things about their future--the
+promise not to transfer, the transfer not to do more testing.
+ But what they will hold in their hands is the present and
+that are things like--those are things like these 20 missile
+bases, the nuclear weapons stockpile, things of these--things
+of this nature. That is a negotiating challenge.
+ The third number is 108, and this is the number of times
+that the president has made reference to his--made reference to
+the question of whether we need to have U.S. forces in Korea.
+ One of the key metrics for me of the success of this
+meeting will not be so much what North Korea gives, because I
+think that they will give very little, but that we do not cut
+into our alliance equities and offer those as negotiating chips
+to North Korea--things like our exercises and our readiness,
+our troop disposition on the Peninsula. These are not things
+that should be traded for temporary gains on North Korea.
+ The fourth number is 2007. 2007 refers to the last
+agreement that we were a part of where North Korea agreed to a
+peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and the stipulation then
+was that at an appropriate time North Korea and the United
+States and other parties would engage in peace regime talks.
+ The phrase ``at an appropriate time'' referred to North
+Korean denuclearization, return to the nonproliferation treaty,
+and full scope compliance with IAEA safeguards. So the idea of
+a peace regime was contingent on these steps forward.
+ What we are doing now is we are potentially front loading
+the peace regime part to see if we can get steps toward
+denuclearization and compliance with IAEA NPT safeguards.
+ And, finally, fifth--the fifth number is two, and that
+refers to 2 years have gone by and the administration has still
+not appointed a senior envoy for human rights abuses in North
+Korea. The human rights issue is often framed as a distraction
+to the negotiations but it is not. For all of us to achieve our
+objectives, the human rights issue needs to be addressed.
+ President Trump has made very clear that the core element
+of his negotiation is to offer North Korea a brighter economic
+future in return for giving up their weapons.
+ That brighter economic future cannot come without some
+addressing of the human rights abuses because there is no
+international financial institution, there is no general
+counsel of any American corporation that is going to recommend
+putting money into North Korea if there are human rights abuses
+along the supply chain.
+ So it is in the interests of both the United States, South
+Korea, and North Korea to bring human rights into the
+discussion.
+ Thank you very much.
+ [The prepared statement of Mr. Cha follows:]
+
+
+[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
+
+ Chairman Sherman. I am going to hold off on my questions
+for a bit and recognize the gentlelady from Nevada.
+ Ms. Titus. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
+thank you and the ranking member for bringing us such
+outstanding witnesses. They are so knowledgeable and I so much
+appreciate their being with us today.
+ Both of you have mentioned how the president likes to
+negotiate directly with the chairman and he seems to prefer
+this mano a mano kind of diplomacy as opposed to anything
+multilateral.
+ Some of us believe, however, you have to include your
+allies as you move forward in any kind of negotiation and I
+believe part of our success working with North Korea we will be
+able to work in collaboration with both Japan and South Korea.
+ Would you two please address what you think are the
+consequences of our not bringing them into the circle or how is
+our leadership in terms of getting them to work together with
+us on this, even though their interests may not always align
+and their interests may not always align with ours?
+ Mr. Richardson. In my judgment, Congresswoman, we need to
+work with Japan better than we have. My sense is Japan has been
+left out of the negotiations with North Korea. You know, there
+is a rivalry with South Korea, who has been deeply engaged with
+us.
+ So Japan is vulnerable to a missile attack and this is a
+horrific prospect that the Japanese people are concerned about.
+They also are concerned about getting some of their human
+rights issues addressed by North Korea.
+ South Korea--I think President Moon has been very
+constructive. He was elected as a peace candidate dialog with
+North Korea. But sometimes I feel that he is getting ahead of
+us on wanting an agreement with North Korea at all costs, in my
+judgment.
+ They are great allies, and Dr. Cha mentioned I think it was
+a mistake initially at the first summit for the United States
+to make a concession, which is to reduce or terminate the
+number of military exercises we had with South Korea.
+ So the last peg here is China. I do believe China has made
+a positive effort at sanctions. You know, most of the commerce
+that goes through North Korea is through China and China, I
+believe, through the United Nations and other entities, there
+are coal sanctions, energy sanctions, people sanctions against
+North Korea. But they are not going to operate well unless they
+are enforced.
+ I think China has done a better job in the past of
+enforcing sanctions. But there is a lot of cross-border
+contraband that they could do a better job of enforcing.
+ And, quite frankly, I have been a little worried. I know we
+have some tense trade negotiations with China that somehow
+China has to say, well, you know, you want to slap some tariffs
+on us--maybe we will not help you as much on sanctions with
+North Korea, which is vital.
+ Russia has not observed sanctions as much as they should--
+in fact, very little. That is another problem.
+ So you are right, Congresswoman. You got to have regional
+support for what you are doing. I am pleased that they are
+having this summit in Vietnam.
+ I think Vietnam is an emerging positive country that is
+pro-private sector, that, you know, is concerned about Chinese
+expansionism and I am pleased that they are part of this
+regional situation.
+ But the Six-Party Talks, which Victor was involved with--
+the other countries, which encircle the whole issue--I am not
+sure the Six-Party Talks can be revived again. I hope they
+would. But this is how I see the regional perspective that you
+mentioned.
+ Ms. Titus. Doctor?
+ Mr. Cha. Yes. So on China, the key is to get China to
+continue to enforce sanctions. Without Chinese economic
+pressure, the North Koreans are not going to be willing to
+negotiate in earnest.
+ Ninety percent of North Korea's external trade today is
+with China. So if they do not put pressure on it does not work.
+ With South Korea, it is really restraining them. They are
+so enthusiastic about moving forward that they too can do
+things that would undercut U.S. leverage at the table. And then
+with regard to Japan, as Governor Richardson said, they are--
+they are going to be important to any political and diplomatic
+deal that is reached with North Korea.
+ Historically, they have been important in the past two
+deals and they will be important again. So it is important that
+we--it is critical that as we go into Hanoi that we have all of
+these pieces in the right place, and that takes work. That is--
+there is bilateral discussions with the North Koreans but there
+is also all this work you have to do on the side.
+ Ms. Titus. Do you feel like that is taking place?
+ Mr. Cha. I think with the South Koreans I have a sense that
+it is. But it is difficult with the Chinese because of the
+trade disputes, and Korea and Japan, our two key allies, are
+just not talking to each other right now.
+ And so it was important that Secretary Pompeo, in his last
+meeting with the South Korean foreign minister, expressly
+talked about the need for more trilateral coordination because
+usually we go into these meetings with North Korea having fully
+consulted with Seoul and with Tokyo. And right now, because of
+the difficulties between Seoul and Tokyo we are not able to do
+that.
+ Ms. Titus. Thank you.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Sherman. The ranking member is recognized.
+ Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
+testimony.
+ Again, I am going to just reiterate the historic nature of
+this. You know, in the past there has been three attempts--in
+the Clinton Administration, in the Bush, and the Obama
+Administration--to bring peace to the Korean Peninsula.
+ Yet, during those negotiations they were traditional. They
+had traditional negotiators, people from the State Department,
+diplomacy and all of that, and they did not work.
+ And so I think this is a great tactic. History will look
+back on this moment, whether it was a good one or a bad one,
+and let us hope for the--that it turns out the way we want it
+to.
+ But and you brought this up, Governor Richardson. An
+agreement should be gradual and broken into small reciprocal
+steps, and you both have experience in the Asian market.
+ In order to do business, what we have heard, what is the
+first thing you have to establish to move forward in any
+negotiations over there?
+ Dr. Cha.
+ Mr. Cha. I mean, you have to establish a relationship. You
+have to establish a relationship with the other party. You just
+do not slap a legal document on the table. You have to
+establish a relationship.
+ Mr. Yoho. That is what Americans are bad at. We have been
+told over and over again--you guys want to get here, get the
+bottom line, and you do not want to know anything about us.
+ And so I commend, I will say, the foresight of President
+Trump reaching out to do this, and he has lavished praise and
+edification on Kim Jong-Un that he has probably never had, and
+I will hold off on whether he should deserve any of that at
+this point.
+ But we need to look into the future of where we are going
+and we cannot move forward if we do not have that initial trust
+and that relationship. And then I had the opportunity to talk
+to Special Envoy Biegun about what denuclearization is.
+ Do we have a firm commitment of what it is that all parties
+agree on? Do you guys have any speculation or any idea? Do we
+have a sound definition?
+ Mr. Cha. I think that there is a definition, Congressman,
+you know, that has been agreed to by the North Koreans in the
+past in writing and that is denuclearization means they will
+give up all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs. That
+is language that they signed up to in 2007.
+ I believe that--I believe that that is what the president
+believes and that is the definition I think we will try to push
+for in Hanoi.
+ Mr. Richardson. I believe that the North Koreans--we have a
+different perspective of what denuclearization is. I think that
+is the problem. In other words, we think, Congressman, that
+denuclearization is dismantling, destroying, ending whatever--
+the 40 nuclear weapons, the WMD.
+ The North Koreans do not believe in that definition. They
+want to keep their weapons. They want to keep some of their
+weapons.
+ Now, so far, they have dismantled nothing. So there is a
+definition--what is the word I am looking for--a definition
+deficit here----
+ Mr. Yoho. Yes.
+ Mr. Richardson [continuing]. On what denuclearization is.
+Now, I do agree, you have to have trust--I think maybe that was
+the word you were looking for--in the relationship between the
+two leaders and I will maybe take a little issue with what you
+said.
+ Under the Clinton Administration, the agreed framework,
+North Korea did not produce any weapons for 9 years and I think
+the Bush Administration negotiated well with North Korea. The
+problem was North Korea was intent on increasing their arsenal
+and they are still doing it right now while saying they are for
+denuclearization.
+ Mr. Yoho. Right. And I just--let me just add here, I am not
+putting criticism on anybody----
+ Mr. Richardson. Right. OK.
+ Mr. Yoho [continuing]. You know, because that is not going
+to do us any good. It is what can we learn from that that we
+can move forward. And, again, that breakfast I had this morning
+with Dr. Chung-in Moon, he has been there at all three
+negotiations--probably the only person that was there on the
+first three and he has been to every meeting up there with
+President Moon.
+ He says he has seen a distinct difference in North Korea
+today from when it was before. Before when they went there it
+was all military that was present in the negotiations, in the
+streets, in the Pyongyang whereas today you do not see hardly
+any military presence.
+ So the atmosphere in North Korea has changed. Let us just
+hope that we can have a definition that we all agree on that we
+can move forward based on that trust, and what he said that Kim
+Jong-Un has said that we have destroyed Yongbyon nuclear site.
+ But it was a nonfunctional one, as we understood it. But,
+yet, he has not sent anybody in there to verify it from the
+outside world other than their word and those things have got
+to be built upon to move forward.
+ And let us just hope that the skilled people we have, with
+Secretary Pompeo and Stephen Biegun, can move in that direction
+to help facilitate those documents to move forward and that
+once and for all we bring this Korean conflict to an end, peace
+to the Peninsula with reunification as they see fit to serve
+them between North and South, and that we look at trade because
+our top four trading--after World War II we were in a war with
+Germany, France.
+ Since then it was Korea and Vietnam. None of those
+countries today have nuclear weapons and are--some of them are
+our best trading partners.
+ So the idea that we want to implore to Mr. Kim is you do
+not need nuclear weapons. Let us just focus on trade and get
+rid of this and move forward on our economies and our
+countries.
+ I yield back. Thank you.
+ Chairman Sherman. Thank you.
+ The gentleman from Virginia.
+ Mr. Connolly. I thank the chair. Well, maybe on a more
+critical note--I think a case could be made for diplomatic
+malpractice in how we are approaching North Korea. Remember
+that this is the administration that ripped up the JCPOA with
+Iran, that by all accounts is working in every metric, because
+it was inadequate.
+ And yet, they meet with the nuclear threat, Kim Jong-Un and
+North Korea, and he gets international legitimacy from meeting
+with the president of the United States, that audience with the
+president directly, the cancellation of military exercises with
+our South Korean allies, and in the joint statement they do not
+even mention that denuclearization needs to be irreversible and
+verifiable, which is one of our goals.
+ Not even mentioned in the joint statement. Nor is there any
+mention of the North's ballistic missile program--a criticism
+used to justify the evisceration of the JCPOA.
+ Why should we not look at that and call that what it is,
+diplomatic malpractice? We have nothing, and Kim Jong-Un has a
+lot.
+ Now, maybe that is a strategic sort of move where we are
+being patient and waiting for the future and this summit may
+then prove that there are other steps. But it seems to me that
+thus far nothing has happened and we have not even furthered
+the goals ostensibly we say we are committed to.
+ Dr. Cha.
+ Mr. Cha. Thank you, Congressman.
+ So I am a professor so I will give you another number, and
+that is seven. That is the number of pages that the agreement
+that we worked on in 2007 was. It was seven pages long--the
+Six-Party joint statement.
+ The JCPOA, I think, was 150 pages. I do believe that if we
+are going to move forward with denuclearization with North
+Korea, we are going to need a document that is much more
+detailed, certainly, than what came out of Singapore and even
+what came out of the previous two agreements under President
+Bush and under President Clinton.
+ Mr. Connolly. Well, let me just--a little footnote. Yes,
+but from your point of view after the first summit, did Kim
+Jong-Un commit to anything?
+ Mr. Cha. No. I think the first summit laid out a statement
+of principles. In many ways, it was an agreement between the
+leaders about what the outcome of diplomacy should be, which is
+normalized relations, a peace treaty, and a fully denuclearized
+North Korea.
+ But subsequent to that, there were really no steps that
+took us tangibly down any of those paths.
+ Mr. Connolly. Governor Richardson.
+ Mr. Richardson. With what Dr. Cha--what you said, on the
+diplomacy side, I have been very involved with the remains
+issue. I think something positive has come out of that. We need
+to do a lot more.
+ I do think there are some human rights family
+reunifications between North and South that are better.
+ Third, you know, this is very vague but there is less
+tension in the Peninsula. However, Congressman, I agree with
+you in terms of what North Korea committed to in the first
+summit--complete denuclearization.
+ They have done nothing there. In fact, they increased their
+enriched uranium capability. You know, they are not doing much.
+ Mr. Connolly. That is right.
+ Mr. Richardson. This is why I just hope the president, and
+Congressman Yoho mentioned Stephen Biegun and Pompeo--
+especially Biegun. He knows what he is doing.
+ Mr. Connolly. Mr.--Governor Richardson, because I am going
+to run out of time but I thank you for that answer.
+ Let me ask one other question. One of the concerns some
+people have is that North Korea is about to get us into a trap
+so that we sign an agreement ending the war, after 66 years.
+ But in doing that, which is a laudable goal, we undermine
+the rationale for U.S. troop trip wire presence in South Korea.
+Is that a realistic concern, Dr. Cha, and also Governor
+Richardson?
+ And I yield back the balance of my time.
+ Mr. Cha. Yes. I mean, I think there is some concern among
+experts that in trying to get bigger steps on denuclearization
+we might put bigger chips on the table.
+ As I said in my testimony, I think there should be a bright
+red line between things that we do on sanctions versus things
+that we do with our alliances. Sanctions, liaison offices, some
+of the things that Governor Richardson mentioned--they may be
+part of the bargain. But we should not be trading away alliance
+equities.
+ Mr. Connolly. If the chair would allow Governor Richardson
+also to answer, I thank the chair.
+ Mr. Richardson. Yes. Congressman, I agree. I would not
+trade an end to the war treaty or unless there is a
+denuclearization of sizable numbers of dismantling of weapons
+and WMD and missiles. I would not.
+ Perhaps a vaguer statement that says tensions are less and
+the war is over, OK. Maybe. But not as a tradeoff unless there
+is substantial denuclearization.
+ And I am concerned. There have been some reports that we
+are considering that. And it means exactly what you said--the
+vulnerability of us being or having to look at troop reductions
+in South Korea. We have 30,000 troops there--28,000.
+ Chairman Sherman. I will recognize Mr. Bera after I
+recognize the gentleman from Utah.
+ Mr. Curtis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member.
+This is an important hearing. Thank you to our witnesses for
+being here.
+ I am hopeful that we see a productive summit. I, for one,
+view it as historic and important to be taking these steps.
+However, we know that the Kim regime does not negotiate in good
+faith and I think many of us are optimistic but worrisome.
+ Regardless of the outcome of the summit, I for one will
+continue to urge the administration to use every possible
+economic and diplomatic solution to find answers and bring us
+forward.
+ As I listened to your testimoneys and questions of my
+colleagues, I sometimes feel like we have a cultural thing here
+in America where we want to solve everything immediately and we
+hope that one summit or two summits has this magic ability to
+solve it.
+ So I am curious, from both of your perspectives, not
+whether we are on the cusp of solving this but how do you see
+the trajectory? Are we improving and moving in a good
+trajectory? I guess that is my simple question.
+ Governor first, and then Dr. Cha.
+ Mr. Richardson. Well, the trajectory is going to depend a
+lot on the results of this summit--this upcoming summit
+starting today or tomorrow. My hope, Congressman, is that there
+be substantial progress on the denuclearization issue.
+ You talked about long range. I think it was unrealistic for
+anyone to expect North Korea to denuclearize completely. They
+always have--and if you look at that language, they have said
+it in the agreement with Clinton, with Bush, and they never do
+it.
+ Now, is there a trajectory that is more positive? I think
+we have underestimated Kim Jong-Un. I think in the end--and I
+am not--I am not praising him. I am saying he is--his vision is
+an exchange for the lesser--some dismantling of nuclear
+weapons.
+ He wants American investment. He wants European investment.
+He wants infrastructure. He wants energy, a new grid, and so
+the trajectory is in that direction. His father, I think, was
+more of a--I will not call him--he was more of a negotiator.
+ He used to say, OK, well, you want this prisoner back from
+the United States--send President Clinton to pick him. You
+know, things like that.
+ Mr. Curtis. Right. And I hate to push you but I am going to
+be short on time so let me--let me move on.
+ Mr. Cha. So I think if we look, starting, Congressman, from
+2017, in 2017 there were 20 North Korean ballistic missile
+tests and a hydrogen bomb test and we were moving military
+assets to the region.
+ I mean, it was a really scary time. I mean, since then we
+have gotten no diplomacy. We have gotten no more testing by the
+North Koreans.
+ I just came back from South Korea about 10 days ago and
+there is a completely different view now in South Korea.
+Everybody says, the war is over--like, why do not we just admit
+the war is over.
+ So I think there has been certainly a positive trajectory
+since 2017. But, as the Governor said, the key piece is we
+really need to see tangible steps on denuclearization coming
+out of the summit because this has to be a road to somewhere,
+right, and so that is the key piece.
+ Mr. Curtis. Let me kind of followup on that. We almost
+exclusively talked about denuclearization and yet we have said
+in this hearing today that Japan could be hit by long-range
+ballistic missiles.
+ Is it a mistake not to have a broader scope than just
+denuclearization?
+ Mr. Cha. No. I agree that it must include ballistic
+missiles, not just the long-range but also the shorter and
+medium range ones.
+ Mr. Curtis. As well. What is there culturally that
+Americans need to understand that would help us better
+understand this process. The two cultures, right, are very,
+very different.
+ I mentioned earlier ours is one of immediate expectations
+and things like that. What is there culturally that Americans
+could better understand that would help us get our arms around
+this process?
+ Mr. Richardson. From my experience--from my experience,
+they negotiate totally differently than we do. Their idea of a
+concession is they think they are always right.
+ It is a deity that guides them--the father or the
+grandfather of Kim Jong-Un--and their idea of a concession is
+they will give you a little more time for you to get to their
+point of view.
+ That is their idea of a concession. They always want you to
+go first. You make the concession and then we will--you know,
+we will see about whether we reciprocate or not. They are
+deeply suspicious of us, totally.
+ I mean, they think if we--if they disclose where their
+weaponsites are we are going to bomb them. I mean, there is
+just--I have been there several times. It is just another--
+another world.
+ Mr. Curtis. OK. I am out of time. Let me thank both of you
+and yield my time back.
+ Chairman Sherman. I know I had said it would be the
+gentleman from California. However, the gentlelady from
+Pennsylvania has returned. She is vice chair of this
+subcommittee and she is recognized.
+ Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. I appreciate that, and thank you,
+gentlemen, for your testimony.
+ The history of negotiations between the U.S. and North
+Korea is, obviously, long and tumultuous. But one thing is
+clear and I think a lot of people have been talking about it--
+the importance of all of our allies and our partners in the
+region and making sure that we are respectful to them.
+ What is your assessment of how the administration is or is
+not implementing ARIA, or the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act,
+which we recently signed in December?
+ And, specifically, can you talk a little bit about the
+U.S.-Korea special measures agreement that was recently also
+agreed to and the impact that it might have on our bilateral
+relationships since it is a short timeframe instead of a longer
+timeframe?
+ And then, finally, if you could talk about that impact on
+Japan, who is also up for that same kind of conversation as
+well and its impact on our relationship with that important
+ally.
+ Mr. Cha. So, Congresswoman, I would say that the special
+measures, or SMA negotiations, have created a lot of ripple
+effects I think not just in Korea but in Asia and allies, more
+broadly.
+ I mean, it is clearly a different template for negotiating,
+at least in the Korean case, the nonpersonnel cost of
+stationing U.S. forces in Korea.
+ You know, someone said the president wants cost plus, which
+is very different from what has been negotiated in the past. A
+very tumultuous 12 months of negotiation led to this interim
+agreement. It is not followed as much here in the United States
+but it is followed very carefully in the region.
+ And the SMA Korea negotiations were watched by Japan. They
+were watched by NATO because they are next on the block. These
+are not easy negotiations even in the best of times. But I
+think these particular negotiations are quite contentious and
+it is not clear to me what the ultimate effect will be in terms
+of how the allies perceive the United States as we continue to
+as for more and more of these allies.
+ Mr. Richardson. Congresswoman, sometimes I feel that the
+U.S.-South Korea relationship is very important. But, if
+anything, I would say to this administration, for instance,
+they are obsessed with having South Korea pay more for the
+military relationship that we have.
+ We do want to save money, but the U.S. military
+relationship with South Korea is in our interest, too, and
+sometimes, I will say, the president says, well, they should
+pay more. All right, and South Korea is paying a little more.
+ But that is a very valuable military relationship for us,
+not just because of--not just because of North Korea but
+because of China and the region.
+ Second, with Japan, we should be more conscious of Japan's
+needs in this security relationship with North Korea. Yes, the
+president and the prime minister of Japan have a very good
+personal relationship.
+ But somehow the Japanese government--you can get a briefing
+on this--feels that they have been left out of this
+negotiation.
+ Ms. Houlahan. Yes.
+ Mr. Richardson. China--again, it is a very complicated
+relationship we have with China and we absolutely need them to
+keep enforcing sanctions or the pressure on North Korea will
+deteriorate.
+ Now, there are some very good, as I mentioned, family
+relationship, more investments between North and South. I think
+all of that is good--less tension.
+ Ms. Houlahan. Thank you.
+ And my last question is, as a member of the Armed Services
+Committee as well as this one, I am very concerned about the
+suspension of exercises in other committee hearings that I have
+had.
+ The military folks have been also similarly concerned about
+how long we can do this and still remain ready and effective.
+Do you all have any insight into that as well?
+ Mr. Cha. So my understanding is that when we go for a full
+year without exercising then we are really starting to erode
+readiness. There are elements, as you know well, of these
+exercises that we can do in other places like Cobra Gold. But
+there are certain elements of the exercise that can only be
+done on the Peninsula.
+ So this is something really that has to be considered, you
+know, if we are looking to suspend the spring exercises, which
+were to start actually this month. If we suspend those again, I
+think we really need to think about how we are going to
+maintain readiness because readiness is part of deterrence and
+that is what has made the Peninsula peaceful since 1953.
+ Ms. Houlahan. Thank you.
+ And sir?
+ Mr. Richardson. I would just add, this was a concession in
+the first summit that we got nothing in return. So we should
+not concede that one again. Maybe you bring them back, those
+exercises, if North Korea is not conscious of doing something
+on denuclearization.
+ They are valuable for South Korea, for the United States,
+for our troops. You know, you want them ready in case there is
+a misfire or some kind of small conflict that could light up
+the whole region.
+ Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. That is incredibly helpful,
+gentlemen. Thank you very much for your time. I yield back.
+ Chairman Sherman. The gentleman from Utah is recognized.
+ Oh, excuse me. No. The gentleman from Pennsylvania is
+recognized.
+ Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen,
+for your testimony.
+ Dr. Cha, what was the United States posture vis-a-vis North
+Korea prior to this administration from a hostility/wartime
+footing? I mean, I am trying to--I am not trying to evoke--I am
+not trying to put words in your mouth but what would you--how
+would you characterize our posture vis-a-vis North Korea?
+ Mr. Cha. Prior to the state of this Administration it was,
+I think, popularly known as strategic patience, which was sort
+of a medium level sanctions plan with the effort of trying to
+bring North Korea to the table to negotiate.
+ Mr. Perry. And what was North Korea doing under that
+posture?
+ Mr. Cha. They were actively building their nuclear weapons
+programs and ballistic missile programs and were on the verge
+of testing at the end of--at the end of 2016 and I believe that
+those tests would have happened in 2017 no matter who was
+president.
+ Mr. Perry. Right. So they were building, progressing,
+testing, and from the--from the United States standpoint, I
+think that we were at a posture of considering armed conflict
+with North Korea.
+ But if I am the only one here that thinks that--I mean, do
+you get that sense that that is where we were?
+ Mr. Cha. My sense is that the previous administration was
+really focused on sanctioning toward the last--sort of last 12
+months in office, were really focused on ramping up the
+sanctions campaign, which then the Trump administration took to
+an even higher degree.
+ Mr. Perry. I agree with that. But having--I participated
+personally in the military exercises on the Peninsula as a
+service member and I was in this house at the time of the last
+administration and the conclusion of it and I attended
+briefings with uniformed service members who, I would just tell
+you, in my opinion, the posture of the United States military
+was planning for armed conflict if necessary in North Korea.
+And I just want to ask if you dispute that--if you can dispute
+that. Maybe that is the best way of putting it.
+ Mr. Cha. I do not know, Congressman. I mean, I think what
+I--what I recognized the most was this effort at building
+sanctions on the regime and focusing on more robust exercises.
+ Mr. Perry. Sure. Sure. But the sanctions were not working,
+right? They were still constructing, they were testing, and
+they were posturing--the rhetoric, everything, was, in my
+opinion--maybe I am wrong so if I am wrong correct me.
+ But everything we were seeing from North Korea was
+bellicose.
+ Mr. Cha. Yes.
+ Mr. Perry. Yes. Right? So let me ask you this. Is the fact
+that they are not launching missiles out into the ocean and
+over Japan and continue with nuclear tests for the last--
+essentially, the greater part of the last 2 years, is that--can
+that be viewed as a concession or not?
+ Mr. Cha. It is certainly an important nonevent. Yes.
+Fifteen months of no testing of any sort is good for the
+diplomatic climate and also makes it harder for them to develop
+their programs.
+ Mr. Perry. Right. Right. So, look, I am not pie in the sky
+here and I am not looking, like, through rose-colored glasses.
+North Korea is a hostile actor and an enemy of the United
+States of America and Western civilization and democracies all
+around the world. That is a given, right?
+ But I think we are at a--you know, I think it is hard to
+say objectively that we are not, at this very point, in a
+better place from a rhetorical and a wartime footing vis-a-vis
+North Korea than we were at the end of the last administration.
+ I think it is--and there has been a price to pay for that.
+Let us just--let us just admit there has been a price to pay
+for that.
+ But I think that Americans right now are sleeping a little
+better not wondering if tomorrow their sons and daughters are
+going to be called up to go to war on the Korean Peninsula with
+potential horrific artillery barrage on Seoul or nuclear
+weapons being exchanged across the lines. I mean, is that
+reasonably safe to say?
+ Mr. Cha. Yes. I mean, I think the--this administration's
+decision to engage in the summit diplomacy with North Korea has
+certainly played a role in their not testing----
+ Mr. Perry. Right.
+ Mr. Cha [continuing]. And that has made the situation a lot
+calmer.
+ Mr. Perry. So, because the tenor of the meeting seems to be
+that the president has failed. It is more dangerous. We are
+giving everything away. We are getting nothing for it.
+ Look, I do not like dealing with dictators at all. But I
+understand they live in the world today and if we are going
+to--and if we are going to, you know, try and fix things we are
+going to have a discussion with them and I do not remember
+anybody on this committee on the other side of the aisle being
+too upset when the last administration negotiated with Cuba and
+opened up relations with them.
+ One last question, though, for you, sir. With Asian
+diplomacy particular and specifically vis-a-vis other places in
+the world, is not the personal relationship key to success in
+that as opposed to the tenets of an agreement or the--or the
+facts of the matter.
+ I mean, the relationship is what folks from that part of
+the world see as key and building a trusting relationship to
+moving forward. Is that true or not true, generally speaking?
+ Mr. Cha. Yes. I mean, I think if we want a watershed
+agreement with North Korea there needs--you need to establish
+trust with the only person who makes a decision.
+ Mr. Perry. And how many meetings has this president has
+with that--with President Kim?
+ Mr. Cha. This is now his second meeting.
+ Mr. Perry. This is now--so we have--we have one meeting. We
+have had one meeting and we are predicating all the rhetoric
+here in this committee on one meeting the start. Not the end of
+negotiations, like in the JCPOA, but the beginning.
+ With that, Mr. Chairman, I would yield.
+ Chairman Sherman. I recognize the gentleman from
+California.
+ Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ I am going to take a little bit of different perspective
+than my colleague from Pennsylvania. I do not view foreign
+policy and our strategic aims through a lens of partisanship or
+one administration or another administration and I would say,
+you know, I had my issues with the prior administration--
+President Obama and strategic patience, which I did think
+eroded some of our strength in that region. You know, I would
+point to the South China Sea and the complexity of not
+addressing that a bit more aggressively.
+ I would also argue that, you know, having been on the same
+committee, having gone through those same briefings, I do not
+think the prior administration was putting us on a war footing.
+ I do think our troops on the Peninsula constantly are
+training, constantly are prepared. For those of us that have
+gone to the DMZ and talked to those troops, they are constantly
+ready for anything to happen.
+ I do think 2 years ago this time and even a year and a half
+ago the tensions on the Peninsula, the potential of kinetic
+conflict, the potential of war was much higher.
+ I will credit the Trump administration for being willing to
+negotiate and, you know, maybe there was a strategic goal there
+of increasing those tensions, increasing the possibility of
+war, increasing the sanctions, to bring them to the table.
+ So, I am going to give credit to the Trump administration
+just starting a dialog. I have very real concerns that the
+outcome of the first summit was, you know, a halting of our
+troop preparation, our exercises in the region.
+ I think we have to continue to maintain a strong posture
+there. I am very concerned, and both of you referenced it. We
+hear the rumblings of troop reductions, troop withdrawals. You
+know, regardless, even if we had a safe peninsula that was
+moving forward with denuclearization, the presence of our
+troops on the Peninsula served broader strategic importance--
+served strategic importance of stabilizing that region.
+ We have an adversary in China. It serves a strategic
+importance in being a check on China's aggressiveness in the
+region and I would caution the administration. I would point
+out that Congress does have an oversight role here. There are
+checks and balances.
+ Our colleague from Arizona, Mr. Gallego, has in the prior
+Congress introduced legislation to--you know, if troop levels
+fall below a certain level you have got to come to Congress and
+justify that, and I think those are the right steps for us as a
+body.
+ This is going to be a long process and, again, I am not
+criticizing the Trump administration. I would rather see
+dialog. I would rather see where we are today, where the
+atmosphere on the Peninsula is not one of imminent war or
+concern but is one of looking at how do you--how do you move
+forward.
+ So both of you, in your opening testimony and, you know, my
+sense is let us not set expectations for this summit super high
+but let us actually be realistic. And if we can come out of the
+summit with that framework and that parameter of what does this
+look like, moving forward, in terms of meetings, who is going
+to be negotiating--future Chairman and President Trump
+negotiations.
+ Governor Richardson, what would--if you were sitting at the
+negotiating table what would success look like to you? And then
+I will ask the same question to Dr. Cha.
+ Mr. Richardson. Well, success for me would be a commitment
+by North Korea to dismantle some--some of their weapons,
+missiles. I will not get into a number because they vary. WMD--
+some tangible dismantling. What else are remaining?
+ Mr. Bera. Do you think that is realistic out of this
+particular summit as opposed to, I guess, success--what a
+framework--next negotiating steps would be?
+ Mr. Richardson. A freeze would be a mild success of
+existing testing, weapons, new development. But, in a way,
+North Korea has already done that, you know, so you want to
+move forward.
+ Establishing a liaison office is good for both sides.
+Dialogue--it would allow, for instance, our inspectors to have
+a chance. Our inspectors' verification time lines--that is also
+a definition of success. More joint excavations of our remains.
+I think Dr. Cha mentioned eventually a discussion on human
+rights, religious freedom there. But I think that is more----
+ Mr. Bera. And since I am going to run out of time let me
+just--you know, some of us also think part of the reason why
+Chairman Kim is willing to sit at the table now is they have
+acquired their nuclear capabilities. They have acquired their
+missile capabilities, et cetera.
+ So now they are not negotiating from a place of weakness.
+They are negotiating from a place where they have acquired some
+of those capabilities and that is certainly--let us go into
+this with our eyes wide open.
+ Mr. Cha. So I would say that in terms of what would be
+success, you know, the key word is verifiability. Whatever the
+North Koreans give us, whether it is a couple of sites or
+whether it is a promise not to produce more fissile material,
+it has to be verifiable, right.
+ And so they decommissioned some sites after the Singapore
+Summit, as Congressman Yoho said, but they did not allow
+anybody to verify it. And so that is really the key piece to me
+is to see whatever they have put on the table--how small or how
+large--it has to be verifiable.
+ Chairman Sherman. I recognize the gentlelady from Missouri.
+ Mrs. Wagner. I thank--thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
+organizing this hearing and thank you to our witnesses for
+their time.
+ Following up on my friend and colleague, Mr. Bera's, line
+of questioning, Dr. Cha, U.S. special representative for North
+Korea, Stephen Biegun, who Governor Richardson has spoken so
+highly of, has noted that even as United States pursues a
+direct leader-to-leader format for the current talks with North
+Korea, it is supplementing summit-level meetings with intensive
+working-level negotiations.
+ Do you think this strategy will better ensure the U.S.
+walks away from Hanoi with some sort of acceptable deal,
+agreement?
+ Mr. Cha. Congresswoman, I think what--certainly what was
+better in process with regard to this summit was that there was
+a lead up of intense, as you said----
+ Mrs. Wagner. Right.
+ Mr. Cha [continuing]. Working-level negotiations that Steve
+Biegun led. The first summit in Singapore, as you remember, was
+just an announcement that they were going to meet and there was
+no working-level effort.
+ So those working-level meetings are important to help the
+outcome of the summit be successful.
+ Mrs. Wagner. Not just happening at the summit. Let us be
+clear, Dr. Cha. It has been in the lead-up to the summit----
+ Mr. Cha. Yes.
+ Mrs. Wagner [continuing]. In a very intensified way, from
+what I understand. Is that your understanding?
+ Mr. Cha. Yes. Yes. And that is--that is the way it should
+be done. Yes.
+ Mrs. Wagner. Great. Wonderful.
+ Governor Richardson, you have spent decades working through
+formal and informal channels in North Korea to secure the
+release of American citizens held unjustly by the Kim regime.
+ Informal exchanges like the relationships you have built
+over the last several years can be highly effective in
+promoting mutual understanding. How do your efforts support and
+intersect with official talks?
+ Mr. Richardson. I think you asked a question about Special
+Envoy Biegun. I think he is very effective. You know, the
+administration consults with me. They do not listen, though.
+ [Laughter.]
+ Mrs. Wagner. They do not listen to me either.
+ Chairman Sherman. They do not even talk to me.
+ [Laughter.]
+ Mr. Richardson. They do, sometimes.
+ Mrs. Wagner. I know.
+ Mr. Richardson. My point here, Congresswoman, is I think
+you need, yes, Presidential--the president. That is good.
+Personal relationships. But you need the staff work in
+preparation for that.
+ Mrs. Wagner. Right.
+ Mr. Richardson. And sometimes I wonder, because of the
+president's style, that that does not happen as much as it
+should. I hope he is listening. I mean, we are going to find
+out in 2 days whether this summit is a success or not. He
+listens to Envoy Biegun, the Secretary Pompeo, you know, who
+has had to negotiate with the North Korean's spy chief ever
+since the first summit or before the first summit.
+ My worry is--and before, I think, you came in I said it is
+better to negotiate with the foreign ministry types in North
+Korea rather than the intelligence people because they are more
+flexible.
+ We will see what happens in this next summit. We are kind
+of hanging on to--for the result.
+ Mrs. Wagner. But you would agree that both formal and
+informal lines----
+ Mr. Richardson. Absolutely.
+ Mrs. Wagner [continuing]. Of communication are important,
+correct?
+ Mr. Richardson. Absolutely. Absolutely. You know, on
+prisoner exchanges.
+ Mrs. Wagner. Right.
+ Mr. Richardson. On rescuing American servicemen, on
+remains--yes. I mean----
+ Mrs. Wagner. We thank you for your leadership in that----
+ Mr. Richardson. Thank you.
+ Mrs. Wagner [continuing]. In that regard. Russia and China
+appear to be weakening on sanctions enforcement, although U.S.
+negotiators are working to solidify support in advance of the
+Hanoi Summit.
+ Dr. Cha, how worried should we be about Chinese and Russian
+compliance and how can the U.S. convince the international
+community to kind of hold the line?
+ Mr. Cha. So it is--I think it is a real problem,
+Congresswoman. Any agreement we make with North Korea has to be
+enforceable, and enforceability means also sanctioning if they
+violate the agreement, and China holds a lot of cards when it
+comes to sanctioning.
+ I mean, I think the only--the only way to really compel
+China to do this is to be willing to secondary sanction--I
+mean, to go after Chinese companies that are willfully and
+knowingly violating U.S. law. That is the only way to----
+ Mrs. Wagner. Well, you found that secondary sanctions can
+be very effective in that regard?
+ Mr. Cha. I think--I think they can. They certainly spread
+the net of who is responsible when it comes to this. I mean,
+China is a U.N. Security Council member so they should be
+complying with the 11 U.N. Security Council resolutions with
+regard to North Korea on--particularly on trade. But they
+really have not been for about 15 months now.
+ Mrs. Wagner. Well, thank you. I think my time is about to
+expire so I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Sherman. Thank you. I will recognize myself at
+this point. As to denuclearization, I am not sure that we
+disagree as to what it means. I think we disagree as to when.
+ All the signatories of the nonproliferation treaty
+including Russia and the United States are on record saying we
+look forward to eventually having no nuclear weapons in the
+world and I am confident that Pyongyang will denuclearize as
+soon as the United States and Russia do so.
+ As to the change in the level of tension, 2015 and 2016 was
+not a period of particularly high blood pressure. We had a
+policy of strategic patience. It was not a good policy but at
+least it was not a policy fraught with tension.
+ The tension was in 2017. It has declined since then. As to
+a minimal level of success, I think I mostly agree with the
+Governor. But I would say that if we had a verifiable halt to
+the creation of more fissile material that would mean we were
+safer.
+ If all we have is a halt to testing, well, Kim has said he
+has done all the testing he needs. So a new test might not make
+us less safe since it would give him the information he already
+has or claims to already have, whereas, clearly, a halt to the
+creation of new fissile material, if verifiable, would make us
+safer.
+ Dr. Cha, you talk about the importance of human rights. We,
+obviously, need to be bringing this up. It is very important to
+the North Koreans. One place where they could make a concession
+easily is to allow more family reunification visits,
+particularly for the 100,000 Korean Americans who have family
+north of the 38th Parallel.
+ Is there any reason why Kim would not make that concession
+other than he knows we want it so he would not want to give it
+to us? Any disadvantage to him to allowing such family
+reunifications with Korean Americans?
+ Mr. Cha. No. I mean, I think, as you said, that there are
+still many divided families as a result of the Korean War. This
+could be a very useful humanitarian gesture.
+ I say useful because, from the perspective of incentives,
+there is every reason for him to do it if he wants to have, you
+know, a more positive view of the--of himself in the broader--
+in the broader press.
+ But there still needs to be--there needs to be a raising of
+the human rights abuses, not just humanitarian issues.
+ Chairman Sherman. Gotcha.
+ Mr. Richardson. Congressman, could I just add to that?
+ Chairman Sherman. Yes.
+ Mr. Richardson. What North Korea needs more than anything
+in terms of investments, it is not necessarily the United
+States. It is South Korea. And there is an effort by South
+Korea to possibly invest in the railway in North Korea, the
+Kaesong joint facility that was shut down.
+ So my point is that North Korea will want to make strong
+family reunification. It is in their interests if they want
+this South Korean investment. I mean, it is called politics. It
+is something that you are all the experts.
+ Chairman Sherman. Now, the North Koreans have a
+conventional military double the size of South Korea and yet
+they are pressuring us to remove some of our 28,000 troops
+while, of course, North Korea has almost a million, or to make
+those troops less effective by canceling exercises.
+ I have been told that the long-term North Korean dream is
+you get America to withdraw its forces. This makes
+international business less interested in investing in South
+Korea. That leads to the kind of economic decline in South
+Korea that makes unification on their terms possible.
+ Is there any--how do the North Koreans argue for a
+diminution of American forces in South Korea when they have
+such a powerful conventional military?
+ Governor or Doctor?
+ Mr. Cha. Well, I think it goes along with, and this goes
+back to the gap and denuclearization definitions--it goes back
+to the way the North Koreans define denuclearization.
+ They define it as being--their willingness to do this will
+be--will happen when the United States is off the Peninsula and
+no longer has a security commitment to South Korea. That is
+when they consider real--the real concept of denuclearization.
+ Chairman Sherman. It's good politics in the United States
+to announce an end to the Korean War and sign the peace treaty.
+All Americans like peace treaties. This would not cause
+pressure on the United States to move its forces from South
+Korea.
+ We have a--World War II is over with peace treaties in
+Europe and Japan and we had troops in Germany--we have troops
+in Japan. So the question is would a peace treaty with North
+Korea--it, obviously, is important to them--but it--would it
+create pressure in South Korea to expel American troops?
+ Doctor or Governor?
+ Mr. Cha. Quickly, I will just say that--yes. Quickly, I
+will just say that I think it would start to create a
+discussion about the utility of U.S. forces in Korea once a
+peace declaration of some sort was made, certainly, among the
+progressive camp in South Korea. Maybe less so among the
+conservative camp, but certainly among the progressive camp.
+ Chairman Sherman. OK. And then, finally, Governor, what are
+the phony concessions that North Korea can make? Are there
+facilities that are no longer useful to them? Yongbyon, I
+guess, may have outlived its usefulness. The nuclear weapons
+testing facility they destroyed some or all of because it
+outlived its usefulness.
+ What are the things they can give up that sound important
+that are not important?
+ Mr. Richardson. You mentioned the two that are, I think,
+most obvious--the Yongbyon facility, this test site where they
+blew up I think the sides and they did not allow inspections or
+the press there.
+ Those are what I would expect they will try to get away
+with. I just happen to think that if they continue to say, we
+are not going to have any testing--nuclear testing, missile
+testing--they have already done that. I want them to do a lot
+more.
+
+ While I am not diminishing that but, this is something that
+they have done the last--it is now almost a year. Let them do
+more. Again, I agree with Dr. Cha. Verification is essential of
+what they do, and I am concerned with one concession that I
+sense we may be giving up and that is list all of your sites,
+your facilities, and inventory so this can be inspected and
+verified, and I sense that we are kind of--may lose that at
+this summit.
+ Chairman Sherman. All the press reports are that we have
+given up on that, and that--and with that, I will recognize the
+gentleman from Michigan.
+ Mr. Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to you and
+the ranking member for the terrific witnesses here. I thank
+both of you for coming. Good to see you, Governor Richardson.
+ Dr. Cha, I want to start with a question for you about
+human rights. The logic behind choosing Vietnam for this
+summit's setting seems to be that if Kim sees firsthand
+Vietnam's economic success he will want to mirror that success
+in North Korea. Or, put another way, he may see an incentive to
+denuclearize.
+ One issue that seems to be missing from this calculus,
+though, is human rights. Human Rights Watch reported earlier
+this month that, and I am quoting, ``Vietnam's one-party state
+severely restricts fundamental civil and political rights and
+has stepped up its harsh crackdown on activists and
+dissidents.''
+ Reports indicate that these crackdowns range from arbitrary
+arrests of activists to a lack of press freedom to a grossly
+unfair legal system. Amnesty International has documented more
+than a hundred prisoners of conscience who remain in prison at
+the risk of being tortured or ill-treated.
+ So my question to you is, is there a risk that Kim will get
+the message that North Korea can indeed achieve what Vietnam
+has and that just like Vietnam he does not need to respect
+human rights to do it?
+ Mr. Cha. Thanks, Congressman. It is a great question.
+ I certainly hope that is not the message that he will get.
+I mean, if anything, I think what would be very useful would be
+for the North Korean leader to get a briefing about all the
+laws that now exist passed by this body with regard to not just
+proliferation but human rights abuses that will make it
+impossible for U.S. companies to do any sort of business in
+North Korea.
+ That could probably be the most important thing that could
+be told to him that would be incentive for him to try to
+address the human rights abuses in the country.
+ Mr. Levin. I really need to study up on that because I have
+noticed a lot of U.S. companies doing a lot of business in
+countries with gross human rights violations over the years.
+Maybe we have done a better job more recently before I came to
+Congress. I think of not--this is not just about Korea or Asia,
+you know--in Latin America and Central America and all over the
+world, in Africa and so forth.
+ You mentioned earlier, that the Trump administration has
+failed to appoint a special envoy for human rights in North
+Korea, which is a requirement set forth in the North Korea
+Human Rights Act of 2004. What impact do you think this vacancy
+has on the coordination of our larger North Korea policy?
+ Mr. Cha. So as you mentioned, it is mandated by Congress.
+President Bush appointed the first Special Envoy for Human
+Rights, Jay Lefkowitz, and then President Obama appointed Bob
+King.
+ I think the most important job--position--role that this
+position plays is a leadership role not just here in Washington
+but at the United Nations and, indeed, around the world with
+regard to getting the international community to focus on the
+human rights abuses in North Korea.
+ One very quick example--last December the U.N. Security
+Council did not vote for raising U.N.--North Korean human
+rights in the Security Council agenda, which I think was a big
+defeat because they had done it previously.
+ And there is another opportunity this spring, perhaps after
+the summit, but it requires U.S. leadership and if we do not
+have an envoy and if we do not have a U.N. Ambassador it is
+harder to do that.
+ Mr. Levin. And do you think that this lack of appointing
+someone sends a signal to the international community about our
+commitment to human rights, more broadly?
+ Mr. Cha. Well, I think that there are a number of people
+around town who have drawn a relationship between the absence
+of a human rights envoy and things that are happening in
+China--more crackdowns in China--the Uyghur camps in China.
+ So the United States always has been a beacon for human
+rights and human freedom, and we should continue to do so.
+ Mr. Levin. Thank you very much. I hope we do continue to do
+so and I fear that we are not being that beacon right now.
+ Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
+ Chairman Sherman. Thank you.
+ I recognize the gentlelady from Virginia.
+ Ms. Spanberger. Thank you, Mr.----
+ Chairman Sherman. Oh, and I will point out we will do a
+second round, but we will adjourn by 12:20 at the very latest.
+ Ms. Spanberger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ So, Dr. Cha, you have written extensively and, Governor
+Richardson and Dr. Cha, we have talked extensively today about
+undeclared North Korean missile operating bases that may not be
+included in denuclearization discussions.
+ News reports earlier this month described a U.N.--a
+confidential U.N. report that North Korea was engaging in what
+the intelligence community calls denial and deception
+techniques--deliberate efforts to hide their nuclear and
+ballistic weapons to prevent U.S. and others from discovering
+them.
+ Dr. Cha, you spoke a bit as well about the idea that any
+agreements have to be verifiable. So my question is, given the
+denial and deception, how can we ensure that inspectors, given
+whatever agreement is made, are gaining access to all of North
+Korea's weapons and facilities and operating bases and how can
+the U.S. negotiate an agreement that North--with North Korea
+that would actually account for any undeclared weaponsites,
+development facilities, or operating bases and ensure that we
+can verify whatever agreements are made?
+ Mr. Cha. Well, it requires the president to raise it. I
+mean, this is--I think there are things that North Korea will
+be willing to put on the table in the discussions over the next
+48 hours. But the key condition, I think, for our side to say
+that this is useful or successful would be conditions and
+protocols for verification.
+ I mean, once they agree to verification we know how to do
+it. The International Atomic Energy Agency knows how to do it.
+There are people there who have known these North Korean sites
+for years from working on them in the past.
+ But it requires the president to raise it and for the North
+Koreans to agree to it.
+ Ms. Spanberger. As a former intelligence officer myself--I
+am a former CIA officer--I am particularly concerned about what
+appears to be a growing disconnect between our political and
+intelligence leaders and, in particular, the undermining of
+objective nonpartisan intelligence assessment.
+ So following up on that notion of what is verifiable,
+allowing third-party organizations to determine what is in fact
+happening on the ground in North Korea and also listening to
+our intelligence community assessments based--about what is
+happening in North Korea.
+ Do you have any thoughts about what we, as Members of
+Congress, can do to ensure that the White House is, in the
+first place, receiving, considering, and then evaluating the
+intelligence information and other information that is
+available and created to help inform U.S. policy engagement
+with North Korea?
+ Mr. Cha. It is a great question and, again, given your
+experience in this area, you know a lot more than I do about
+this. I will just say that when we were doing the negotiations
+10 years ago, the intelligence briefing that we had every
+morning was about the most important information that we could
+work from and without it, personally, I felt like we were just
+flying blind.
+ This is the hardest intelligence target in the world. I
+think Governor Richardson would agree it is the hardest
+intelligence target in the world. But I think our IC--the
+intelligence community--has done a remarkable job trying to
+gain information not just about their capabilities but their
+intentions.
+ Mr. Richardson. I would just add, Congresswoman, what is
+critical is that you and this committee get the best briefings
+from our intelligence people. That is No. 1.
+ And I believe that what the NSA and CIA and DIA the--and I
+am concerned about this gap between the White House and our
+intelligence people. And, you know, we spent billions on
+intelligence--human assets, technological assets, and we should
+listen to them.
+ But I think you, in your role of oversight, should insist
+on those briefings. What else would I suggest? You know,
+verification inspections are key. The North Koreans will object
+if we are the inspectors, I believe--we, the United States.
+ We should insist on that. Perhaps the International Atomic
+Energy Agency--the IAEA, that is involved with the Iran deal in
+the past--well, it still is--that that may be part of the
+inspections regime.
+ Ms. Spanberger. Thank you very much to the witnesses.
+ And to the chair, I yield back.
+ Chairman Sherman. Without objection, we will recognize a
+member of the full committee who is not a member of this
+subcommittee but the former chair of the subcommittee, Mr.
+Chabot.
+ Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
+ I apologize, first of all. I was in Judiciary and unable
+to--but I definitely wanted to stop by. It is a very important
+topic and I will go back and review the questions with my
+colleagues and the answers later on.
+ You know, I have to be very honest about this whole
+negotiations and meetings with Kim Jong-Un. He is somebody--he,
+being Kim Jong-Un, is somebody--if he is anything like this
+father and grandfather and, I think in this case, the apple
+does not fall too far from the tree, we have to be extremely
+leery of anything he says and, obviously, the president and the
+people that he has surrounded himself with, the number-one--the
+number-one thing that we have to be focused on is what is in
+best interests of the United States and our security--security
+of the American people.
+ Now, diplomacy certainly is better than military
+confrontation and I think we were getting closer and closer to
+that. I think it was a game changer when we believe that they
+had either reached or were very close to having the ability to
+land a nuclear device on American soil.
+ I think previous administrations maybe had somewhat of a
+luxury in that we could continue to try to get North Koreans to
+back off their nuclear program and we could negotiate on
+occasion and we saw that when we had--when we would get
+together with them and, in general, we would provide food and
+energy resources and in return they would promise that they
+were going to back off their program or discontinue it or close
+down facilities and we would continue underground full speed
+ahead.
+ Maybe not full speed ahead but they would continue the
+programs, maybe not quite as quickly as they would have if they
+had not agreed but they moved forward nonetheless.
+ So I am concerned that that behavior will be repeated here.
+That being said, I hope and pray that the president is
+successful and that he really will be able to get some behavior
+changed in Kim Jong-Un. We cannot predict the future but I
+think we all are hoping that that is where we get.
+ So I guess my question then, after rambling on there for a
+couple of minutes, is should we be--should we be in a, like
+President Reagan said--he said, obviously, when negotiating
+with the Soviet Union, trust but verify?
+ Is this a--should we be distrust but verify, but
+hopefully--I will, for example, as somewhat of a--well, not
+somewhat--quite skeptical, will I--am I likely to be surprised
+and there really is a possibility here that we will have peace
+on the Peninsula and they will denuclearize?
+ So I would be happy to open it up to either Bill or the
+other gentleman here.
+ Mr. Richardson. Congressman--Mr. Chairman----
+ Mr. Chabot. Thank you for your years of service here, too.
+We--a lot of us, especially those that have been around the
+block, it was an--it was an honor to call you a colleague and
+you have done great and done wonderful things for our country
+all over the globe. So thank you for that.
+ Mr. Richardson. Well, my answer is I was going to commend
+you for your very hopeful and positive statement. I believe we
+need to continue these negotiations, even if this next summit
+does not appear to bear many results. I am concerned about
+that.
+ But this is the most--this is the tensest region in the
+world right now, I believe, with nuclear weapons, with
+missiles, with our allies, with our troops--28,000 in South
+Korea, 30,000 in Japan.
+ I think we need to keep talking and dialog, even if we do
+not get the results we want at this summit, needs to continue
+and regardless of what administration is in power.
+ Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
+ Sir?
+ Mr. Cha. I am--yes, I am uncertain, as you are,
+Congressman, of whether we can get to full denuclearization.
+But I do know that any steps we take along those paths cannot
+simply be promises that are made without verification because
+it makes no sense if nothing can be verified.
+ And in the end, if we take steps along those lines then we
+are moving in a positive direction.
+ Mr. Chabot. Thank you. Thank you very much. I appreciate
+that, and I want to thank the chair and the ranking member for
+allowing me to participate.
+ Thank you very much.
+ Chairman Sherman. Thank you.
+ One thing about sanctions is that if you are dealing with a
+democracy you have a little bit of sanctions. You say depress
+income in the country by 10 percent--that is a big deal.
+ It is not a big deal to Kim whether his people are 10
+percent richer or 10 percent poorer, and so the problem with
+partially relaxing sanctions is that you certainly do not have
+regime-threatening sanctions if you go from what I think are
+the inadequate sanctions we have now to something even less.
+ My first question is about the train. Kim flew to
+Switzerland when he was a student. He flew to Singapore last
+year. He is on a train through China. Why?
+ Mr. Richardson. Well, first, the maintenance record of
+North Korean aircraft is not the best. That is why. Second, you
+know, this has been a tradition in his family----
+ Chairman Sherman. Yes. I mean, his father used to go to
+Beijing on an armored train.
+ Mr. Richardson. He would go to China, Russia, by train. I
+have seen that train. You should to go see it. It is in a
+museum in Pyongyang. Well, they move it in and out.
+ But, last, I think it is mainly a security issue and,
+symbolically, I think Kim Jong-Un was trying to show that he
+went through and he needs China. So he was giving visibility to
+China, and I think going to Vietnam is a signal that North
+Korea wants to do business outside of China with Vietnam.
+ Chairman Sherman. We have this image that Kim is in total
+power. Yet, I study dictators and none of them are in total
+power. If he was in total power he could do whatever he thought
+was in the long-term interests of his dynasty.
+ What restraints are there? What red lines cannot he cross?
+What people in Pyongyang cannot he cross? What institutions? Or
+is he really that--the thing I have not been able to find in
+history and that is the total dictator?
+ Mr. Cha. It is a great question, Congressman. It is a hard
+one to answer, I think. There was a view when he first started
+that because of his inexperience he needed to balance different
+factions in the party, the military, and, of course, the
+family.
+ But he has since then gone on, as you know well, such a
+ruthless purging campaign that I think many experts saw his
+trip to--his first trip to China, first time out of the
+country, for as long as he was gone as a sign that he really
+had consolidated power.
+ So I think there still is a degree of purging taking place
+but, you know, I think relative to when he started he seems to
+be in about as secure a position as we could have imagined, you
+know, 6 years ago and he does seem to be calling the shots.
+ Chairman Sherman. If--and this would be my wildest
+fantasy--he just goes to Vietnam and gives up his nuclear
+program in return for getting the Apple headquarters and maybe
+Amazon as well move to Pyongyang--whatever it took--if he were
+to do that, and none of us expect it, what repercussions would
+he have at home or can he just go back and say, hey, it is time
+to be Silicon Valley?
+ Mr. Richardson. He has total control in North Korea. I
+think he is more secure than ever before. His main objective,
+Congressman--Mr. Chairman--is--his main objective is to stay in
+power, more so than detente with the United States or--stay in
+power and I think a source of that is keeping his nuclear
+weapons or some of his nuclear weapons.
+ I think what you suggested may be a little wishful thinking
+that he will give it up. But he has said to his people, we have
+to improve our economy and, in a way, he said, you know, the
+only way we can do that perhaps is--they always want to deal
+with the United States.
+ They would say to me, we should settle things. The U.S. and
+North Korea--not China, not Russia, not South Korea. We are the
+big guys around here. So I think that is why they are talking.
+ Chairman Sherman. I am going to make one more comment and
+that is the fact that Japan and Korea cannot cooperate is
+harmful to the United States' national security and I
+recognize--I brought this home to both Korean and Japanese
+leaders recently--that they have a certain animosity from the
+first half of the 20th century.
+ But Poland and Germany cooperate and that helps our
+national security, and if I had more time I would ask for--you
+could respond for the record as to if there is anything we can
+do to get these two countries to cooperate on that--on security
+matters.
+ I am going to recognize the ranking member for a limited
+time and then I have to go, and I know the witness has to go as
+well.
+ Mr. Yoho. Thank you both, and I think the important thing
+is that we look forward where we are going. We cannot worry
+about what did not work in the past--I mean, we have to learn
+from that--but more forward looking.
+ The thing that brought North Korea to the negotiating
+table--correct me if I am wrong--was the unanimous U.N.
+agreement resolution that I think 17 countries placed severe
+sanctions on North Korea.
+ With people pretty much adhering to that--i.e., us, Russia,
+China, South Korea--that put enough pressure where they did
+come to the table. Since that point in time, we have seen
+Russia, China, even South Korea with a transfer of--it was
+either coal or petroleum that they said was a mistake--it did
+happen and they went after the people, you know, taking that on
+good faith.
+ We have a report, and I do not have the U.N. report--it
+will be out later this year--that we have a report of over 148
+ship-to-ship transfers from January to August. It was oil at
+sea.
+ How detrimental is that to our negotiations and moving
+forward if they start normalizing and allow this to happen, and
+then, more importantly, what I would really like to hear from
+you your recommendations to us on this committee as a
+bipartisan group to where we can hold the administration or
+South Korea or China or Russia accountable so that we keep that
+maximum pressure on them until we get a clear blueprint of
+where we are going and then the verification. I wanted to ask
+you real quickly about that. But if you would answer those.
+ Mr. Cha. So, first, to the chairman's earlier point about
+trilateral coordination, for the record, it is absolutely
+necessary. We are stronger--the United States is stronger if we
+are lined up with our allies, Japan and Korea, for the record.
+ Mr. Yoho. Sure.
+ Mr. Cha. On the maximum pressure, diplomacy does not work
+without maximum pressure. The president's efforts at diplomacy
+will not work without maximum pressure and that--and that
+speaks not just--as you said, not just to China but also to
+South Korea.
+ And then the third point is there is a way--if we start to
+lift sanctions it will most likely be through South Korea--
+South Korea reopening Kaesong Industrial Complex with the
+North.
+ I think where human rights matters there is we can require
+the South Koreans to ensure that they can pay the North Korean
+workers directly in Kaesong, which would address the human
+rights issue and address the desire for----
+ Mr. Yoho. You know, that came up today in our meeting I
+had. How can you pay them directly? I mean, is Kim Jong-Un
+going to allow that to happen? I mean, that would have to go
+through him and he would have to OK that.
+ Mr. Cha. Right. Right. Yes. Yes.
+ Mr. Yoho. If that happens, that would be--I mean, that
+would be a huge concession on his part, I would think, to allow
+people to actually earn--keep what they earn and put in the
+labor.
+ Mr. Cha. Right. And it would be--for our policy it would be
+a huge success if that could happen.
+ Mr. Yoho. That would be a huge success.
+ Governor, do you have any thoughts?
+ Mr. Richardson. Congressman, my sense is that Russia is not
+observing sanctions. There is massive violations that----
+ Mr. Yoho. Oh, terrible.
+ Mr. Richardson [continuing]. The site of the border there,
+the port. Victor, what is the name of that port where the--
+China has--Russia has a short border.
+ Mr. Yoho. Yes.
+ Mr. Richardson. So----
+ Mr. Yoho. I know where you are talking.
+ Mr. Richardson. Russia needs to get tougher and they are
+not doing it. I think these U.N. sanctions were the strongest
+that we have ever had. A lot of it has been working and it is
+essential that China continue the sanctions.
+ But the cross-border contraband, the verification----
+ Mr. Yoho. Right.
+ Mr. Richardson [continuing]. There is key. I always found
+that the most effective sanctions, and I think this was in the
+Bush Administration on North Korea, were banking sanctions on
+their banks and how--I think there is some of that left.
+ But the sanctions that have, I think, bitten--that bite the
+most have been the coal, the uranium, the oil sanctions that
+are imposed now by the U.N.
+ Mr. Yoho. Right. But, yet, China and Russia are cheating
+and so what we wanted to do is go after the bigger banks, the
+bank of--the construction bank, their agriculture bank--the big
+ones. That would really hurt China.
+ And so we are going to followup on our letter to the
+Treasury Department through this administration, and I guess we
+are at a point to demand why are these not taking place.
+Because if we put that pressure on China and Russia they will
+come to the table and I see China as just--they are insecure
+because they fear North Korea becoming more like South Korea.
+ But, yet, if they look at the world overall, we are their
+largest trading partner and they are going to benefit hugely
+from this. But they are intimidated by success, I guess, of an
+open society.
+ And then you brought up, and I agree with you, what would--
+the inspectors. I do not think they need to be U.S. inspectors.
+They just need to be verifiable inspectors that we have the
+faith in that they carry this out. And you are in agreement
+with that, right?
+ I am out of time. He has got to get to a meeting. Thank you
+both.
+ Chairman Sherman. I want to thank our witnesses and my
+colleagues, and I look forward to exploring this further.
+ [Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
+
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