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+ - BUILDING THE INFORMATION ANALYSIS CAPABILITY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
+
+[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
+[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
+
+
+
+ BUILDING THE INFORMATION ANALYSIS
+ CAPABILITY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
+ HOMELAND SECURITY
+
+=======================================================================
+
+ HEARING
+
+ before the
+
+ SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION
+ SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT
+
+ of the
+
+ COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
+ HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
+
+ ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
+
+ FIRST SESSION
+
+ __________
+
+ FEBRUARY 16, 2005
+
+ __________
+
+ Serial No. 109-2
+
+ __________
+
+ Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
+
+[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
+
+
+ Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
+ house
+
+
+ __________
+
+ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
+20-542 WASHINGTON : 2005
+_____________________________________________________________________________
+For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
+Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
+Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�0900012005
+
+
+ COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
+
+ Christopher Cox, California, Chairman
+
+Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
+Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
+Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania, Vice Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
+Chairman Norman D. Dicks, Washington
+Christopher Shays, Connecticut Jane Harman, California
+Peter T. King, New York Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
+John Linder, Georgia Nita M. Lowey, New York
+Mark E. Souder, Indiana Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
+Tom Davis, Virginia Columbia
+Daniel E. Lungren, California Zoe Lofgren, California
+Jim Gibbons, Nevada Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
+Rob Simmons, Connecticut Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
+Mike Rogers, Alabama Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
+Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Islands
+Katherine Harris, Florida Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
+Bobby Jindal, Louisiana James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
+Dave G. Reichert, Washington Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
+Michael McCaul, Texas
+Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania
+
+ ______
+
+ Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk
+ Assessment
+
+ ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut, Chairman
+
+CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania ZOE LOFGREN, California
+PETER T. KING, New York LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
+MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana JANE HARMAN, California
+DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California NITA M. LOWEY, New York
+JIM GIBBONS, Nevada SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas
+STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina
+BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
+DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
+CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi
+CHRISTOPHER COX, California (Ex (Ex Officio)
+Officio)
+
+ (II)
+
+
+ C O N T E N T S
+
+ ----------
+ Page
+
+ STATEMENTS
+
+The Honorable Rob Simmons, a Representative in Congress From the
+ State of Connecticut, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
+ Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk
+ Assessment..................................................... 1
+The Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Representative in Congress From the
+ State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
+ Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk
+ Assessment..................................................... 2
+The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of California, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
+ Security....................................................... 4
+The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
+ From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
+ Homeland Committee............................................. 5
+The Honorable Charlie Dent, a Representative in Congress From the
+ State of Pennsylvania.......................................... 19
+The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of North Carolina.................................... 17
+The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of New York.......................................... 16
+The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
+ From the State of Rhode Island................................. 20
+The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress
+ From the State of Texas........................................ 25
+The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
+ From the State of California................................... 22
+
+ WITNESS
+
+Lieutenant General Pat Hughes, (Retired), Acting Under Secretary,
+ Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, Department
+ of Homeland Security
+ Oral Statement................................................. 6
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 7
+
+ APPENDIX
+ Material Submitted for the Record
+
+Questions and Responses submitted by the Honorable Bennie
+ Thompson....................................................... 31
+
+
+ BUILDING THE INFORMATION ANALYSIS
+ CAPABILITY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
+
+ ----------
+
+
+ WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 2005
+
+ U.S. House of Representatives,
+ Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information
+ Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment,
+ Committee on Homeland Security,
+ Washington, DC
+ The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:06 p.m., in
+Room 1334, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Rob Simmons
+[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
+ Present: Representatives Simmons, King, Lungren, Pearce,
+Dent, Cox, Lofgren, Etheridge, Langevin, Thompson, and Jackson-
+Lee.
+ Mr. Simmons. [Presiding.] The Subcommittee on Intelligence,
+Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment will come to
+order.
+ The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on how
+the fiscal year 2006 Department of Homeland Security budget
+request helps further the information sharing and analysis
+capabilities of the Department of Homeland Security. I am told
+that we only have this room until 4:00 p.m., 1600 hours, today,
+so I will be short in my comments, and then we will try to
+extend to all members the opportunity to ask questions, but
+also remind them that the room will be made available to
+another group at 4 p.m.
+ I would like to recognize myself for an opening statement.
+As we begin this first hearing of the Committee on Homeland
+Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and
+Terrorism Risk Assessment, I would like to start by thanking
+the Chairman, Chairman Cox, for his leadership in helping to
+establish the full committee as a standing committee of
+Congress. I look forward very much to working with my
+colleague, Representative Lofgren from California, as the
+Ranking Member of the subcommittee, and also the Ranking Member
+of the full committee, Representative Thompson, who is with us
+here today.
+ I represent the Second District of Connecticut. On
+September 11, we lost 12 friends and neighbors. On September
+11, we all failed in our constitutional responsibility to
+provide for the common defense. This subcommittee has a vital
+role to build our capabilities in intelligence, information
+sharing and risk assessment to help prevent another terrorist
+attack.
+ I would also like to make a second point. I believe in
+bipartisanship when it comes to national security and homeland
+security. When I joined the U.S. Army almost 40 years ago, I
+put these dog tags around my neck. I wore them until I retired
+from the U.S. Army Reserve in the year 2003. These dog tags
+have my name on them, my serial number, my blood type and my
+religion, but there is no mention of party affiliation. During
+my years of public service, I have tried to be bipartisan. I
+look forward to conducting the work of this subcommittee in a
+bipartisan fashion.
+ Information analysis and warning is perhaps the most
+important capability of the Department of Homeland Security.
+Intelligence must drive our protection decisions, resource
+allocations, and homeland security priorities. Since its
+inception in March 2003, the Department of Homeland Security
+has worked to construct a robust analytical capability and has
+dedicated itself to fulfilling the broad statutory functions
+outlined in the Homeland Security Act. The committee is
+encouraged by the progress to date, but there is a lot more
+work to do, and the responsibility for that work falls on us.
+ General Hughes, you have some challenges and opportunities
+ahead of you. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention
+Act of 2004 created a Director of National Intelligence and a
+National Counterterrorism Center. This new reality will require
+the office of Information Analysis of DHS to adjust to a new
+operating environment. IA must take this opportunity to
+continue to build on its initial progress and construct a fully
+functioning and operational Intelligence Community component,
+while ensuring that DHS maintains the vital link to its state
+and local partners, and also ensuring that as we work to
+protect the freedom and security of our homeland, we also
+continue to protect and preserve our civil liberties.
+ The partnerships that you have engaged in have led to
+central communications links between the federal government and
+state, local, tribal and private sector officials. These links
+help to ensure that the men and women on the frontlines in the
+fight to protect our homeland have the essential information
+they need to help prevent another terrorist attack. I hope your
+testimony today will address how these links and partnerships
+are being strengthened and refined to help keep America safe.
+ I welcome you, General Hughes, to the subcommittee today. I
+also want to thank you, as somebody who has also worn the
+uniform for, in my case, 37 years, 7 months, and 24 days, but
+who is counting. When you are having a good time, you do not
+count it all up. But I want to thank you for your very
+distinguished service to our country. I look forward to hearing
+your testimony.
+ I would like now to recognizing the Ranking Minority Member
+of the subcommittee for any statement that she may wish to
+make.
+ Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling
+this hearing to discuss the proposed fiscal year 2006 budget,
+building the information analysis capability of the Department
+of Homeland Security.
+ Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you. I hope to
+be able to have a good, productive and professional
+relationship on this subcommittee, as I enjoyed in the last
+Congress with Chairman Thornberry. That was a very rewarding
+experience for me, and I think for Chairman Thornberry.
+ We worked together as a team. We developed our hearings
+together. We decided our witnesses together. We wrote bills
+together. In the end of the Congress, we issued not a majority
+report and a minority report, but we issued one report from our
+committee. I hope that we will have that same level of success
+in standing up for our country and making sure that we are
+facing.
+ General Hughes, I welcome you and I look forward to hearing
+your testimony, as we work with you as we seek to empower the
+critical exchange of information within the Department of
+Homeland Security. You have a difficult task, and I hope that
+the subcommittee will be able to help you as you work to
+enhance the department's capability to collect, aggregate,
+analyze and share information.
+ I understand your office is responsible for four specific
+tasks: analyzing and mapping terrorism threat intelligence to
+vulnerabilities in the nation's critical infrastructure;
+sharing information with state and local governments and at
+times with the private sector on the public information
+concerning terrorist threats; meeting operational efforts
+regarding the homeland security advisory system; and providing
+intelligence analysis to senior DHS officials.
+ As you may know, I served for 14 years on the Board of
+Supervisors for in Santa Clara County, so I have a very keen
+interest in how information is shared with local governments so
+that they can take appropriate action. I am also very
+interested in how we have assessed what is vulnerable so that
+we can effectively map the threats that we discover.
+ Finally, I do not want to be a nag, but I am going to raise
+it anyhow. This is your first meeting before us and so I am
+going to cut a little slack to the department, but there is a
+Committee Rule, rule 11(j), that requires witnesses to have
+their statements to the committee in advance of the actual
+hearing. It is 48 hours that testimony is to be submitted, and
+we received your testimony just 4 hours ago.
+ So this is not a senseless rule. I like to read the
+testimony before I come to a hearing and have the staff analyze
+it, and receiving it 4 hours in advance of a hearing just does
+not permit that. If we are going to do our job well, you need
+to help us by complying with that rule. So I hope I will never
+have to refer to that rule again, and I look forward to your
+testimony.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Simmons. Thank you. That is a good and a useful comment
+to make.
+ I would now like to recognize the Chairman of the full
+committee, the gentleman from California, Mr. Cox, who I just
+mentioned a few minutes ago has played an historic role, a
+truly historic role, in bringing about a full Committee on
+Homeland Security.
+ I believe the reorganization of our government over the
+last several years is the largest reorganization we have
+encountered since World War II, with the National Security Act
+of 1947 and the creation of the Department of Defense. With
+that massive reorganization goes a requirement to oversee the
+Department of Homeland Security.
+ Chairman Cox has been a critical component in making sure
+that the Congress lives up to its obligations in these
+difficult, historic times.
+ Mr. Chairman?
+ Mr. Cox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ I want to begin by welcoming Chairman Simmons to this
+subcommittee. We are picking up the work that was carried on in
+the Select Committee on Homeland Security during the last
+Congress. I do not think there is any question that by
+background, Congressman Simmons is well suited to chair this
+subcommittee. I do not think there is any question either that
+Zoe Lofgren of California is very able and equipped to serve as
+our Ranking Member on this subcommittee.
+ General Hughes, as you know, we have been on this
+committee, at least as it was constituted in the last Congress,
+aggressive supporters of your responsibilities in the
+Department of Homeland Security. Since the last Congress, we
+have enacted legislation creating a national Intelligence
+Director and creating the NCTC that will have profound impacts
+on the Information Analysis responsibility within the
+Department of Homeland Security.
+ I note that this is not a packed hearing room and it is in
+some senses ironic because I do not believe we will ever focus
+on anything that is more central to the government's
+responsibility in protecting Americans from terrorism than what
+we are going to be talking about today. So to those of you are
+here, you are involved in a very important undertaking on
+behalf of our country.
+ The Homeland Security Act of 2002 gave the department a new
+overriding counterterrorist mission that had not previously
+been the job of any part of the federal government. It sought
+to enable to department's success in this new mission through a
+Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure
+Protection. The information analysis portion of that
+directorate is the intelligence piece overview with prevention,
+particularly when it comes to the eventual threat of terrorists
+armed with nuclear weapons, not dirty bombs, but real nuclear
+weapons, or terrorists armed with bio-weapons, particularly
+bio-engineered weapons that are designed to be resistant to
+antidotes and vaccines that we might have stockpiled. There can
+be no overstating the importance of prevention. That is what
+this is all about.
+ During the Cold War, I think we understood that dealing
+with the response and recovery from a nuclear exchange was not
+plan A, plan B, or plan C. We were very much focused on
+avoiding that nuclear exchange. Likewise, the prospect that
+terrorists might apply weapons of mass destruction now or in
+the future has to cause us to focus enormous attention on
+prevention. That is what we hope, notwithstanding the passage
+of the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Implementation Act, we
+can continue to do under the legal mandate of the Homeland
+Security Act.
+ The memorandum of understanding on information sharing of
+March 2003 was a truly unprecedented undertaking between the
+Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the
+Secretary of Homeland Security. Its purpose is to move
+information along and through these three communities free of
+the longstanding constraints that existed prior. There are some
+signs that are less encouraging or convey a mixed message about
+our potential to achieve what we envisioned when we wrote the
+Homeland Security Act and in passing the law in 2002, and when
+this memorandum was agreed to in 2003.
+ I hope today, General Hughes, that we have the opportunity
+to understand from you exactly where we are headed and whether
+we have the resources to get there.
+ I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Simmons. I thank you for your comments.
+ Now, the Chair would like to recognize the Ranking Member
+of the full committee, Mr. Thompson from Mississippi.
+ Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am appreciative of
+you calling this hearing at this time. Even though we cannot
+discuss the numbers for this department in open session, I
+think there are some issues that we need to get on the table
+real quick for the sake of the public.
+ I guess about 2 months ago, Ms. Lofgren and I had an
+opportunity to look at the vulnerabilities of our
+infrastructure by state. We were somewhat dismayed, Mr.
+Chairman, at how inconsistent that list was by state, and we
+are really concerned that somehow we have to have some
+standardization associated with that infrastructure list. As I
+understand it, there are some 85,000 vulnerabilities identified
+from miniature golf courses to shopping centers and what have
+you. But I am concerned about it, and I want to make sure that
+we address it this year so that we all, as members of this
+committee, can feel comfortable that those critical
+infrastructures in our districts clearly are being identified
+so that they can be protected.
+ In addition to that, I am concerned about this information
+sharing across the board, whether or not we have satisfactorily
+changed the culture of the department so that they are actually
+talking to each other. We hear comments all along about
+departments being territorial with their information, and if we
+are indeed protecting the homeland. We ought to make sure that
+all those agencies involved in protecting us are communicating
+with each other. So I look forward to this hearing and many
+more around this subject. Obviously, I look forward to your
+testimony, General Hughes.
+ Thank you very much.
+ Mr. Simmons. I thank the gentleman for his comments. As
+somebody who worked for the CIA for 10 years, and then finally
+in military intelligence for over 30 years, sharing information
+is a hugely important issue. Security is important, but a
+perfectly secure piece of information which is not disseminated
+is of no use. So what we have to do is come up with a balancing
+act. We have to balance the needs for security with the needs
+for sharing so that we can better protect the American
+homeland. So that is a very good point.
+ General Hughes, thank you again for coming before the
+subcommittee today. I will apologize to you in advance. I will
+have to vacate myself from the chair in a few moments to meet
+with the Secretary of the Navy in a prior commitment. I trust
+that our distinguished full committee Chairman will be able to
+carry on in my absence. I will be back as soon as possible.
+Thank you for being here today, and we look forward to hearing
+your testimony.
+
+ STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL PATRICK HUGHES (RETIRED),
+ ACTING UNDER SECRETARY FOR INFORMATION ANALYSIS, AND
+ INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
+ INFORMATION ANALYSIS
+
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. Thank you very much. I am glad
+to be here today, too. I may have been the victim of a
+biological attack before coming here. I am a little ill.
+ Mr. Simmons. Spread it around.
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. I am trying not to. I hope you
+will forgive me if I have to cough or blow my nose or
+something. My apologies.
+ I liked your opening comments very much. I, too, have worn
+a set of dog tags around for a long time, and have the same
+frame of reference. I note that this is quite different,
+however. I did not realize, I don't think, before I came to the
+Department of Homeland Security how different it is to come
+into my office in the morning and find myself examining a map
+of the United States and operating in the construct of our
+national values and civil liberties and rights of American
+citizens, as compared to the military application of force in
+an overseas environment. It is quite interesting to me, and has
+caused me to have to shift to some degree my mind set.
+ I think I would like to apologize to the Congresswoman for
+the delay in our testimony getting here. I would merely say we
+did submit it on time, but the clearance process did not
+respond. We will do our best, though, and your point is not
+only well taken, but understood. So thank you very much.
+ I believe from your comments and Ms. Lofgren's comments and
+others that I have to clear the air here. Otherwise, I will
+proceed in this hearing under false pretenses. My last day on
+this job will be March 15. You are speaking to someone who will
+not be carrying out for the most part many of the hopes and
+dreams that you have as a federal official, but in my future I
+will continue to support the Department of Homeland Security,
+and I will do everything I can to support the government in the
+future. I would just like you to know that, because it sounded
+like in your comments you did not know that, and you expected
+me to be continuing in this job. I hope that is not too much of
+a surprise to you.
+ Mr. Simmons. Well, you are on the hot seat right now, so
+let's just keep you there until you disappear.
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. That is fine. I am not trying to
+avoid anything. I merely want you to know my tenure here is
+relatively short. I would be glad to answer questions about
+that, if you would like me to include any ideas I might have
+about my replacement.
+ The last comment I would like to make to you all is that I
+have lived through the last year and a few months with you. I
+have come before you on a few previous occasions formally and
+several times informally. I have appreciated every opportunity
+I have had to talk with you and interact with you. I can look
+you directly in the eye and tell you that we have made
+progress. We have made a lot of progress. In some cases, it is
+not smooth or very attractive, but it is real. We are
+continuing that progress. The dedication and devotion of the
+people who are carrying out the work of the Department of
+Homeland Security, if you have that in your mind, you can never
+be in doubt.
+ We do require guidance and direction and we do require
+measuring and rating at times, and we do require a steward and
+admonition and wisdom from others. But the heart, the spirit,
+the devotion and the dedication to duty is present in all of
+those who serve in this department.
+ Thank you very much. I will be happy to answer questions
+you ask.
+ [The statement of Lieutenant General Hughes follows:]
+
+ PREPARED STATEMENT OF PATRICK M. HUGHES
+
+ Good morning Chairman Simmons, Congresswoman Lofgren and
+distinguished Members of the Committee. It is a pleasure to appear
+before you today to discuss the Information Analysis (IA) capability of
+the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This time of year marks the
+two-year anniversary of the actual ``stand up'' of the Department. We
+have really been able to support the intelligence and information needs
+of the Department for about 13 months. As we transition much of the
+senior leadership of the Department and as we anticipate the arrival of
+our new Secretary, we clearly intend to work to improve our
+capabilities, but it is important to acknowledge the tremendous efforts
+of the many individuals who have worked tirelessly to bring together a
+functional and effective intelligence support organization. I want to
+specifically mention the extraordinary men and women of the Information
+Analysis and Information Protection Directorate (IAIP) with whom I am
+so proud to have served. These superb professionals, laboring often in
+the background, are focused on the business of the Department and the
+Nation because they are 100 percent committed to our mission and our
+Nation's security. Judging from the feedback I have personally
+received, and according to my professional judgment, we--they--are
+making a difference with our effort to provide accurate, timely,
+actionable, and cogent information to the customers we serve.
+ It is also important to recognize the impressive strides made in
+the area of information sharing, collaboration and cooperation at the
+Federal level. We have worked hard to develop more robust and
+deliberate interaction with our Federal partners, particularly with the
+Federal Bureau of Investigation. Our joint efforts with the National
+Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), our relationships with DOD and the
+Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other key departments, such as
+Justice, State, and Energy, have greatly advanced our collective
+capabilities and relationships. Our current information sharing and
+collaboration environment within the government is far superior to that
+which existed before the establishment of DHS and has notably improved
+during the past year. We look forward to the advent of the Director of
+National Intelligence and continuing progress throughout the
+intelligence community.
+ Our efforts to build a DHS intelligence capability are oriented
+around three overarching imperatives. These are: building and expanding
+capacity within the Department; furthering our coordination and liaison
+efforts with all of our stakeholders, domestic and foreign, government
+and non-government; and, creating and distributing the work products
+that will ensure we all have the right information, at the right time,
+in the right way. . . to protect and preserve. In short, we are doing
+our job supporting the Department of Homeland Security and in my view
+doing it well.
+ As we evaluate and assess the roles and mission of the Office of
+Information Analysis (IA), I believe we must acknowledge IA's role
+within the broader construct of DHS. IA should be considered the Office
+of Intelligence for the Department. This essential function will
+include building out the intelligence infrastructure for DHS
+Headquarters and ensuring the establishment of common Intelligence
+Community (IC) standards that apply to the ``intelligence elements'' of
+the ``components'' of DHS. The 9/11 Commission Report specifically
+cited the continuing need to assimilate and analyze information from
+DHS' own components. IA needs to better integrate, coordinate,
+correlate and fuse these activities and the intelligence information
+they produce, in partnership with all component intelligence elements.
+IA, acting as the Departmental intelligence office, is developing a
+plan for the integration and collective application of all DHS
+component intelligence organizations in a way that will achieve greater
+synergy in this mission area. IA is and will continue to develop as the
+Departmental intelligence support element, while continuing to pursue
+its statutory obligations under the Homeland Security Act. As you know,
+IA is a part of the Intelligence Community and its funding is provided
+by the Intelligence Authorization Act, the specifics of which are
+classified. While I cannot go into classified specifics in this open
+forum, I am more than ready to discuss IA's budget with you in an
+appropriately classified session at your convenience.
+ We have a dynamic vision of how intelligence and information will
+be analyzed, how the analytic elements of the Department will be
+managed to achieve optimum benefit, and how to develop a budgetary
+strategy that will unify the programs related to intelligence
+activities and information analysis across DHS. A major collaborative
+study is currently under way within the DHS to establish the baseline
+for this effort. In addition, we seek to reshape the Department's
+efforts consistent with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
+Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) and the new authorities of the Director
+of National Intelligence (DNI).
+ No less important is the need for adequate facilities, analysts,
+and program resources to assure that the complex and difficult process
+for obtaining and analyzing intelligence is managed, operated and
+sustained. It is not sufficient to simply create authorization for
+fully funded U.S. Government employees without also providing the
+resources to properly house these intelligence professionals in
+facilities that are designed and constructed to facilitate the receipt,
+handling, analysis, and storage of highly classified material in order
+to protect and preserve our security. To that end, the 2006 budget
+request includes $38 million to allow IAIP to fit out facilities that
+meet security and information technology requirements and allow IAIP to
+access and analyze intelligence, collaborate with our partners and
+execute the mission we have been given. IAIP came into the Department
+with no legacy facilities and no predetermined permanent housing. We
+now have a plan to occupy both swing and permanent facilities that fit
+our needs, and this funding request will enable us to complete that
+plan.
+ As we work toward building IA's capability, we have framed our
+thinking around a new paradigm that seeks to encompass ``all
+information necessary to protect and preserve the homeland.'' Within
+that environment are subsets of information such as defense or military
+information, intelligence information, law enforcement information,
+homeland security information, and critical infrastructure information
+as well as public and private sector information. All of these types of
+information make up the vast array of intelligence that DHS needs to do
+its job.
+ DHS is a fully vested member of the IC and the Office of the
+Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis represents the Department
+in all IC venues, ensuring that DHS interests and requirements are
+fully represented and considered among the community. IA analysts have
+access to the most sensitive national intelligence regarding
+international and domestic terrorist threats, and the interaction with
+their peers throughout the IC continues to develop and improve. Much of
+the information we receive comes to us from IA analysts' connections to
+the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications Systems (JWICS), NCTC
+Online, the IA Automated Message Handling System (AMHS), the Homeland
+Security Information Network (HSIN), the Open Source Information System
+(OSIS), and a variety of other formal and informal (i.e., analyst-to-
+analyst) mechanisms. These information streams from external sources
+are augmented by our own internal reporting from DHS components. We are
+increasingly well informed, but not yet satisfied with this endeavor.
+ The range of intelligence and information coordinated by IA from
+the IC, and our state, local, tribal, municipal and private sector
+partners; as well as from all DHS entities with intelligence and
+operational capabilities, is both impressive and daunting. These
+entities--and their products--continue to be an important part of how
+IA does its work.
+ IA's relationship with our colleagues in the Infrastructure
+Protection (IP) Directorate is critical to our success. Jointly we are
+able to deliver threat-informed vulnerability analysis and data-
+supported risk assessments regarding our critical infrastructure to our
+constituents and customers--notably the private sector, which owns the
+vast majority of our nation's critical infrastructure.
+ IA is an integral part of the Homeland Security Operations Center
+(HSOC) effort to monitor and communicate on all matters of homeland
+security interest 24x7. Intelligence from DHS components that IA
+correlates and analyzes provides invaluable perspectives and insight
+for the entire Federal government. From a citizen providing a Patriot
+Report on suspicious activity, to Border and Transportation Security
+(BTS) reports regarding individuals of interest trying to enter the
+United States illegally, or US Coast Guard reports regarding suspicious
+activity near critical infrastructure. Such information is provided to
+IA through the same methods the larger IC uses: the physical presence
+of DHS component and IC element liaison officers within both IA and the
+Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), strong linkage between the
+HSOC and our constituents, and communication between analysts and
+leadership. In fact, the presence of representatives of 30 separate
+Federal and local representatives within the HSOC provides a
+perspective and collaboration capability that is virtually unique.
+Additionally, coordination within DHS is aided by regular meetings of
+the intelligence chiefs of each entity, led by the Assistant Secretary
+for Information Analysis.
+ It is not sufficient to just produce information. In order to be
+effective, information must be shared. DHS has developed this
+capability and in cooperation with our Federal partners and is
+coordinating information sharing among previously unconnected systems.
+For example, DHS has collaborated with the Justice Department on the
+DOJ Law Enforcement Sharing Plan. Further, the Homeland Security
+Information Network (HSIN) is a ``system of systems'' that provides
+discrete communities of interest for Law Enforcement, Counter
+Terrorism, Analysts, Emergency Management, and Critical Infrastructure
+groups to collaborate and share critical information in real time. In
+addition, the DHS network provides the ability to pull together
+participants from all of these communities, into a shared space to
+collaborate, during any period when the threat creates the need.
+Further, as a direct result of the Department's Information Sharing and
+Collaboration (ISC) initiative to cooperate and work jointly with other
+Federal partners, DHS and DOJ/FBI have established the first ever
+capability to share information between our respective communications
+and automation networks. Specifically, we were able to connect the
+Homeland Security Information Network with the Regional Information
+Sharing Systems (RISS) and Law Enforcement Online (LEO). More needs to
+be achieved but we are on the right track
+ Already, the DHS ISC Program has engaged other Federal, State,
+local, and Tribal, information sharing programs in an effort to create
+synergy by fostering mutual awareness of their key programs and
+capabilities, and creating a forum to garner feedback on policies and
+procedures under development at the Federal level. Additionally, this
+effort has resulted in the first ever capability to share information
+among the State, local, and tribal information sharing systems.
+ IAIP's fiscal year 2006 budget request includes $7,482,000 for ISC.
+The Department is budgeting an additional $5,000,000 from the Chief
+Information Officer and $4,000,000 from the Working Capital Fund to
+bring the total funding for ISC in fiscal year 2006 to $16,482,000.
+ In addition to receiving information from these entities, IA is
+routinely sharing information and collaborating at all levels--from the
+Federal Government and the IC to State and local officials. DHS
+component organizations also serve as a conduit through which
+information and warnings can pass to government at all levels. Thus,
+IA's continuous information sharing and collaboration with the HSOC,
+BTS, USCG, and other DHS entities, provides valuable information to all
+of the men and women responsible for protecting the homeland.
+ It is IA's specific focus on the protection of the American
+homeland against terrorist attack that is unique among its IC partners.
+This focus provides invaluable information and assistance not only to
+State, territorial, tribal, local, and private sector officials that
+receive accumulated threat information, but also to DHS components that
+use the information, trends, and indicators to inform and prepare
+operators and decision makers on the front line. The relationship IA
+has with the HSOC, BTS, and other DHS entities translates into
+continuous information sharing and collaboration that provides a unique
+threat picture and actionable information to those who are vital to
+protecting the homeland.
+ The Department of Homeland Security is a prime example of how
+changes have been made within the Intelligence Community, the
+counterterrorism community, the law enforcement community and the
+response community to work more cohesively as well as more
+collaboratively, and to assure information is shared as fully and
+completely as possible. This represents a dramatic change from
+conditions as they existed before September 11th, 2001 and an very
+impressive change from even one year ago. DHS plays a central role in
+the counter-terrorism and homeland security effort as we continue the
+work of communicating intelligence and information to our partners in
+the federal government as well as with the State, territorial, tribal,
+local, major city and private sector officials charged with protecting
+the people and infrastructure of the United States.
+ We are proud of our work and our place in the larger national
+defensive network and we look forward to a safe and secure future for
+our nation. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes
+my prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may
+have at this time.
+
+ Mr. Simmons. I thank you for your testimony. What we will
+do is I will ask a question and then I will go to my left and
+right by order of appearance at the time of the gavel and
+thereafter, after of course our Chairman and Ranking Member
+have had their opportunities.
+ I commanded a military intelligence unit in the mid-1990s
+that created a handbook for open source intelligence that was
+eventually adopted by the U.S. Army as doctrine. I have had a
+personal interest in open source intelligence ever since. I
+have traveled to Special Operations Command in my capacity as a
+member of the Armed Services Committee. I have gone to open
+source conferences. I have met with officials from around the
+world who have an interest in this capability.
+ It seems to me that open source acquisition or open source
+intelligence, that is intelligence that is created from the
+collection and analysis of open sources of information, lends
+itself particularly to the intelligence challenges of the
+Department of Homeland Security for two reasons. One, in some
+respects the information that we are relying on or looking for
+may come from that small municipal county sheriff's department,
+for all we know. It needs to be transmitted quickly, and it
+does not need to be classified in and of itself. Two, products
+that are derived from open source acquisition and analysis
+often do not have to have the same level of classification as
+those that are collected through other venues, so it is more
+readily available to share with the American people.
+ Cost is also a factor. Where are we in the development of
+this capability in support of the mission of the Department of
+Homeland Security, and where would you like to see us go?
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. We have explored a number of
+avenues with regard to open source information. I have been a
+proponent of it for a long period of time. I have to tell you
+that I have discovered along the pathway that I have taken,
+anyway, that there are some problems with it. A lot of
+information from open sources, much of it is erroneous, wrong.
+When we use it exclusively without cross-checking it with
+something else, we have found, I have found, it has been my
+experience, that it usually gets us in trouble.
+ So I think while I think there is great power in this
+source of information, I also think we need to tread carefully
+in using it, and understand the context in which it can be
+used. We have on our computers now in the IA element the OSIS.
+It stands for the Open Source Intelligence System that the
+intelligence community is the proponent for and now provides
+numerous search engines, databases, media files, download
+capabilities of all kinds, including photographs, pictures of
+the ambient culture and environment around the world. We have
+all that at our fingertips right now. We have had guest
+speakers on this topic we have tried to inculcate in the
+homeland security intelligence analysis the power of, the idea
+of open source intelligence.
+ I do not know whether you are familiar with a gentleman
+named Robert Steele.
+ Mr. Simmons. I am intimately familiar.
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. Okay.
+ Mr. Simmons. I think you know what that means.
+ [Laughter.]
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. Yes, I do. I do. Robert Steele,
+for all of his many interesting characteristics, has been
+something of a pioneer in this field. We have had him come and
+talk to us. It was a very interesting talk and very
+deliberative and engendered a lot of discussion. I think that
+with Robert Steele's views as something on the far end of the
+utility spectrum, you may think of never using open source
+information as the other end of that spectrum. We are trying to
+find utility and balance along that spectrum.
+ Once again, I think it has great potential and we are very
+knowledgeable about it and using it.
+ Mr. Simmons. Thank you for that response.
+ I would like to recognize the gentlewoman from California,
+Ms. Lofgren.
+ Ms. Lofgren. Thank you very much.
+ I am concerned about the number of contractors that are in
+the department, instead of full-time employees, not just in IA,
+but throughout the department. One question I have, without
+getting into the numbers, which we cannot, is whether you are
+confident that we have sufficient budget authority to actually
+have staff, as opposed to contractors, in the upcoming fiscal
+year.
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. Yes, ma'am. I believe that the
+budget authority is not in question here. Finding the expertise
+is a problem. And accompanying this, to the best of my ability
+to characterize the truth here, it is true that the contractors
+have offered us and we have taken advantage of their offer,
+some very fine people with some tremendous technical expertise
+that we were not able to acquire in any other way.
+ Back to the fiscal realities of this, those people are
+costing us more money than a federal employee would. However,
+you cannot get them. We have not been able to get them by
+hiring them off the street. They are a limited supply and high
+demand.
+ Ms. Lofgren. I know we cannot go into the numbers in this
+open session, but I would be interested in a secure setting to
+take a look at where that balance is so we can get a handle. I
+know in some of the other aspects of DHS, I have a better
+handle on the contractor-to-employee ratio and how it is
+working. I would like to do that if I could arrange that with
+you.
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. I would be happy to do it. In
+lieu of reading, which might take a longer time, I can get an
+information paper back to you that has the details at either
+the unclassified level or at the level of classification that
+we have.
+ Ms. Lofgren. Why don't you do that, and then if I have
+further questions, we can follow up further.
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. I am happy to do so.
+ Ms. Lofgren. I appreciate that.
+ In thinking about the task that you face, is it fair to say
+that the largest part of the IA job is to map the intelligence
+collected by other agencies to the critical infrastructure
+information maintained by IP? If that is the case, I am
+wondering what influence you have, if any, on the state of the
+critical infrastructure listing and analysis, and how much that
+is impairing your task?
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. First, the answer to the first
+part of your question, is that our primary or most critical
+function, my answer to that, I am sorry to say, is no. Our
+primary task and our most critical function has become, and I
+think it is logical for this to happen, departmental support
+across the board, working as an all-source intelligence
+producer for the department. That is really our work in its
+primary form.
+ The most important part of that work is to continue that
+interface between IA, the intelligence part, and IT that does
+the risk analysis and vulnerability assessment, but I will have
+to tell you that it is a little bit hard for all of us to
+understand, the risk analysis and vulnerability assessments are
+not done strictly on the basis of threat. They are done with
+civil characteristics in mind. One of them is apparent
+vulnerability to possible attack using means of attack. Another
+idea that is applied here is whether or not a particular kind
+of infrastructure has proven to be attackable if gaps are not
+closed and if vulnerabilities are not reduced.
+ Another idea behind it is the value of the infrastructure,
+whether it has ever been attacked or not. That is kind of a
+strategic assessment. As an example, I think Mr. Thompson
+mentioned miniature golf courses or something like that.
+Obviously, when you are using good common sense, not high-
+faluting intelligence, and you are weighting the importance of
+a miniature golf course against a nuclear storage site,
+hopefully most people would choose the nuclear storage site.
+That does not mean, however, that something in between those
+two extremes does not need some kind of protection.
+ Ms. Lofgren. I know my time is up, but the concern I had
+with the latter question is that in fact the miniature golf
+site is on the list and the nuclear power plant is not. So if
+part of your job is to map the threats to the listing of the
+critical infrastructure, and the critical infrastructure is
+just random, how do you do that job?
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. That should not be the case. I
+am not familiar with the specific part of the list that you are
+telling me the nuclear power plan is not on there, but let's
+suppose that that is accurate. That is a mistake and we need to
+fix that.
+ Ms. Lofgren. Okay. Thank you.
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. You are welcome.
+ Mr. Cox. [Presiding.] General, I would like to go into some
+of the numbers in this open session, and I do not see any
+reason that we cannot discuss the programmatic figures here. My
+understanding with staff is that these are all open. I would
+like to talk about threat determination and assessment,
+evaluation and studies, the homeland security operations
+center, and the new account for information sharing and
+collaboration.
+ I wonder if, just to set the stage for discussion of this,
+if you could describe for the subcommittee what each of these
+programs is in chief focused upon, starting with TDA.
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. I hope I can do this right, but
+it is not a classification issue. It is a knowledge issue, so I
+am going to have to refer to a book. The first one you wanted
+to talk about, sir, was?
+ Mr. Cox. Threat determination and assessment. Do you know
+what I can do also, I mean, we are sort of constrained to go
+through this program by program in order to talk about it in
+this open session, but I would like to get into what is the nub
+of your work. The figures that I have before me include the
+programs for threat determination and assessment, evaluation
+and studies, homeland security operations center, and
+information sharing and collaboration. I wonder if you could
+begin with whichever of these is closest to the core function
+of IA to do all source intelligence fusions?
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. Obviously, threat determination
+and analysis is a primary factor. I am not sure exactly what
+you want to know, but if you want to know if our budget is
+adequate, the answer I believe is yes.
+ Mr. Cox. To the extent that threat determination and
+assessment is central to your mission, it would disturb me,
+then, that we are cutting its budget.
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. I do not know if you should be
+disturbed about that, sir. We are not cutting it too much. The
+issue here is the threat determination, after you initially
+make it on a piece of fixed infrastructure, does not really
+need too much work after that if nothing changes. So once you
+lay down a baseline, you may not need quite the same level of
+effort that you did in the past. You do not have to re-do that
+baseline.
+ Mr. Cox. Over time, we have been working with the
+department and with you directly to make sure that you acquire
+the number and quality of analysts necessary to perform IA's
+function. To what extent do these programmatic figures for TDA,
+for evaluation and studies, for the operations center and for
+information sharing and collaboration reflect the number of
+analysts that you have at your disposal?
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. In the case of the operations
+center, there is no parallel at all. The operations center
+generally has people in it who are doing what I would refer to
+as information transfer. They are getting information in from
+any source at all. They do not analyze the information. They
+put it in the right bins. They alert people to the fact of the
+information. They pass it to others. They do any analytic
+endeavor.
+ Mr. Cox. I note that the operations center is getting a big
+plus-up of, it looks to eyeball it, of about 40 percent.
+Likewise, evaluation and studies is getting a healthy increase.
+The threat determination and assessment account, on the other
+hand, is being reduced, and the explanation that has been
+provided to committee staff is that it is due in large part to
+a decrease in purchasing from government accounts and a
+decrease in advisory services needed for this account.
+ To be perfectly honest with you, I do not have any idea
+what that means. So I do not know whether or not I need to be
+concerned. I know what our chief programmatic concerns are, and
+that is that we continue to help you build a core of talented
+analysts who can carry the full statutory mission forward of
+all source intelligence analysis, and make sure that even post-
+9/11 Act, that the Homeland Security Department is a major
+participant in the intelligence community at the NCTC.
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. I think your concern is well
+founded. If I could try it from a macro level, our overall
+budget I think is about 2 percent reduced, but money has been
+shifted around inside the structure of the IAIP to meet needs
+that we believe are present. Part of the plus-up in the HSOC is
+to handle COOP requirements and to meet the needs of the
+information flow that we anticipate is going to come into the
+department from greater feeding of information. This is raw
+information from the state and local sectors. In other words,
+we think after fielding homeland security information network,
+and that is JRIES with a new name on it, and after upgrading it
+to the secret level, we will be getting a lot more raw
+information.
+ Handling that, processing it, is part of the plus-up that
+you see there. The idea of whether or not I can characterize
+what this set of words or phrases means exactly is kind of a
+mystery to me, too. In fact, I do not know if I could explain
+it. But I think the idea here is to get the information into
+not only the operational channel, but the intelligence channel
+for analysis concurrently. Lots of information that comes,
+especially the state and local and private sector, does not
+require much analysis in its initial form. It is a spot report,
+a patriot report, a person's call-in of suspicious activity.
+ That may indeed be a piece of information that has to be
+put into the analytic environment, but standing alone it can
+also be passed to operators and actors for their initial
+appraisal of the information. To use the phrase, the phrase has
+become so unpopular, to connect the dots, the connection of the
+dots still goes on, but it kind of rests in the background for
+some of this information. The foreground is the initial use of
+the information in an operational setting, but we have shifted
+money around to do that.
+ Mr. Cox. My time has expired.
+ The gentleman from Mississippi, the Ranking Member of the
+full committee, Mr. Thompson.
+ Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Cox.
+ General Hughes, can you provide this committee with a
+breakdown of those contractor services that we are paying for
+over and above normal personnel costs, as information that you
+get back to us? You do not have to comment on it. Just provide
+to us.
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. Yes, sir.
+ Mr. Thompson. To your knowledge, are you aware of any
+problems with any of those contracting services as of this
+date?
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. I am aware of some problems.
+ Mr. Thompson. You are?
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. Yes.
+ Mr. Thompson. Can you also provide this committee with a
+listing of those problems?
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. I will.
+ Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
+ With respect to the mapping the threat to vulnerabilities,
+what is your opinion of those vulnerabilities that have been
+identified, just in general? Do you think in your opinion those
+vulnerabilities meet the test of mapping? Do you think it is 50
+percent complete? Just give me your honest opinion of it.
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. My honest opinion is that we are
+far from finished. Indeed, we are now using a term called
+``complex urban environment.'' We are treating the major cities
+especially, but also the industrial outliers and some other
+parts of the United States that have a concentration of
+activity that is of interest to us, and we believe it might be
+of interest to the terrorists, as an organism, so that if you
+kick the shin of a large complex city, the city may also get a
+headache at the same time as the shin hurt, because the thing
+is so interconnected. It is very much like an animal or a
+human. The nervous system of the city may indeed be affected by
+a kinetic blow. That is an important concept. I know it sounds
+a little ethereal, perhaps, but it is not. It is a fact.
+ So probably the most common example of this is the
+electricity. You turn off the electricity, you turn off a lot
+of capability. If you turn the electricity off for a short
+period of time, you can live with it, not a problem. If you
+turn it off hard for a long period of time, we would have
+difficulty performing some of the functions we now take for
+granted.
+ So that is an example. The electricity itself is what you
+have to attack in order to do that, or the control mechanisms
+associated with it. That fact, that idea that a hospital, as an
+example, when it runs out of fuel and its alternate power
+source does not operate anymore, and the electricity is still
+off, means that that is a vulnerability you have to assess
+carefully.
+ If you did not assess it properly and have enough vision to
+see that after 3 days you were going to run out of fuel, there
+may not be a way to get more fuel because the pumps at the fuel
+station do not work because the electricity is off.
+ Mr. Thompson. Okay.
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. More than you wanted to know
+about it.
+ Mr. Thompson. Well, I just want to know if we identified
+the hospital as a potential target.
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. Absolutely.
+ Mr. Thompson. Yes, okay. With respect to your present
+position, have you any access to all intelligence available?
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. Yes, I have, but I have to tell
+you that not everyone who works for me has.
+ Mr. Thompson. What was the problem with others not having
+access to that information?
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. There is in the intelligence
+committee, it remains to this day, a culture in which a known
+person with a certain track record, having been polygraphed and
+background investigations done repeatedly over time, and a
+certain amount of dependability built into that background, and
+perhaps maybe you could even call it familiarization, the old-
+boy network, that culture has something to do with what level
+of trust and confidence others are willing to place in you.
+ Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, if I could. So if Congress
+passes an Act mandating agencies to share information, do I
+understand you to say that that is still subject to whether or
+not certain individuals want to share that information with
+other agencies?
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. I probably would not put it
+quite like that. It is subject to the rules governing the
+information itself and who has access to it for what reasons.
+ Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, I guess my point is, if we pass
+an Act saying that these agencies have to share this
+information between them, I am now hearing that there is some
+other standard out there somewhere that prevents that
+information being shared.
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. Let me just tell you, if I may
+respond to this, this always has been in the intelligence
+business in the government, something called the ``need to
+know.'' The ``need to know'' rule still applies, and for the
+most sensitive kinds of intelligence, about very specific
+activities, the ``need to know'' rule still is at work.
+ My personal view, by the way, is it should be. You should
+not tell everyone every single thing every single day. You
+should make sure that the key persons who are involved in this
+work know the essential issues each and every day, and I
+believe that has been done in my case.
+ Mr. Thompson. Well, I think we will probably have some more
+opportunities for discussion. Thank you.
+ Mr. King. [Presiding.] All right, Mr. Thompson.
+ General Hughes, let me thank you for your service, and I
+certainly wish you well after March 15.
+ In a way, I will be following up on Congressman Thompson's
+question, or maybe expanding it a bit. Obviously, information
+analysis is a work in progress. You have described it that way
+yourself.
+ How has the passage of the Intelligence Reform Act impacted
+on that, either positively or adversely? Do you feel that the
+sharing is working the way it should? Is it better than it was
+before? Do you feel constricted? Again, how does it impact on
+the Department of Homeland Security?
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. The first part of the answer is
+it is a lot better than it was.
+ Mr. King. Because of the legislation being passed, or just
+because of the evolving of time?
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. To be very frank, sir, I have
+not personally seen or observed any change since the act was
+passed that could be attributed directly to the act. Any of the
+changes that have occurred were ongoing prior to the act being
+passed. The act is going to take some time to reach fruition,
+to have impact.
+ I think it is a very good act. I fully support it. I think
+the advent of a Director of national Intelligence is an
+important piece of that act and will cause the sharing
+function, the interoperability and commonality among the
+information systems to occur so that sharing can be better
+facilitated, and numerous other functions that we all think are
+laudatory. That will happen. It is ongoing, and much of it was
+ongoing before the act was passed. That is just a fact.
+ Over time, since September 11, I have seen a marked
+improvement. Indeed, in the past year, as I stated in my
+written testimony, there has been a distinct qualitative and
+quantitative improvement in the information that is being
+shared in the intelligence community. By the way,
+parenthetically, in what can be distinguished from the
+intelligence community, is the law enforcement community, which
+as we all know is the nexus that makes Americans nervous, but
+it is a nexus that has to occur in the battle against terrorism
+and the battle against destabilizing forces inside our culture.
+So that is working. We have a much better information
+relationship than we ever did with the FBI. Actually, it is
+improving right along. Every few days, we make some kind of
+improvement.
+ Is it perfect? Is it everything we could wish for? No. But
+the improvement is so dramatic that I am loath to criticize it
+in any way. I am happy to characterize it as something that we
+ought to keep going.
+ Mr. King. I have to ask you, is there anyone that you are
+willing to criticize? Are there any elements within the
+intelligence community, the law enforcement agencies, who you
+feel are not cooperating with the spirit of the post-9/11 world
+that we live in?
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. I am not willing to criticize
+them.
+ Mr. King. Could you question them? Could you enlighten us
+as to perhaps areas we should be looking at, where there is not
+full cooperation being given?
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. I think you ought to do what you
+are doing now, which is continuing to press the entire
+intelligence community and the culture to the degree they
+possibly can to have broad and full information sharing. Just
+continue the pressure. It is working. I, for one, ascribe that
+success not to the practitioners of intelligence, but to you,
+the Congress. You have brought pressure to bear, and I thank
+you for it.
+ Mr. King. If we were in closed session, could you direct us
+as to where we should apply more pressure, you know, in one
+place rather than another?
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. No. I do not think so. I think I
+have given you an honest answer today.
+ Mr. King. Okay. Also in your opening statement when you
+mentioned the fact that you would be leaving on March 15, you
+sort of enticed us with a statement that if we have any
+questions to ask you about suggestions that you might want to
+make, we should ask them.
+ Let me ask you: Do you have any suggestions as to the
+future, regarding the department or regarding your specific
+position?
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. I hope we can continue this
+work, strengthen it. We need the support of Congress and
+obviously we need the support of this committee and the
+subcommittees of the committee that are named after the work of
+securing the homeland. You need to be first for effectiveness,
+change, progress in the future here on the Hill. You also need
+to be our advocate to some degree.
+ I certainly make a plea for that to continue. My view is
+that we did not have the same kind of supporting mechanism in
+Congress when we first started out at the so-called ``legacy''
+or older agencies and departments did have. We are slowly
+building that. I see the permanence of this committee finally
+recognized, I think a year late at least, as a manifestation of
+that. I cannot see how you could view it any differently.
+ Mr. King. Thank you, General.
+ The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Etheridge.
+ Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me join my
+colleagues and thank you for holding this hearing.
+ General Hughes, thank you for being here. We are going to
+miss you.
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. Thank you, sir.
+ Mr. Etheridge. I wish you all the best.
+ My State of North Carolina is a participant in the regional
+information sharing system or the RISS program. My question is,
+what is the status of linking the homeland security information
+network to RISS? How do you propose that we avoid duplication
+and confusion when we try to make these linkages so they will
+work best for the American people?
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. RISS and LEO, the law
+enforcement side of that, can link now to JRIES. The names kind
+of run together here, but the homeland security information
+network is being empowered right now by the JRIES system which
+was an old Department of Defense system. That system was
+brought over to the Department of Homeland Security and put in
+place. Most people who have looked at it think it is an
+effective and efficient system. RISS and LEO both were able to
+link to it. It is not really hard to do.
+ However, I believe that what we should have is a narrowing
+down of these systems and maybe even one system with one name,
+which can then be managed technically by one organizational
+entity. That is what I would like to see. That has proven to be
+an unpopular idea because of the investment that has been made
+in each of these separate systems. There are others besides
+RISS and LEO and JRIES out there.
+ So I think another year or so of maturity and perhaps field
+evaluation may show, I am hoping it will show, that the power
+of combining these systems should be facilitated as rapidly as
+possible.
+ Mr. Etheridge. General, let me follow that up, because it
+seems to me if we can get to that, and the sooner the better,
+because we save not only time, but we will save money. My
+personal view it would be a lot more effective for the American
+people and for those who use it. Would you agree or disagree
+with that statement?
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. I completely agree.
+ Mr. Etheridge. Is there some way, then, that this committee
+can help facilitate that movement and the maturity of that
+system?
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. I think you can. I would like to
+invite you to have the proponents of the homeland security
+information network come here before this committee and give
+you their views and RISS and LEO also and others. I think that
+would be an excellent thing for you to do.
+ Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, sir. I will encourage the
+leadership to take a look at that at some point. I think that
+is real cost savings, and would be very effective for the
+American people.
+ I understand that DHS is attempting to provide useful
+intelligence to state and local first responders. How does IA
+handle the raw data and reports that you get from state and
+local officials coming in from the local?
+ For example, what is the procedure for a police officer to
+report a suspicious activity that they may find, or any law
+enforcement officer, that ultimately could be used that may
+very well forestall a major problem that Homeland Security is
+responsible for?
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. Right now, a police officer or a
+police organization will make a report through law enforcement
+channels to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and either
+concurrently or separately to the Department of Homeland
+Security. These reports can be made verbally by telephone, or
+in some cases by the RISS network or the LEO network or some
+other way, a lot of which are terminated at the Homeland
+Security operations center.
+ So the FBI gets them and we get them, generally speaking.
+There are cases where we have heard about, where reports do not
+come concurrently to one or the other. Usually, the report
+usually goes to the FBI first, and does not come to the
+Department of Homeland Security as a matter of routine. We are
+pressing to fix that by, first, advertising our role in the law
+enforcement community and asking them to follow this procedure.
+ I might add that we have begun in the past year, and we now
+have something over 300 reports that are jointly filed with the
+Federal Bureau of Investigation. Those reports carry a message
+with them in the body of the report that says if you have any
+further information, or if you have any indication of activity
+associated with this report or in any other way, please report
+it to your local joint terrorism task force and the homeland
+security operations center.
+ Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, General. I see my time has
+expired.
+ It seems like this is another area that we could press a
+little more on, because if the FBI is not sending that
+information over, and it is not being shared, that is not what
+we had in mind when we set up Homeland Security.
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. The FBI, I need to add this, I
+hope I did not characterize this wrongly, the FBI is not a
+problem in this regard. The FBI, at least as far as I know, is
+not preventing information from coming to the Department of
+Homeland Security. The local police, the law enforcement
+authorities out in the states and localities, sometimes do not
+report that information concurrently. But when the FBI gets it,
+in most cases they pass it to us, and we do the same.
+ Mr. Etheridge. Thank you for that clarification.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. King. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent.
+ Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ General thank you for your service.
+ My question deals with the credibility of threats.
+Obviously, the 9/11 report talked a lot about the need to know
+versus need to share, and how do you strike that proper
+balance. When information, before it is going to be shared,
+obviously you have to determine whether it is credible. What is
+the process for determining the credibility of these types of
+threats before you can disseminate that information out in a
+timely manner to the people who need to know?
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. That is a wonderful question
+because we live each and every day, and it is what I would
+refer to as Hobson choice.
+ Mr. Dent. A what?
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. A Hobson choice--a ``damned if
+you do, damned if you don't'' kind of choice. If we send
+information that we get out rapidly without taking some time
+with it, it is apt to be wrong. But if we take some time to
+clarify it, too much time, it loses its importance and its
+value over time. We never know. We cannot know whether it is
+accurate or not immediately.
+ So our choice has been to report it as rapidly as we can,
+knowing that that is going to lead to much information going
+out in the field which is wrong. We know that, but we are
+hoping that all the professionals that receive this information
+will somehow understand that and be able to live with it.
+ Mr. Dent. Just to follow up, we spend a lot of time around
+here trying to determine answers to questions, and thank you
+for your service.
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. Thank you very much.
+ Mr. King. The gentleman from Rhode Island is recognized,
+Mr. Langevin.
+ Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ General I want to thank you for being here and for your
+testimony. Thank you for your service to the country,
+particularly in your latest role at the Department of Homeland
+Security. You have made a great contribution.
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. Thank you.
+ Mr. Langevin. If I could just begin with IA's role in the
+intelligence community. The Senate report on the intelligence
+leading up to Iraq brought to light a tendency toward group-
+think. The information basically stressed the worst-case
+scenario, and a failure to question assumptions, if you will.
+ The question I have is, has IA institutionalized measures
+to ensure that a similar type of intelligence failure does not
+occur here, and if so, what measures are in place and are they
+effective?
+ Second, there is a truism in the intelligence business that
+to get included in the right meetings, that you have to be able
+to bring something to the table. So what products or expertise
+does IA currently bring to the rest of the intelligence
+community such that it is seen as a valuable contributor to the
+intelligence process?
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. Thank you very much.
+ In the first case, we think there is a problem consistently
+over time in the intelligence building, and you have to guard
+against it at all times. One of the things that it is up to
+leaders to do is to develop an environment in which any
+question could be asked, any premise can be challenged, any
+idea can be called to account. We just have to do that. We have
+to tell people the truth as directly and as clearly as
+possible.
+ I would place the burden for avoiding group-think not on a
+process or procedure, but on leaders, specifically the leaders
+in the intelligence community, not merely at the highest level,
+and I would certainly hold them accountable, but also down to
+the mid-grade, middle-management level. They have to let
+analysts reign in their intellectual space and be able to think
+beyond some kind of artificial limit, to be able to deal in
+concepts in their own context without some kind of constraint
+or restriction.
+ If we do not have that kind of environment in the
+intelligence community, then group-think will absolutely occur,
+you can depend upon it. I had a friend when I was in the
+military, an Israeli intelligence general. He happened to be a
+lieutenant colonel at the time of the 1973 invasion by the
+Egyptians across the Suez Canal. A captain came to him and
+said, those Egyptians are testing us each and every time we
+carry out war games, and we are not doing anything about it.
+The lieutenant colonel said, they are just war games. The
+captain said, they are not just war games; they are practicing.
+One of these days, they are going to continue. You know the
+rest of the story.
+ The lieutenant colonel later regretted his failure in this
+function, and the picture of the dead from the front there was
+an intelligence analyst with chains and a big heavy locks
+around his head. That is the issue. We just have to somehow
+generate an environment that never allows that to happen in the
+United States.
+ Mr. Langevin. General, if I could be clear in the
+understanding that you in particular in your department have
+things in place to make sure that consciously you have made
+sure that group-think is not going to be a problem?
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. I have done the best I could to
+generate an environment in which any idea is welcome, any
+thought is fine. At some point, however, decision-makers have
+to make decisions. If your decisions over time prove to be
+flawed or faulty, then you obviously have a problem.
+ The second part of your question, would you repeat it?
+ Mr. Langevin. I want to know if it is true that in the
+intelligence business, to get included at the right meetings,
+you have to bring something to the table. So I wanted to ask
+what IA currently brings to the rest of the intelligence
+community such that you are seen as a valuable contributor to
+the intelligence process.
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. I think that is right, that you
+do have to contribute. I think we are beginning to contribute
+something that is somewhat unique. I refer to it as domestic
+information. In the situation here in the United States, we are
+in partnership with the FBI that involves the concept of law
+enforcement information and intelligence all together to inform
+decision-makers and responsible parties about the context in
+which things are happening, and about potential events. This is
+not spying on the American people in any way, but it is
+understanding that there are persons inside our society and
+coming towards us who would do us great harm. We have to know
+where those people are, who they are, what their capabilities
+are, and what the potentialities are.
+ The Department of Homeland Security represents unique
+capabilities in that regard. We are the people who inhabit and
+control the borders. We are the people who inhabit and control
+the borders. We are the people who take care of the brown water
+on the shores of our nation. We are the people who sense the
+environment to protect important persons from harm. We are the
+people who administer the safety of our transportation system.
+ No one else does these things. I believe we are being
+recognized as bringing unique and very valuable, not only
+information, but skills and capabilities to the table. I will
+have to tell you that I still detect some resistance, among
+others, to mention of those ideas in the context of the
+Department of Homeland Security.
+ There is still sort of a default mechanism out there that
+when you talk about transportation security, and you might say
+TSA. If you talk about the Coast Guard, you talk about the
+Coast Guard. But over time, some development of the concept of
+an umbrella organization is gaining strength and will come to
+fruition. That would be the development of a very valuable
+concept for the Department of Homeland Security, which can
+achieve intra-component synergy among all of these
+capabilities.
+ The simple answer is, yes, we bring something to the table,
+now and more in the future.
+ Mr. Langevin. I see my time has expired. Thank you for your
+answer to the questions, and again thank you for your service.
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. Thank you.
+ Mr. Simmons. [Presiding.] I thank the gentleman for his
+questions. If he refers to the bipartisan Senate Intelligence
+Committee report of last year, the first eight conclusions deal
+with issues of group-think, and a contributing factor to group-
+think is a lack of information.
+ The gentleman from California is recognized, Mr. Lungren.
+ Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
+ Thank you for your testimony, General, and thank you, more
+importantly, for your lifetime of service. We all appreciate
+that.
+ Could you give us an idea of where you think your
+department's information analysis capability is right now? That
+is, if you have to say that complete success would be a 10, and
+we know we could never get to a 10; maybe 9 is what we can
+achieve because we are always changing for that last one. As
+you leave, where do you think it is?
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. Five to six.
+ Mr. Lungren. If it were five to six, for us to get up to
+nine, what are the very specific two or three priorities that
+you would have the department emphasize with your successor?
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. The kind of experienced,
+analytic workforce, public employees that we can depend upon
+over time, that will stay in this occupational field and
+continue to do this work for a long period of time. This is not
+conventional or routine intelligence work. It is different.
+ Second, improvement on facilities. The facilities are
+inadequate to the task. We need support in that area.
+ Three, you need a full understanding of the remainder of
+the intelligence community about what it is that we are doing,
+why we are doing it, and how we are doing it. I think that is
+the third item on the list for a reason. That is the lowest
+priority. The first two are vital.
+ I would mention that we need more time. Everyone keeps
+saying, and I heard the Chairman mention a ``two-year period.''
+It is true that we have been in existence for over two years,
+but I can tell you that we were not functional when I arrived
+on 17 November, 2003, in the intelligence business. We had 27
+people; we could not do the job. Time period has to be measured
+in capability and effectiveness. We were not effective. We are
+not completely efficient and we are not as good as we should
+be. The progress is real. We just need some more time.
+ We also need more people of the right kind, government
+employees, better facilities and structures, and we need
+understanding and support.
+ Mr. Lungren. General, when I was Attorney General of
+California, one of my responsibilities was the head of WSIN,
+the Western States Information Network, one of the RISSes
+around the country. Are we utilizing the RISSes around the
+country effectively in information gathering and sharing?
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. Probably not as effectively as
+we should. That is a process that we began this past summer by
+having people from all of the states come here to Washington.
+We began to inform them about the methods of information
+sharing at that time. We have a plan in place to have that same
+kind of gathering again this summer, and we are sending out
+mobile training teams who help people understand how things can
+be improved in that regard.
+ Mr. Lungren. Let me ask the question this way: Are we
+utilizing the RISSes as a platform to provide information to
+you? Or are you duplicating or replicating that?
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. We are using the RISS, the law
+enforcement network, and others to the degree that we can. It
+is a cooperative effort.
+ Mr. Lungren. Okay. Sure. I know you are loath to criticize
+anybody, and I will not ask you to do that here, but I will
+just give you some insights I have received from some law
+enforcement people on the ground or in middle-management
+positions. They still find a reluctance to share information
+from the feds on down, specifically with the FBI. I would
+normally say, ``Well, you are always having grousing like
+that,'' but when I was Attorney General, frankly, I can tell
+you it was very serendipitous as to whether or not we got a
+spirit of cooperation from the feds, whose need to know seemed
+to be the feds need to know, but you do not need to know.
+ Much information in the domestic arena, frankly, can be
+gathered as well and sometimes even better by the many more law
+enforcement officers we have at the local and state level than
+we do not the federal level. They are much closer to the
+street. They have more contacts. They may not have all the
+contacts in the specific terrorist organizations, but they have
+contacts with a lot of people that may come into contact with
+them. It is debilitating for them to be viewed as second-class
+citizens, and to have the feds say, we have the view, we have
+the mileage, we have the right to know, and you do not.
+ I see it expressed in this way. That is, with the color
+code system we have and the alerts that they receive, they told
+me that oftentimes they would receive these alerts without
+really underlying information. So they were told generally
+speaking the threat assessment was higher, but they did not
+have real information therefore to respond to that. That, to
+me, suggests an underlying lack of trust of local and state
+government that still pervades the federal establishment. Can
+you tell me whether you have seen that, number one; and number
+two, if you have, what steps in particular has your department
+taken to try and break that down?
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. First, everything you said I
+have heard. We may know the same people.
+ [Laughter.]
+ Mr. Lungren. We will not put that on the record.
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. I have to tell you that I think
+it is absolutely accurate. The phenomenon of the arrogance of
+the federal establishment in relationship to the state and
+localities with regard to information is well known.
+ Mr. Lungren. Well, members of Congress excepted, of course.
+ [Laughter.]
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. Sir, you can believe whatever
+you want. I have heard a lot about this.
+ [Laughter.]
+ Mr. Lungren. Better watch it, General. Be careful there.
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. I have to tell you that I think
+it is an accurate portrayal. The local effort feels like they
+are second-class citizens because of the attitude that is
+conveyed to them by some federal officials.
+ I do not think that is across the board. I think it is
+somewhat circumstantial, but nevertheless, it is a fact.
+ What we have done is, first, we are sending out a lot more
+information; that is simply a fact. We can prove that by simply
+showing you the documents we now send routinely to the states
+and localities. We did assemble them here, and we are going to
+assemble then here again this year. It is a participative
+effort. Admittedly, it was not much of a dialogue. That is too
+bad, but in the first instance we had a lot of things to put
+out to them. And they actually thought it was very worthwhile.
+ This summer, we have meetings here in Washington again over
+a three-to four-day period. We hope to make it more of a
+dialogue and we will hear from that more.
+ By the way, we have this in August, so if there is any
+possible way we could get a Congressman or a Senator to come
+and meet before that group and give your views, we would really
+appreciate it, because this kind of interaction is vital.
+ We have also established, and we are establishing over
+time, relationships with people. Some of these relationships
+are very circumstantial and short-lived. I did not meet the
+sheriff of Las Vegas, even though I had telephone conversations
+with him and talked to him on a couple of occasions. I never
+met with this gentleman personally face to face until a few
+days ago. Indeed, when I met with him, he had his share of
+complaints.
+ But he is the guy in charge of Las Vegas. What do I know
+about Las Vegas? Nothing. I am completely dependent on him to
+know primarily what is going on in Las Vegas.
+ However, he recognizes, I think as most localities do, that
+occasionally, especially in the world of terrorism, big
+problems can come toward specific towns and cities that the
+town and city do not know about. That is a fact. It is the
+nature of the larger world of intelligence and
+counterterrorism. They do not come and rest and stay in exactly
+the target place, so that everybody and their brother gets to
+know them. They project themselves into these environments and,
+usually relatively rapidly in the target area, take action.
+ So we are trying to get a mutual understanding of the
+phenomenon. We do at the national level, at the federal level,
+have something to contribute, and we should contribute that by
+passing it to the states and local authorities, and we are
+trying hard to do that. We have made improvements, and if they
+were sitting here in this room, I think they would say that. I
+think they would say, yes, things are better than they used to
+be.
+ Mr. Lungren. Thank you, General. Mr. Chairman, could we ask
+the staff to work with the General's staff for us to be able to
+see when threat assessments are made, the level of information
+that is given to local jurisdictions, so that we might be able
+to see what we are really talking about, because I have had
+these complaints from law enforcement saying they have
+inadequate information once a threat level is given to them.
+Maybe we just need to look at it ourselves.
+ Mr. Simmons. I would be happy to do that. I began my
+political career as a police commissioner, and in the post-9/11
+environment, the new model is not local, state, federal each
+doing its own thing. The new model is communication between all
+levels. I know the Ranking Member has expressed to me her
+frustration over the same type of issue. My guess is that this
+is an important consideration for this subcommittee, and we
+will certainly look into it.
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. If you do not mind, I must give
+you just another piece of information.
+ Mr. Simmons. I do not want to deny you, but the
+distinguished lady from Texas, her questions, I know she has
+been here for a while, so make it brief, General.
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. Okay, I will make it brief. The
+question you posed to me was in the context of the homeland
+security alert system, the changing of the colors. It is true
+that in the initial application of the changing of the colors,
+not much information was given. It is increasingly true, has
+been over time, since the Christmas 2003 and January, February,
+and March 2004 period, we have given more information. I will
+make sure you have the context of the question, there. But I
+think it is a very good thing to ask, to have us give you a
+better characterization of how much information we are giving
+out.
+ Mr. Simmons. The distinguished lady from Texas, Ms.
+Jackson-Lee.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. I thank the Chairman and the Ranking
+Member.
+ General let me thank you for your service, and try to go
+quickly through my questions because of the time.
+ I believe that one of the aspects of the IAIP's most
+important issues is the analyzing and integrating terrorist
+threat information and making sure that amongst any other
+agency that we relate to the homeland, I think of the FBI and
+the CIA as having their own constituency bases, even though we
+are trying to work very hard at the integration of those
+agencies, really in terms of fighting terrorism, the Department
+of Homeland Security signified to America that we are focused
+on their needs and providing them with the intelligence they
+need to understand the terrorist threat and to fight terrorism.
+ As I look at the budget, and I know that this is
+particularly related to the intelligence needs, I think a point
+worth noting is that the President's budget indicates that
+government-wide spending for homeland security increases really
+overall by $1 billion. To put this in perspective, we all know
+that we are spending about $1 billion a week in Iraq and
+probably other added dollars in Afghanistan. In particular, I
+believe that there is an intent to hire an additional 73 more
+employees, and also to seek ways of improving our ability to
+analyze and integrate terrorist threat information, map threats
+against our vulnerabilities and implement actions to protect
+American lives.
+ I know that we are going to lose your talent in March, and
+again let me thank you for your service, but how are we going
+to do that when we are looking at a potential cut of $20
+million? Might I add to that question a statement that you made
+in your speech when you were able to say that we were able to
+connect the homeland security information network with the
+regional information sharing system, and I think the previous
+question raised that question. You yourself said that one needs
+to be achieved, but we are on the right track. If you could
+expand on what you gave to Congressman Lungren, and talk
+specifically about the ability to hire employees and try to
+improve what we are trying to with this budget cuts.
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. If I understand the question
+right, ma'am, the budget cut is not an assured thing. The
+Department of Homeland Security expects plus-up in our overall
+budget as you described, and we do not expect for the budget to
+be cut back. That is our hope.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. But if it is cut back, then you will have
+difficulty fulfilling your mission. Is that correct?
+ Lieutenant General Hughes. That is true. That is correct. I
+would certainly hope that that does not happen.
+ With regard to the idea of whether or not we can do the job
+and how well we can do it, the connectivity that we have out
+there with the RISS system and the LEO system and others, this
+is an evolutionary thing. We just discovered not long ago a
+system that is run by the Federal Protective Service, which is
+part of the Department of Homeland Security, which is a portal
+into law enforcement information the Federal Protective Service
+holds. That is within our own department and we did not know it
+existed until not long ago.
+ So we are learning. We are developing over time. A lot of
+these things, even though they may seem self-evident, they are
+not. We have had to ferret them out. I think we are continuing
+to make good progress.
+ The answer I would give to you and to the person who asked
+the earlier question is, connectivity is almost everything. If
+we do not have that, and I think the Chairman is familiar,
+information not shared is worthless. That is it. That gets to
+the central idea here. We can get the information. The next
+imperative is to share it. That is what we are all about. So we
+have been trying to build and make this interconnected network
+a system of systems, whatever names you want to apply to it. We
+want to make sure it is interoperable, that it has enough
+elements of commonality so that we can pass information
+horizontally and vertically throughout the system. That is what
+we would like to do.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the General's
+views, and Ranking Member, sort of focusing on our questions,
+but let me just say that this exercise poses a very difficult
+challenge, because it is very difficult when you have
+overlapping committees of jurisdiction such as the Budget
+Committee. Your expertise and the Ranking Member's expertise on
+some of the aspects of this, still the time is not long enough
+to sort of probe General Hughes and the knowledge that he has.
+ Two points I think are key to this, and I would start out
+by saying that homeland security connotes security of the
+homeland. People think of the FBI and CIA, so you have a great
+responsibility. I think that this one sentence that he has, the
+pages are not numbered, but when he talks of RISS and the law
+enforcement online, one needs to be achieved, I think in our
+work we need to focus in on whether we have appropriate
+resources to make sure that the communication is going on in
+the homeland with law enforcement.
+ Another point is, and I think it is very important, is this
+right-to-know rule. We look forward to your expertise, but I
+wonder whether or not this committee will have oversight to be
+able to refine that in this new post-9/11 era. For example, and
+I will close on this note, General Hughes, there is something
+called OTMs at the border, the southern border, other than
+Mexican nationals coming across. That has taken a new life,
+that there are potential individuals coming across that border
+that may do us harm. The border patrol agents then become a
+greater force with respect to their need to know, and they need
+to know classified information or information at a very high
+level. I am not comfortable that even in this budget oversight
+we have focused on it.
+ General Hughes, I thank you for the one very great point
+that you said, if we cut the budget and do not provide you with
+the resources, you are not going to be able to do the job. I
+think that is our responsibility.
+ I yield back, and I thank the Chairman for the additional
+time on the clock. Thank you.
+ Mr. Simmons. I thank you for your comments. I think we are
+all aware that this is the first hearing of the permanent
+subcommittee. It is historic in that regard. The opportunities
+for us are pretty dramatic, but the challenges are also great.
+It is an area where we have to work together and share together
+to be successful. I thank you for your comments. I think they
+are right on the dime.
+ We will keep the record open for 10 days for any additional
+written comments that anyone may wish to submit. I have a few
+remarks to make as closing remarks, but I would like to
+recognize my Ranking Member, if she has remarks she would like
+to make.
+ Ms. Lofgren. This is just the beginning, obviously, and
+General, we do appreciate your being here today, even though we
+will not be seeing much of you for long. I think certain
+questions have become more ripe in our minds as we listened to
+you. The connectivity of the system obviously is important,
+whether it is the Internet or whether it is intelligence.
+Therefore, we are dependent on agencies both within DHS, but
+also without. So we certainly cannot do it today, I am thinking
+about the FBI system that we had great promise for, but did not
+produce, and how that is going to impact DHS.
+ I have spent 10 years on the Judiciary Committee paying
+attention to immigration, and I am very well aware of the
+deficiencies in the technology and that aspect, and the impact
+it has on the ability to gather information that then could be
+shared. So I am hopeful that as we move forward in this year
+that we will be able to look at those as they connect and maybe
+get some improvements that will make us all safer.
+ I did want to just follow up very briefly in writing, but
+comment that I am concerned about the ``need to know''
+information issue. Certainly, the Congress cannot micromanage
+an intelligence agency. It would not be proper, but I am
+concerned that if that is an ad hoc decision being made in the
+agency, then we have maybe failed to actually have the policy,
+the ``who voted for'' implemented. I think we have to explore
+that further, Mr. Chairman.
+ Finally, my colleague from California mentioned the
+frustration that local agencies have. I think that has improved
+somewhat with Director Mueller and the FBI task force. At least
+the feedback I am getting from law enforcement is much
+different than I used to. But what I am hearing form local law
+enforcement is that they never hear from DHS. It is invisible
+to them. So I think we need to sort through and be parochial.
+There are more people living in Los Angeles County than there
+are in over 20 states, and how we are dealing with the gigantic
+nation-state of California and whether that system is going to
+work for that state or not, and how we might format it so we
+really do have a system that is slick and works and protects
+us.
+ I thank the Chairman for recognizing me.
+ Mr. Simmons. Thank you.
+ Just very briefly, back in 1981, I became the staff
+director of the Senate Intelligence Committee, working for
+Senator Barry Goldwater as the Chairman and Senator Daniel
+Patrick Moynihan as the Vice Chairman. Try that one on for
+size, staff. The Chairman is Senator Goldwater. Well, you are
+too young to even remember who he is; and the Vice Chairman was
+Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a good Republican and a good Democrat.
+One from the west and one from the east; one conservative and
+one liberal. I sat and worked with them for 4 years as they
+initiated what I consider to be professional congressional
+oversight of the intelligence community.
+ I learned about the value of bipartisanship, and I learned
+about the value of listening to others when it comes to the
+intelligence business. I learned that you can put those
+differences aside if you are focusing on a common goal, which
+in that case was to build the intelligence community to
+preserve and protect our values and our people and our country.
+ Regrettably, on 9/11 we failed in that regard. So the
+mantle has been passed to another generation of members of
+Congress and another generation of members of the staff, to do
+what we can do to preserve and protect our homeland, while at
+the same time preserving and protecting our civil liberties.
+That is an awesome challenge. In those days 25 years ago, we
+did not have a hearing room or spaces that were ours. We
+occupied the auditorium in the Dirksen Building. Today, we do
+not have a hearing room, I do not believe. We are looking for
+one, although this is much better than the auditorium of the
+Dirksen Building, I can assure you.
+ But we should not let these little logistical challenges
+get in the way of the important work of this subcommittee and
+of course the important work of the full committee.
+ I will leave you with a final thought. For the 4 years that
+I have been a member of Congress, I have never changed the
+license plate on my car. I know some immediately go out with a
+screw driver and put on that lovely congressional plate. But
+the plate that I have on my car has the simple phrase ``kung
+ho,'' which conveys enthusiasm and excitement, but as we all
+know comes from the Chinese word ``kung ho,'' which means
+``work together.''
+ I look forward to working together with the staff, with the
+members of this subcommittee, with the Administration and
+others, to pursue the important agenda that we have before us.
+ Thank you all for being here today.
+ And thank you, General, for your participation.
+ [Whereupon, at 3:37 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
+
+
+
+ A P P E N D I X
+
+ ----------
+ --________
+
+ Material Submitted for the Record
+
+ Questions and Responses Submitted for the Record by the Hon. Bennie
+Thompson for Acting Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis Karen
+ Morr on behalf of DHS
+
+ Question: 1. General Hughes, one theme the Department has repeated
+in describing the President's Fiscal Year 2006 budget is consolidation.
+I think we all recognize that the current organizational structure at
+DHS isn't necessarily the best one, and that moving offices or
+functions can improve performance or reduce cost.
+ Some agencies, including the office that distributes billions of
+dollars to first responders, rely on IA for threat information.
+However, some parts of DHS have their own intelligence departments--
+including the Coast Guard and Secret Service as part of the
+Intelligence Community, but also TSA, the Federal Air Marshals, CBP,
+and ICE. Thankfully, many of these programs are unclassified, so we can
+talk about their budgets in public. TSA, for example, is requesting $21
+million and 99 FTEs for Fiscal Year 2006.
+
+ Question: 1. Given the trend within DHS for consolidation, for
+example the transfer of research and development activities to the
+Science and Technology Directorate, should IA have more control over
+all the intelligence operations in DHS?
+ Intelligence is integral to the successful operations of the
+Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In our efforts to build a strong
+Department from its original 22 agencies, it is critical to coordinate
+DHS intelligence functions. The ability of the Department to conduct
+its mission is enhanced when components have synchronized intelligence
+activities. The Office of Information Analysis, in concert with the DHS
+components that have intelligence activities, is conducting a study
+with the intent of developing a plan to integrate key aspects of these
+activities. That study is reviewing several elements of the
+intelligence program, including mission areas and supporting functions.
+The results of this study will be presented to the senior leadership
+this spring. IAIP will continue to work to ensure the Department's
+intelligence activities are coordinated.
+
+ Question: 2. With the first deadline on the ``Information Sharing
+Environment,'' as mandated by the recently enacted Intelligence Reform
+and Terrorism Prevention Act, occurring in less than two months, do you
+know what will be the role of DHS in operating or setting the rules for
+the ``environment''
+ The first deadline related to the terrorism information sharing
+environment (ISE) was met. The President designated John Russack as the
+Program Manager responsible for planning for, overseeing the
+implementation of, and managing the ISE pursuant to section 1016 of
+P.L. 108-458. Per our statutory authorities and responsibilities, DHS
+has a critical role in the development of all aspects of the ISE,
+including the establishment of the business rules for the ISE. DHS has
+been actively engaged in the work to date toward developing the ISE and
+will continue to have an active role in relation to this Department,
+our stakeholders, and the community at large.
+ In particular, DHS has a unique role, as defined under the Homeland
+Security Act, for sharing homeland security information with state,
+local, and tribal governments as well as the private sector in relation
+to critical infrastructure. Specifically, Executive Order 13311
+delegates to the DHS Secretary the responsibilities for procedures for
+prescribing and implementing information sharing as defined in Section
+892 of the Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296). Improving information
+sharing has been and continues to be a top strategic priority for DHS.
+The Information Sharing and Collaboration Office (ISCO) was established
+in DHS to provide focus and coordination for these statutory and
+Presidential mandates.
+ DHS is currently a key link among State, tribal, and local
+government, as well as the private sector critical infrastructure
+entities. The Department is already operating in critical information
+spheres (defense, intelligence, homeland security, law enforcement,
+private sector) and is providing strategic guidance to oversee the
+development of their intersection and collaboration to produce all
+information necessary to govern and protect and will coordinate these
+activities with the Program Manager.
+
+ Question: 3. After the 2004 elections, then-Secretary Ridge said
+that there had been a decrease in chatter and that the threat of
+terrorist attack was lower than it had been in some time. Is that still
+the case, and if so, how do you account for that?
+ Beginning in Summer 2004, we began to see a decrease in incoming
+credible and/or specific information mentioning direct threats to the
+United States. The reasons for the quantitative and qualitative
+decrease--which lasted through late February 2005--remain unclear.
+Since then, we have tracked a number of threat streams deemed credible
+and/or specific to Homeland-related interests, however we do not know
+if this is related to the natural cycle of the intelligence collection
+process or other factors more related to actual terrorist operational
+planning.
+ Despite this relative increase in credible and/or specific
+reporting since late February, we continue to lack information
+indicating an imminent threat to the United States, as well as the
+timing, targets, or methodology of any potential operation. While the
+Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the rest of the Intelligence
+Community are still analyzing each particular threat stream, as well as
+those streams collectively, they do reinforce our perception regarding
+al-Qaida's ongoing strategic intent to conduct another dramatic attack
+in the United States. This intent and possible planning is reflected in
+all-source intelligence reporting, vice a single collection discipline.
+ We note that the reporting level from vague, low-credibility, or
+undetermined sources (call-ins, write-ins, walk-ins, media
+pronouncements, etc.) regarding possible attacks on the Homeland
+remains relatively constant and numerically more significant than
+reports from ``credible'' sources.
+
+ Question: 4. What changes are being considered for the Homeland
+Security Advisory System, and will the system continue to be used in
+its current structure?
+ The Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) has evolved throughout
+the history of DHS and currently includes the flexibility to assign
+threat levels for the entire nation, or a particular geographic area or
+infrastructure sector, depending on the credibility and specificity of
+available threat information. The HSAS is a collaborative process which
+takes into account current threat information and incorporates the
+perspectives of other federal entities (both within and outside of
+DHS); state, local, and tribal partners; and private sector
+stakeholders. DHS learns new lessons and continues to improve the
+system each time HSAS level changes are considered.
+
+
+
+