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+ - A PATHWAY FOR PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN: EXAMINING THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AFGHANISTAN STUDY GROUP
+
+[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
+[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ A PATHWAY FOR PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN:
+
+ EXAMINING THE FINDINGS AND
+
+ RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AFGHANISTAN
+
+ STUDY GROUP
+
+=======================================================================
+
+ HEARING
+
+ BEFORE THE
+
+ SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
+
+ OF THE
+
+ COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM
+
+ HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
+
+ ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
+
+ FIRST SESSION
+
+ __________
+
+ FEBRUARY 19, 2021
+
+ __________
+
+ Serial No. 117-2
+
+ __________
+
+ Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Reform
+
+
+
+
+ [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
+
+
+ Available on: www.govinfo.gov,
+ oversight.house.gov or
+ docs.house.gov
+
+
+
+ ______
+
+
+ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
+43-713 PDF WASHINGTON : 2021
+
+
+
+ COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM
+
+ CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York, Chairwoman
+
+Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of James Comer, Kentucky, Ranking
+ Columbia Minority Member
+Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts Jim Jordan, Ohio
+Jim Cooper, Tennessee Paul A. Gosar, Arizona
+Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia Virginia Foxx, North Carolina
+Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois Jody B. Hice, Georgia
+Jamie Raskin, Maryland Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin
+Ro Khanna, California Michael Cloud, Texas
+Kweisi Mfume, Maryland Bob Gibbs, Ohio
+Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, New York Clay Higgins, Louisiana
+Rashida Tlaib, Michigan Ralph Norman, South Carolina
+Katie Porter, California Pete Sessions, Texas
+Cori Bush, Missouri Fred Keller, Pennsylvania
+Danny K. Davis, Illinois Andy Biggs, Arizona
+Debbie Wasserman Schultz, Florida Andrew Clyde, Georgia
+Peter Welch, Vermont Nancy Mace, South Carolina
+Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Scott Franklin, Florida
+ Georgia Jake LaTurner, Kansas
+John P. Sarbanes, Maryland Pat Fallon, Texas
+Jackie Speier, California Yvette Herrell, New Mexico
+Robin L. Kelly, Illinois Byron Donalds, Florida
+Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan
+Mark DeSaulnier, California
+Jimmy Gomez, California
+Ayanna Pressley, Massachusetts
+Vacancy
+
+ David Rapallo, Staff Director
+ Daniel Rebnord, Subcommittee Staff Director
+ Amy Stratton, Deputy Chief Clerk
+
+ Contact Number: 202-225-5051
+
+ Mark Marin, Minority Staff Director
+ ------
+
+ Subcommittee on National Security
+
+ Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts, Chairman
+Peter Welch, Vermont Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin, Ranking
+Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Minority Member
+ Georgia Paul A. Gosar, Arizona
+Mark DeSaulnier, California Virginia Foxx, North Carolina
+Kweisi Mfume, Maryland Bob Gibbs, Ohio
+Debbie Wasserman Schultz, Florida Clay Higgins, Louisiana
+Jackie Speier, California
+
+ C O N T E N T S
+
+ ----------
+ Page
+Hearing held on February 19, 2021................................ 1
+
+ Witnesses
+
+The Honorable Kelly A. Ayotte, Co-Chair, Afghanistan Study Group,
+ U.S. Institute of Peace
+Oral Statement................................................... 5
+General Joseph F. Dunford Jr. (Ret), Co-Chair, Afghanistan Study
+ Group, U.S. Institute of Peace
+Oral Statement................................................... 6
+The Honorable Nancy Lindborg, Co-Chair, Afghanistan Study Group,
+ U.S. Institute of Peace
+Oral Statement................................................... 8Q04
+Written opening statements and statements for the witnesses are
+ available on the U.S. House of Representatives Document
+ Repository at: docs.house.gov.
+
+ Index of Documents
+
+ ----------
+
+
+There were no additional documents entered into the record during
+ this hearing.
+
+
+ A PATHWAY FOR PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN:
+
+ EXAMINING THE FINDINGS AND
+
+ RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AFGHANISTAN
+
+ STUDY GROUP
+
+ ----------
+
+
+ Friday, February 19, 2021
+
+ House of Representatives
+ Subcommittee on National Security
+ Committee on Oversight and Reform
+ Washington, D.C.
+
+ The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:46 a.m.,
+via WebEx, Hon. Stephen F. Lynch (chairman of the subcommittee)
+presiding.
+ Present: Representatives Lynch, Welch, Johnson, DeSaulnier,
+Speier, Grothman, Gosar, Foxx, and Higgins.
+ Mr. Lynch. Again, good morning. The committee will now come
+to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare
+a recess of the committee at any time.
+ I will now recognize myself for an opening statement.
+ Good morning, everyone. Before we begin our first
+subcommittee hearing of the 117th Congress, I'd like to welcome
+members on both sides of the aisle and congratulate the
+gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Grothman, for returning as our
+ranking member. I look forward to working with all of you as we
+conduct meaningful oversight of the many critical national
+security and foreign policy challenges facing the United
+States.
+ Since the war in Afghanistan began nearly 20 years ago,
+more than 775,000 of our brave men and women in uniform have
+deployed to Afghanistan. More than 2,400 have made the ultimate
+sacrifice, and another 20,000 have been wounded. The war is now
+the longest in our Nation's history and has cost American
+taxpayers more than $860 billion.
+ On February 29, 2020, after more than a year of diplomatic
+negotiations led by U.S. special representative for Afghanistan
+reconciliation, Zalmay Khalilzad, the Trump administration, and
+the Taliban, signed a landmark agreement for bringing peace to
+Afghanistan.
+ This agreement was established--excuse me. This agreement
+established a timeline for the complete withdrawal of U.S.
+military forces from Afghanistan by May 1, 2021, so long as the
+Taliban agreed to begin peace talks with the Afghan Government
+and to sever its ties with al-Qaida and other terrorist
+organizations.
+ In his first public testimony before Congress on the U.S.-
+Taliban peace deal in September of last year--and that was
+before our subcommittee--Ambassador Khalilzad reported that the
+Taliban had not fully complied with their counterterrorism
+commitments under the agreement and stating, I will quote,
+``With regard to terrorism and al-Qaida in this setting, what I
+can say is that the Taliban has taken some steps, based on
+commitments they have made, positive steps, but they have some
+distance still to go,'' end quote.
+ Despite these shortcomings, the Trump administration began
+a military drawdown in Afghanistan that even outpaced the terms
+of the February 2020 peace agreement. Today, 2,500 troops
+remain in Afghanistan, even as the Taliban violence continues,
+and the security situation on the ground continues to
+deteriorate.
+ Upon taking office last month, the Biden administration
+announced its intent to review the U.S.-Taliban agreement,
+including whether the Taliban remains in compliance with its
+terms. The administration also stated its commitment to protect
+the historic gains made by Afghan women and girls as the peace
+process continues.
+ That brings us to this important hearing, and we are
+honored to be joined today by the three co-chairs of the
+Afghanistan Study Group. I'd also like to take a moment to
+thank the nonpartisan U.S. Institute of Peace for the support
+and expertise they provided to the study group during the
+course of its work.
+ In the Fiscal Year 2020 omnibus bill, Congress, led by
+Senator Graham, Senator Patrick Leahy, and the Senate
+Appropriations Subcommittee of State Foreign Ops and Related
+Programs, they tasked the independent and bipartisan
+Afghanistan Study Group to, quote, ``consider the implications
+of a peace settlement, or the failure to reach a settlement, on
+U.S. policy, resources, and commitments in Afghanistan.''
+ After nearly nine months of review and consultation with
+current and former U.S. and Afghan Government officials, allies
+and partners, and other key stakeholders, the Afghanistan Study
+Group issued its final report earlier this month. The study
+group concluded, in part, that, for the first time since 2001,
+an opportunity now exists to achieve a just and durable peace
+in Afghanistan, but this will not be easy.
+ And the current situation has left President Biden with few
+good options, as the study group explained in their final
+report--and, again, I quote--``On the one hand, the Taliban
+have signaled publicly that if all international forces are not
+withdrawn by May 1, 2021, as envisioned in the Doha Agreement,
+they will resume their jihad against the foreign presence and
+will withdraw from the peace process. On the other hand, a
+withdrawal may, under certain circumstances,'' excuse me,
+``under current conditions, will likely lead to a collapse of
+the Afghan state and a possible renewed civil war,'' close
+quote.
+ So nearly 20 years of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan might
+very well be defined by the next three to six months, likely
+with profound consequences for U.S. national security and the
+future stability of the region.
+ We are thankful for the thoughtful and deeply probing
+analysis of the Afghan Study Group, and we are thankful for the
+patriotic service of the members of that group and our
+distinguished witnesses. We look forward to their testimony.
+ And, with that, I will now yield to the ranking member from
+the great state of Wisconsin, Mr. Grothman, for his opening
+statement.
+ Mr. Grothman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I'm glad you're
+holding the hearing so quickly. And I'd like to thank the study
+group for showing up today, or whatever, at least for being at
+the hearing virtually.
+ As we discussed at last week's markup, it is, I think,
+sometimes easier, you know, if we do have hearings in the
+Capitol, at least the option to it. We've done it on other
+committee hearings, and it seems to work out OK. Not everybody
+has to show up.
+ In any event, this year is the 20th anniversary of United
+States being attacked by al-Qaida in 2001. Those brutal attacks
+took the lives of nearly 3,000 innocent Americans in New York,
+Pennsylvania, and The Pentagon.
+ Days later, on October 7, the United States launched
+Operation Enduring Freedom and invaded Afghanistan, leading to
+the toppling of the Taliban's terrorist regime. The United
+States has been in Afghanistan ever since.
+ Unfortunately, every time we meet to discuss ongoing
+efforts in Afghanistan, the same issues have come up. To date,
+the U.S. taxpayers spent over $1 trillion in Afghanistan,
+either supporting combat or construction. In America's longest
+war, we're just starting to see a light at the end of the
+tunnel.
+ President Trump reduced the American footprint in
+Afghanistan from over 100,000 soldiers during the Obama
+Administration to just a few thousand. On February 29 of last
+year, under the strong leadership of President Trump, the
+United States signed a peace agreement to gradually withdraw
+Americans. This agreement will create a safe and prosperous
+Afghanistan by ensuring that it will not be a safe harbor for
+terrorists.
+ Now, I understand, and I'll be the first to admit, that
+just packing our bags and leaving is dangerous, which is why
+we're having this hearing today. That type of withdrawal will
+create a vacuum for terrorism, and potentially set back social
+and governmental gains in Afghanistan, not to mention, I think
+it could lead to the possibility of Iran and Russia increased
+presence in the region.
+ What I do believe is that it should be our goal to reduce
+our global military footprint and bring troops home. This just
+needs to be done safely and with American national security
+interests at heart.
+ I want to thank you and your group for the hard work you've
+done to produce this report. The report makes specific
+recommendations and ought to advance American interests in
+Afghanistan and the region, such as clarifying the end state,
+working to promote the success of the peace negotiating
+process, and having an overarching regional diplomatic
+strategy. Each of your recommendations suggest the need for a
+safe, stable, and independent Afghanistan. It's important for
+the Biden administration to continue the hard work of President
+Trump to advance these goals for achieving independence.
+ I look forward to hearing from you today.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
+ Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Grothman. The gentleman yields
+back.
+ I will now introduce our distinguished panel of witnesses,
+all of whom are co-chairs of the Afghanistan Study Group, and
+two of whom are old friends, and I had the honor and pleasure
+of working with them in Afghanistan at various times.
+ We are honored today to be joined by the distinguished
+former U.S. Senator from New Hampshire, the Honorable Kelly
+Ayotte. Kelly Ayotte represented New Hampshire in the U.S.
+Senate from 2011 to 2016, where she chaired the Armed Services
+Committee on Readiness. Senator Ayotte co-chairs the Commission
+on Health Security at the Center for Strategic and
+International Studies. She is also a board member of the Board
+of Advisors from the Center on Military and Political Power at
+the Foundation of Defense of Democracy and the Aspen
+Institute's Economic Strategy Group.
+ General Joseph F. Dunford is a native of south Boston and
+Quincy. General Dunford served as the 19th chairman of the
+Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Nation's highest-ranking military
+officer. In this role, he was the principal military adviser to
+the President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security
+Council from 2015 to 2019.
+ General Dunford was commissioned in 1977 and served as
+infantry officer at all levels, to include commanding the 5th
+Marine Regiment during Operation Iraqi Freedom. His experience
+of leading large organizations included serving as the 36th
+Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, the Assistant
+Commandant of the Marine Corps, and commander of all U.S. and
+NATO forces in Afghanistan. Welcome.
+ Ms. Nancy Lindborg is the co-chair of the--is also a co-
+chair of the Afghanistan Study Group. Nancy Lindborg is
+president and CEO for the David and Lucile Packard Foundation,
+a position she assumed in August 2020. She is responsible for
+the overall management of the foundation and its grantmaking
+activities. She previously served as the president and CEO of
+the U.S. Institute of Peace from February 2015 through August
+2020.
+ So, I want to welcome all of you, and thank you for the
+wonderful work that you have done, the patriotic service you
+have rendered to our country.
+ So, before I swear in our witnesses, I should note that,
+while the U.S. Institute of Peace facilitated the work of the
+Afghanistan Study Group, the co-chairs are not affiliated with
+the Institute. However, I do wish to thank the Institute for
+the support they provided to the study group.
+ The witnesses will now be muted so we can--be unmuted--
+excuse me--so we can swear them in.
+ I ask you to please raise your right hands.
+ Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to
+give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
+so help you God?
+ Ms. Ayotte. I do.
+ Ms. Lindborg. I do.
+ General Dunford. I do.
+ Mr. Lynch. OK. Let the record show that the witnesses have
+answered in the affirmative. Thank you.
+ Without objection, your written statements will be made
+part of the record.
+ Senator Ayotte, you are now recognized for a five-minute
+summation of your testimony.
+
+STATEMENT OF HON. KELLY A. AYOTTE, CO-CHAIR, AFGHANISTAN STUDY
+ GROUP
+
+ Ms. Ayotte. Thank you, Chairman Lynch and Ranking Member
+Grothman and members of the committee for taking the time on
+this important and difficult topic.
+ We have submitted the Afghanistan Study Group's report as
+our formal testimony, representing not only ourselves, but the
+full complement of members whose congressional mandate it was
+to deliver our analysis and recommendations. It has been an
+honor to chair this study group, supported by the United States
+Institute of Peace, alongside General Dunford and Nancy
+Lindborg, and the esteemed member of--group of members who
+helped us, 12 of them, along with 26 superb senior advisors.
+ Collectively, those who contributed to this report have a
+breadth of leadership experience in foreign policy, national
+security, humanitarian aid, Democratic institutions, and
+counterterrorism.
+ The study group conducted 40 consultations with over 60 key
+stakeholders in Afghanistan, including U.S. officials and
+former officials, Afghan officials, Afghan members of civil
+society, and the private sector regional stakeholders, allied
+partners, multilateral organizations, as well as academics and
+activists.
+ We understand and we're humble about the complexity and
+difficulty of the decisions that need to be made in
+Afghanistan. However, we believe that our recommendations,
+which were just issued in January, are particularly timely.
+ This is a crucial moment for Afghanistan and the United
+States. The United States needs to decide whether we will
+continue to keep our troops in the country past May 1, the
+deadline set forth in the Doha Agreement, in order to support
+the peace process, and protect our national security interests.
+ There are currently 2,500 U.S. troops in Afghanistan. That
+number has been reduced from 14,500 over the last several years
+during the Trump administration. And now, for the first time
+since 2002, there are almost twice as many non-American NATO
+troops supporting the mission in Afghanistan.
+ Yesterday and the day before, NATO defense ministers met to
+discuss the future of our alliance in Afghanistan. Our NATO
+allies have been anxious to know what the U.S. will do. They
+have stood by us for two decades, and how we end our engagement
+in Afghanistan matters to our NATO allies, and may impact our
+ability to call on our partners in the future outside of NATO
+countries.
+ Although we thoroughly considered other alternatives which
+we detailed in the report--and you certainly can look at that
+analysis--we recommend that U.S. troops remain beyond May 1. We
+believe a precipitous withdrawal of U.S. and international
+troops in May would be catastrophic for Afghanistan, leading to
+civil war, and allow the reconstitution of terror groups, which
+threaten the United States within an 18-to 36-month period. Our
+presence in Afghanistan has contained these groups and
+protected our homeland.
+ Let me be clear. Although we recommend that our troops
+remain beyond May 1, we propose a new approach toward
+Afghanistan, which aligns our policies, practices, and
+messaging across the U.S. Government to support the Afghan
+peace process rather than prosecute a war. Our troops would
+remain not to fight a forever war, but to guarantee the
+conditions for a successful peace process and to protect our
+national security interests to ensure that Afghanistan does not
+become a haven again for terrorists who threaten the United
+States of America.
+ Our report calls for a negotiated peace that ends the war
+and allows our troops to eventually come home. We believe that
+it is possible for the United States, with the engagement from
+countries in the region and our NATO partners, to negotiate an
+extension of the May 1 Doha deadline because the process got
+off to a late start, and the conditions indicated in the Doha
+Agreement have not been met.
+ Achieving peace in Afghanistan requires conditionality on
+all sides. That conditionality includes the reduction of
+violence by the Taliban, and a demonstrated ability by the
+Taliban to contain terror groups in Afghanistan, and by the
+Afghan Government to deal with corruption and to accept that
+the Taliban will have some role in the future of Afghanistan.
+ Sustainable peace will not be possible without an inclusive
+government.
+ Chairman, if I may continue 30 more seconds? Thank you.
+ Based on our experiences and consultations, it's clear that
+civil society has been greatly enhanced in Afghanistan over the
+last two decades and has an important role to play going
+forward.
+ Finally, we recommend an intensified and active regional
+diplomacy to support the peace negotiations in Afghanistan
+going forward. After two decades of war, there is not a
+military solution in Afghanistan for either side, but the best
+hope to protect American interests and help preserve the gains
+made by the Afghan people, is to align U.S. policy to support
+the opportunity for a negotiated peace settlement.
+ Thank you.
+ Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Senator. I've been known to have a
+slow gavel, so we won't hold people to the exact second.
+ But next, we will hear from my dear friend, General Joe
+Dunford, for five minutes for a summation of his testimony.
+ General, you are recognized.
+
+ STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., CO-CHAIR,
+ AFGHANISTAN STUDY GROUP
+
+ General Dunford. Chairman Lynch, Ranking Member Grothman,
+members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
+appear before you this morning, and it's an honor to join my
+fellow co-chairs and to represent the members of the Afghan
+Study Group.
+ The Senator outlined our mandate, our methodology, and our
+core recommendations, and I'd like to briefly expand on her
+comments by outlining the key judgments that we made during our
+deliberations, and provide some further context on our
+recommendations.
+ Based on the extensive consultations that the Senator
+mentioned with key stakeholders, the experience of the Afghan
+Study Group, as well as the senior advisors, we made key
+judgments about Afghanistan in four major areas: the security
+environment, the stability of the Afghan state, regional
+dynamics, and the current peace negotiations themselves. And I
+want to summarize a few of the more important judgments so you
+can understand the logic behind our recommended approach, but
+also the framing of the alternative pathways that the chairman
+mentioned that are included in the report. These are pathways
+that we considered, but we did not recommend them.
+ With regard to security, many will point to the fact that
+the terrorist threat has been reduced, and we agree with that
+assessment, but we believe that that is because of the U.S.-
+trained Afghan forces and continued U.S. military presence.
+And, as the Senator mentioned, as a result of our
+deliberations, we believe that the threat can reconstitute
+itself in a period of about 18 to 36 months and present a
+threat to the homeland and to our allies.
+ We conclude, and it will be no surprise to members of the
+committee, that the Afghan forces are highly dependent on U.S.
+funding, as well as operational support, and they will remain
+so for some time. And we also conclude that the probability of
+civil war is high in the wake of a precipitous U.S. withdrawal.
+ With regard to stability of the state, our analysis and
+recommendations on stability of the Afghan state were very much
+informed by the work that led to the Afghan, or to the Fragile
+State Act, and our judgment is that Afghanistan meets the
+definition of a fragile state. But, despite very real
+challenges, with support, the Afghan Government can deliver
+minimally effective governance.
+ And Ms. Lindborg is going to address further how the Afghan
+or how the Fragile State Act informed our recommendations in
+Afghanistan.
+ Perhaps the most important judgments we offer concerns the
+opportunity to see enhanced regional and broader diplomatic
+effort in support of the Afghan peace negotiations, as well as
+a possible peace agreement. This issue was raised in a large
+number of our engagements. And there does, in fact, appear to
+be an end state that would satisfy all regional stakeholders,
+to include Pakistan, China, Russia, India, and others.
+ And by no means, when I outline these factors, do we
+believe it would be easy, then, to take this and create an
+overarching regional diplomatic approach, but we do offer
+foundational elements for that diplomatic approach, and they
+include an Afghanistan that is at peace with its neighbors; one
+that doesn't allow its territory to be used for attacks on
+other countries; one that is not a venue for proxy warfare; one
+that is not a source of mass migration or illicit narcotics;
+and one that is interconnected with the region.
+ Our judgments with regard to the ongoing Afghan peace
+negotiations include the fact that we believe our military
+presence and our diplomatic engagement, which are a physical
+manifestation of U.S. commitment, are actually foundational for
+the Afghan peace negotiations. We believe that continued
+support to Afghan state institutions throughout the peace
+process will be necessary.
+ And the Senator mentioned our engagements did highlight
+that the Taliban were not meeting the conditionality of the
+February 2020 agreement, and she pointed out that that was as a
+result of not seeing a broad reduction in violence, and as a
+result of not seeing the Taliban demonstrate the will or
+capacity to prevent al-Qaida from using Afghanistan as a
+platform.
+ And I want the members of the committee to know that we
+also relied on the recently released United Nations report as
+well as the January 2021 U.S. Treasury Report when we made our
+judgments about Taliban and their current relationship with al-
+Qaida.
+ The third element of that, of course, is progress toward
+peace in the former peace agreement, and we haven't seen that
+progress to date.
+ It's also important at this point that I highlight, with
+regard to the peace negotiations, that we've placed equal
+emphasis on the roles and responsibilities of the current
+Afghan Government in that peace process.
+ Informed by these judgments, we determined our approach in
+the recommendations we made. And I want to emphasize, we did
+look at all the various pathways that we believe are available
+to President Biden before offering the recommendations that the
+Senator outlined. And we did spend as much time on the
+alternative pathways as we did on our recommendation. And we
+made every effort to give this challenge a fresh look, and we
+believe that the way that we've integrated our security,
+diplomatic and assistance recommendations, does provide new
+opportunities, even as we seek to leverage the ongoing Afghan
+peace negotiations.
+ And without understating the challenges, I think each of
+the three of us would emphasize that the group was compelled by
+the argument to take advantage of the opening that currently
+exists with an emphasis on meeting our national interests,
+clarity of commitment, acting in accordance with our allies,
+conditionality, and increased emphasis on diplomacy.
+ And, Chairman, I look forward to your questions which will
+allow us to examine our work and these recommendations in more
+detail. Once again, thank you very much for conducting this
+hearing on such an important and timely topic.
+ Mr. Lynch. Thank you, General.
+ Ms. Lindborg, you are now recognized to give us a five-
+minute summation of your testimony. Thank you.
+
+ STATEMENT OF HON. NANCY LINDBORG, CO CHAIR, AFGHANISTAN STUDY
+ GROUP
+
+ Ms. Lindborg. Thank you. And I add my thanks to Chairman
+Lynch, Ranking Member Grothman, and members of the
+subcommittee. Thanks for this opportunity to discuss the report
+of the congressionally mandated Afghan Study Group. It has been
+an honor to serve alongside my two very distinguished co-
+chairs, and all the members of the Afghan Study Group.
+ My co-chairs have ably described the core approach and key
+recommendations of the report. I will simply go beyond their
+comments to emphasize that we do believe that there is an
+important opportunity to pursue a negotiated peace that has not
+existed before, and we're clear there is no military solution,
+and, therefore, recommend this new approach that, for the first
+time, creates this clear goal of a negotiated peace; enables us
+to align our messaging policies and practices; and, as you
+heard from General Dunford, puts a heavy emphasis on
+partnership with our allies and regional diplomacy.
+ These recommendations build on the work of previous study
+groups that have focused on the links between fragile states
+and violent extremism. And, as the former president of U.S.
+Institute of Peace, I was pleased to be a part of two of these
+study groups, and to witness, in December 2019, the signing
+into law of the Global Fragility Act with bicameral and
+bipartisan support.
+ These studies, and the Global Fragility Act, informed our
+deliberations by underscoring that fragile states, which are
+characterized by the breakdown of the social compact between
+the state and its people, provide a breeding ground for violent
+extremism. And we learned from 9/11 that state fragility
+presents a threat to our security even when geographically
+remote, and Afghanistan certainly qualifies as a fragile state.
+ So, we understand the fatigue of dealing with Afghanistan,
+so let me underscore we are not recommending a blank check to
+the Afghan Government. The report is clear about the importance
+of ensuring that not just the Taliban, but also the government
+of Afghanistan is held accountable for meeting conditions. The
+government must engage seriously in the peace negotiations, as
+well as exercise greater responsibility in curbing corruption.
+ The continued corruption and lack of access to justice for
+too many of their citizens consistently results in widespread
+grievances that are easily exploitable by the Taliban. This is
+a common characteristic of fragile states that often leads to
+violent extremism.
+ So, the report, therefore, lays out an approach that's
+based on the core principals of the Global Fragility Act: first
+and foremost, a shared goal across our security, development,
+and diplomacy efforts, and then focused coherent international
+support to keep key institutions functioning, in this case,
+until there is a peace agreement; working with our allies, as
+agreed upon in the 2020 Geneva donor conference that lays out
+four years of strict conditions, we should put large
+infrastructure or other expansive projects aside for now,
+continue our support for essential humanitarian assistance,
+basic services, and, importantly, support for civil society.
+ The growth of civil society over the past two decades,
+which now includes a new generation of young Afghans, is a
+bright spot, and they have consistently and courageously
+elevated critical values of human rights, women's rights, and
+democracies, which we believe are fundamental to a future
+stable Afghanistan. They are the constituency demanding a
+sustainable peace.
+ So, ultimately, a peaceful Afghanistan that doesn't present
+a threat to the region, or to the United States, it will
+ultimately require an inclusive, accountable government able to
+sustain a social compact with its citizens. This will take a
+long time. But first, it requires peace and a stop to the
+fighting.
+ So, I will just underscore the moment that we have before
+us by focusing seriously on the peace process. We have, for the
+first time, this opportunity to align messages, policies, and
+actions, because too often in the past, we've pursued military
+victory at the same time as a peace process. We've surged while
+announcing withdrawals. We've let short-term counterterrorist
+interests undermine long-term institution building. Our
+multiple objectives pursued with multiple tools by multiple
+parts of our government bureaucracy have often undermined each
+other.
+ We have confused our Afghan partners and regional actors,
+which often leads to hedging behavior that has further
+undermined our ability to achieve our objectives and withdraw
+military forces.
+ So, this report calls for a new approach, calls for a
+negotiated peace that ends the war and allows our troops to
+come home with honor, recognizing that this requires effective
+conditionality on all sides, but that a negotiated peace would
+best serve American interests and help preserve the gains of
+the Afghan people over the last two decades.
+ Thank you.
+ Mr. Lynch. Thank you very much.
+ The chair now recognizes himself for five minutes for
+questions.
+ So, we're at an important crossroads right now. I do
+appreciate the report. I want to recommend to the members--so
+the report--the Afghan Study Group report is about 88 pages,
+but I thought some of the most helpful material was at the very
+end. And, you know, sort of as--not as an afterthought, but as
+an addendum.
+ There are four pathway alternatives. As I understand it,
+the Afghanistan Study Group began to write this report prior to
+a time when we knew who was going to be the next President. So,
+I think it's helpful to know that, in the context of this
+report, the group did not know whether they were advising
+President Biden or President Trump. And I think that makes it a
+better report.
+ I do want to say that, of the four pathways and the red-
+team analysis, you know, present very different scenarios, but
+I would recommend that members read those to understand the
+likely consequences of choosing one path versus another.
+ So, my question to the panel really--and I know you've each
+taken, you know, slices of your responsibility during your
+testimony, but, OK, so May 1 comes. We know that the Taliban
+anticipates complete withdrawal. The previous administration
+pointed to a timeline-specific determination that they would
+withdraw. But, at the same time, we see that the global
+terrorism index has Afghanistan at the top of the list. It has
+had more terrorism than any other nation on the planet. Twenty
+of the largest terrorist attacks on the planet last year, six
+of them were in Afghanistan.
+ We've got a pattern of assassination ongoing right now,
+major government officials being assassinated, religious
+leaders assassinated, journalists assassinated, judges
+assassinated, all personnel who are, I think, inimical to
+Taliban rule. You know, they're eliminating their opponents.
+ So, my question is: We come up to May 1, and we announce--I
+guess we announce an extension of our presence there, and I'm
+concerned because, even now, even now, we have force protection
+issues, and I think General Dunford has spoken to that
+previously.
+ What does it look like? What does it look like? And I don't
+expect that we have an opportunity between now and May 1 to
+negotiate an extension with the Taliban. They seem to be of a
+mind that, you know, they've been led to believe by the earlier
+administration that May 1, we're gone.
+ And so tell me what that looks like? Tell me how that rolls
+out in terms of next steps if we chose that path, that we
+extend the date of withdrawal? Does it require us to put in
+more troops for force protection?
+ I know that the previous Secretary of Defense, we met with
+him in Afghanistan, and he recommended that there be a minimum
+of 4,500 troops for force protection services--purposes, and
+now, we're a couple thousand below that.
+ So, tell me what that looks like on May 1 if we adopt your
+primary recommendation of extending the deadline and adopting
+the four initiatives that you've recommended?
+ And anyone who feels, you know, best able to answer that,
+go right ahead. I know you're all equally capable.
+ General Dunford. Chairman, I'll start, and then--and let
+the other co-chairs fall in on it. I mean, that is--what you've
+got in that is the critical question. And I would say upfront
+that we have humility about our ability to predict what the
+Taliban will or won't do if we stay past the 1st of May, but
+there are some factors that we considered.
+ No. 1 is, what leverage do we have over the Taliban? And
+there is three things that we look at when we think about the
+Taliban; one is they want relief from sanctions; the other is
+they want international legitimacy; and the third is that they
+recognize that, regardless of the future character of the
+Afghan Government, continued international support is going to
+be required.
+ So, to mitigate the risks associated with May 1, we're not
+advocating for a unilateral declaration that we remain behind
+after the 1st of May. We're recommending that the Taliban
+actually hear that same message from other regional
+stakeholders, not the least of which is China, Russia, and
+Pakistan.
+ And, so, we do think that continued negotiations with the
+Taliban to highlight the fact that we remain committed to the
+February 2020 agreement, and we've demonstrated that by drawing
+down to 2,500, we remain committed. But due to the reasons that
+my co-chairs outlined in their opening statement, we haven't
+had the time to fully implement the agreement, and the core
+conditions outlined in the agreement haven't yet been met.
+ So, the mitigation is both in terms of the approach that we
+would take in conjunction with others, as well as the
+narrative, if you will, about why an extension past May 1 is
+required.
+ The second question you asked is also an important
+question, which is: Do we need to increase forces if the
+Taliban don't accept an extension past the 1st of May, and if
+they then would re-initiate attacks against U.S. Forces?
+ And, Chairman, we heard exactly what you heard. In the
+fall, what we were told by commanders on the ground and the
+Department of Defense was that 4,500 U.S. Forces, in addition
+to the NATO forces that are there, was the minimum level to
+address both the mission as well as protection of our forces in
+the context of the conditions that existed in the fall. And, as
+you've highlighted, those conditions have only gotten worse
+since the fall.
+ So, in our judgment, 2,500 would not be adequate should the
+Taliban re-initiate attacks against the United States, and
+we've recommended that the administration engage with the
+leadership to make sure President Biden has that information as
+he makes his decision.
+ But I think the important thing is that we believe that the
+impact of the May 1 decision can be mitigated, again, with both
+diplomacy, and by using leverage. Sometimes we think we don't
+have any leverage over the Taliban. They have been using
+violence to gain leverage in the negotiations, but we assess
+that the Taliban recognize that they cannot achieve their
+political objectives merely through violence, and particularly
+in those three areas that I mentioned.
+ I'll stop there and see if the other co-chairs want to add
+to that.
+ Ms. Ayotte. What I would just add is that the regional
+partners--some aren't partners, some are just regional
+countries--for us, have an interest. While they want us to
+leave, it's--they understand it creates a very big problem for
+them if we precipitously leave in terms of migration, in terms
+of the civil war in Afghanistan to their own interests.
+ And, so, they also--in this negotiation process, it is why
+we recommend sort of a re-invigorated regional diplomacy in the
+context not just of the peace negotiations going forward, but
+in renegotiating this May 1 deadline. And we heard that with
+our consultations from the regional countries that we were able
+to connect with, including Pakistan. And, so, I think that will
+also help leverage this with the Taliban.
+ Ms. Lindborg. Chairman, I would just add, thank you for
+noting the pathways that are included in the report, and I do
+commend those, because we looked very carefully at what the
+alternatives are, understanding that, you know, these are not
+great choices, but that we believe that the recommendations
+provide the best options, and enable us to test the proposition
+that this is the possibility for peace against an almost
+certain outcome of collapse and civil war were we to leave,
+without the conditions having been met on May 1.
+ Mr. Lynch. Thank you very much.
+ I will now recognize the ranking member, the gentleman from
+Wisconsin, Mr. Grothman, for his five minutes of questioning.
+ Mr. Grothman. Thank you. We've been in a conflict with
+Afghanistan for two decades. Last fall, we had the Doha
+Agreement. I'll ask any one of you: Is it a fair
+characterization to say that, without this agreement, there
+wouldn't be peace talks now between the Afghan Government and
+the Taliban?
+ Ms. Ayotte. Yes. I think we need to acknowledge that this
+was important to bring these peace negotiations forward. It's
+hard to go back and know whether it would have happened, but it
+clearly--the push toward the peace negotiations was a very
+important step by the Trump administration that brought us to
+this point.
+ Mr. Grothman. When we negotiate with the Afghan--with the
+Taliban, do you feel that it is enough a monolith or whatever
+that they have the ability to stick with their side of the
+deal?
+ General Dunford. Ranking Member Grothman, what I would say
+is that we believe the leadership of the Taliban can speak with
+one voice, and the evidence of that was, in the early days when
+there was an agreement to have a complete cease-fire for a
+period of time, the Taliban actually had the authority and had
+the ability to effect that cease-fire.
+ So, we know that there is a degree--a high degree of
+control by Taliban leadership over all their fighters. I would
+not, my own judgment, use the word ``monolith,'' and it's not
+automatic that, if we make an agreement with Taliban
+leadership, that all their fighters across Afghanistan will
+stop fighting.
+ I do think it's fair to say that we can affect a
+significant reduction of violence and set conditions such that
+the Afghan forces are much more capable of providing security
+should the character of government change.
+ Mr. Grothman. You mentioned before the problems we have
+with the current Afghan Government. What do the--I guess
+because Afghanistan itself is nowhere near a monolith, what do
+the people of Afghanistan think right now of the Taliban, of
+the Afghan Government? And I talked to a guy who was over in
+Afghanistan about four years ago, who worked for me a little,
+What do they think of the United States?
+ General Dunford. Yes. I can start just--my mic's open and
+then let the other co-chairs jump in. But the one thing that we
+heard universally from the Afghans--and we spent a lot of time,
+as the other co-chairs mentioned, with civil society, Afghan
+leaders, and there is a very strong consensus for peace inside
+of Afghanistan. But, to be candid, not peace at any cost.
+ And they all emphasized the need to protect the gains that
+have been made in Afghanistan over the past two decades with
+regard to civil society, women, and so forth. And they also
+said that any future Afghanistan must be consistent with the
+values that are memorialized in the current constitution.
+ And, with regard to--and now I'm not speaking of the
+Taliban, but I'm speaking about Afghans that are in the
+government and civil society. I think, universally, they
+recognize the important role that the United States continues
+to play in brokering a peace agreement and bringing stability
+and security to Afghanistan. I don't think it would be an
+overstatement to say that they view us as indispensable in that
+regard.
+ With regard to the Taliban, I think I would just conclude
+by saying there is a high degree of mistrust across Afghan
+society about the Taliban, and about the ability to have them
+included in a future government. But this is really the gist of
+what has to occur inside of the Afghan peace negotiation is,
+they've got to come up with a framework within which there can
+be a character of government that is consistent with the values
+of the constitution, and yet, allows the political differences
+that clearly exist in Afghanistan to be settled without force.
+ And I'll let the other co-chairs followup if I've missed
+something.
+ Ms. Ayotte. One thing I would comment on is that the
+Afghanistan of today is different than the Afghanistan that the
+Taliban ruled 20 years ago, and that's because of civil
+society. And the notion that the members of this civil society
+and the people are going to accept that same kind of rule, I
+think, is a very different situation and that that won't be
+acceptable to them if we go back to 20 years ago.
+ So, just a point that we heard over, and I'm sure many of
+you have also heard that when you traveled to Afghanistan.
+ Mr. Grothman. Yes. It's kind of interesting. I was struck
+by the number of young people on social media. I mean, that, by
+itself, I would think, would dramatically change the thinking
+of the average person as opposed to the more agrarian society
+that we had 20 years ago.
+ I'll narrow it down, though, because I talked to a guy who,
+as I said, worked for me. Do the average Afghans have a high or
+low opinion of the United States? Does it bother them that
+they're there? Do they like us? Do they view us as a positive
+force, or do they view us as a bunch of outsiders and they wish
+we'd get out of there?
+ General Dunford. My own experience, in that regard, is it's
+not one voice. I think all Afghans, out of pride, would wish
+that they could protect themselves and not require U.S. Forces
+to be there. I think that's a fair statement.
+ Clearly, those of the same ideology as the Taliban want the
+United States gone. I think, universally, the assessment of the
+rest of the Afghans, even those that want to see us eventually
+gone, recognize, that at least for the near term, and
+particularly in the context of bringing about peace and getting
+a peace agreement for the Afghan peace negotiations, they want
+the United States, perhaps, to leave at some point, but not
+precipitously.
+ Mr. Grothman. OK. I'll give you another question about, in
+general, the Afghan Government.
+ Mr. Lynch. The gentleman's time has expired.
+ Mr. Grothman. Oh, I'm sorry.
+ Mr. Lynch. That's OK. That's OK. And, if we want to go back
+to a second round, we can do that.
+ But I do want to recognize the chairwoman of the full
+committee, Mrs. Maloney, for five minutes for her questioning.
+ Mrs. Maloney. Thank you so much, Chairman Lynch, and thank
+you so much, Ranking Member Grothman, for your continued
+efforts on the oversight of the U.S. war in Afghanistan.
+ Last Congress, under your leadership, this subcommittee
+held multiple hearings and briefings that highlighted the
+importance of U.S. support for women and girls in Afghanistan.
+In fact, you and I received a letter last week from the Afghan
+Government's chief negotiator along with four female diplomats
+on the Afghan team involved in the peace process.
+ Mr. Chairman, I would like permission to enter this into
+the hearing record. In the letter, the negotiators wrote that
+our hearings, quote, ``sent a strong message that there is
+accountability and that the women and negotiators must be
+listened to, respected, and that the issues they speak about
+must be taken seriously.''
+ They said, and I quote, ``The two hearings also gave us the
+assurance that we will not be alone in demanding a just and
+practical political settlement that one that guarantees equal
+rights and opportunities for all people,'' end quote.
+ Ms. Lindborg, do you think public messaging from
+Washington, including during congressional hearings, sends a
+strong signal to the Taliban that the U.S. expects them to
+respect and protect the rights of Afghan women and girls?
+ And thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership on
+this, and put this in the record.
+ Mr. Lynch. Without objection, the lady's submission is
+accepted into the record.
+ Mrs. Maloney. So, Ms. Lindborg?
+ Ms. Lindborg. Great. Thank you, Chairwoman Maloney, and
+thank you for your leadership on these issues.
+ I think that the letter underscores both the extraordinary
+progress of the Afghan women over the last several decades and
+the important role that they're playing now. And, absolutely, I
+think it's important for there to be continued signals and
+expressions of support for preserving those gains, and also for
+ensuring that they have a voice at the negotiating table.
+ We know from research that having a voice at the table
+makes a difference in creating a more lasting and durable peace
+agreement.
+ So, thank you for entering that.
+ And I would--I would also note, building on the previous
+question, that women in, particular, are terrified that the
+U.S. will leave precipitously, and understand that their--that
+we haven't met the conditions yet for the peace negotiation to
+really move forward in a more effective way.
+ Thank you.
+ Mrs. Maloney. Thank you, and I'm also encouraged that
+President Biden's National Security Advisor recently made clear
+to his Afghan counterpart that the gains that have been made by
+women and other minority groups must be protected as part of
+the peace process.
+ Nevertheless, I think we can all agree that the gains
+Afghan women have made since 2001 are fragile, and I have deep
+concerns that they may be at risk if the Taliban returns to
+power.
+ The study group itself acknowledges that there is, quote,
+``realistic and widespread fear that women will be marginalized
+in the public space should the Taliban return.''
+ And, in a recent report, the special IG for Afghanistan's
+reconstruction cautioned that a narrative has formed in
+Afghanistan that, quote, ``The country can either have women's
+rights at the cost of peace, or peace at the cost of women's
+rights,'' end quote.
+ Senator Ayotte, if the Taliban overrun or enter a power-
+sharing agreement with the Afghan Government, do you expect an
+effort to roll back the rights of Afghan women and girls?
+ Ms. Ayotte. Chairman, thank you.
+ First of all, I think this is a very important issue for
+the negotiations. And we heard loud and clear from civil
+society, especially women's groups, that they did not want to
+be marginalized, and that's why the government itself does have
+women negotiators at the table.
+ And just to put in some perspective, as it's outlined in
+our report, in 2001, when the Taliban were in Afghanistan, zero
+girls were educated. Now, over 3 million girls are educated.
+There are women in the government; there are women in the
+society, in the private sector.
+ And so, in order for a peace agreement to be successful,
+this issue of inclusivity will have to be addressed, because I
+do not believe that the women who are engaged now are going to
+accept a government that has no role for them or where they are
+marginalized. So, this is obviously a very key issue at the
+negotiating table.
+ Mrs. Maloney. Thank you.
+ And, General Dunford, last, what impact would that
+ultimately have on the future security and stability of
+Afghanistan, and what is the best way for the U.S. to continue
+to insist that women's and girls' rights must be respected in
+any agreement? General Dunford?
+ General Dunford. OK. Thank you, Chairwoman Maloney.
+ And what I would say is that we highlighted the issue of
+women's rights and values in a future Afghanistan consistent
+with the constitution for two reasons, and it wasn't just
+because it was the right thing to do; we actually assessed that
+stability and security cannot be achieved unless we have a
+future Afghanistan consistent with the values in the
+constitution and unless women's rights are respected. And that,
+again, was not the--just the assessment of the group. It came
+from those 60 engagements that we conducted, and we heard this
+universally.
+ And I believe the second part of your question is a really
+important one, is, so--well, how do we ensure that this
+happens? And this is why we believe that our facilitation of
+the Afghan peace negotiations and subsequent support for any
+peace settlement and implementation is so critical, because I
+think the United States, both with regard to resources and
+influence, can assist the Afghan Government in forming a future
+government where the character actually does respect women, and
+again, those values memorialized in the constitution.
+ Mrs. Maloney. Thank you.
+ In closing, thank you all for all of your work. And thank
+you, Chairman and Ranking Member. We have seen, again and
+again, that women's participation in resolving conflict is
+essential to sustainable peace. It is critically important that
+we in the United States continue to support the women and girls
+of Afghanistan and around the world.
+ Again, thank you for your work, and I yield back.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Lynch. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
+ And the chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona,
+Mr. Gosar, for five minutes.
+ Mr. Gosar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
+having this hearing this morning.
+ I want to begin with part of the premise of the study
+group's findings, which is adapting the current withdrawal
+structure in place from one focused on counterterrorism and
+troop reduction to one where troop withdrawal is based on
+permanent Taliban cease-fire, and the cessation of
+indiscriminate violence against the Afghan people.
+ Essentially, we're discussing war termination and banking
+the concept that U.S. involvement in a current civil war in
+Afghanistan will end when the primary threat, the Taliban, has
+committed to peace.
+ My main concern here is that we're hanging our future plans
+on such an expectation that seems rather impossible. Since
+2001, United States has been attempting to meet these
+conditions with little success. In fact, this year----
+ Mr. Lynch. Mr. Gosar, you might be muted. Sorry.
+ I think Mr. Gosar is freezing up. Let's see if he comes
+back.
+ [Audio malfunction.]
+ Mr. Lynch. Mr. Gosar, you were muted or frozen for a good
+portion of that testimony, or question. I'm not sure if we can
+correct the situation.
+ Mr. Gosar. Can you hear me?
+ Mr. Lynch. All right. We're going to try to resolve Mr.
+Gosar's technology problem. But, in the meantime, I would like
+to go to the next Republican member, the gentlelady from North
+Carolina, Ms. Foxx.
+ Ms. Foxx. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
+ And I want to thank our witnesses very much for their very
+good presentation and your opening comments, and I'd like to
+wish Chairwoman Maloney a happy birthday. I thank--I don't know
+if she's still there, but I wish her a happy birthday.
+ To the witnesses today--and, again, thank you all for being
+here and for your work. Your report--I'm wanting to ask the
+same question that Chairwoman Maloney asked--I'm glad she did--
+about the women in Afghanistan, and I'm pleased to hear your
+responses on that.
+ Your report says that an irresponsible withdrawal of U.S.
+Forces risks a new civil war in Afghanistan. I agree that a
+withdrawal should be done responsibly, but I'm concerned that
+the threat of a civil war may not be avoidable.
+ The Department of Defense lead inspector general report on
+Operation Freedom Sentinel, released this week, states that the
+Taliban have not agreed to any substantive matters in the peace
+talks and said that the group is deploying violence across the
+country to increase its leverage in the negotiations.
+ Is it possible that the Taliban have no interest in coming
+to a lasting peace and that a civil war will be the ultimate
+outcome if U.S. troops leave Afghanistan?
+ And I'll ask that question to General Dunford.
+ General Dunford. Congresswoman, thank you for that
+question.
+ Look, my short answer is, is it possible that civil war
+will result regardless? I would have to say in candor, yes, it
+is possible.
+ I think what is important, though, for us to consider--and
+I think it really gets to where Congressman Gosar was going as
+well--is what's different today than has been the case over the
+past 18 or 19 years, and I think the difference is that we have
+the Taliban at Doha in discussions with the Afghan Government.
+And we have an opportunity in a short period of time to
+determine whether or not they're sincere in wanting peace, and
+we have an opportunity in a short period of time to see if
+there's a framework within which the compromise that's
+necessary for a reduction in violence and in a future
+government can be determined.
+ And so, Congresswoman Foxx, that's why we offered the
+alternate pathways, because our real recommendation is: Take
+advantage of this opportunity as it exists right now and it
+hasn't existed for the last 18 or 19 years. And all of the
+other pathways that we outline in the report will still be
+available to President Biden subsequent to determining whether
+or not the Afghan peace negotiations can be successful or not.
+ So, that's why we really do focus on taking advantage of
+the opportunity and testing the theory of the case. Because we
+are humble, I think, all of us, about our knowledge of what the
+future will be, but we have to deal with what the facts are
+that we know. And the facts that we know are that there is
+ongoing discussions at Doha, so let's see if we can make
+something of them.
+ Ms. Foxx. Thank you.
+ Senator Ayotte, your report highlights the need for
+continued economic support for the essential institutions of
+the Afghan state, including security institutions.
+ I understand the need to provide support for these
+institutions to ensure stability within the country. However,
+it concerns me and it concerns my constituents a lot that we
+have been investing in Afghanistan for the better part of 20
+years and likely will for the foreseeable future.
+ Can you discuss how much longer you envision the U.S. and
+our partners' aid being necessary to support Afghan
+institutions and how we can assure that that aid is being used
+as efficiently as possible?
+ Ms. Ayotte. Yes. Thank you, Congresswoman Foxx.
+ I think your constituents rightly are concerned about this.
+And I know that all the work done by the inspector generals
+over the years in Afghanistan have highlighted areas where we
+have invested, for example, in some of these major
+infrastructure projects that really have not borne fruit and
+have wasted taxpayer dollars. So, this is a very important
+issue to focus on.
+ Yes, we will need to continue to support the Afghan
+institutions. In our report, we lay out that that should be
+done consistent with the outline of the Global Fragility Act,
+which all of you passed, and focusing really on targeted aid
+that supports the major institutions, and hold that aid as
+targeted, conditional; hold people accountable.
+ And, also, in terms of the Afghan National Security Forces,
+it's going to be important that we continue to support them.
+Because without that support, obviously, the security situation
+in terms of protecting our own national security interests will
+devolve further. So, we do need to continue to do that.
+ I'm also, with your permission, going to ask my colleague
+Nancy Lindborg, who has really worked very closely on this
+particular issue, to jump in, if that's OK.
+ Ms. Foxx. Certainly. Thank you.
+ Ms. Ayotte. Thank you.
+ Ms. Lindborg. Yes. Thank you, Congresswoman Foxx. It's
+absolutely an important question. The report details how we can
+reduce the levels of assistance while providing the kind of
+focus that Senator Ayotte just identified.
+ And, also, we have the opportunity to work more closely
+with our allies and our partner donors to move forward what was
+agreed upon in Geneva in November: four years of very strict
+conditions, and conditions based on holding the Afghan
+Government responsible for upholding the kind of rights and
+rule of law and reduction in corruption that are absolutely
+essential for the kind of state that can more effectively be
+stable into the future.
+ We've seen that the lack of justice for particularly rural
+residents creates the opportunity for the Taliban to come in,
+exploit those grievances, and gather recruits.
+ So, it's important for the security of the country to have
+the kind of assistance that promotes that better governance.
+That's the core of the Global Fragility Act.
+ Ms. Foxx. Thank you.
+ Mr. Chairman, I don't have a clock, but I suspect my time
+has expired, and I will yield back.
+ And, again, thank the panelists, and thank you, Mr.
+Chairman, for your leadership on this.
+ Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentlelady.
+ The gentlelady yields back.
+ The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Vermont, Mr.
+Welch, for five minutes.
+ Mr. Welch. Thank you very much.
+ I really appreciate the panelists and your report that is
+extremely helpful, and I thank all of you.
+ And I want to particularly thank, of course, General
+Dunford for your service but also, through you, for the brave
+men and women who served us and all those who died. Thank you,
+General.
+ A couple of things.
+ No. 1, Senator Ayotte mentioned that the effort here is to
+promote a peace process, not a war process, is the ultimate
+resolution. But we've been there 20 years, and I've come to
+certain conclusions.
+ One is, we can't trust the Taliban. That's pretty obvious.
+No. 2, we can't have confidence in the Afghan Government. It's
+been corrupt; it's been ineffective. No. 3, if we're going to
+have a process that requires us to trust the negotiated outcome
+with the Taliban, I'll lack confidence in that.
+ And, General Dunford, I think you outlined areas where we
+have some leverage. And those were that the Taliban wants
+relief from sanctions, it wants international recognition, and
+it wants international help.
+ So, the question I have is not so much about the May 1,
+because we know that's a somewhat subjective date, and there
+can be arguments for and against. And you've made, quite well,
+the arguments about why that might want to be delayed.
+ But why not have a strategy where we just flat-out
+recognize that the Afghan Government has failed and has not
+been a reliable partner, that the Taliban is not going to be
+any trusted partner in the future, but where we utilize our
+leverage as opposed to our military, those three things you
+mentioned, with robust international diplomacy, where the
+regional countries, as Senator Ayotte mentioned, have an
+interest in stability as opposed to a refugee crisis? Why not
+focus on that and recognize that what Trump has been doing,
+bringing troops home, is overdue and made some sense?
+ General Dunford?
+ General Dunford. Congressman, thanks so much.
+ I think you have just succinctly captured the core
+recommendation that we make. And, in fact, we don't believe
+there's a military solution. And we do believe, both with
+regard to the Afghan peace negotiation but as well as long-term
+integration that you're suggesting, that the key element of
+that has to be regional diplomacy and then broader
+international effort to bring about those conditions.
+ And if there is any hope for a future government that, in
+the character of the government, actually does have some
+legitimacy and is able to do the things necessary to bring
+about peace and stability, if that's ever going to happen, it
+has to be exactly as you've outlined: through a very strong and
+concerted diplomatic effort and in conjunction with our
+partners in the region and the international community.
+ So, Congressman, I guess what I would say--and I think I
+say this on behalf of the entire Afghan Study Group--what
+you've just outlined is certainly a conclusion that we drew in
+our deliberations after 10 months of talking to people and
+studying the problem.
+ Mr. Welch. OK.
+ One other thing. We accepted, or stumbled into, a nation-
+building goal in Afghanistan, which I think most people now
+acknowledge has not worked, as opposed to counterterrorism.
+ And one of the concerns that was expressed was that
+Afghanistan would become a haven for terrorism. But I want to
+challenge that Afghanistan is any different than many other
+areas around the world where there is terrorism brewing where
+we don't have occupation or military forces.
+ Why would we have that policy in Afghanistan when there are
+so many other parts of the world where we face a similar
+terrorist threat?
+ General Dunford?
+ General Dunford. Sure, Congressman. I think there are a
+couple factors. One is geography. And we saw what geography
+means back in 2001. And the other is the historical and
+cultural significance of the Khorasan and what that would mean
+to the global jihadist movement. And those are two factors that
+make Afghanistan different.
+ I also think, Congressman--and we didn't spend a lot of
+time on this in the Afghanistan Study Group, but certainly I
+feel confident in making this assertion--when you look at South
+Asia as a whole and you look at the possession of nuclear
+weapons by two states in the region, there's no question in my
+mind that we have long-term security interests in South Asia.
+ There's also no question in my mind that Afghanistan, were
+it to become ungoverned spaces, has a high probability of being
+a location of a proxy war between two states that have nuclear
+weapons.
+ So, from a broader security perspective, I do believe
+Afghanistan is different.
+ I take your point that we're dealing with, you know,
+extremists with the same ideology from West Africa to Southeast
+Asia. And we actually do need a global strategy to deal with
+that that focuses on the flow of resources, the flow of foreign
+fighters, and the basic ideology that unites those groups.
+ But I do think there are some geographic, some cultural,
+and some historical factors of Afghanistan that do make it
+unique. And, as the chairman outlined, it's because of those
+factors that it's No. 1 on the Terrorist Index. It's because of
+those factors that there's at least two groups who aspire to
+attack the United States directly and we believe, if left
+unchecked, would have the capability to do so.
+ Mr. Welch. OK. Thank you, General.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
+ Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentleman.
+ The gentleman yields back.
+ The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr.
+Higgins, for five minutes.
+ Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank our
+panelists. This is a very important discussion.
+ Most of my constituents, and perhaps Americans from sea to
+shining sea, grow weary of this endless conflict. And many
+historians generally agree and the archaeological record
+generally suggests that the entire region that we're
+discussing, including, of course, Afghanistan, has been engaged
+in some level of continuous war for 7,000 years, with
+essentially brief periods of relative peace breaking up that
+continuous war.
+ In modern history, we've been there for 30 years. And,
+General, I would ask you, realistically, sir--you've been a
+voice of solid reason, and we thank you for your service and
+your experience and your insight here. But at what point is
+enough, enough for American engagement in this region?
+ And why, if there's a presence required from American
+military force, why does that have to include actual boots on
+the ground, soldiers on the ground, given the vast power of our
+Navy and the technology and success of our rapid deployment
+capabilities? Why do we need boots on the ground in this
+region, at this point, moving forward?
+ I realize that there's an opportunity for peace, but I'm
+quite sure they've had that discussion over the course of the
+last 7,000 years. Why would it work now? And why do we need
+boots on the ground there?
+ General Dunford. Thank you, Congressman. You ask a really
+important question. And, as you can imagine, I've been involved
+in several similar conversations about Afghanistan for now at
+least 10 years.
+ And I do understand your constituents growing weary. I do
+think that they need to understand that we've not had a U.S.
+loss of life in a year. And they also need to understand that
+we've gone from over 100,000 forces on the ground in
+Afghanistan when I was in command in 2013 and 2014 to 2,500
+forces right now, which, in the context of our grander
+strategy, is certainly, in my judgment, a sustainable level.
+ But your question about why on the ground is really an
+important one. And I want to emphasize that, in our study, we
+focused on how to address our national interests, not whether
+to address our national interests.
+ We know that the President, any President, can make a
+judgment to assume risk against our national interests, either
+because they conclude that we are unable to address them at a
+sufficient level of resourcing or they want to accept that risk
+and reprioritize those resources somewhere else.
+ But why boots on the ground? And I've looked at this
+problem extensively. In order to be effective in conducting
+counterterrorism, you have to create an ecosystem, if you will,
+of intelligence. And we would not have the networks available
+to us from an intelligence perspective, we would not have the
+platform availability--that is, the systems that allow us to
+collect that intelligence--and we wouldn't have the ability to
+strike quickly with the resources necessary to destroy
+terrorists once the intelligence develops their location.
+ So, were we to do it from outside of Afghanistan, you would
+just merely have a geology problem and a responsiveness
+problem; you would not be as effective.
+ But, Congressman, I think we would not argue that a
+President could choose to accept risk. I view a presence of
+approximately the size we have right now in pursuing peace as,
+at least in the interim, equivalent to term insurance, where we
+have a sufficient presence, sustainable sufficient presence,
+both in terms of diplomacy and military forces to mitigate the
+risk of an attack against the United States.
+ You know, and when does that end? Again, our argument right
+now is, let's first focus on the Afghan peace negotiation, see
+if we can set the conditions for reduction of violence such
+that it doesn't impact our interests. And then, if that doesn't
+work out, I think your constituents know that we have other
+options that the President can take in the future, you know,
+should he judge that Afghan peace negotiations are not going to
+be successful.
+ I hope that answers your question.
+ Mr. Higgins. Very thoroughly. General, again, thank you for
+being a voice of reason.
+ Mr. Chairman, I have a second question to submit in writing
+unless we have a second round. And I yield. Thank you, good
+sir.
+ Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentleman.
+ The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr.
+Johnson, for five minutes.
+ Mr. Johnson. Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Speier has to go
+at 12 o'clock, and so I've agreed to yield my--not yield my
+time, but allow her to go in front of me. So, if that is OK
+with the chair, I would defer to Congresswoman Speier.
+ Mr. Lynch. Well, I thank the gentleman.
+ The gentlelady from California is recognized for five
+minutes. Thank you.
+ Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And my deep gratitude
+to Mr. Johnson for allowing me to go in front of him.
+ First, to Senator Ayotte and to General Dunford and Ms.
+Lindborg, thank you for your service and for providing us this
+blueprint.
+ I, like, I think, many of my colleagues, have grave
+concerns about the corruption that exists in Afghanistan that
+will not change. The fact that Inspector General Sopko has
+outlined for us in quarterly reports how money we have provided
+there has been misused should not be lost on any of us, but--
+and that the opioid trade continues at a very robust level.
+ So, I don't think we change the culture in Afghanistan. I'd
+be interested in each of your thoughts on that.
+ I do believe that protecting women and girls and allowing
+them to continue to progress through school is an important
+component.
+ And I would share General Dunford's supposition that we're
+going to have to be there. I hate saying that, but I do believe
+that a footprint of some sort, like we have a footprint in
+Europe and other places, is going to be necessary for our own
+personal security.
+ So, I would just be interested in each of your comments on
+those principles.
+ Ms. Lindborg. Well, I'll give it a start. And thank you for
+the question, Congresswoman Speier. And I'm appreciating your
+dogs in the background.
+ Ms. Speier. I'm sorry about that.
+ Ms. Lindborg. Because my cat's going in and out.
+ But you raise a really important question. And corruption,
+of course, is deeply aligned with the kind of states that are
+prone to violent extremism. And that's why it is such a key
+component of the Global Fragility Act and a cornerstone of how
+we recommend reorienting our assistance programs.
+ So, part of that is ensuring that we are aligned across all
+of our capabilities--our diplomacy, our security, our
+intelligence, and our development assistance--so that we're not
+inadvertently undermining each other.
+ So, the first part of my answer is that I think we can do a
+better job of promoting better accountability, especially
+working with our donor partners, who all agreed in Geneva in
+November 2020 on very strict conditions over the next four
+years, that we will coherently work with the Afghan Government
+to address corruption.
+ And the second part of my answer is that ultimately it is
+going to be up to the Afghans themselves. And that's why the
+development of civil society, the ability of women to have a
+much greater role, the rise of a new generation who has very
+different expectations of their government and demand more
+accountable government and ultimately a peaceful Afghanistan,
+that will be the key. Because it has to be driven by the
+Afghans who want this less corrupt, more peaceful nation.
+ And our investments to support civil society have made a
+tremendous difference over the past 20 years. And you're right,
+we will need to continue to support them. But hopefully we can
+do so in a more effective way and at reduced levels, as we
+outlined in the report.
+ Ms. Speier. Thank you.
+ Ms. Ayotte. I would just add to what Nancy said that I
+think we're also anticipating that the aid be more focused.
+ You know, if you look at our history of some of the
+projects I think I mentioned earlier that we've supported in
+Afghanistan, really focusing the support on key institutions
+and be prepared to hold them accountable, that we will, if we
+have to in certain areas, withdraw support with the government
+if they don't take certain actions that need to be taken.
+ And this I know is not an easy question, but I think the
+Global Fragility Act does provide a very important framework
+that we have not had in the past for how we should be
+supporting countries that are fragile, like Afghanistan.
+ General Dunford. Congresswoman Speier, it's good to see you
+again. And as you came on the screen, I thought, the last time
+I testified before you was about 18 months ago, and I thought
+it would be my last time testifying. And I think I celebrated,
+actually, that night that that was the end of my congressional
+testimony after a decade and a half of testifying. But here I
+am back before you again.
+ But in response to your question, I think it's helpful for
+us to identify what we can do and, as the other co-chairs have
+mentioned, what the Afghans can do.
+ What can we do with our allies? We can mitigate the risk of
+terrorist attacks, and we can mitigate the risk of mass
+migration. But when we talk about changing culture and
+addressing some of those underlying challenges that you
+identified, from corruption and opioids and so forth, all we
+can do in that regard is afford the Afghans an opportunity to
+make changes in those areas.
+ I'm very humble about our ability to externally effect the
+change in the Afghan culture that gets after those problems. I
+am more optimistic, even though still humble, about our ability
+to address our national interests.
+ So, I view this as kind of a twofold problem. One is, do
+the things that we have to do that are really relevant to our
+core national interests, and then set conditions where the
+Afghans can address those challenges that are unique to
+Afghanistan and really do require long-term changes in the
+character of government and long-term changes in the Afghan
+culture so that issues like women's rights are not behaviors
+that are conditioned on our international support but are
+actually an integral part of the culture.
+ Ms. Speier. Thank you.
+ My time has expired, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Lynch. The gentlelady yields back.
+ The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr.
+Johnson, for five minutes.
+ Mr. Johnson. I thank the chairman. And thank you for
+holding this very important hearing.
+ And I want to thank the panelists for your service to the
+Nation.
+ And, in reading your report, you indicate--or you state
+that the Taliban have threatened to reinstitute jihad if all
+international troops, including and especially the U.S. troops,
+are not out of Afghanistan by May of this year.
+ And that presents us with a bargain that is really
+untenable. In other words, we withdraw and then leave the
+situation to collapse and terrorism to then have a laboratory
+to explode within, or we stay the course and we do what appears
+to be nation-building, from seeing your standards for the U.S.
+being able to withdraw from Afghanistan totally.
+ And so you recommend that we maintain our current force
+posture and continue with dialog with the Taliban, and I
+support that conclusion.
+ What I want to ask is, you know, the Taliban get their
+financial and military support from somewhere. Where do they
+get their support from? Which countries?
+ General Dunford. Congressman, I think a fair amount of
+their support comes from the drug trade. The last time I
+checked, it was in excess of 50 percent. And I don't have
+unclassified information on where the support comes from.
+ We know that the Taliban have had sanctuary in Pakistan. We
+know that they have an active diplomatic effort--traveling to
+Moscow, traveling to Beijing, traveling to other countries. We
+know they travel in the Gulf. We know Iran has provided some
+material support----
+ Mr. Johnson. Well, let me ask you this, General. The
+Taliban is an Islamic Wahhabi strain of Islam-based terrorist
+organization, is it not?
+ General Dunford. It is a Sunni terrorist organization, yes.
+ Mr. Johnson. And it's a Wahhabi-based Sunni terrorist
+organization? Is that correct?
+ General Dunford. Similar ideology, yes, Congressman.
+ Mr. Johnson. And the Wahhabi strain of Islam is a very
+extreme, fundamentalist strain which undergirds the Saudi
+monarchy, correct?
+ General Dunford. The Saudi monarchy--I mean, Wahhabism
+obviously emanates from Saudi Arabia. It originated in Saudi
+Arabia, and there has been a historic relationship between the
+royal family, if you will, and Wahhabi religious leaders, yes.
+ Mr. Johnson. Yes. And the Wahhabist strain of Islam is
+behind the 18,000-plus madrasas, or Islamic schools, that teach
+this fundamentalist strain of Islam. Isn't that correct?
+ General Dunford. There's no question that the Taliban
+originates from the madrasas in Pakistan. That's correct.
+ Mr. Johnson. And isn't it also true that the Taliban gets
+support from Saudi Arabia, from the Saudi Arabian Government?
+ General Dunford. Yes, Congressman, I don't have any
+specific information certainly as a part of the Afghan Study
+Group that can point to any specific country as providing
+material resources to the Taliban. I'm not suggesting that's
+not true. I just can't--I can't comment on it.
+ Mr. Johnson. Well, it just seems to me that if we identify
+the revenue sources of the Taliban, we can weaken them and
+maybe even eliminate them as a threat if we choke off their
+resources.
+ And my suggestion is that Saudi Arabia may, in fact, be a
+major source of revenue and resource for the Taliban, and I
+think America's policy should not be at cross-purposes with
+itself. If we're supporting the Saudis, who are supporting the
+Taliban, we are at cross-purposes with ourselves.
+ And those are the kinds of things that I believe we should
+look to in being able to solve this problem that we have. We
+don't want to leave Afghanistan and leave it to the Taliban to
+establish another Wahhabi-based nation, which would be a
+lawless nation. You know, drugs, terrorism would flow with
+impunity, and we would have to go back in at some point to
+protect our interests, like we had to go in after September 11
+of 2001, 20 years ago.
+ So, you know, I mean, am I off base?
+ General Dunford. Congressman, you're not.
+ The only thing I'll tell you from my past experience is
+that, you know, identifying resources as one, you know, of the
+critical capabilities of the Taliban is something that we have
+looked at for a long time, and we've looked at trying to
+interdict those sources of revenue.
+ In my experience, we've found that the sources of revenue
+for the Taliban are fairly diverse and fairly resilient. Again,
+a large part of it comes from the opioid trade inside of
+Afghanistan. But they have proven to be pretty resilient in
+their ability to develop resources. And I'm unaware of any
+single source of income that we could go after in the immediate
+future to have a big impact.
+ But that's not something that--we should continue to look
+at that, for sure.
+ Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
+ Would any of the other panelists want to comment?
+ Ms. Lindborg. Yes, Congressman. I would just add, you know,
+that one of the distinguishing characteristics of the Taliban
+is that they grew out of the more conservative Pashtun culture.
+And so it's a bit of a distinguishing characteristic from some
+of the other Wahhabi-based terrorist groups, in that their
+principal focus is on Afghanistan as opposed to looking outward
+to create a larger caliphate.
+ And so, therefore, that's what makes the prospect of a
+negotiated peace possible, is that it's bringing together the
+Afghan sides and recognizing that they are--that the Taliban
+are connected to the Pashtunwali conservative parts,
+particularly present still in the more rural south, which is
+part of where they derive their ability to sustain themselves
+and some of their resources.
+ Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
+ Mr. Chairman, you've been more than liberal with the time,
+and I appreciate it. And, with that, I yield back.
+ Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentleman. The time was well-spent.
+ And just a side note. We have followed that chain of
+causation from the Wahhabi-supported and Wahhabi-sustained
+madrasas in northern Pakistan and southern Afghanistan. We have
+met with the royal family in Saudi Arabia, urging them--we
+don't have evidence that the Saudi Government is supporting the
+madrasas, but we do feel there's money coming out of the Gulf
+or maybe from members of the Saudi royal family who are
+supporting those efforts.
+ So, the gentleman's target is spot-on. There are wider
+problems, as Ms. Lindborg has pointed out, with the Pashtun
+nature of this. But, like I say, the gentleman's remarks were
+well-received.
+ I don't see Mr. Gosar on the board, so I'm going to go to
+the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. DeSaulnier, for five minutes.
+ Mr. DeSaulnier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentleman from
+California.
+ Mr. Lynch. The gentleman--I'm sorry, I'm sorry, I'm sorry.
+ Mr. DeSaulnier. That's OK. You should say that I'm a native
+of the great Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Thank you, Mr.
+Chairman.
+ I do want to thank all of my colleagues, first off, for the
+content and the tone of this hearing, particularly for you, Mr.
+Chairman, because you set that tone, and how constructive this
+is. And many of us yearn more for this type of focus and
+atmosphere.
+ And to the witnesses, thank you so much for your careers
+and your dedication to peace and America's peace. Really a
+remarkable product here in a very complex situation that I am
+only somewhat familiar with.
+ So, first to General Dunford: In a statement last weekend,
+the Taliban said: Anyone seeking extension of wars and
+occupation will be held liable for it, just as in the previous
+two decades.
+ The inspector general in its most recent report said, and I
+quote, ``The Taliban is very likely prepared to resume its
+campaign of violence against the U.S. and coalition targets if
+it perceives that coalition forces have stalled or reversed
+course on the agreed upon withdrawal.''
+ So, General, knowing that--and you've alluded to this in
+some of the other responses, but what is your expectation for
+what will happen? And how well can we protect not just Afghanis
+but, in particular, American forces who will remain there if
+the Biden administration suggests, as you are suggesting, that
+we revisit this accord?
+ General Dunford. Congressman, thanks.
+ And, you know, I would say right up front, I don't know
+whether the Taliban will accept a U.S. presence beyond the 1st
+of May, and I don't know what they'll do should we decide to
+stay past the 1st of May.
+ I am compelled, again, by the areas of leverage that we
+have over the Taliban and by our judgment that they see the
+political process as the best way to achieve their long-term
+objectives. In other words, I think they are aware of the
+limitations of military force. I think they believe they can
+get leverage in the peace negotiations by increasing violence,
+and I think that's what we're seeing them do right now. I don't
+believe that they assess they can achieve their overall
+political objectives with a sustained military campaign, which
+is why they're in Doha right now and why they are talking to
+the Afghan Government.
+ Should we decide to stay past the 1st of May and should the
+Taliban resume attacks against the United States, I leave it to
+those who are leading the fight right now to talk to specifics,
+but it would be my judgment that we would have to make some
+adjustments in our force posture and in our force composition
+to adequately protect our forces and continue to support the
+Afghan forces under those conditions.
+ Mr. DeSaulnier. Thank you, General.
+ Senator Ayotte and Ms. Lindborg, my questions originally
+were designed more around leverage and what kind of actual
+mechanisms we have. I really appreciate the recommendation that
+we don't be driven by the metric chronologically of time but of
+performance.
+ Which leads me to, we know that the world is changing. We
+know now, with research and work, remarkable work, that
+neuroscientists and sociologists are working on now, that we as
+humans and cultures are only willing to accept so much change.
+We see it in our own country. And you've all alluded to the
+future and younger generations. And, of course, we've talked
+about this in regards to this region and its neighbors,
+particularly in Iran.
+ So, the expectation that you can build these inclusive
+institutions and avoid the extractive institutions that
+unfortunately Afghanistan has been plagued with through its
+history, and the hope and the expectation that particularly
+younger people, who are being socialized in a very, very
+different environment from older generations, strikes me as
+really the key question and a lot to hope for. Not that we
+shouldn't, and I really think we have to. But the expectation
+that this critical mass is there, not just in the next few
+months but in the next few years, that these new generations
+can actually change what previous generations haven't been able
+to change in Afghanistan.
+ So, Senator, if you could just respond to that. And maybe
+Ms. Lindborg and General Dunford, if you have any observations.
+ Ms. Ayotte. Thank you, Congressman. I think you've made a
+very important observation and point.
+ And it brings me back to where, when the Taliban were in
+charge, before the attack on our country and before we went to
+Afghanistan, the Afghanistan of today, 20 years later, there
+has been a growth, as we've mentioned, of civil society, of
+young people, of just the ability to use the internet and
+communicate and also robust press that was not present. And
+that's taken time, and that has caused some fundamental changes
+within the country.
+ Now, it hasn't, obviously, changed the whole character of
+the nature of Afghanistan. They still have grave challenges
+with corruption and other issues. But that piece and that
+change of the configuration and more voices being able to
+actually speak out in that society does make it a very
+different circumstance for the Taliban to consider, if they
+think they're going to be able to go back and somehow govern in
+the way they did in 2001, if they want to be part of the
+government.
+ And I think it's an important component of what we hope can
+be built on going forward despite all the challenges there.
+ Mr. DeSaulnier. Ms. Lindborg?
+ Ms. Lindborg. Yes. Thank you very much for your question
+and your observations.
+ And, you know, we've learned a lot from previous decades of
+nation-building, and I think one of the core lessons is that
+people have to build their own nation. And, therefore, it will
+be the power, the energy, and the demand of this new generation
+and women who ultimately will determine what Afghanistan looks
+like. And that's the only way that change will occur.
+ One of the last trips I made before the pandemic shut
+everything down was to Afghanistan, and I had a chance to meet
+with a wide swath of women, youth, faith leaders, government
+leaders, you know, really courageous human rights workers, and
+the Helmand peace marchers in both Jalalabad and Kabul. And,
+you know, there is--I think there is a palpable new energy and
+demand for peace. People are just really tired of the war. And
+they do have the ability, I believe, to make a difference in
+how this all goes forward.
+ And our help to get a viable peace process supported is the
+bet that we're making with our recommendations.
+ Mr. DeSaulnier. Thank you.
+ General Dunford. Congressman, if I could just make one
+quick followup as the committee considers this.
+ You know, when I think about the problem, I don't think
+about it as, can we effect the changes that you talked about? I
+agree with you in terms of how difficult they will be. I think
+we should look at the problem we're trying to solve as one of,
+can we reduce the level of violence and allow those changes and
+allow the political differences to be addressed in an
+environment where there's a reduced level of violence and a
+reduced terrorist threat?
+ So, in other words, I have a much humbler appreciation for
+what can be achieved in the near term. And I think if we look
+at how long will it take to effect fundamental cultural changes
+and address the economy and address the character of the
+government, I do think we're talking about, you know, a long,
+long time for some of those issues to be addressed.
+ What I think is more realistic is for us to come out of the
+Afghan peace negotiations with a peace agreement that actually
+does result in the reduction of violence and actually does
+allow these political differences that are very real and need
+to be addressed to be addressed in an environment where we
+don't have a terrorist threat and there's reduced violence and
+there's a political framework within which these issues are
+being addressed. That, to me, is what winning would look like.
+ Mr. DeSaulnier. Well, thank you again. Really, really
+fascinating. And I really want to thank the Peace Institute as
+well. What a valuable, valuable resource.
+ And, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back, but I want to thank
+you for letting me tease you about the geographic issues,
+differences between Colorado and California. And I realize, as
+a native of Massachusetts, when I lived there, I frequently got
+those states confused. Anything west of West Stockbridge was
+always confusing to me.
+ Mr. Lynch. Anything west of Worcester is the same, as far
+as I'm concerned.
+ Mr. DeSaulnier. The home of my alma mater, Worcester. Thank
+you.
+ Mr. Lynch. Well, we are very--and I apologize to the
+gentleman from California. We are very proud of the gentleman's
+connection to Massachusetts. It was certainly California's gain
+and Massachusetts' loss.
+ But, in closing, you know, we've had the presence and the
+participation of our panelists for two hours now, so I think I
+should bring this to a close, even though I have more questions
+and I would like to further discuss this.
+ In closing, I want to thank our panelists for their
+wonderful work and their willingness to help the committee with
+its task. I think this study, this report, could be extremely
+helpful to the administration, and I'm sure they are weighing
+it seriously.
+ I want to commend my colleagues for their participation,
+despite the weather all across the country, in this important
+conversation.
+ With that, without objection----
+ Mr. Grothman. Could I----
+ Mr. Lynch. Is somebody seeking time?
+ Mr. Grothman. Yes. This is Congressman Grothman.
+ Mr. Lynch. Oh, Mr. Grothman, I'm sorry.
+ Mr. Grothman. Before you break up, I'd like to thank you
+for having the hearing. I, quite frankly, wish it'd go another
+couple more hours, because I have a lot of questions to ask.
+ I want to emphasize that, at least as far as me, I realize
+we have important obligations as a world power. We have a
+fraction of the number of troops there that we did a few years
+ago, and I have no problem voting if the feeling is it's
+necessary to keep those troops there years more, if that's the
+appropriate thing.
+ I wouldn't mind if--it's unfortunate we have a hearing like
+this that has to be public, because, of course, people are
+listening in to what we say who might not be considered friends
+of the United States, and that makes things difficult. I wish
+we would've had some time to get into the potential roles that
+Iran and Pakistan are going to play if we left, which I think
+is relevant. And I appreciate Congressman Johnson's comments as
+to where the money is coming from and if any of the money is
+coming from people who we think are our friends.
+ But I'd like to thank you for having it. If you want to do
+another one of these a month from now or two months from now,
+I'd be happy to do another one, because I'm sure I could find
+another 15 or 20 minutes of questions. But, again, thank you
+for having the hearing.
+ Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentleman.
+ And just so we all understand, Inspector General Sopko, the
+Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, has his
+report coming out in two weeks. It's a follow-on to many of the
+same issues we're talking about here but on a granular level
+with respect to some of the projects that Ms. Foxx identified,
+the spending of money, the corruption, all that.
+ So, that will give us an opportunity to revisit a lot of
+these issues and have a wider discussion as well, so I'm
+looking forward to that. And I think that's scheduled in two or
+three weeks.
+ But, with that--and I appreciate the gentleman's remarks.
+ Without objection, all members will have five legislative
+days within which to submit additional written questions for
+the witnesses to the chair, which will be forwarded to the
+witnesses for their response. I ask our witnesses that if
+questions are submitted to them to please respond as promptly
+as you are able. Again I want to thank our panelists for your
+wonderful and patriotic work, this meeting is now adjourned.
+ Mr. Lynch. Again, I want to thank our panelists for your
+wonderful and patriotic work.
+ This hearing is now adjourned. Thank you.
+ [Whereupon, at 12:31 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
+
+
+