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+
+ - ASSESSING THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN SAUDI ARABIA
+
+[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
+[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
+
+
+
+
+ ASSESSING THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN SAUDI ARABIA
+
+=======================================================================
+
+ HEARING
+
+ BEFORE THE
+
+ SUBCOMMITTEE ON
+ MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA, AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM
+
+ OF THE
+
+ COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
+ HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
+
+ ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
+
+ FIRST SESSION
+
+ __________
+
+ March 18, 2021
+
+ __________
+
+ Serial No. 117-22
+
+ __________
+
+ Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
+
+
+
+[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
+
+
+
+Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,
+
+ or http://www.govinfo.gov
+
+
+
+ ______
+
+
+ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
+43-783PDF WASHINGTON : 2021
+
+
+
+ COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
+
+ GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York, Chairman
+
+BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
+ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey Member
+GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
+THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
+KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
+WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts DARRELL ISSA, California
+DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
+AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
+JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas ANN WAGNER, Missouri
+DINA TITUS, Nevada BRIAN MAST, Florida
+TED LIEU, California BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
+SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania KEN BUCK, Colorado
+DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
+ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota MARK GREEN, Tennessee
+COLIN ALLRED, Texas ANDY BARR, Kentucky
+ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GREG STEUBE, Florida
+ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia DAN MEUSER, Pennsylvania
+CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas
+TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey PETER MEIJER, Michigan
+ANDY KIM, New Jersey NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York
+SARA JACOBS, California RONNY JACKSON, Texas
+KATHY MANNING, North Carolina YOUNG KIM, California
+JIM COSTA, California MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida
+JUAN VARGAS, California JOE WILSON, South Carolina
+VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas
+BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois
+
+
+
+ Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director
+ Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
+ ------
+
+ Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa, and Global Counterterrorism
+
+ THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida, Chairman
+
+GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia JOE WILSON, South Carolina,
+DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island Ranking Member
+TED LIEU, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
+COLIN ALLRED, Texas ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
+TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey LEE ZELDIN, New York
+KATHY MANNING, North Carolina BRIAN MAST, Florida
+WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
+BRAD SHERMAN, California GREG STEUBE, Florida
+JUAN VARGAS, California RONNY JACKSON, Texas
+BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida
+
+ Casey Kustin, Staff Director
+ C O N T E N T S
+
+ ----------
+ Page
+
+ WITNESSES
+
+Nossel, Ms. Suzanne, Chief Executive Officer, PEN America........ 9
+Aldosari, Dr. Hala, Scholar in Women's Health and Activist from
+ Saudi Arabia................................................... 16
+Fontenrose, Ms. Kirsten, Director, Scowcroft Middle East Security
+ Initiative, Atlantic Council................................... 22
+
+ APPENDIX
+
+Hearing Notice................................................... 59
+Hearing Minutes.................................................. 60
+Hearing Attendance............................................... 61
+
+ RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
+
+Responses to questions submitted for the record.................. 62
+
+
+ ASSESSING THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN SAUDI ARABIA
+
+ Thursday, March 18, 2021
+
+ House of Representatives,
+ Subcommittee on the Middle East, North
+ Africa, and Global Counterterrorism,
+ Committee on Foreign Affairs,
+ Washington, DC.
+
+ The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., via
+Webex, Hon. Theodore E. Deutch (chair of the subcommittee)
+presiding.
+ Mr. Deutch. The subcommittee on the Middle East, North
+Africa, and Global Counterterrorism will come to order. Without
+objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess of the
+subcommittee at any point.
+ All members will have 5 days to submit statements,
+extraneous material, and questions for the record, subject to
+the length limitation of the rules.
+ We have been joined by the chair of the Foreign Affairs
+Committee, Chairman Meeks. Thank you so much for being here.
+ As a reminder to members, please keep your video function
+on at all times, even when you are not recognized by the chair.
+Members are responsible for muting and unmuting themselves, and
+please remember to mute yourself after you finish speaking.
+ Consistent with House Resolution 8 and the accompanying
+regulation, staff will only mute members and witnesses as
+appropriate when they are not under recognition to eliminate
+background noise.
+ I see that we have a quorum. I'll recognize myself for
+opening remarks.
+ Pursuant to notice, we are holding a hearing on human
+rights in Saudi Arabia. For decades, American presidents, both
+Democrats and Republicans, elevated human rights and advanced a
+values-based foreign policy, not because of altruism.
+ Human rights and a principled foreign policy provided
+important advantages to the United States and strategic
+competition, and still does today, a competition with
+authoritarian rivals, from Putin's Russia to Khamenei's Iran to
+Xi's China.
+ The U.S.-Saudi partnership forged in the aftermath of the
+Second World War is more than three quarters of a century old.
+It has persisted for more than 75 years through very different
+eras guided by very different kings and presidents because the
+United States and Saudi Arabia do share important interests.
+ Working constructively and honestly with Saudi Arabia can
+advance U.S. interests and stability both in the Middle East
+and globally.
+ However, human rights are a longtime point of contention in
+our relationship, and I believe that we must always ensure
+human rights are at the forefront of our foreign policy.
+ The cold-blooded murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi by
+Saudi operatives in October 2018 and the Trump administration's
+response, which prioritized business opportunities over values,
+forced the reconsideration of the role that human rights play
+in U.S.-Saudi ties.
+ The brutal murder of Khashoggi, a Washington Post
+journalist and Virginia resident in Mr. Connolly's district,
+was a rebuke to the values for which America stands.
+ Approved by the highest levels of the Saudi government, as
+the recently declassified U.S. intelligence report made known,
+the killing undermined Americans' confidence in our partnership
+with the kingdom and inflicted enormous damage on the bilateral
+relationship.
+ Other recent Saudi actions have tested the relationship,
+including the arrest and alleged torture of women's rights
+activist Loujain al-Hathloul, who simply advocated for the
+right of Saudi women to drive.
+ Loujain was recently released but Saudi Arabia upheld her
+original sentence, so she still faces 3 years of probation in
+addition to her travel ban. Her probation also stipulates that
+anything perceived by Saudi authorities as political activism
+could result in rearrest.
+ Saudi Arabia also imprisoned the blogger Raif Badawi, who
+is serving a 10-year sentence on bogus charges related to his
+writing and peaceful activism, Dr. Walid Fitaihi, a U.S.
+citizen and medical doctor who worked to build bridges between
+his native and adopted countries, was sentenced in December to
+6 years in prison, and Dr. Bader al-Ibrahim, a journalist from
+northern Colorado who was targeted for his peaceful advocacy
+for social reforms.
+ Saudi authorities also detained Salah al-Haidar, a writer
+and journalist, on baseless charges, and Aziza al-Yousef, a
+woman's rights activist who remains on provisional release.
+ Both Mr. al-Haidar and Ms. al-Yousef are constituents of
+our colleague, Mr. Connolly, and as I mentioned earlier, Jamal
+Khashoggi was also a resident of Mr. Connolly's northern
+Virginia district, and I'd like to just take a moment to
+commend Mr. Connolly's tireless efforts on their behalf and for
+his work to uphold human rights in Saudi Arabia and around the
+world.
+ Saudi Arabia is a partner, but we cannot be afraid to speak
+truth to our partners and we cannot sacrifice American values,
+especially when certain actions threaten the foundation of a
+relationship that advances U.S. interests.
+ And while I acknowledge and appreciate recent Saudi reforms
+that provide greater rights to women and will reform elements
+of the Saudi judicial system, the Saudi government must take
+additional actions to address American concerns about the
+treatment of our citizens and residents. It must stop targeting
+Saudi dissidents and political activists, and must ensure
+fundamental human rights in the kingdom.
+ Two and a half years after the murder of Jamal Khashoggi,
+we must reinforce this message already delivered by broad
+bipartisan majorities in Congress. We have passed multiple
+bills and resolutions calling for accountability for the murder
+of Khashoggi, the release of unjustly detained American
+citizens and Saudi political prisoners, and an improved human
+rights environment in Saudi Arabia.
+ Additional measures, which we will hear about today, have
+been introduced in recent weeks by our colleagues on this
+subcommittee. Our focus must be on building a more balanced,
+healthy, and principled relationship with the kingdom.
+ President Biden understands the role of values in our
+approach to the world. In fact, he has spent nearly 50 years
+advocating and implementing a principled U.S. foreign policy.
+The president believes, and I quote, ``The reason why we lead
+the world is not merely because we have the most powerful
+military in the history of the world. The reason we're followed
+is not because of the example of our power, but the power of
+our example, our value set. That's what's been able to persuade
+the world to move in the direction we want to move,'' closed
+quote.
+ That's why the Biden Administration recently declassified
+and released the American intelligence community's assessment
+of the Khashoggi murder.
+ I commend the Administration for taking this important and
+overdue step toward transparency, accountability, and justice
+for Jamal including the State Department announcement of visa
+restrictions and the Treasury Department's announcement of
+sanctions.
+ These actions make clear the United States will not
+tolerate those human rights abuses, including the targeting of
+dissidents. But these actions should not be the last word.
+ Congress must work with the Biden Administration on this
+difficult but necessary process of recalibrating U.S.--Saudi
+relations and ensuring that the tenor of bilateral ties always
+reflect our values as well as our national interests.
+ I'd like to thank the witnesses for their testimony. I look
+forward to discussing this issue, which is so critically
+important to U.S. foreign policy, and to the protection of
+human rights around the world.
+ And with that, I now yield to my friend from South
+Carolina, our ranking member, Joe Wilson, for any opening
+comments he may have.
+ Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
+Chairman Ted Deutch, for calling this important hearing on the
+status of human rights in Saudi Arabia, America's 75-year
+partner providing for stability in the Middle East.
+ With Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's increased policy
+role in recent years, there's been a shift in messaging coming
+from the kingdom.
+ The ongoing domestic initiatives of Vision 2030, an agenda
+aimed at diversifying revenue, increasing tourism, and
+presenting Saudi Arabia as a modern kingdom ready to do
+business around the globe, all are hailed as revolutionary.
+ More still can be done, though, to accomplish the kingdom's
+goals of being accepted and being, again, a very appreciated
+ally of the United States. It seems that the image being
+portrayed to the world does not reflect the realities of life
+of the citizens of Saudi Arabia.
+ The release of the declassified report by the director of
+National Intelligence confirms that a team of operatives
+carried out the brutal murder of journalist and Saudi
+government critic, Jamal Khashoggi, who was living in Virginia.
+ In recent years, there has been increased use by the
+Specialized Criminal Court officially designated to counter
+terrorism to prosecute journalists, activists, and political
+dissidents.
+ I hope our witnesses will speak to how the United States
+can use its policies to promote accountability for the past
+crimes and ongoing abuses.
+ There have been positive developments regarding the rights
+of women, such as the reversal of the archaic ban on women
+driving, more ability for women to participate in social and
+cultural events, and some changes in guardianship policies.
+ Small steps toward progress should be recognized. Sadly,
+these policies have been accompanied by an ongoing crackdown on
+activism and dissent. Reports by some female activists allege
+torture, imprisonment, and arbitrary charges and sexual abuse
+while detained. These abuses should be fairly investigated.
+ For years, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has also pledged to
+address the issue of promoting extremist views toward religious
+minorities through its educational material.
+ The Office of International Freedom at the State Department
+and organizations have indicated that the textbooks in Saudi
+Arabia classrooms incite hatred and rejection of other
+religions.
+ Phrases that explain jihad as, quote, ``a joined battle
+against disbelievers,'' end of quote, have been frequently
+found in Saudi textbooks. I was grateful to introduce the
+bipartisan H.R. 554, Saudi Educational Transparency and Reform
+Act in 2019 with the distinguished Member of Congress from
+Massachusetts, Representative Bill Keating to require an annual
+review of Saudi Arabia's textbooks, ensuring that there is full
+implementation of its commitment to reform. Also, a country
+seeking modernity must not be involved in propagating hate in
+its textbooks and sowing extremist sentiments in children.
+ I appreciate that the witnesses here are before us today
+and we were very grateful to have them here. Look forward to
+their perspectives, and it's also very important that we
+understand in the Middle East how important Saudi Arabia is
+standing firm against the murderous regime in Tehran, which has
+attacked the kingdom with rocket attacks over the last 2 years.
+ And with that, I yield back.
+ Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
+ I'll now recognize the chair of the Committee on Foreign
+Affairs, Mr. Meeks. Chairman Meeks, we're very glad to have you
+with us today for this important hearing and are honored by
+your presence, and you're recognized for any opening remarks
+you may have.
+ Chairman Meeks. Well, good morning, and thank you, Chairman
+Deutch, for holding this timely hearing and for your excellent
+opening statement. I want to associate myself with it in its
+entirety.
+ To our distinguished witnesses, I want to also thank you
+for your insights on this important topic. Saudi Arabia is a
+long-standing and critical U.S. partner in a complex and
+changing region.
+ Our political, economic, and commercial interests intersect
+in important ways and many of our regional goals align. These
+goals are essential to the security of our country and that of
+our closest allies, and must be pursued together.
+ Nonetheless, for far too long, Saudi Arabia's routine
+suppression of basic rights and free expression has gone
+unaddressed. From the lack of religious freedoms and minority
+rights to the act of suppression of public debate, free speech,
+and a criminalization of dissent, such actions are a thorn in
+the side of this important bilateral relationship.
+ Though Saudi Arabia has taken steps toward reform, such as
+granting women the right to drive and obtain travel documents,
+recent years have been marred by the Saudi government's
+brutality against dissidents, most notably the detention and
+abuse of numerous peaceful protesters and a brutal killing of
+The Washington Post journalist and U.S. resident, Jamal
+Khashoggi.
+ Despite overwhelming evidence of the Saudi government's
+role in this murder, the previous administration did little to
+ensure our relationship with Saudi Arabia remained consistent
+with American values.
+ In contrast, the Biden Administration's release of the DNI
+report was a good step toward accountability for the killing of
+Mr. Khashoggi, finally following a bipartisan legal requirement
+the previous administration refused to comply with for over 1
+year.
+ Now, I look forward to the witnesses' testimony today and
+will close with this thought. We can and should maintain a
+strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia while being firm and
+clear about our values as a country, especially when it comes
+to the targeting of journalists, political dissidents, and the
+imprisonment of U.S. citizens.
+ I look forward to hearing from the witnesses. Thank you,
+Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
+ Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Chairman Meeks.
+ I will now introduce our distinguished witnesses. Ms.
+Suzanne Nossel is chief executive officer at PEN America. She
+previously served as chief operating officer of Human Rights
+Watch, executive director of Amnesty International U.S.A.
+ She also served in the Obama Administration as deputy
+assistant secretary of State for international organizations,
+leading U.S. engagement in the U.N. and multilateral
+institutions on human rights issues, and in the Clinton
+Administration as deputy to the U.S. Ambassador for U.N.
+management and reform. She is the author of ``Dare to Speak:
+Defending Free Speech for All.''
+ Dr. Hala Aldosari is a scholar of social determinants of
+health and gender-based violence research. She examines the
+influence of gender norms on women's political, economic,
+legal, and health statuses in the Arab Gulf States.
+ Dr. Aldosari has worked as a biomedical scientist and
+consultant for the Ministry of Health of Saudi Arabia and as a
+lecturer of health sciences. She has been selected for
+fellowships and scholar residencies at multiple top
+universities, and she was the Washington Post's first Jamal
+Khashoggi Fellow.
+ And Ms. Kirsten Fontenrose is the director of the Scowcroft
+Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council.
+Previously, she served as senior director for the Gulf at the
+National Security Council, leading the development of U.S.
+policy toward the GCC, Yemen, Egypt, and Jordan.
+ Her interagency experience includes 5 years at the State
+Department, leading the Middle East and Africa team in their
+Interagency Global Engagement Center, and she spent a year in
+the private sector consulting on specialized projects in the
+national security space.
+ Thanks to all of the witnesses for being here today. I will
+now recognize witnesses for 5 minutes each, and without
+objection, your prepared written statements will be made a part
+of the record.
+ Ms. Nossel, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
+
+ STATEMENT OF SUZANNE NOSSEL, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, PEN
+ AMERICA
+
+ Ms. Nossel. Thank you, Chairman Deutch and Ranking Member
+Wilson, for convening this timely hearing.
+ PEN America unites writers and their allies to celebrate
+creative expression and defend the liberties that make it
+possible. We're grateful for the opportunity to testify today
+on the ongoing assault on human rights and free expression in
+Saudi Arabia.
+ PEN America has been vocal and active in advocating for
+justice following the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. In 2019, we
+awarded our PEN/Barbey Freedom to Write award to Saudi women's
+rights activists and writers Nouf Abdulaziz, Eman Al-Nafjan,
+and Loujain al-Hathloul.
+ We recognize them for their fearless work exposing the
+deprivations of Saudi's infantilizing guardianship system over
+women and launched a global campaign for their freedom.
+ While the recent conditional release of Hathloul and
+several other Saudi writers and women's rights activists is
+welcome, it must not blind us to the ongoing reality of
+sustained repression.
+ Legal harassment, detention, and the threat of execution
+constrict the freedoms of those who dare speak out on sensitive
+subjects.
+ Even those released are far from free, subject to travel
+bans, surveillance, and the risk of renewed imprisonment. The
+regime's determination to hunt down dissenters instills a
+fear--a sense of fear from which there is no escape, even far
+beyond Saudi borders.
+ Saudi Arabia has long been one of the most restrictive
+countries in the world for human rights, including freedom of
+expression in the press. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is
+sometimes described as a modernizer. But his updated policies
+and practices must not be mistaken for true liberalization,
+much less any commitment to human rights.
+ The Crown Prince has sought to consolidate his shaky hold
+on power by pairing social reforms popular with young Saudis
+with an intensifying crackdown on dissent and free speech.
+ Measures to loosen restrictions on dress, entertainment,
+social media, and women's autonomy have been paired with a
+clamp down on the country's most potent rights advocates and
+dissenters.
+ Loujain al-Hathloul is a striking example. Women were
+granted permission to receive driver's licenses in June 2018.
+But just weeks prior, she and others who had campaigned for
+years to secure this freedom were arrested, entering a nearly
+3-year legal odyssey involving incommunicado detention and
+torture.
+ The Crown Prince claimed glory for lifting the unpopular
+ban on driving, but went to extreme lengths to prevent those
+who had championed the cause from receiving credit or moving on
+to wage new fights for rights.
+ Further waves of arrests of writers and activists in April
+and November 2019 evinced utter imperviousness to international
+outcry in the wake of the Khashoggi murder.
+ The present moment represents a critical juncture to
+reorient U.S. policy on Saudi Arabia, making good on President
+Biden's promise to tip the scales in the direction of human
+rights.
+ Saudi Arabia also represents an essential proving ground
+for an administration that aims to restore the U.S.'s
+legitimacy and leadership on human rights worldwide. Prisoner
+releases within weeks of President Biden's inauguration
+demonstrate the leverage the Administration can wield if it
+chooses to do so.
+ After taking the crucial step of releasing the DNI report,
+the decision to spare the Crown Prince from sanction in order
+to protect other facets of the U.S.-Saudi relationship risks
+overshadowing the Administration's rhetoric and actions in the
+name of accountability.
+ These include, importantly, the creation of a global
+Khashoggi ban, allowing visa restrictions for officials
+responsible for extraterritorial attacks on journalists. Robust
+further measures are now essential to ensure that neither Saudi
+Arabia nor the rest of the world are left with the impression
+that the U.S.'s commitment to human rights and press freedom
+will be traded away when the stakes are highest.
+ The Crown Prince must face meaningful personal consequences
+for having directed the crime that shocked the conscience of
+the world. Otherwise, the shroud of untouchability shielding
+not just him but other abusive autocrats with whom the U.S.
+does business will stiffen with grave implications for global
+press freedom, free expression, and human rights.
+ Congress should pass several bills that have been
+introduced to advance accountability for human rights
+violations in Saudi Arabia. These include the Saudi Arabia
+Accountability for Gross Violations of the Human Rights Act,
+introduced by Representatives Malinowski, McGovern, and Kim,
+the Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act reintroduced this year
+by Representative Connolly, and the Jamal Khashoggi Press
+Freedom Accountability Act, introduced by Representative Schiff
+and Senator Klobuchar.
+ As for the Biden Administration, it should make good on its
+view voiced during the campaign that it would be necessary to
+seek a set of pledges from the Saudi government to ensure
+atrocities like the Khashoggi murder do not occur.
+ They should make clear that such progress is a condition of
+future stable partnership with the U.S., including and
+particularly if the Crown Prince is to become king.
+ The Biden Administration's commitment to rejoin the
+United--the U.N. Human Rights Council presents one vehicle.
+Saudi Arabia has been a member of the Council for 12 of the
+last 15 years since it was created in 2006.
+ In running for election to the Council, the kingdom has
+pledged to consider joining key human rights treaties and
+cooperating with U.N. human rights mechanisms. But so far,
+these have been empty promises.
+ In 2020, their candidacy was, thankfully, defeated in what
+the kingdom considered an embarrassing blow. The Biden
+Administration and the U.S. Congress should now push Saudi
+Arabia to adopt the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
+the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, key
+human rights instruments that Saudi Arabia has never joined.
+ Saudi Arabia should be pressed to permit entry by U.N.
+special procedures to carry out their work within country and
+to establish a U.N. Office for Human Rights in the kingdom that
+would help implement and assess planned legal and judicial
+reforms and advance further measures to uphold rights.
+ Loujain al-Hathloul's sister Lina shared these words with
+us: ``Loujain was released thanks to international pressure,
+and the fight for her should not end here. Loujain is a symbol
+of Saudi Arabia's human rights defenders and giving up on her
+now is giving up on the fight for freedom. We thank the many
+Members of Congress who have raised their voices on behalf of
+writers, activists, and other human rights defenders in Saudi
+Arabia. It makes a difference and we must keep up and step up
+the fight.''
+ Thank you.
+ [The prepared statement of Ms. Nossel follows:]
+
+
+[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
+
+
+ Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Ms. Nossel.
+ Dr. Aldosari, welcome back to the subcommittee. You are
+recognized for 5 minutes.
+
+ STATEMENT OF DR. HALA ALDOSARI, SCHOLAR IN WOMEN'S HEALTH AND
+ ACTIVIST FROM SAUDI ARABIA
+
+ Dr. Aldosari. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished
+members of the House for organizing this important event and
+for including my voice and voices in the region in your
+deliberation.
+ I present my statement here as a citizen of Saudi Arabia
+who was forced into exile because of my advocacy for women and
+human rights in my country. I'm one of hundreds of Saudis,
+scholars, activists, who were forced in the last few years to
+seek refuge in other countries because of their writings or
+demands for reforms.
+ Saudi Arabia has become one of the most repressive
+countries while pursuing certain legal reforms. The brutal
+murder, as mentioned, of Jamal Khashoggi has actually revealed
+the reality on the ground.
+ Human rights in Saudi Arabia are severely limited because
+of the absolute monarchial system of governance. There is no
+political parties, independent media associational life for the
+civil society or any other means for peaceful safe public
+engagement in political affairs.
+ The Royal Advisory Council is made up of appointed members
+without legislative or oversight power. Only two-thirds of the
+municipal council seats are open for election, and candidates
+are routinely disqualified if they were engaged in any public
+discourse on reforms.
+ While activists and advocates for reforms are routinely
+targeted and silenced, the situation has become more aggressive
+both in scope and severity since the Crown Prince, Mohammed bin
+Salman, came to power in 2017.
+ Several waves of arrests, as mentioned by my other
+colleagues, have targeted people of different backgrounds:
+religious reformers, bloggers, businessmen, Statesmen, members
+of the ruling family and men and women activists under various
+pretexts like fighting political Islam, corruption, or treason.
+ The Presidency of State Security established by Mohammed
+bin Salman in 2017 reports directly to court or to Mohammed bin
+Salman with the authority of utilizing any institutional
+resources or manpower to conduct its operations without any
+kinds of judicial oversight.
+ Testimoneys of several detained individuals indicate an
+alarming use of torture to coerce confessions or to seize
+personal assets. Laws on counterterrorism and cybersecurity are
+repeatedly cited in targeting peaceful advocates for reforms.
+ In his 2018 mission report, the Special Rapporteur on the
+promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental
+freedom while countering terrorism expressed his concern that
+confessions obtained under torture were admissible and
+decriminalized in the specialized criminal court, and this is a
+quote often used to try activists and advocates for reforms.
+ He also noted that there were 3,000 allegations of torture
+were formally recorded but without any kinds of persecution of
+officials involved. There are no safeguards against torture or
+ill treatment and most individuals are held incommunicado for
+extended periods of time.
+ We have learned only from, you know, those who were
+recently released or the relatives of those who were detained
+about the different forms of torture used and how systematic it
+became as part of the State investigation.
+ Electric shock, waterboarding, severe beatings, starvation,
+sleep deprivation were common practices in Saudi interrogation.
+In addition, the woman activist have also been exposed to
+sexual abuse and threats of rape and killing.
+ They all have pointed to the role of the masked individual
+from the State Presidency Security and for individuals such as
+Saud al-Qahtani, who is an advisor or close advisor of Mohammed
+bin Salman and who has been cleared from any kinds of
+responsibility and the Khashoggi killing.
+ So despite very good reforms to ease the restrictions on
+women's autonomy and women mobility, women remain vulnerable to
+discrimination and abuse. These reforms do not protect women
+from their guardians asking for--you know, revoking any kinds
+of rights because of this obedience or absence from home.
+ Sponsorship system remains problematic, despite the reforms
+that have been in effect, and we, as a people, have come
+together to establish a vision for reform that puts people in
+exile--I mean, Saudi people in exile--have put the people's
+vision for reforms that centers human rights and social justice
+as key measures or benchmarks for any meaningful reforms.
+ And I thank you. I do not want to speak more, but we can
+definitely discuss this at length in questions.
+ Thank you.
+ [The prepared statement of Ms. Aldosari follows:]
+
+[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
+
+
+ Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Dr. Aldosari.
+ Ms. Fontenrose, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
+
+ STATEMENT OF KIRSTEN FONTENROSE, DIRECTOR, SCOWCROFT MIDDLE
+ EAST SECURITY INITIATIVE, ATLANTIC COUNCIL
+
+ Ms. Fontenrose. Chairman Deutch, Chairman Meeks, Ranking
+Member Wilson, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for
+your attention to an interest in shaping the future of the
+U.S.-Saudi relationship.
+ The U.S. has an opportunity now at the start of an
+administration that has made it clear that the U.S.-Saudi
+relationship will be recalibrated to set a course for the
+bilateral that protects and advances both human rights and U.S.
+strategic interests.
+ The administration's vow to apply Global Magnitsky
+sanctions to employees of the kingdom who threaten Saudi
+activists abroad is a step in the right direction. Likewise is
+the travel visa ban on Khashoggi--or the Khashoggi ban, though
+it is a downside in the eyes of human rights attorneys that we
+can discuss later if you're interested.
+ Diplomatically, President Biden's choice to limit Mohammed
+bin Salman, or MBS's, access within the U.S. Government to his
+official role as Minister of Defense sends an important
+deterrent message in the service of human rights.
+ Not treating MBS as de facto head of State implies that the
+Crown Prince would not be safe from prosecution in American
+courts. Examples from recent years indicate that this pressure
+can result in policy changes in the kingdom within certain
+lanes.
+ U.S. urging helped lead to reforms passed in 2019 to allow
+women to drive and travel abroad independently and to end
+flogging as a criminal punishment. And as mentioned previously,
+U.S. pressure obtained the release of Loujain al-Hathloul.
+ The State Department has encouraged the kingdom's efforts
+to remove hate speech from its school curriculum since 2015. A
+new version was released last year, perhaps in response to
+legislation sponsored by Congressman Wilson.
+ One reality check, however, the U.S. recently lost a point
+of leverage with MBS by releasing the unclassified ODNI report
+on the murder of Jamal Khashoggi so early in the
+Administration. A delay in the report's release might have
+yielded additional concessions to the U.S. act.
+ In the bilateral relationship, the U.S.'s position is
+arguably stronger than the kingdom's, but the U.S. is still
+wise to weigh the cost of its policy decisions.
+ Sanctioning MBS could lead to calls for sanctioning Chinese
+President Xi Jinping, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei for
+ordering and overseeing the abuses that make China and Iran No.
+1 and No. 2 respectively on the U.N.'s list of the world's
+worst human rights abusers in 2020, ahead of Saudi Arabia's
+slightly less egregious position as No. 5. Sanctioning the
+Crown Prince is unlikely to create support for replacing him as
+heir apparent.
+ After Members of Congress spoke angrily in December 2018
+about MBS's role in the Khashoggi killing, third-party
+pollsters in Saudi Arabia registered rising support for the
+Crown Prince amongst young adults, his base for more than half
+of the population.
+ U.S. sanctions are--I'm sorry, U.S. actions targeting
+Mohammed bin Salman personally with the implied aim of
+impacting his chances for ascension could draw retaliation from
+Saudi Arabia on multiple fronts.
+ These might include reductions in foreign direct investment
+in the U.S., increased cooperation with China on nuclear
+energy, refusal to normalize with Israel, refusal to contribute
+to expensive regional stabilization projects that will be U.S.
+priorities, support to Bashar al-Assad's government in Syria,
+continuation of the war in Yemen, or undermining of President
+Biden's energy transition agenda.
+ It's important to understand that the root of human rights
+abuses perpetrated by Saudi Arabia are issues perceived as
+existential by the increasingly narrow circle of decisionmakers
+in the royal family.
+ Whether this perception is accurate or not, if Riyadh's
+calculus indicates that a U.S. act will cause regime
+vulnerability, it will not be met. New methods are necessary. I
+offer four pages of options in my written testimony.
+ But for now, I would like to stress two overarching pieces
+that would increase the odds of any U.S. policy actuating
+change in Saudi Arabia.
+ First, clearly defined red lines and consequences for
+violating them. U.S. administration bears the baggage of the
+Obama red line on the use of chemical weapons in Syria in 2012,
+but actual tiers of red lines with proportional responses could
+reduce the likelihood of the kingdom calling the U.S.'s bluff.
+ Second, an international rise response to Saudi human
+rights violations like the Khashoggi murder. Citizens of
+multiple nations are victims of human rights abuses at the
+hands of Saudi actors, and there was no need for the U.S.
+bilateral relationship to be the sacrificial lamb.
+ I propose for your consideration instead an international
+convention against harassment and harm of political dissidents
+abroad that commits all signatories to enact sanctions or take
+other steps together against violators.
+ In closing, I'd like to note that the kingdom is a linchpin
+for nearly every U.S. objective in the region and some beyond:
+drawing down our military footprint, expanding and deepening
+Arab-Israeli normalization, preventing the resurgence and
+spread of violent extremist groups, ending the war in Yemen,
+containing Iranian nuclear and regional ambitions, preventing
+adversarial great power domination of the resources and
+waterways of the region, ensuring the flow of energy to fuel
+American lives and industry, stabilizing post-conflict zones so
+populations in countries wracked by war can begin to rebuild
+their lives, and energy transition and decarbonization.
+ U.S. goals in the Middle East are best served by remaining
+closely engaged with the government of Saudi Arabia, adopting
+an approach that is part boot camp instructor, part parole
+officer, and part avuncular advisor.
+ Demographic trends indicate that Saudi will look very
+different in 10 to 20 years. That could allow for a new
+political model.
+ An alienated Saudi Arabia will not get there by itself. It
+is in the U.S. interest to shepherd that potential, lead course
+correction, and build a better partner.
+ Thank you.
+ [The prepared statement of Ms. Fontenrose follows:]
+
+[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
+
+ Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Ms. Fontenrose.
+ Thanks to all of you for your testimony today. I will now
+recognize members for 5 minutes each. Pursuant to House rules,
+all time yielded is for the purposes of questioning our
+witnesses.
+ Because of the virtual format of this hearing, I'll
+recognize members by committee seniority, alternating between
+Democrats and Republicans. If you miss your turn, please let
+our staff know and we will circle back to you.
+ If you seek recognition, you must unmute your microphone
+and address the chair verbally. We will start and I will yield
+to my friend from New York first, the chairman of the House
+Foreign Affairs Committee, Gregory Meeks, for any questions
+that he may have.
+ Chairman Meeks, you are recognized.
+ Chairman Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Let me ask Ms. Nossel, the Trump administration rarely
+raised difficult issues with the Saudis, and the United States
+must grapple with the question of how to address actions by
+partners in countries that conflict with who we are as a
+country, without basic values.
+ So given the lack of effective response to public
+statements drawing attention to the Saudi human rights
+violations, what do you view as the most effective way that the
+United States can encourage changes in the Kingdom of Saudi
+Arabia?
+ Ms. Nossel. I agree with you that the United States has
+leverage, must use its leverage. I think it's a combination of
+measures both public and private.
+ I think it needs to be made clear that the future of this
+relationship depends upon demonstrable durable progress. I
+think it's very important to distinguish between
+ [inaudible] really an attempt at some greater support
+amongst the Saudi population and particularly the youth in
+order to stabilize the monarchy and protect against any sort of
+public uprising and tamp down on opposition.
+ So taking certain measures to sort of twist the valve and
+release some of the pressure that would otherwise buildup,
+things like allowing women permission to drive, loosening some
+of the strictures of the guardianship system, allowing some
+more access to social media.
+ But I think the United States needs to make clear that it
+does not--it's not deceived into thinking that this is a
+liberalization agenda that's simply, you know, on its way and
+it's going to lead inexorably to greater freedom over time.
+ I think it's quite the opposite. I think it's a deliberate
+two-pronged strategy to, on the one hand, modernize and satisfy
+some of that public pressure and, you know, perhaps also window
+dressing in terms of global perceptions of the kingdom.
+ But that is being paired with this intensifying crackdown
+that is worsening the situation for freedom of expression,
+making life even more difficult and risky for dissidents.
+ And so I think the United States needs to be candid about
+sort of seeing through that. I think there's a wish to look at
+the modernization methods as sort of steps in the right
+direction and if we can just encourage more of that we'll be on
+our way.
+ I do not think that's accurate. I think we need a candid
+discussion about the imperative of concrete measures. I think
+we need to take steps of our own to ensure that they think--
+they recognize we take this--these issues seriously and we're
+prepared to take some risks in the relationship on behalf of
+human rights.
+ But we also have to insist that they--that the Saudi
+government commit to tangible steps, and there are all sorts of
+things. They know it's releasing dissidents.
+ It's not imprisoning additional people. It's allowing the
+kind of discourse online that was flourishing a few years ago
+but now has been, you know, brutally muzzled and suppressed.
+ And so, yes, I think there are a variety of levels. I agree
+with the idea of multilateralizing that pressure and engaging
+others in applying it so it's not just the United States alone.
+ I think the Human Rights Council in Geneva can provide an
+important vehicle for that.
+ Chairman Meeks. So what about, you know, there have been
+issues and questions going along as far as accountability is
+concerned, particularly in light of the killing of Jamal
+Khashoggi.
+ Are there any other actions that you think that you would
+view as appropriate to ensure accountability and/or--and
+positive steps for reform that we--you know, that can be done
+here?
+ Ms. Nossel. Yes. So, I mean, I think the two really need to
+be paired. I think when it comes to accountability, the obvious
+glaring gap is with respect MBS himself. I understand the
+dilemma that the Administration faces and the other equities
+that are at work in the relationship.
+ But I do think this is a situation where, no matter the
+other measures enacted, some of which I think have been, of
+course, very positive--the application of the Magnitsky
+sanctions, the global Khashoggi ban and the application of that
+to 76 Saudis who were implicated not just in the Khashoggi
+case, but in attacks and plots against other dissidents around
+the world.
+ So positive steps, but I think the rubber hits the road
+when it comes to MBS and if the perception is that he's gotten
+off scot free, that unravels the whole notion and concept of
+accountability in this case.
+ And so I think it's extremely important that he not be
+welcomed back into diplomatic good graces anytime soon, that if
+and when he is it is in response to concrete, measurable,
+visible, and irreversible steps that we can point to to say,
+you know, this is a different era, and the pressure worked and,
+you know, he's been prompted and the monarchy has been prompted
+to do things it would not otherwise have done.
+ I think the measures I referenced in my statement, the
+congressional measures, including Representative Malinowski's
+important proposal to impose a travel ban--you know, that would
+signify that the buck stops where it should stop and not
+several steps down, which is, you know, I think the perception
+in light of where things are today.
+ I do think, as you say, it's not just about accountability
+for the Khashoggi murder, as important as that is. I think it
+has to go further with the broader climate of brutal repression
+of free expression. That's what Jamal Khashoggi lived for and,
+ultimately, died for.
+ And so if we do not reach beyond, you know, this current
+question of accountability for this horrific heinous deed, you
+know, the legacy and the forces that brought it about will
+survive intact.
+ And so I do not think we can count that as a success, and
+that's why I think we need to press for these four systemic
+changes.
+ Chairman Meeks. Thank you so very much. I'm out of my--out
+of time. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.
+ Mr. Deutch. Of course. Thank you, Chairman Meeks.
+ Next, we'll go to Ranking Member Wilson.
+ Mr. Wilson, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
+ Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I want
+to thank our witnesses for being here today. An indication of
+how important their testimony is how fortunate we are to have
+Chairman Greg Meeks participate, and so this truly indicates
+how important this issue is.
+ And I have a question for each of our three witnesses and
+that is, how strongly is Saudi Arabia motivated to
+differentiate itself from Iran on human rights? On what human
+rights issues do you see the most potential for behavior to
+change due to this motivation?
+ Any of the witnesses?
+ Dr. Aldosari. I can talk about that. Saudi Arabia is more
+committed to being part of the global movement, basically, of
+modernization, global movement to fight radical Islam or
+radical movement more so than Iran on that front, and this
+presents a leverage for the U.S. and democratic countries to
+utilize, to lead by example, to push for more democratic--back
+for democratic change or transformation in Saudi Arabia.
+ Saudi Arabia seems to be keen very much to be a hub for
+international business, to open its--to open the country for
+tourists. These are all things that you do not really see in
+Iran and they're very much, like, a closed off country and
+different in these kinds of issues.
+ So I think that leverage, the leverage of global business
+values, global tourism, being part of, you know, those
+democratic countries, these are all leverages that can be used
+to reform certain issues inside Saudi Arabia and more so in
+political reforms to democratic change, which is the only, I
+would say, safeguard against the excesses of abuses that we're
+seeing and witnessing from the--from the State.
+ Mr. Wilson. Either other witness any comment? But thank
+you, that was right on point.
+ Ms. Fontenrose. I would only--I would add that, according
+to Human Rights Watch, the use of capital punishment declined
+in 2020 to 8 percent of the 2019 numbers, whereas Iran in the
+same year carried out the death penalty 15 times as often as
+did Saudi Arabia.
+ This is not what the U.S. can claim credit for, but we
+assess that it was Saudis' need to differentiate itself from
+Iran in ways that are meaningful to Europe that may have played
+a role here.
+ And I think that the areas we're seeing the most acceptance
+by Saudi in terms of making changes in human rights are women's
+issues and in terms of religious tolerance and religious
+freedoms.
+ We are on the cusp of Saudi normalizing with Israel. It
+will probably be after a change in top leadership, but that
+will happen, and these are places where the U.S. can take
+credit for applying the pressure that has made a difference.
+There's quite a bit of leverage that the U.S. has in this
+relationship: our military presence, the presence of our
+expats.
+ We have tens of thousands of people living in Saudi Arabia,
+and they're very aware, to my co-panelist's point about
+economic incentives, that if the U.S. multinational
+corporations pull their people other multinationals will
+follow, and this will very negatively impact Saudi Arabia's
+economic landscape.
+ We also have leverage in terms of our court system, which I
+alluded to, our troop presence, arming and equipping of their
+security services, our intelligence sharing. There are many
+levers the U.S. can play with here.
+ Mr. Wilson. And I--yes.
+ Ms. Nossel. Yes. I mean, just to add, briefly, I think the
+Saudi participation in U.N. human rights mechanisms and their
+seeking out of a seat on the Human Rights Council four times is
+indicative of what my colleagues are talking about, which is
+this desire to be recognized on the world stage, to win
+diplomatic acceptance, to be welcomed in the corridors of
+power, you know, which is something that operates very
+different--you do not see that with Iran.
+ They have, you know, positioned themselves as an
+international outlier with certain alliances but not--
+certainly, not in the good graces of the West. And I think
+Saudi is very much seeking that acceptance and it is a crucial
+point of leverage.
+ I think MBS is emblematic of that and, you know, in a very
+conflicted way. But it's clear he wants to be part of the club
+on the global stage, and so making very explicit what the
+conditions and imperatives are, you know, if he's ever going to
+attain that status, I think, is important.
+ You know, I think my colleagues are correct in terms of
+identifying areas like women's rights, certain religious
+freedoms, you know, where there's more leeway. These legal and
+judicial reforms that have now been proposed to extend right to
+counsel, greater transparency in legal proceedings are
+important.
+ But there is a fundamental problem, though, which is that
+this monarchy is shaky and MBS's ascension is shaky, and as
+long as that remains true, ultimately, their willingness to
+tolerate dissent is not going to--is going to be very limited
+because he recognizes that, you know, twisting the valve and
+allowing people to speak out and question what is being done
+and the decisions that are being taken, the legitimacy of his
+role, whether he's qualified to be in the position he's in, you
+know, all of those debates are existential for him.
+ And so I think we have to be sort of forthright that, yes,
+making promises--progress on women's rights is essential. You
+know, it could ultimately burgeon into something wider.
+ But at the same time, you know, there is that kind of
+fundamental disconnect between sort of the instability of the
+regime and the fragility of it and the unwillingness to
+tolerate dissent.
+ Mr. Wilson. Thank you all, and I yield back.
+ Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Mr. Wilson.
+ Next, we will go to Mr. Connolly. Mr. Connolly, I said
+earlier I wasn't--I wasn't sure that you were on. But let me
+just say, again, that the work that we're doing on this--on so
+many issues but on this--on this topic specifically is
+informed, in large part, by your advocacy, your leadership, and
+your work on behalf of Jamal Khashoggi and your other
+constituents, protecting Saudi dissidents in your legislation.
+Thank you for all that you do for us and for the focus on human
+rights around the world, in Saudi Arabia in particular.
+ And I will now recognize you for 5 minutes.
+ Mr. Connolly. Mr. Deutch, thank you so much. What gracious
+remarks and what a great way to begin my day. So thank you so
+much, and thank you for having this hearing.
+ Ms. Fontenrose, I want to--I want to use two words here.
+One is impunity and the other is leverage. We just heard how
+shaky, in a sense, the monarchy is and, yet we look at a Saudi
+government that, I think, for decades has operated with
+impunity with respect to the United States relationship.
+ They know that the oil relationship, the arms sale
+relationship, the strategic posture of Saudi Arabia as a, you
+know, a counter pressure point to the Iranians and to giving
+the nod now and then to the Israeli relationship are all so
+important that we're going to have to overlook bad behavior.
+ And, you know, for me, Chairman Deutch just mentioned, of
+course, the unbelievable and despicable murder of my
+constituent, an American resident, Jamal Khashoggi, and the
+dismemberment of it, and the word impunity comes to mind.
+ The fact that anyone would even think to plan such a thing
+would suggest, I'm pretty sure we're going to get away with it,
+and, frankly, in the Trump administration, they did.
+ And I am worried that the Biden Administration has made a
+calculated assessment that says the relationship is too
+important to just junk it, and I, certainly, do not know that
+we--that's our only option.
+ So how do we counter the impunity we're dealing with and
+could we use the fact that there are--you know, there's
+instability in the royal family, including a lot of resentment
+against the Crown Prince.
+ Could we use that to advantage to make him an unacceptable
+choice as heir to the throne and use our leverage for once in a
+meaningful and significant way? Or is that a stretch too far,
+from your point of view?
+ I mean, sanctions and travel bans and all that are useful.
+But I do not know that they get to the impunity I am talking
+about.
+ Your observations?
+ Ms. Fontenrose. I agree with your assessment on the
+immunity and it really is at the very top levels. We hear quite
+often from our interlocutors at senior levels and below in
+Saudi Arabia that they understand that this is a problem for
+us. This is, certainly, not an immunity that we see across the
+board in the Saudi government.
+ But I do think we have to be careful, because at a certain
+point when we talk about using our leverage to influence
+decisionmaking on succession in Saudi Arabia, we start to sound
+like we're talking about regime change, and that's not a game
+that the U.S. wants to get into again. We do not tend to do it
+very well.
+ But there are some ways that we can change some of the
+decisionmaking at the top that would impact this impunity.
+Mohammed bin Salman is surrounded by an echo chamber right now.
+ He only hears the good news, and they continue to sponsor
+campaigns of disinformation and misinformation globally and
+here that are intended to spread a narrative about how
+wonderful things are in Saudi, how suitable he is as a ruler.
+ And while that's not all entirely false, it's certainly an
+indication that that impunity remains and that we have not
+really seen a mea culpa that we're looking for.
+ Part of this is his inner circle. There are a lot of wise
+advisors in Saudi Arabia who were replaced in recent years.
+These were people we trusted, people we worked with for
+decades, and people who understand both how the global system
+works and understand America's values and our priorities.
+ Those folks aren't there in the numbers we'd like to see,
+and one of my colleagues already mentioned a specific person,
+Saud al-Qahtani, who both the intelligence community and the
+policy community assessed was instrumental in some of the
+negative decisions that came out of the kingdom, not only the
+Jamal Khashoggi murder, which we assess he orchestrated and
+masterminded, but also in many other--many other negative
+decisions like civilian targeting in Yemen, like the standoffs
+with Canada and with Germany, like the interrogations in the
+Ritz.
+ Saud al-Qahtani is sort of the Oddjob to Mohammed bin
+Salman's Goldfinger, and he tells him what he wants to hear. He
+keeps him very safe. He is not loyal to any other member of the
+royal family or to any other business interests because he does
+not come from a prominent family or a competing branch of the
+royal family, and that makes him incredibly loyal and,
+therefore, incredibly dangerous to our interests.
+ He was removed from his place at the elbow of the Crown
+Prince previously, but as my colleague mentioned, when he went
+through a court proceeding he was found not guilty.
+ At the time, I wrote an article saying that this finding of
+him as not guilty was actually a dent in the U.S.-Saudi
+relationship and that we would take it quite seriously. He is
+someone we need to make sure is removed from the decisionmaking
+circle in Saudi Arabia, and if that means stating a red line,
+then that means stating a red line.
+ Saudi, at one point, even tried to tell us that he was
+dead. I mean, the disinformation to protect his role as the
+Mohammed bin Salman whisperer has been notable.
+ And there are things we could do. We could ask for some of
+our favorite interlocutors to be reinStated. We could embed
+advisors, much as we do in many other nations, to help with the
+drafting of legislation that protects human rights.
+ We can encourage them to build out their National Security
+Agency, which is actually their equivalent of our NSC, which
+they made a real effort to build, but because of stovepipes and
+because of personality politics in Saudi Arabia, it's really
+just been this sort of administrative function.
+ We can work with them, hold their hand to say this is how
+you do interagency collaboration, interagency coordination of
+policy in such a way that only vetted ideas reach your senior
+decisionmaker, and not these crazy ideas that come from people
+without the policy or the international affairs knowledge to be
+making these kinds of recommendations.
+ So there's some very proactive things.
+ Mr. Connolly. Very helpful. Unfortunately, my time is up
+and the chairman has been gracious in allowing us to continue.
+But I think, bottom line, the United States needs to approach
+this relationship with boldness and fortitude.
+ And thank you for your suggestions. Very helpful.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Connolly.
+ Mr. Perry, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
+ Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm just curious, based
+on my good friend Representative Connolly's questioning for Ms.
+Fontenrose, are there--are there better options? I mean, is
+there any realistic option other than MBS regarding the
+leadership in Saudi Arabia?
+ I mean, is there any reason for us to really be--I mean, do
+we have any other option or is that the--is that the best it's
+going to get?
+ Ms. Fontenrose. The issue, really, is that this branch of
+the royal family has been consolidating power for quite some
+time.
+ Previously, Saudi would share--would power share across
+branches of the royal family. But in recent years, this has
+gone almost entirely to the branch of the family headed by
+current King Salman.
+ So what this means is that when you look around for other
+options, you're looking at people who do not have a lot of
+decisionmaking power right now.
+ You're also looking at the fact that Mohammed bin Salman
+has consolidated his control over all of the security services
+and over the finances of most of the royal princes. So if they
+were to, perhaps, speak out against him, their families could
+potentially be destitute and they could, perhaps, find
+themselves in jail.
+ So we have to ask ourselves are there people we would be
+willing to back in any way, not only in a, you know, to--as a
+potential replacement for Mohammed bin Salman, but also what
+would that do to Saudi politics writ large?
+ What would that do to the power sharing among the branches
+of the royal family? Are we willing to talk about regime change
+in any realistic way?
+ Do we even have the legal authority to do that? And would
+we be willing to ask Saudi friends to put their own lives and
+financial security at risk to spearhead something like that
+conversation?
+ We have realized in recent years that national sovereignty
+and national succession are places that we can have opinions
+on, but it's best that we not actually put our finger on.
+ Mr. Perry. Yes. So it sounds to me like whether we like it
+or not, agree with him or not, that whether he's moving quickly
+enough or not or whatever our disagreements are, we're going to
+have to work with him and resign ourselves to that fact.
+ Does he--does he particularly--could he particularly be
+sensitive to international condemnation, condemnation from the
+United States regarding Khashoggi or anybody else? And just as
+a curiosity of mine, what is the--what is his viewpoint or the
+ruling faction's viewpoint on the Muslim Brotherhood in Saudi
+Arabia?
+ Ms. Fontenrose. Mohammed bin Salman is confused by why the
+U.S. and the Western world are so upset about the Khashoggi
+killing. They understand that the way it was conducted is
+heinous. Most Saudis are as appalled as we are.
+ But I will quote a conversation I had with a very senior
+Saudi representative who said, ``When I speak to Saudis about
+the Khashoggi murder, they ask, why are they so upset about
+this when Jeffrey Epstein died in government custody?''
+ That causes all of us to kind of drop our jaws but that is
+very realistically--it's a State-controlled media and, as I
+mentioned, there is an echo chamber.
+ So while Mohammed bin Salman is very sensitive to the
+discussions of Khashoggi. he does believe that this is an issue
+that can be dealt with and that it will not necessarily create
+a dent in the U.S.-Saudi relationship if they can just do
+enough other things, but none of those things that are related
+to human rights.
+ You'll notice that they have done quite a bit in terms of
+climate change just since inauguration. They're really trying
+to be a great U.S. partner and kind of erase this memory.
+ But to my co-panelist's point, there are things we could be
+doing to press the human rights issue and make it more directly
+aligned.
+ To your question on the Muslim Brotherhood, the Saudi
+regime is extremely opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood. They do
+consider the Brotherhood an existential threat to regime
+stability and to the royal family, writ large.
+ So the Brotherhood is probably their number-one threat, I
+would say, equal to and in some cases above Iran.
+ Mr. Perry. Yes, I think that's an important point, and I
+think there's a connection with Khashoggi in that regard as
+well. But I do agree with your point, you know, regarding the
+other measures that Saudi has taken. I'm thinking just most
+recently regarding COVAX.
+ But as you also Stated, it does not--it does not absolve
+them of--I mean, I think they're No. 5 on the list of human
+rights abusers, you know, just downstream from China and Iran,
+essentially, North Korea, et cetera.
+ So they're--you know, they've got a lot of work to do and I
+think that we absolutely need to make that a focal point. At
+the same time, I think that we have very, very difficult issues
+to deal with in Iran and China and so on and so forth and I do
+not want to see the committee--and this is not--you know, this
+is not your bailiwick, but completely focused on Saudi Arabia
+here.
+ But I did listen to some of the other things that you had
+said that we could leverage regarding Saudi Arabia's human
+rights abuses, and I think we need to do that on every single
+occasion and keep pressing.
+ And while we probably acknowledge things like the good work
+on COVAX, we absolutely need to bring up the point every single
+time that the human rights abuses are unacceptable and that
+we're going to keep highlighting them and we're going to keep
+pursuing them.
+ I think you've given us a pretty good list. So I do not
+want to talk for the sake of talking. I appreciate your time
+here and everybody's time here.
+ And I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you.
+ Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Representative Perry.
+ Mr. Cicilline, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
+ Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really want to
+thank you for your leadership and calling this really important
+hearing and also acknowledge the incredible leadership of Mr.
+Connolly for so long on this issue.
+ And I think as you described in your opening remarks, this
+is a challenge for us to ensure that we have foreign policy
+that reflects our values, and I think when you look at the
+backsliding of democracy and the rise of authoritarian
+leadership around the world, maybe this is no--there's no place
+where it's more clear than here in Saudi Arabia how challenging
+this is.
+ But when you look at the age of the Saudi population under
+the age of 25--half of the population is in that age group--and
+the looming ascent of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, this is
+a very important time for us to figure out how we both hold the
+Saudis accountable for their human rights record but also
+ensure that we can maintain a productive relationship, and I
+think this is a great challenge.
+ Ms. Nossel, I want to begin with you and that is--my first
+question is, you know, how urgent is this issue with respect to
+the suppression of dissent or the inability to criticize the
+kingdom in any way for the average Saudi?
+ Is it a real issue and is it bubbling up to be something
+that could cause real change in the kingdom?
+ And second part of the question is, can you recommend any
+specific achievable kind of free expression reforms that the
+U.S. might be able to press for in its engagement with the
+Saudis?
+ Ms. Nossel. Sure. You know, I would say it's hard to know
+exactly. Of course, you know, there are no really reliable
+public opinion polls that are conducted within Saudi Arabia.
+ You know, there isn't free media. There's repression online
+such that, you know, it's hard to reliably gauge, you know, how
+important this issue is to the man on the street.
+ And I think the strategy that MBS has undertaken is to
+address certain issues--the ban on driving being at the top of
+the list, the loosening of the guardianship restrictions--that
+have sort of across the board support.
+ That women's rights agenda is something that cuts across
+ideology, religious sectarianism, geography within Saudi
+Arabia. It has a lot of support in many quarters, and so I
+think that's why we have seen progress in that area.
+ And I think, you know, the strategy really is to take other
+steps that will appease a kind of pent-up demand for more
+freedom. But in order to be able to sustain this very intense
+type control over expression and dissent that it's a kind of a
+bargain.
+ I think it's important to recognize that. It's not sort of
+a progression where one will inexorably lead to the other. You
+know, first you address women's rights and then there will be
+liberalization when it comes to free expression and dissent.
+ I think it's actually the two issues play off one another
+and that, you know, in a sense, the Crown Prince is buying
+himself some support to continue this crackdown and, you know,
+when it comes to certain officials who are more----
+ Mr. Cicilline. And I--no, I appreciate that. I just want to
+try to get in one more question. If you could--I'm sorry, I
+didn't want to interrupt you but I want to try to get in one
+more question.
+ Ms. Nossel. Sure.
+ Mr. Cicilline. And that is, you know, there's been a lot of
+reporting that's--and this is for Ms. Fontenrose--there's been
+a lot of reporting that Saudi Arabia is using hacking and
+social media surveillance to spy on and intimidate dissidents.
+ In November 2019, U.S. authorities charged two former
+Twitter employees for spying on users on behalf of Saudi
+Arabia.
+ And so, Ms. Fontenrose, how does technology fit into Saudi
+efforts to harass and intimidate activists and political
+opponents, and how can Congress ensure U.S. firms and
+technology are not being used in these efforts?
+ Ms. Fontenrose. Technology is the primary tool in tracking
+and suppressing opposition, and the person I mentioned, Saud
+al-Qahtani, was instrumental in building Saudi Arabia's arsenal
+of these technological tools and continues to be.
+ And we also note that, you know, Saudi Arabia went to the
+level of even harassing the CEO of a major U.S. corporation
+with this--with this technique.
+ The way that this can be handled is already underway.
+Congress and the U.S. Government and most of the social media
+companies are involved in really in-depth discussions about
+where the limits of their authorities are and how much they can
+actually do in terms of personal freedom.
+ One of the challenges is that since many of these companies
+are U.S. based, we allow quite a bit more in terms of personal
+freedom than some of these other countries would. If these--if
+these companies, for instance, were North Korean, they would
+probably be able to put quite a bit of limitation on their
+usage.
+ But we have a tougher time with that conversation and
+that's what we're trying to work out right now. State
+Department is really engaged in these discussions with the--
+with the community.
+ We could, perhaps, sanction some of the organizations that
+do this work in Saudi Arabia. We have done that before. There
+was an organization--the acronym was CSMARC--that was involved
+in the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, and we said we would sanction
+the organization. We made great moves to do it, and Saudi
+Arabia eventually just shut the whole organization down.
+ But we know that some of those roles have been
+reconstituted, and if we sanction those it makes it--it makes
+it then impossible for U.S. technology companies to work with
+them or for them to contract with providers of specialized
+capabilities.
+ So that might be one step. It's sort of a simple step. But
+until we get to the bottom of what the government nexus with
+private sector is in terms of what we're allowed to allow and
+prohibit, that might be one of the--one of the easier ways to
+immediately address it.
+ Mr. Cicilline. Thank you so much.
+ And with that, my time is expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+I yield back.
+ Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline.
+ Mr. Mast, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
+ Mr. Mast. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you
+recognizing me.
+ I've enjoyed hearing the debate and the conversation today.
+I think it's important. It's important to recognize important
+partners in every region that we work with. But it's also
+important for us as a nation and for our citizens who we are
+representative of to never be allowed to be naive as to who it
+is that we're working with, and then we make an honest decision
+about how and where we will work with those individuals.
+ And so it's in that that I'm going to bring attention
+just--and I will not have any questions today. I just want to
+bring attention to something that a number of us have made
+requests for and worked on as it relates to Saudi Arabia and
+bring it to--maybe to the attention of some of the other
+members of our committee who have not been on this, and ask for
+your consideration on this.
+ In the previous Congress, we did write a letter to Attorney
+General Barr to specifically express our concerns over a
+decision, or more than one decision, to assert what's known as
+the State secrets privilege on litigation brought by victims of
+September 11 attacks and their families against the Kingdom of
+Saudi Arabia.
+ I would like to, basically, ask that all members of this
+committee look into what is being considered under that State
+secrets privilege and that we write to Merrick Garland about
+the exact same issue, making sure that it is transparent for
+all Americans, not just what has gone on with the situation
+like Khashoggi but what has gone on that has perpetuated the
+United States of America to be at war for 20 years--you know,
+war that has, you know, began on our soil, has affected many of
+us personally, me personally, in war, many of my friends and
+family, and that we make every single effort to have very true
+and real transparency about all of those that we are working
+with.
+ So in that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back my time. I know
+this is something that you have worked on as well. But just to
+say I would ask for the support of members of this committee as
+we sit here and discuss Saudi Arabia to also not lose sight of
+what is still being kept secret about September 11th to those
+that were most intimately affected by it.
+ And in that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
+ Mr. Deutch. I thank you for your comments, Mr. Mast.
+ And we'll yield 5 minutes now to Mr. Malinowski.
+ [No response.]
+ Mr. Deutch. Mr. Malinowski, we're having some trouble with
+your sound. Why do not--why do not we--why do not we give you a
+minute to work with staff to try to square that away? And, you
+know, we cannot hear you.
+ If it's OK with you, Mr. Malinowski, we'll go to Ms.
+Manning, and then we'll come back to you. Thank you very much.
+ Ms. Manning, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
+ Ms. Manning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
+hearing and thank you to all the witnesses. I'm assuming you
+can hear me.
+ OK, great. Thank you to all the witnesses for their
+outstanding testimony.
+ Ms. Fontenrose, you have articulated so clearly the
+complexity of our relationship with Saudi Arabia, including the
+importance of Saudi Arabia in the balance of power in the
+region and in achieving some critical U.S. goals, and your
+suggestion of setting clear red lines with actions for crossing
+those lines and the importance of acting in concert with the
+international community against human rights violations are all
+well taken, as well as your suggestion that the U.S. act as an
+avuncular advisor, which suggests a wonderful balanced
+approach.
+ I'm interested in whether you can talk to us about whether
+there are carrots we can use in addition to sticks.
+ Ms. Fontenrose. Thank you, Congresswoman.
+ Yes, there absolutely are, and I think that's incredibly
+important. If we only lead with sticks, then we risk losing
+some of the loyalty we have from Saudi Arabia to competitors,
+whether adversarial or friendly, whether economic or military.
+ So in terms of some of the--some of the carrots, things
+like securing Saudi Arabia against the attacks they're
+receiving from Iran-backed proxies, the very immediate carrot
+are--the end of our support for the coalition in Yemen did send
+a clear message to Mohammed bin Salman that there needs to be
+an end--a political end to the war in Yemen very quickly.
+ But it also did embolden greater kinetic action on the part
+of the Houthis. If we were to offer Saudi Arabia assistance
+with resisting that--those attacks, that is a carrot.
+ They are looking for ways to push back that will not anger
+our Congress. They are very aware that if they use air strikes
+there will be condemnation from the Hill.
+ So what are other ways that we can offer them? We can offer
+them cyber assistance. We can offer them electronic warfare
+assistance in addressing the guidance systems or the launch
+systems of the missiles and rockets that are coming at them.
+ We can offer them assistance with assessing their
+vulnerability to drones and, perhaps, assistance in identifying
+which counter-UAS technologies might be most useful for them so
+they aren't just buying haphazardly from people pitching to
+them and acquiring technology that, frankly, will not be useful
+against the threat.
+ We can work on intelligence sharing and identifying where
+those attacks are coming from, and then if the Administration
+really wants to give them a carrot, the Administration will
+talk to Congress and say, we have shared information on where
+these attacks are coming from.
+ We have told the Saudis it is OK for them to strike these
+launchers or these missile depots and we would appreciate it if
+you would not condemn them for these particular targeted
+strikes against imminent threats.
+ So there's some very, very--not very difficult and very
+immediate things we can do that are carrots. Other carrots
+include things like welcoming them back more robustly into the
+international economic community.
+ They are really trying to rebuild their previous economic
+power, and our insistence that they be treated as a pariah has
+made the international finance community a little bit hesitant
+to do that.
+ They would, certainly, welcome that sort of--that sort of
+welcome into this conversation again, welcome back into that
+more robustly.
+ That's not something we necessarily have to do, but that
+definitely would be a carrot and that's simply diplomatic. That
+does not require policy changes. It does not require
+legislation. It does not require resourcing.
+ Other carrots we can give them are consulting with them on
+the JCPOA. Yes, we have said that we would do that, but are we
+really? Really taking into account their concerns about
+regional activities and missile programs from Iran would be a
+carrot for sure.
+ Ms. Manning. Great. Let me ask you one more question. Are
+there steps that the U.S. can take to encourage the
+normalization of the relationship between Saudi Arabia and
+Israel to bring them into the Abrahamic Accords?
+ Ms. Fontenrose. I do not even think we have to do much
+more. I think Mohammed bin Salman is on board with this. We are
+dealing with the fact that the current king of Saudi Arabia,
+who has been a wonderful partner to the U.S., is opposed to
+normalization until there is a political solution that is
+acceptable to the Palestinian camp.
+ And it's my understanding that as long as King Salman is
+king, that that stance will stay solid. That is--that is,
+essentially a core value in Saudi Arabia and that we will see
+more direct movement on normalization either if Mohammed bin
+Salman is made prime minister or if there is--if there's a
+succession, and Mohammed bin Salman were to take the throne.
+Not necessarily upon the passing of King Salman, even prior.
+ But I think that's where we're going to see it. I think
+pressure before then we'll still run up against King Salman's
+personal beliefs and personal wishes, and we might not want to
+press that from a long-standing great partner.
+ But in the meantime, we can, certainly, work with Saudi on
+some things that they can do to show that normalization is
+coming. One is messaging to their own people. There's a big
+public diplomacy perception issue in much of the Arab world
+about normalization.
+ They can start working on that right away. They can also
+start working on small economic agreements. They can start
+working on technical cooperation in areas of missile defense or
+maritime security.
+ There are things they can do that are steps toward
+normalization without officially making that one of their
+policies. That would help set the stage, would really put them
+in place, and then normalization would almost look like a
+logical completion of a process.
+ Ms. Manning. Thanks so much. My time is expired. I yield
+back.
+ Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Ms. Manning.
+ Before going to you, Mr. Burchett, we're going to take just
+a quick moment and see if Mr. Malinowski's audio works.
+ [Pause.]
+ Mr. Deutch. No, unfortunately not. Maybe we can----
+ Mr. Burchett. Mr. Chairman, if he comes back on just stop
+me. It's good.
+ Mr. Deutch. We will not send you--hold on 1 second, Mr.
+Burchett.
+ Mr. Malinowski, I'll try one more time.
+ Mr. Burchett. How about that?
+ Mr. Deutch. Great. Okay. Great. So, Mr. Burchett, we're
+going to you. Then we'll come back to Mr. Malinowski and----
+ Mr. Burchett. Mr. Chairman, in bipartisan nature, let's go
+back to Mr. Malinowski. He had to skip he--and I'm cool with
+that, Okay?
+ Mr. Deutch. That's actually very kind of you. But we went
+to Ms. Manning, who's a Democrat, and keeping with our true
+bipartisanship nature, we're going to come back to you now, if
+you're----
+ Mr. Burchett. All right. Well, I tried, brother. I tried. I
+apologize.
+ All right. Ms. Fontenrose, you mentioned in your testimony
+that we released Khashoggi reports too soon and missed out on
+additional human rights concessions. Which concessions do you
+think we missed out on?
+ Ms. Fontenrose. It's my understanding, from speaking with
+colleagues inside the kingdom, that there was great concern in
+Saudi Arabia that the report might include incriminating
+information, and so they were keen to be very conciliatory
+prior to the release of the report.
+ So it's my feeling that had the report release been delayed
+we may have actually had leverage to make additional requests
+of Saudi Arabia. So we succeeded in the release of Loujain al-
+Hathloul, but she has--she has peers who are still imprisoned,
+and it might have been possible to get some movement on those
+specifically.
+ Mr. Burchett. Okay. And for the committee, is there any
+internal pressure on Saudi Arabia to improve its human rights
+practices? And that's out to anybody.
+ Anyone? Ms. Fontenrose, do you want to try that?
+ Ms. Fontenrose. I apologize. I thought that question was
+for the committee. And can you repeat it really quickly?
+ Mr. Burchett. It was, but since you're a part of it, is
+there any internal pressure on Saudi Arabia to improve its
+human rights practices?
+ Ms. Fontenrose. It's a great question because there is,
+certainly, pressure from the public who does believe that human
+rights improvements would improve their own lives.
+ But that public has no leverage in Saudi Arabia. There is
+no mechanism by which they can express themselves in a way that
+will create policy change but, potentially, not endanger them
+as individuals.
+ So, unfortunately, the pressure--the desire is there, but
+the pressure is not effective.
+ Mr. Burchett. Okay. And this is for of the committee, so
+you all get ready to get on your buzzers. Do you think that
+Saudi Arabia will develop closer ties with our adversaries,
+such as Russia and China, because the U.S. pressured them on
+human rights?
+ Mr. Deutch. Mr. Burchett, I think you're referring to the
+committee of witnesses. Is that correct?
+ Mr. Burchett. Yes. Yes, I'm telling the witnesses. I'm
+sorry. Not our committee. I do not want to hear any of you all.
+I'm tired of hearing you all. So go ahead.
+ Ms. Fontenrose. I can speak to that. The answer is
+absolutely yes. We are the priority partner for Saudi Arabia.
+They are very clear about that, and we have no reason to doubt
+that.
+ But it is definitely true that Russia and China bring their
+partnership without human rights strings attached. Russia would
+love to replace the U.S. as the hub for security relationships
+in the region.
+ They have floated a proposal to this--to this effect, that
+they continue to socialize, including in the recent visit of
+Lavrov to the--to Riyadh. And China is very happy with the U.S.
+being the security guarantor and locking down its economic
+interests.
+ We would not expect China to come in as a guarantor of
+Saudi security or a protector of waterways or the like, but
+they'll certainly replace us as a vendor of arms and they'll
+also sell those arms to Saudis' enemies, which, you know, if
+you let Russia and China lead the way in terms of military
+technology in the region, you definitely have the kind of arms
+race that could lead to escalation.
+ So yes, it's very real. Saudi would not like to go that
+way. They do not choose to go that way. But they do have other
+options.
+ Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Oh, go ahead.
+ Ms. Nossel. No, I was just going to add briefly, I think
+that's true but I think it should not be overStated. I think
+particularly when it comes to the rivalry with Iran, the
+partnership with the U.S. is not replaceable by either Russia
+or China.
+ They're not going to serve as that kind of bulwark against
+their Iranian nuclear ambitions and regional ambitions. And so
+I think that the degree of preference for the U.S. is, we
+should recognize, is strong and not be too quick to assume that
+any antagonism is going to lead them into the arms of Beijing
+or Moscow.
+ Mr. Burchett. Right. I've got--Mr. Chairman, I yield back
+the remainder of my time Mr. Malinowski, if he figured out his
+computer. If he does not, tell him to get a 13-year-old
+daughter because she will explain the--everything you're doing
+wrong with your computer and embarrass you continuously with
+it.
+ So I yield.
+ Mr. Deutch. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Burchett.
+ Mr. Malinowski, we are ready to try again.
+ Mr. Malinowski. Yes. How's this?
+ Mr. Deutch. We can hear you. Does your camera work?
+ Mr. Malinowski. It should be. Yes.
+ Mr. Deutch. Oh. Does everyone else see Mr. Malinowski? Only
+I do not?
+ Mr. Malinowski. I see Gerry----
+ Mr. Deutch. Oh, sorry. That's apparently--that's a problem
+on my end. Mr. Malinowski, I want to also, as I acknowledge
+you, take just a moment to thank you for your principled and
+strong leadership on human rights, especially on human rights
+in Saudi Arabia. We're grateful for your leadership, and you're
+recognized for 5 minutes.
+ Mr. Malinowski. Thank you so much, and I think my daughter
+would probably give us the advice not to be using WebEx. But
+we'll set that aside for a moment.
+ So look, I want to just jump right into what's been a
+really interesting exchange about leverage and our interests,
+and to start with Ms. Fontenrose because in your testimony you
+made a proposal that is very consistent with what many of us
+have been advocating and with what the Biden Administration has
+actually begun to do, and that is to draw a red line around
+what could be called transnational repression, authoritarian
+States such as Saudi Arabia reaching beyond their borders into
+the United States, into democratic countries in Europe, into
+Canada, to pursue their enemies, which is essentially what
+happened in the Khashoggi case but also others.
+ At the same time, you expressed some concern about doing
+too much to go after the main author of the killing of
+Khashoggi, and I wanted to challenge you a little bit about an
+apparent contradiction between those two positions.
+ I understand that there are limits to what the United
+States can do to challenge Saudi Arabia in terms of human
+rights conditions within the country. I want to try. I'm
+passionate about it.
+ But that is, I think, somewhat different from the Khashoggi
+case. The Khashoggi case, yes, it's a human rights case. But it
+was also--it was also something that can be considered a
+hostile act against a resident of the United States of America.
+ And if we're going to have an actual red line, as you
+suggested, if we are going to build a coalition, an alliance of
+democratic States, making clear that we have zero tolerance for
+that kind of activity, do not we undercut that message if we
+say that a relationship with a particular individual in Saudi
+Arabia is too important to hold that individual accountable in
+any way?
+ Ms. Fontenrose. Congressman, I do not think that what we'd
+be saying is that the relationship with that individual is too
+important. We'd be saying that the relationship with the
+country is too important and we'd be acknowledging that because
+of the potential for retaliation by the individual at the top
+for certain actions, it would be in better serving U.S.
+interests not to take certain methods for responding to the
+Khashoggi murder.
+ We are not without options. There are many, many options
+for U.S. response. So the issue is just assessing which of
+these will lead to the advancement of U.S. interests long term,
+and which would look like they were getting at Mohammed bin
+Salman but would, in fact, be pyrrhic victories.
+ And so things like sanctioning him would definitely lead to
+retaliation against U.S. interests in many sectors, as I
+mentioned, even things like energy transition, and certainly it
+would cripple our ability to respond to post-conflict
+stabilization needs across the region. We do really count on
+Saudi Arabia writing checks. In 2018, the current coordinator
+for the Middle East on Biden's team at the NSC asked Saudi
+Arabia for $100 million to use in Syria.
+ Without that money, we couldn't have accomplished some of
+what we needed--we needed to do there. And I guarantee you that
+Saudi Arabia is already considering the fact that that person
+will very likely come back and ask for more.
+ We also are going to see needs in Iraq and in Lebanon,
+certainly, in Yemen and Libya. And without one of the largest
+powers in the region in terms of resources and political
+weight, that will be very difficult to do on our own unless we
+want to get far more involved in these conflicts. And in the
+short run----
+ Mr. Malinowski. Now, I am just going to--sorry, reclaiming
+my time a little bit. What I worry about is that, I mean, we
+have sanctioned the country.
+ We just haven't done anything about the individual, and by
+sanction I'm not--I'm not in favor of economic sanctions
+against MBS for some of the reasons that you've laid out.
+ What we have proposed is something that falls short of
+that. But I worry about the danger of reinforcing the official
+Saudi line, which is that the murder of Jamal Khashoggi was a
+crime but it was committed by everybody other than MBS.
+ They have sanctioned the same henchmen, for the most part,
+that we have sanctioned in the past, and I do not want to
+reinforce that lie.
+ And I do not have that much time left, but I think that a
+lot of the steps that you have suggested Saudi Arabia might
+take to harm our interests if we take the step would also be
+incredibly harmful to Saudi interests.
+ Yes, China can sell them weapons. Yes, Russia can run
+around and propose regional security arrangements in which
+Russia takes part. But it's absolutely crystal clear that only
+the United States protect Saudi Arabia. Chinese weapons are
+useless to them because their own military is not what defends
+them.
+ It is the United States military that defends them if
+anything were to happen, an Iranian attack on Gulf shipping or
+on Saudi Arabia itself. The Saudi military would be asked to
+stand down, and the United States would be protecting the king,
+and they know that.
+ So I wish we could continue the exchange. But I'm out of
+time and I yield back. Thank you.
+ Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Malinowski.
+ Mr. Steube, you're recognized.
+ Mr. Steube. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My questions are for
+Ms. Fontenrose. What posture should the U.S. take in its public
+statements about human rights and political freedoms in Saudi
+Arabia?
+ Ms. Fontenrose. Excellent question. It actually allows us
+to followup a bit on what Congressman Malinowski was raising as
+well.
+ I think it's very important that the U.S. take a very
+public posture on the core value of human rights, and I think
+this administration has already kicked that off very well by
+stating that.
+ On the flip side, I think that conversations about
+reactions to it need to happen privately because of the
+psychology of Mohammed bin Salman, and I encourage you to ask
+for briefings from your intelligence--representing your
+intelligence community liaisons on this if you'd like.
+ This is best handled in a way that does not make him look
+like a public pariah. But the standards and the red lines
+should be Stated publicly, and America's insistence on these
+being upheld should be Stated publicly. There needs to be sort
+of this establishment of accountability.
+ And then the methods by which we are willing to assist for
+the--for the red lines we're drawing in terms of what the
+punishments will be can be private discussions.
+ Mr. Steube. Well, and kind of related to that, your policy
+recommendations include trying to have a positive influence on
+Saudi leaders through our engagement.
+ Are there examples of ways in which our engagement with
+Saudi political or military leaders has had a positive impact
+on promoting America's values and policies?
+ Ms. Fontenrose. Absolutely. Specifically on military, and
+this is a very tactical example, but the U.N. recorded a
+decrease in the loss of life by civilians in Yemen between 2017
+and 2019 that we think is directly correlated to the advisement
+of our U.S. military to the cell that does deconfliction
+targeting in Yemen.
+ We also know, as you mentioned, about U.S. pressure
+resulting in the release of Loujain al-Hathloul, and I
+mentioned in my testimony that the Saudi--the assistance by the
+State Department and the pressure from Congress that resulted
+in changes to Saudi curriculum that is used globally worldwide.
+ I think there are also additional ways that the U.S. can
+apply pressure diplomatically that would be well received. One
+is definitely staying on top of the call for the release of
+additional activists and dissidents.
+ There are also other--we could ask, as I mentioned, for
+embedding of advisors into Saudi ministries to work on
+legislation, to work on the drafting of new laws and then
+codifying. We can recommend supporting them in their
+digitization efforts.
+ We have--we have placed pressure on them in terms of
+improving their human rights record, but we haven't really
+given them tools or said specifically how to do that. Saudi is
+really good about responding to specific requests, not so good
+about responding to generic requests, often because they simply
+do not know where to start.
+ So if we provide some of the capacity and we say, all
+right, now that you've said Insha'Allah and sort of shaking
+your head and said you're willing to come along, we're going to
+show you exactly how to get there and we're going to walk you
+through this.
+ I think there--I think it's very, very, very plausible.
+ Mr. Steube. In your testimony, you highlighted a tradeoff
+between sanctions blocking access to the United States and
+enforcing other accountability measures against human rights
+violators.
+ How would you recommend we resolve this tradeoff in U.S.
+policy?
+ Ms. Fontenrose. Can you repeat that one more time? I'm
+sorry. It kind of broke up.
+ Mr. Steube. Sure. In your testimony, you highlighted a
+tradeoff between sanctions blocking access to the United States
+and enforcing other accountability measures against human
+rights violators. How would you recommend we resolve this
+tradeoff in U.S. policy?
+ Ms. Fontenrose. I do not think it has to be a tradeoff. We
+could also choose to simply sanction businesses that Mohammed
+bin Salman has a stake in and, therefore, avoid the tradeoff
+issue at all.
+ He is the head of the Sovereign Wealth Fund. He also holds
+many of the private sector companies in Saudi Arabia under his
+personal portfolio, and one of them, for instance, we know
+owned the planes that were used to transport the kill operation
+to and from Turkey.
+ So we could choose to sanction businesses he's associated
+with instead of sanctioning himself and that might then lessen
+the risk of reducing U.S. access in the country and lessen the
+risk of retaliation and negate any tradeoff.
+ Mr. Steube. Well, thank you for being here today. My time
+is almost expired. So I yield back.
+ Mr. Deutch. Thank you very--thank you very much, Mr.
+Steube.
+ Mr. Keating, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
+ Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ When we're looking at what we can do in terms of human
+rights concerns and, particularly, the discussion centered on
+MBS and what we could do, to look at the actions he's taken
+without compromising our policy, it's really interesting.
+ I've been noticing on television--I think maybe some of the
+people here in the committee hearing have been noticing the
+television--the promotions, the tourist promotions that are
+much more extensive than they ever were for tourism travel into
+Saudi Arabia, and Mohammed bin Salman took his oil interests
+and transferred a great deal, billions of that, toward a Vision
+2030.
+ But also, specifically on the tourism, the high-end tourism
+industry where the Red Sea development companies and other
+companies that he's been very involved with and controls to a
+large measure, pouring those billions of dollars into there,
+and the hypocrisy of these resorts and hotels and airports that
+he's upgrading and creating and the rules that are there in
+terms of women wearing bikinis or the serving of alcohol or
+whether--you know, whether they can even--unmarried couples can
+share rooms, those things are like a for-profit hypocrisy to
+everything else they're doing in the country as well.
+ So my question is, given his personal focus and investment
+on this, given the fact that in one end, he's really being
+hypocritical about many of the things he's doing, particularly
+the things he's doing to still allow from the State standpoint,
+taking away human rights issues and, in particular, rights of
+women.
+ What's going on on the private side? Are you aware of any
+private groups or private citizen groups that are interested in
+these human rights issues, that are interested in what's being
+done to hurt women's equality there?
+ Whether there's advocacy groups, whether there's any
+acknowledgment of businesses that are having meetings there?
+What can we--are you aware of what's going on on the other
+side, the nongovernmental side, of approaching the violations
+for human rights that the Saudi government does by looking at
+these investments, investments, by the way, that require
+participation from many of the countries who are working to
+make sure these norms no longer exist.
+ Anyone who wants----
+ Dr. Aldosari. I can talk a little bit about that.
+ Well, the fact is, yes, there are a strong drive from the
+leadership toward creating something similar to the Dubai
+environment, a climate where it really is global and open to
+tourists and international business, foreign business in
+particular.
+ But it wasn't very successful because of the structural
+problems. We have seen increased fees on migrant workers, for
+instance. Migrant workers represent half of the work force
+inside Saudi Arabia and a third of the population.
+ Many of them do not really enjoy, you know, the freedom to
+change jobs or to exit. But there were some reforms allowed for
+some segments of the work force--not the domestic workers or
+the most vulnerable--to change their jobs or to leave the
+country without consent.
+ So there are some policy problems to engaging foreigners
+inside Saudi Arabia. There are also more problematic issues
+when it comes to creating those futuristic cities. Those
+futuristic cities are aimed to be directed toward the foreign
+population rather than the local population. So it does not
+really change the situation for the local tribes.
+ We have seen forced relocation in NEOM for the futuristic
+city, for instance, of al-Huwaitat tribes in which several were
+imprisoned--several people were imprisoned and one was killed
+for refusing the forced relocation.
+ There are groups, private groups, of course, engaging in
+those issues. Some of them are from the people in exile, the
+Saudis in exile, who are meeting regularly with, you know,
+influential figures and influential groups.
+ But one of the main hurdles that we face is the poor
+communication with officials. So these people do not have a
+channel of communication with their officials or with the
+officials who are visiting Europe and promoting these kinds of,
+you know, initiatives.
+ So I would say, yes, there are private groups working
+toward improving the situation of human rights and highlighting
+those issues. But because of the atmosphere of repression
+inside Saudi Arabia, it's becoming more difficult for us to
+gather testimoneys or to get information, real proper
+information, on what's happening and who's most affected by
+this kind of----
+ Mr. Keating. Well, if I could interrupt. I'm sorry. But,
+for instance, there is a French company that's doing massive
+investments in this, too. We're sanctioning other companies and
+corporations in the world for other activities. This is a way
+the U.S. could approach it from a governmental standpoint, but
+also those of us that are concerned as U.S. citizens and people
+that are interested to do it in a private way--that was my
+point--from the outside.
+ Because if we hurt this massive investment because of their
+actions in human rights and the way they treat women, then I
+think that might pressure him more, instead of just the veneer
+of these cosmetic changes that he has made.
+ With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
+ Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Keating.
+ Dr. Jackson, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
+ [No response.]
+ Mr. Deutch. Is Representative Jackson still on?
+ Mr. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you
+recognizing me. I think that most of the questions I had have
+already been answered at this point. So I'll yield back the
+rest of my time. Thank you, sir. Appreciate it.
+ Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much.
+ Mr. Vargas, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
+ Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Again, I
+want to thank you for holding this hearing and I particularly
+want to thank the witnesses for their important testimony.
+ I also want to thank my good friend, Mr. Connolly from
+Virginia, for his leadership in pursuing justice for Mr. Jamal
+Khashoggi.
+ But it does seem like we're in a very difficult place, and
+we want to continue our important relationship with Saudi
+Arabia. And it also seems like the Saudi royal family seems to
+have picked Mohammed bin Salman as their future leader.
+ So here we are. It seems like we have a very difficult time
+really treating the murder of Jamal Khashoggi as a murder
+because we do not really believe in regime change, and if we
+try, we're not normally very good at it anyway.
+ So here we are. We continue to make very strong statements
+about human rights, and I think we should, and certainly I
+believe in them.
+ But it does seem that we're stuck in a very difficult
+place, treating this really like a murder because of the
+situation we're in. I mean, am I wrong about that, Ms.
+Fontenrose?
+ Ms. Fontenrose. You're absolutely right about that. That is
+exactly the cognitive dissonance we're facing right now is the
+king in Saudi Arabia has chosen Mohammed bin Salman as the next
+leader of Saudi Arabia, and Mohammed bin Salman has shored up
+his likelihood of succession.
+ So then the U.S. must ask itself what are our priorities in
+terms of not only the relationship but what we want for years
+to come in terms of Saudis' role in supporting our objectives
+in the region and elsewhere?
+ Can we work with this person? If not, what are our options,
+and they're fairly limited? If so, what do we need to do?
+ What steps do we need to take to ensure that the direction
+of the kingdom is such that they are a productive and helpful
+partner and not one that we are constantly having to turn
+around and rebuke and scold for massive foreign policy
+problems?
+ And I think that's what we're talking about today, trying
+to find the ways that we can lead Saudi Arabia to this kind of
+change we're looking for, because if he is the king and he does
+survive, as his predecessors have, then we'll be dealing with
+him for the next 10 presidencies.
+ Mr. Vargas. No, I agree. So in light of all that, then I'd
+like to ask Dr. Aldosari. You know, one of the things that I
+think is very, very important is, obviously, the issue of
+women's rights.
+ And I've been to Saudi Arabia a few times myself on CODELS
+and it is glaring. I mean, it's obvious the lack of rights that
+women have. I mean, how can we push harder and at the same time
+not get people imprisoned and killed over this?
+ I mean, I was surprised. You open up the issue of driving
+for women, then you arrest the women that were pushing for
+women to drive. I mean, what can we do?
+ Dr. Aldosari. Exactly. So I would suggest that, you know,
+the U.S. uses its position--its position as an ally, as a
+protector, to push for those reforms, to amplify the voices of
+the civil society and the women activists.
+ The women activists did not only represent a voice for
+reforms. They were in a place where there's very limited
+support and resources available for most vulnerable groups.
+They were able to amplify their voices.
+ They were able to, for instance, apply for a shelter for
+survivors of violence. That is not very limited in terms of
+services and access, as the government operated government-
+sponsored shelters.
+ So I think that one key thing is to establish a good
+support or a good relationship with the civil society in Saudi
+Arabia. Mostly are in exile now. They're not really active from
+within. Even those who were released from prison are banned
+from resuming any kinds of activism.
+ But at least with the civil society of Saudi Arabia, who
+are in exile outside, there is a National Assembly Party that
+has been formed last year by some of the scholars and activists
+and diaspora that is calling for a democratic transition and
+highlighting the issues from the point of view of the people.
+ So having, you know, informed voices from the civil
+society, Saudi civil society, and try to amplify their demands
+for reforms and amplify their voices is a good first step to,
+basically, push for more reforms in Saudi Arabia that is based
+on public needs.
+ Mr. Vargas. Well, I have to say, again, I think that we
+have some leverage here because of this murder. I do think
+that, you know, that MBS does care about his image, and I do
+think that we can do the things that you said, you know, for
+women and the activists within and outside of the country by
+pushing harder and making our voice heard.
+ Again, it's a very difficult situation. But it seems that
+this situation that we're in does not seem like we have a whole
+lot of options.
+ I see that my time is expired, and Mr. Chairman, I yield
+back. Thank you.
+ Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Mr. Vargas.
+ Mr. Schneider, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
+ Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
+having this committee. I want to thank the witnesses and I'll
+start with you, Ms. Fontenrose, and I'm trying to figure out
+how to juxtapose two separate questions.
+ I guess I'll start picking up what was discussed earlier
+about normalization. The Abrahamic Accords, the dynamic of
+things happening in the region and around the world that are
+creating, I think, a unique opportunity to promote
+naturalization and, certainly, the United States has a role to
+play in fostering that but also within Saudi Arabia.
+ Just curious, and to all the witnesses as well, have you
+seen any steps within Saudi Arabia for the regime to be laying
+the groundwork with the people toward moving closer toward
+normalization, and any sense of what the public might be
+willing to accept or where the leadership might be willing to--
+or able to move them to on what normalization might look like?
+ Ms. Fontenrose. We have heard statements and rhetoric out
+of the Saudi government that are supportive of the Abraham
+Accords and supportive of the concept of normalization. It does
+appear that they are trying to prepare their population for the
+idea that Saudi Arabia should and could have a future
+relationship with Israel.
+ There has not been any negative messaging out of Saudi
+Arabia about the Accords from the official government. Now,
+this is different than what we're hearing about from some parts
+of the population.
+ Saudi does have a fairly right wing and conservative and
+anti-Israeli segment of their population that is of concern in
+terms of creating change too quickly in Saudi Arabia, what
+might their reaction be.
+ But the government itself, yes, has been--has been very
+pro-normalization in terms of their support for the idea that
+Israel could be a partner for peace.
+ Mr. Schneider. Great, thank you.
+ Dr. Aldosari. I would just add one thing here.
+ Mr. Schneider. Please. Please.
+ Dr. Aldosari. I'm sorry to interrupt.
+ There is an intelligence sharing and cooperation with
+Israel. In fact, the software used to hack into Jamal
+Khashoggi's phone and other dissidents abroad was authorized by
+the Israeli Ministry of Defense and sold to Saudi Arabia and
+used in most of the hacking attempts.
+ So I would say that there is already an ongoing
+relationship with the Saudi government and the Israeli
+government. But there is, of course, a very strong sentiment
+against any kinds of normalization from the people, not
+necessarily because they were--they are conservative Islamist,
+not from an Islamic point of view only, but also from a point
+of standing with the Palestinians' rights of self-
+determination.
+ This is not something that is mentioned in the Accords and,
+you know, this kind of individual normalization that would
+put--you know, would put no pressure whatsoever on Israel to
+solve the conflict with Palestinians, this is something that
+most of the rights groups in the region are against, not only
+the Saudis.
+ Mr. Schneider. All right. Thank you for that.
+ With the last 2 minutes I'll go a slightly different
+direction and, Ms. Fontenrose, I will point to--finish with
+you.
+ You know, very broadly, this applies everywhere but we're
+focused on Saudi Arabia. How would you describe the
+implications for U.S. foreign policy and outcomes when we do
+not get the right balance on emphasis on human rights issues?
+ And to be clear, that can be either putting too little or
+too much emphasis, although I have my own bias that there's no
+such thing as too much.
+ What is the implications of not getting that balance right?
+And I think we have lost Ms. Fontenrose.
+ Mr. Deutch. Mr. Schneider, why do not you ask the question
+again? I'll give you additional time.
+ Mr. Schneider. Thank you. Ms. Fontenrose, can you hear me?
+ [No response.]
+ Mr. Schneider. I'm not sure if we have audio connection.
+Are you able to hear me, Ms. Fontenrose?
+ Ms. Fontenrose. I apologize. I lost power for a second
+there. Can I ask you to repeat that?
+ Mr. Schneider. No worries. Yes, I'll repeat the question.
+ What I'm saying is that in foreign policy in general, but
+we're talking Saudi Arabia and specific to the delicate balance
+of the emphasis we place in our foreign policy on human rights,
+and, you know, clearly, it can be not enough emphasis, too much
+emphasis.
+ I have my bias it is not possible to put too much emphasis
+on human rights. But what are the implications for foreign
+policy for not getting the balance right?
+ Ms. Fontenrose. I think the--there's no negative to
+stressing human rights. I think the balance we need to strike
+is in not being the only voice calling for them.
+ We need to make sure that it's not simply an American
+request but that this is an international request. You know, we
+want Japan, we want Europe on side with us saying that these
+are expectations of the global world order and we're going to
+need you to raise your baseline to meet them.
+ Because otherwise, we do risk isolating ourselves. You
+know, it's true that we do not think any of these countries
+that we're talking to about human rights are necessarily going
+to jump into the arms of others in terms of their leading
+partners right away.
+ But the more that we drive ourselves to a point where we're
+asking them to take great, great, great steps--you must sign on
+to this agreement that says that you will do certain
+maintenance and training and in user agreements and we're going
+to put ethics training into our military sales while other
+countries aren't doing that makes us a more expensive and a
+more difficult partner.
+ And we should not lower our standards, but we should be
+diplomatically pressuring our partners at the least to meet
+those same standards, whether it's in nuclear energy or whether
+it's on military ethics training.
+ Whatever it is, we shouldn't simply be focusing on the
+human rights violations. We should be focusing on the global
+voice that's calling for the rise in that standard.
+ Mr. Schneider. Thank you. And I'll add, you know, having
+the consistent message and engaging with our allies not just
+here and there but across the board is a easier way to do that.
+ So I thank you. I went over time. Thank you, Chairman,
+ Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Schneider.
+ I will now yield myself time for questioning. Thanks to all
+of the witnesses for your testimony. It's been a really good
+hearing.
+ Dr. Aldosari, I want to focus on what you said in response
+to a recent question. We have had a lot of conversation today
+about the needs of Saudi Arabia and the Crown Prince, about the
+needs of America.
+ Obviously, as we have discussed, the Saudis are concerned
+about Muslim Brotherhood. They're concerned about Iran. They
+have very real security needs.
+ As they look out to the future, there is talk of
+diversifying from oil. The Crown Prince's Vision 2030 was a
+bold idea--women driving_there's a lot that the Saudis are
+thinking about and doing.
+ We spent this whole hearing talking about the importance of
+American values and human rights and why we cannot separate our
+pressing for human rights advances with recognizing the
+interests that we have in Saudi Arabia.
+ But I want to focus, Dr. Aldosari, on what you said, which
+is the public needs. And in your conversation with Mr. Vargas,
+you talked about what happens when the government jails the
+same people that are now able to drive. They're jailed because
+of reasons that they're told they have nothing to do with that.
+ But when we look at the public needs, going forward, and
+the young people in Saudi Arabia, where does--where does real
+reform in women's rights come in? How is it viewed? How
+important is it?
+ Dr. Aldosari. It's very significant now and it's actually
+been recognized and acknowledged by Mohammed bin Salman and the
+government as a very important card, basically, to--not only
+for the economy but also for improving the image and meeting
+the youth needs, the youth demands.
+ So, as one of my colleagues mentioned, women's rights
+represent, you know, a consensus, basically. The drive of the
+woman to move rights is a consensus across different religious
+and different ethnic groups and even different socioeconomic
+status. Women are now entering the military.
+ So there have been advances. But the problem is, again, as
+I said, without people able to come together to express their
+needs and demands and to expose what kinds of loopholes exist
+in the policies, it is going to be very difficult to sustain
+those kinds of reforms.
+ For instance, the government said that they will enact, you
+know, family laws and they will codify the criminal law, you
+know, soon--that those things will be launched soon.
+ But we have seen other similar countries in the region--
+Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait--they do have family laws, but it is
+very much an institutionalizing the discrimination against
+women in the family and the power of the male guardians, and
+most important decisions of marriage, divorce, child custody,
+custody and assets within marriage. So it didn't really relieve
+the pressure from women.
+ So I would say having women activists coming together and
+being able to voice those concerns and, basically, being able
+to mobilize their community as they used to so that the change
+of the norms around certain issues is vital and the--and this
+is something that needs to be moving as well.
+ Mr. Deutch. Let me--let me just try to make this a finer
+point here, Dr. Aldosari. The changes that we have seen, the
+opening up to music, to dancing, things that we have been told
+we wouldn't see because of religious restrictions, we're now
+seeing, and it's important to young people.
+ On the issue of all of--of how the laws around guardianship
+are viewed and interpreted, is it--can we be hopeful that given
+the way young people have viewed the changes that have taken
+place already that it is imperative that the government
+understand that there will have to be comparable changes there
+as well in the role of women?
+ Dr. Aldosari. I think it is understood by the government,
+but how much or how far they're willing to go, they're not
+really willing to, basically, dismantle this kind of power of
+men over women in the family, and it has been actually voiced
+out by Mohammed bin Salman in one of his interviews.
+ He said, ``We do not want to challenge the family
+structure, and charges against the women activists is
+destabilizing the foundation of the Saudi society.''
+ And these are very broad terms which, basically, comes to
+women trying to be equal to men in terms of bigger rights. The
+fact that men still hold women, you know, under--you know,
+under their power by charges of disobedience and absence from
+home just render all kinds of reforms and new rights granted to
+women useless, basically.
+ Mr. Deutch. Thanks. And if it's OK with the ranking member,
+I'm going to yield myself just a little extra time to ask one
+more question. Thank you.
+ Ms. Nossel, I want to ask you the same question about young
+people and the public needs of young people in Saudi Arabia,
+going forward, but this time viewed through the lens of freedom
+of expression, of the rights of journalists, of bloggers.
+ Obviously, we live in an age where the world is more
+interconnected than ever before. Young people understand the
+importance of that interconnectedness.
+ So when you look at the case of--when you look at Badawi,
+you look at these other cases, isn't it--can we see the needs
+of the public driving to such a point where our pressing for
+human rights and the government's need to acknowledge the
+demands of young people are going to coincide?
+ Ms. Nossel. You know, I think possibly, although, you know,
+the government is sort of, you know, playing this game of
+trying to--it's a playbook, you know, that I think the Chinese
+have really perfected, which is that you open up on music and
+entertainment and social media but within very strict
+parameters, and that opening, you know, gives people the sense
+that they are able to communicate, take advantage of these
+technologies, enjoy some of the rewards.
+ But anytime it verges toward actual dissent, organizing, or
+the expression of independent political opinion, you know,
+that's where the buck stops and the system is tightly
+controlled.
+ I think in Saudi Arabia, you know, we do see this kind of
+bleeding over between the activist core and a much wider public
+opinion.
+ It's evident in the area of women's rights, as Dr. Aldosari
+said, where it has become a consensus viewpoint. You have this
+crucible of activists who put themselves on the line and paid
+an incredibly high price in giving up their freedom to be on
+the forefront of that campaign.
+ But then you see, you know, scores of Saudi women across,
+you know, socioeconomic, professional, religious, and
+geographic lines supporting it, and that has driven the
+government toward some change.
+ So I think we have to be optimistic. I think we have to
+believe that in the long arc and, you know, I think that's
+important when we think about the outcome after the murder of
+Khashoggi, you know, whether in a few years, you know, 4 years,
+8 years, we'll be able to say that there was substantial
+movement.
+ I think, you know, if there is, I believe, even if we
+cannot see this mass pressure for free expression across Saudi
+Arabia, it is there.
+ You know, I believe free expression is a universal drive
+and hunger that people have, and we saw it in Saudi with the
+burgeoning of social media, you know, over the last several
+years, now more repressed.
+ So I think ultimately, yes, although we shouldn't
+necessarily expect--criticize about the short term.
+ Mr. Deutch. Great. Well, thank you very much, and just
+invoking the word optimism in today's hearing, I think, is very
+much appreciated, as Ms. Fontenrose points out.
+ Should things go the way they're headed now and,
+ultimately, the Crown Prince becomes the king and is the king
+throughout 10 presidencies--thank you for putting it in bold
+terms like that, Ms. Fontenrose--this is--there's a reason that
+we need to continue to press on human rights because this is a
+long game and America's voice is critically important, as we
+recognize both the importance of the relationship and, most
+importantly, the importance of our values and human rights and
+advancing that relationship.
+ So to all of the witnesses, I want to say thank you for a
+really informative and interesting conversation. I want to
+thank the members for participating, and I want to thank the
+staff for pulling off a relatively seamless virtual hearing.
+Thanks to all of them as well.
+ Ranking Member Wilson, thank you for your leadership, and
+with that, this hearing is adjourned.
+ [Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
+
+ APPENDIX
+
+[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
+
+ RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
+
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+
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+