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+
+ - AMERICAS WAY FORWARD IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
+
+[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
+[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
+
+
+ AMERICAS WAY FORWARD IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
+
+=======================================================================
+
+ HEARING
+
+ BEFORE THE
+
+ SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC, CENTRAL
+ ASIA, AND NONPROLIFERATION
+
+ OF THE
+
+ COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
+ HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
+
+ ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
+
+ FIRST SESSION
+
+ __________
+
+ MARCH 22, 2021
+
+ __________
+
+ Serial No. 117-16
+
+ __________
+
+ Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
+
+[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
+
+
+ Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://
+ docs.house.gov,
+ or http://www.govinfo.gov
+
+ __________
+
+ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
+43-785PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
+
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
+
+ GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York, Chairman
+
+BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
+ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey Member
+GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
+THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
+KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
+WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts DARRELL ISSA, California
+DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
+AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
+JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas ANN WAGNER, Missouri
+DINA TITUS, Nevada BRIAN MAST, Florida
+TED LIEU, California BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
+SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania KEN BUCK, Colorado
+DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
+ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota MARK GREEN, Tennessee
+COLIN ALLRED, Texas ANDY BARR, Kentucky
+ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GREG STEUBE, Florida
+ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia DAN MEUSER, Pennsylvania
+CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas
+TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey PETER MEIJER, Michigan
+ANDY KIM, New Jersey NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York
+SARA JACOBS, California RONNY JACKSON, Texas
+KATHY MANNING, North Carolina YOUNG KIM, California
+JIM COSTA, California MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida
+JUAN VARGAS, California JOE WILSON, South Carolina
+VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas
+BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois
+
+ Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director
+
+ Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
+
+ ------
+
+ Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia, and Nonproliferation
+
+ AMI BERA, California, Chairman,
+
+BRAD SHERMAN, California STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Ranking Member
+DINA TITUS, Nevada SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
+ANDY LEVIN. Michigan ANN WAGNER, Missouri
+CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania KEN BUCK, Colorado
+ANDY KIM, New Jersey TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
+GERALD CONNOLLY, Virginia MARK GREEN, Tennessee
+TED LIEU, California ANDY BARR, Kentucky
+ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia YOUNG KIM, California
+KATHY MANNING, North Carolina
+
+ Jamie Morgan, Staff Director
+
+
+ C O N T E N T S
+
+ ----------
+ Page
+
+ WITNESSES
+
+Rolland, Nadege, Senior Fellow for Political Affairs, National
+ Bureau of Asian Research....................................... 8
+Haass, Honorable Richard N., President, Council on Foreign
+ Relations, Former Director of Policy Planning at the U.S.
+ Department of State............................................ 12
+Schriver, The Honorable Randall G., Chairman, Project 2049
+ Institute, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-
+ Pacific Security Affairs....................................... 23
+
+ APPENDIX
+
+Hearing Notice................................................... 52
+Hearing Minutes.................................................. 53
+Hearing Attendance............................................... 54
+
+ STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD FROM REPRESENTATIVE CONNOLLY
+
+Statement for the record from Representative Connolly............ 55
+
+ RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
+
+Responses to questions submitted for the record.................. 57
+
+
+ AMERICAS WAY FORWARD IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
+
+ Friday, March 22, 2021
+
+ House of Representatives,
+ Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific,
+ Central Asia, and Nonproliferation
+ Committee on Foreign Affairs,
+ Washington, DC.
+
+ The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m.,
+via Webex, Hon. Ami Bera (chairman of the subcommittee)
+presiding.
+ Mr. Bera. The Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and
+Nonproliferation will come to order. Without objection, the
+chair is authorized to declare a recess of the committee at any
+point. And all members will have 5 days to submit statements,
+extraneous material, and questions for the record subject to
+the length limitation in the rules. To insert something into
+the record, please have your staff email the previously
+mentioned address or contact full committee staff.
+ Please keep your video functions on at all times, even when
+you are not recognized by the chair. Members are responsible
+for muting and unmuting themselves. And please remember to mute
+yourself after you finish speaking.
+ Consistent with remote committee proceedings of H.Res. 8,
+staff will only mute members and witnesses as appropriate when
+they are not under recognition to eliminate background noise.
+In recognizing that we probably will have votes called shortly,
+we will continue the hearing as members kind of cycle in and
+out to report their votes on the floor.
+ I see that we have a quorum now, and I will now recognize
+myself for opening remarks. I want to thank Ranking Member
+Chabot, the members of this subcommittee, our witnesses,
+members of the public for joining today's hearing.
+ Before we get started, I do want to take a moment to talk
+about what we have seen in the hate-filled mass shooting in
+Atlanta earlier this week and to recognize the pain and trauma
+it has caused for many across the country, particularly, in the
+Asian-American, Pacific Islander community. We have seen a
+dramatic rise in hate crimes against Asian Americans over the
+last year, crimes that tear at the very fabric of what makes
+our country so strong. And on Tuesday, eight lives were cut
+short because of this hate, including Daoyou Feng, Paul Andre
+Michels, Hyeon Jeong Park, Julie Park, Xiaojie Tan, Delaina
+Ashley Yaun, and others.
+ I know, on this committee, we will be taking a hard look at
+the region and certainly, you know, the Chinese Communist Party
+and what the Chinese Community Party and their government is up
+to. But we also have to be careful about the language we use on
+this committee and understand that the Chinese Communist Party
+is not a reflection of the Chinese people and certainly is not
+a reflection of the many patriotic Chinese Americans and Asian
+Americans.
+ So, as we take a hard look and look at the challenges in
+the Indo-Pacific, the challenges in this great strategic power
+competition with China, let's be mindful of the language we use
+and mindful that we do not conflate what the Chinese Communist
+Party is doing with what patriotic Chinese and Asian Americans
+do every day in representing the values of the United States of
+America.
+ With that, you know, we do have many challenges. I applaud
+the Biden Administration for their recognition that the Indo-
+Pacific region may, in fact, be one of the most challenging
+regions in the coming decades in the pivot and emphasis on
+Indo-Pacific strategy. You know, I appreciate the leaders'
+summit that happened with the Quad and our allies in Japan,
+India, and Australia last week and the partnership and the
+commitment that our friends and allies through the Quad have
+focused on in terms of creating regional security.
+ I also applaud Secretary Blinken and Secretary Austin for
+making an early visit to our allies in Japan and Korea to
+strengthen that trilateral relationship as we deal with what is
+still quite a bit of a challenge in North Korea. We need a
+strengthened trilateral alliance to address those issues.
+ I also appreciate Secretary Blinken, you know,
+specifically, calling out to China to say they have a
+responsibility in helping us get to the ultimate goal of a
+nuclear-free peninsula on the Korean Peninsula.
+ In addition, this subcommittee will spend quite a bit of
+time looking at the increased Chinese aggression. Certainly, we
+are seeing the antidemocratic moves that are taking place in
+Hong Kong with real concern. We see that human rights abuses
+that are taking place in Xinjiang province against the Uyghur
+population, as well as what has happened for years in Tibet.
+And, increasingly, we are seeing Chinese aggression in the
+South China Sea and the East China Sea. And with increasing
+concerns--I know the Ranking Member Chabot and I have talked
+quite a bit about our concerns with Chinese aggression and
+increased aggression toward Taiwan--an importance that we
+understand that, you know, that the United States really does
+stand with Taiwan with our allies. And, hence, we have
+introduced the Taiwan Fellowship Act, which will be a first
+step but not a last step. You know, this Chinese aggression,
+while we are going to have a history of competition with China,
+you know, we do not--our desire is not to have a direct
+confrontation. But, again, we have to have the rule of law. And
+this committee will be taking a long look at building up that
+foundational strategy there.
+ So, with that, you know, we have got, you know--the
+committee also has jurisdiction over Afghanistan. We will be
+saying--you know, May 1 is right around the corner, real
+challenges in how we approach Afghanistan. And we will be
+working very closely with the rest of the full committee to
+address that and what that way forward looks like.
+ So I expect us to have a very robust agenda on multiple
+fronts, and I look forward to doing things in a very bipartisan
+way. You know, Ranking Member Mr. Chabot and I have worked
+pretty closely together over, you know, my 9 years on the
+subcommittee. And, again, I look forward to having a great
+partnership with Mr. Chabot.
+ And, with that, let me recognize my good friend from Ohio,
+Ranking Member Representative Steve Chabot, for any opening
+comments that you may have.
+ Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Chairman Bera.
+ I want to thank all the members from both sides of the
+aisle as we convene the first hearing of the Asia, Pacific,
+Central Asia, and Nonproliferation Subcommittee of the 117th
+Congress. I also want to thank our distinguished witnesses for
+their willingness to provide their insight and thoughts on how
+the U.S. should continue engaging the Indo-Pacific region
+during these challenging times.
+ I have served on the full Foreign Affairs Committee for my
+entire Congress, a quarter of a century now, including having
+chaired this very subcommittee back in 2013 and 2014. And I am
+pleased to have the opportunity to serve as ranking member--of
+course, I prefer to be chair--during what is arguably the most
+important period for U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific region
+in recent memory.
+ It is hard to overestimate the or overstate the
+significance of this region, which includes over half the
+world's population and more than a third of its global economy.
+Geographically, that is everything between the Caspian Sea and
+Hawaii, excluding Iran and Russia, who are, of course, in the
+jurisdiction of another subcommittee.
+ While it would be impossible to discuss all U.S. interests
+in such a vast and important region, the following are some of
+the highlights this committee should be focusing on, in my
+opinion. The Chinese Communist Party poses an existential
+threat to the United States and to our allies. This is evident
+from their massive military buildup, their large-scale
+intellectual property theft, persistent cyber attacks, and
+their mercantilist trade policies. It is also evident from
+their territorial aggression, concealment of the COVID-19
+outbreak, and blatant disregard for human rights, the
+environment, and international treaties, and on and on.
+ The CCP wants regional and eventually global hegemony. They
+want to return to a world that is dominated by and resolves
+around the Middle Kingdom. The CCP is unwilling to operate by
+international norms. Unfortunately, given China's size and
+impact on the global economy, we cannot simply isolate them.
+Instead, we must work with our allies and partners to hold
+China to the same rules that everybody else follows and impose
+penalties when they do not.
+ It is imperative that America rises to this challenge, and
+our subcommittee has the mission to lead that effort. We must
+sustain and build our alliances and partnerships. I have long
+favored a robust U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific region,
+which is demonstrated by the fact that I co-chair, along with
+some of my Democratic colleagues, six caucuses in the region:
+India, Taiwan, Philippines, Cambodia, Kazakhstan, and the
+Pacific Islands.
+ While many of our allies and partners share our concerns
+with regard to China, they may not willing to be--resist and
+even sometimes confrontational as we might believe is the wise
+course of action at that time. We should strengthen and
+buildupon the relationship with our Quad partners: Japan,
+India, and Australia. And with our ASEAN partners, especially
+our allies in Singapore and the Philippines.
+ Our relationship and deep ties Taiwan, as you have
+mentioned, Mr. Chairman, and Korea are also of paramount
+importance. And I must say strategic ambiguity relative to
+Taiwan and China is, in my opinion, absurd and dangerous. We
+ought to be crystal clear that, if China attacks Taiwan, we
+will be there with Taiwan. That is the best way to keep China
+from miscalculating and starting a war.
+ By cooperating with our allies and partners, the U.S. seeks
+to advance prosperity, human rights, and economic development,
+and the rule of law. We believe our model offers the best
+opportunity for the region. It is by working with those who
+share our values that we can help the region take full
+advantage of opportunities.
+ Finally, the United States must make trade and investment
+throughout Asia a top priority. Countries throughout the region
+are hungry for U.S. investment, while U.S. Businesses are eager
+for new markets and investment opportunities. By cultivating
+our economic ties, we will grow both our economies and
+economies of our partners.
+ Economic engagement is also an excellent means of fostering
+developing relationships in Central Asia where partners like
+Kazakhstan are eager to engage. And improved economic
+partnerships are avenues to diversify our supply chains away
+from China and foster promising alternatives, like Vietnam.
+ I would like to close by introducing our vice ranking
+member, Congresswoman Young Kim from California. As a long-time
+staffer to former Chairman Ed Royce, she has worked on trade
+negotiations. She has taken on leadership roles in the U.S.-
+Korea interparliamentary exchange, and has a deep understanding
+of the Indo-Pacific region. Her experience and expertise will
+truly advance the work of this subcommittee.
+ Mr. Chairman, I believe we have a great group of members on
+our side who bring experience, dedication, and commitment to
+American values to this subcommittee. Your members are okay,
+too. We look forward to working with you and our Democratic
+colleagues on this committee in addressing our Nation's
+challenges in a bipartisan manner.
+ And I, again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for reaching out to
+me and discussing issues in advance of this hearing. And we
+look forward to working with you. Thank you.
+ Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you, Ranking Member Chabot.
+ I should point out my vice chair, the Congressman from
+Michigan, Andy Levin, he has got a very important resolution on
+the floor today, condemning the actions that we are seeing in
+Burma and standing with the Burmese people against this group.
+ With that, let me take a moment to introduce our witnesses.
+Our first witness is Dr. Richard Haass, who is the president of
+the Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. Haass comes to us with a
+widely respected record of innovative thinking on many of our
+biggest strategic challenges.
+ Dr. Haass, we are grateful for your presence today.
+ We are also joined by Ms. Nadege Rolland. She is the senior
+fellow for Political and Security Affairs at the National
+Bureau of Asian Research. Ms. Rolland is one of the foremost
+experts on Chinese Government strategy and on some China's most
+consequential initiatives, like the Belt and Road Initiative.
+ Ms. Rolland, thank you for joining us today as well.
+ And last and certainly not least is Mr. Randy Schriver, the
+chairman of the Project 2049 Institute and former Secretary of
+Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs. Mr. Schriver brings
+a long record of service in government on national security
+challenges in the region, including civilian and military
+service.
+ Mr. Schriver, we thank you for your service and for being
+with us today.
+ I will now recognize each witness for 5 minutes.
+ Without objection, your prepared written statements will be
+made part of the record. I will first call on Dr. Haass for
+your testimony.
+
+STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD N. HAASS, PRESIDENT, COUNCIL
+ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, FORMER DIRECTOR OF POLICY PLANNING AT THE
+ U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
+
+ Dr. Haass. Well, thank you, Chairman Bera, Ranking Member
+Chabot, I just want to make clear that I am speaking here on my
+personal capacity, not for the institution I am fortunate
+enough to be the president of. You have chosen a subject that
+is central, not just to this country but really to the
+trajectory of this century. It covers an awful lot, geography
+and otherwise. I will focus, though, on China in my opening
+remarks, even though I cover a lot else in my rather lengthy
+written statement.
+ Whatever it is we do in this part of the world,
+multilateralism will prove essential. We simply cannot deal
+adequately with China's power and China's reach unilaterally.
+But we also cannot ask others in the region, our partners and
+allies, to choose between us. We need to understand that they
+will want to maintain a relationship with China at the same
+time they maintain relations with us, even though the specifics
+will obviously differ. We also need to understand the limits of
+what some of our partners or allies are prepared to do with us
+when it comes to China. And here I mention
+ [audio malfunction].
+ Mr. Bera. It looks like we may have lost Dr. Haass. Is that
+correct from the tech side?
+ Voice. Yes, sir. It looks like Dr. Haass is having some
+connectivity issues.
+ Mr. Bera. Let's do this, let's go ahead and move to Ms.
+Rolland and then see if we can work on the technical issues
+with Dr. Haass. When he gets back, we will let him do his full
+testimony.
+ Ms. Rolland, let's go and recognize you for your testimony.
+
+ STATEMENT OF MS. NADEGE ROLLAND, SENIOR FELLOW FOR POLITICAL
+ AFFAIRS, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH
+
+ Ms. Rolland. Thank you, sir. Chairman Bera, Ranking Member
+Chabot, I am deeply grateful and honored to be asked to share
+my thoughts with the subcommittee members today. As an analyst
+who devotes her days trying to understand the world through
+Beijing's eyes, I will focus my statement on where the Indo-
+Pacific region fits into the Chinese leadership's grand
+strategy.
+ The Indo-Pacific region is where U.S. and Chinese tectonic
+plates rub against each other. The term ``Indo-Pacific'' itself
+is very telling about the U.S. perspective. It is primarily a
+maritime geographic expanse that links the U.S. to an
+economically vibrant region and a crucial strategic space where
+many of its key military allies are located, an area the U.S.
+Envisions as free, open, secure, and prosperous.
+ There is no Indo-Pacific in Beijing's conception. The
+region is, in fact, included as part of China's periphery.
+Here, too, the term itself is very telling about the Chinese
+perspective. China is at the center and at the top of a 360-
+degree peripheral zone that expands over both the continental
+and maritime domains.
+ Dr. Haass. I do not know who is talking, but I have
+somebody else who is talking over me. And I got cutoff, and I
+still hear a woman's voice.
+ Mr. Bera. Hi, Dr. Haass. We lost you for a moment there
+because of technical difficulties. So we moved on to Dr.
+Rolland to do her testimony. And then, after she finishes, we
+will come back to you, Dr. Haass, and let you do your full
+testimony, if that works. We lost you for a moment.
+ Go ahead, Dr. Rolland.
+ Ms. Rolland. Thank you, sir. Left unclear are the exact
+geographic extent of this periphery and the kind of future the
+Chinese party-State hopes to see for it.
+ In order to get a better understanding of the Chinese
+leadership's objectives for the region, one needs to look back
+over a decade ago. In the immediate aftermath of the 2008
+global financial crisis, Chinese political elites felt that the
+American/Western decline had accelerated while China was on an
+unremitting upward trajectory.
+ The 2011 Obama Administration's announcement of the
+rebalance of its diplomatic and security focus to the Asia-
+Pacific region was read in Beijing as a move meant to increase
+the pressure on Chinese's immediate periphery, constrict its
+strategic space, and ultimately thwart its rise. In order to
+counter what was essentially perceived as an intensified phase
+of American containment, Chinese planners devised their own
+strategic rebalancing.
+ The strategy embraced both land and sea, trying to
+stabilize China's eastern maritime flank, constricting as much
+as possible U.S. access to the China Seas while pressuring its
+allies, while at the same time consolidating China's power on
+its western continental and maritime flanks.
+ To expand China's influence and bolster its position over
+the region, Chinese planners decided to use economic power,
+China's strong point, as the main sinews, supplemented by the
+building of an increasingly dense network of both hard and soft
+infrastructures, transportation, energy, information and
+communication infrastructure-building, trade and financial
+agreements, and people-to-people exchanges. The strategic plan
+was announced at the end of 2013 under the name One Belt, One
+Road, which is now better known globally as the Belt and Road
+Initiative.
+ Viewed for what it is, namely, as a strategic plan, the BRI
+gives some indications about the Chinese leadership's intent.
+Geographically, BRI includes not only the Eurasian Continent,
+Central, South and Southeast Asia, and the Middle East, Africa,
+and portions of Central and Eastern Europe, also known as the
+Silk Road Economic Belt, but also its adjacent waters, Arctic,
+South Pacific, Indian Oceans, and Mediterranean Sea, also known
+as the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, and its three blue
+economic passages.
+ The vision for the region's future is better explained by
+what it is not. It is not one where the widespread respect for
+an application of liberal democratic principles, such as
+freedom, individual rights, rule of law, transparency, and
+accountability, lead to greater openness, prosperity, and
+security. At the same time, it is not where all the countries
+in China's greater periphery end up having muddled themselves
+on the Chinese party-State's system or have become local
+appendages of the Chinese Communist Party.
+ It is a vision where the multiplication of dependencies to
+China have created enough positive incentives and coercive
+leverage to ultimately compel regional countries to defer to
+Beijing's wishes and constrict their ability and willingness to
+defy and resist against China's power. This vision is not
+compatible with that of the United States.
+ With this, I will yield. Thank you, sir.
+ [The prepared statement of Ms. Rolland follows:]
+
+ [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
+
+ Mr. Bera. Thank you, Ms. Rolland.
+ Let's go back to Dr. Haass. And, Dr. Haass, if you want to
+start from the top of your testimony, because we lost you in
+there for a moment.
+
+STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD N. HAAS, PRESIDENT, COUNCIL
+ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, FORMER DIRECTOR OF POLICY PLANNING AT THE
+ U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
+
+ Dr. Haass. Okay. Thank you, sir. And apologies for the
+technological differences. I am not at my normal base. But,
+again, I want to thank you and the ranking member for asking me
+here today. I just wanted to make clear I speak for myself and
+not for the organization I lead. Your subject is obviously an
+important one. How Asia goes will in many ways determine how
+the 21st century goes. I will focus, though, on China, even
+though there is a lot else to cover.
+ I begin by pointing out that multilateralism is essential
+for all we do. We simply cannot deal adequately with China's
+power and reach unilaterally. That said, we also cannot ask our
+partners and allies to choose between us. Many of them will,
+for example, want to have economic ties with China, even though
+they will emphasize security ties with the United States.
+ That said, we also need to understand that there are limits
+to what some of these partners and allies are prepared to do.
+And I am happy to discuss, for example, limits that India might
+face. Whatever it is we do in the region, we need to beef up
+the economic dimension. To be blunt, we have sidelined
+ourselves, we have limited our involvement, and our influence.
+We should join the CPTPP. There is tremendous economic and
+strategic arguments for doing so. And I am also prepared to
+argue there could be climate reasons for doing so.
+ As for China, it is anything but a supporter of the status
+quo. Xi Jinping's China is fundamentally different than the
+China of his predecessors. It is stronger, wealthier, more
+repressive, and more assertive. For all that, I do not think it
+is useful to use a cold war framing for our relationship simply
+because China is so different than the Soviet Union was, and,
+as a result, our response will need to be different.
+ The priority for our foreign policy ought to be to shape
+China's behavior, particularly its external behavior. We should
+be imposing costs where we must and encouraging cooperation
+where we can. Toward that end, I believe and despite what
+happened in the last 24 hours, a private, sustained, strategic
+dialog is in the interest of the United States, not as a favor
+to China but as a tool of American national security.
+Consistent with that, I believe that regime change is beyond
+our ability to induce and, in any event, is not essential.
+ Democracy and human rights consideration can and should be
+a part of our conversation with China, but we must accept and
+approach them with the realization that, one, we have other
+priorities; and, two, our ability to advance what we like to
+see in the realm of democracy in human rights in China is
+distinctly limited.
+ When it comes to economics and technology, the United
+States should work with others on selective technological
+restrictions with a scalpel rather than with a blunt
+instrument. But here I would say decoupling from China is
+neither necessary, nor is it possible.
+ What we should do, though, and something Congress can play
+a large role in is increase our supply chain resilience. We can
+do that through multiple sourcing, through stockpiling, and
+through domestic and joint production arrangements with our
+partners and allies of selective items.
+ We need to strengthen deterrence in the region that
+obviously involves our military presence, cooperation with
+grouping such as the Quad. More than anything else, we must
+increase our ability to deter and prepare for and respond to
+any Chinese coercion against Taiwan. The stakes are enormous.
+Not to act would be, I believe, a strategic error of the first
+order.
+ I do believe we should move from strategic ambiguity to
+strategic clarity in terms of the means of our policy. But then
+it is essential that we complement with this move to strategic
+clarity with strategic capability. We cannot allow a gap to
+persist between our commitments and our capabilities to act on
+them.
+ Last, and for all of this, I would say China policy begins
+not in the region, but it begins at home. We need to become
+more competitive with China, and this involves everything from
+increasing Federal support for research and development for
+basic research, the kind of thing companies cannot be expected
+to do on their own; for a wise immigration policy that attracts
+the most talented in the world to come and stay here; to build
+infrastructure; to improve our education. And, second of all,
+we need to improve the reality, as well as the appearance of
+our economic and political model.
+ When we fail, we essentially let China off the hook. We,
+basically, lose the opportunity to show the advantages of a
+robust democracy and a robust, market-oriented order;
+therefore, their leaders feel no pressure from below.
+ So, if we want to succeed versus China, we need to become
+more competitive, but again we need to pose a successful
+alternative. Thank you very much.
+ [The prepared statement of Dr. Haass follows:]
+
+ [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
+
+ Mr. Bera. Thank you Dr. Haass.
+ Let me now recognize Mr. Schriver for his testimony.
+
+ STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RANDALL G. SCHRIVER, CHAIRMAN,
+ PROJECT 2049 INSTITUTE, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
+ FOR INDO-PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS
+
+ Mr. Schriver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
+Chabot, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I
+appreciate being included in this hearing and given the
+opportunity to express some thoughts on these important
+strategic matters.
+ The Indo-Pacific is indeed where our country's future
+fortunes will largely be determined, and, of course, our most
+significant strategic competitor, China, also resides in this
+region. Our interest in the Indo-Pacific are enduring, but the
+challenges are involving. The inheritance, I believe, from the
+previous administration is a strong one. The previous
+administration named the Indo-Pacific region as the priority
+theater, recognized the necessity of adopting a more effective
+competitive posture vis-a-vis China, provided stronger and more
+visible direct support to Taiwan, nurtured and grew emerging
+partnerships with countries like India and Vietnam, gave
+unprecedented attention to the Pacific Islands, and began
+implementing policies to sustain and promote a free and open
+Indo-Pacific. All this despite the efforts of the Chinese
+Communist Party to actively undermine that order.
+ The previous administration worked with Congress on a
+number of important initiatives, on reforms to CFIUS, on the
+creation of the Development Finance Corporation, and investing
+in our joint force, making it more lethal and with PLA as a
+pacing element in mind.
+ Of course, the previous administration benefited greatly
+itself from the work of its predecessor administration. In many
+ways, the last administration's policy of a free and open Indo-
+Pacific was a natural successor to the Obama Administration's
+pivot to Asia.
+ And so I think we will likely see continuity, which in my
+opinion is a good thing. I am encouraged by many of the
+statements and actions coming out of the Biden Administration
+through its earlier days. Like you, Mr. Chairman, I applaud the
+meeting of the Quad at the Presidential level. I welcome the
+two-plus-two meetings with Japan and Korea, and Secretary
+Austin's follow-on trip to India. And the continued recognition
+of China as its strategic competitor and the need to partner
+with like-minded countries preserve a free and open order is
+the appropriate vision.
+ So, given this good start, rather than criticize the new
+administration, I would like to forward some thoughts and
+recommendations, as there are still policies under review and
+positions yet to be revealed.
+ First, I believe the Biden Administration should continue
+to make competition with China its true priority in both word
+indeed, and it should be sufficiently resourced across all
+domains. Our alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Australia
+should be understood to be our greatest asymmetric advantage in
+this competition.
+ Two, it should be the goal of the United States to maintain
+a military edge and to achieve a high degree of confidence that
+the U.S. would prevail in a range of known contingencies with
+China. This will necessitate wise implementation of the Pacific
+Deterrence Initiative. And it will also necessitate thoughtful
+approaches to how we might deploy ground-based precision fire
+capabilities that are now allowed after the withdrawal from the
+INF Treaty.
+ Three, human rights and democracy promotion should be major
+pillars in our foreign policy, including in the Indo-Pacific,
+where we should also consider the geopolitical environment, and
+we must be deft enough to avoid pushing allies and partners
+further into China's camp. We should also be willing to raise
+the cost to the CCP for China's historic human rights abuses
+and not shy away from articulating a vision for a future of the
+Chinese people beyond authoritarian control and abuse.
+ Four, the technology competition with China is very real
+and critical to the overall strategic competition. We should
+continue to develop tools to protect our technology, ensure the
+integrity of our critical supply chains and reduce
+vulnerabilities, and work with partners and allies to achieve
+the same. But prevailing in a tech competition is most
+dependent on out-innovating the other side. So we need our
+government to support entrepreneurship and innovation. And we
+should think creatively about where we are willing to bear
+risk.
+ Five, the Quad should be made more meaningful on the
+defense and security side. This can be done through more
+complex exercises and more real-world cooperation. But we
+should also consider a flagship initiative, perhaps, in the
+area of maritime domain awareness and maritime security across
+the region to make it meaningful.
+ Six, I very much agree with Dr. Haass, we should pursue
+some type of flagship trade agreement. We need to be in the
+game as economic and trade and commerce are really the
+lifeblood of this region.
+ Seven, I believe engagement with Taiwan should be enhanced,
+and U.S. support should be made more visible to further
+strengthen our deterrence against the PLA invasion. And I agree
+we should move away from strategic ambiguity and toward
+strategic clarity and tactical ambiguity.
+ And, finally, related to DPRK, I believe the Biden
+Administration should recreate the maximum pressure campaign
+directed at the DPRK but resist providing the early and quick
+diplomatic off-ramps before the sanctions come into full
+effect. I think this would also mean dealing with the DPRK as a
+de facto nuclear state and all that that entails with
+deterrence and counter nonproliferation while still pursuing
+denuclearization.
+ Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
+ [The prepared statement of Mr. Schriver follows:]
+
+ [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
+
+ Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Schriver, for your testimony.
+ I will now recognize members for 5 minutes each. And,
+pursuant to House rules, all time yielded is for the purposes
+of questioning our witnesses.
+ Because of the virtual format of this hearing, I will
+recognize members by committee seniority, alternating between
+Democrats and Republicans. If you miss your turn, please let
+our staff know, and we will circle back to you. If you seek
+recognition, you must unmute your microphone and address the
+chair verbally.
+ I will start by his recognizing myself for 5 minutes.
+ You know, each of you touched on a number of consistent
+themes. And maybe I will ask three questions, one to each much
+of you. Dr. Haass, you talked a bit about--or each of you
+talked about the importance of multilateral partnerships with
+likeminded friends and allies in the region. You know, let's
+talk about the Quad for a second. I would love to get your
+perspective on, one, do we more formalize the Quad into a more
+formal organization and your thought there? And how should we
+use the Quad to then engage the ASEAN nations, you know, that
+obviously also have a critical stake? So your thoughts there.
+ Ms. Rolland, I would ask you a question. You know,
+obviously, Taiwan and Chinese aggression to Taiwan looms large
+on our committee's mind, and, you know, we want to make sure
+they do not make a misstep. I am glad in my conversations with
+our friends in Japan or our allies in Japan, I am glad the
+Japanese raised it with Secretaries Blinken and Austin. Your
+thoughts--as we formulate a more strategic approach working
+closely with our allies in Japan, I think it is the right
+strategy. But how are the Chinese going to view that closer
+alliance in their perspective and counter?
+ And then, Mr. Schriver, you touched on the importance of
+maritime security and the like, and that is something we are
+clearly going to focus on in this committee. We have seen, you
+know, the Chinese Coast Guard becoming much more aggressive
+both in the South China Sea and the East China Sea with some of
+the smaller ASEAN nations. So, as we are thinking through that
+strategy, how should we as well as the Biden Administration
+adjust our U.S. Strategy in both the South China Sea and the
+East China Sea.
+ So, Dr. Haass, let's start with you.
+ Dr. Haass. Well, thank you, sir. Let me just say two
+things. I think the Quad is important, but to try to formalize
+it, I would like to argue, you would actually risk it. India,
+in particular, has a long tradition of strategic independence,
+and I believe will shy away from anything that smacks of an
+anti-Chinese alliance.
+ I think, more broadly, given the many types of challenges
+we face in the region from North Korea to various China-related
+challenges to others, we have flexibility to order the hallmark
+of our approach to multilateralism. For different challenges,
+we put together different groupings of partners and allies. And
+we, again, ought to mostly eschew having anything that is so
+formal.
+ I think, with the ASEAN countries, something I would
+recommend is--and it gets at Ms. Rolland's comments--which is
+as part of a response to BRI. I would think that a U.S.-
+coordinated and--led infrastructure initiative could be
+something that was very attractive, an infrastructure broadly
+defined. And just like now we are getting more active in the
+region through the Quad in things like vaccines. I think a
+provision of public goods to the region and specific goods and
+specific goods and services to various countries ought to be
+increasingly an example or a priority for what it is we usually
+do in the region.
+ Mr. Bera. Great. Ms. Rolland.
+ Ms. Rolland. Thank you, sir.
+ Regarding Taiwan, I think, obviously, the military
+deterrence is extremely important, and strengthening the
+alliance system in Asia is one part of this response the U.S.
+can have.
+ In addition to that, I would submit that Taiwan is under
+enormous pressure, also, in the influence of operations realm.
+And there are things that I think the U.S. and its allies could
+do to better defend and protect the cyberspace.
+ And, finally, I think the strengthening Taiwan's
+international diplomatic space as well within international
+institutions is something that the U.S. can do not just with
+its allies in Asia but also in Europe and in other places. I
+think these are three points that could help with deterring
+further aggression of Taiwan. Thank you, sir.
+ Mr. Bera. And Mr. Schriver.
+ Mr. Schriver. Thank you. Maritime security begins with
+maritime domain awareness. And in that regard, many of our
+partners need to develop more capabilities. So capacity-
+building is a big part of this. We need countries to be able to
+see and sense, but also share. So networking is a part of this.
+So targets of interest can be held and passed between countries
+who share that overall vision for a free and open order.
+ And then response, having the platforms that can operate in
+ways that challenge vessels that are operating in illegal
+expansive ways. Of course, the United States can operate across
+the full spectrum of seeing, sensing, sharing, and responding.
+We need other countries to be able to move further on that
+spectrum through capacity-building and partnerships.
+ Mr. Bera. Thank you. And I appreciate all of those
+perspectives and look forward to working with the three of you.
+ Let me go ahead and raise my good friend from Ohio, the
+Ranking Member Mr. Chabot, for 5 minutes.
+ Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ And, Secretary Schriver, I will go with you first, if I
+can. I am one of the co-chairs of the congressional Taiwan
+Caucus. In fact, I was one of the original founders about two
+decades ago. And over the past 2 years, China has been
+increasingly provocative in trying to intimidate Taiwan. That
+is nothing new, as I think we know, but they have been
+particularly outspoken recently. An INDOPACOM Commander Admiral
+Phil Davidson testified recently before the Senate Armed
+Services Committee, and he stated that he thought that China
+could invade Taiwan within the next 6 years. What is your
+opinion with respect to both Taiwan's and the U.S. military's
+current state of preparedness in such an event? And you
+mentioned in your statement, strategic ambiguity, as Dr. Haass
+did, and I agree with both of you that that is dangerous. And
+could you elaborate on what would be a better policy with
+respect to strategic ambiguity?
+ Mr. Schriver. Thank you. The risks of Taiwan are growing
+because of Chinese investment in their capability to
+operationalize a Taiwan contingency. But this situation is
+dynamic. Taiwan can do things to respond. The United States can
+do things to respond as well. So I certainly noted Admiral
+Davidson's comments. But I do not know that we can be that
+precise in the timeline because, again, it is dynamic, and it
+depends upon how we respond to the growing PLA threat.
+ I do believe Taiwan is on the right track with its overall
+defense concept, and the acquisition of some of the systems
+they are now investing in. ISR capabilities, for example,
+through unmanned systems. The coastal missile defenses. And I
+think our planners at INDOPACOM and the Joint Staff are
+thinking about a scenario in much more realistic ways and
+thinking about how we might have to fight in ways that are
+putting us on the right track.
+ Of course, the comedian Will Rogers said, ``Even if you are
+on the right track, you can get run over if you are not running
+fast enough.'' We do need a sense of urgency and a sense of
+purpose in these matters, and so we need to work on this very
+diligently.
+ On strategic ambiguity, the formula that I like--and I
+applaud Dr. Haass' contribution to this conversation--the
+formula I like is strategic clarity and tactical ambiguity. I
+think with respect to strategic clarity, we should say it is in
+our interest for Taiwan to continue to survive and exist in its
+current form or better. As a fellow democracy and a likeminded
+partner on so many regional and global issues, we should be
+able to say is it not in our interest for Taiwan to be
+controlled by the CCP and Beijing and brought under its
+authoritarian rule.
+ We will always have tactical ambiguity when it comes to
+response because response would be highly scenario-dependent.
+And there are certainly a range of things we can do in a
+contingency, and there are a range of things the PLA might do.
+A blockade is different than an all-out attack.
+ So I think that formula of clarity on the strategic side
+and ambiguity on the tactical side would strengthen our
+position.
+ Mr. Chabot. Thank you. Let me just followup with you, Mr.
+Schriver, at this point. Along with my colleague, Brad Sherman,
+we together are co-chair of the India Caucus. And the Indians
+have historically had different threat perceptions with respect
+to China. But in light of the Galwan Valley Incident, those
+perceptions are likely changing somewhat. With that in mind,
+how should we expect India to contribute in the future to our
+efforts to maintain regional stability and counter Chinese
+aggression?
+ Mr. Schriver. Well, thank you. I am optimistic that our
+partnership with India will grow. This is the work over several
+administrations. The Obama Administration did a terrific job
+building the defense relationship. I would like to think the
+Trump administration contributed as well. But a lot of this
+isn't just being driven by the strategic landscape and the
+understanding that China has ambitions on Indian territory.
+China is a partner of Pakistan and sees that as a counter way
+to India to try to divert their attention to their other
+border.
+ So we have been able to leverage that shared understanding
+of the threat to really enhance our cooperation. I agree that
+we will probably not formalize anything in a bilateral alliance
+or even a multilateral grouping in a formal way. But in terms
+of real cooperation, we are seeing very positive developments.
+And I think, for us, if the Indians are able to secure their
+territorial interest with enough capability to deter China and
+to be able to operate in the Indian Ocean more effectively so
+that that critical part of the Indo-Pacific remains free and
+open, and smaller South Asian States are secure in their own
+sovereignty and with their interest, India can be a great
+partner to us in that record.
+ Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ My time has expired, but let me commend you and committee
+staff on both sides for really putting together a tremendous
+panel of witnesses here this morning, and I yield back.
+ Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chabot.
+ Let me recognize my colleague from California, Mr. Sherman,
+for 5 minutes.
+ Mr. Sherman. Mr. Bera, congratulations on your first
+hearing of the new Congress.
+ Of course, your first hearing of the subcommittee, I always
+remind people, was the first hearing of Congress to focus on
+COVID.
+ And I want to associate myself with your comments about the
+AAPI community and understanding that, while we may criticize
+the Communist Party of China, we embrace the AAPI community in
+our country.
+ We have spent over the last several years half a billion
+dollars in aid to the government of Myanmar, Burma. That was
+clearly wrong given their treatment of the Rohingya. It is even
+more wrong to continue that, given the recent coup. I would
+hope that we would feel--get ways to turn down the temperature,
+the naval temperature in the South China Sea.
+ Dr. Haass and Mr. Schriver both pointed out that a critical
+part of this is our research on new technologies in the future.
+I need to point out that, due to an accounting convenience rule
+that was established over 20 years ago, all American
+corporations are punished in their earnings per share, the most
+important thing to those corporations, when they spend money on
+research. And this pernicious accounting quirk is probably
+depressing the amount of research we are doing by 10, 20, maybe
+even 30 percent. Reversing it would not cost us a penny.
+ As we see today, witnesses that come before us tend to do
+it virtually. And this means that we can have witnesses to our
+full committee or our subcommittee, wherever they happen to be,
+even if they had come to the United States, for convenience
+reasons or because our State Department will not give them an
+appropriate visa.
+ Dr. Haass, would it be a good idea for us to have as a
+witness at a briefing or hearing the Foreign Minister of
+Taiwan? What message would that send?
+ Dr. Haass. Well, again, what it would send is another sign
+you of normalization, if you will, between the United States
+and Taiwan. And I have not thought about that specific thing,
+but let me just make a larger point here.
+ Mr. Sherman. Dr. Haass, I have got limited time, and we
+have got to move on. Dr. Haass, I have got limited time, and I
+have to move on.
+ All of us on this committee and our witnesses live in a
+world where we get to think of--the geopolitics and how the
+world is going to look decades from now. Our constituents live
+in the real world. They are not worried about the end of the
+world, but they are worried about getting to the end of the
+month.
+ Every dollar of trade deficit we run with China probably
+costs us on the order of 10,000 good jobs. So you can see how a
+trade deficit of hundreds of billions of dollars affects our
+people every day. Does any witness have a particular step or
+two we could take to reduce our trade deficit with China? I am
+looking for--I do not--Dr. Haass, do you have----
+ Dr. Haass. Well, again, I do not think that reducing our
+trade deficit with China per se ought to be a goal of American
+foreign policy. The order----
+ Mr. Sherman. Dr. Haass, that isn't responsive to the
+question. Thank you. I will go back to my constituents and tell
+them it should not matter to them----
+ Dr. Haass. Well, Congressman, if you are going to have to
+ask these questions----
+ Mr. Sherman. Dr. Haass----
+ Mr. Haass [continuing]. I would think you would want to let
+me answer them.
+ Mr. Sherman [continuing]. This is the third time you have
+interrupted me. Dr. Haass, please.
+ China has made an enormous investment in American debt.
+And, yet, the things that cause the currency to go down are
+running a trade deficit with the world and running a budget
+deficit fiscally.
+ Mr. Schriver, from the Chinese perspective, do they think
+that they need to reduce the trade deficit or take any other
+steps to protect them from a precipitous decline in the value
+of a dollar?
+ Mr. Schriver. The Chinese understand that trade deficit and
+the amount of debt they hold gives them a certain amount of
+leverage. Of course, it also binds them to us.
+ Mr. Sherman. Oh, I disagree with you. If you owe the bank
+money, they have got leverage over you because they can
+foreclose. If you owe the people money in international
+affairs, there is no foreclosure. If my bank could not
+foreclose on my house, my banker would be very nice to me. Do
+you see them moving out of U.S. debt?
+ Mr. Schriver. Well, I do not because I think it is the best
+place for them to put the surplus money that they have. They
+are not investing solely to gain leverage over us; they are
+they investing because they have got to do something with all
+of that currency.
+ Mr. Sherman. I yield back. Thank you.
+ Mr. Bera. Let me go and recognize my colleague from the
+great state of Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry, for 5 minutes of
+questioning.
+ Mr. Perry. Thank you, Dr. Bera. Congratulations on the
+hearing. Thank you very much.
+ Dr. Haass, I am going to come to you in a minute and let
+you respond to my good friend from California, but I do have a
+question in the meantime for Secretary Schriver. Let me lead up
+to that for a moment. As the administration embarks on
+establishing the Indo-Pacific strategy, I hope to discuss
+perhaps one of the more pressing issues relating to the region,
+at least in my opinion, and that is the security of Taiwan.
+ Very shortly, I will be introducing the Taiwan Plus Act.
+The bill would raise the value threshold for arms sales to
+Taiwan before the President would have to notify Congress. So I
+want to give the President some flexibility to do that. It will
+also cut down on the notification time the President would need
+to provide Congress for defense articles that exceed the values
+of the threshold from 30 to 15 days.
+ Other than NATO, there are five other countries, the so-
+called NATO-plus group that enjoy these privileges. They are
+Australia, South Korea, Japan, New Zealand, and, of course,
+Israel. We do have a time limit on it. And there is history
+regarding the U.S.-Jordan Defense Cooperation Act where we can
+rescind that if the situation changes.
+ Assistant Secretary, I want to just ask you, I know I am
+hitting you with this cold, but your general thoughts regarding
+what I characterize as the Taiwan Plus Act and whether or not
+you believe the legislation could work in tandem with already
+existing efforts to ensure deterrence against China, and my
+interest is in deterrence. What are your thoughts?
+ Mr. Schriver. Well, thank you. And as I said in my
+statement, we do need a sense of urgency. And so anything that
+gives greater flexibility to the U.S. administration to provide
+security assistance to shorten timelines, I am all for it. So I
+appreciate your initiative and would very much support the
+legislation and hope it is successful.
+ Mr. Perry. All right. Thank you, sir.
+ Dr. Haass, I just feel like you have been kind of maligned
+there in your treatment a little bit. I want to yield you a
+little time to answer the question that was kind of posed for
+you and you were not allowed to answer. If you do not mind.
+ Dr. Haass. Thank you, sir.
+ Let me say two points. On Taiwan, like, for example,
+meetings with their Foreign Minister, I would think that I
+would not emphasize such symbolic upgradings of ties with
+Taiwan. What I would focus on is the real meat of our
+relationship. What do we do to increase our ability to deter,
+prepare for, or defend against Chinese coercion or aggression?
+That to me ought to be what Congress focuses on, rather than
+things that simply take a stick and poke China in the eye.
+There are ways you can functionally do things with Taiwan, but
+symbolic things that provoke ought not to be fundamentally what
+we are about.
+ With trade, is the other question I was asked. Again,
+balances do not matter. What I care about is China doing
+anything to unfairly advantage their export stock, that stock
+ [inaudible] And our American firms having the access they
+need to China's market. And the only thing that should hold us
+back there is our need to be selective on what technologies we
+are allowed to go there.
+ Mr. Perry. All right. I appreciate your response. And I
+understand your opinion regarding the symbolic gesture, so to
+speak. And I am not saying it is not one to a certain extent.
+Look, I would like to get much tougher on China, completely. I
+would like it, if you know anything about me, I mean, think we
+ought to just recognize full relations with Taiwan and consider
+them the true China. But, so, maybe that is a little too
+provocative for some people, but I think that sooner or later
+we are going to have to fish or cut bait with the Chinese
+Communist Party, and all we are doing is fiddling around the
+edges.
+ So I understand your perspective, but I do want to move
+forward on kind of both avenues. And I think that this is at
+least something in a bipartisan way that signals that we want
+to pull China--or, correction, Taiwan a little closer.
+ I mean, going back to the Secretary, what do you think if--
+and you know, and, look, I know this is a hard question, but
+how do you think the Taiwan Plus Act would be received by the
+Chinese Communist Party and, specifically, the General
+Secretary? I mean, is it going to be seen as a kind of a hollow
+gesture? Because they seem to blow everything out of
+proportion, but they seem to have some effect at doing that and
+chill every effort on our part to stand with our allies.
+ Mr. Schriver. Well, that is certainly one of the problems.
+They object to virtually everything, which then makes it hard
+to sort of disaggregate it and determine which things they
+really care about and which they care less about. But I would
+think, you know, for the more sophisticated analysts on the
+Chinese side and the PLA side, they would see your initiative
+for what it is: a way to strengthen security cooperation,
+defense and military ties, and enhance Taiwan's deterrence
+capabilities and posture. So I think this would be received
+negatively, but certainly that is not the metric for whether or
+not we do something: if China does not like it. In fact, in
+some cases, it is the metric for why we should. And in this
+case, I think we should very much follow the course you are
+suggesting.
+ Mr. Perry. Yes, and I appreciate your input. And I would
+agree with much of your sentiments, especially when it comes to
+the Communist Chinese Party. The fact that they oppose it is a
+signal to me that we are on the right track.
+ With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back any balance of the
+time. Thank you, sir.
+ Mr. Bera. Thank you.
+ Let me go on and recognize my colleague from Nevada, Ms.
+Titus.
+ Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ I thank the witnesses for being here today.
+ I would like to ask Dr. Haass more about Burma.
+ The situation in Burma is just continuing to escalate every
+day. Even after rebukes from the global community, the violent
+reaction by the military does not seem to show any signs of
+stopping.
+ ASEAN has been kind of lukewarm at best in this whole
+process, and we have seen some member countries actually begin
+diplomatic relations with the new military government.
+ I wonder what you think is our best course of action,
+working with some of our allies to try to end the conflict, and
+if you think it is realistic to believe that the NLD and Aung
+San Suu Kyi will come back, or is this push for democracy
+bigger than just the cult of her personality.
+ Dr. Haass. Well, Congresswoman, the push is bigger than the
+cult of any individual. The problem is the ability of those in
+power now to resist the kinds of pressures you are talking
+about. And they are gradually beginning to expand their ties
+with the outside world, some of the ASEAN countries and China.
+ To me, it is a frustrating classic textbook case of the
+difficulty of translating our principles into policy and into
+outcomes that we want. So I think we continue to advocate for
+what we want.
+ Look, whether it is China, Russia, Turkey, Myanmar,
+whatever, I think what we are seeing in some ways is the limits
+to America's ability to influence the internal trajectories of
+other countries.
+ So, yes, we should still advocate for it, yes, we should
+introduce sanctions where we think it should do some good, but
+I think we also have to be realistic about the limits to our
+influence.
+ Ms. Titus. Well, thank you.
+ Isn't that, then, conceding to China's point that we should
+stay out of the issues of Taiwan or Tibet or other human rights
+abuses, Hong Kong?
+ Dr. Haass. No, none whatsoever. Hong Kong, China violated
+its international undertakings. We ought to be clear
+rhetorically. But, also, we ought to look, working with the
+British and others, look for financial penalties.
+ With Taiwan, we have all sorts of obligations under the
+Taiwan Relations Act. We do not have to accept the Chinese
+position on Taiwan or on the Uyghurs or anything else.
+ All I am saying is we have to calibrate our response
+against two things. We have got other priorities in American
+foreign policy, not just these. And I think, at times, we have
+to understand there are limits to how far we can succeed when
+we try to pressure other countries to change their internal
+workings.
+ This is not new. This is a recurring challenge, for
+example, vis--vis the Soviet Union during the cold war. And I
+think this will always be part of our foreign policy
+experience.
+ Ms. Titus. Thank you.
+ Ms. Rolland, I would ask you to comment on our relations
+with China. What are some of the things where we can come
+together, even though we see them as our most serious
+competitor? And certainly the talks did not start off too well
+with Secretary Blinken over this past week.
+ Ms. Rolland. Thank you, ma'am.
+ I think the possibilities for cooperations are really very
+small nowadays, unfortunately. Even if many people are still
+hoping that we can work on global issues and problems like
+pandemic and climate change, I think, fundamentally, the
+interests of both countries are not converging.
+ It is important to continue to maintain communication
+channels, obviously, but I think we should lower our
+expectations about the positive outcomes that we could get from
+Beijing.
+ Ms. Titus. Do you think strengthening our ties with Japan
+and Korea will help in any way, or is that just----
+ Ms. Rolland. I would also broaden the scope and not just
+focus on East Asia, per se. I know that this is where American
+allies are strong and very much in close contact with China.
+ But I would also urge the U.S. to think about a broader
+coalition of like-minded countries that extend beyond East
+Asia. Because the challenges that China poses are not just to
+the U.S., and they are not just to Taiwan. It is a broader
+challenge that expands to many different domains--economic,
+technological, human rights, but also in terms of norms.
+ So it is a very complex task, because it is so
+multidimensional. And, therefore, the U.S. should--it is
+impossible, I think, to focus on just one segment of it. It has
+to be much broader in terms of domains and in terms of allies
+and partners that you can find to reduce that challenge.
+ Ms. Titus. We certainly see Chinese economic influence with
+the Belt and Road, building a port in Peru, for example. It is
+everywhere.
+ Ms. Rolland. That is exactly right. That is one good
+example.
+ Ms. Titus. Thank you.
+ Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
+ Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you.
+ Let me recognize my colleague from Tennessee, Mr. Burchett,
+for 5 minutes of questioning.
+ Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ I have a pretty simple question, because I think words are
+cheap on a lot of this stuff. It does not seem to really do a
+whole lot a lot of times. And it is not a partisan thing, that
+is just my assumption of all this.
+ How should the U.S. respond to China's Belt and Road
+Initiative? It seems that is one of the most egregious things
+they do outside of human rights violations. They get their
+claws into these little countries, and then they own them. But
+what can we do to respond to it?
+ And that is for the whole panel.
+ Dr. Haass. Well, I can say one thing. And, by the way, the
+Council on Foreign Relations has a task force coming out on
+what should be the response next week, an entire comprehensive
+study of it.
+ But it involves everything from working with locals, I
+think, on an infrastructure fund. It means new trade
+initiatives, joining CPTPP. It means looking at our foreign
+aid, who gets it, how we use it. It means looking at our
+immigration policy in some cases, our exchanges.
+ Bottom line is we have got to compete. And, Congressman, I
+think, if we compete with China, I am not worried so much about
+the reach of Belt and Road. I think, historically, we have got
+a lot more to offer, when it comes to technology, when it comes
+to investment, when it comes to trade. We have just got to get
+out on the dance floor.
+ Mr. Burchett. Okay. And we are not doing that right now?
+ Dr. Haass. Not nearly enough, sir.
+ Mr. Burchett. Okay. Do you all have, does the Council on
+Foreign Relations have any parameters on how much money we
+should be putting into these countries?
+ Dr. Haass. I will get you the report presently. How is
+that?
+ Mr. Burchett. All right. Will Strother in my office needs
+to get that, if you can.
+ Dr. Haass. Yes, sir.
+ Mr. Burchett. Any of the others?
+ Ms. Rolland. If I may, sir, I have been looking at the Belt
+and Road for the past 7 years myself, and I think really what
+we need to understand, it is like Belt and Road is not just
+about infrastructure building. It is the focus of it, and it is
+where the attention went because of the trillion-dollar number
+attached to it, and because of some of the examples, like in
+Sri Lanka, where Chinese entities have seized assets in the
+Port of Hambantota, for example.
+ I think, beyond infrastructure, there are also a lot of
+soft infrastructures that are being built by China, including
+through currency swap agreements, financial integration
+agreements, agreements in higher education and technology,
+industry standards.
+ You need to think about BRI as China's response to American
+strategy, not the other way around. And, yes, we need to
+provide alternatives, because the way China is doing business
+through Belt and Road is antinomic to the way international
+standards are promoted. There is no transparency. There is no
+respect for labor rights. There is no respect for the local
+populations or environmental sustainability.
+ So, yes, it is important to provide alternatives to these
+countries, but also to go beyond the kind of narrow view that
+this is about infrastructure building. This is about creating a
+world where China is the predominant power in the region
+through a wide array of networks and knitting together the
+region around China.
+ So, in that way, I think this is why we need to be more
+multidimensional in the way we address it.
+ Mr. Burchett. All right. Thank you.
+ Recently, Kazakhstan has pushed back against Russia and
+even against Chinese Belt and Road diplomacy. What are some of
+the ways the U.S. can build a strong relationship with Nur-
+Sultan, the capital, and muscle out Moscow and Beijing?
+ Ms. Rolland. If I may, I think many of these countries want
+to actually have it both ways. And having China coming in is a
+good leverage for many of them to say, ``Look, we would like to
+engage with other countries,'' so that they can then choose
+what is best for themselves.
+ This is where I think it is not just true for Kazakhstan,
+it is true for many of the other regions, in the South Pacific,
+for example, in Southeast Asia as well, and the South Caucasus.
+ These countries want to develop themselves, first and
+foremost. And so having different great powers that are paying
+attention to them, it is a good way to leverage one against the
+other and then choose what is the best option for themselves in
+the end.
+ Mr. Burchett. Okay. Anybody else on that?
+ One final thing. Is there going to be a way that we can
+drive a wedge between the Kazakhs and the Chinese due to the
+Chinese persecution of the Uyghurs?
+ Mr. Schriver. I spent a lot of----
+ Ms. Rolland. If I may--sorry. Go ahead, Randy.
+ Mr. Schriver. I was going to say, I spent a lot of time in
+the region talking about this very issue when I was in
+government. And it will be a slog. I mean, the governments
+themselves are very deferential for reasons that we can
+probably figure out--the proximity to China, the importance of
+the economic relationship, and so on and so forth.
+ But in many cases, civil society, to the extent it exists
+in these places, that is where the concern is really growing.
+ It is interesting. They will--the governments will complain
+to the U.S. about moving our embassy to Jerusalem, but not a
+peep about the Uyghurs or the Rohingya, which is much more
+closer to home. But if you talk to civil society in these
+countries, they do have concern about how their fellow Muslims
+are being treated.
+ Mr. Bera. The gentleman's time has expired.
+ Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Bera. You are welcome.
+ Let me go ahead and recognize my colleague, the vice chair
+of the subcommittee, Mr. Levin from Michigan.
+ Mr. Levin. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
+ And I am going to pick up right on your important opening
+remarks. We are having this hearing 3 days after shootings in
+Atlanta that killed eight people, six of whom were Asian women.
+ Hate crimes against Asian Americans in major cities
+skyrocketed last year by almost 150 percent, and that is just
+the ones that were reported.
+ Obviously, this is a hearing about foreign policy, not hate
+crimes in the U.S., but I do not think we can separate the two
+completely.
+ We talk a lot here about foreign policy challenges as they
+relate to China, and we should. I, myself, often talk about the
+Chinese Government's human rights abuses in Tibet, Xinjiang,
+and elsewhere. I witnessed the government's crackdown on
+dissent in Chengdu during the Tiananmen massacre in June 1989
+firsthand.
+ I have no illusions about the CCP.
+ As we hold the government accountable, though, I think we
+need to keep in mind the impact our words can have on people.
+ Donald Trump's racist references to the coronavirus
+absolutely deserve blame for the spikes in attacks. Stop AAPI
+Hate's national report included examples of verbal attacks that
+parroted his words specifically.
+ But discrimination against Asians did not start with him.
+In fact, one of our country's first immigration laws was the
+Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.
+ I say all this not to suggest that we should not tackle
+issues related to China or any Asian government. We should and,
+indeed, we must. But I think we need to take care when we talk
+about this to avoid language that stigmatizes people. I know I
+will be challenging myself to do more to stop AAPI hate.
+ So let me get to my first question on this topic. I want to
+ask Dr. Haass, how might we do a better job of separating our
+criticisms of CCP policies from the Chinese people and their
+aspirations? And how does racist language from American
+political leaders hurt America's standing in the region?
+ Dr. Haass. Congressman, let me just say I think what you
+have raised is--it is troubling and important. Our Founders set
+out to form a more perfect Union, and, clearly, two and a half
+centuries later, we are not quite there. And you are pointing
+to some of the most recent egregious examples.
+ Look, I think it is important, in part, to calm down some
+of the public language. I was not a big fan, shall we say, to
+say the least, I thought it was just dead wrong to talk of
+things about the China virus. Yes, it almost certainly began in
+China. The origins are unknown.
+ But when it came to the United States, how we responded to
+it was on us. And scapegoating, it seems to me, is never a wise
+public policy. And the scale of the cost in the United States,
+that was not on China. That was on us and what we failed to do.
+ So I would just say more broadly, though, as I said, we
+should be pointing out the flaws in China. We should be putting
+forward a more positive image of ourselves. But we have got to
+have a private dialog with them.
+ This is the most important bilateral relationship of this
+era. It will have enormous impact on history and on ourselves.
+ Mr. Levin. Exactly.
+ With my limited time, let me get to one more question.
+ I want to sort of pull together some of this dialog we have
+been having about China, Belt and Road, and U.S., how to deal
+with it.
+ I think we need to--and some of you referred to this--I
+think we need to not just be reactive, but deal with the world
+as it is in a bold, American, innovative, creative way that
+provides leadership.
+ So, for example, might it be an effective thing--and we
+also need, in dealing with China, to have an industrial policy
+in this country.
+ So might it be an effective thing to deal with China for
+the United States to lead a hemispheric climate change
+initiative to help all the countries, especially the poorer
+countries in the region, develop wind, offshore wind, solar,
+energy storage on a large scale, where we could have a lot of
+U.S. industrial participation, but also work with them to
+develop their own capacity, in a way that is truly generous,
+but truly multilateral and regional, and that is not defensive?
+Because it deals with the greatest problem of our time.
+ So, Dr. Haass, I will start with you. And, if others, if we
+have time, others can jump in.
+ Dr. Haass. We are in violent agreement. We ought to be
+offering technology. Sustainable development ought to be
+something that we take the lead in. A lot of BRI is still very
+heavily oriented toward coal.
+ So we ought to be looking at, just like we do in the sphere
+of pharmaceuticals, where can we license or make available
+technologies that would help other people grow, and grow in a
+sustainable way? That is exactly the sort of response we ought
+to have to BRI.
+ Mr. Levin. Thank you.
+ And, Mr. Chair, I think my time has expired. I do not see
+you.
+ Mr. Bera. It does look like your time has expired, Mr.
+Levin.
+ Mr. Levin. Thank you so much.
+ Mr. Bera. Let me go ahead and recognize my colleague from
+Kentucky, Mr. Barr, for 5 minutes of questioning.
+ Mr. Barr. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks for
+doing such a great job.
+ Again, compliments to these terrific witnesses for
+discussing this very significant national security challenge
+and the rise of China and how we respond to it.
+ And let me pick up where my friend and colleague from
+Michigan left off. And I appreciate his comments about being
+careful and making distinctions between the CCP and the people
+of China. I think it was an excellent point, and I appreciate
+the sentiments, the very decent sentiments of my friend.
+ I do want to just, though, point out that moral clarity is
+required in this discussion, and sharp criticism of the CCP is
+not racist. It is about policy, and it is about foreign policy.
+And I think clarity is really important.
+ And so, Mr. Schriver, yesterday, during the meeting in
+Alaska, the Chinese delegation attempted to paint the United
+States as hypocritical for our directly raising a number of
+international concerns regarding the CCP. And while I know the
+United States has gone through a very rough year and we have
+our own issues, I did want to ask a series of questions, and
+they highlight the differences, the moral differences between
+the United States and China.
+ Is the United States currently participating in an ethnic
+cleansing of its own population in State-run internment camps,
+yes or no?
+ Mr. Schriver. No.
+ Mr. Barr. Is the United States currently stealing
+intellectual property from companies doing business here and
+then giving that technology to our military, yes or no?
+ Mr. Schriver. Certainly not government--Federal Government
+sponsored.
+ Mr. Barr. Is the United States jailing those speaking out
+in favor of democracy and human rights, yes or no?
+ Mr. Schriver. No.
+ Mr. Barr. No. And thank you.
+ And I want to highlight these differences, for when we are
+talking about our way forward in the Indo-Pacific we must be
+clear to our partners and allies--and this must be a moral
+clarity--of who China is and what behavior they engage in, and
+the moral superiority, frankly, of the Western approach and the
+approach of an open, free, and democratic society versus a
+closed Communist police State that is the CCP.
+ And I do not believe that that is racist rhetoric. That is
+rhetoric about the challenges that we confront, and it is about
+being clear eyed.
+ Let me ask Dr. Haass a question about emerging
+technologies, 5G, 6G, and protecting American technology.
+ The U.S.-China Economic Security Review Commission is a
+great resource for the Congress and for policymakers. And, in
+speaking to some of these just outstanding experts on our
+complicated relationship with China, it has been said that we
+need to be putting higher walls around fewer things, and
+especially when it comes to protecting American technology in
+the face of decoupling.
+ How can Congress partner with industry in the United States
+and in allied and partner countries to protect necessary
+critical technologies?
+ Dr. Haass. That is exactly right, by the way, Congressman.
+We need higher walls around fewer things--scalpel, not
+sledgehammer.
+ I think we ought to--the first thing is to identify what
+those technologies are. What are the things most likely to be
+drivers and make a difference in the commercial economy, in the
+intelligence business, in the military.
+ And those are the ones we have to think about funding. Not
+just domestically, but one of the things Congress could do also
+is to facilitate joint projects with the partners and allies
+that we spent so much time talking about in the course of this
+hearing.
+ Mr. Barr. Let me quickly talk about Belt and Road, and
+countering Belt and Road, followup on Mr. Burchett's line of
+questioning.
+ To any of our witnesses, how can we more effectively use
+the Development Finance Corporation and the Export-Import Bank
+in countering Belt and Road?
+ Ms. Rolland. Sir, I think this is a very important tool
+that is available to the U.S. I would not believe necessarily
+that what the Americans have to offer is necessarily what the
+developing world wants, because those loans and grants come
+with political conditionalities that many of those countries do
+not want to accept in terms of transparency, rule of law, et
+cetera.
+ And this is where the Chinese way of doing things--the
+Chinese Government's way of doing things--is a challenge,
+because they do not offer any political conditionality to those
+countries in terms of democratization or anything else.
+ So this is really the crux of the matter, because there are
+two offers there that are very different, and providing an
+alternative is very important.
+ At the same time, I think there are other ways, in addition
+to money and funding, that can be helpful, like skills and some
+sort of expertise in demonstrating that perhaps Chinese
+projects are not going to be sustainable in the long run. I
+think this is also an efficient way of coping with BRI.
+ Mr. Barr. Thank you, Dr. Rolland.
+ Well, obviously, my time has expired. I hope someone on the
+panel will ask about Taiwan accession to the United Nations as
+a deterrent to PRC aggression. And I, obviously, cannot ask
+that question now, but I invite someone else to.
+ And I yield back.
+ Mr. Bera. All right. Thanks, Mr. Barr.
+ Let me now recognize my colleague from Pennsylvania, Ms.
+Houlahan, for 5 minutes of questioning.
+ Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. I did not expect to be called. I
+very much appreciate the opportunity to talk.
+ My first question is for Dr. Haass, which has to do with
+the Council on Foreign Relations and their recent report on the
+role of women in terrorism. And it said that the U.S. pretty
+traditionally neglects the roles that women play in violent
+extremism.
+ And so I was brought personally to include an amendment or
+a provision in the NDAA that asks the DoD to assess this issue
+and how to better incorporate women into our efforts to counter
+violent extremism.
+ I was wondering if you have any ideas on how we might be
+doing that more effectively in the Indo-Pacific specifically.
+ Dr. Haass. The short answer, Congresswoman, I do not--I do
+not--I know we published it. I am not an expert on it. But I
+will make sure we followup with you.
+ Ms. Houlahan. I would very much appreciate that, because I
+think that this is--you know, obviously, we are 51 percent of
+the population, and I think that this is something that needs
+the attention of all of us when we are talking about security
+around the world.
+ My next question is for you and for everyone.
+ In 2020, the Global Terrorism Index ranked Pakistan, India,
+the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Myanmar as the top 25
+countries impacted by terrorism. The Asia-Pacific area was one
+of only three regions that experienced a rise in terrorism in
+2019.
+ I was wondering what you attribute that rise in terrorism
+to specifically in the Asia-Pacific region, and can you
+describe the U.S. counterterrorism efforts that the U.S. has in
+that region to try to combat that trend?
+ Dr. Haass, if we could maybe start with you.
+ Dr. Haass. I was going to defer to Mr. Randy Schriver, who
+is more of an expert.
+ Ms. Houlahan. Of course.
+ Dr. Haass. I will just say in 30 seconds, and I will defer
+to him, he is a real expert, is that in many of these cases the
+problem is not strong governments, but weak governments, who
+are either unable or unwilling to make the commitments to
+police what goes on within their own territory, Pakistan being
+the poster child of that.
+ And, for us, what we have to think about is not necessarily
+fighting the problem for them, but how we can help build
+capacity in these countries so they can do a better job to meet
+their domestic and international obligations.
+ Mr. Schriver. Yes, I agree with that. I think you really
+have to disaggregate and look at each country and the
+challenges they face.
+ In the Philippines, in the case of recapturing Marawi City,
+it was not only capacity building for the Air Force of
+Philippines, but it was direct enabling support. We were in the
+fight in a way that became enabling for the AFP to retake the
+city.
+ In other cases, it is assistance with reintegration of
+foreign fighters. So you really have to understand the
+specifics of the challenges a particular country may face.
+ But it is certainly a focus for our Special Operations
+Command, and it is a focus of Indo-Pacific Command as well, to
+be able to get to that level of granularity and assist the
+countries with the particular challenges they have.
+ Ms. Houlahan. Thank you.
+ And my next question is actually for you, Mr. Schriver, as
+well.
+ Secretary Austin has embarked on a global force posture
+review while also launching a China Task Force to better align
+our military resources and to better address China's evolving
+military capabilities.
+ If you were conducting those reviews now, what realignment
+would you consider of basing agreements as well as diplomatic
+and economic resources?
+ Mr. Schriver. Well, I wish them success in these efforts.
+It is very important.
+ I think, if you look at the potential China fight--and not
+that we want to have that fight, but that, in order to deter
+them, we need to be able to have a high confidence that we
+would prevail--it is about dealing with their ballistic and
+cruise missiles and the fact that they can hold our forward-
+deployed forces at risk, so their so-called A2/AD strategy.
+ So I think, thinking about dispersal, dispersification,
+survivability, and a protracted ability to continue to operate
+in the environment are the keys.
+ I think the Pacific Deterrence Initiative is a great start.
+It gives some new tools to be able to forward deploy
+ammunition, logistic support.
+ But ultimately dispersal and access, that means having
+partner countries willing to participate in particular ways,
+give us the access when we need it. So that is really on our
+diplomats, too, to help develop those relationships.
+ So I am encouraged with the direction that the Biden
+Administration is taking. There are quite a bit of details to
+be worked through, though.
+ Ms. Houlahan. Thank you.
+ And I only have 10 more seconds left, and I will submit the
+rest of my questions for the record. But, for Dr. Haass, I very
+much would like to have a continuing conversation on the role
+of women and security in the region.
+ Thank you. With that, I yield back.
+ Mr. Bera. Thank you, Ms. Houlahan.
+ Let me go ahead and recognize my colleague from Tennessee,
+Dr. Green, for 5 minutes of questioning.
+ Mr. Green. Thank you, Chairman and Ranking Member, for your
+holding of this committee today.
+ I want to thank our witnesses for testifying before us
+today.
+ Dr. Haass, let me say your book, ``A World in Disarray,''
+is one of my favorites, and I suggest every member of this
+committee should read that book.
+ While I am ranking member on Western Hemisphere, the
+Chinese Communist Party makes this subcommittee the most
+important one in Congress. The United States and the Chinese
+leadership--note I did not say Chinese people--the U.S. and the
+Chinese leadership have contrasting values and incompatible
+goals.
+ We certainly do not share the same vision for the Indo-
+Pacific. The United States seeks to advance the fairness-for-
+all values of the rules-based international order--in a word,
+freedom. The CCP seeks political power and regional dependence
+on Beijing, not unlike previous Chinese emperors--in a word,
+they want authoritarian control and subservience to their
+concept of world order.
+ According to a report by the RAND Corporation, nations in
+the Indo-Pacific believe the United States has more diplomatic
+and military influence than China. However, they believe China
+has more economic influence, and China uses this leverage to
+undermine the United States diplomatically and militarily.
+ Many analysts suggest the world is at risk of losing the
+freedom to navigate the region. This is preventable. President
+Biden should continue efforts to negotiate free trade
+agreements with our allies. The President should also continue
+the previous administration's efforts to counter the Belt and
+Road Initiative, such as the Trilateral Partnership for
+Infrastructure Investment.
+ Additionally, we need to encourage American companies to
+move their supply chains out of China. That is why I introduced
+the Bring American Companies Home Act, to offset the moving
+costs for American companies that reshore their supply chains
+from China.
+ We must not neglect the economic sphere when it comes to
+our allies in the Indo-Pacific. We must show them that the
+international rules-based order is a better alternative to the
+Chinese Communist Party's Middle Kingdom tributary system.
+ China's strategy has two critical components. First, to
+advance its technologies and, hence, their sharp power through
+China 2025. And, second, to disrupt our allies and partnerships
+through their Belt and Road Initiative.
+ Our strategy should, as the Atlantic Council suggests,
+focus on three long-term objectives.
+ First, strengthen. We must strengthen relationships with
+our allies and partners in the rules-based international order
+by, (A) prohibiting Chinese engagement in economic sectors
+vital to our national security; (B) developing new military
+capabilities to maintain a favorable balance of power; and, (C)
+reasserting influence on multilateral institutions and even
+creating new ones when necessary.
+ Second, we have to defend, defend against Chinese
+aggressive behavior and impose costs for those violations. That
+means establishing offsetting measures, to use the Council's
+word, collectively, resisting coercion by decreasing dependence
+for ourselves and our allies and partners. And, in order to
+defend, we must counter Chinese IP theft and their influence
+operations.
+ Third and final, we need to engage China. Now, that may
+sound odd coming from someone who most would call a China hawk,
+but our ultimate goal here should be to cooperate with China
+where we can--only where we can. Things like public health and
+the environment are two great areas where we can work together
+and communicate and advance our relationship so that we can
+incorporate China into the rules-based order.
+ Dr. Haass, do you mind elaborating on the differences
+between Xi Jinping and his predecessors and how that may impact
+or provide enlightenment, so to speak, to our strategy?
+ Dr. Haass. Yes, sir.
+ The predecessors to Xi Jinping, most importantly Deng
+Xiaoping, were much more cautious in their external behavior
+and their foreign policy, basically said China needs a stable
+periphery in order to do the social, political, and economic
+development at home. And it is not surprising that the best
+period of U.S.-Chinese relations in the modern era was during
+that period.
+ What we now have with Xi Jinping is someone who is very
+different, basically is acting as if China's time has arrived,
+sees the United States as weak and divided, and essentially is
+pressing on every front.
+ We see it with India. We see it in the South China Sea. We
+see it with Taiwan. We see it with Japan. We see China not
+meeting its international obligations on trade. We see it not
+meeting its international obligations on Hong Kong. We see what
+they are doing vis--vis the Uyghurs.
+ This is a very different China that basically is no longer,
+to use the Chinese expression, hiding and biding its time. But
+China is basically saying: We are arrived, and we are going to
+act differently now.
+ Mr. Green. Would you say they are in the phase three of an
+insurgency, so to speak, a direct confrontation phase?
+ Dr. Haass. No, but I think they are acting in ways, say,
+vis--vis Taiwan, that we have to be extraordinarily mindful of.
+ And what we have to do is basically say: How do we now push
+back selectively to make sure that, whatever their goals are,
+where you begin your intervention, whatever their goals are,
+they decide they cannot pursue them successfully? That is what
+we need to get to.
+ Mr. Green. Agreed. Thank you.
+ My time has expired. I appreciate you all being here today.
+ Chairman, I yield.
+ Mr. Bera. Thank you.
+ Let me go ahead and recognize my colleague from North
+Carolina, Ms. Manning, and welcome to the subcommittee.
+ Ms. Manning. Thank you very much, and thank you, Mr. Chair,
+for putting together this excellent panel.
+ Dr. Haass, I was particularly interested in your statement
+that the U.S. needs to focus on certain areas where we need to
+enhance our own ability to be competitive. You mentioned, for
+example, that we need to reform our immigration policies to
+attract the best and the brightest.
+ We are currently considering immigration reform that would
+increase the number of H-1B visa holders that are exempt from
+caps, people with Ph.D.s in the STEM fields.
+ Is this the kind of reform you believe we need? Would we be
+better off if we extended that exemption to people with
+master's degrees or even bachelor's degrees in the STEM areas?
+ Dr. Haass. Directionally, it is 100 percent right. If you
+look at the Fortune 200, 500, a shocking percentage of the
+people are either immigrants or the first generation after
+immigrants. This is real talent.
+ China does not have an immigration policy of people coming
+in. This is one of our structural advantages, if we will only
+allow it to be.
+ Ms. Manning. Thank you.
+ You also referenced the importance of ensuring that we have
+supply chain resilience, diversification of sources, and the
+stockpiling of domestic production.
+ We saw during this pandemic that we had a dramatic shortage
+of PPEs when our supplies from China were cutoff. In my own
+district, we had manufacturing companies that were told by the
+prior administration to ramp up and produce those PPEs, and
+then they were left with warehouses full of PPEs when they were
+undercut by lower-cost PPEs from China when the supply chains
+opened back up.
+ Do we need to maintain domestic supplies in our own country
+in anticipation of future disruptions?
+ Dr. Haass. Well, you raise a good question, and there is a
+risk we will be asking companies to take if we go ahead with
+stockpiling.
+ I would say, in certain areas, that is a price worth
+paying. We would say, as part of long-term public security, we
+are going to make certain investments in certain areas.
+ What we will probably want to do is, given the expiration
+dates of certain things, is come up also with a way of getting
+those things out of stockpiles while they are still valid.
+ And, again, it is something that does not just have to be
+domestic. We could use the USMCA with Canada and Mexico. We
+could do certain things with some of the countries that fall
+under the purview of this committee.
+ They are much more likely to work with us if there is also
+an upside for them in the process.
+ Ms. Manning. I also have a high-tech manufacturer of
+microchips in my district who has said that we will see the
+loss of our microchip industry to China if we do not protect
+domestic supply chains in that area as well.
+ What are your thoughts on ensuring the domestic microchip
+industry?
+ Dr. Haass. Well, again, I would defer to the other two to
+some extent.
+ But I would say, look, so much of it is in Taiwan. One, it
+is a powerful argument for why Taiwan is so important, that its
+security is so important.
+ But, also, I think this is a legitimate subject for debate.
+What do we in the United States need going forward in order to
+not eliminate, but reduce our vulnerability? And there is,
+again, diversification of foreign sources, stockpiling, and
+domestic or joint production arrangements. And the areas of
+chips is one of the things absolutely we ought to be looking
+at.
+ Ms. Manning. Thank you.
+ I am going to ask this last question and open it to anyone,
+any of our wonderful presenters.
+ Throughout history, when a rising power has challenged the
+presiding world power, more often than not the result been war,
+and in many cases the wars have devastated all involved.
+ How do we avoid what we have seen so often in history as we
+see increasing clashes between China, in its quest for
+dominance, and the U.S.?
+ Dr. Haass. That is in many ways the great strategic
+question of our time.
+ I would simply say the Chinese are rational. What we
+constantly want to be is sufficiently strong ourselves and
+organize with our partners and allies so any Chinese leader who
+is tempted to do certain aggressive things that could lead to
+conflict will think twice, because they will realize the game
+is not worth the candle. And that is why exactly what we are
+talking about here today is so essential.
+ And, in the immediate future, I would think making sure
+that China is not tempted to move against Taiwan coercively
+ought to be a priority for American foreign policy, not just
+what we declare, but what we do. We have got to close the gap
+between our declaratory policy and our ability to implement it.
+ Ms. Manning. Mr. Schriver, would you like to add anything
+to that?
+ Mr. Schriver. Sure. Thucydides was a very smart person and
+put forward some very compelling arguments, but that was
+largely a world before nuclear weapons and largely a world
+before we built our system of alliances and partnerships.
+ So this isn't really about the U.S. and China per se. It is
+about China's revisionist aspirations and growing power against
+a coalition of like-minded partners who want to preserve the
+free and open order.
+ So I think the combination of deterrence through the
+strategic weapons we have and the coalition that we have that
+will ultimately push back against China will be our best
+protection against a conflict that nobody wants.
+ Ms. Manning. Thank you.
+ Ms. Rolland, I am sorry I did not get to you, but my time
+has expired, and I yield back.
+ Mr. Bera. Thank you.
+ Let me go ahead and recognize my colleague from California
+and welcome her to the subcommittee.
+ Mrs. Kim, you are recognized for 5 minutes of questioning.
+ Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you, Chairman Bera and
+Ranking Member Chabot. I appreciate your leadership. It is a
+pleasure to join you today for the first hearing of the Asia
+Subcommittee and welcome this distinguished panel of witnesses.
+ And I am really excited to be able to serve as a vice
+ranking member of this subcommittee, and I look forward to
+working with all of you in this position moving forward.
+ I would like to start my remarks today by recognizing the
+horrific events that have taken place in Myanmar over the past
+month. The actions taken by the Tatmadaw in overthrowing the
+democratically elected government and cracking down on peaceful
+protesters and killing dozens, if not hundreds, of its own
+people in the streets is deplorable, it is horrific, and it is
+wrong.
+ The leaders of Myanmar made a commitment to uphold
+democratic principles over a decade ago, and the United States
+will not tolerate the oppression and killing of the freedom-
+loving people of Myanmar.
+ And I call on our administration to immediately work with
+our partners in Asia to form a united multilateral front to
+pressure the Tatmadaw to step aside and accept the results of
+this election from last year.
+ So, for my first question, I would like to turn to the
+Philippines and the hardships facing land owners and farmers
+there as the government allows or participates in stealing land
+from its own citizens for large corporations or government use.
+ Many of my own constituents with ties to the Philippines
+have watched as their family lost their lands and livelihoods
+against their will at the hands of the government and big
+businesses.
+ So I would like to pose this question to Mr. Schriver.
+ Given your experience dealing with the Philippines, could
+you explain why this issue continues to persist and what the
+United States is doing to resolve it?
+ Mr. Schriver. Well, our alliance has always been somewhat
+hindered by the fact that the Filipino people have not had the
+good governance and quality governments that they deserve.
+There is certainly a history of corruption. There is certainly
+a history of elitism that results in unfavorable government
+policies to the people. There is now the issue of extrajudicial
+killings related to the drug war.
+ So we have an important relationship with the Philippines.
+It is an important ally. And I do not think we should curb our
+engagement, particularly on the military and security side,
+because there are important things happening in that region.
+ But certainly, as a friend of the Philippines, and the
+history that we have there and what we have done side by side,
+we have to be encouraging the Philippines for a more
+representative government and a more enlightened approach to
+these various issues. Otherwise, our partner will be diminished
+and left behind.
+ Mrs. Kim of California. Well, thank you.
+ Next, I would like to turn your attention to Cambodia.
+ As you know, Prime Minister Hun Sen has ruled Cambodia for
+decades as the sole source of centralized power.
+ In 2017, he further cemented that power by outlawing
+opposition parties from participating in the Nation's
+Parliament and ensuring one-party rule.
+ Kem Sokha, who I had the pleasure of meeting, the leader
+of--he is the opposition--the Cambodia National Ruling Party
+leader. He was then arrested on attempts of seeking to
+overthrow the government and charged further with conspiracy
+with foreign powers last year as he awaits a trial for treason.
+ So, Mr. Schriver, could you comment on the current safety
+of Mr. Sokha and what options are available to Congress and the
+administration to have him released from the prison and
+democratic representation reinstated in Cambodia?
+ Mr. Schriver. Well, thank you for the question.
+ Kem Sokha is an important figure in Cambodia, and certainly
+his efforts to promote a democratic future by participating in
+the elections, despite the flaws in the electoral system and
+the fact that Hun Sen was never going to cede power no matter
+the outcomes. So it is important that he be given the
+opportunity not only for his freedom, but to continue to be
+active in the political space.
+ I do check in on his condition every once in a while. You
+probably know he has family members in Washington, DC, who are
+active on Capitol Hill and with the administration. His
+conditions have gone from house arrest to prison and
+different--a variety of ways of holding him.
+ And I think the important thing is we continue to pressure
+the government in Phnom Penh to not only release him, but allow
+him to participate in the politics of Cambodia, because it is
+so important for the future of the people there.
+ Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you.
+ I do have further questions, but I would like to submit
+them for the record if I may. And my time is up, so I yield
+back.
+ Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you.
+ I think all the members have had a chance to ask questions,
+but I am going to take the chair's prerogative, just because we
+have this wealth of expertise in front of us, and certainly we
+will extend the same to the ranking member in his closing
+remarks, to just ask a couple followup questions on issues that
+we have touched on, but also that we may further want to
+explore.
+ And, Dr. Haass, I will also reach out to the Council.
+ One area that the ranking member and I talked about was,
+obviously, our failure to get the Trans-Pacific Partnership
+across the finish line and the strategic loss of not having
+that rules-based agreement in place.
+ So we will reach out to the Council and others to think
+about understanding our own domestic politics and challenges,
+how we might consider pushing, whether it is joining CPTPP or
+some other multilateral agreement. But certainly not having a
+multilateral agreement in place leaves us vulnerable to Chinese
+influence.
+ The two questions that I have, if the witnesses are willing
+to indulge, we have alluded to the multilateral coalition and
+over the past 12 months with the pandemic have had multiple
+conversations with our European allies and parliamentarians in
+how we approach the region.
+ And if any of the witnesses could comment on how we marry
+an Indo-Pacific strategy with our transatlantic strategy. I
+think that is something we did not do well in the post-World
+War II environment, but certainly in this new world, talking to
+our allies in Germany and elsewhere, I think it is in our
+interest to create that partnership.
+ And then a second piece that perhaps Ms. Rolland, but
+certainly would open up to any of the panelists, my last travel
+to the region prepandemic included visiting both Sri Lanka and
+Nepal. And part of the intent in those two countries was we had
+MCC compacts that were approved that were there to help build
+the infrastructure, to help the hydroelectric projects in Nepal
+that would be to the benefit of this young democracy.
+ They both got enmeshed in domestic politics, political
+issues there, and I think it is my understanding that neither
+one got across the finish line.
+ And, as we think about aid and development, countering Belt
+and Road, it does occur to me that we also--my intuition was
+that, domestically, there probably was Chinese influence in
+turning the public against some of these what, again, I thought
+were incredibly good projects that would help both Sri Lanka
+and Nepal. So how we might think about the influence battle as
+well and how we counter that.
+ So I will turn it over maybe to Dr. Haass, and then Ms.
+Rolland, and then Mr. Schriver.
+ Dr. Haass. Thank you, sir.
+ By the way, 10 seconds on CPTPP. One way to expand, I
+think, domestic support in this country for entry could be if
+we introduced a serious climate component, so it did not just
+make economic and strategic sense, but, for example, if you try
+to modify the agreement so certain types of goods either had
+advantages or disadvantages in trying to enter based upon their
+use, how much carbon and so forth they were associated with,
+that might be something to change the debate in this country.
+Just saying.
+ In terms of transatlantic, it is important. We saw with the
+separate EU-China investment agreement, if we do not coordinate
+with the Europeans, we could pay a price for it. We could lose
+leverage vis--vis China. So your meetings with parliamentarians
+are actually a really good idea.
+ We should talk about things like coordinating sanctions and
+responses to Taiwan contingencies. There is more we could and
+should be doing on Hong Kong and on other human rights
+violations, like the Uyghurs, agreement on technology transfer
+restrictions, and on something like 5G.
+ One of the lessons we should have learned, as Will Rogers
+might have said if you had invited him here today, you cannot
+beat something with nothing. So the United States and Europe
+are natural technology partners. Maybe it is in 6G or other
+things. And that ought to be part of the conversation I would
+think you and your colleagues would have.
+ Mr. Bera. Great.
+ Ms. Rolland.
+ Ms. Rolland. Thank you, sir.
+ On the European side, being a European myself, I have to
+say something about that. I think the time is really right.
+And, again, I think European powers are more and more willing
+to look into the Indo-Pacific region.
+ Many of them have their own Indo-Pacific strategy set in
+place. That includes not just the military and security
+component, but also other dimensions that I think align very
+well with the American interests.
+ Of course, Europeans being Europeans, they will always want
+to retain a degree of strategic autonomy and not necessarily be
+always aligned with Washington, DC. However, I think
+convergence of interests, the convergence of values, are really
+important and are going to lead to greater cooperation in all
+of these domains confronting the China challenge.
+ Regarding your experience with Nepal and Sri Lanka, I thank
+you for sharing this experience. And I think this is a great
+example of where actually BRI is, again, more of a grand
+strategy that looks into various domains. Influence operation
+is an extremely important component of them, including the
+cooperation of local elites, which in the long-term influenced
+political decisions.
+ And so, if the U.S. wants to provide alternatives to some
+of these projects, it cannot just be in terms of contracts and
+sustainable projects that we can offer, that the U.S. can
+offer, but also working more broadly with different
+constituencies in those countries, improving good governance,
+making sure that, again, the governments of countries where
+China wants to expand its influence are very much aware of the
+consequences it might have for their national interests in the
+long-term as well.
+ So it is a comprehensive objective, I believe.
+ Mr. Bera. Great.
+ Mr. Schriver.
+ Mr. Schriver. Well, I endorse those answers.
+ I would just add on the EU point, since I came from the
+Defense Department, when it comes to actual hard power, there
+is really--some countries are more important than others.
+ And I think we need to look at enhancing our cooperation
+with the French, for example, who have forward-deployed forces
+in the Pacific region given their Pacific holdings. They have
+frigates in New Caledonia and personnel stationed there.
+ So working with them, working with the Brits on the
+sanctions enforcement directed at North Korea. People who can
+bring hard power are part of this equation as well, but it is a
+little bit more limited than you will find in the other areas
+of cooperation.
+ Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you.
+ And, again, I want to thank the witnesses.
+ Let me offer the same courtesy to the ranking member, if
+there are any closing questions or clarifications and any
+closing comments that you would like to make.
+ Mr. Chabot.
+ Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ This panel did such a great job in their presentations and
+answering the questions that I am not going to toss them any
+more questions.
+ Also, we have our last vote of the day, the week, and this
+session coming up here any minute now, so I do not want to drag
+it out.
+ But, really, all three were excellent. So I, again, commend
+you, Mr. Chairman, and staffs on both sides for working this
+out with these witnesses.
+ I hope that we can see them on future panels, which I am
+quite sure we probably will, because they really have been
+great.
+ So thank you very much. I hope you all have a great
+weekend. And you are always welcome to come to Cincinnati, the
+greatest city in the United States, at any time. I just happen
+to represent it.
+ So, anyway, you all take care.
+ Back to you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Bera. Great.
+ I want to thank the ranking member, Mr. Chabot.
+ I want to thank our witnesses who participated in this very
+important virtual hearing.
+ Without objection, all members will have 5 days to submit
+statements, extraneous materials, and questions for the record
+subject to the length limitation in the rules.
+ And, again, look forward to working with each of the
+witnesses, as well as the members of the subcommittee, to
+address these major issues.
+ And, with that, a virtual bang of the gavel, and the
+subcommittee is adjourned.
+ Thank you.
+ [Whereupon, at 11:59 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
+
+ APPENDIX
+[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
+
+ STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD FROM REPRESENTAIVE CONNOLLY
+[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
+
+ RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
+[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
+
+
+ [all]
+