diff --git "a/data/CHRG-117/CHRG-117hhrg43993.txt" "b/data/CHRG-117/CHRG-117hhrg43993.txt" new file mode 100644--- /dev/null +++ "b/data/CHRG-117/CHRG-117hhrg43993.txt" @@ -0,0 +1,2094 @@ + + - DOLLARS AGAINST DEMOCRACY: DOMESTIC TERRORIST FINANCING IN THE AFTERMATH OF INSURRECTION +
+[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
+[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ 
+                  DOLLARS AGAINST DEMOCRACY: DOMESTIC
+
+                       TERRORIST FINANCING IN THE
+
+                       AFTERMATH OF INSURRECTION
+
+=======================================================================
+
+                            VIRTUAL HEARING
+
+                               BEFORE THE
+
+                   SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
+
+                       INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
+
+                          AND MONETARY POLICY
+
+                                 OF THE
+
+                    COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES
+
+                     U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
+
+                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
+
+                             FIRST SESSION
+
+                               __________
+
+                           FEBRUARY 25, 2021
+
+                               __________
+
+       Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services
+
+                            Serial No. 117-6
+                            
+                            
+                            
+ [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]                
+ 
+ 
+ 
+                              ______                       
+
+ 
+               U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
+43-993 PDF              WASHINGTON : 2021                            
+                            
+                            
+                            
+
+                 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES
+
+                 MAXINE WATERS, California, Chairwoman
+
+CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York         PATRICK McHENRY, North Carolina, 
+NYDIA M. VELAZQUEZ, New York             Ranking Member
+BRAD SHERMAN, California             FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
+GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York           BILL POSEY, Florida
+DAVID SCOTT, Georgia                 BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri
+AL GREEN, Texas                      BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan
+EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri            STEVE STIVERS, Ohio
+ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado              ANN WAGNER, Missouri
+JIM A. HIMES, Connecticut            ANDY BARR, Kentucky
+BILL FOSTER, Illinois                ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas
+JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio                   FRENCH HILL, Arkansas
+JUAN VARGAS, California              TOM EMMER, Minnesota
+JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey          LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
+VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas              BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia
+AL LAWSON, Florida                   ALEXANDER X. MOONEY, West Virginia
+MICHAEL SAN NICOLAS, Guam            WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio
+CINDY AXNE, Iowa                     TED BUDD, North Carolina
+SEAN CASTEN, Illinois                DAVID KUSTOFF, Tennessee
+AYANNA PRESSLEY, Massachusetts       TREY HOLLINGSWORTH, Indiana
+RITCHIE TORRES, New York             ANTHONY GONZALEZ, Ohio
+STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts      JOHN ROSE, Tennessee
+ALMA ADAMS, North Carolina           BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin
+RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan              LANCE GOODEN, Texas
+MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania         WILLIAM TIMMONS, South Carolina
+ALEXANDRIA OCASIO-CORTEZ, New York   VAN TAYLOR, Texas
+JESUS ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois
+SYLVIA GARCIA, Texas
+NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia
+JAKE AUCHINCLOSS, Massachusetts
+
+                   Charla Ouertatani, Staff Director
+           Subcommittee on National Security, International 
+                    Development and Monetary Policy
+
+                  JIM A. HIMES, Connecticut, Chairman
+
+JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey          FRENCH HILL, Arkansas, Ranking 
+MICHAEL SAN NICOLAS, Guam                Member
+RITCHIE TORRES, New York             LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
+STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts      ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas
+MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania         TOM EMMER, Minnesota
+ALEXANDRIA OCASIO-CORTEZ, New York   WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio
+JESUS ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois      ANTHONY GONZALEZ, Ohio
+JAKE AUCHINCLOSS, Massachusetts      VAN TAYLOR, Texas, Vice Ranking 
+                                         Member
+                                         
+                            C O N T E N T S
+
+                              ----------                              
+                                                                   Page
+Hearing held on:
+    February 25, 2021............................................     1
+Appendix:
+    February 25, 2021............................................    35
+
+                               WITNESSES
+                      Thursday, February 25, 2021
+
+Boukadoum, Iman, Senior Program Manager, Fighting Hate and Bias, 
+  The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights............     4
+Brooks, Lecia, Chief of Staff, Southern Poverty Law Center.......     6
+Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed, CEO, Valens Global.....................    12
+Glaser, Daniel L., Global Head, Jurisdictional Services, and Head 
+  of Washington, DC Office, K2 Integrity; Senior Advisor at the 
+  Foundation for Defense of Democracies; and former Assistant 
+  Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, U.S. 
+  Department of the Treasury.....................................     8
+Rogers, Daniel, Co-Founder and Chief Technology Officer, Global 
+  Disinformation Index...........................................    10
+
+                                APPENDIX
+
+Prepared statements:
+    Boukadoum, Iman,.............................................    36
+    Brooks, Lecia,...............................................    42
+    Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed.....................................    58
+    Glaser, Daniel L.............................................    97
+    Rogers, Daniel...............................................   102
+
+
+                  DOLLARS AGAINST DEMOCRACY: DOMESTIC
+
+                       TERRORIST FINANCING IN THE
+
+                       AFTERMATH OF INSURRECTION
+
+                              ----------                              
+
+
+                      Thursday, February 25, 2021
+
+             U.S. House of Representatives,
+                 Subcommittee on National Security,
+                          International Development
+                               and Monetary Policy,
+                           Committee on Financial Services,
+                                                   Washington, D.C.
+    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., 
+via Webex, Hon. Jim A. Himes [chairman of the subcommittee] 
+presiding.
+    Members present: Representatives Himes, Gottheimer, San 
+Nicolas, Torres, Lynch, Dean, Ocasio-Cortez, Garcia of 
+Illinois, Auchincloss; Hill, Zeldin, Williams of Texas, Emmer, 
+Davidson, Gonzalez of Ohio, and Taylor.
+    Ex officio present: Representative Waters.
+    Chairman Himes. The Subcommittee on National Security, 
+International Development and Monetary Policy will come to 
+order. Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a 
+recess of the subcommittee at any time. Also, without 
+objection, members of the full Financial Services Committee who 
+are not members of this subcommittee are authorized to 
+participate in today's hearing.
+    As a reminder, I ask all Members to keep themselves muted 
+when they are not being recognized by the Chair. This will 
+minimize disturbances while Members are asking questions of our 
+witnesses. The staff has been instructed not to mute Members, 
+except when a Member is not being recognized by the Chair and 
+there is inadvertent background noise.
+    Members are also reminded that they may only participate in 
+one remote proceeding at a time. If you are participating 
+today, please keep your camera on. And if you choose to attend 
+a different remote proceeding, please turn your camera off.
+    If Members wish to be recognized during the hearing, please 
+identify yourself by name to facilitate recognition by the 
+Chair.
+    Today's hearing is entitled, ``Dollars Against Democracy: 
+Domestic Terrorist Financing in the Aftermath of 
+Insurrection.''
+    I now recognize myself for 4 minutes to give an opening 
+statement.
+    As we heard from Merrick Garland during his confirmation 
+hearing earlier this week, the country faces a, ``more 
+dangerous period in the wake of January 6th than we did after 
+the Oklahoma City bombing, the single deadliest act of domestic 
+terrorism in American history.'' This threat is real and it is, 
+therefore, incumbent on all of us on this subcommittee to look 
+at the ways that these extremist groups fund not only their 
+violent activities, but their recruitment and radicalization 
+efforts as well.
+    In the wake of the attacks of September 11th, we recast the 
+entire Federal Government, and worked feverishly to defund 
+terrorist extremes. To effectively disrupt domestic extremist 
+groups, we need to better understand their financing.
+    In today's hearing, I want us to focus on three important 
+areas.
+    First, to better understand how these groups are raising 
+money. Unlike ISIS, for example, these organizations are not 
+pyramid-shaped, where funding comes from a handful of easily 
+disruptible areas. An online fundraising drive for a legitimate 
+charity, and one that helps support an extremist group, can 
+look very similar. Some extremist groups are eschewing the 
+traditional banking sector in favor of cryptocurrency, thereby 
+avoiding our traditional methods of disrupting extremist 
+financing.
+    Second, to give serious thought to where our efforts on 
+disruption are best spent. Terrorist attacks rely on their 
+asymmetrical nature to be effective. Many of the domestic 
+terrorist attacks in recent memory have been self-funded. The 
+bomb constructed by Timothy McVeigh cost less than $5,000. 
+However, recruitment and radicalization efforts are often more 
+resourced and time-intensive. Targeting these efforts may 
+provide an avenue for preventing future attacks.
+    Third, we need to be conscientiously mindful of the civil 
+liberties concerns at play here. Unlike international extremist 
+groups, law enforcement is constrained by the Constitution when 
+dealing with domestic extremists. Balancing the desire to give 
+law enforcement the tools necessary to disrupt these groups, 
+with the need to respect the rights of all Americans in the 
+Constitution to which we have all pledged an oath, is 
+essential.
+    I will quickly note, in the spirit of my opening statement 
+and the subcommittee's first hearing, that this hearing is not 
+about, ``what-aboutism'' or ``both-sidesism.'' The topic is 
+domestic terrorism, and it must be divorced from any specific 
+ideology.
+    While we all lived through a brutal event on January 6th 
+undertaken by right-wing extremists, no location on the 
+political spectrum has a monopoly on extremism or violence. 
+Focusing on one group to score political points doesn't do 
+anything to help us solve the very real problem at hand, a 
+problem that could get worse over time, as January 6th 
+demonstrated to so many groups that they could, in fact, make 
+the news and be effective in their dark ways.
+    Finally, I would like to thank our panel of witnesses whose 
+expertise and experience in their respective fields is 
+unparalleled. I sincerely appreciate your assistance in 
+tackling this difficult issue.
+    The Chair now recognizes the ranking member of the 
+subcommittee, Mr. Hill, for 5 minutes for an opening statement.
+    Mr. Hill. I thank the chairman, and I appreciate you 
+holding this hearing, and for your opening statement, and I 
+appreciate the witnesses lending their expertise today.
+    I know this is a topic that touches all members on this 
+subcommittee and across the Capitol, for the events that 
+transpired on January 6th affected all of us deeply. While we 
+have discussed domestic terrorism financing in the past, this 
+hearing will hit closer to home than the previous ones.
+    I look forward to the constructive dialogue on this topic 
+as a way to bring both sides of the aisle closer together. The 
+Majority has made the decision to convene this hearing in the 
+aftermath of the horrific destruction and mayhem of January 
+6th. All of us are saddened and outraged by the actions of 
+those involved in that evil and devastating act. All of us 
+condemn the rioters' destruction and malice towards the 
+peaceful conduct of the business of democracy here in the 
+people's House.
+    But I would be remiss if I didn't note that extremist 
+events like this have been caused by both the far left and the 
+far right all across our country. Even this week, in Senate 
+testimony, we are learning important details about the 
+premeditation of the attack and the weakness in the Capitol 
+security planning and preparation.
+    To honor the rank and file men and women of law 
+enforcement, I have sponsored a resolution with my good friend, 
+Representative Ed Perlmutter, to celebrate the bravery of the 
+Capitol Police, the D.C. Metropolitan Police, and other law 
+enforcement officers. These men and women protected us with 
+courage, and they should not be overlooked. I am pleased to 
+report that this resolution has strong bipartisan support, with 
+over 133 co-sponsors.
+    It is important to note, though, that this is not the first 
+time that our Nation's Capitol and elected officials have been 
+targeted. I will spare the committee a long history lesson, but 
+I will mention that prior to the events of January 6th, there 
+have been 6 other attacks on the Capitol involving extremists, 
+ranging from White supremacists to anarchists. Most in this 
+room will remember the members of this committee and our 
+colleagues who were attacked during the Congressional baseball 
+game practice in 2017, committed by a terrorist fueled by rage 
+against Republicans.
+    Unfortunately, as the chairman said, extremism, on both the 
+radical left and radical right in our country, is not new, and 
+it affects all Americans. It is important that we investigate 
+the funding for such attacks and mitigate extremists' ability 
+to access it. Cutting off funding will inhibit their ability to 
+grow and expand their abilities and scope.
+    We need to craft bipartisan solutions to ensure that the 
+violence and hatred that fuel the attacks does not happen 
+again. We must use our existing extensive laws and law 
+enforcement operation and cooperation to identify and prosecute 
+those on the left and right who attempt to use terror and 
+violence.
+    I appreciate the chairman, and in a final comment, I would 
+hope--I see our distinguished Full Committee Chair on the 
+call--I would urge our Chair, when we are in Washington to--I 
+would invite her consideration of an in-person hearing.
+    And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my 
+time.
+    Chairman Himes. The Chair thanks the ranking member for his 
+statement, and now recognizes the Chair of the Full Committee, 
+the gentlewoman from California, Chairwoman Maxine Waters, for 
+1 minute.
+    Chairwoman Waters. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I 
+think this is extraordinarily important. I thank you for 
+holding this hearing.
+    We are here against the backdrop of the January 6th 
+insurrection, a deplorable, yet predictable, display of White 
+supremacists such as the Proud Boys, the Oath Keepers, QAnon, 
+and others, and nationalist violence incited by President Trump 
+against the members of this body and against democracy itself.
+    Unfortunately, the violence that we saw on the 6th is not 
+new, but arises from our nation's legacy of violence towards 
+people of color, religious minorities, LGBTQ persons, women, 
+and immigrants; from the KKK and lynching, to the terror in 
+Charlottesville, Pittsburgh, El Paso, and Escondido, White 
+supremacists and nationalism are not new threats.
+    But there is hope. The radicalization, recruitment, 
+training, and operations that made January 6th possible also 
+had a money trail, which can and must be targeted to turn the 
+tide against future attacks.
+    Thank you. And I yield back the balance of my time.
+    Chairman Himes. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
+    We now welcome the testimony of our distinguished 
+witnesses, and we have five witnesses today. First, Ms. Iman 
+Boukadoum, who is a Senior Program Manager at The Leadership 
+Conference on Civil and Human Rights; second, Ms. Lecia Brooks, 
+who is Chief of Staff at the Southern Poverty Law Center; 
+third, Mr. Daniel Glaser, who is Global Head of Jurisdictional 
+Services and head of the Washington, D.C., office of K2 
+Integrity, a Senior Advisor at the Foundation for Defense of 
+Democracies, and a former Assistant Secretary for Terrorist 
+Financing and Financial Crimes at the U.S. Department of the 
+Treasury; fourth, Dr. Daniel Rogers, who is co-founder and 
+chief technology officer of the Global Disinformation Index; 
+and fifth, Dr. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, who is chief executive 
+officer at Valens Global.
+    Witnesses are reminded that your oral testimony will be 
+limited to 5 minutes. You should be able to see a timer on your 
+screen that will indicate how much time you have left, and a 
+chime will go off at the end of your time. I would ask that you 
+be mindful of the timer, and quickly wrap up your testimony if 
+you hear the chime, so that we can be respectful of both the 
+witnesses' and the committee members' time.
+    And without objection, your written statements will be made 
+a part of the record.
+    Ms. Boukadoum, you are now recognized for 5 minutes to give 
+an oral presentation of your testimony.
+
+STATEMENT OF IMAN BOUKADOUM, SENIOR MANAGER, FIGHTING HATE AND 
+   BIAS, THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS
+
+    Ms. Boukadoum. Chairman Himes, Ranking Member Hill, and 
+distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for 
+holding this timely hearing today.
+    Last month's violent insurrection, heavily fueled by White 
+supremacy and White nationalism, shocked the world, but it 
+didn't shock me. It didn't shock my community or other 
+marginalized communities, because we are not new to White 
+nationalist violence. Personally, as a Muslim and an Algerian 
+American, I appreciate the opportunity to be heard today as we 
+wrestle with the aftermath of this horrific day.
+    We echo the sense of urgency shared by many of you today in 
+Congress regarding the very real threat of White nationalist 
+violence, and I would just note that our coalition has been 
+ringing the alarm relating to White nationalist violence for 
+generations.
+    We know, however, that even well-intentioned national 
+security laws are invariably weaponized against Black, Brown, 
+and Muslim communities, and that White nationalist violence is 
+not prioritized, making that policy failure the fundamental 
+reason for what transpired on January 6th, not a lack of legal 
+authority.
+    For this reason, we oppose any legislation that would 
+create new charges for domestic terrorism or any enhanced or 
+additional criminal penalties. The Federal Government, 
+including the Treasury Department, has many tools at its 
+disposal to investigate. And also, the FBI and DOJ have 50 
+terrorism-related statutes and over a dozen criminal statutes 
+that they can use. They just need to use them to target White 
+nationalist violence.
+    And, of course, we know that White nationalist violence and 
+violence inspired by Muslims or ISIS and al-Qaida-inspired 
+violence is very differently treated in this country. Global 
+policing of charitable giving by Muslims, for example, in my 
+community, which is a core part of my faith, has led to the 
+effective forfeiting of our First Amendment rights.
+    The failure to prioritize White nationalist crimes and the 
+over-policing of innocuous financial transactions by mosques or 
+those originating from the Middle East or people with Middle 
+Eastern names, has taken attention away from the clear and 
+present threat of White nationalist violence percolating all 
+around us, and countless innocent people, particularly in the 
+Muslim community, as I said, have effectively lost their right 
+to perform religious duties for decades.
+    What is clear is that the Treasury Department and other 
+Federal law enforcement agencies already have vast 
+administrative and statutory authorities at their disposal 
+which they routinely use to disrupt financing relating to 
+clandestine activity by freezing bank accounts and stopping 
+those transactions.
+    And what history demonstrates is that providing additional 
+national security authority to fight domestic terrorism would 
+devastate already over-policed and over-surveilled communities 
+of color and Muslims.
+    I would like to sum up with a few recommendations.
+    First, the Jabara-Heyer NO HATE Act is an important piece 
+of legislation that must be passed. It centers communities, and 
+it would help with information-sharing relating to hate crimes, 
+and would allow the Treasury Department to trace financial ties 
+to White nationalist violence.
+    Second, the the Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act (DTPA) is 
+a piece of legislation that we have endorsed and we believe 
+will also help with information-sharing, including with the 
+Treasury Department, to enhance clamping down on White 
+nationalist violence.
+    And, third, we believe that hate crimes data must be 
+reported and mandated for public consumption and that 
+government leaders must be able to see what is happening across 
+our country within the hate crime space.
+    I will just conclude by saying that history has taught us 
+that national security laws invariably harm the very 
+communities they are supposed to protect. From COINTELPRO, the 
+FBI's unlawful domestic surveillance operation that the church 
+committee demonstrated in Congress, was shamefully used against 
+Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and other civil rights leaders in 
+the 1960s; and it, too, was justified as a national security 
+program.
+    And now, after 9/11, we have seen similar frameworks used 
+to unjustly target and harm Arabs, Muslims, and others, 
+treating us and our religion as suspicious, and compromising 
+our First Amendment rights, freedoms, and due process rights.
+    Adding national security authorities will only exacerbate 
+these challenges.
+    Thank you. And I am happy to answer any questions.
+    [The prepared statement of Ms. Boukadoum can be found on 
+page 36 of the appendix.]
+    Chairman Himes. Thank you, Ms. Boukadoum.
+    Ms. Brooks, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
+
+STATEMENT OF LECIA BROOKS, CHIEF OF STAFF, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW 
+                             CENTER
+
+    Ms. Brooks. Good morning, Chairman Himes, Chairwoman 
+Waters, Ranking Member Hill, and members of the subcommittee. 
+My name is Lecia Brooks, and I serve as the chief of staff for 
+the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC).
+    For 50 years, SPLC has been a catalyst for racial justice 
+in the South and beyond. We work in partnership with 
+communities to dismantle White supremacy, strengthen 
+intersectional movements, and advance the human rights of all 
+people. The SPLC began tracking White supremacist activity in 
+the 1980s. Each year, since 1990, we have conducted a census of 
+hate groups operating across the U.S. as part of our annual 
+Year in Hate Extremism report. Our 2020 report, released this 
+month, documented a decline in the number of hate groups, but 
+not a decline in the strength and momentum of their movement.
+    As the January 6th Capitol Hill siege affirmed, their 
+threat to our democracy has not diminished. Far-right 
+extremists are exploiting internet technology to create a 
+broader, more decentralized, and more dangerous movement. The 
+proliferation of numerous internet platforms has allowed 
+individuals to engage with potentially violent movements, like 
+QAnon and Boogaloo, without being card-carrying members of a 
+particular group.
+    Our testimony outlines how this movement finances itself in 
+the decentralized way in which they now operate. The funding 
+and financing of hate groups in this decentralized landscape is 
+also changing in important ways. In the past, hate groups 
+raised money by charging dues, selling products, or requiring 
+the purchase of uniforms. Today, some White nationalist groups 
+and personalities are raising funds through the distribution of 
+propaganda itself.
+    In November, SPLC researchers reported that dozens of 
+extremist groups were earning thousands of dollars per month on 
+a popular live-streaming platform called DLive. As the post-
+election period became dominated by former President Trump's 
+false assertions that the election was fraudulent, these DLive 
+streamers shifted to video streaming at in-person events 
+branded with the slogan, ``Stop the Steal.'' Some of these same 
+individuals were featured by House impeachment managers as key 
+perpetrators of the violence on January 6th. You see, they had 
+used DLive to live-stream the events inside the Capitol and on 
+the grounds.
+    Crowdfunding is also being exploited by hate groups to earn 
+money in this new decentralized landscape. Crowdfunding sites 
+played a critical role in the Capitol insurrection, providing 
+monetary support that allowed people to travel to Washington, 
+D.C. They have also played a crucial role in raising hundreds 
+of thousands of dollars in legal fees for extremists.
+    The violent insurrection at the U.S. Capitol on January 6th 
+should serve as a wake-up call for Congress, the Biden 
+Administration, internet companies, law enforcement, and public 
+officials at every level. But we had wake-up calls before, many 
+of them, in fact: Charleston, in 2015; Charlottesville, in 
+2017; and Christchurch, New Zealand, and El Paso, in 2019.
+    As we all saw last month, we can no longer afford inaction. 
+Some technology companies have taken steps in the right 
+direction to combat the rise of hate and extremism on these 
+platforms, but both government and internet companies must do 
+far more.
+    Let me close by highlighting five policy recommendations we 
+included in our testimony:
+    One, tech companies must create and enforce terms of 
+service to ensure that they do not become platforms for hate. 
+They should prevent their sites from being used by extremist 
+organizations to raise money for their illegal actions.
+    Two, these companies should commit to much more 
+transparency and regular outside audits to measure financial 
+harms caused by their platforms.
+    Three, Congress should prioritize the funding of programs 
+for research into technologies that can be used to detect and 
+prevent online financial harms while preserving human rights.
+    Four, Congress should reject legislation to create a new 
+Federal criminal domestic terrorism statute. If passed as 
+prologue, such a statute could be used to expand racial 
+profiling, or even be wielded to surveil and investigate 
+communities of color and political opponents in the name of 
+national security.
+    Finally, we should make concerted efforts across the 
+government to improve Federal hate crime data collection, 
+training, and prevention. Data drives policy. We cannot address 
+hate violence unless we measure it properly.
+    Thank you for holding this important hearing. The SPLC 
+looks forward to working with you as you continue to focus your 
+urgent attention on this important issue.
+    [The prepared statement of Ms. Brooks can be found on page 
+42 of the appendix.]
+    Chairman Himes. Thank you, Ms. Brooks.
+    Mr. Glaser, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
+
+  STATEMENT OF DANIEL L. GLASER, GLOBAL HEAD, JURISDICTIONAL 
+  SERVICES, AND HEAD OF WASHINGTON, DC OFFICE, K2 INTEGRITY; 
+ SENIOR ADVISOR AT THE FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES; 
+  AND FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR TERRORIST FINANCING AND 
+       FINANCIAL CRIMES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
+
+    Mr. Glaser. Thank you, Chairman Himes, Ranking Member Hill, 
+and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for 
+the opportunity to appear before you today to talk about how 
+the U.S. Government can employ similar tools and strategies 
+against White nationalist and other domestic terrorist groups 
+as it has employed against global jihadist groups over the past 
+2 decades.
+    This is a personal issue for me. During my time at the 
+Treasury Department, I fought to cut off funding to terrorist 
+groups such as al-Qaida, the Islamic State, and Hezbollah. As a 
+Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bush Administration, and 
+eventually as the Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing 
+in the Obama Administration, my primary responsibility was to 
+lead the design and implementation of strategies, to attack the 
+financial networks of these groups, and other threats to our 
+country's national security. And while we should never let down 
+our guard with respect to those still-potent terrorist 
+organizations, it has become tragically clear that there are 
+domestic extremist groups that, in some ways, present an even 
+greater threat to our ideals and our democracy. We have the 
+responsibility to target those groups with the same 
+determination, creativity, and sense of purpose that we 
+displayed in the years following 9/11.
+    To be sure, counter-illicit finance strategies are not 
+silver bullets, and there are practical and constitutional 
+limitations to domestic action that do not arise in the global 
+context. But any comprehensive response to a national security 
+threat must include a strategic financial component. It is my 
+hope and expectation that the new leadership at the Treasury 
+Department will turn its attention to precisely that challenge.
+    From the outset, let's be clear, that the purpose of a 
+counter-illicit finance strategy is not to replace the 
+traditional law enforcement tools which will remain the 
+foundation of any domestic effort.
+    Supplementing those efforts, a counter-illicit finance 
+strategy should seek to hinder the ability of extremist groups 
+to use the financial system to mask their identities and to 
+raise and move funds. The first step must be to understand the 
+typologies and methods by which such groups raise and move 
+funds and to map out their financial networks.
+    This first step should be followed by two general 
+categories of actions: first, offense, undermining the 
+financial networks that support these groups; and second, 
+defense, taking systemic action within the financial system to 
+make it less vulnerable to abuse by these groups.
+    It is sometimes stated that extremist groups are less 
+vulnerable to financial measures because of their informal and 
+decentralized structure. I believe that this is a hypothesis 
+that is yet to be tested. Any group that engages in organized 
+activity needs to raise and move funds, and when those 
+activities extend nationwide or globally, it only increases 
+such groups' reliance on the financial system.
+    The U.S. Government should undertake a comprehensive effort 
+to understand how these extremist groups are accessing the 
+financial system and, to the extent possible, to map their 
+financial networks. Once the financial networks and activities 
+of the extremist groups are better understood, the U.S. 
+Government should consider the application of targeted 
+financial measures. The U.S. currently has all the authority it 
+needs to apply targeted financial sanctions against foreign 
+extremist groups, and it began to do so last spring with the 
+designation of the Russian Imperial Movement.
+    Unfortunately, the U.S. has yet to target additional 
+foreign groups. And in contrast to previous campaigns against 
+jihadist groups, Treasury has not followed up the initial 
+Russian Imperial Movement designation with a financial pressure 
+campaign involving waves of sanctions seeking to dismantle 
+facilitation networks. I encourage the U.S. Government to 
+pursue such campaign as a priority matter.
+    Practical and constitutional constraints give the U.S. 
+Government far less ability to apply targeted financial 
+measures against domestic groups. Congress should consider 
+legislation allowing for sanctions like authorities to protect 
+the U.S. financial system from abuse by domestic extremist 
+groups. Such authorities will need to be tailored to ensure 
+that the government complies with constitutional requirements, 
+including First Amendment restrictions on how groups are 
+targeted and due process restrictions on how such measures are 
+applied. One consideration could be to forego the asset freeze 
+that is usually associated with sanctions in favor of some more 
+limited measures.
+    There are also measures that the U.S. Government can take 
+today to make the U.S. financial system less vulnerable to 
+abuse by extremist groups. The United States has a robust anti-
+money-laundering and countering the financing of terrorism 
+regime, but it can always be fine-tuned and adjusted to address 
+new vulnerabilities, including those presented by domestic 
+extremist groups.
+    The potential measures in Treasury's toolbox include: the 
+issuance of guidance to financial institutions on financial 
+typologies, methodologies, and red flags; the establishment of 
+private-public partnerships; the use of information-sharing 
+authorities; and the use of geographic targeting orders.
+    Taken together, these measures will strengthen the ability 
+of financial institutions to identify, report, and impede the 
+financial activity of domestic extremist groups, and will 
+ensure that the U.S. financial system is a hostile environment 
+for these groups.
+    Thank you, again, for the opportunity to testify, and I 
+look forward to answering your questions.
+    [The prepared statement of Mr. Glaser can be found on page 
+97 of the appendix.]
+    Chairman Himes. Thank you, Mr. Glaser.
+    Dr. Rogers, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
+
+  STATEMENT OF DANIEL ROGERS, CO-FOUNDER AND CHIEF TECHNOLOGY 
+              OFFICER, GLOBAL DISINFORMATION INDEX
+
+    Mr. Rogers. Chairman Himes, Ranking Member Hill, Chairwoman 
+Waters, and members of the subcommittee, good morning, and 
+thank for the opportunity to speak before you and discuss the 
+funding mechanisms of these domestic violent extremist groups.
+    I am the co-founder and chief technology officer of the 
+Global Disinformation Index (GDI), a nonprofit focused on 
+catalyzing change in the technology industry to disrupt online 
+disinformation.
+    Last fall, my colleague, Ben Decker, and our team at the 
+GDI collaborated with the Institute for Strategic Dialogue to 
+conduct a study entitled, ``Bankrolling Bigotry'', to examine 
+the funding mechanisms of American hate groups.
+    Many of the groups implicated in the events of January 6th 
+are the same ones that we examined last year in our study. This 
+is why I sit before you today to discuss a little bit about 
+what we learned about how technology and payments companies 
+enable groups like those that participated in the insurrection 
+to operate.
+    These groups leverage the internet as a primary means of 
+disseminating their toxic ideologies and soliciting of funds. 
+One only needs to search Amazon or Etsy for the term, 
+``QAnon'', to uncover shirts, hats, mugs, books, and other 
+paraphernalia that both monetize and further popularize the 
+domestic violent extremist threat. Images from that fateful day 
+last month are rife with sweatshirts that say, ``Camp 
+Auschwitz'', that, until recently, were for sale on websites 
+like Teespring and CafePress.
+    As we speak, at least 24 individuals indicted for their 
+role in the January 6th insurrection, including 8 members of 
+the Proud Boys, have used crowdfunding site GiveSendGo to raise 
+nearly a quarter of a million dollars in donations. And it is 
+not just about the money. This merchandise acts as sort of like 
+a team jersey that helps these groups recruit new members and 
+foment further hatred towards their targets.
+    We analyzed the digital footprints of 73 groups across 60 
+websites, and 225 social media accounts and their use of 54 
+different online fundraising mechanisms, including 47 payment 
+platforms in 5 different cryptocurrencies, ultimately finding 
+191 incidences of hate groups using online fundraising services 
+to support their activities.
+    The funding mechanism included both primary platforms like 
+Amazon, intermediary platforms such as Stripe or Shopify, 
+crowdfunding sites like GoFundMe, payment facilitators like 
+PayPal, monetized content streaming services such as YouTube 
+Super Chats, and cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin.
+    All of these payment mechanisms were linked to websites or 
+social media accounts on Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, 
+Telegram, LinkedIn, Pinterest, Gab, BitChute, and others. The 
+sheer number of companies I just mentioned is the first clue to 
+the scale and the scope of the problem. This is not an issue of 
+any one individual company, but, rather, a systemic problem of 
+hate and bigotry exploiting an entire industry, and even 
+government policy, to raise funds, peddle extremist ideologies, 
+and commit acts of violence.
+    A number of conclusions stood out to us in performing this 
+work. For starters, over half of the platforms we identified 
+already have explicit policies against hate and extremism that 
+are simply not enforced. We also found that a large fraction of 
+the groups we studied have approved tax-exempt status with the 
+IRS. A full 100 percent of anti-Muslim groups, 75 percent of 
+anti-immigrant groups, and 70 percent of anti-LGBTQ groups have 
+501(c)(3) or 501(c)(4) status.
+    Over 1/3 of the militia groups that we identified, 
+including the Oath Keepers, whose leadership was recently 
+indicted on charges related to January 6th, have tax-exempt 
+status.
+    This status gives them access to a whole spectrum of 
+charity fundraising tools from Facebook donations to Amazon 
+Smile to the point where the most common fundraising platform 
+we identified across all of our data was Charity Navigator. 
+These platforms are reticent, to say the least, to make 
+unilateral decisions that go against IRS determination.
+    The problem of hate groups exploiting the Tax Code goes 
+back decades, and stems from a combination of a lack of 
+resources at the IRS to properly enforce compliance, as well as 
+long-standing efforts by some to exploit the charity rules for 
+political, and, now, extremist purposes.
+    But the issue has become more urgent in the wake of January 
+6th. In the days leading up to the insurrection, the Oath 
+Keepers' founder, Stewart Rhodes, appeared on a podcast and 
+solicited charitable donations to the Oath Keepers Educational 
+Foundation. It can only be presumed that these funds, which 
+listeners were notably able to deduct from their Federal taxes, 
+went to transporting and lodging members of the group slated to 
+participate in the ensuing riots.
+    Private industry must also step up and do more. Since the 
+publication of our report last October, we have documented at 
+least 17 actions taken by platforms against the groups we have 
+enumerated. For example, four of the six payment mechanisms 
+routing funds to the Oath Keepers have been blocked. Amazon has 
+even removed them from Amazon Smile. But 17 actions out of 200 
+instances we observed speaks to the rampant way that it has 
+been allowed to persist. In fact, while most platforms have 
+removed the Oath Keepers, payment facilitator RallyPay still, 
+to this day, services the group's fundraising needs, and has 
+shown no signs of responding to public pressure to stop.
+    More must be done. Industry-wide standards must be set, and 
+enforcement across both the private and public sector must be 
+stepped up.
+    Chairman Himes, Ranking Member Hill, Chairwoman Waters, and 
+members of the subcommittee, thank you for your time, and I 
+welcome your questions.
+    [The prepared statement of Dr. Rogers can be found on page 
+102 of the appendix.]
+    Chairman Himes. Thank you, Dr. Rogers.
+    Dr. Gartenstein-Ross, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
+
+          STATEMENT OF DAVEED GARTENSTEIN-ROSS, CEO, 
+                         VALENS GLOBAL
+
+    Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Domestic violent extremism is today 
+uniquely posed for growth. Opportunities are given by our 
+information environment by seemingly intractable global 
+problems that governments appear incapable of addressing, by a 
+nation riven by its differences, and by an age where ethics and 
+identity are in constant flux.
+    Chairman Himes, Ranking Member Hill, Chairwoman Waters, and 
+distinguished members of the subcommittee, on behalf of Valens 
+Global, it is an honor to appear before you today. I think it 
+is obvious how the backdrop I describe represents an attractive 
+recruiting environment for any extremist group.
+    This panel's consensus is that White supremacist extremism, 
+or WSE, is the most pressing present threat. This is not just 
+the panelists' opinions. Multiple U.S. Government assessments 
+validate this view, as do relevant statistics, but White 
+supremacist extremism is not the only concern in the domestic-
+violent extremist, or DVE space.
+    In addition to documenting relevant WSE threat actors, my 
+written testimony details street violence, assaults, arson, and 
+intimidation employed by another militant stream. There has 
+been a general rise in extremism.
+    The opening remarks of the chairman and the ranking member 
+rightly emphasized that we are living through a dynamic 
+multifaceted ecosystem of extremism. Our divisions could plunge 
+the U.S. into serious conflict, or even fragmentation.
+    Scholars have discussed reciprocal radicalization, where 
+opposite extremes strengthen both sides and give average people 
+a reason to drift toward extremes. Reciprocal radicalization 
+shows that the power and success of groups aligned with one 
+extremist ideology fuels ostensibly opposing groups. Though 
+different forms of extremism can thrive off one another, 
+society suffers.
+    Our policies must be appropriate to this environment. Any 
+policies to combat DVE should be narrowly targeted and rights-
+protected. Unfairly targeting only one ideology, or seeking to 
+criminalize constitutionally protected behaviors, may push the 
+country into deepening conflict. So, what can be done?
+    First, the U.S. Government should consider designating 
+additional WSE groups as terrorist organizations. I single out 
+WSE groups here because of the level of transnationalism in the 
+movement, which is a prerequisite for designation under current 
+law. The State Department's designation last year of the 
+Russian Imperial Movement was significant, and it is worth 
+considering further designations of violent groups that satisfy 
+the criteria.
+    Second, any current discussion of DVE financing will touch 
+about a domestic designation statute allowing designation of 
+purely domestic groups. This is the most direct way of 
+addressing DVE groups' financing, potentially criminalizing the 
+act of funding them and letting authorities clamp down on their 
+assets. Yet, such a statute would be fraught with civil 
+liberties concerns. Any such statute must be viewpoint-neutral 
+with designations corresponding to the threat groups posed, not 
+to the ideas that they espouse. The statute must be clear about 
+predicate acts that could result in designation, and that 
+threshold for designation should be relatively high.
+    Third, [inaudible] more rigorously mapped relevant DVE 
+groups and their finances. The current consensus among DVE 
+experts is that these groups are relatively fluid and devoid of 
+organizational hierarchy. This may be so, but there is a 
+tendency for experts to see groups as disorganized or non-
+hierarchal, when they have a hidden structure, something to 
+which Mr. Glaser's testimony alluded. Our current understanding 
+of DVE group structure and funds may be incomplete, and in the 
+digital age, fluid structures can quickly morph into more 
+concrete ones. Further research may present further policy 
+options.
+    Finally, the U.S. Government should devote resources to 
+better understanding reciprocal radicalization and related 
+phenomenon, fringe fluidity, the transition of an individual or 
+group from one extremist ideological stream to another. Better 
+understanding of these dynamics would afford us a better 
+understanding of how violent extremists interact with each 
+other.
+    In conclusion, this hearing refers to the events of January 
+6th as an insurrection. Anybody who has been in an insurgency 
+or a civil war situation knows that it is essential to reduce 
+the potential pool from which militant factions can draw. 
+Everyone who is a part of this hearing--Members of Congress, 
+experts, media, spectators--should understand that we are all a 
+part of this story. Our work is not to score partisan points, 
+but to make this democracy more resilient to the challenges it 
+confronts.
+    With the divisions we have, with today's unprecedented 
+ability to mobilize for good or ill, we need to reduce the 
+number of people who might try to impose their will on the rest 
+of us by force.
+    Thank you.
+    [The prepared statement of Dr. Gartenstein-Ross can be 
+found on page 58 of the appendix.]
+    Chairman Himes. Thank you, Dr. Gartenstein-Ross.
+    We now come to the member question portion of the hearing. 
+I thank all of the witnesses for that comprehensive testimony, 
+and now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions.
+    One thing that struck me is that we heard from five 
+excellent witnesses, and I don't believe I heard the word, 
+``cybercurrency'' once. It comes up a lot with my constituents. 
+It comes up a lot in different contexts. So just to keep some 
+organization, let me ask two of the witnesses to just offer a 
+brief perspective on how the committee should think about 
+cybercurrency as an anonymous and potentially untraceable 
+source of financing.
+    Let me start with Ms. Brooks. Any thoughts?
+    Ms. Brooks. I invite my colleague, Dr. Rogers, to take the 
+first shot at that.
+    Mr. Rogers. Okay. Thank you. Thanks, Congressman. That is a 
+very interesting question, and one that was included in our 
+study. We looked at five different cryptocurrencies and their 
+involvement in transferring funds to these groups. They are 
+definitely there. They are definitely part of the fundraising 
+strategies. What we noticed was that there was a strong 
+correlation with the kind of explicit extremism of the group 
+and their use of cryptocurrencies. So, maybe less extreme 
+groups, or more cryptically extreme groups, for lack of a 
+better word, had a more dominant use of traditional fundraising 
+platforms that touched the kind of mainstream financial system. 
+And what would happen is as they were deplatformed off of those 
+tools, those sites, they would migrate into the use of 
+increasingly anonymized cryptocurrencies.
+    I should also point out that cryptocurrencies, I like to 
+call them pseudonymous, not necessarily anonymous, and there 
+are efforts and ways to track transactions, the challenge being 
+attributing, say, a particular cryptocurrency wallet to a 
+particular actor, but we definitely saw the use of 
+cryptocurrencies generally behind the most extreme groups that 
+we studied.
+    Chairman Himes. Thank you, Dr. Rogers.
+    I do have one other question, if any of the other witnesses 
+have a different or additional perspective on cryptocurrencies, 
+let me just invite anyone who wants to chime in.
+    Mr. Glaser. If I could chime in, Mr. Chairman?
+    Chairman Himes. Yes, please.
+    Mr. Glaser. This is Danny Glaser talking.
+    With respect to cryptocurrencies, I think it is important 
+to remember that if you want to be able to use a cryptocurrency 
+in the real economy to any scale, at some point, it does need 
+to be converted into actual currency, into dollars. That is the 
+place where the Treasury Department does regulate 
+cryptocurrencies, and cryptocurrency exchanges are regarded as 
+money services businesses. They have full customer due 
+diligence requirements. They have full money-laundering program 
+requirements. They have reporting requirements.
+    The U.S. Treasury Department, just last month, issued a 
+proposed rule relating to unhosted wallets of cryptocurrencies, 
+and that is out for notice and comment right now. It addresses 
+the particular issue of wallets that are not hosted on a 
+particular exchange. I think it is an important rule that is 
+out there, and I do encourage people to take a look at it. The 
+comment period closes in May, and then, hopefully, Treasury 
+will be able to take regulatory action to close that particular 
+vulnerability.
+    Chairman Himes. Thank you, Mr. Glaser.
+    I actually have an additional question for you, and I don't 
+have a lot of time. One of the things that struck me about the 
+testimony is that there weren't really calls for additional 
+laws. In fact, two of our witnesses urged us to avoid that.
+    Mr. Glaser, you, though, suggested something new that I 
+would like to give you, maybe, the 42 seconds I have left to 
+elaborate on. You said you were hopeful for sanctions like 
+authorities against domestic actors. You did nod to 
+constitutional and civil liberties concerns, but give us 
+another 30 seconds on exactly what you mean and, perhaps, most 
+importantly, what sort of Fourth Amendment overlay should 
+accompany such authority?
+    Mr. Glaser. Thank you for the question.
+    The fact is that the Treasury Department really does not 
+have a lot of authority to go after purely domestic groups in 
+the way that it goes after global terrorist organizations. It 
+simply doesn't have that authority.
+    You could imagine an authority that does allow for the 
+designation of domestic organizations. It would have to take 
+into account, certainly, constitutional restrictions. When you 
+read a lot of the court decisions, there are concerns relating 
+to notice. Those concerns could be addressed in a statute. 
+There are concerns that a lot of the scrutiny is heightened 
+because sanctions are usually accompanied with asset freezes. 
+But you could imagine sanctions that don't involve asset 
+freezes that involve--transaction bans that involve regulatory 
+type of requirements that you see in Section 311 of the PATRIOT 
+Act.
+    So, there is a variety of ways that the due process 
+standards could be raised from what we see in the global 
+context and the--
+    Chairman Himes. Thank you, Mr. Glaser. I hate to cut you 
+off, but I have to be a little disciplined on time. I am very 
+interested in that, so let me encourage you, if you want to 
+submit additional testimony, to do so.
+    And before I recognize the ranking member, it was 
+startling--not startling, it was interesting to me that there 
+were apparently no strong dissenting views on the concept of 
+additional legislation. So if the witnesses have additional 
+thoughts on that, the chairman would certainly welcome that in 
+written form.
+    And with that, the Chair now recognizes the distinguished 
+ranking member for 5 minutes for questions.
+    Mr. Hill. Thanks, Chairman Himes. This has been an 
+excellent panel, with really superb presentations, and it has 
+been very informative.
+    In looking at the draft legislation that the Majority 
+noticed with this hearing, one bill stuck out to me, and I 
+think it is a good follow-up from your most recent exchange. It 
+seeks to amend Title 31 to require the Secretary of the 
+Treasury to establish a program to allow designated employees 
+of financial institutions to access classified information 
+related to terrorism, sedition, and insurrection.
+    Now, over the past three Congresses, we have talked about 
+the concept of a fusion center, not unlike we do in monitoring 
+cyber risk and cyber crimes, for this terror finance arena. We 
+have never been able to come ashore on it legislatively, so I 
+found that interesting; however, I am concerned when you 
+deputize bank employees without any oversight as to how the 
+information would be protected, or if there is really even a 
+need for that, so I would like some comments.
+    Dr. Gartenstein-Ross, could you describe how banks share 
+information with law enforcement today, and then provide 
+feedback on how we might change these protocols, or if that 
+protocol change is necessary?
+    Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Thank you, Ranking Member Hill.
+    There are four primary ways that banks share information 
+now. The first is suspicious activity reports (SARs). Financial 
+institutions have to file these documents with the Financial 
+Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) when there is a suspected 
+case of money laundering or fraud. The SAR is designed to 
+monitor activity in finance-related industries that are out of 
+the ordinary, or a precursor to illegal activity, or could 
+threaten public safety.
+    Second, there is law enforcement's Section 314(a) power 
+under the PATRIOT Act, in which it obtains potential lead 
+information from financial institutions via FinCEN.
+    Third, law enforcement can use its subpoena power if a 
+court issues a subpoena pursuant to an investigation, or to an 
+administrative proceeding.
+    And, fourth, where there are blocked assets, pursuant to 
+the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) authorities, 
+sanctions, or otherwise, banks are required to report blocked 
+assets back to OFAC.
+    The information-sharing, in my view, is currently quite 
+effective. Treasury, in particular, has a very strong 
+relationship with the U.S. financial institutions.
+    Mr. Hill. Thank you. And we made one tweak that was passed 
+into law, signed into law last year, a bill of mine, called the 
+Cooperate with Law Enforcement Agencies and Watch (CLAW) Act, 
+which encouraged cooperation on accounts kept open so that they 
+could be pursued by law enforcement investigations. And I 
+appreciated the bipartisan support for that.
+    On Section 314 in the PATRIOT Act, is that a place where we 
+could, in a protected, appropriate way, make a change that 
+relates to this domestic issue, or is that, in your view, too 
+challenging?
+    Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. No. I think it is a place where you 
+could definitely make a change. The 314(a) process allows an 
+investigator to canvas financial institutions for potential 
+lead information that might otherwise never be uncovered. It is 
+designed to allow disparate pieces of information to be 
+identified, centralized, and evaluated.
+    When law enforcement submits a request to FinCEN to get 
+information from financial institutions, it has to submit a 
+written certification that each individual or entity about 
+which the information is sought is engaged in or reasonably 
+suspected of engaging in terrorist activity or money 
+laundering.
+    I think that in some cases, 314(a) may already be usable, 
+but I think it is worth looking at the 314(a) process to see 
+if, in this particular context, when you are looking at 
+domestic violent extremism, as opposed to foreign terrorist 
+organizations, there are some tweaks that would provide the 
+ability to get leads in this matter.
+    Mr. Hill. Yes, I share all of the chairman's concerns about 
+this, but I would invite you to write to the committee with 
+more details about how one might make a regulatory or 
+procedural change there at Treasury on that topic.
+    Let me switch subjects. You made a very interesting point 
+in your comment about mapping these extremist groups' 
+organizational capability. Can you expand on the mapping part? 
+We have about 30 seconds, and I will turn it to--
+    Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Yes, sir. Basically, right now--and 
+you heard several witnesses say this, and I am not disputing 
+this--the view of these groups is that they tend to be rather 
+hierarchy-less. They are not very vertical in structure. And 
+what I have noticed in the realm of extremist groups is 
+sometimes there are hidden structures that we experts are slow 
+to recognize. I know that one of the proposed bills on the GAO 
+would look in more detail into the assets that DVE groups have. 
+I think that is a good idea. I think that we could do more to 
+map the assets and understand the flow of funds to these 
+organizations, sir.
+    Mr. Hill. Thanks for your time.
+    Mr. Chairman, thank you for your leadership, and I yield 
+back.
+    Chairman Himes. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member.
+    The Chair now recognizes the Chair of the Full Committee, 
+Chairwoman Waters, for 5 minutes of questions.
+    Chairwoman Waters. Thank you so very much for allocating 
+this time.
+    I would like to direct a question to Mr. Glaser and, 
+perhaps, Ms. Brooks also.
+    As you know, Henry Enrique Tarrio is known as the national 
+chairman of the Proud Boys, and he was in town prior to January 
+6th, and he was ushered out of town by the local metropolitan 
+police. But what is interesting about him is he had a 
+relationship with the FBI, and he became an informant for the 
+FBI, and he informed on people for drugs and gambling and human 
+smuggling, and some other things; but it appears that they 
+turned a blind eye to the fact that he was a domestic 
+terrorist, and, basically, was participating in terrorist 
+activities, et cetera, and getting away with it, and said that, 
+before going into rallies, they would inform law enforcement 
+that the Proud Boys were going to be involved.
+    Now, even though this hearing is based on financing, I 
+guess my question, Mr. Glaser and Ms. Brooks, is this: Should 
+we look at public policy that would not allow the FBI to have 
+these kinds of relationships where they would turn a blind eye 
+to domestic terrorism in exchange for information and informing 
+on drugs and gambling and that kind of thing?
+    Mr. Glaser?
+    Mr. Glaser. Thank you for the question, Chairwoman Waters.
+    I certainly don't think the FBI should be turning a blind 
+eye to White supremacy and to domestic terrorism of any kind. 
+Of course, the FBI has a difficult job to manage in terms of 
+figuring out the best way to collect information that it could 
+act upon. I don't know that I know enough about the internal 
+deliberations within the FBI that led it to make the decisions 
+that it made, but I certainly do agree that we should be--and I 
+don't think we have been, and when I was in government, we 
+certainly--I will take that as a criticism of myself as well. 
+We certainly did not prioritize efforts against White supremacy 
+as much as we should have. I think that is changing now, and I 
+think it needs to continue to change, and I think it should 
+change throughout the government.
+    Chairwoman Waters. Okay. Thank you very much. It is, I 
+think, very important to understand whether or not the FBI will 
+use criminals and domestic terrorists and turn a blind eye in 
+exchange for information about drugs, gambling, and other 
+things. I knew that happened in dealing with drug dealers, 
+where they let some drug dealers stay free if they turned in 
+other drug dealers but this makes it appear they don't care 
+about domestic terrorism.
+    Do you know anything about this? Ms. Brooks, have you heard 
+about the Proud Boys and their relationship to the FBI?
+    Ms. Brooks. Yes, ma'am. Thank you. Thank you, Chairwoman 
+Waters.
+    I completely agree with my colleague, Mr. Glaser, that they 
+should not turn a blind eye. The Southern Poverty Law Center 
+would say that it is because we failed to take the threat of 
+White supremacy and White nationalists, we failed to recognize 
+the importance of it. And, so, that the FBI would engage in 
+some information-sharing at the risk of our democracy is 
+untenable, and I believe that solely because, as we saw on 
+January 6th, we failed to recognize the threat. I believe we 
+have learned some things, and hopefully, the information-
+sharing will be taken seriously, and we will recognize that the 
+greatest threat to our homeland is from White nationalists with 
+a White supremacist ideology.
+    Chairwoman Waters. Do you think that I, or Chair Himes, or 
+anyone should pursue public policy in this area of turning a 
+blind eye from our law enforcement in exchange for information 
+that they could give them on other kinds of crimes?
+    Ms. Brooks. Yes, ma'am. I do think that it is something you 
+should look into. The Southern Poverty Law Center is happy to 
+assist in that, and we can bring some research together and add 
+it to the record if you would like.
+    Chairwoman Waters. Thank you very much.
+    Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
+    Chairman Himes. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
+    The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Williams, is now recognized 
+for 5 minutes.
+    Mr. Williams of Texas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank 
+you, Mr. Hill.
+    Unfortunately, January 6th was the second politically-
+motivated attack that I have been involved in, in the past 4 
+years. As we talked about already this morning, on June 14, 
+2017, a crazy Bernie Sanders supporter opened fire on a 
+Republican congressional baseball practice and injured me, 
+along with five other individuals. Because of the heroic 
+actions of Capitol Police Special Agents Crystal Griner and 
+David Bailey, and with God being in charge, the only fatality 
+that day was the crazed shooter.
+    Now, this was a politically-motivated attack driven by 
+anger and extremism, where signs were posted on social media 
+beforehand, and some of the posts read, ``Republicans are the 
+Taliban of the U.S.A.'', and, ``It is time to destroy Trump and 
+company.'' Unfortunately, if you went on Twitter or Facebook 
+right now, you would find similar messages from hundreds of 
+people spewing this type of hate.
+    So, Ms. Boukadoum, how could we possibly monitor everything 
+posted on the internet without greatly expanding the police 
+state, and significantly infringing on our First Amendment 
+rights and all Americans' constitutional rights?
+    Ms. Boukadoum. Thank you for the question, Congressman.
+    I believe that there was a fundamental breakdown in law 
+enforcement response on January 6th, and also, when the attack 
+happened by that Bernie Sanders supporter, because the law 
+enforcement agencies in our country have disproportionately 
+prioritized the wrong thing. This is a question of 
+prioritizing. We have not prioritized White nationalist 
+violence. We have not prioritized violence that is motivated by 
+actions. We have prioritized ideology, and that is deeply 
+troubling, and, in fact, as you said, Congressman, it's a 
+violation of the Constitution.
+    And so, our position is that we must follow the acts of 
+people. So if there is a threat made by people, whether it is 
+the Proud Boys, or whether its Bernie Sanders supporters, then 
+law enforcement must follow that. What we have seen is a 
+fixation on a certain type of terrorism that is inspired by so-
+called Muslim ideology, and that has blind-sighted us. And, 
+unfortunately, we missed a huge attack on January 6th, and many 
+people died, and many people are shocked still.
+    So, that is my answer to you.
+    Mr. Williams of Texas. Okay. In 2019, the City of San 
+Francisco voted to label the NRA as a domestic terrorist 
+organization. In August of 2020, Speaker Pelosi called 
+Republican lawmakers, ``enemies of the State.'' Now, with 
+people being so quick to judge their political opponents as 
+domestic terrorists, it makes me very uncomfortable to expand 
+the powers to go after our own citizens.
+    So, Dr. Gartenstein-Ross, what safeguards are in place to 
+make sure that any additional powers granted to the State are 
+not abused for political gain?
+    Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Thank you, Representative Williams. 
+That is a great question, and I share your concern about people 
+throwing the word, ``terrorist'' around, or overlabeling in 
+this regard. This is why when I emphasized, and to be very 
+clear, I am not advocating a domestic designation statute. I 
+was simply making the case both for and against it. But for any 
+additional powers that are given to the State, I think what is 
+important is: first, setting a clear threshold for what 
+designation, or who the predicate of the crime would be; and 
+second, making sure that it is keyed to actual terrorism.
+    One thing we have seen over the course of the past year is 
+that we have an unprecedented ability to mobilize for a variety 
+of causes. Some mobilizations result in violence being 
+inflicted by a variety of actors, and I think we are going to 
+see more mobilizations around a variety of causes that end up 
+with violence being a part with the mobilization. I think we 
+need to understand any powers given to the State against that 
+context and against the context that you emphasized that there 
+are a variety of groups, a variety of individuals who 
+increasingly see their opponents as evil, and harming them as 
+something which naturally flows from their very binary world 
+view.
+    Mr. Williams of Texas. Okay. Throughout the COVID-19 
+pandemic, I have been very concerned about having our kids out 
+of school and learning remotely, but the social skills that our 
+children learn through interacting with other people their age 
+cannot be replicated over a computer, and never will be. We 
+have already seen reports of increased mental health issues, 
+depression, and suicides as a result of the COVID-19 lockdown.
+    So, Dr. Rogers, can you talk about the role that isolation 
+and mental health play in radicalizing individuals to carry out 
+these horrible attacks?
+    Chairman Himes. The gentleman's time has expired, so the 
+witness will have to provide that statement as an amendment to 
+the witness' testimony.
+    Just for clarity, since we are getting started on these 
+hearings, the Chair will allow the witnesses the courtesy of 
+finishing an answer that they have begun before the timer goes 
+off, just as a matter of courtesy and good transmission of 
+information, but that courtesy will begin to be revoked 15 or 
+so seconds after the timer.
+    So with that, the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. 
+Gottheimer, is recognized for 5 minutes.
+    Mr. Gottheimer. Thank you, Chairman Himes, Chairwoman 
+Waters, and Ranking Member Hill. Thank you very much for 
+putting together this important hearing, and thanks to all of 
+our witnesses for being here today.
+    I proposed bipartisan legislation called the Freezing 
+Assets of Suspected Terrorists and Enemy Recruits (FASTER) Act, 
+featured in today's hearing. This bill will help law 
+enforcement to freeze the assets of domestic terrorists facing 
+Federal charges for insurrection and seditious conspiracy, like 
+those who stormed the Capitol, but also like ISIS-inspired lone 
+wolf terrorists, and others of that ilk.
+    Mr. Glaser, given your experience in the private sector and 
+as the former Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and 
+Financial Crimes, you know that for foreign terrorist 
+organizations, the threshold for asset seizure is low. Given 
+what transpired at the Capitol, do you believe that law 
+enforcement could make use of greater authorities in certain 
+cases for domestic extremism, such as insurrection or seditious 
+conspiracy?
+    Mr. Glaser. Thank you for the question, Congressman. And to 
+be clear, I think we need to make a distinction between seizure 
+and forfeiture on the one hand, and freezing assets on the 
+other hand. The standard for seizing and forfeiting assets 
+under any circumstance is the same under criminal or civil 
+forfeiture. It is relatively lower with respect to freezing 
+assets for foreign organizations. And as I was saying, when I 
+talk about a domestic terrorist financing authority, I am 
+talking about the application of sanctions like authority in 
+that case, but it doesn't necessarily have to involve a freeze.
+    But to answer your question with respect to your 
+legislation, I do think it addresses a lot of concerns with 
+respect to immobilizing assets quickly. It is linked to the 
+criminal justice system. It is not linked to more traditional 
+terrorist financing types of activity in which the Treasury 
+Department would be involved.
+    I guess my question is whether or not an asset forfeiture 
+count within an indictment would serve a similar purpose, but I 
+do certainly applaud your effort to ensure that assets relating 
+to insurrection are quickly immobilized, and it seems to me 
+that is what the statute is trying to do.
+    Mr. Gottheimer. Thank you, sir. And just to follow up, do 
+you believe that the current financial intelligence system we 
+have in place is effective in providing the proper data to law 
+enforcement to combat the financing of these attacks?
+    Mr. Glaser. I think that our anti-money-laundering 
+counterterrorist financing system does generate an enormous 
+amount of information for the government to analyze and then 
+use. I think there are ways that it can be improved. Public-
+private partnerships are very important. Daveed talked about 
+the use of 314, both A and B to transfer information, and I 
+think there are maybe tweaks we can make to the suspicious 
+activity reporting that would provide, not necessarily more 
+information, but better information.
+    Certainly, there is technology that also could be employed 
+by the government and by financial institutions to allow them 
+to go through the massive amounts of data that banks need to go 
+through to file quality suspicious activity reports.
+    I think there are plenty of ways the system can be 
+improved, but the fact is that Treasury has access to massive 
+amounts of financial information, and I think the focus should 
+be on improving the quality, not necessarily the quantity.
+    Mr. Gottheimer. Thank you, sir.
+    Ms. Brooks, in the work that the Southern Poverty Law 
+Center has done to track domestic extremist groups like the 
+ones that attacked the Capitol on January 6th, have you 
+observed increased use of 21st Century technologies to enable 
+these groups? For example, using websites that are outside of 
+the mainstream to organize and spread hate, and fundraising 
+tools like cryptocurrencies that are more difficult for law 
+enforcement to track?
+    Ms. Brooks. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question, and this 
+really speaks to the earlier question as well. As I mentioned 
+in my oral testimony, we note a massive decentralization of 
+these groups and a disbursement of groups, so it makes it 
+harder to track them and harder to follow the money. And we 
+have noticed that the groups are continuing to self-disburse.
+    Mr. Gottheimer. Are they using cryptocurrencies? Do you 
+notice them using cryptocurrencies?
+    Ms. Brooks. Oh, yes, sir. Hold on one second. I have 
+something on that. Yes. Monetized propaganda has continued to 
+increase and we see a lot of personalities distributing--I'm 
+sorry. I apologize. I am looking for my notes on that. Hold on 
+a second.
+    On December 8th, someone from the far right personalities 
+distributed--oh, sorry. I will stop.
+    Mr. Gottheimer. Mr. Chairman, will you allow the witness to 
+answer the question? Is that okay?
+    Chairman Himes. Oh, yes. If the witness would like to 
+quickly conclude her answer, that is fine.
+    Mr. Gottheimer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+    Ms. Brooks. Thank you. In a single bitcoin transaction, we 
+noted about $523,000 exchanged on blockchain. The recipients 
+included Nick Fuentes whom, as you know, is a far-right 
+internet personality who is banned from YouTube and other 
+platforms because of his hateful content. And so, we continue 
+to see this money transferring across lines.
+    Mr. Gottheimer. Thank you, Ms. Brooks. And thank you, Mr. 
+Chairman.
+    Chairman Himes. You are welcome.
+    The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Davidson, is now recognized 
+for 5 minutes.
+    Mr. Davidson. I thank the chairman, and I thank the 
+witnesses for the expertise you have provided for this hearing 
+and the preparation that goes into it. With each passing 
+Congress, I want to share a concern, that really, with each 
+passing Congress, we further erode the Fourth Amendment under 
+the guise of promoting national security. This has evolved from 
+a trend to a real tradition.
+    As an example, the Corporate Transparency Act took a large 
+chip out of the Fourth Amendment last year. I fear that January 
+6th will be used as another reason to further destroy the 
+Fourth Amendment and the protections it provides.
+    Mr. Glaser's testimony states that the U.S. anti-money-
+laundering (AML) CFT regime can always be fine-tuned and 
+adjusted to address a variety of vulnerabilities, including 
+those presented by racially- and ethnically-motivated violent 
+extremist groups.
+    Mr. Glaser then lists different tools the Treasury can use 
+to fine-tune and adjust. Let's take a moment to translate what 
+it means to fine-tune and adjust this AML toolbox. It really 
+means that we are further intruding on individual privacy by 
+handing the government more and more of a person's financial 
+record. At what point do we draw the line?
+    January 6th cannot and should not be used to destroy our 
+right to privacy even further. And, frankly, I was encouraged 
+by Ms. Brooks' notion that we should resist the temptation to 
+further empower the Federal Government because it has been 
+abused and, frankly, it has been abused heavily towards 
+minority groups in the past, and now under the guise of 
+protecting them, it would be a shame to see further powers that 
+erode privacy protections.
+    So, I urge my colleagues to speak up on this topic and the 
+narrative that really attacks the Fourth Amendment right to 
+privacy. Mr. Glaser, in your testimony you said that the 
+government should consider legislation to protect the U.S. 
+financial system from being abused by domestic terrorists. You 
+acknowledge that the legislation would have to be tailored to 
+comply with the Constitution, specifically the First Amendment, 
+but you really don't make mention of the Fourth Amendment 
+anywhere.
+    My question is, what constitutes an unreasonable search of 
+an American citizen? Should Americans have any expectation of 
+privacy with respect to their personal finances? Where is that 
+limit, because it sounds like there might not be one. In fact, 
+the word, ``privacy'' isn't even mentioned in your testimony.
+    Mr. Glaser. Thank you for the question, Congressman. In my 
+testimony, I did make reference to constitutional due-process 
+requirements. I didn't specifically mention the Fourth 
+Amendment, but, of course, the Fourth Amendment is where many 
+of those constitutional due process requirements are contained, 
+so it certainly wasn't my intention to imply that the Fourth 
+Amendment shouldn't be--we shouldn't ensure that the Fourth 
+Amendment protections adhere.
+    I would also note that with respect to the Anti-Money 
+Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) 
+measures that I recommend be taken, none of them involve 
+providing the government with more financial records.
+    Mr. Davidson. I appreciate that. I do get that. And, look, 
+you served in a very important post, one of the most important 
+in our government, for that matter, in my view, in terms of 
+overseeing this part of Treasury, which is really vital for our 
+national security, and I think it is relevant for Chairman 
+Himes to be holding this hearing on the topic.
+    So, the tension is just so incredibly important. I guess, 
+the core question is, do you believe that Americans should have 
+an expectation of privacy with respect to their personal 
+finances?
+    Mr. Glaser. Yes, of course, I think Americans should have 
+an expectation of privacy with respect to their personal 
+finances. As with every other privacy consideration, it is a 
+question of balancing where the liberal limitations of that 
+privacy begin and end, and I think it is certainly possible and 
+I think we do so every day to respect people's privacy on the 
+one hand, but also give the government the tools it needs to 
+protect its citizens from other threats. Because threats to 
+civil liberties come in all direction--
+    Mr. Davidson. I appreciate that. I apologize. I have to get 
+at least one more question in. I have about a dozen, so. But 
+Mr. Gartenstein-Ross, according to the LexisNexis report last 
+fall, the scope of AML is huge. So my question is, should we 
+double down on a static AML system in an ever-evolving industry 
+that is growing compliance costs or should we try to overhaul 
+it?
+    There was a really good BuzzFeed article last year that 
+talked about the problems where the biggest banks, frankly, are 
+the biggest money launderers, how do we address that--
+    Chairman Himes. The gentleman's time has expired.
+    The gentleman from New York, Mr. Torres, is recognized for 
+5 minutes.
+    Mr. Torres. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Both the Code of 
+Federal Regulations and the PATRIOT Act provide the Federal 
+definition of, ``domestic terrorism'', but as has been noted, 
+there was no Federal designation of domestic terrorism nor was 
+there Federal prosecution of domestic terrorism as a crime unto 
+itself, all of which has me wondering, what is the point of 
+defining domestic terrorism in Federal law if it doesn't result 
+in designation for prosecution, what practical impact does the 
+Federal definition have on domestic counterterrorism and, in 
+particular, counterterrorism finance?
+    Mr. Glaser?
+    You are on mute, Mr. Glaser.
+    Chairman Himes. The Chair will instruct that 25 seconds be 
+added back to the gentleman from New York's time.
+    Mr. Torres. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman.
+    Chairman Himes. Mr. Glaser, are you with us?
+    Mr. Torres. Mr. Glaser, you are on mute.
+    Is there anyone else on the panel who can address this 
+question?
+    Ms. Boukadoum. I am happy to jump in. The domestic 
+terrorism definition that is in the PATRIOT Act is really 
+defined for FBI investigatory purposes. And you are absolutely 
+right, Congressman Torres--and it is good to see you, again--
+that there is no parallel charge that goes with the domestic 
+terrorism definition. So, it is really designed for 
+investigatory purposes.
+    What we submit is that the material support for terrorism 
+statute--as we know, there are two of them. There is one with 
+an international nexus that is required and there is one that 
+allows for investigating material support for terrorism, 
+domestic terrorism, in particular, as defined in the PATRIOT 
+Act with underlying statutes that allow for any crimes that 
+take place within the United States that have no international 
+nexus.
+    And we believe that second piece of the material support 
+for terrorism statute has been neglected, and can be nicely 
+used with the domestic terrorism definition as laid out in the 
+PATRIOT Act, and we hope that statutory framework will be used 
+to actually go after violent White nationalists and others.
+    Mr. Torres. Much has been said about the First Amendment 
+and domestic counterterrorism. I have a hypothetical. Suppose 
+there were a White supremacist organization with a publicly-
+stated mission of murdering minorities, overthrowing the 
+government, and establishing a White ethnostate, could the 
+Federal Government legally open an investigation into the 
+membership and financing of such an organization without 
+running afoul of the First Amendment?
+    Ms. Boukadoum. That is an excellent question and it is not 
+a hypothetical, Congressman. It is actually a fact. We have 
+seen, as my friends and colleagues at the Southern Poverty Law 
+Center who are part of our coalition have highlighted time and 
+time again, that there are myriad organizations that have 
+absolutely espoused violence out in public on Facebook, on big 
+tech platforms, that have not been taken seriously. And so, 
+yes, absolutely, the financial institutions and financial 
+enforcement apparatus can trace those groups and should be 
+tracing those groups, frankly.
+    But as I said, there has been a deprioritization of White 
+nationalist violence at the expense of our collective security. 
+So I would submit that there is nothing wrong, or that there is 
+nothing that runs afoul of the First Amendment to go into 
+investigating those types of groups.
+    Mr. Torres. I want to make one observation, and let me know 
+if you agree or not, but it seems to me there is a cognitive 
+dissidence or double standard on the part of law enforcement. 
+If you are a member of a violent enterprise like the mafia or a 
+gang, you can be prosecuted under the RICO law, but if you are 
+a member of a violent White supremacist enterprise, then 
+somehow you are protected by the First Amendment. Can anyone on 
+the panel explain the disconnect there?
+    Ms. Boukadoum. I think that is an excellent point. And in 
+my written testimony that we submitted for the record, we 
+highlight that RICO and conspiracy statutes are extremely broad 
+and should absolutely be used against particularly organized 
+White nationalist groups that, as you mentioned, espoused an 
+ethno-national state that wants to get rid of and kill millions 
+of people, but I would love to open it up for the other 
+panelists.
+    Ms. Brooks. Thank you.
+    Thank you for the question, Representative Torres. And I 
+completely agree there. The Southern Poverty Law Center 
+documents White nationalist groups today to be clear their 
+mandate is to create a White ethnostate, and they have proved 
+time and time, again, that they will carry out violent means to 
+reach that end.
+    I would also offer that the Southern Poverty Law Center has 
+used RICO statutes in the course of our civil suits against 
+hate and extremist groups over the past couple of decades and I 
+think that--those are the laws that we mean when we say that 
+there exist current statutes that law enforcement could use to 
+address the real threat of domestic terrorism.
+    And for me, and I agree with my colleagues in the 
+Leadership Conference, it is important that we educate 
+ourselves and recognize the very real threat of domestic 
+terrorism. That is why the Southern Poverty Law Center supports 
+the Prevention Act.
+    Law, as you know, is a very, very blunt tool and we 
+advocate for further education and communication between and 
+coordination between the Department of Homeland Security, the 
+Department of Justice, and the FBI. And they could really work 
+together to lower the threat level and strengthen a partnership 
+that would blunt these hate and extremist groups.
+    So, thank you for the question.
+    Chairman Himes. The gentleman's time has expired. The 
+gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Gonzalez, is recognized for 5 minutes.
+    Mr. Gonzalez of Ohio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank 
+you to our panel for today's testimony. It is an important 
+hearing and, Mr. Chairman, I do appreciate your comments at the 
+beginning about how this shouldn't have a political lens on it, 
+and I think we need to be honest with ourselves about that.
+    I want to start by referencing the testimony of Dr. 
+Gartenstein-Ross. You talked about, in chilling fashion, how 
+extremism is poised for growth. Unfortunately, I agree with you 
+100 percent, for a variety of reasons, and you also highlighted 
+reciprocal radicalization, and I think that is right.
+    I would argue that there is an escalating component to it 
+as well, one side does one thing, the other side escalates and 
+radicalizes, and there is a countermovement that does the same. 
+And we are in this Ping-Pong of extremism, unfortunately.
+    So with that as my first question for Dr. Gartenstein-Ross, 
+in your research, did you find that any of the political 
+violence from the summer--and I am not creating an equivalency, 
+so let's just get that clear. What happened at the Capitol is 
+far worse. I am not creating an equivalency, but I am trying to 
+understand the mechanisms.
+    In your eyes, did the political violence from the summer 
+inspire or activate some of the far-right nationalist movements 
+that we saw at the Capitol?
+    Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Thank you, sir, for that question. I 
+would say it is unsettled, but I believe that the answer is 
+yes, in a rather subtle way. There is a really good book 
+called, ``How Terror Evolves'' by Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, 
+which looks at airplane hijackings. And it argues that tactics 
+evolve from one group to another regardless of ideology, and it 
+even looks at criminal groups that have used airplane 
+hijackings.
+    I think what we saw over the course of the past year is a 
+number of different mobilizations, starting with the anti-
+lockdown mobilization, then there is a racial justice 
+mobilization, then an anti-fascist/anarchist mobilization, and 
+finally a pro-Trump steal an election mobilization, and those 
+aren't all extremist mobilizations by any means, but all of 
+them were mobilizations that were very powerful.
+    And I think that each mobilization learned from the other 
+ones, and the lesson that was learned by the time of the 
+Capitol attack is that attacking a symbol of government is 
+extraordinarily dramatic, and there are multiple examples of 
+that from attacks on mayor's offices to autonomous zones and 
+attacks on police precincts that provided some tactical guide 
+for what occurred.
+    So I do think that different groups, both extremist and 
+nonextremist, are learning to mobilize faster than before. And 
+all of them are learning from one another's tactics, and 
+tactics that we may applaud today may be used tomorrow by a 
+group that we utterly despise and that despises us.
+    Mr. Gonzalez of Ohio. Thank you for that answer.
+    And a follow-up, what role do public figures, politicians 
+or otherwise, play in contributing to the violent behavior that 
+we have seen across society over the last year? And how can we 
+be better leaders?
+    This is where I want you to lecture us and tell us how we 
+have failed the American people.
+    Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. I love the question. And we are in an 
+extraordinarily polarized environment where even the slightest 
+differences of point of view can lead to recrimination, fear, 
+calls for people to be fired, different labels being thrust 
+upon other people. I think now is the time for political 
+leaders to show wisdom, and let me applaud this subcommittee 
+for the bipartisan way that it put this hearing together.
+    I applaud it for getting witnesses who can speak to both 
+sides of the aisle, but I agree with the premise of the 
+question that ultimately, we need to figure out how to step 
+back from the precipice. We need to figure out how we live 
+together within a system that we all support.
+    We need to figure out how the fact that the person next to 
+us disagrees on some issues doesn't cause us to think of that 
+person in a binary way as being evil or beneath us or someone 
+who is our enemy. We are struggling with that, and part of it 
+is politicians, and part of it is the systems of communications 
+that we have.
+    It is a complex, multifaceted problem, but the question you 
+asked, sir, is the exact right question, and politicians have 
+often been a part of the problem.
+    Mr. Gonzalez of Ohio. Thank you. And with my final 30 
+seconds, I am going to share a brief story. I voted for 
+impeachment, as most of you know, and I am a Republican. So, I 
+have been the subject of threats in two different instances in 
+the last year, one from the left and one from the right. And I 
+will tell you my personal opinion is if this body and some of 
+us on this committee don't start acting more responsibly, what 
+happened in January is only the beginning, and that is up to 
+us. That requires real leadership.
+    And so, I thank you for your answers, and I hope we will 
+heed those lessons.
+    Chairman Himes. The gentleman's time has expired.
+    The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch, is recognized 
+for 5 minutes.
+    Mr. Lynch. Chairman Himes, first, I want to congratulate 
+you on your chairmanship. I am proud and happy to be a member 
+of this subcommittee, and thanks for putting this hearing 
+together. Congratulations to the ranking member as well.
+    I want to talk about cryptocurrencies a little bit. The use 
+of cryptocurrencies by terrorist networks, drug traffickers, 
+and other illicit activities is well-documented. I know Mr. 
+Glaser, we worked together when I used to Chair the Task Force 
+on Terrorist Financing back in the day, but we had experts from 
+FinCEN to the RAND Corporation. They have all expressed 
+concerns about the use of cryptocurrencies by criminals, and we 
+do have some examples that haven't been mentioned here.
+    One example is the far-right group, the White supremacist 
+platform, The Daily Stormer. They actually solicit donations 
+from users by cryptocurrency. They use Monero, but there have 
+been high-profile, high-value bitcoin transfers to a number of 
+these U.S.-based groups. These are domestic far-right extremist 
+wallets.
+    As a matter fact, earlier this month, Treasury Secretary 
+Yellen said, ``I see the promise of these new technologies, but 
+I also see the reality. Cryptocurrencies have been used to 
+launder the profits of online drug traffickers and they have 
+also been used as a tool to finance terrorism.''
+    So Mr. Glaser, and also Dr. Rogers, I think you could speak 
+to this as well, how does the use of cryptocurrencies--and I 
+Chair the Task Force on FinTech, and we are worried about this. 
+We are trying to adopt some of these technologies, but this is 
+one of those double-edged swords, I guess. How does the use of 
+cryptocurrencies affect the ability of law enforcement agencies 
+and research organizations and financial institutions to 
+identify and trace the funding of domestic extremists?
+    Mr. Glaser. Thank you for the question, Congressman Lynch, 
+and it is good to see you, again, and thank you for your 
+leadership on these types of issues over the years.
+    After 9/11, all of the focus was on Hawala, and there was 
+this notion that it was some sort of magical, mysterious system 
+that nobody could comprehend and it was impossible to trace 
+through. And in the end, we found out that really wasn't the 
+case; it operated based on the same principles as a lot of 
+other financial transfers, and it was just a matter of bringing 
+it into the system in an appropriate way. And I think that 
+there is an analogy between that and cryptocurrencies.
+    Cryptocurrencies aren't inherently bad and, in fact, as 
+Secretary Yellen said, they have a lot of useful purposes and 
+could really help on issues such as financial inclusion.
+    That said, they are also subject to abuse, so the challenge 
+is to bring them into the system and regulate them in the 
+appropriate way. I do think that the Treasury Department 
+approaches it the right way through the regulation of 
+exchanges, applying customer due diligence, programmatic 
+requirements in suspicious activity reporting requirements to 
+the exchanges which is where the cryptocurrencies are 
+ultimately transferred into Fiat currency and where Fiat 
+currency is transferred back into the cryptocurrency.
+    Again, I highlight that FinCEN has a rule out right now, a 
+proposed rule, related to unhosted wallets, which is a loophole 
+in the system right now and that is a place where I think 
+people should be focusing.
+    But the fact is that there are some cryptocurrencies out 
+there which try to design themselves along the fault lines of 
+the AML/CFT restrictions. We need to look at those. We need to 
+make sure that those types of cryptocurrencies are banned, but 
+we also need to provide opportunities for the sector to grow in 
+a supervised, regulated way as I think it is, for the most 
+part, right now.
+    Mr. Lynch. Wouldn't it require getting rid of the 
+pseudonymist nature, where we don't have digital identities? 
+Isn't that the core of the problem? And that is what the users 
+or the advocates of crypto, a lot of them, cling to that; that 
+they want to decentralize anonymous or pseudonymist systems. Is 
+that part of the problem?
+    Mr. Glaser. Yes. Anti-money-laundering, countertrust 
+financing rules and regulations at the end are about 
+transparency. It is about transparency in the international 
+financial system and the domestic financial system. And in 
+certain ironic ways, cryptocurrencies provide enhanced 
+opportunities in certain ways for law enforcement agencies to 
+be able to trace transactions that aren't there and sort of 
+bulk transactions in the private sector.
+    But, again, I come back to, [inaudible] And I think the 
+point of entry is at the exchanges, which is where we are 
+trying to regulate it now.
+    Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+    I yield back.
+    Chairman Himes. The gentleman's time has expired. The 
+gentleman from Texas, Mr. Taylor, is recognized for 5 minutes.
+    Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this 
+hearing, and I appreciate the witnesses and the expertise that 
+they bring to this important topic. Domestic terrorism 
+obviously is something that I think, with a little historical 
+perspective--I think we remember Puerto Rican separatists 
+shooting Members of Congress on the Floor of the U.S. House 
+back in the 1950s, so this is a long path that we have been 
+going down in trying to fight this.
+    And, obviously, I was intrigued, Mr. Chairman, by your 
+comments about the domestic terrorism being more difficult 
+because they have First and Fourth Amendment rights.
+    But I remember my own time as a Marine on the U.S./Mexican 
+border contending with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
+Act (FISA), and the Posse Comitatus Act, dealing with the 
+international component and really the PATRIOT Act, dealing 
+with that and trying to figure out, well, okay, where does the 
+international stop and the domestic begin, and how do we share 
+data between the CIA and the FBI, and how is that legal, when 
+is that legal, which, unfortunately, 9/11 really revealed to us 
+we had some problems there.
+    So just going down the path of making sure that we are 
+sharing information across platforms at the same time, 
+protecting peoples' rights, and I think that is something that 
+we are all conscious of, that push/pull.
+    Dr. Gartenstein-Ross, just in terms of the way you think 
+about this, is there enough sharing between the FBI, the 
+Department of Homeland Security, and local law enforcement? Are 
+there regulatory or statutory changes that we can make at the 
+congressional level to encourage information-sharing so that we 
+can actually stop/prevent terrorist actions?
+    Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. That is an excellent question. As you 
+know, sir, DHS, one of its mandates is to share information 
+with local law enforcement, which is a relatively effective 
+system; although, you have had a number of times where some of 
+the information shared ends up getting leaked to the press, 
+which, in turn, causes controversy and then impedes sharing.
+    One of the reasons why we were so slow to look at WSE 
+extremism as the government relates to a 2009 controversy about 
+a report on what was dubbed right-wing extremism at the time. 
+So, it is not clear to me that there are specific fixes that 
+can immediately leap to mind, but I will say that this is 
+something that we should look into to see if there are things 
+that impede the flow of information. Anything that will allow 
+information to be shared more widely will be a positive.
+    Mr. Taylor. Mr. Glaser, just given your experience in 
+government, what would you say to that in terms of information-
+sharing between--again, I saw the restriction when it went from 
+international to domestic. There were definitely some walls 
+that were created there in the 1970s that were knocked down a 
+little bit after 9/11, but do we have those in terms of dealing 
+with this problem?
+    Mr. Glaser. Thank you for the question. And I agree with 
+your premise that there needs to be a vibrant partnership 
+between the public sector and the private sector to attack 
+these sorts of issues. In fact, when I was in--
+    Mr. Taylor. We will get to that in a second, but the 
+question is, within the Federal Government and local law 
+enforcement, are there walls that we need to break down 
+statutorily or by regulation?
+    Mr. Glaser. With respect to financial intelligence, I think 
+that there is very good information-sharing between the Federal 
+Government and the State Governments. State Governments have 
+access to suspicious activity reports, so I think that there 
+are probably mechanisms that we could implement to improve 
+them, but they wouldn't be legislative in nature.
+    Mr. Taylor. Okay. And then Ms. Boukadoum, this is something 
+you are concerned about, is the role of private companies 
+taking it upon themselves to report to the authorities what 
+they perceive to be problematic when they are not required to 
+do it, right?
+    And so I am thinking recently there was an allegation that 
+Bank of America went in, pulled all the data from their 
+customers, and reported that to law enforcement without having 
+a warrant, and that--in assisting the Fourth Amendment 
+question, should the government even be willing to accept data 
+that they don't have the right to get, that the Fourth 
+Amendment precludes them from? Your opening statement leads me 
+to believe that you are concerned about this as well.
+    Ms. Boukadoum. Absolutely, Congressman. I think that civil 
+liberties have to be protected, and I think that the private 
+sector, Bank of America, big tech have to really make sure that 
+there is a notice requirement that is provided to customers and 
+also that there is, yes, a warrant from the FISA court, even 
+though, it is a secret court, but there are mechanisms for 
+making sure that due process and transparency to the extent 
+possible are complied with.
+    Mr. Taylor. Thank you.
+    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
+    Chairman Himes. The gentleman yields back. The gentlewoman 
+from Pennsylvania, Ms. Dean, is recognized for 5 minutes.
+    Ms. Dean. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for hosting 
+this important hearing. I will get right to some questions. I 
+thank all of those who are testifying today to help us 
+understand this better.
+    Mr. Rogers, if I could start with you, what evidence is 
+there of alternative financing platforms contributing to 
+expanded recruitment or radicalization of domestic terror 
+groups? Do we have any evidence of alternative financing 
+platforms?
+    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Congresswoman, for the question. And 
+if I may clarify, by alternative financing platforms, can you 
+provide more detail about exactly the sorts of platforms you 
+are referring to?
+    Ms. Dean. Fundraising.
+    Mr. Rogers. Okay. That is sort of the core of our entire 
+research, how extensively those sorts of platforms are being 
+used, and it speaks to a lot of the discussion today that most 
+of the financial activities not through the kind of, 
+traditional banking, there is a lot of other sort of companies 
+and chokepoints being involved whether you are talking about 
+crowdfunding platforms--I mentioned GiveSendGo as an example, 
+Rakuten Pay, all of these companies, they sit on top of the 
+larger kind of payments in banking.
+    At the end of the day, the money lands somewhere that is a 
+more traditional bank or payment provider, but even before you 
+get to those companies, there is a whole host of smaller and 
+alternative, what you may call, tech companies, that are 
+facilitating these payments and we outline close to 100 of them 
+in our report.
+    Ms. Dean. And would you say that those digital fundraising 
+platforms are contributing to the diffusion of harmful 
+ideologies?
+    Mr. Rogers. Absolutely. As I mentioned in my testimony, not 
+only are they just helping or facilitating raising funding for 
+these groups, but merchandising platforms. Go to Etsy.com and 
+type in, ``QAnon'', and the sale of merchandise helps further 
+the ideology, kind of creates that, as I call it, that team 
+jersey to help the group recruit and further whatever ideology 
+they are peddling.
+    Ms. Dean. Thank you. I appreciate that.
+    Mr. Glaser, if I could turn to you. FinCEN, at the 
+Department of the Treasury, is at the forefront of detecting 
+illicit financial transactions involving potential crimes in 
+terrorism, and I am thinking of, for example, advisories 
+regarding possible human trafficking or drug trafficking. But 
+does FinCEN provide this type of guidance related to armed 
+domestic extremists or mass shooters in terms of potential 
+purchase of weapons, amassing of arsenals of guns, or other 
+weapons for attacks?
+    Is there such an advisory alert? We are examining 
+communications and gaps in communications--is there such an 
+advisory around the amassing of weapons?
+    Mr. Glaser. FinCEN does not currently have an advisory 
+relating to domestic terrorism. I would not be surprised if 
+they were working on one right now, and I think it is a great 
+question. In my testimony, I specifically reference that as one 
+of the things that FinCEN could be doing.
+    And as I said, I wouldn't be surprised if they were working 
+on one right now, but there is not currently one out there.
+    Ms. Dean. There was legislation that was introduced last 
+session by my friend, Representative Wexton--perhaps you are 
+familiar with it--the Gun Violence Prevention Through Financial 
+Intelligence Act. It was a bill in simplicity that would 
+develop an advisory notification to assist financial 
+institutions in detecting and then reporting suspicious or 
+illegal financial activities around firearms.
+    Do you think that legislation is worthy, and would be a 
+step in the right direction?
+    Mr. Glaser. Thank you, Congresswoman. I must admit that I 
+am not familiar with that specific legislation. I will say that 
+banks already have the obligation to report suspicious activity 
+to FinCEN, but there are holes in it relating to illegal 
+activity relating to firearms, I am sure that is something that 
+should be addressed.
+    Ms. Dean. Thanks so much.
+    And maybe Ms. Brooks, I will go for a quick question to 
+you. How can the Federal Government provide better tools or 
+facilitate coordination, again, about communication with State 
+law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, the Federal Government--
+what should we be doing to share information more efficiently?
+    Ms. Brooks. Thank you for the question. The Southern 
+Poverty Law Center, of course, supports the Domestic Terrorism 
+Prevention Act because it really is about improving 
+communication and coordinating communication in response across 
+agencies.
+    Of course, it doesn't provide for additional Federal 
+criminal enforcement power, but we believe that improved 
+communication and coordination was the big part of the issue on 
+January 6th, so we support that, just the sharing of 
+information and acting upon that information.
+    Thank you for the question, Representative Dean.
+    Ms. Dean. Thank you.
+    I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+    Chairman Himes. The gentlewoman's time has expired. The 
+gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Garcia, is recognized for 5 
+minutes.
+    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you, Chairman Himes and 
+Ranking Member Hill, for convening this hearing, and thank you 
+to the witnesses for joining us today and sharing your research 
+and knowledge.
+    We know that racism and right-wing extremism have long 
+histories in this country. As an immigrant, I have seen it for 
+most of my life. Donald Trump tapped into that from the very 
+start of his campaign, and what happened here on January 6th is 
+a symptom of something very serious.
+    Like many of you, I was locked down in my office that 
+afternoon. I didn't know whether or not armed militia had 
+entered my office building. I didn't know if they were looking 
+for me as a proud immigrant, Mexican-American Congressman, but 
+I knew they wanted to stop a Democrat from being elected 
+President.
+    It is easy to say that the people who stormed the Capitol 
+last month represent a small fringe in our politics, but they 
+have allies and friends in high places.
+    I have a couple of questions. Ms. Brooks, in your 
+testimony, you gave us a good timeline of how racist extremism 
+has connected to party politics. Could you talk a little more 
+about how the radical right entered the mainstream and what we 
+should be worried about moving forward?
+    Ms. Brooks. Thank you so much for the question. As the 
+Southern Poverty Law Center has documented over the last couple 
+of decades, there has been an increase in the number of active 
+hate groups in the United States. We found about 10 years ago, 
+maybe 15 years ago, that that increase is directly connected to 
+the shifting demographics within the United States.
+    And so, the decrease in the White population serving as a 
+numeric majority has served to create fear and anxiety in the 
+White population. As we saw with the ascension of President 
+Obama, that was kind of a peak moment, and an example, if you 
+will, for Whites who were beginning to think that they were 
+being displaced, and feeding into a White nationalist trope 
+around the great replacement or White genocide.
+    So, we have seen an increase in that rhetoric. What we saw 
+over the last 6 years was an increase in that rhetoric that was 
+echoed from the highest office in the country, from the 
+President, and that served to kind of fuel and carry the 
+disinformation, fear, and anxiety to this fever-pitch position 
+in which we find ourselves in today.
+    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you.
+    Dr. Rogers, you studied radicalization and terrorism in a 
+number of countries and your report on bankrolling bigotry 
+mentioned that far-right groups use the 501(c)(3) nonprofit 
+status to look legitimate. What role does money in our 
+political system play in fanning the flames of right-wing 
+extremism? Do all of these nonprofits and shell companies make 
+it harder to track their role?
+    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Congressman, for the question. For 
+starters, I am not an expert on tax exempt organizations, and I 
+am certainly happy to point you to ones that I have worked with 
+in the past.
+    But it is my understanding that the abuse by some of the 
+charity and the nonprofit tax-exempt rules has grown over time 
+as political campaigns and what-not have become more expensive 
+as a way to shield identities involved in political donations 
+and things like that.
+    And so, that abuse has grown over the past decades, while 
+at the same time, the resources for enforcing the 501(c)(3) and 
+501(c)(4) rules to say that if a group applies as a supposedly 
+educational charity, to enforce that they actually are engaging 
+in educational charitable activities and not say, secretly a 
+violent militia, the resources that the IRS has to fulfill that 
+regulatory compliance role have decreased over time for a whole 
+host of reasons.
+    So one of our recommendations that we have taken from one 
+of our experts is to actually break out that function from the 
+IRS. The IRS is ultimately a revenue-generating organization, 
+and this part of the IRS is not, by definition, revenue-
+generating, so it tends to be kind of ignored.
+    If you took that regulatory function out, much as the 
+charity commission in the U.K. as an independent organization 
+to fulfill that role, that might help with the compliance and 
+the enforcement problem. So, just one idea related to that.
+    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you very much.
+    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
+    Chairman Himes. The gentleman yields back. And the 
+gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Auchincloss, is recognized 
+for 5 minutes.
+    Mr. Auchincloss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to 
+those who are testifying today. As part of our ongoing 
+investigation into the insurrectionist attack on the Capitol on 
+January 6th, the attack laid bare our vulnerability to domestic 
+terrorism, and we need to examine solutions to stop future 
+attacks before they happen.
+    I believe it would be a grave mistake, however, to maintain 
+permanent fencing around our Capitol. Constituents, advocates, 
+have the right to visit the home of our democracy and speak 
+with their Representatives to share their thoughts, agreements, 
+and concerns. We need innovative tools to root out domestic 
+terrorism, and protect Members, staff, and visitors without 
+turning this building into a fortress surrounded by fences 
+topped with barbed wire.
+    And, indeed, we also need to find ways to protect places of 
+worship, including in my own district, without them having to 
+resort to a military posture as well, in particular, Jewish 
+places of worship.
+    I represent one of the most densely-populated Jewish 
+districts in the country, and I know that my Jewish 
+constituents who go to places of worship are increasingly on 
+edge and increasingly concerned about the threats of domestic 
+terrorism targeted and fueled by anti-Semitism.
+    I wonder if, first, Ms. Brooks, and then, Mr. Rogers, might 
+speak for 30 seconds to a minute each about the intersection 
+between anti-Semitism and domestic terrorism in this country 
+and whether they have seen a rise in both intent and actions 
+targeted against Jewish people.
+    Ms. Brooks. Thank you so much for the question. And we 
+don't talk about this enough, but there is a direct link and a 
+connection between White nationalism, White supremacy, and 
+anti-Semitism. It should not be separated at all. There has 
+been an increase in anti-Semitism in this country and globally 
+for the last couple of decades, and people have failed to pay 
+attention.
+    We have these major violent events like the Tree of Life 
+Synagogue, like what happened in Escondido, and then we move 
+on, but we are not connecting the dots. We are in this 
+together, and a White supremacist agenda would separate 
+everyone from who they are. So to be clear, we should stand 
+together against White nationalism and anti-Semitism in support 
+of the Jewish population. Thank you for the question.
+    Mr. Auchincloss. I just want to state, for the record, how 
+much I agree with standing together. I think the Jewish people, 
+as well as my African-American constituents know that where 
+there is conspiracy theorizing, where there is extremism, it is 
+just a matter of time before they come for Black Americans and 
+for Jewish Americans, such has been our history. So, thank you 
+for saying that.
+    Mr. Rogers, I welcome your thoughts as well.
+    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Congressman. And I could not agree 
+more with both your thoughts and Ms. Brooks, your statement on 
+the subject, another subject that I am passionate about as 
+well. As you say, if history is any guide, hate is hate, and it 
+always comes for people of color and the Jewish community as 
+well.
+    One other point I would add is that in many ways, the QAnon 
+conspiracy theory phenomenon is itself a kind of remix, if you 
+will, or a mash-up of historically all of the various sorts of 
+anti-Semitic Jewish blood libels. The idea of the cabal at the 
+top, et cetera, et cetera, that if not explicit, is a very 
+thinly veiled version of the same blood libel that has been 
+circulating for a hundred, if not, hundreds of years.
+    And so, yes, I think they go very much hand in hand whether 
+explicit or not, and I think they are linked and solidarity is 
+obviously of utmost importance.
+    Mr. Auchincloss. Mr. Rogers, are there particular actions 
+that you would recommend Congress pursue relative to anti-
+Semitism and the intersection of anti-Semitism and domestic 
+terrorism, in particular, and the spread of disinformation 
+about that?
+    Mr. Rogers. I think there are a number of regulatory fronts 
+that all go to the general problem of disinformation as a 
+whole, and I don't know that we have the time to get into all 
+of them here, but I think they certainly fall into three big 
+categories, with the one most relevant to today's discussion 
+being this idea of government platform liability, that our data 
+is showing what a key role these sorts of platforms play in 
+facilitating the activities of these groups.
+    And the fact that the liability is so nebulous or 
+nonexistent through things like Section 230 and what-not, what 
+we found is that there are already policies in place against 
+all of these hate and extremist groups, but they are just 
+simply not enforced.
+    So updating that kind of platform liability to help drive 
+enforcement, I think is one of the key areas that we can focus 
+on.
+    Mr. Auchincloss. Slightly--
+    Chairman Himes. The gentleman's time has expired.
+    Mr. Auchincloss. Okay. Thanks.
+    Chairman Himes. I believe that every present member of the 
+subcommittee has had an opportunity to ask questions. If that 
+is incorrect, speak up now or forever hold your peace.
+    Hearing no one, I would like to thank our witnesses for 
+their testimony today and for an excellent, excellent 
+discussion.
+    The Chair notes that some Members may have additional 
+questions for this panel, which they may wish to submit in 
+writing. Without objection, the hearing record will remain open 
+for 5 legislative days for Members to submit written questions 
+to these witnesses and to place their responses in the record. 
+Also, without objection, Members will have 5 legislative days 
+to submit extraneous materials to the Chair for inclusion in 
+the record.
+    I ask our witnesses to please respond as promptly as you 
+are able, and I noted a couple of questions that sadly were cut 
+off by the timer, and I will ask the staff to facilitate that.
+    With that, I will thank our excellent witnesses one more 
+time, and the hearing is adjourned.
+    [Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
+
+                            A P P E N D I X
+
+
+
+                           February 25, 2021
+
+
+[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 
+
+