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+ - PLUGGING THE GAPS IN BORDER SECURITY: THE ONE FACE AT THE BORDER INITIATIVE
+
+[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
+[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
+
+
+
+ PLUGGING THE GAPS IN BORDER SECURITY
+
+=======================================================================
+
+ HEARING
+
+ before the
+
+ SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFRASTRUCTURE AND BORDER SECURITY
+
+ of the
+
+ SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
+ HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
+
+ ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
+
+ FIRST SESSION
+
+ __________
+
+ OCTOBER 16, 2003
+
+ __________
+
+ Serial No. 108-30
+
+ __________
+
+ Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security
+
+
+ Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
+ house
+
+
+ __________
+
+ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
+21-510 WASHINGTON : 2005
+_____________________________________________________________________________
+For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
+Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
+Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�0900012005
+
+
+ SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
+
+ CHRISTOPHER COX, California, Chairman
+
+JENNIFER DUNN, Washington JIM TURNER, Texas, Ranking Member
+C.W. BILL YOUNG, Florida BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi
+DON YOUNG, Alaska LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
+F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
+Wisconsin NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington
+W.J. (BILLY) TAUZIN, Louisiana BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
+DAVID DREIER, California JANE HARMAN, California
+DUNCAN HUNTER, California BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
+HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER,
+SHERWOOD BOEHLERT, New York New York
+LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
+CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania NITA M. LOWEY, New York
+CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
+PORTER J. GOSS, Florida ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,
+DAVE CAMP, Michigan District of Columbia
+LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida ZOE LOFGREN, California
+BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri
+ERNEST J. ISTOOK, Jr., Oklahoma SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas
+PETER T. KING, New York BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey
+JOHN LINDER, Georgia DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN,
+JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona U.S. Virgin Islands
+MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina
+MAC THORNBERRY, Texas CHARLES GONZALEZ, Texas
+JIM GIBBONS, Nevada KEN LUCAS, Kentucky
+KAY GRANGER, Texas JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
+PETE SESSIONS, Texas KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
+JOHN E. SWEENEY, New York
+
+ JOHN GANNON, Chief of Staff
+
+ UTTAM DHILLON, Chief Counsel and Deputy Staff Director
+
+ DAVID H. SCHANZER, Democrat Staff Director
+
+ MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk
+
+ ______
+
+ SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFRASTRUCTURE AND BORDER SECURITY
+
+ DAVE CAMP, Michigan, Chairman
+
+KAY GRANGER, Texas, Vice Chairwoman LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
+JENNIFER DUNN, Washington EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
+DON YOUNG, Alaska NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington
+DUNCAN HUNTER, California BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
+LAMAR SMITH, Texas BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
+LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER,
+ROBERT W. GOODLATTE, Virginia New York
+ERNEST ISTOOK, Oklahoma PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
+JOHN SHADEGG, Arizona SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas
+MARK SOUDER, Indiana BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey
+JOHN SWEENEY, New York CHARLES GONZALEZ, Texas
+CHRISTOPHER COX, California, Ex JIM TURNER, Texas, Ex Officio
+Officio
+
+ (II)
+
+
+ C O N T E N T S
+
+ ----------
+ Page
+
+ STATEMENTS
+
+The Honorable Dave Camp, a Representative in Congress From the
+ State of Michigan, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Infrastructure
+ and Border Security
+ Oral Statement................................................. 1
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 2
+The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
+ Infrastructure and Border Security
+ Oral Statement................................................. 2
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 3
+The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of California, and Chairman, Select Committee on
+ Homeland Security.............................................. 22
+The Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in Congress From the
+ State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Select Committee on
+ Homeland Security.............................................. 6
+The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of Washington........................................ 24
+The Honorable Jennifer Dunn, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of Washington........................................ 27
+The Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of Virginia
+ Oral Statement................................................. 4
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 5
+The Honorable Kay Granger, a Representative in Congress From the
+ State of Texas................................................. 32
+The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress
+ From the State of Texas
+ Oral Statement................................................. 33
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 6
+The Honorable Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of Massachusetts..................................... 29
+
+ WITNESSES
+
+The Honorable Robert Bonner, Commissioner, Bureau of Customs and
+ Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security
+ Oral Statement................................................. 7
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 11
+Mr. Tom Keefe, President, National Treasury Employees Union,
+ Local 137
+ Oral Statement................................................. 36
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 38
+Mr. Tom Kuhn, President, American Federation of Government
+ Employees Union 2580
+ Oral Statement................................................. 40
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 42
+Mr. Bill Pauli, President, California Farm Bureau Federation
+ Oral Statement................................................. 44
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 46
+
+ APPENDIX
+ Material Submitted for the Record
+
+Prepared Statement of Donna M. Garren, Ph.D. Vice President,
+ Scientific and Technical Affairs............................... 58
+Prepared Statement of Mr. Thomas P. Kuhn......................... 60
+
+
+ PLUGGING THE GAPS IN BORDER SECURITY:
+ THE ONE FACE AT THE BORDER INITIATIVE
+
+ ----------
+
+
+ Thursday, October 16, 2003
+
+ House of Representatives,
+ Subcommittee on Infrastructure
+ and Border Security,
+ Select Committee on Homeland Security,
+ Washington, DC.
+ The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:06 p.m., in
+Room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dave Camp
+[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
+ Present: Representatives Camp, Granger, Dunn, Smith,
+Goodlatte, Sanchez, Markey, Dicks, Cardin, Slaughter, Jackson-
+Lee, Cox, ex officio, and Turner, ex officio.
+ Mr. Camp. The Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border
+Security hearing will come to order. I would like to welcome
+and thank all of those attending today's hearing.
+ Today's business is to receive testimony regarding the new
+border security initiative announced by Secretary Ridge on
+September 2, creating One Face at the Border; and the
+subcommittee will first hear from Commissioner Robert Bonner in
+his first public hearing on this new proposal. We will then
+hear from a second panel comprised of the National Treasury
+Employees, represented by Tom Keefe; the American Federation of
+Government Employees, represented by Tom Kuhn; and the
+California Farm Bureau Federation, represented by Bill Pauli.
+ Typically, in these hearings, to allow for more time for
+witness testimony and questions, the Chair requests that the
+members agree to a unanimous consent to waive opening
+statements.
+ Is there any objection to unanimous consent to waive
+opening statements?
+ Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Chairman, I believe there are some people
+on my side that wanted to do some opening statements.
+ Mr. Camp. All right. Seeing then an objection to the
+unanimous consent, we will proceed with opening statements. And
+under committee rule 3, any members present at the beginning of
+the hearing may make a 3-minute opening statement, the Chair
+urges members to make summaries of their statements and insert
+their full statements into the record.
+ I do have a statement that I will insert into the record.
+
+ Prepared Opening Statement of Dave Camp, Chairman, Subcommittee on
+ Infrastructure and Border Security
+
+ The Homeland Security Act consolidated several border security
+agencies in the DHS Directorate of Border and Transportation Security.
+The success of the BTS Directorate requires effective and expedited
+coordination of the transferred agencies, which is the purpose of the
+One Face at the Border Initiative.
+ The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection houses the inspection
+functions and we've called CBP Commissioner Bonner here to gather
+additional information about the purpose and impact of the new
+initiative.
+ This proposal aims to fully integrate the three separate inspection
+positions, Customs, Immigration and Agriculture inspectors, into one
+new CBP Officer cross-trained to successfully screen for all three
+priority missions.
+ Historically, travelers entering the U.S. could make up to 3 stops,
+with each inspection carried out by a separate DHS employee. CBP is
+following through on a commitment to unify this system in order to
+process travelers more rapidly and conveniently while simultaneously
+identifying and addressing potential risks.
+ Merging the inspection forces of legacy Customs, INS, and APHIS has
+the potential to greatly increase the law enforcement responsibilities
+of the individual inspector at the border. These expanded
+responsibilities include such diverse areas as: evaluating terrorist
+threats; enforcing customs rules relating to commerce; enforcing
+immigration laws; and inspecting food and agricultural imports for
+insects and quarantine.
+ By utilizing one employee to perform all three primary inspection
+functions, the Department hopes to deploy additional employees into
+secondary inspection thus targeting our resources towards those
+passengers and cargo with suspicious indicators.
+ Each year more than 500 million people legally enter the country
+and over $1 trillion in trade crosses our borders. Searching for the
+threats and security risks in that bulk of commerce and people is a
+huge task. We have an unprecedented opportunity with the new Homeland
+Security Department to change the way we do business. Now is the time
+to develop and implement a comprehensive vision for border security.
+ Anytime something changes, there is concern and unease until it is
+implemented and proven successful. Through multiple conversations that
+I have had with the private sector and individual stakeholders in this
+endeavor, I have not heard anyone say that this is a bad idea. In fact,
+most people see initiatives like this as the foundation necessary for
+effective homeland security.
+ Legitimate concerns have been expressed about losing some of the
+expertise that our legacy inspectors have gained during their years of
+service. Commissioner Bonner will be called upon to address those
+questions today and I look forward to hearing more about the specific
+details of the program, especially regarding on-the-job training and
+mentoring.
+ I don't think that anyone would argue that this is going to be a
+simple and easy transfer, but instead will require a lot of work and
+dedication from both the legacy and new employees. The expertise and
+skill from those currently on our front lines will be necessary for
+mentoring and training the new CBP Officers. The force multiplying
+potential of having one face at the border could be a great advantage.
+The critical nature of the homeland security mission requires innovate
+and comprehensive strategies that multiply our strengths and diminish
+the risks.
+ The impact of this initiative is greater than its stated purpose.
+The integration will set a standard and be a model for subsequent
+homeland security initiatives and future DHS efforts to integrate its
+legacy agencies. How this the One Face at the Border initiative is
+carried out will lead the way for other much needed security reforms.
+ I would like to express my thanks and appreciate to Secretary Ridge
+and Commissioner Bonner for their leadership in announcing and
+implementing the One Face at the Border workforce.
+ I will conclude my remarks and enter my full statement for the
+record.
+
+ With that, I would yield to the ranking member, Ms.
+Sanchez.
+ Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will just
+summarize and also put my statement in for the record.
+ First of all, I thank you, Honorable Mr. Bonner, for coming
+back before us. We are--I know that you have a lengthy
+testimony today, so we are looking forward to hear what you
+have to say.
+ Obviously, this hearing is about taking various tasks and
+putting them all together and having one person do it pretty
+much. And I would like to hear how we are going to get that
+done, how it is coming along, and whether we are going to end
+up with a jack of all trades, but an expert in none. I think
+that is really the concern that many of us have.
+ Also, I was a little worried because I thought at first
+that the agriculture entry piece was going to get shortchanged,
+but I hope you will expand on the fact that there actually will
+be some specialists who will still do the agricultural work and
+scrutiny.
+ The reason that is so important to me, of course, is, my
+home State of California's number one industry is agriculture.
+We are always very concerned about people coming into our
+country who might want to do us harm. But there are always
+those people who seem to bring back plants or fruit or
+something who, not really understanding, may bring that in with
+them and do us even more harm, economic harm, by bringing in
+pests and other diseases.
+ So I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses. I
+am particularly going to look forward to the next panel also,
+because we will have some people who have actually been on the
+ground and who understand the limitations and the challenges of
+trying to get the work done right on the front lines.
+ With that, Mr. Chairman, I will submit my statement for the
+record.
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you very much.
+ [The statement of Ms. Sanchez follows:]
+
+ Prepared Opening Statement of The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a
+ Representative in Congress From the State California, and Ranking
+ Member, Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security
+
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to thank all of our witnesses for
+coming here today. This is the second time Mr. Bonner has visited this
+subcommittee and we are glad to have him back.
+ Today's hearing on the ``One Face at the Border'' Initiative is an
+important one. The introduction of the new Department of Homeland
+Security and the assimilation and reassignment of the duties of former
+agencies within that department is what the ``One Face'' Initiative is
+all about.
+ The department has taken on an ambitious task: To focus on stopping
+potential terrorist activity while at the same time attempting to
+streamline the immigration and customs process without losing any
+expertise in the process.
+ Many of us are concerned that for one person to be expected to do
+all the jobs of immigration, customs, and possibly agriculture
+inspector--and do them well--might be unrealistic.
+ I am very happy to see that we have not only Commissioner Bonner,
+but two inspectors, one former immigration and one former customs, to
+give us their perspective. I always find that to get the full
+information, it is best to ask both management and rank- and-file
+opinions and I am happy to see that we will have that perspective
+today.
+ ``One Face'' is like a one-stop shop. In previous years, those
+entering the US would go through immigration, then grab their luggage
+and go through customs, and, if necessary, go though an agriculture
+station.
+ The new initiative would combine primary customs, immigration, and
+agriculture into one person--the Customs and Border Protection or CBP
+officer. The traveler may be cleared to go after primary inspection by
+the CBP officer, or may be referred to secondary inspection, where a
+CBP officer would have more time to inspect them.
+ Compared to the old system, there is no marked difference between
+the expertise and experience level between primary and secondary
+inspectors.
+ There are specialists, such as canine and drug interdiction that
+can be called in, but the old system was set up so that secondary
+inspectors were those that had more expertise than those in primary.
+This is not the case in the new system as I understand it.
+ One of the things I was gratified to see was the existence of the
+CBP Agriculture Specialist. Mr. Pauli from the California farm bureau
+is here. He was concerned, as was I, when initial reports indicated
+that the scientific expertise formerly required of all USDA Agriculture
+inspectors would be lost if all of them were replaced by CBP Officers.
+ I was relieved to find out that the ``One Face'' plan still calls
+for CBP Agriculture Specialists, distinct from CBP Officers, who will
+retain that specialized training that the USDA inspectors had.
+ My home state of California, after all, is the largest agricultural
+producing state in the country. In our desire to prevent the country
+from terrorists, we cannot forget that significant harm can be caused
+to our economy if we fail to protect ourselves from agricultural
+parasites and diseases.
+ I am looking forward to hearing from all of our witnesses today. I
+hope that this initiative will be successful, and it is the intention
+of this committee to help ensure that success.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+
+ Mr. Camp. And I would now recognize Mr. Goodlatte for any
+opening statement.
+ Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you also
+for holding this important hearing. I would say that the
+subject of this hearing is the reason why I requested to be put
+on this committee and why as the chairman of the House
+Agriculture Committee the Speaker of the House placed me on
+this committee.
+ This is an extremely important issue. I am very interested
+in hearing what Mr. Bonner has to say about the same subject
+raised by the gentlewoman from California with regard to
+agriculture, because in your testimony, Mr. Bonner, there are--
+in the thousands of words, there are only 56 that relate to the
+responsibility of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection
+Service, which we were very concerned about when that agency
+was split in two, part of it remaining in the Department of
+Agriculture, part of it going over to the Department of
+Homeland Security.
+ We understand the need for coordination at the border. We
+think that the President's initiative, which I supported, is
+important. But we also understand the exceedingly serious role
+that Animal and Plant Health Inspection people play with regard
+to this.
+ There are billions of dollars at stake here, there are
+people's lives at stake here. The fact of the matter is, if
+something like hoof and mouth disease, which the Department of
+Agriculture has done a very good job of keeping out of this
+country, were to get into the country, the damage to our
+livestock industry would clearly be in the billions of dollars.
+ The same thing with BSE, a problem which occurred recently
+as close as Canada.
+ And yet we are concerned about the training and the
+requirements that need to be improved upon, the people who will
+be hired to fill these multiple-role positions, inspecting not
+only for animals and plants, but immigration and normal customs
+duties as well.
+ We have been disappointed with the amount of information we
+have received from the Department regarding this. We have on
+more than one occasion requested that representatives of the
+Department come to the Hill, most recently just prior to this
+hearing, to be briefed. And we were told that the Department
+staff were too busy.
+ We also requested to be briefed after this hearing, which
+we thought was a little more open-ended, and we were again told
+that the Department was too busy.
+ The Agriculture Committee will be following up on Chairman
+Camp's hearing on this, and we will be pursuing this at great
+length. But let me say when an event like hoof and mouth
+disease comes into this country on the shoes of somebody who
+visits a farm anywhere in the world where that disease is
+rampant and is not properly inspected at the border and that
+kind of a disease does come about, the answer of ``we were too
+busy'' to consult with the people who have the ability to give
+good advice on how to handle this will not be acceptable.
+ Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
+
+ Prepared Statement for the Record of The Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a
+ Representative in Congress From the State of Virginia
+
+ Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today. In that the
+One Face at the Border initiative is already being implemented, I am
+grateful for the opportunity this hearing and further oversight
+hearings I intend to convene in the Agriculture Committee present to
+ensure success of our new consolidated border inspection program.
+ I am generally supportive of the Administration's efforts to
+streamlinegovernment programs by making more efficient use of limited
+Federalresources. That said, the ``One Face at the Border'' initiative
+leaves me witha number of questions, and quite frankly, a good deal of
+concern regardingthe effectiveness of the new inspection model.
+ In particular, I am concerned that the proposal regarding training
+and staffing levels as currently reflected in communications with DHS,
+would be insufficient to protect American Agriculture against the
+unintentional introduction of plant and animal pests and disease.
+ As I sit here today, I have a number of questions concerning the
+proposed training program; the level of staffing by agricultural
+specialists at passenger and cargo terminals; proposals from DHS on how
+they intend to spend funds collected from Agricultural Quarantine
+Inspection User Fees; and the amount of consultation that took place
+between the DHS and the Department of Agriculture prior to DHS
+announcing this new management initiative.
+ I am particularly concerned, Commissioner Bonner, with the
+unwillingness of your staff to provide my committee with the answers to
+questions we have raised on these topics.
+ DHS is a new department that combines existing agencies in new
+ways. By definition they have a new mission. But contained in that
+mission is an important function that's been going on for over a
+hundred years: protecting agricultural production from the introduction
+of foreign animal and plant diseases. Over the years, this function has
+involved the investment of hundreds of millions in taxpayer dollars and
+had countless man hours, education, and experience devoted to it. At
+risk is a food production system which is truly priceless. Those with
+experience in this field understand the old adage: ``An ounce of
+prevention is worth a pound of cure.'' If an accidental introduction of
+Foot and Mouth Disease were to occur, it would cost our economy tens of
+billions of dollars. Compare this to the simple investment of time and
+personnel to adequately safeguard against the introduction of such
+foreign diseases and you can begin to understand our concern with this
+new initiative. In our zeal to focus attention on the intentional
+threat to America, we simply cannot neglect to protect ourselves from
+the historical threats that continue.
+ There will be scant satisfaction from stopping a terrorist attack
+on American agriculture if it is subsequently destroyed by neglecting
+the commonplace animal and plant diseases that the agriculture
+community faces everyday.
+ I know that agricultural quarantine inspection is in many ways a
+new world for the legacy Customs managers and inspectors. These people
+are at the beginning of a steep learning curve so I understand and
+anticipate that they will face some hurdles from time to time. Many of
+these hurdles can be minimized, or completely eliminated through
+cooperation and dialogue which at this point, has been all too limited.
+ It is clear that in the recent meetings with senior officials in
+the USDA as well as representatives of the agricultural sector,
+Commissioner Bonner is becoming aware of the unique risks faced by
+agriculture, not only from acts of terrorism, but the risks associated
+with the unintentional introduction of a pest or disease that could
+cost American agriculture millions, or even billions, of dollars.
+ Unfortunately, this new found understanding is not reflected in any
+material we can find on the DHS web site nor in communications with the
+Agriculture Committee. I am hopeful that this hearing represents a new
+beginning in the discussion of DHS' management of the programs for
+which they have been entrusted. I look forward to today's testimony.
+Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
+
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you.
+ And now I recognize the ranking member of the full
+committee, Congressman Turner, for any opening statement.
+ Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too will file my
+statement for the record, but let me say that I am very pleased
+to see Commissioner Bonner here with us today. I know he works
+very hard at the task that he has at hand. It is a very
+challenging responsibility.
+ The questions that I hope will be addressed today are the
+same that our ranking subcommittee chairwoman addressed,
+because I have wondered whether it is possible to provide the
+additional training necessary to perform these difficult
+responsibilities at the border in such a way that one person
+will be able to carry out all these inspection
+responsibilities.
+ I also want to be sure that we are not rolling back the
+level of training that for inspection agents at a time when
+their capability, their training, is more important than ever
+before. So I hope, Commissioner, you can reassure us with
+regard to those issues.
+ I also want to say I was very pleased when I learned that
+the Department will keep our agriculture inspectors separate
+and distinct from the Customs and Border Protection officers.
+There is, I think, very specialized training needed by the
+agricultural inspection agents and I think that that decision
+was a wise one.
+ I look forward to hearing from each of our panelists today.
+Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+
+ Prepared Statement of The Honorable Jackson-Lee, a Representative in
+ Congress From the State of Texas
+
+ I want to start by commending the United States Bureau of Customs
+and Border Protection (CBP) for its decision to implement the One Face
+at the Border initiative. This program is long overdue. The debate
+about consolidating ports of entry inspection functions began in the
+early 1970s. In 1993, the General Accounting Office (GAO) convened a
+panel to discuss various operational options for managing international
+ports of entry. The results of this discussion were reported by J.
+William Gadsby in testimony before the House Subcommittee on
+Information, Justice, Transportation, and Agriculture.
+ According to Mr. Gadsby, a GAO director, the panel members did not
+believe that the dual management structure between the former
+Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the U.S. Customs
+Service was adequate. The panel members were concerned that this dual
+system would not be able to handle the customs and immigrations service
+demands that were likely to confront the government in the next 10 to
+30 years. They believed that management benefits could be gained by
+vesting responsibility with one agency. They expected the benefits to
+include (1) an improved capability to think strategically about related
+immigration and customs issues, and (2) clearer accountability for
+border operations by having one spokesperson within the government for
+issues surrounding the movement of people, goods, and services into the
+United States.
+ These benefits and more will be derived from the One Face at the
+Border initiative. Under this initiative, the previous separation of
+the immigration, customs, and agriculture functions will be eliminated.
+Thus, the need to undergo up to three separate inspections will be
+eliminated. The unified inspection process will involve a single
+primary inspector who will determine whether the individual needs to go
+to secondary inspection for a more thorough screening and review by a
+higher-level inspector.
+ Also, by utilizing one employee to perform all three primary
+inspection functions, CBP will be able to deploy additional employees
+to secondary inspection, which is where potentially dangerous
+immigrants will be questioned.
+ It is vital for Congress to support the implementation of the One
+Face at the Border initiative. We must make more resources available to
+CBP. Among other things, our ports of entry are inadequately staffed,
+and infrastructure needs have not been met. For instance, although all
+of the ports at land borders have entry lanes, many of them lack the
+facilities for exit lanes. If we want to improve border security at our
+ports of entry, we must work with CBP to ensure adequate staffing,
+infrastructure, and technology.
+ I am particularly concerned about maintaining adequate staffing
+levels. The international airport at Houston, Texas, has had
+recruitment and retention problems for many years. This has resulted in
+an inability to maintain a full staff, and many of the inspectors are
+recent hires who lack experience. The increased waiting time at
+inspection lines is unacceptable.
+ CBP faces grave challenges. Recent government studies have revealed
+serious inadequacies in the training of immigration inspectors. Among
+other things, they have not received sufficient training in detecting
+fraudulent documents. Also, complaints from my constituents indicate
+that more work is needed to ensure that every inspection is done with
+due respect for the dignity of the person being inspected. I know,
+however, that CBP is addressing these and other problems in its new
+training programs. I am particularly pleased with the emphasis that is
+being placed now on such things as cultural awareness. Thank you.
+
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you. And seeing no additional requests for
+time, we will begin.
+ Again, I would like to thank our witnesses for being here
+and we will hear testimony from Commissioner Bonner first,
+followed by questions. And then we will hear from the second
+panel, followed by questions.
+ So we will begin welcoming back Commissioner Robert Bonner
+of the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection. We have your
+written statement, and we would ask you to summarize that in 10
+minutes; and we look forward to hearing from you. Thank you for
+being here.
+
+STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT C. BONNER, COMMISSIONER, U.S.
+ BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
+ HOMELAND SECURITY
+
+ Mr. Bonner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
+committee, Ms. Sanchez and the other members of the
+subcommittee, as well as Mr. Turner of the full committee.
+ I appreciate the opportunity to testify today regarding
+U.S. customs and now Customs and Border Protection, to testify
+briefly on our efforts since 9/11 to improve border security,
+including more recently our efforts to achieve ``One Face at
+the Border,'' that is, one agency to manage and secure our
+country's border.
+ A lot has been done to improve border security and I want
+to touch on the fact that since 9/11, U.S. Customs, now Customs
+and Border Protection, has taken many steps to literally
+reinvent our borders and make them secure against the terrorist
+threat, but to do so in a way that does not stifle the trade
+and commerce that is so important to our economy. I want to
+list some of these steps for this committee.
+ On 9/11 we had about 1,000 Customs inspectors and 500
+Immigration inspectors at our northern border ports of entry.
+Today, we have over 2,900 CBP inspectors at our northern
+border. We have also increased the number of inspectors at our
+Nation's seaports, airports and southern border crossing
+points.
+ On 9/11, we had no large-scale X-ray-type machines on our
+northern border. Today, we have 24 and we have them at all the
+major crossings between Canada into the United States.
+ On 9/11, we had 45 large-scale X-ray-type machines deployed
+mostly at our border with Mexico for drug detection purposes.
+Today, we have 134 of these large, whole container, whole truck
+X-ray-type machines deployed nationwide.
+ On 9/11, there were only 368 authorized positions for
+Border Patrol agents on our northern border with Canada to
+secure between the ports of entry, and I am pleased to say that
+I am in the process of increasing that number to 1,000 Border
+Patrol agents, and we will be there soon.
+ On 9/11, there was no Customs-Trade Partnership Against
+Terrorism to better secure our supply chain of goods moving
+into the United States in partnership with the private sector.
+Today, there are 4,300 companies participating in the C-TPAT
+program.
+ On 9/11, the Free and Secure Trade initiative, or FAST, did
+not exist. That is a binational program with Canada. Today, it
+is operational on 28 lanes, six major commercial crossings
+between the U.S. and Canada, and we are about to begin
+implementing the FAST program with Mexico at El Paso later this
+month.
+ On 9/11, the Container Security Initiative did not exist.
+Today, governments representing 19 of 20 foreign ports have
+signed up to implement CSI, and CSI is already operational in
+16 ports worldwide.
+ Since 9/11, Customs or Customs and Border Protection has
+implemented the 24-hour rule so that we can get advanced
+information on sea cargo containers destined for the United
+State 24 hours before those containers are loaded at foreign
+ports on a vessel. Soon we will have finalized regulations
+requiring advanced electronic information for the other modes
+of transportation--air cargo, rail and commercial trucks.
+ Since 9/11--by the way, with the help of Congress--Customs,
+now Customs and Border Protection, implemented legislation in
+November of 2001 that required air carriers to transmit to us
+advanced information on international airline passengers to
+better determine whether passengers pose a potential threat for
+terrorism in advance of their arrival.
+ Since 9/11, working with Canada we expanded the NEXUS
+program, a secure traveler program, from a small pilot project
+to eight northern border crossing points. There are over 23,000
+people that have been vetted and enrolled in the NEXUS program.
+ On 9/11, CBP did not have an automated risk management
+system at the national level to identify potential terrorist
+threats to our country. Shortly after 9/11, in October of 2001,
+CBP staff established a National Targeting Center to do this.
+It is now called the National Targeting Center of Customs and
+Border Protection.
+ On 9/11, CBP had 3,800 personal radiation detectors
+deployed. We now have over 8,000 deployed. All frontline
+inspectors wear them.
+ On 9/11, CBP had no radioisotope identifiers and no portal
+radiation detection monitors. We have deployed 300 isotope
+identifiers and well over, I believe, 60 now, radiation portal
+monitors, and we are steadily increasing that deployment.
+ On 9/11, our canines, as most of you know, our detection
+dogs were trained to detect illegal drugs and currency. Today,
+we have a canine training program for detecting explosives and
+chemicals to be used as terrorist weapons.
+ I would be remiss if I did not note two critically
+important steps that the President, with the support of
+Congress, has taken to better secure our country against the
+terrorist threat. Those are, the establishment of the
+Department of Homeland Security, and within the Department of
+Homeland Security, just a little over 7 months ago, the
+creation of Customs and Border Protection. I will say that
+under the Department, under the leadership of Secretary Ridge,
+they will make our Nation safer and better able to deal with
+our Nation's terrorist threat.
+ You know the priority mission of Customs and Border
+Protection is to protect our country from this threat, but we
+also have some very, very important traditional missions to
+perform. U.S. Customs and Border Protection is creating what
+Secretary Ridge has called ``One Face at the Border'' by
+establishing one agency for our borders. In the past 7-1/2
+months, since it was created, Customs and Border Protection has
+made great strides toward unification. America's borders are
+more secure than when our border responsibilities were
+fragmented among four different agencies and three departments
+of government, which was the case before March 1 of this year
+and before the creation of the Department of Homeland Security.
+ Now, I want to mention two steps that we have taken, only
+two that we have taken, to unify Customs and Border Protection.
+One of the important steps is the decision that all 18,000 CBP
+inspectors, whether they be legacy immigration or customs or
+agriculture, should have one uniform, not three different
+uniforms. One Face at the Border certainly means one uniform at
+our ports of entry, both internally so we identify as one
+agency, and externally so the 200 million to 300 Million people
+that arrive in the United States at our international airports
+and across our land borders see that we do have one agency at
+our border, not three different agencies and three different
+uniforms.
+ And by the way, I have here today a Customs and Border
+Protection inspector--Inspector Chausse, will you stand up?
+This is the new uniform of Customs and Border Protection. And I
+don't know--maybe you could step forward. You will see this is
+worn by all legacy inspectors. We started rolling out this
+uniform in August, and in 9 months we will have this uniform
+deployed for all of the 18,000 inspectors at Customs and Border
+Protection.
+ The patch on the sleeve, if you could turn sideways--he is
+a very good model, isn't he? The patches, of course, have the
+name of the agency, U.S. Customs and Border Protection; and in
+the center of the patch is the seal and the logo of the United
+States Department of Homeland Security. That is a very
+important unifying step.
+ You can sit down.
+ A second and very significant step was announced by
+Secretary Ridge in early September, last month, and that is the
+creation of the CBP officer position and a new agriculture
+specialist position for Customs and Border Protection. Moving
+to the new CBP officer, by the way, will--first of all, of
+course, it is going to help us unify as one agency, rather than
+three separate agencies at our ports of entry. More
+importantly, in my judgment, we will be able to perform the
+priority mission, the antiterrorism mission, the homeland
+security mission more effectively.
+ We will be able to perform our traditional missions,
+including our very important mission of protecting United
+States' agriculture against diseases and pests, and traditional
+missions historically of customs and immigration. We are going
+to be able to perform those traditional missions more
+effectively. And lastly we will be able to, with the CBP
+officer position, eliminate the disparities of pay and overtime
+that currently exist among the legacy inspectional work forces
+in Customs and Border Protection.
+ We are no longer hiring for legacy Immigration inspectors
+and Customs inspectors. We have begun training a new cadre of
+CBP inspectional officers starting this month, who will be
+equipped to handle all primary and secondary inspection
+functions in both the passenger and cargo environment. We have
+also established a CBP Agriculture Specialist position to
+perform the highly specialized agriculture inspection function
+at both passenger and cargo processing areas.
+ By the way, we will have--I know I spoke by phone with Mr.
+Goodlatte, but we will have a number of Agriculture Specialists
+that will be at least equal to the number of current
+Agriculture Quarantine inspectors at our ports of entry; and we
+will also have CBP officers who have received significant
+training with respect to the agriculture protection function.
+ We have created a basic training program that will be
+followed by post-basic-inspection training at port, classroom
+training, and on-the-job training, and I will tell you that no
+CBP officer will perform any duties until they are
+appropriately and adequately trained to do them and we will
+continue to rely on the expertise, which is extraordinary, of
+18,000 current inspectional officers at our ports of entry.
+ I expect the first class of CBP officers will graduate from
+the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center next January, and
+then in the Spring of 2004, current legacy immigration and
+customs inspectors will be converted to CBP officers and
+receive cross-training.
+ Current Agriculture Quarantine Inspection officers will
+have an opportunity to become CBP officers or CBP agriculture
+specialists. If they opt for CBP officers, they will be
+backfilled in those positions as agriculture specialists.
+ We are moving out to achieve the President's and the
+Secretary's goal of One Face at the Border, and that is one
+unified, flexible and effective agency to better manage
+security and control our country's borders. There is, of
+course, much more to do and with the help of this
+subcommittee--the full committee and this subcommittee--I hope
+to do it.
+ Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by saying that I believe we
+have forged a good relationship with this subcommittee. I look
+forward to strengthening that relationship with the
+subcommittee and the full committee, and I know that, working
+together, I am confident that we can further protect and secure
+our country's borders.
+ I want to thank you for giving me the opportunity to take a
+little bit more time than ordinary to summarize things, but I
+would be happy to answer any questions that you, Mr. Chairman,
+or any members of the subcommittee might have.
+ [The statement of Mr. Bonner follows:]
+
+ Prepared Statement of The Honorable Robert C. Bonner
+
+ Chairman Camp, Ranking Member Sanchez, Members of the Subcommittee,
+thank you for this opportunity to testify. I am pleased to appear
+before you today to discuss U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border
+Protection, our efforts to achieve ``one face at the border,'' and our
+work in improving border security since September 11, 2001.
+ Although over two years have passed since 9-11, that day remains as
+vivid in all of our memories today as it was two years ago. We still
+grieve for the 3,000 innocent people whose lives were cut short on that
+day and for their families and loved ones. The horror and the anger
+that we all felt as a result of the terrorist attacks on 9-11 have not
+changed in the two years that have passed.
+ But today I will tell you about some of the things that have
+changed.
+
+DHS
+ The creation of the Department of Homeland Security is one very
+important step--perhaps the most important step here at home--that
+President Bush and our nation have taken to address the ongoing threat
+of international terrorism, a threat that is likely to be with us for
+years to come. With our federal government's prevention, preparedness,
+and response capabilities now under one roof, in one department of
+government, and with that department under the outstanding leadership
+of Secretary Ridge, our nation will be--and already is--safer and
+better able to deal with the terrorist threat.
+
+BCBP
+ The creation of U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, or
+``BCBP''--this new agency within the Department of Homeland Security's
+Border and Transportation Security Directorate--is another
+extraordinarily important step in addressing the terrorist threat. In
+fact, the BCBP merger is a big part of the Department of Homeland
+Security reorganization to better protect our Nation's borders. BCBP is
+the largest actual merger of people and functions going on in the
+Department of Homeland Security. Indeed, about one-fourth of the
+personnel of DHS are in BCBP. That's not surprising considering how
+important the security of our borders is to the security of our
+homeland.
+ To create BCBP, on March 1, we took most of U.S. Customs and merged
+it with all of the immigration inspectors and Border Patrol from the
+former INS, the agriculture border inspectors from the Department of
+Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. This means
+that for the first time in our country's history, all agencies of the
+United States Government with significant border responsibilities have
+been unified into one agency of our government, one agency to manage
+and secure our Nation's borders.
+ As U.S. Customs and Border Protection, we are creating, as
+Secretary Ridge has called it, ``One Face at the Border,'' by
+establishing one agency for our nation's borders. In the seven and a
+half months since it was created, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
+has made significant strides toward unification. And America's borders
+are safer and more secure than we were when border responsibilities
+were fragmented among different agencies in three different departments
+of government, as they were before March 1, 2003, as they were before
+the creation of the Department of Homeland Security.
+ On day one, March 1, 2003, we designated one Port Director at each
+port of entry and put in place a single, unified chain of command. And
+in terms of an immediate increase in antiterrorism security, on day
+one, all frontline, primary inspectors at all ports of entry into the
+United States were equipped with radiation detection devices. Since
+March 1, 2003, all inspectors have received antiterrorism training.
+ We have begun rolling out unified BCBP primary inspections for U.S.
+citizens at international airports around the country. It is presently
+operational in 8 major airports (Dulles, Houston, JFK, Newark, LAX,
+Atlanta, Miami, San Francisco), and will be operational at ten
+additional airports by the end of this month. By the end of this
+calendar year, we will have 60 airports conducting unified primary
+inspections for U.S. citizens. This a major step forward in eliminating
+the process of travelers potentially having to ``run the gauntlet''
+through three separate inspection agencies; separate questioning and
+inspections for customs, immigration, and agriculture.
+ Although legacy customs and immigration inspectors for years have
+been interchangeable at the land border ports of entry, this is the
+first time unified primary is being done at our country's airports.
+Significant cross-training is being provided to our frontline
+inspectors to ensure effective implementation, as is counterterrorism
+training is creating a better understanding of terrorist issues and
+better referrals to the secondary area. Along with unified primary, we
+are developing specialized immigration and customs antiterrorism
+response teams and consolidating our passenger analytical targeting
+units.
+ We have also begun rolling out a new BCBP uniform and patch for all
+BCBP inspectors at our Nation's ports of entry, that will replace the
+three different customs, agriculture, and immigration inspectional
+uniforms and patches. The new uniform and patch represent our most
+visible unifying symbols to the American public. The new uniform is
+being implemented in four phases. In the first phase, completed as of
+October 1, 2003, all BCBP managers and supervisors converted to the new
+uniform. Other BCBP uniformed personnel will be phased in at various
+points over the next nine months, with implementation scheduled to be
+complete by July 31, 2004.
+
+BCBP Officer
+ All of these things are helping us unify and become more effective
+as an agency; however, our most significant step toward achieving ``One
+Face at the Border'' was announced by Secretary Ridge last month on
+September 2, 2003: the rollout of the new ``BCBP Officer'' position.
+Starting this month, we will no longer be training legacy
+``immigration'' or ``customs'' inspectors. We will be training a new
+cadre of ``BCBP Officers,'' who will be equipped to handle all BCBP
+primary and many of the secondary inspection functions, in both the
+passenger and cargo environments. We will also be deploying BCBP
+Agriculture Specialists to perform more specialized agricultural
+inspection functions in both these environments.
+ Training is a very important component to the roll out of the BCBP
+Officer. We have created a new 71-day basic course that provides the
+training necessary to conduct primary processing and have a familiarity
+with secondary processing of passengers, merchandise, and conveyances,
+in all modes of transport--air, sea, and land. The new BCBP Officer
+course was built from the 53-day basic Customs inspector course and the
+57-day basic Immigration inspector course, with redundancies removed,
+and with additions to address anti-terrorism and BCBP's role in
+agriculture inspection. The training also supports the traditional
+missions of the legacy agencies integrated in BCBP.
+ Our first BCBP Officers were hired on September 22, 2003, and they
+have already started training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training
+Center (FLETC). The first BCBP Officer class started training on
+October 8, 2003, and two additional classes started yesterday. All of
+our BCBP Officer classes for the months of October and November are
+filled, for a total of 480 new BCBP Officers by the time their training
+is complete. We are now in the process of filling our classes for
+December.
+ In the spring of 2004, current legacy Customs and Immigration
+inspectors will be converted to BCBP Officers and will begin cross-
+training for their broadened responsibilities. Current Agriculture
+Quarantine inspectors will have an opportunity to become BCBP Officers
+or BCBP Agriculture Specialists.
+ We are moving out quickly to achieve the President's and the
+Secretary's goal of ``One Face at the Border,'' that is, one unified,
+flexible, and effective agency to better manage, control, and secure
+our Nation's borders.
+
+Priority Mission and Traditional Missions
+ The priority mission for our BCBP Officers and for our entire
+agency is homeland security. For the unified border agency of our
+country, that means detecting and preventing terrorists and terrorist
+weapons from entering the United States. We are doing everything we
+reasonably and responsibly can to carry out that extraordinarily
+important priority mission.
+ But we are also continuing to carry out the traditional missions of
+the predecessor agencies that make up U.S. Customs and Border
+Protection. These missions include, among others:
+ seizing illegal drugs and other contraband at the U.S. border;
+ apprehending people who attempt to enter the United States
+illegally;
+ determining the admissibility of people and goods;
+ protecting our agricultural interests from harmful pests and
+diseases;
+ regulating and facilitating international trade;
+ collecting duties and fees--we collected over $23 billion last
+year alone;
+ and enforcing all laws of the U.S., including trade and
+immigration laws, at our borders.
+
+Twin Goals
+ As U.S. Customs and Border Protection works to carry out its
+priority antiterrorism mission and its traditional missions, we have
+devised ways to do so without choking off the flow of legitimate trade
+and travel, so important to our nation's economy and our openness as a
+nation.
+ I learned the need to do this most graphically on September 12, 13,
+and 14, 2001. On 9-11, U.S. Customs went to its highest level of
+security alert--short of shutting down our borders. On September 12,
+2001, wait times at our land borders skyrocketed from 10 to 20 minutes,
+to 12 hours at many of our major land border entry points. The border
+with Canada virtually shut down.
+ And the consequences for our ``just in time'' economy were quickly
+apparent. Some U.S. auto plants began to shut down by September 14th.
+ To preserve the U.S. economy, indeed, the North American economy,
+we needed to reinvent the border. We needed a more secure border
+because of the terrorist threat. But we also knew that, as we added
+security, we needed to ensure the continued movement of legitimate
+cargo and people through our borders. That's why we have twin goals:
+(1) increasing security and (2) facilitating legitimate trade and
+travel.
+ We have learned that by using advance information, risk management,
+and technology, and by partnering with other nations and with the
+private sector, these goals don't have to be mutually exclusive. Since
+9-11, we have developed ways to make our borders more secure that also
+ensure the more efficient flow of legitimate trade and travel.
+ Today, I will tell you about some of the things U.S. Customs and
+Border Protection has done in the past two years--and is continuing to
+do today--to carry out those twin goals--things we've done and are
+doing to ``reinvent the border.''
+
+Staffing and Technology Increases
+ Before 9-11, we had about 1,000 customs inspectors and about 500
+immigration inspectors on our shared 4,000 mile border with Canada.
+Most of the lower volume border crossings were not open 24 hours a day.
+There was no security when they were closed, other than an orange cone
+in the road. An orange cone was all that stood in the way of someone
+driving a vehicle from Canada into the United States on a paved
+highway. That vehicle could have terrorists or terrorist weapons or it
+could be a weapon--a car bomb.
+ That was unacceptable. So, right after 9-11, I directed that all
+border crossings be staffed with two armed Customs inspectors 24x7.
+Because I didn't want inspectors doing this forever--the 24x7 staffing
+was a temporary measure--I mandated ``hardening'' and electronic
+monitoring of our low volume northern ports of entry to prevent
+unauthorized crossings. This meant installing gates, signs, lights, and
+remote camera surveillance systems, which we have done.
+ I have received significant staffing increases for the northern
+border, supported by the Administration. Today, we have over 2,900 BCBP
+inspectors along the northern border, up from about 1,600 on 9-11. We
+have also bolstered our staffing on the southern border. We know that
+terrorists have and will use any avenue they can to enter our country.
+Prior to September 11th, we had 4,371 inspectional staff at the
+southern ports of entry. Today, we have almost 4900 standing ready to
+protect us.
+ We also added sophisticated detection technology, such as large
+scale x-ray type machines that can scan an entire tractor trailer truck
+in a couple of minutes. There are now 24 such machines deployed at all
+the significant commercial crossings between Canada and the United
+States. There were exactly zero on 9-11. Nationwide, we have increased
+the number of whole container x-ray-type machines from 63 on 9-11 to
+134 today.
+ We know that securing the areas between the ports of entry is just
+as important as adding security at the ports of entry. A chain, after
+all, is only as strong as its weakest link. Terrorists, just like
+others who seek to enter the U.S. illegally, may attempt to enter
+through official crossings with phony documents, or they may attempt to
+evade detection by crossing in areas between ports of entry.
+ BCBP's Border Patrol is responsible for patrolling those areas and,
+using sophisticated sensor technology, detecting those who attempt to
+illegally enter the U.S. between the ports of entry. Since March 1 of
+this year, the Border Patrol is a part of U.S. Customs and Border
+Protection, and we are revising and refocusing the Border Patrol's
+strategy--which had been principally focused on preventing the flow of
+illegal aliens and drugs crossing between ports of entry on our border
+with Mexico--to include an aggressive strategy for protecting against
+terrorist penetration, at both our northern and southern borders.
+ On 9-11, there were only 368 authorized positions for Border Patrol
+agents for the entire northern border. We are currently at 558. We have
+selected an additional 220 positions, and the other 222 are in the
+process of being selected. With the relocation funds from the 2003 War
+Supplemental, we will meet our goal of having 1,000 agents on the
+northern border by March 2004.
+ This staffing increase will better secure our border against
+terrorist penetration. But we are doing more than just adding staffing.
+We are adding sensors and other technology that assist in detecting
+illegal crossings along both our northern and southern borders,
+including Remote Video Surveillance (RVS) systems. These RVS systems
+are real-time remotely controlled force enhancement camera systems,
+which provide coverage along the northern and southern land borders of
+the United States, 24 hours per day, 7 days a week. The RVS system
+significantly enhances the Border Patrol's ability to detect, identify,
+and respond to border intrusions, and it has a deterrent value as well.
+ There are currently 238 completed Remote Video Surveillance (RVS)
+sites in operation; 170 along the southwest border and 68 along the
+northern border. An additional 224 installations are in progress.
+
+C-TPAT
+ One thing that was apparent as we confronted post 9-11 security
+issues was that support of the private sector was essential. A
+comprehensive border security strategy for our nation and for global
+trade simply had to include the private sector, because they are the
+ones who own the supply chain. We also knew that we could offer
+something to the private sector in return for increased security:
+expedited processing at the borders--air, land, and sea.
+ From those realizations, the Customs-Trade Partnership Against
+Terrorism was born as an idea in November 2001. As many of you know, C-
+TPAT is a partnership between Customs and Border Protection and the
+trade community to implement security standards and best practices that
+better protect the entire supply chain against exploitation by
+terrorists--from foreign loading docks to our ports of entry. In
+exchange, companies that meet our security standards get the fast lane
+at and through our borders.
+ C-TPAT was launched in January 2002. Within one year, in January
+2003, we had over 1,600 companies participating in the program. Today,
+we have over 4,300 companies participating.
+ That number demonstrates that many businesses recognize their role
+in, in fact, their responsibility to take part in, security efforts.
+Even more importantly, it indicates that because of C-TPAT, trade is a
+lot safer from terrorist exploitation.
+ Presently, BCBP has initiated the validation process for over 130
+C-TPAT certified companies. These companies are in different stages of
+their validation process with 100 scheduled to be complete by November
+2003. Validations serve to determine the accuracy and effectiveness of
+the companies' security profiles as applied to their supply chain, both
+foreign and domestic.
+ BCBP is also coordinating with other agencies to look at
+opportunities to leverage resources and technology, and to develop
+policy that supports a comprehensive and coordinated approach to cargo
+security. For example, TSA and BCBP are looking at the operational
+feasibility of coordinating TSA's Known Shipper program to BCBP's C-
+TPAT initiative in the air cargo environment. Although these programs
+have distinct goals and objectives, information on shipper legitimacy
+gained through Known Shipper may help to strengthen C-TPAT's foreign
+and domestic supply chain security validation process; conversely, C-
+TPAT certification helps ensure a greater degree of in-transit security
+and integrity as cargo is transported through the supply chain.
+
+FAST
+ Another important post 9-11 initiative--one that draws upon the
+Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism--is the Free and Secure
+Trade, or FAST program along our northern border with Canada. The way
+the FAST program works is that importers, commercial carriers (i.e.,
+trucking companies), and truck drivers enroll in the program and, if
+they meet our stringent mutually agreed to security criteria, they are
+entitled to expedited clearance at the border.
+ Participation in our C-TPAT program is required for those who want
+to bring goods from Canada into the U.S. through the FAST lane and for
+the trucking company also. Indeed, the truck drivers themselves must be
+vetted as well for security.
+ FAST is operational in 28 lanes at six major commercial crossings
+along the northern border. We are about to begin implementing a pilot
+FAST program with Mexico on our southern border. On October 27, 2003, a
+dedicated FAST lane will become operational in El Paso. If adequate
+security is achieved with this FAST pilot project at El Paso,
+particularly against drug smuggling, I expect that FAST will be
+expanded to other major commercial crossings on our border with Mexico.
+
+CSI
+ In the wake of 9-11, we realized that we had to begin pushing our
+zone of security outward. We wanted our borders to be our last line of
+defense against the terrorist threat, not our first line of defense.
+This is the ``extended border,'' defense-in-depth concept, or what
+Secretary Ridge has aptly called a ``Smart Border.''
+ C-TPAT and FAST are extended border initiatives. Another extended
+border, smart border initiative, is CSI, the Container Security
+Initiative. National security experts consider the vulnerability of
+cargo containers to terrorist exploitation to be chilling, especially
+the prospect that one of the seven million containers shipped to the
+U.S. annually could conceal a weapon of mass destruction.
+ Given this vulnerable system, we needed to develop and implement a
+program that would enable us to better secure containerized shipping--
+the most important means of global commerce--against the terrorist
+threat. That program, which I proposed in January 2002, is CSI.
+ Under CSI, BCBP has entered into bilateral partnerships with other
+governments to identify high-risk cargo containers and to pre-screen
+them before they are loaded on vessels destined for the United States.
+It involves stationing small teams of U.S. Customs, now BCBP, personnel
+at the foreign CSI ports to identify and target containers that might
+pose a potential terrorist security risk.
+ The initial goal was to implement CSI at the top 20 ports in terms
+of the volume of cargo containers shipped to the United States, because
+those top 20 ports alone account for two-thirds, nearly 70%, of all
+containers shipped to U.S. seaports, and because most cargo shipments
+from high-risk countries are transshipped through these ports.
+ Today, governments representing 19 of those top 20 have signed up
+to implement CSI. And we have actually already implemented CSI at 16
+foreign seaports. These ports include 9 in Europe (Antwerp, Rotterdam,
+Le Havre, Felixstowe, Genoa, La Spezia, Bremerhaven, Hamburg, and
+Gothenburg, Sweden); 4 in Asia (Singapore; Hong Kong; Yokohama, Japan;
+and Pusan, Korea); and the 3 Canadian ports of Vancouver, Montreal, and
+Halifax.
+ With nearly all of the top 20 are on board, we have begun Phase 2
+of CSI, where we are expanding beyond the top 20 to additional foreign
+ports.
+
+24-Hour Rule
+ A key to CSI's success, and the success of other Smart Border
+initiatives, is advance information. For example, in order to identify
+high-risk containers before they leave foreign ports, we need the
+manifest information before the cargo is put on board those ships.
+ Last fall, I issued a rule, the so-called ``24-hour rule,'' that
+required transmission of complete manifest information for sea cargo to
+U.S. Customs 24 hours in advance of lading. Through that rule, BCBP is
+getting information that allows us to identify containers we need to
+take a closer look at--ones that raise security concerns.
+
+Trade Act Proposed Regulations
+ And U.S. Customs and Border Protection has worked closely with the
+trade community to develop regulations that will require advance
+electronic information for the other modes of transportation--
+commercial trucks, rail, and air cargo.
+ Our proposed regulations were published in late July. When final,
+these regulations, like the 24-hour rule, will permit better risk
+management for the terrorist threat, before cargo shipments reach the
+U.S. border ports of entry.
+
+Advance Passenger Information
+ Advance information is also critical to our efforts to identify
+individuals who may pose a security threat. Before September 11th,
+2001, air carriers transmitted some advance information on
+international airline passengers to U.S. Customs on a voluntary basis.
+In late 2001, we sought, and Congress enacted, legislation that would
+make the transmission of advance passenger information mandatory.
+ U.S. Customs, now BCBP, implemented that legislation, and moved
+aggressively to achieve compliance from all air carriers as soon as
+possible. In less than a year, we achieved a 99% compliance rate. BCBP,
+through our combined customs and immigration authorities, uses that
+information to evaluate and determine which arriving passengers pose a
+potential terrorist risk.
+
+NEXUS and SENTRI
+ Since 9-11, BCBP has pressed forward with initiatives with both
+Canada and Mexico that enable us to focus our resources and efforts
+more on high-risk travelers, while making sure those travelers who pose
+no risk for terrorism or smuggling, and who are otherwise legally
+entitled to enter, are not delayed at our mutual borders.
+ Our program with Canada is the NEXUS program. Under NEXUS, frequent
+travelers whose background information has been run against crime and
+terrorism indices are issued a proximity card, or SMART card, which
+allows them to be waived expeditiously through the port of entry. NEXUS
+has expanded to eight crossings on the northern border, including ports
+of entry at Blaine, Washington; Buffalo; Detroit; and Port Huron.
+Approximately 50,000 people have enrolled in the program so far.
+ With Mexico, we have the SENTRI program. Like NEXUS, SENTRI is a
+program that allows low-risk travelers to be processed in an expedited
+manner through a dedicated lane at our land border with less delay.
+SENTRI is currently deployed at 3 southwest border crossings: El Paso,
+San Ysidro, and Otay Mesa.
+
+US VISIT
+ Another new tool for border security and enforcement, with respect
+to travelers entering and exiting our country, is the US-VISIT program
+currently being developed. US-VISIT will capture point of Entry and
+Exit information by visitors to the United States. This system will be
+capable of using information, coupled with biometric identifiers, such
+as photographs and fingerprints--to create an electronic check-in/
+check-out system for people who come to the United States to work or to
+study or visit. Through US-VISIT, all border officers at air and some
+sea ports of entry will have the capability to access and review the
+visa information, including the photograph, during a visa holder's
+entry into the United States. BCBP is working with the US-VISIT office
+in developing the training and implementation facets of the US-VISIT
+system.
+
+National Targeting Center
+ One of the greatest challenges--if not the single greatest
+challenge--we face in the war on terrorism is determining who and what
+to look at. BCBP has broad power to question and search every person,
+vehicle, and shipment of goods entering the U.S. How do we sort out who
+and what to look at, question, and inspect?
+ In October 2001, U.S. Customs established a National Targeting
+Center--using automated risk management for the first time at the
+national level--to help us meet the challenge of identifying potential
+terrorist threats to our country. Remember, our priority mission is
+detecting and preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering
+our country. Our National Targeting Center in Virginia is an essential
+tool for carrying out our priority mission.
+ The Center gathers the advance electronic information I talked
+about, and uses our Automated Targeting System for passengers and cargo
+to identify what is high risk--to identify potential terrorists and
+terrorist targets for follow up at U.S. ports of entry and CSI ports.
+ The National Targeting Center has given us the ability to locate
+and eliminate terrorist threats before they become a reality, and it
+did not exist on 9-11.
+
+Comprehensive Strategy to Address Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism
+ One of the greatest terrorist threats is the threat of nuclear and
+radiological terrorism--nuclear devices and RDDs, or so-called dirty
+bombs. This threat, particularly the threat of nuclear devices, is
+largely an external one--meaning someone would have to bring the device
+across our borders and into this country.
+ This past year, BCBP developed a Comprehensive Strategy for
+addressing that threat. Our plan focuses on several components, one of
+which is maintaining a secure border at our ports of entry that is
+capable of detecting potential nuclear and radiological devices.
+ BCBP's current deployment of radiation detection technology
+includes: over 8,000 personal radiation detectors, or PRDs, over 300
+radiation isotope identifiers; and over 60 radiation portal monitors
+deployed. It should go without saying that we must and are continuing
+to steadily increase our deployment of radiation detection technology,
+but what we have today is a vast improvement over what we had on 9-11.
+
+Chemical/Explosive Detection Dogs
+ Another terrorist threat is the threat of explosives and chemicals
+that could be used as terrorist weapons coming across our borders. For
+years, BCBP has used canines to detect illegal drugs and even cash, but
+after 9-11, we began training dogs to detect explosives and chemical
+weapons of mass destruction. These talented dogs are an important
+resource in our antiterrorist efforts. And on 9-11, this resource did
+not exist--we had no chemical/ explosive detection dogs at our ports of
+entry.
+Conclusion
+ The efforts I have talked about today are the result of this
+Administration, this Congress, and the vision and leadership of the
+Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge. The
+creation of DHS and the unification of the border agencies within BCBP
+are among the most significant of those efforts. They enable us to have
+a more comprehensive and effective strategy as we press forward with
+our many initiatives for protecting and securing America's borders.
+ Although I have only covered some of our efforts since 9-11, I hope
+I have given you a sense of where we are today, as compared with where
+we were two years ago. We have made great strides. America is safer.
+Our borders are more secure against terrorists and their weapons of
+terror than they were two years ago.
+ But our work is far from finished. There is much more to do. And
+rest assured, I and all the men and women of U.S. Customs and Border
+Protection are continuing to push full steam ahead. We are also working
+hard to become the truly unified agency that we know we can and should
+and will be--so that we can be the more effective, more efficient
+agency that the American people expect and deserve.
+ Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by noting the important working
+relationship BCBP has forged with this Subcommittee. I have had the
+pleasure of meeting and talking with many of this Subcommittees'
+members, including you, Mr. Chairman, on a number of issues. I am very
+impressed with this Subcommittee's concern for, and expertise in, port
+and border security. As an example, Congressmen Shadegg and Souder and
+I have been in regular contact on a border security matter of mutual
+concern and we have made good progress working together. I know from my
+staff that the staff-to-staff relationship between BCBP and this
+subcommittee is, as it should be, very strong. This is critically
+important as we move forward and identify legislative and budgetary
+initiatives that will further protect and secure our nation.
+ Thank you. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.
+
+ CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION ACADEMY'S NEW BASIC CBP OFFICER COURSE
+
+ U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is creating ``One Face at
+the Border'' by integrating people, processes, training and
+technologies from three federal agencies with border responsibilities
+into one unified border agency. Unified training is the foundation of
+these integration efforts.
+ Beginning with the first class of CBP Officers in October 2003, the
+CBP Academy now delivers a new basic training curriculum that provides
+important knowledge and skills needed to perform the duties of this
+critical frontline officer position. The comprehensive and integrated
+basic CBP officer course provides the training necessary to support the
+priority mission of CBP--detecting and prevention terrorists and
+instruments of terror, including weapons of mass destruction, from
+entering our country.
+ With the formation of CBP in the Department of Homeland Security,
+three different inspectional workforces joined together at our nation's
+ports of entry. Prior to that time, separate training was provided in
+separate academies. Now, with the establishment of a unified frontline
+officer, an integrated training course ensures that the CBP Officer is
+fully equipped to carry out all of the functions of his or her
+position.
+ What's new? For the first time, one basic course provides the
+training necessary to conduct primary processing and have a familiarity
+with secondary processing of passengers, merchandise, and conveyances,
+in all modes of transport--air, sea and land. The 71-day CBP officer
+course was built from the 53-day basic Customs inspector course and the
+57-day basic Immigration inspector course, with redundancies removed,
+and with additions to address anti-terrorism and CBP's role in
+agriculture inspection.
+ The training also supports the traditional missions of the legacy
+agencies integrated in CBP, which includes interdicting illegal drugs
+and other contraband, apprehending or denying entry to people seeking
+to enter the United States illegally, protecting U.S. agricultural and
+economic interests from harmful pests and diseases, and regulating and
+facilitating international trade and collecting revenue.
+ With the first graduation slated for early January 2004, the CBP
+Academy expects to graduate approximately 300 CBP officers a month.
+ However, the training does not stop there. There is a comprehensive
+technical and structured In-Port training program which is a
+combination of classroom, computer-based and on-the-job training.
+
+?
+
+ 18
+
+ INTEGRATED CBP OFFICER COURSE
+
+ CBP Academy
+
+Objective: Graduates will be proficient at the trainee level in
+ primary inspection operations and familiar with secondary
+ processing.
+
+Duration: 71 days 111.8 weeks (based on 6 days per week).
+
+Major Components (entire course focuses on priority mission of
+ anti-terrorism):
+
+Anti-Terrorism Constitutional Border Search
+Integrity Authority
+Nationality Law Officer Conduct and
+TECS/NAILS/NSEERS/ACS Professionalism
+Grounds of Inadmissibility Non-Immigrant Classification /
+Interviewing Techniques Processing
+Agriculture Threats Immigration Classification /
+Firearms Usage Processing
+Physical Conditioning Document Examination
+Practical Exercises Trade Processing
+Inspection Technology General Inspection Procedures
+ Officer Safety and Basic
+ Enforcement
+ Arrest Techniques and Defensive
+ Tactics
+ First Aid/CPR
+ Identifying Drugs
+
+ In-Port Training Program (Post-Academy)
+
+Objective: Graduates will be proficient at the trainee level in
+ secondary processing.
+
+Duration: Estimate 30+ classroom 1 computer-based training days
+ and approximately 100 on-the-job training days during the first
+ year after completing the CBP Academy.
+
+Major Components:
+ JT on Unified Primary--all modes (air, land and
+ sea)
+ Immigration Secondary--all modes
+ Immigration Secondary--sea crewmembers
+ Customs Secondary Passenger--all modes
+ Customs Secondary Cargo--all modes
+ Agriculture Secondary Cargo and Passenger--all
+ modes
+
+
+ Mr. Camp. Well, thank you very much, Commissioner, for your
+testimony.
+ We will begin the questioning now. I just have a couple of
+questions.
+ On a recent visit to the border, I was struck by the
+discussion in terms of trying to find out what people did, that
+were either a legacy customs individual or legacy immigration
+individual, so I welcome the unifying of these positions.
+ What process did DHS use to determine that these functions
+could be unified, and was there a working group or task force
+set up that participated in this?
+ Mr. Bonner. Yes. First of all, at the very beginning,
+shortly before March 1, which was the date the reorganization
+began at Customs and Border Protection, I established a
+transition team. The transition team is made up, by the way, of
+individuals from all of the legacy agencies--legacy
+Immigration, legacy Customs, legacy Agriculture. Among the
+things the transition team was tasked to look at were unifying
+symbols like uniforms and the like. A separate working group
+was set up to take a look at, and study, the jobs that were
+performed by the inspectional work force within CBP.
+ That group did do a rigorous analysis of the job
+descriptions, the job duties, the similarities, by the way, in
+the skills that are employed by all of the inspectional work
+force. Different levels, different kinds of knowledge in terms
+of different areas, but the skills, by the way, are very
+similar, if not substantially the same.
+ In any event, it was based upon that analysis that we
+concluded that you could have essentially an inspectional
+officer for CBP, Customs and Border Protection, that could
+perform, with appropriate and adequate training, multiple
+functions.
+ I want to also say, by the way, there is some notion that
+perhaps you train somebody to do all functions at all times,
+but that is not the case at all. Each port of entry will make
+an assessment as we go forward in terms of the needs of that
+particular port of entry, and there are certainly going to be
+specialized areas within the CBP officer. Let me name a couple.
+ Canines: We will continue to have a canine officer; that is
+a specialized skill. A CBP officer that wants to go into that
+will get some special further training to become a canine
+officer.
+ The same for the analytical units for cargo and people.
+ So there will be some specialized areas and training that
+will be given to CBP officers for some specific needs that we
+have as we go forward.
+ Of course, we will also have the existing expertise of the
+work force, which is 18,000 men and women, about 10,000 of them
+are legacy Customs, 6,000 legacy Immigration and there are
+about 1,500 Agriculture quarantine inspectors, plus 500 techs.
+So that is the process.
+ We looked at it hard. By the way, we looked at it with an
+open mind; we did not say whether this could or could not be
+done. The conclusion is that it could be done, that you could
+train for more multifunctionality, and this ultimately would
+make us more effective not just for our traditional missions,
+which it will, but also our homeland security mission.
+ Mr. Camp. I realize it is new, but what kind of feedback
+are you getting on the unification of the responsibilities?
+ Mr. Bonner. First of all, I have had extensive discussions
+with our people in the field. Many of these have been through
+town hall meetings that I have had around the country, other
+top management of Customs and Border Protection have had. We
+received, through discussion and dialogue, a lot of feedback
+that way.
+ We have had discussions with the trade community, with
+other stakeholders, about this; and essentially we have made a
+significant effort to explain what we are doing, how we are
+doing it, what the rollout-type period is for it. And so we
+have gotten a lot of feedback or input in that manner as well.
+ Mr. Camp. Okay. Thank you.
+ And now I will recognize Ms. Sanchez for any questions that
+she may have. .
+ Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Thank you for being before us.
+ I have a question. I am trying to figure out what your
+initial academy training does. From what I could read and from
+what I understand, it is now a 71-day course. But before, when
+you had Customs and Immigration--you had a Customs-only course
+that lasted 53 days and an INS course that lasted 57 days; that
+is 110 days. Now you only have 71 days.
+ So does that mean that you are cutting some things out,
+that there was overlap on some? Why would the two separate ones
+have so many days and this one be pared down?
+ Mr. Bonner. It is a good question. The reality is that we
+are actually adding something to it. There was a lot of overlap
+between training for legacy Immigration and legacy Customs.
+There was 24 hours of that training devoted to the legacy
+Customs inspector for Immigration training; and Immigration got
+about 24 hours of Customs training in the old program. So there
+was overlap in that sense, and I will tell you why in a minute.
+ There was overlap in terms of firearms training; and
+practical exercises, training and the like, there was quite a
+bit of overlap. And the reason for it is, when you start
+thinking about Customs--legacy Customs or legacy Immigration
+doing each other's functions for over 20 years, Customs
+inspectors at the land border ports of entry have been doing
+both--certainly primary for both Immigration and Customs
+purposes; and Immigration inspectors at our land border have
+been doing inspectional primary for both Customs and
+Immigration purposes. That has been going on since the 1970s.
+And so they are cross-designated to do that.
+ Now, as we are one agency, you do not need to have a
+separate--with a CBP inspectional officer, you do not need to
+have a separate training that would be cross-training people.
+So that is the reason.
+ There was a lot of duplication and overlap in the training.
+A lot of the skill sets that are--for which Immigration and
+Customs inspectors are trained, and by the way even Agriculture
+inspectors to some degree, a lot of the skill sets are the
+same. How do you ask questions of people? How do you read
+behavior? These are skills that both Customs and Immigration
+inspectors have--they have now, by the way, and need to have,
+and you have to train for this.
+ The reality is, we have a longer course because it is 71
+days. It is longer than the legacy Customs or Immigration basic
+courses were, significantly longer. We are adding some
+antiterrorism training to that. We are adding some agriculture
+training.
+ And the key thing here is to remember that it is not just
+all basic training. That is the way it used to be for Customs
+and Immigration; you got your basic training, and then you were
+just out there. We have basic training, which is that 71 days,
+which by the way translates into 3 months, 6 days a week at
+FLETC. And then there will be post-basic training which will be
+classroom--significant classroom training at the port, in-port
+training as well as on-the-job training.
+ So we are doing--the key to part of this--a key component
+is, frankly, a lot more training than either one of these
+inspectional services were doing prior to the creation of
+Customs and Border Protection and the CBP officer.
+ Ms. Sanchez. You mentioned earlier that there was a lot of
+discrepancy going on between what the INS, legacy INS and
+legacy Customs was being paid, et cetera. Going back to the 6-
+day training week at the academy, I have been told that legacy
+INS are being paid overtime for working the 6-day training, but
+legacy Customs are not being compensated at all for that sixth
+day.
+ Can you tell me if that is true? What is the intent to fix
+it? Are we going to work on fixing that? Why the difference?
+ Mr. Bonner. First of all, I am glad you asked that. It is
+true, there are disparities and there are significant
+disparities in the pay and overtime systems between legacy
+Customs and Immigration and legacy AQI inspectors, and we need
+to get rid of those discrepancies. We cannot unify as an agency
+until we get rid of them.
+ You mentioned one of them, and one of them is that under
+the Customs overtime system, which is called COPRA, you are not
+entitled to the FLSA kind of overtime, but the Immigration
+inspectors are entitled to it. That is one discrepancy that
+benefited legacy Immigration inspectors.
+ On the other hand, under COPRA, a Customs inspector can
+credit up to one-half of his overtime to retirement; an
+Immigration inspector cannot. So we need to eliminate these
+disparities, and frankly, I don't think we will ever unify as
+one agency until we do that.
+ And the CBP officer allows us to go to essentially one pay
+and one overtime system; the question is, what is it? And I
+have submitted that question to the Department of Homeland
+Security HR design team to come up with options and
+recommendations as soon as possible, but before the end of the
+year to the Department of Homeland Security, so we can have
+that decided.
+ Ms. Sanchez. And once you have that decided, will then the
+old legacy go under the new system and everybody will be under
+the new system? There is no problem with switching them over?
+ Mr. Bonner. There is a sequence to it, but the answer to
+that is yes. We need to have this decided before the first CBP
+officers graduate in January, and then in March we will convert
+the legacy Customs and Immigration inspectors to CBP
+inspectional officers, and we will have one system. And so it
+will have been decided what that system is. And there will be
+overtime, because we depend on overtime to be able to do our
+job.
+ But what is the system? We need to have one system. And
+right now, we do not. There are disparities, and it is unfair
+and it is inequitable. And part of the CBP officer concept
+actually gets us to essentially one pay and overtime system. It
+helps us get there. And by March of next year, we will have one
+pay and overtime system, and we won't have these kinds of
+disparities that you just alluded to that occur right now, and
+every day, because we have three different overtime systems.
+ Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Bonner. It is a nightmare to administer, by the way.
+ Mr. Camp. I notice the chairman of the full committee is
+here.
+ Would the chairman of the full committee seek to inquire
+now?
+ Mr. Cox. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Welcome. Thank you for your outstanding testimony. Let me
+jump ahead to one of the witnesses that we are going to hear
+from shortly, who is concerned with the capacity of your
+officers to cross-train, as it were. Do you want to address
+that?
+ Mr. Bonner. Yes, I do. I know there is a concern, and I
+think Ms. Sanchez alluded to it. There is a concern, the jack-
+of-all-trades-and-master-of-none concern.
+ First of all, we have to remember that we are not starting
+from scratch here. We have 18,000 highly trained inspectors
+that have a high level of expertise in the customs field, in
+the immigration field, and in the agriculture field. So we are
+not just starting everything over. That is number one.
+ Secondly--and we intend to and will continue to use that
+expertise. We will be training a CBP officer, though, Mr.
+Chairman, that we will begin rolling out in January, which will
+be--by the way, we are talking about maybe 200 or 300 new CBP
+officers a month that will graduate from the basic training
+down at FLETC. And they will get some very good, solid basic
+training in immigration and in customs procedures and the
+background they need.
+ But they are also going to get additional training when
+they go out to the field. And that is the proficiency training,
+that is, the in-port classroom training, so that as you are
+going to assign somebody, let's say to a particular function or
+area, whatever that area or function might be, that you have
+actually not only trained, but you have tested and certified
+that they are capable of performing that function. And only
+then do they get assigned.
+ So you are not training 18,000 people--inspectors to do
+everything all at once. What you are doing is, you are training
+them to have--certainly for the antiterrorism mission, you are
+training them for the important traditional missions of Customs
+and Border Protection, and then you have a corps officer which
+you can--with additional training and mentoring and the like,
+that will be--in my judgment will be capable of performing a
+variety of functions that we will need for CBP. Whether that is
+in Immigration or the Customs area or otherwise.
+ Mr. Cox. I am a strong supporter of what you are doing. I
+think it is vitally important and vitally necessary. From the
+standpoint of law-abiding U.S. constituents who come across our
+borders, it is maddening to have to provide the same
+information on similar forms to two different parts of the
+Federal Government right as you go through the same port of
+entry. And I think consolidating Customs and Immigration and
+APHIS, something that has been an opportunity for a long time,
+now the creation of the Department enables us to do.
+ I also can see that as we implement programs for biometric
+identification of visitors to the United States, some of the
+problems that I think very properly the Immigration inspectors
+are complaining about, the complexity of their jobs, will
+diminish. We have a primary lane and a secondary lane and we
+refer the people from primary to secondary if they have an
+irregular circumstance. It is very easy to imagine, if things
+that are now pilot programs such as US-VISIT and FAST become
+the norm rather than the exception, that the job of your
+inspector is going to be almost entirely focusing on the
+exceptions rather than focusing on the people who are law
+abiding.
+ Right now we have it almost backwards. We spend a whole lot
+of time making people stand in line, taking a lot of their
+time, and looking at them when, in fact, we should be looking
+for the needle, not the haystack.
+ Can you comment on whether my assumption is correct that
+the expanded use of biometric identifiers will actually make
+this concept more meaningful?
+ Mr. Bonner. Well, we are definitely moving there and it is
+going to be helpful. Our whole approach, Mr. Chairman, has been
+to better use advanced information, electronic information,
+technology risk management to sort out the haystack, to narrow
+down the haystack both for people and cargo coming into the
+United States. Biometrics as US-Visit is implemented, is going
+to be a very helpful tool to us, along with the other kinds of
+automated information and technology that we use that permits
+us to not only screen in advance, select in advance, but also
+to screen faster and to have a faster process.
+ If I could add one other thing to that is very important:
+As we have unified Customs and Border Protection in one agency,
+let's look at some of the things that are already happening.
+One is that since March 1, we are unifying the passenger
+analysis units. Immigration had theirs at airports and Customs
+had theirs, and obviously you want to merge these and marry
+these together when you are using them for the antiterrorist
+threat.
+ By the same token, as you narrow things down, cargo or
+people of concern, you want to use joint secondary teams. You
+do not want just an Immigration secondary that is looking at
+somebody for admissibility purposes or a Customs secondary over
+here that is looking at a potential terrorist threat for
+purposes of searching for drugs or other things. You want both
+of these expertises together and their authorities together.
+ We really need to go to the CBP officer to be more
+effective in performing that priority homeland security
+antiterrorism mission so they are more focused on it. It will
+help us better perform our traditional mission because it gives
+us a force multiplier, more people that know the broader
+missions of the agency as well as their traditional missions.
+ Mr. Cox. It is abundantly clear that none of the legacy
+agencies that have been folded into the Department of Homeland
+Security had as their primary mission protecting against
+terrorist attack on the United States. That is now the mission
+of the Department and it is now your mission. And it seems to
+me that if people are saying this is not the way we have done
+it for the last 20 years, that that is essentially an
+establishment of nothing because nothing about DHS is the way
+we used to do it.
+ We are trying to change. We have got to change, and I
+applaud you for your efforts. Working change in 22 legacy
+agencies is going to be very difficult, but it is vitally
+important because we have a new mission and we have to
+accomplish it.
+ Thank you for your testimony.
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you.
+ Mr. Dicks may inquire.
+ Mr. Dicks. Thank you very much for your testimony. And
+being from Washington State, we just had a good trip out there
+with Chairman Cox and Vice Chairman Dunn and had a chance to
+talk to people about the NEXUS program and the FAST program.
+This morning, I had a meeting with the director of our airport
+in Seattle--.
+ Mr. Bonner. SEATAC.
+ Mr. Dicks. At SEATAC.
+ --and basically was told when we go into the VISIT program
+we are going to have problems at the airports because you are
+going to have to put in new equipment and reorganize how you do
+this because of the biometrics. As I understand it, there has
+not been a lot of dialogue between the Department of Homeland
+Security and the airports on this subject and that there ought
+to be.
+ In fact we are trying to arrange a meeting to have Ms.
+Lindsey, the Director of Sea-Tac Airport, come down and talk to
+somebody at DHS about this because she thinks this is going to
+be a problem, just like the baggage has been a problem, in how
+you work this out between the airport and the local officials.
+And we had some problems out there this summer over in the TSA
+area in terms of number of people or adequacy of people.
+ Do you have any comment on this? Is this your
+responsibility of how US-VISIT is going to be done at airports
+or is that somebody else's responsibility?
+ Mr. Bonner. The program itself, Mr. Dicks, is being handled
+at the Department level within the Border and Transportation
+Security Directorate, and that is where the program is headed
+up by Jim Williams.
+ That said, of course, Customs and Border Protection are
+participating in the development and particularly the
+practicalities of implementing US VISIT initially, as you know,
+at our international airports, so that it can be implemented in
+a way that does not result in significant wait times in terms
+of processing people into the country-and so that there is a
+meaningful exit, too, by the way. I know there are various
+discussions as to how the exit part initially is going to be
+done.
+ I have people at my agency that are participating with the
+Department in terms of working on that issue both from an IT
+issue, and also from a practical operational issue--how does it
+work. I have not gotten a briefing in a week or two on it, but
+there is some good work being done.
+ That said, I think it is very important--and I will take
+this back--that we engage with the airport authorities, what
+the plan is, how this is going to be implemented, and how we
+are going to make this work to establish this capability by the
+end of this year to be able to, at least with respect to some
+or all nonimmigrants--I don't know exactly what the universe
+will be there--can be part of those biometrically entered when
+entering into the United States, and we will know when they
+have exited.
+ But it is a big priority of the Department of Homeland
+Security. The program is at that level essentially under the
+overall oversight of Secretary Asa Hutchinson at the Border and
+Transportation Security Directorate.
+ Mr. Dicks. Thank you very much.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you very much.
+ Mr. Goodlatte may inquire.
+ Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Commissioner Bonner, your opening statement and some of the
+answers that you have given have enlightened us a little bit
+about our concerns, expressed by myself and Congresswoman
+Sanchez, about agriculture, certainly far more than the very
+paltry amount of information in your testimony.
+ However, I would again renew my concern that there are
+numerous questions, far more than my 5 minutes here today are
+going to allow me to get answers to and I must say, I am
+concerned. When you called me, and I appreciated the call; and
+in fact, at that time I raised with you the concern that we
+needed to be briefed, and we still have not been briefed. And
+it was especially disappointing when, after that, we asked for
+a briefing even after this hearing, and we were told that you
+would be too busy, not you personally, but your staff would be
+too busy to brief the committee staff.
+ This is not something that is a recent problem. My
+committee has had simple requests for information on the
+specific topic of training for 5 weeks and questions on port
+staffing levels since the first week in August. Can we get that
+briefing?
+ Mr. Bonner. Absolutely. First of all, Mr. Goodlatte, after
+we spoke I believe that there was a briefing of your staff or
+the staff of the Agriculture Committee. But if we are remiss,
+if we have not followed up on these things, you have my
+assurance we will promptly follow up and get you the
+information you need.
+ Frankly, I would welcome an opportunity to have further
+briefings of your staff on any and all issues that you might
+have. And beyond that, by the way, I am prepared at any time
+personally to meet with you or whoever you think I should meet
+with to provide you the answers to the legitimate questions
+that you and others might have in terms of how we are going to
+address in a way that improves and does not degrade the very
+important mission of protecting American agriculture.
+ Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you. We will take advantage of that.
+ However, I must say that the input that we would like to
+have in this process has been partially lost. And there is
+nothing in the law that requires that input; however, I would
+note that section 421(d)(3) of the Homeland Security Act
+provides that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
+consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture, may issue such
+directives and guidelines as necessary to assure the effective
+use of personnel to carry out the functions transferred. And
+that is required under the law.
+ And I would ask you, how many such consultative meetings
+between DHS and the U.S. Department of Agriculture occurred
+prior to announcing the One Face at the Border initiative?
+ Mr. Bonner. I don't know if I can categorize. I know that
+Jayson Ahern, Commissioner of Field Operations, which would
+oversee the inspectional work force at the ports of entry, I
+know he had discussions with Dr. Dunkle at Agriculture. I know
+I personally outlined the concept of the CBP officer and the
+agriculture--
+ Mr. Goodlatte. This was prior to the announcement of One
+Face at the Border?
+ Mr. Bonner. Yes, when I say I did--and by the way, also
+before the announcement, I did attempt to--by the way,
+unsuccessfully, just before Secretary Ridge announced this, I
+did attempt to reach Bobby Acord of the Agriculture Department.
+As things turned out, it took several days before we were able
+to connect, but I did give Bobby--.
+ Mr. Goodlatte. Let me interrupt you because I have a
+limited amount of time here, a minute left to get to the
+substance of this and the purpose for why we want these to
+occur.
+ One of our grave concerns is the amount of training that
+the CBP officers are receiving. Right now, all of the APHIS
+inspectors at the border are required as prerequisite to have
+extensive background, in fact, either comparable experience or
+a B.S. degree in biology, and then after that they undergo a
+10-week or 400-hour training session. And this compares to a
+scant 16 hours of agricultural training with no scientific
+prerequisites for new hires.
+ I understand that you have experience there, and we are
+glad you have this, but the new hires have got to, on the spot,
+recognize problems and ask the right questions before they ever
+get to the agriculture specialists being involved. And I have
+herewith, because I cannot go into it because my time has
+expired--but I will ask, Mr. Chairman, that we make it a part
+of the record-- examples of some of the products, some of them
+very innocent looking, like a can of Heinz soup, which is an
+import item coming into the country that is a banned product
+for very specific scientific reasons. There is a risk of BSE in
+that particular case.
+ But, in any event, it concerns me greatly that there is not
+enough training going into these frontline individuals for what
+is a very high-risk area in terms of the responsibilities that
+they have to undertake, that is, agricultural inspection.
+ Mr. Bonner. Can I just make two quick points, very quickly?
+ One is, the CBP officer with both the basic training and
+the import classroom training, it is contemplated, will have 90
+hours of training in the agricultural protection mission. That
+is number one.
+ Number two, there will be a number of Agriculture
+Specialists that will be equal to the number of current AQI
+inspectors, that will be trained--there may be a somewhat
+longer training--it will be essentially the same training that
+they currently get through the U.S. department of Agriculture
+at the national center over in Maryland.
+ So you will have that corps, and then you will have CBP
+officers who do have significant training in the agriculture
+protection mission, so we will be able to perform that function
+more effectively.
+ At over half of the ports of entry, there are not any
+Agriculture inspectors. I hate to tell you this: There are no
+AQI inspectors at over half of the ports of entry in the United
+States. So we want a CBP officer in addition to the Ag
+Specialists that are going to be better able to protect our
+country against agriculture. I think we will be more effective,
+not less effective.
+ Mr. Camp. Mr. Cardin may inquire.
+ Mr. Cardin. No questions.
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you.
+ Ms. Dunn may inquire.
+ Ms. Dunn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
+ And welcome, Commissioner. I see that you were sworn in on
+the 24th of September, so I congratulate you on your strength
+of character to hang in there, knowing that your job would
+change a whole lot as a result of 9/11.
+ I wanted to ask you a couple of questions. First of all,
+how have your responsibilities shifted since 9/11? And are you
+well enough funded to be able, for example, to continue to pick
+up the legacy responsibilities of the drug smuggling and other
+things that were more of a focus before 9/11?
+ Mr. Bonner. Well, first of all, the responsibility--
+September 24th of 2001, I was sworn in as Commissioner of
+Customs, and the responsibilities changed dramatically with 9/
+11. Literally, we had to refocus U.S. Customs on the
+antiterrorism/homeland security mission.
+ When you think about it, Customs--of course, with
+Immigration--is the frontline at our borders in terms of
+protecting our country; and Agriculture inspectors,
+specifically with respect to agriculture diseases and pests.
+And so certainly my whole responsibility turned dramatically
+because it was clear to me from--and it was clear to me,
+listening to the President, that I needed to refocus U.S.
+Customs immediately and promptly on the antiterrorism, or what
+we now would call the Homeland Security mission; and that is
+what we have been doing, literally, since I hit the ground in
+September of 2001.
+ Now, this does not mean, by the way, we drop all of the
+traditional mission. We also have had to balance that. And we
+have to balance that as we become Customs and Border Protection
+with even more traditional missions which go from everything--
+interdicting illegal drugs and protecting our country in that
+sense to making sure that people that are illegally entering
+our country are apprehended, that if they are not admissible
+that those determinations are made.
+ From a budget point of view, this is the first year
+actually--fiscal year 2004 that I will actually have a budget
+for the entire Customs and Border Protection. For the last half
+of 2003, part of that budget was someplace else which made
+things difficult. But I think we have basically--without
+getting into a lot of fine details, I do think that we have a
+good budget that has been submitted by the President and
+enacted by the Congress for fiscal year 2004, and I am
+confident that we can do the mission.
+ Now, there may be some missions and initiatives as we go
+forward that may be necessary, and I will bring those up as
+appropriate to this subcommittee, to our Appropriations
+subcommittee.
+ Ms. Dunn. Good. I am glad.
+ We will also be interested in being helpful to you as you
+carry out what was required before 9/11 and what we are very
+interested in having you focus on, the Department of Homeland
+Security responsibilities.
+ I am from the State of Washington and many of my
+constituents are those of neighboring districts, up north, who
+move daily across the border into Canada. And I am interested
+in how the NEXUS program is working, whether it is serving my
+constituents and other Washington State constituents well.
+ Ms. Dunn. What can I tell them about this program, as you
+initiate it, and the future of this program?
+ Mr. Bonner. NEXUS is working better in the State of
+Washington than in any other place. We have over 35,000 people,
+both U.S. and Canadian citizens who are enrolled in the
+program, who provide information so their backgrounds could be
+checked through criminal and terrorist indices in both Canada
+and the United States, and who have submitted to a personal
+interview by, usually, a U.S. customs and Border Protection
+official and with the Canadians, and have been--we have made a
+determination that they do not pose a risk to the terrorist or
+even drug smugglers. And then they are enrolled in the program.
+ It is a model in the sense that I think you know at the
+Peace Arch, which is part of the Blaine port of entry, and this
+is one of the important things. We actually have a dedicated,
+not just a NEXUS booth, but a lane that you can get into, so it
+is truly a fast lane into the United States; and that has
+helped us with enrollment. Overall, this is important because
+the more people that we can get vetted, that we know are
+trusted, that we do not have to look at every time they come to
+the border entry point.
+ By the way, it may still be a random check once in a while,
+but we can concentrate more of our efforts on people we do not
+know anything about, or people who are Ahmed Ressams, who was,
+as you know, an individual who was arrested and apprehended by
+a U.S. customs inspector in early 2000, who was an Al-Qaeda
+terrorist. So that is what we want to focus our effort on, and
+these programs, like NEXUS, help us do that.
+ Ms. Dunn. Thank you for that answer.
+ There was a woman at U.S. Customs, a very alert woman; the
+Canadians tried to take credit for that snatch, by the way.
+ Mr. Bonner. They had nothing to do with it. It was Diana
+Dean.
+ Ms. Dunn. Good for you.
+ We have now got that on the record, finally, and we did
+have a wonderful report of that by one of your Customs agents
+in Seattle when we were there for our visit a couple of weeks
+ago.
+ Let me ask you about something that my other committee,
+Ways and Means, discussed because we, at least until now,
+oversaw the Customs department; and in our discussion as to
+what should go into the Department of Homeland Security, we
+talked about whether we should separate out the revenue-raising
+portions of Customs, the duty portions, for example, from the
+rest of the responsibilities.
+ Do you have any impression on whether that would be a good
+idea or a bad idea to do, as you move into--under Homeland
+Security?
+ Mr. Bonner. I think that would be a serious mistake. There
+are all sorts of connections and interconnections between,
+let's say, the inspectors at the ports of entry and the trade
+regulation and compliance function, as well as the trade
+facilitation function. U.S. Customs, now Customs and Border
+Protection, collected about $23, $24 billion last year in
+revenue.
+ Most of that, 90 percent or thereabouts, are import duties
+and the other 10 percent are fees of some sort that we are
+collecting. So it is very sizable, and it is very much
+interrelated; and I actually appreciated the fact that when the
+Homeland Security legislation was enacted, it did permit
+essentially for most of U.S. Customs to remain intact and our
+management system intact, so that we could add pieces from
+other agencies that had significant border responsibilities,
+like the Immigration inspector program from the former INS that
+was abolished on March 1, the Agriculture AQI inspection
+program at our borders, and the entire Border Patrol, and by
+doing that, we now--we do have one agency for the border.
+ But the trade functions and even the revenue functions are
+interrelated with what Customs and Border Protection does, and
+so I think it would be a mistake to split them all out. And I
+am glad, by the way, that Chairman Thomas and the Ways and
+Means Committee permitted the statute to be constructed in a
+way where we could build a border--one agency for our border,
+and that is what we have done under the Department of Homeland
+Security.
+ Ms. Dunn. Thank you very much.
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you.
+ Mr. Markey, you may inquire.
+ Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
+ This hearing room is a particularly fitting venue for
+today, given the debate on the Iraq war supplemental going on
+on the House floor and this committee, the work of this
+committee. The mural on the back wall reminds us of the battle
+that is still being waged in Iraq and Afghanistan and the
+courage of our men and women in the Armed Forces whose valor
+and determination keep our Nation secure.
+ The photo behind us of soldiers marching down a city street
+reminds us that we need protection here on our Nation's Main
+Street, as well, to safeguard the homeland from those who try
+to perpetrate terrorist acts against Americans inside our
+country.
+ My question for Mr. Bonner today relates to the efforts
+that Customs is making to ensure that our homeland is secure.
+On September 12, I wrote to Secretary Ridge to express my
+concern about a shipment of depleted uranium that ABC News was
+able to transport undetected from Jakarta to the Port of Los
+Angeles. I have not yet received a response from the Department
+and would like to take this opportunity to ask you to address
+some of the questions I raised in my correspondence.
+ Media reports indicate that upon arrival at the Port of Los
+Angeles on August 23, the shipment of depleted uranium from
+Jakarta was screened by U.S. Customs inspectors. They did not
+detect anything dangerous or suspicious inside the trunk using
+radiation pagers and X-ray scanners, so they did not open the
+crate. As you know, while depleted uranium is a harmless
+substance, its chemical signature is similar to highly enriched
+radium, which can be used to make radiological dirty bombs or a
+nuclear explosive device that might be used against America.
+ My first question: Have you investigated how this shipment
+was able to pass from Jakarta to Los Angeles without raising
+the suspicions of Customs inspectors? And I will have follow-up
+questions after that.
+ Mr. Bonner. Okay. First of all, it did raise the suspicions
+of Customs inspectors. We had--through our automated targeting
+system, we identified this container as potentially being a
+container that posed a potential risk, based upon various
+factors that go into our automated targeting system, and so it
+was identified as a container that would get a security
+screening.
+ Mr. Markey. So why wasn't the crate opened if it was
+identified as a suspicious crate?
+ Mr. Bonner. Well, it was identified as posing a potential
+risk, based upon a number of factors about the container. It
+was given, and all containers that are identified as a
+potential risk get, a minimum security inspection, which
+includes running the container through a large-scale X-ray-type
+machine, and running it also for potential radiation admission.
+That was done with it. It was determined by the way that there
+was nothing dangerous in the container that posed a threat and
+in fact--in truth, in fact, there was nothing dangerous.
+ Mr. Markey. I am saying--.
+ Mr. Bonner. Just a minute, Mr. Markey.
+ There was nothing in the container that posed a threat.
+ Mr. Markey. No, I know that, but I am saying since the
+radiation signature is very similar to highly enriched uranium,
+did they determine that there was uranium in the container?
+ Mr. Bonner. Well, first of all, it was depleted uranium.
+ Mr. Markey. Did they determine that there was uranium in
+the container?
+ Mr. Bonner. Well, you said ``or a radiation signature
+similar to highly enriched uranium''; and by the way, I take
+issue with that. It does not--the depleted uranium is depleted
+of most of its radiation source, so it is a very low-emitting
+substance. It actually emits about as much radiation as a pile
+of dirt, so it is not emitting a radiation signature that is
+very easy to pick up, as opposed to highly enriched uranium,
+which would emit--if it is not heavily lead-shielded, would
+emit a radiation signature.
+ Mr. Markey. Was the evidence that you had previous
+something that told you there could be uranium in that crate?
+You said that it had been identified. Was the information you
+had that there could be uranium?
+ Mr. Bonner. No. No. The information we had was based upon
+an analysis of advance information that we get under the 24-
+hour rule, which I described earlier in my testimony, which
+gives us information about a container. We then run it against
+a large database we have with respect to importers, shippers,
+and other factors, including intelligence information; and we
+determined--by the way, when we say it is a potential risk
+container, that just means we haven't been able to rule that
+container out as a risk.
+ Mr. Markey. I appreciate that. So you are saying you didn't
+identify it as something which could potentially have uranium
+in it?
+ Mr. Bonner. No, we thought it could potentially--have
+potentially some sort of terrorist weapon, which could be
+anything from a manpad to a nuclear device to the materials
+that could make a nuclear device to just, potentially, ordinary
+explosive material.
+ Mr. Markey. So you do not have a system to open those
+crates that you believe pose a significantly higher risk?
+ Mr. Bonner. No. We do have a system, and the system is, if
+there is something about the container, it is either emitting
+radiation, or based upon the X-ray screening, there is an
+anomaly, there is something that doesn't look right in terms of
+what is advertised to be in the container, then we do a full
+physical inspection of the container.
+ That was not the case with respect to the small amount of
+depleted uranium, which was about the size of a Coke can that
+was shipped by ABC News as a supposed test. I do not think it
+was a valid test with respect to the capabilities of detecting,
+let's say, a terrorist weapon.
+ Mr. Markey. Okay, so the Natural Resources Defense Council
+says that without opening the crate, there is no way to tell
+the difference between HEU, highly enriched uranium, and
+depleted uranium without looking inside.
+ Do you disagree with that?
+ Mr. Bonner. I think highly enriched uranium which is not
+lead-shielded emits significantly more gamma rays than depleted
+uranium, so it is easier to read with a radiation detection
+device from a greater distance. That is what I believe.
+ Mr. Markey. And do you have detection devices which would
+pick up lower enriched uranium, or did that just go through?
+ Mr. Bonner. We are looking for highly enriched uranium that
+you could make into a nuclear device--which, by the way, there
+is a certain quantity that you would need that would displace a
+certain amount of space; and if you are going to prevent it
+from emitting, you have to have some significant lead shielding
+of the material. And I think if you did all of those things, I
+have a great deal of confidence that that kind of anomaly would
+have been detected by the X-ray scan that was done in that
+container.
+ If you are talking about a Coke can full of depleted
+uranium, no, that is not necessarily going to be detectable,
+but it does not pose any risk being--it is not a terrorist
+weapon, it cannot be made into a terrorist weapon. And
+frankly--.
+ Mr. Markey. No, I did know that. That is obvious.
+ Mr. Bonner. Yeah.
+ Mr. Markey. The question is, does it emit a radiation
+signature, chemical signature that is something that should be
+suspicious to you?
+ You disagree that it does not emit a chemical signature
+which is something that should be suspicious to you? You
+disagree with that; is that right?
+ Mr. Bonner. I am actually disagreeing with you on the level
+of emission.
+ Mr. Markey. That is what I am saying.
+ Mr. Bonner. Okay.
+ Mr. Markey. Are you saying you do not agree that it emits a
+signature which should cause any concern for any inspector? Is
+that what you are saying?
+ Mr. Bonner. No. I am saying it emits an extremely low level
+of radiation.
+ Mr. Markey. No. I am asking you.
+ Mr. Bonner. And is a sensitive device to pick up that
+radiation.
+ Mr. Markey. But is it something that should be suspicious
+and, as a result, looked at?
+ You are saying no?
+ Mr. Bonner. Well, if it is depleted uranium, no. Depleted
+uranium is used for a lot of purposes.
+ Mr. Markey. Stop, please.
+ You don't know it is depleted uranium until you open the
+crate. You have to first decide that the level of radiation
+which is picked up, the chemical signature, is significant
+enough to open the crate.
+ You are saying that this would not emit a chemical
+signature significant enough to open the crate?
+ Mr. Camp. I will give the Commissioner time to answer the
+question. The time has expired.
+ Mr. Bonner. I am not disputing you on the signature. I am
+disputing you on the level of the emission that could be read
+and on what distance it could be read.
+ We would almost have to go into a classified hearing if we
+want to get into specific details on this.
+ Mr. Markey. All right.
+ Mr. Camp. Ms. Granger may inquire.
+ Ms. Granger. Thank you.
+ Very simple questions, and I apologize because I came in
+late.
+ You said there would be 200, 300 graduating each month, and
+I believe you said it started in January. Did I say that right?
+ Mr. Bonner. That is right.
+ Ms. Granger. What is your total number of CBP officers?
+ Mr. Bonner. Well, you know, eventually--first of all, that
+is a hard question to answer because it says, what is the right
+number of inspectional officers that we need.
+ But let's say we have 18,000 inspectional officers, right
+now--.
+ Ms. Granger. All right.
+ Mr. Bonner. --so I would think at a minimum that given the
+terrorist threat and given the traditional missions that we are
+going to need ultimately, a number of CBP officers that is
+equivalent to that.
+ Now, maybe--I do not want to box myself in here--a year or
+two from now I may think we may need to increase that in
+certain places, and I cannot do it through reallocation, but
+generally speaking, over time, you would end up with having the
+number of CBP officers that is equivalent to the total number
+of inspectional officers that are at least legacy Customs and
+legacy Immigration. That is, by the way, about 16,000 to
+17,000.
+ Ms. Granger. And so do you have a time frame to say, this
+is when we expect to have that done?
+ Mr. Bonner. Well, first of all, there would be new CBP
+officers that are being trained; and they are actually
+starting--we have actually started the training--and they would
+graduate in January, as I indicated. And there will be some
+graduating classes; it will be around 300 a month, depending on
+what our hiring needs are. But at the same time, in March of
+next year, the plan would be to convert the legacy Immigration
+and Customs inspectors to CBP officers and to provide, both
+before and after that, some additional cross-training and
+refresher training of the legacy work force, if you will,
+inspectional work force. But at that point essentially all of
+the inspectional work force, except for the Agriculture
+Specialist, would be CBP officers.
+ Ms. Granger. Okay, and one other question: What will that
+consolidation do in terms of the overall number of personnel at
+ports of entry?
+ Mr. Bonner. Well, it will not affect it at all per se, by
+the way, without prejudice to my right to decide that we need
+more inspectors at a particular one port of entry and perhaps a
+few less at another.
+ But this has nothing whatsoever to do--we would have
+essentially, and as a generalization, the same number of
+inspectors at, let's say, the San Ysidro port of entry or
+Detroit or Pembina, North Dakota, or JFK Airport, L.A. seaport
+or Seattle Seaport. You would have the same general number of
+inspectors that you have, now.
+ What you have, though, is you have inspectors that have a
+greater level of training and knowledge, both, as to the
+homeland security/antiterrorism mission and to the general,
+important, traditional missions that the agency as a whole must
+perform.
+ I hope that--.
+ Ms. Granger. Yes.
+ Thank you.
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee may inquire.
+ Mr. Bonner. We will be adding about 2,000, from 2002 to
+2004, we are adding about 2,000, a little over 2,000 inspectors
+to the work force, based upon where we were in fiscal year
+2002.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. I thank the chairman very much, and the
+ranking member.
+ This is a very important hearing and, Commissioner, I am
+gratified for your presence here. I always would hope or always
+would intend for Congress to be problem solvers, and certainly
+your agency was created to solve our biggest problem or to be
+part of the solution to our biggest problem that we are facing
+in the 21st century, and that is of terrorists and terrorist
+activities and horrific acts against the States.
+ So I apologize. There are two conflicting, or at least in
+terms of my time, Immigration Subcommittee hearings that are
+going on, in the Judiciary and this one; and you may have said
+this already. But I would like to know specifically on this
+question of fewer overall hours of training--in fact, I just
+came through the international segment of my airport, Houston
+Intercontinental; and I will put in a local plug and say, we
+want you down there. I am going to personally invite you,
+because we have had a continuing problem in backlogs with the
+number of inspectors.
+ It is not their fault, if you will, but it is a tough job
+with a high volume, and we have not been able to solve that; so
+let me extend a direct invitation. I think we had that
+invitation in before, and we have not been able to work out the
+schedule, so I hope we will be able to do that.
+ But the idea of fewer hours of training. Tell me what your
+vision is for this merged combination of Customs, Immigration
+and Agricultural inspectors. What is the best result of what
+you expect to have happen?
+ Mr. Bonner. Well, first of all, I do not believe there will
+be overall fewer hours of training. I believe there will be
+more hours of training with the approach we are taking.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. And tell me how so?
+ Mr. Bonner. Well, how so in two ways. First of all, the
+basic CBP inspectional officer training will be 3 months, so I
+mean, it is longer significantly than--and that is 6 days a
+week, by the way, so it is significantly longer than the
+current legacy Customs inspector training.
+ But there is a lot of overlap in the Customs and
+Immigration training courses, so--we eliminated that, so I
+think the training is going to be at basic--the basic
+inspectional training is going to be in terms of hours; I think
+it will be roughly equivalent to what it has been separately
+now for the legacy Customs and Immigration basic training
+academies.
+ Now--but in addition to that, we are going to post-in-port
+classroom training when a CBP inspectional officer moves out to
+a port of entry. There were going to be additional training
+requirements and hours of training with respect to the mission,
+which doesn't exist right now, by and large. There is on-the-
+job training and there is occasional, sporadic classroom
+training. But this will be a structured in-port classroom
+training program which is going to be, also, a significant
+number of hours, so at the end of the day, I fully expect that
+CBP officers are going to be more highly trained than they
+currently are.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. Can I stop you?
+ Are they going to have the inherent knowledge where they
+can address technical or out-of-the-box situations in this
+combination? What is your vision for getting them gelling
+together, working with at least a common understanding of the
+procedures, the technical procedures, so that we have an
+effective response to what we are trying to do, which I imagine
+is maximizing personnel to get the most efficient operating
+system that we can?
+ Mr. Bonner. Efficient and effective, but one of the things
+to gel together is, of course, to put all of the inspectional
+officers into one uniform, which we have done, and that will be
+phased in over the next 8 or 9 months.
+ Another thing, though, is in terms of how do they get the
+specialized knowledge that they are to going to need to perform
+their function? Well, there is basic inspectional training. You
+know, a new trainee has to be trained. They go from a GS-5 or
+GS-7 to a GS-11, so there is a period of time with any new
+trainee, where you need to provide on-the-job training, and as
+I say, additional in-port classroom training modules.
+ And then, thirdly, in terms of the inherited sort of
+expertise, we have 18,000 CBP Customs and Border Protection
+inspectors that have a tremendous amount of expertise in the
+Immigration area, the Customs area, and the Agriculture
+protection mission area.
+ And lastly let me just say about more efficient, because I
+know we have been--we discussed the Houston airport and the
+wait times at the airport; and one of the key reasons for those
+wait times has been the lack of what were INS or Immigration
+inspector staffing at the primary booth. And so as you train,
+by the way, new people to perform multiple functions, you can
+have greater flexibility so that you can literally staff all of
+the primary inspection booths with a CBP inspectional officer,
+where we had not been able to do that in the past, so it makes
+us more efficient too in performing missions.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. Let me just conclude.
+ My time, Mr. Chairman--I would just like to conclude by
+saying the topic in the Judiciary Committee is the issue of
+these overstays. Now, that is after the fact, but one of the
+problems that I see is that we need to refine and expedite the
+distinction between perceived troublemakers, because we have
+already defined them as troublemakers--and I use that term not
+lightly because it has offended many of our friends and allies
+from certain regions--and get a preapproval process that helps
+move that process along in terms of people.
+ The other thing that I would like to raise in this
+committee and raise with you as I conclude is that we need to
+also deal on a southern border with the whole question of
+smuggling, which I hope that maybe this merged group may have
+some sensitivities to that.
+ I have a CASE Act, and I hope I will get a hearing in this
+committee dealing with going at the nerve of smuggling so that
+we sort of move that criminal aspect away, so that this merged
+group can deal with the overall commerce and tourism that comes
+about, that we should not be undermining in light of the fact
+that we are all trying to fight terror; and I hope that I can
+engage you in this issue and engage the chairman.
+ It is called the CASE Act. We have worked the FBI, Treasury
+Department, law enforcement on incentives to getting informants
+penalty enhancements, and an outreach program to educate people
+about the travesty and tragedy of smuggling human cargo; and I
+hope we will be able to present that to this committee.
+ I thank you very much.
+ Mr. Bonner. Yes. Happy to discuss that with you.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. Thank you.
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you. And this concludes the questioning for
+the Commissioner.
+ Again, I want to thank you for being here and all that your
+doing and your time today.
+ Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Chairman?
+ Mr. Chairman, may I just add something?
+ Mr. Camp. Yes.
+ Ms. Sanchez. I am very concerned that this whole issue is
+about the agriculture, again, because my State's main industry,
+believe it or not, is agriculture.
+ Mr. Bonner. Well, it is in my State, too, Ms. Sanchez, by
+the way.
+ Ms. Sanchez. I would really look forward to maybe getting a
+personal briefing from your department, just to ensure that we
+are getting our questions asked with respect to that particular
+piece of the program.
+ Mr. Bonner. We will be happy to do that. We will make sure
+that that happens.
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you. Thank you very much.
+ The second panel may come forward. We will have Mr. Tom
+Keefe, President of the National Treasury Employees Union,
+Local 137; Mr. Tom Kuhn, President of the American Federation
+of Government Employees Union, Local 2580; and Mr. Bill Pauli,
+President of the California Farm Bureau Federation.
+ Mr. Camp. Mr. Keefe, why don't we begin with you? We have
+your written testimony, and I would ask that you briefly
+summarize your statement in 5 minutes. There will be another
+hearing, that is scheduled for this room, so we do need to be
+done by 3:30.
+ So, Mr. Keefe, why don't you begin?
+
+ STATEMENT OF TOM KEEFE, PRESIDET, NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES
+ UNION LOCAL 137
+
+ Mr. Keefe. Thank you.
+ Chairman Camp, Ranking member Sanchez, distinguished
+members of the subcommittee, I would like to thank the
+subcommittee for the opportunity to testify on the Bureau of
+Customs and Border Protection's One Face at the Border
+initiative.
+ I am a second generation Customs inspector, proudly
+following in the footsteps of my father, who was a Customs
+inspector until his death in 1982. My law enforcement career
+spans 22 years.
+ In 1982, I started as a deputy sheriff and was a police
+officer for 2 years. In 1984, I accepted a position as an INS
+inspector, in Champlain, New York. To qualify for this
+position, I was required to attend and successfully complete 20
+weeks of Immigration officer basic training class at the
+Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia.
+ In 1989, I transferred to accept a position with the U.S.
+Customs Service. I again was required to attend and
+successfully complete a 9-week basic Customs inspector class at
+FLETC.
+ In addition to my INS and Customs training at the Federal
+Law Enforcement Training Center, I have recently had the
+opportunity to be a part of the DHS Human Resources Design
+Team. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 authorized the
+Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of OPM to
+develop new resources--human resources systems for Federal
+employees in the Department of Homeland Security in the areas
+of pay, performance, management, job classification,
+disciplinary matters, and labor-management relations.
+ As an employee representative from NTEU, the National
+Treasury Employees Union, I was proud to serve on the DHS Human
+Resources Design Team field group. From the extensive field
+hearings and meetings of our design team, we developed 52 human
+resources options that will eventually be sent to Secretary
+Ridge and OPM Director James. I believe this collaborative
+agency-employee process that was used for the DHS design team
+worked very well, and I would suggest that a similar process
+might be useful as the agency looks at challenges of
+reorganizing its border inspections function.
+ As the subcommittee is aware, on September 2, 2003,
+Secretary Tom Ridge announced the creation of the new CBP
+officer position and the One Face at the Border initiative.
+ Under this plan, a new position, the Customs and Border
+Protection officer, would combine the duties of legacy
+inspectors from Customs, INS, and APHIS into a single frontline
+border security position at the 307 official ports of entry
+across the United States.
+ I and the legacy Customs employees that I work with believe
+that combining the border protection responsibilities that were
+held by three highly skilled specialists into one ``super
+inspector'' raises some serious concerns. By utilizing one
+employee to perform all three primary and secondary inspection
+functions, will this agency lose the expertise that has made
+the United States border inspection personnel second to none?
+ I would note that a specialist position will be established
+within APHIS, and no specialist position will be created for
+legacy Customs or INS inspectors. I truly hope that the lack of
+a specialist position will not lead to the lack of specialists
+in many critical Customs and INS functions performed at the
+border. After 20 years as an inspector for both legacy Customs
+and legacy INS, and as a participant of the DHS design team, I
+believe we have a unique perspective to bring to this committee
+as relates to this new Department of Homeland Security and its
+implementation of the One Face at the Border initiative.
+ Prior to the creation of the CBP officers, legacy Customs
+officers receive 9 to 10 weeks of intensive training on the
+Customs Service rules and regulations alone. Under the new CBP
+officer training guidelines, legacy inspectors such as myself
+will be transitioning into the new position in the spring of
+2004 by way of classroom training, CD-ROM, computer training
+and on-the-job training.
+ While the new training will lead to a broader knowledge of
+the INS, Customs and APHIS rules and regulations of entry for
+passengers and those entering the United States, there is a
+concern as to whether it will provide the specialized expertise
+necessary to ensure the successful accomplishment of the
+critical missions of the Department of Homeland Security.
+ Another aspect of the One Face at the Border initiative
+that needs to be more scrutinized, and is lacking in detail, is
+with regard to secondary inspections processed at ports of
+entry. Currently, legacy Customs and INS inspectors and APHIS
+inspectors are cross-trained as to the most basic Customs and
+INS procedures for entry into the United States, for passengers
+and goods.
+ However, if a legacy Customs inspector, for example, is
+faced with a complicated visa situation, they have the ability
+to send the passenger to a more intensive, secondary inspection
+where an experienced legacy INS inspector can make the
+determination as to the validity, say, of a particular visa. It
+is unclear whether experts in visa issues or other Customs and
+INS border protection matters will continue to be available for
+secondary inspection.
+ I feel strongly that the specific expertise must be
+maintained. Stationed at the 307 ports of entry across the
+United States, legacy Customs inspectors, such as myself, K-9
+enforcement officers and in-port specialists make up our
+Nation's front line of defense in the wars on terrorism and
+drugs, as well as facilitation of lawful trade into the United
+States.
+ In addition, legacy Customs personnel are responsible for
+ensuring compliance with over 400 in-port laws and regulations
+for over 40 agencies, as well as stemming the flow of illegal
+contraband, such as child pornography, illegal arms, weapons of
+mass destruction, and laundered money.
+ Both the American public and the trade community expect our
+borders to be properly defended with as little interference to
+legitimate trade as possible. In order to do that, we must
+maintain the expertise of legacy Customs Service personnel who
+have successfully performed these functions in the past.
+ Again, I want to thank the subcommittee for the opportunity
+to share my thoughts on this very important issue concerning
+the CBP's One Face at the Border initiative, and I would be
+happy to answer any questions that you may have.
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you, Mr. Keefe.
+ [The statement of Mr. Keefe follows:]
+
+ Prepared Statement of Thomas Keefe
+
+ Chairman Camp, Ranking Member Sanchez, distinguished members of the
+Subcommittee; I would like to thank the subcommittee for the
+opportunity to testify on the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection's
+(CBP) ``One Face at the Border'' initiative.
+ I am a second-generation Customs inspector, proudly following in
+the footsteps of my father, who was a Customs inspector until his death
+in 1982. My law enforcement career spans 22 years. In 1982, I started
+as a deputy sheriff and was a police officer for two years. In 1984, I
+accepted a position as an INS inspector in Champlain, New York. To
+qualify for this position, I was required to attend and successfully
+complete 20 weeks of the Immigration Officer Basic Class (IOBTC) at the
+Federal Law Enforcement Officer Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco,
+Georgia. In 1989, I transferred to accept a position as a Customs
+inspector. I again was required to attend and successfully complete a
+9-week basic Customs inspector class at FLETC. In addition, over the
+course of my Customs career I have also attended specialized training
+for the Contraband Enforcement School in 1991 and Senior Inspector
+training when I was promoted to Senior Customs Inspector in 1996 both
+at FLETC.
+ In addition to my INS and Customs training at FLETC, I have also
+recently had the opportunity to be a part of the DHS Human Resources
+Design Team. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 authorized the Secretary
+of Homeland Security and the Director of OPM to develop new human
+resources (HR) systems for federal employees in the Department of
+Homeland Security in the areas of pay, performance management, job
+classification, disciplinary matters, and labor-management relations.
+As part of the creation of the new DHS HR system, a design team
+composed of DHS managers and employees, HR experts from DHS and OPM,
+and representatives from the agency's three largest unions, including
+NTEU, was assembled to develop a wide range of options for
+consideration by Secretary Ridge and OPM Director James.
+ As an employee representative from NTEU, I was proud to have served
+on the DHS Human Resources Design Team Field group. The Design team
+held a number of field hearings, town hall meetings and focus group
+meetings around the country. From the extensive field hearings and
+meeting our design team developed 52 human resource options that have
+been forwarded to a Senior Review Advisory Committee who will
+eventually send final HR options to Secretary Tom Ridge and OPM
+Director Kay Coles James. I believe the collaborative agency/employee
+process that was used for the DHS Design team worked very well and I
+would like to suggest that a similar process might be useful as the
+agency looks at the challenges of reorganizing it border inspection
+functions.
+ As the subcommittee is aware, on September 2, 2003, Secretary Tom
+Ridge announced the creation of a new CBP officer position and the
+``One Face at the Border'' initiative. Under this plan, a new position,
+Customs and Border Patrol Officer (CBPO) would combine the duties of
+legacy inspectors from Customs, INS and APHIS into a single front-line
+border security position at the 307 official ports-of-entry across the
+United States.
+ I and the legacy Customs employees I work with believe that
+combining the border protection responsibilities that were held by
+three highly-skilled specialists into a ``super inspector'' raises some
+serious concerns. Each of the job responsibilities from the three
+legacy inspection agencies is highly specialized and distinct. By
+utilizing one employee to perform all three primary and secondary
+inspection functions, will the agency lose the expertise that has made
+the United States border inspection personnel second to none?
+ I would note that a ``specialist'' position will be established
+within APHIS, but no ``specialist'' positions will be created for
+legacy Customs or INS inspectors. I truly hope that the lack of a
+``specialist'' position will not lead to a lack of specialists in the
+many critical Customs and INS functions performed at the border.
+
+ CBP OFFICER TRAINING:
+ After 20 years as an inspector for both legacy Customs and INS and
+as a participant in the DHS Design Team, I believe that I have a unique
+perspective to bring to the committee as it relates to new Department
+of Homeland Security and its implementation of the ``One Face at the
+Border'' initiative. Prior to the creation of the CBP officer position,
+legacy Customs inspectors received 12 weeks of intensive basic training
+on Customs Service rules and regulations alone. Under the new CBP
+officer training guidelines legacy inspectors, such as myself, will be
+transitioning into the new positions in the spring of 2004 by way of
+classroom training, CD-ROM computer teaching and on-the-job training.
+The new training will lead to a broader knowledge of the INS, Customs
+and APHIS rules and regulations of entry for passengers and goods
+entering the United States but there is a concern as to whether it will
+provide the specialized expertise necessary to ensure the successful
+accomplishment of the critical missions of the Department of Homeland
+Security.
+ Another aspect of the ``One Face at the Border'' initiative that
+needs more thorough scrutiny is the lack of details as in pertains to
+the secondary inspection process at ports of entry. Currently, legacy
+Customs and INS inspectors are ``cross-trained'' as to the most basic
+Customs and INS procedures for entry into the U.S. for passengers and
+goods. However, if a legacy Customs inspector is faced with a
+complicated visa entry situation at an airport or land border primary
+inspection station they have the ability to send the passenger to a
+more intensive secondary inspection station where an experienced legacy
+INS inspector can make a determination as to the validity of a
+particular visa. It is unclear whether experts in visa issues or other
+specific Customs and INS border protection matters will continue to be
+available for secondary inspection. I feel strongly that specific
+expertise must be maintained.
+ Stationed at 307 ports-of-entry across the United States, legacy
+Customs inspectors, such as myself, canine enforcement officers, and
+import specialists make up our nation's first line of defense in the
+wars on terrorism and drugs as well as the facilitation of lawful trade
+into the United States. In addition, legacy Customs personnel are
+responsible for ensuring compliance with over 400 import laws and
+regulations for over 40 federal agencies, as well as stemming the flow
+of illegal contraband such as child pornography, illegal arms, weapons
+of mass destruction and laundered money.
+ As a current legacy Customs inspector I would like to briefly
+discuss what the traditional missions of Customs include as well as our
+newly added homeland security missions such as the Customs Trade
+Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), the Container Security
+Initiative (CSI) and the 24-Hour Rule that requires advanced
+transmission of accurate cargo manifest information to the CBP. Legacy
+Customs employees are involved in both the trade facilitation/
+enforcement and law enforcement missions of the Customs Service,
+requiring a truly unique set of job skills.
+
+ Customs Border Security Mission:
+ In 2002, legacy Customs employees seized over 1.9 million pounds of
+cocaine, heroin, marijuana and other illegal narcotics--including over
+10 million tablets of Ecstasy, triple the amount seized in 1999.
+Customs also processed over 500 million travelers last year, including
+over 1 million cars and trucks and ships and these numbers continue to
+grow annually. Legacy Customs personnel's border security missions
+include examining hundreds of thousands of cargo containers every year
+at our nation's airports, seaports and land borders for contraband as
+well as weapons of mass destruction. Legacy Customs personnel interdict
+more drugs, inspect more cargo and process more vehicles than any other
+agency within the federal government.
+
+ Customs Trade Mission:
+ Legacy Customs inspectors, import specialists, and canine
+enforcement officers work closely together to enforce trade and anti-
+smuggling laws. When an inspector makes an illegal cash seizure at a
+border crossing, the case is given to an agent for a follow-up
+investigation to determine where the illegal funds came from and where
+they were going. The interaction between the law enforcement and trade
+facilitation missions of the Customs Service is also necessary to the
+discovery of counterfeit goods and intellectual property piracy, as
+well as terrorist activity.
+ Customs relies on the expertise of its trade enforcement personnel
+to recognize anomalies as they review the processing of commercial
+transaction information associated with the admissibility and entry of
+imported goods. This process assists law enforcement in developing
+targeting criteria as well as targeting suspect shipments and starting
+investigations. In addition, the legacy Customs Service collects over
+$20 billion in revenue on over 25 million entries involving over $1.3
+trillion in international trade every year, providing the federal
+government with its second largest source of revenue. Last year, the
+Customs Service deposited over $22.1 billion into the U.S. Treasury.
+ Both the American public and the trade community expect the borders
+to be properly defended with as little interference with legitimate
+trade as possible, while at the same time being able to efficiently and
+safely facilitate trade across that border. In order to do that, we
+must maintain the expertise of legacy Customs Service personnel who
+have successfully performed these functions in the past.
+ Again, I want to thank the subcommittee for the opportunity to
+share my thoughts on the very important issues concerning the CBP's
+``One Face at the Border'' initiative. I would be happy to answer any
+questions.
+
+ Mr. Camp. And now we will hear from Mr. Kuhn.
+
+ STATEMENT OF TOM KUHN, PRESIDENT LOCAL 2580, NATIONAL
+ IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICES COUNCIL (AFGE/AFL-CIO)
+
+ Mr. Kuhn. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, my name
+Thomas Kuhn. I am President of Local 2580 of the INS Council,
+and I would like to take the opportunity to thank the members
+for allowing me to present my views on the CBP officer.
+ My career began in 1973 as an inspector at Kennedy Airport.
+The training I received at Kennedy allowed me to develop the
+tools that I needed for the rest of my career. My next 19
+years, I worked on land border, and in 1997 I was promoted to
+special operations inspector and transferred to preclearance
+operations in Canada. I have also served as an acting
+supervisor and instructor and intelligence officer, and I
+currently work in quality control.
+ Immigration inspectors graduate after 20 weeks of basic
+training, and it takes 3 to 5 years before they are competent
+to work secondary without a senior officer. Customs and
+Immigration inspectors currently staff land border inspection
+points. That works in view of the fact that no one other than
+U.S. citizens, Canadians or Mexicans with border crossing cards
+are handled along the primary line. Everyone is referred to
+Immigration secondary, where documents are checked, people are
+interviewed, and determinations are made as to the type of
+visa. There are over 55 nonimmigrant visas in subcategories,
+all with different requirements and durations. Immigration
+inspectors at airports process all passengers with visas on the
+primary line. Only passengers suspected of malfeasance are
+referred to secondary and escorted there.
+ It takes at least a year before an inspector is proficient
+at the primary line alone. When a new inspector starts working,
+he makes many unnecessary referrals to secondary, due to the
+fact there are numerous different passports, visas, green
+cards, all with different security features. Many innocent
+people are referred to secondary and they have long waits, miss
+connecting flights and they are tremendously inconvenienced.
+The airlines suffer a loss of revenue, the new officers are
+also easily fooled by high quality false documents and
+convincing liars.
+ I am an American and I am a New Yorker. I watched the World
+Trade Center being built and I watched it come down, thanks to
+media coverage, so I am fully aware of the need to stop
+terrorists. But if we drive the airlines out of business or we
+make it so difficult to enter the United States that the
+tourists stay home, the tourists have won anyway--the
+terrorists have won anyway.
+ On the other hand, in a world where terrorists destroy 100-
+story buildings and kill thousands of people, the border is no
+place to put someone's idea of efficiency over national
+security. I can tell you that with one position our Nation will
+not be safer. If the management of Customs and Border
+Protection, which has limited immigration experience, plans to
+make CBP officers jacks of all trades, they will be masters of
+none and it will be a grave disservice to the security of the
+country.
+ If, on the other hand, they plan on developing quality
+primary officers from the new CBP officers and they develop new
+CBP paths to specialize in Customs, the concept could work.
+ We must continue to have Customs and Immigration
+specialists. Customs inspectors do a great job of examining
+cargo, searching baggage for contraband and weapons of mass
+destruction. Conversely, Immigration inspectors are experts at
+interviewing people and examining documents. CBP officers will
+never be as good as Customs and Immigration inspectors are
+today. The terrorists depend on expert counterfeiters for
+documents, the drug cartels are always developing new,
+sophisticated methods of smuggling, and WMDs are a whole new
+ball game.
+ The United States must have experts at the borders to stop
+all violators. This is a war, and just as in a war we wouldn't
+have F-15 pilots fly Apache helicopters, no one asked Customs
+and Immigration inspectors to do each other's job.
+ Let us do what we are trained to do. I have in this bag,
+this very large bag, volumes of immigration law, which every
+inspector has to be competent in before he can successfully do
+his job. We also have 30 volumes of BIA decisions, directives
+and numerous other volumes which we need to know.
+ I don't know what Customs does, other than the basics. I
+know how to--we have to look for drugs, we look for contraband,
+we look for duty--things that were dutiable and we refer them
+to Customs.
+ Conversely, they do the same things to us.
+ Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to submit for the record a
+letter which I wrote in June of 2000, at the request of former
+national council President Chuck. He appeared before a
+congressional committee, and I bring to your attention the
+closing paragraph:
+ ``In closing, I can only hope that the Members of Congress
+will answer the wakeup call of the two terrorists caught and
+not wait to have another Pearl Harbor or Oklahoma City on their
+watch. If Congress doesn't act, the only people that will be
+surprised by a new terrorist attack will be the innocent
+victims who depend on the government to protect them.''
+ The law enforcement community is aware of the problem and
+knows that the only people who can help prevent another
+disaster are the Members of Congress, the only ones who are
+able to increase staffing for the level necessary to protect
+our country.
+ In closing, I would just like to say, just as lawyers are
+specialized in various fields of law, we must have specialized
+CBP officers. They enforce the laws passed by Congress to
+protect our citizens and as law enforcement officers they
+deserve the enforcement pay and retirement. Most importantly,
+we deserve to give the country the security it needs. The
+security of the United States is the most important thing. We
+cannot accept nor tolerate mediocrity.
+ Thank you, and I will answer any questions you have.
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you.
+ [The statement of Mr. Kuhn follows:]
+
+ Prepared Statement of Thomas Kuhn
+
+ Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Turner, Members of the Committee:
+ My name is Thomas Kuhn. I am President of Local 2580 of the
+National Immigration and Naturalization Services Council (AFGE). I
+would like to take this opportunity to thank the members of the
+Committee for allowing me to present my views on the proposed Customs
+and Border Protection Officer (CBP) position.
+ I will first provide you with a basic overview of my background and
+experience. I began my career in 1973 with the Immigration &
+Naturalization Service at Kennedy Airport. The training and experience
+I received in the five years at Kennedy allowed me to develop the
+primary, secondary, and investigative tools required for me to
+competently perform my duties for the rest of my career. For the next
+19 years duty assignments were land border inspection stations
+ In 1997 I was promoted to Special Operations Inspector and was
+transferred to Preclearance Operations in Canada.
+ In addition to my inspection duties I also served as an instructor,
+intelligence officer, adjudicator, and currently I am the quality
+control officer for legacy Immigration at Montreal. As a special
+operations inspector I have always received excellent or above ratings
+and have received a number of awards and letters of commendation.
+ It is due to my education, training and experience that I am now
+able to provide an informed recommendation about the newly proposed
+Customs and Border Protection Officer. This new position as I
+understand it is designed to replace the Immigration, Customs and
+Agriculture Inspector with one person with 15 weeks of training, and
+OJT for 6 months. Mr. Chairman, having given the issue a great deal of
+thought, I do not believe that such a consolidation will work nor do I
+feel the country will be safer for it
+ My training and education is a continual process in which a new
+situation or question about the Immigration status of an individual
+traveler brings about moment-by-moment developments.
+ The complexities that the Immigration Inspector encounters on a
+daily basis are endless. There is no situation which is as simple as it
+first seems. What should take several minutes to determine ? if an
+individual is an American Citizen--can at times become an involved
+investigatory process that can take hours or even days.
+ Congress has rewritten the immigration law three times in my career
+and each and every time the repercussion at the front lines caused
+untold delays and loss of man-hours. As an example a person born
+outside the US in 1932 may not derive citizenship from a mother married
+to a non-US citizen father. Yet if they were born with the same
+circumstances in 1960 they would be citizens. And there are countless
+other equally confusing examples of immigration law we must interpret.
+ When an immigration inspector graduates after 22 weeks of basic
+inspector training it takes 3 to 5 years before they are competent to
+work secondary without a senior officer with them.
+ US Customs and Immigration Inspectors currently staff land border
+primary points. This works there due to the fact that no one other than
+US citizens, Canadians, or Mexicans with a border crossing card, are
+processed on the primary point of inspection. If a customs inspector
+encounters anyone other than the above listed individuals, the traveler
+is referred to immigration secondary where the arriving person?s
+documents are checked, he or she is interviewed and a determination is
+made as to the type of visa required. There are over 55 non-immigrant
+visas and sub categories all with different requirements and duration
+of stay.
+ Immigration Inspectors at international airports process all
+passengers with visas on the primary line. Passengers suspected of
+malfeasance are immediately escorted to secondary.
+ It takes at least one year before a new inspector is proficient at
+primary alone.
+ When an inspector starts working he makes many unnecessary
+referrals to secondary due to the fact that there are numerous
+different issues of passports, visas, green cards etc all with
+different security features. In many cases these innocent people have
+long waits and often miss connecting flights causing tremendous
+inconvenience and lost revenue to the airlines. The new officer is also
+easily fooled by high quality false documents and convincing liars.
+ I am an American, a New Yorker. I watched the World Trade Center
+being built from my office when I worked on Wall Street. I watched them
+come apart thanks to media coverage. So I am fully aware of the need to
+stop terrorists. But if we drive the airlines out of business, or make
+it so difficult to enter the US that the tourists stay home, then the
+terrorists have won anyway.
+ On the other hand, in a world where terrorists destroy 100 story
+buildings and kill thousands of people, the border is no place to put a
+bureaucrat's idea of efficiency over our national security. And while
+this proposal may appear more `efficient' I can tell you here and now
+our nation will not be safer for it.
+ If the management of Customs and Border Protection, which has
+limited immigration experience, plans on making CBP officers ``Jacks of
+all trades'' they will be ``Masters of none'' and it will be a grave
+disservice to the security of the country.
+ If on the other hand they plan on developing quality primary
+officers from the new CBP officers and then develop new CBP career
+paths to specialize in immigration or customs the concept could work.
+ We must continue to have Customs and Immigration specialists.
+Customs inspectors do a great job of examining cargo, searching
+vessels, and baggage for contraband and WMDs. If I work until I retire
+in six or seven years I will not be anywhere near as good as they are
+today. Conversely Immigration Inspectors are experts in interviewing
+people and examining documents. CBP officers will never be as
+proficient as good Immigration Inspectors are today.
+ The terrorists and criminals depend on expert counterfeiters for
+documents. The drug cartels are always developing new and more
+sophisticated methods of smuggling drugs, and WMDs are a whole new
+ballgame. The United States must have experts at the borders prepared
+to stop all kinds of violators.
+ This is a war and just as in war we would not ask F-15 pilots to
+fly Apache helicopters or B-52 pilots to fly stealth fighters. Don?t
+ask Customs and Immigration inspectors to do each other?s job. Let us
+do what we are trained to do.
+ 1n 1988 when there was a proposal for the INS to take over all land
+border responsibilities there was a local survey done in the Champlain,
+NY area. At that time Customs manned 2/3 of the primary lanes of
+traffic yet immigration inspectors made more that 2/3 of the referrals
+that resulted in refusals of admission. It?s not that immigration
+inspectors were smarter; it is that they were experts in immigration.
+ If you have doubts about the complexity and details of immigration
+law that are required to be understood by Immigration Inspectors, let
+me dispel it right now. On the desk in front of me are the volumes of
+Immigration Law, Bureau of Immigration Appeals decisions and the
+directives that an immigration inspector must be aware of to be
+competent at his or her job. I do not believe it is possible for one
+person to effectively perform this job and take on the responsibilities
+of both customs and agricultural inspectors.
+ I have very little idea what customs inspectors have to know to be
+fully able to do their job even though I am a cross-designated customs
+inspector and have been for 20 years. I know the basics, find drugs,
+what a tourist can bring back from abroad or what a visitor can bring
+into the US. I have even made Customs seizures when I worked alone at
+small northern ports but as to the rest of their job I have no idea. I
+know they enforce laws for 36 different agencies, I know they enforce
+marking regulations and copyright and trademark laws. They also collect
+duties. Other than that I know very little after 20 years of working
+side by side with customs.
+ Finally Mr. Chairman, I want to submit with my testimony a
+letterwhich I wrote in June of 2000 at the request of former National
+INS Council President Chuck Murphy. It concerns the issue of inadequate
+staffing levels at U.S. ports of entry, a problem which continues to
+this day. He submitted it to a Congressional committee when he appeared
+before it. I would like to call your attention to one particular
+paragraph in that letter:
+ ``In closing I can only hope that the members of Congress will
+answer the wake up call of the two terrorists caught and not wait until
+we have another Pearl Harbor, or Oklahoma City on their watch. If
+Congress does not act, theonly people surprised by a terrorist attack
+will be the innocent victims whodepended on the government to protect
+them. The law enforcementcommunity is aware of the problem and knows
+that the only people who canhelp prevent a disaster are the members of
+Congress. They are the only oneswho can increase the staffing to levels
+necessary to protect our country''
+ In my view, the issue that needs to be addressed by DHS and
+Congress is not the consolidation of existing positions at the border,
+but the inability to attract and retain competent workers for the
+existing positions. Low pay compared with other law enforcement
+occupations, the fear of losing job protections and continuing morale
+problems contribute to the high turnover rate among legacy immigration
+inspectors. The failure to recognize customs and immigration inspectors
+as law enforcement officers for purposes of retirement coverage is, and
+will continue to be, a major reason for leaving.
+ Our nation needs a well trained, highly motivated work force in
+order to protect our borders from the threat of terrorism. The current
+division of responsibilities works well and allows us to pursue that
+goal aggressively. The CBP officer will not function as effectively and
+will not keep our nation safer from terrorists. These jobs are too
+important. We cannot tolerate mediocrity. Thank you.
+
+ Mr. Camp. Mr. Pauli, you have 5 minutes to summarize your
+testimony.
+
+ STATEMENT OF BILL PAULI, PRESIDENT, CALIFORNIA FARM BUREAU
+ FEDERATION
+
+ Mr. Pauli. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ms. Sanchez and Mr.
+Goodlatte. It is a pleasure to be here this afternoon.
+ I am a farmer from California. I am President of the
+California Farm Bureau.
+ Mr. Camp. Mr. Pauli, could you pull the microphone in front
+of you?
+ Thank you.
+ Mr. Pauli. Thank you.
+ It is a pleasure to be here. I look forward to making the
+following comments.
+ I have personally visited border crossings, airports, and
+seaports. I have seen why there is a need to streamline
+inspection protocols, as this initiative does, but it is
+critical that it be done with utmost attention to the Animal
+and Plant Health Inspection Service, APHIS, with their mission
+of protecting plant and animal health to ensure a safe and
+reliable food supply for the American consumer.
+ Therefore, in my testimony today I would like to first
+thank the Bush administration for its diligence in protecting
+our homeland; secondly, raise awareness for the agricultural
+role of the new department; and third, express concerns with
+the new streamlining concept.
+ Farm Bureau has worked closely with the Department of
+Agriculture on homeland security issues and appreciates the
+leadership of Secretary Veneman and Deputy Secretary Moseley.
+ The creation of the Homeland Security Council at USDA has
+assisted in protecting our borders, our food supply, our
+research and laboratory facilities and technology resources
+from any intentional acts of terrorism. The quick and decisive
+actions taken at USDA assured consumers that measures were in
+place to protect the U.S. food supply from attack.
+ Californians, unfortunately, know how devastating either an
+intentional or accidental introduction of foreign animal
+diseases or exotic pests can be to our food supply. USDA and
+the California Department of Food and Agriculture have spent in
+excess of $200 million to control outbreaks of Exotic Newcastle
+Disease, bovine tuberculosis and the Mexican Fruit Fly, all of
+which come from outside our borders. Prevention is certainly
+less costly than control and eradication.
+ In light of these recent pest disease outbreaks and a
+projected $2 billion increase in U.S. agriculture imports this
+year, we must strengthen security procedures for product
+inspection, test control, eradication, and emergency
+management.
+ Farm Bureau has supported increased resources to USDA's
+APHIS to improve surveillance measures and accountability at
+U.S. ports of entry, to prevent the introduction of foreign
+plants and animal pests and diseases.
+ It is imperative, and I repeat, it is imperative that these
+resources, including personnel training and quality control,
+not be diminished under the proposed One Face at the Border
+initiative, as proposed by the Department of Homeland Security.
+The training of the new Customs and Border Protection officers
+is the critical issue. It has become readily apparent to me,
+since we issued our initial comments this morning from various
+sources, that the issue about training is unclear.
+ Training is the heart of the issue and whether it is 16
+days, as initially outlined by DHS, or whether it is 90 hours,
+as they say it is now, the real question here is the amount of
+training, the type of training, the type of officers, and their
+background, so that they have adequate knowledge in order to
+understand the issues that we have faced for years and years in
+APHIS.
+ Training is the key. When APHIS border functions were
+transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security, we were
+given assurance that the integrity of these programs would
+remain intact.
+ However, having One Face at the Border administering
+Customs, Immigration and Agriculture programs could be a
+daunting task. After all, the functions of ag inspectors alone
+is very, very complex, ranging from cargo and containers
+carrying potentially harmful insects to travelers carrying mud
+from a foot and mouth disease-infected livestock operation.
+ While we appreciate the Commissioner's outreach to
+agricultural stakeholders, we urge further dialogue between
+DHS, the USDA, and the industry on the initiative, on the
+further defining of DHS's responsibilities relating to food
+safety and safe trade. Many questions remain--many, many
+questions--such as, what about the collaborative efforts at the
+various State-level departments of agriculture and how that
+will be carried out?
+ Agriculture and consumers must be assured that food safety
+will remain a priority under this department. To that end, Farm
+Bureau and all of agriculture advocate the importance of
+trained agricultural specialists at our Nation's points of
+entry and strongly emphasize the need to ensure sufficient
+staff resources for the new Customs and Border Protection
+officers.
+ We commend this committee for holding this hearing. We look
+forward to working with you, USDA and the Department of
+Homeland Security to safeguard the U.S. food supply for both
+intentional and unintentional accidents which will affect not
+only production agriculture across the country, but will be to
+the detriment of the U.S. consumer.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to any
+questions that you and the other members might have.
+ [The statement of Mr. Pauli follows:]
+
+ Prepared Statement of Bill Pauli
+
+ Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee. My name is
+Bill Pauli. I am President of the California Farm Bureau Federation and
+a member of the American Farm Bureau Federation Board of Directors. I
+produce wine grapes and Bartlett pears in Mendocino County. Thank you
+for the opportunity to present testimony on the ``One Face at the
+Border'' concept proposed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
+ Having personally visited border crossings and seaports, I have
+seen why there is a need to streamline inspection protocol as this
+initiative does, but it is critical that it be done with the utmost
+attention to the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)
+mission of protecting plant and animal health to ensure a safe food
+supply.
+ Therefore, in my testimony today, I would like to first, thank the
+Bush administration for its diligence in protecting our homeland,
+secondly, raise awareness for the agricultural role of the new
+department, and third, express concern with the new streamlining
+concept.
+ Farm Bureau has worked closely with the Department of Agriculture
+on homeland security issues and appreciates the leadership of Secretary
+Veneman and Deputy Secretary Moseley. The creation of the Homeland
+Security Council at USDA has assisted in protecting our borders, food
+supply, research and laboratory facilities and technology resources
+from any intentional acts of terrorism. The quick and decisive actions
+taken at USDA assured consumers that measures were in place to protect
+the U.S. food supply from attack.
+ Californians, unfortunately, know how devastating either an
+intentional or accidental introduction of a foreign animal disease or
+exotic pest can be to the food supply. USDA and the California
+Department of Food and Agriculture have spent in excess of $200 million
+to control outbreaks of Exotic Newcastle Disease, bovine tuberculosis
+and the Mexican Fruit Fly--all of which came from outside our borders.
+Prevention is certainly less costly than control and eradication.
+ In light of these recent pest/disease outbreaks and a projected $2
+billion increase in U.S. agriculture imports this year, we must
+strengthen security procedures for product inspections, pest control,
+eradication, and emergency management.
+ Farm Bureau has supported increasing resources to USDA's Animal and
+Plant Health Inspection Service to improve surveillance measures and
+accountability at U.S. points of entry to prevent the introduction of
+foreign plant and animal pests and diseases. It is imperative that
+these resources, including personnel, training and quality control not
+be diminished under the proposed ``One Face at the Border'' initiative
+by the Department of Homeland Security.
+ The training for the new Customs and Border Protection officers
+would have to be extensive to know when a passenger, piece of luggage
+or cargo container needs further inspection by agricultural
+specialists.Sec. The traditional APHIS border inspectors were trained
+intensively for eight weeks under Veterinary Services and the Plant
+Protection and Quarantine Service. Many had an advanced degree in an
+agriculture related field, were highly trained in animal and plant
+disease identification and understood their movement. Under the initial
+system proposed by DHS, the new Customs and Border Protection officers
+would receive only 16 hours of training regarding agriculture. If DHS
+expects to ensure effective protocols with minimal training via
+secondary inspectors, how will the department meet the timing needs of
+perishable commodities and live animals?
+ When APHIS border functions were transferred to the new Department
+of Homeland Security, we were given assurances that the integrity of
+the programs would remain intact. However, having ``one face at the
+border'' administering customs, immigration and agriculture programs
+could be a daunting task. After all, the function of ag inspectors
+alone is very complex, ranging from cargo containers carrying
+potentially harmful insects to a traveler carrying mud from a Foot and
+Mouth Disease infected livestock operation.
+ While we appreciate Commissioner Bonner's outreach to agricultural
+stakeholders, we urge further dialogue between DHS, USDA and industry
+on this initiative and the further defining of DHS responsibilities
+relating to food safety and safe trade. Questions remain, such as, will
+DHS continue collaborative efforts with state-level departments of
+agriculture?
+ Agriculture and consumers must be assured that food safety will
+remain a priority under the department. To that end, Farm Bureau
+advocates the importance of trained agriculture specialists at our
+nation's points of entry and strongly emphasizes the need to ensure
+sufficient staff resources for the new Customs and Border Protection
+officers.
+ We commend this committee for holding this hearing and we look
+forward to working with you, USDA and the Department of Homeland
+Security to safeguard the U.S. food supply from both intentional and
+accidental threats. Thank you.
+
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you for your testimony. And thank you all
+for your testimony. I have a couple of questions for both Mr.
+Keefe and Mr. Kuhn.
+ Tell me, what is your reaction to all of the added
+resources in personnel that have been put on the border since
+September 11? We had some pretty dramatic testimony about the
+increases in resources and programs. Do you have any comment on
+those?
+ Mr. Keefe. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank God. Thank God and
+finally it happened.
+ I remember giving a brief discussion to the Northern Border
+Coalition, a group of Congressmen that are interested in the
+northern border, and I remember talking once--you know, I
+always hear a lot about after September 11, we have done this.
+Well, let me tell you something. A lot of the men and women I
+work with were doing it before September 11.
+ And I used to sit on certain committees for the union to
+negotiate things for the agency, and I would talk about
+terrorism and preventing terrorist attacks and I would be
+laughed at, but guess what?
+ Nobody is laughing anymore, and you know, we commend and we
+are very grateful for the infusion of resources. It allows us
+now to finally do our job. And I guess it is kind of--it is a
+double-edged sword because it is also very frustrating, because
+now we are doing our job, and like the gentleman from
+California said, it is very daunting to look at this; whereas,
+the resources given us--and I don't want to throw the baby out
+with the bathwater here.
+ Some of this idea is good, some of this merging is good,
+but the specialty has to remain; and it is now very daunting
+for the men and women that I work with, almost paralyzing, to
+think that we have to do all these functions.
+ Mr. Camp. Okay.
+ Mr. Kuhn, any?
+ Mr. Kuhn. I would agree that it is a good concept.
+ The extra manpower on the northern border has been a
+tremendous help. I spent 19 years on the northern border, many
+times working alone on our checkpoint, and there is not a whole
+lot you can do when you are alone.
+ There are vehicles that come down that you would like to
+really look at, but you don't back up 25 minutes away, so now
+that we have two officers in a lot of these places, it gives
+these officers a real feeling of protection for themselves.
+ Also, the knowledge that we are getting and some of the
+tools we are getting is great. They are upgrading our computer
+systems. Right now, if I want to run a full check on somebody,
+I have to go in and out approximately nine different databases,
+all with different passwords, and you know how frustrating and
+complicated that gets. So it is a good idea, the improvements
+are good, but as Mr. Keefe said, we have to maintain a certain
+amount of expertise in the various fields.
+ Mr. Camp. Well, I certainly appreciate those comments and
+what you and the members of your organizations are doing at the
+border to protect and serve the United States and the people
+who live here.
+ Tell me, it seems to me, in those smaller units, this
+integration is actually a good thing because they are doing
+everything anyway; and it seems to me, in the larger areas,
+larger points of entry, that you are naturally going to have
+some sort of specialization. And maybe I am misunderstanding,
+but I didn't see anything that necessarily would prevent
+further specialization in a unified agency. I mean, already the
+Commissioner testified that there would be, for example, a K-9
+unit with special training; and clearly there is the
+Agriculture inspector that is going to be a specialist.
+ Is there something I don't know or is there something
+preventing those who may have a particular expertise or the way
+this will develop? In terms of One Face at the Border, the
+functions will still have to occur. Is there something
+preventing a specialization on behalf of an employee if they
+want to go deeper into something?
+ Mr. Keefe. If I may, I agree with you, and I have heard
+Commissioner Bonner speak on several occasions, and he seems to
+be inching towards specialization, although not explicitly
+saying so.
+ I think there would be a greater comfort level if he
+explicitly said, for example, we are going to have secondary
+legacy Customs people, secondary INS people that are proficient
+and trained to do this--I think that would be a positive step
+in selling this program--and a secondary APHIS inspector.
+Because, as the gentleman said, APHIS, we are all different,
+but APHIS is a very scientific background. And I can tell you,
+in maybe even 20 years, while I may be able to have some
+similar skill sets as my partner Mr. Kuhn, I am not
+scientifically inclined--I don't have that vocation; and it is
+very specific. So I think there is nothing prohibiting it, but
+there is nothing that says it completely.
+ And if I may, Mr. Chairman, I would also like to comment on
+what the full chairman said. I don't want to come across and I
+know the people I represent don't want to come across; as we
+have been doing this for 20 years, we don't want to change. As
+Mr. Kuhn said, we welcome the change, but we think it should be
+done in a constructive, positive way with employees who do the
+job having some feedback; and up until this point, sir, we have
+had none of that.
+ Mr. Camp. Okay. I appreciate your comments.
+ Ms. Sanchez may inquire.
+ Mr. Kuhn. Sir?
+ Mr. Camp. I am sorry. I didn't mean to cut you off.
+ Mr. Kuhn. I have a lot of airport experience that Mr. Keefe
+doesn't have, and it is going to be a real problem at airports,
+at the unified primary. At a land border, when a person comes
+in who is not Mexican, Canadian or U.S., he is immediately
+referred over to secondary where Immigration takes care of him.
+ When you come into an airport, everybody's done on primary,
+and we issue I-94s, we determine whether the person is valid,
+we give them the time frame they have. We have to question them
+on what their intent is, are they coming for business, are they
+a tourist, et cetera. Customs doesn't do any of that now, so
+all of those 10,000 Customs inspectors will have to be brought
+up to speed on that.
+ I have 30 years, and we still get into discussions on the
+basic category of B-1 because it is getting so blurred with
+international business. Is this gentleman a visitor for
+business or does he need a different visa, a treaty trader or
+an in-company transferee, or a work permit; and it is going to
+be a real problem at the airports.
+ Mr. Camp. Okay. Thank you.
+ Ms. Sanchez.
+ Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ I guess I am having a little bit of difficulty trying to
+really understand how this works, this integrated one person
+who is the primary, but that doesn't necessarily mean that
+under the new system, there will be a secondary person--that is
+actually more trained or more specialized is pretty much what I
+really gathered from Mr. Bonner's testimony earlier and some of
+the reading that I did. Is that correct?
+ Is that the understanding, Mr. Chairman, or the
+understanding that you all have as to how this is going to
+work. Or does anybody really know?
+ Mr. Kuhn. Well, what I have been told at town meetings is,
+we are going to start rotating.
+ Ms. Sanchez. So you could end up being the secondary guy or
+the primary guy.
+ Mr. Kuhn. And I could wind up being the Customs secondary
+guy.
+ Do you have anything to declare? Yes. See the Customs
+inspector.
+ Ms. Sanchez. Right. Right.
+ Do you have any comment to that, Mr. Keefe?
+ I mean, I am trying to understand because what I am getting
+is that any of you will be placed in a place, so you could be a
+primary guy or you could be a secondary guy and if you are
+placed in a secondary position, you may not know the full stack
+of books that you have in front of you and all the other
+directives and court decisions that we have going on.
+ Mr. Keefe. Exactly. You have got it, ma'am, with one
+exception.
+ He is correct when he says I have very little airport
+experience. The only airport experience I had was coming down
+here today. I don't work in an airport, and it is a different
+world. We have had--as the Commissioner of Customs said, it is
+called one-step inspection at the border, whereas Customs and
+Immigration inspectors perform inspections of--primary
+inspections on the border. I do it. It is one face. It has been
+that way for 20 years. I don't need a high level of expertise
+to do the primary screening. The skill sets are the same; the
+questioning is the same.
+ Where it gets tricky is where you go into a matter that is
+a little more detailed. And one of the things I said to
+Commissioner Bonner at a town meeting in Buffalo is, physicians
+have similar skill sets, doctors have similar skill sets, a
+podiatrist and a cardiologist. When I get chest pains, I don't
+want to go to a podiatrist. There is a reason for
+specialization.
+ On the land border, if I have got a question on a primary
+issue, I send it to secondary. It is almost a safety net. It is
+a critical thing. It is a different world, though. You just
+have to know the airports and land borders and, for that
+matter, seaports. They are all different environments.
+ Ms. Sanchez. If--I am trying to also understand if we have
+new people coming into the system and now are trained overall
+as just a new Border Patrol--whatever the name of this is, the
+new uniform guy, Oh, it is a new uniform--I don't know that it
+is necessarily a good thing.
+ That is what I am trying to figure out.
+ How comfortable do the people who have already been doing
+this for a long time feel as far as putting aside the, what
+we--well, this is the way we have done it in Border or this is
+the way we have done it in Customs or this is the way we have
+done it in INS for a while.
+ How are they feeling about going through the new training?
+Are they getting new training? Are they getting the same 71-
+hour training course?
+ What do your colleagues--what kind of training do you think
+you are going to get? Do you feel comfortable with that if you
+are going from ``I have always done INS'' and looked at what
+the backgrounds of people are, and now I have got to go and do
+cargo; and I guess the same answer back from cargo to the
+people. Because some people feel very comfortable doing cargo
+and checking things, but they may not feel good about
+questioning people about status, ``Are you really supposed to
+be here in this country?''
+ Not that he would be more lenient, but they might be,
+because confrontation over ``Are you supposed to be here?'' is
+a lot different confrontation from ``You have got to leave that
+pair of scissors there'' or ``We have got to take this away''
+or ``You have got to pay an additional $30 because you didn't
+declare this.''
+ It is a different kind of confrontation.
+ Ms. Sanchez. I guess I am trying to feel how are the
+current employees feeling about all these changes going on?
+ Mr. Kuhn. As far as the training goes we had one videotape
+put out so far on primary, and I reviewed it and there were
+four major errors on the training video. I was asked by my
+point director to review it before we put it out.
+ And with regard to how do the employees feel, we do the
+same job, we need the same skill sets, but things are--with Mr.
+Keefe's job, it is you find it or you don't find it. It is
+physical, it is objective.
+ With integration we train more with the subjective. Your
+answers come from interrogating the people, questioning the
+people and trying to find out what a person's true intent is,
+and one of the major problems is going to be when the
+supervisors switch over. They are going to get a customs
+supervisor, a hundred hours of training on integration, and
+then I am going to have to try and convince him one way or the
+other that, A, we should exclude this guy or, B, we should let
+this guy go. And I believe I could snow it as supervisor if I
+wanted to, and I believe there are some supervisors who no
+matter what I said their mind would be made up even if they
+were wrong. And it is going to be a problem.
+ Mr. Keefe. There is an incredible level where I work of
+frustration and almost demoralization, and it is kind of ironic
+considering as the chairman said, you know, how do we feel
+about the staff. They feel very good about the staffing and the
+recognition for the job we have done, and yet they almost feel
+like their job is being kind of dumbed down, because they have
+worked very diligently and have been very proficient and very
+talented and have intercepted a lot of things, both of our--all
+three of our legacy agencies.
+ As far as the new people, we don't know yet. They are just
+starting to go with this training. So I am sure they will come
+back, and they don't have anything to gauge it by. But most of
+the journey people inspectors are very resentful, and again it
+is not because they are resistant to the change. They are
+resistant to the way the change was thrust upon them without
+their input.
+ Ms. Sanchez. Thank you. And I guess I have one last
+question for Mr. Pauli, and this, again, trying to understand,
+because I didn't get to question the Commissioner as much as I
+had hoped, and I will submit some questions for the record. But
+you have studied this a lot more than I have and probably
+almost any member on this committee because it is directly
+going to effect you as a farmer and our Nation's agriculture.
+ Do you feel comfortable that in fact when there is
+something coming across the border or when there is a person
+coming through the airport or when there is a port person that
+we are actually going to have a secondary agriculture person
+there or there is going to be somebody that is trained up for
+that more so under this system than what we currently have, Mr.
+Pauli?
+ Mr. Pauli. Well, I hope it is apparent from my testimony
+that we have real concerns about how this is going to really
+work. We have questions about the training and the adequacy of
+the training. We think there is potential holes, but we are
+trying to keep an open mind, recognizing that clearly the
+system is changing, but we are not completely comfortable at
+this point by any means.
+ There again, on one hand the Department seems to be open
+and trying to meet with us and talk with us about what they are
+doing and why, and yet they don't seem to have all of the
+answers yet. It is evolving, and that is why we are here today
+to express our concern that we don't know some of the pieces.
+We hope those will come together, but as the other two
+gentlemen have stated, these are complex issues, and when you
+get to the APHIS issues, they too are very, very complex. They
+involve the type of personnel that have a background, desire to
+be in these kinds of areas, these kinds of issues. They have a
+background in agriculture. They understand these diseases and
+these pests. They know where they come from. They know where to
+look for them. And we are not convinced at this point that we
+may or may not get there.
+ Ms. Sanchez. And lastly, how much time do you think you
+have spent trying to understand this and doing meetings and
+talking--trying to talk to some of the Department officials?
+ Mr. Pauli. Well, it is hard to quantify the amount of time,
+but, I mean, there again--.
+ Ms. Sanchez. 10 hours, 50 hours?
+ Mr. Pauli. This has been an issue for over a year for us as
+it has been coming forward, but APHIS has always been a concern
+for us particularly in California and on the border states
+because of the complex issues we face and the outbreaks of
+various diseases and pests. There is not an easy answer to
+detect or prevent these pests.
+ Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you. The chairman of the full committee is
+back if you would like to inquire.
+ Mr. Cox. I would like to thank the witnesses both for your
+prepared testimony and for what you do every day when you are
+not here. Mr. Pauli, congratulations to you on being appointed
+to Governor Schwarzenegger's transition team. I hope that that
+is a worthwhile experience. And Mr. Keefe--is it Kuhn? Mr.
+Keefe and Mr. Kuhn, thank you very much for what you do at the
+border and for the testimony that you provided to us.
+ I want to--first of all, I just want to express my support
+for the concerns that have been raised about getting ag right.
+I am a strong supporter of trying to consolidate our border
+functions, but at the same time I think we have got to do it
+right and particularly when it comes to ag we want to make sure
+that--because that is science as compared to law, if you will.
+It is not just a combination of two separate legal disciplines.
+It is--we are now pitting humanities into sciences, and so we
+need to make sure that we get this right. And I know the
+chairman of the Agriculture Committee wants to get it right. I
+know the Secretary wants to get it right, and so I think that
+the concerns that you have raised with us are very valid ones,
+and we want to continue our oversight and make sure this does
+get done right.
+ Mr. Keefe and Mr. Kuhn have raised slightly different
+issues than the APHIS issue, but I wonder if I could get the
+benefit of, unless I am, Mr. Chairman, covering ground that has
+already been covered at this hearing, get your take on the
+APHIS aspects, because your testimony I think is very good
+about the challenges that we face trying to combine customs and
+immigration. But I would like to hear a little bit more about
+your thoughts on the APHIS aspects, if you feel comfortable.
+ Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I did say a little bit about it
+before you came in, and I think you hit it right on the head. I
+mean, it is an almost an apples and oranges thing. It is a law
+enforcement mindset from the people that I have worked in
+within APHIS to a scientific approach to a job.
+ Again, you know, on the primary--our worlds are a little
+different. I work at the land border. Mr. Kuhn works at an
+airport. On the land border I am able to ask some routine
+questions and do some routine examinations, and I feel a fairly
+strong comfort level with the primary function performing APHIS
+inquiries.
+ However, if you got into anything beyond that--and we are
+not talking a lot of detail--I think that is where it gets very
+problematic, because, again, it requires some level of
+scientific study that I just don't have the benefit in my
+education experience.
+ Mr. Cox. Mr. Kuhn, do you want to add to that?
+ Mr. Kuhn. Basically APHIS is just something that
+immigration inspectors are aware of. We basically ask a few
+basic questions, and we say, see the agriculture officer. I
+don't have any scientific background that would lend itself to
+becoming proficient, you know. I know what an orange is, an
+apple is. I could probably tell if there was a bug crawling on
+one of them, but other than that I don't have a whole lot of
+experience in it.
+ Mr. Cox. Mr. Kuhn, I wonder if I could ask you about an
+area--the area where you are most experienced, and that is
+looking at documents that people bring with them as they try to
+cross the border. We have had hearings recently in this
+committee focused on fraudulent documents and their prevalence
+and also not just fake documents but valid government-issued
+documents that are fraudulently obtained.
+ The latter is of particular concern. The State of Maryland
+right now is considering loosening its requirements for
+issuance of a driver's license. Virginia since 9/11 went the
+other way because the 9/11 terrorists sought out Virginia given
+the laxity of the issuance of their IDs. California just had a
+contest about this in the context of our gubernatorial
+recollection, but, you know, very plainly even before the
+legislature changed the law in California, there were big
+problems at the DMV because the General Accounting Office went
+in and easily obtained fraudulently issued licenses based on
+the most obvious forgeries.
+ What can we do given that while we may fix one of these
+problems in one State or another State, there is this seeming
+proliferation of government-issued IDs that aren't any good?
+What can we do to make sure that as you are looking at people
+coming across the border, A, you don't have to keep in your
+mind 147 different documents and what they are supposed to look
+like and, B, protect you from the problem that just because it
+is government-issued it might not be real. It might have the
+guy's picture on it. It might be from the real state of the
+union, but it is just not legit. What can we do to address this
+problem?
+ Mr. Kuhn. Short of a U.S. citizen ID card which would be
+issued by the Federal Government, it is an absolute nightmare.
+Almost every county in the United States issues a different
+type of birth certificate. It is no big problem to go to a
+cemetery and see someone, you know, of your age who died at a
+very young age. You get a birth certificate for that child. You
+go get a driver's license, and you have the world. You have a
+U.S. passport, which only gets a cursory examination in most
+countries of the world. It is an absolute--you would have to
+cross-reference all the birth certificates and death
+certificates in the country to make sure that somebody can't
+get a birth certificate for a dead person. You should probably
+link all of the driver's license bureaus together.
+ Mr. Cox. And incidentally, we discovered in our hearings
+that that is already done for commercial driver's licenses,
+just not for everybody else.
+ Mr. Kuhn. Right. There was an issue made a short time ago
+about some--I guess it was GAO inspectors that came through the
+northern border and they presented counterfeit driver's
+licenses, and it made press headlines that they got into the
+country. We don't examine driver's licenses. A U.S. citizen
+doesn't have to present anything. I talk to the person. If the
+person is a U.S. citizen, I let them go. If I don't think he is
+a U.S. citizen, then I really worry about documents.
+ So in the case of these guys coming through a land border
+with a false driver's license, it is not a shock to us. We
+don't check those documents. At airports we do, but at land
+borders you don't.
+ Mr. Cox. Well, it is interesting. Our colleague Eleanor
+Holmes Norton, who is one of the moving forces in making sure
+we had this hearing on document fraud, described herself, and I
+think fairly, as a civil libertarian, and she is coming more
+and more to the view that we have got to have some sort of
+biometric identifier as a matter of civil rights and civil
+liberties, because right now what we are doing at the border is
+you are sizing somebody up and deciding whether they are a
+citizen. And obviously that kind of subjective approach is
+going to work less well for people who look like they are from
+some other country, and that is exactly what people from
+various national ethic groups don't like about the way
+government enforces the law.
+ Do you see any down--now, the purpose of a biometric of
+course, whether it be a thumbprint or a hand print or a retina
+or iris or facial, whatever you pick, the purpose of all of
+this is to connect the document with the person and also to
+make it much more difficult for people to generate fraudulently
+obtained government documents in the first place.
+ Do you see resistance to biometrics in the workforce, or do
+you see support for biometrics in the workforce, or do you just
+have a whole host of opinions on it?
+ Mr. Kuhn. We welcome it. Anything that will aid us in
+keeping out the people we need to keep out, we welcome. I don't
+know of an immigration officer who wouldn't love to see a U.S.
+ID card with a biometric in it. It is just something we really
+need.
+ Mr. Cox. Mr. Chairman, as you know, our statute, the
+Homeland Security Act, expressly forbids national identity
+card, and I don't think we should go revisit that portion of
+the statute, but I do think it is incumbent upon us to take a
+look at minimum standards for those who do issue identification
+in the United States of America and certainly for such national
+interstate interests as boarding aircraft, buying weapons and
+so on.
+ I yield back.
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you. Mr. Goodlatte may inquire.
+ Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I also thank
+Chairman Cox for his comments regarding agriculture. It is of
+grave concern here, and I share his hope that we will through
+coordination of efforts here achieve a better result, because
+certainly anything can be improved upon; but less training and
+less front line attention from agriculture folks concern us,
+and we have had not only on our part but I think on the part of
+the farm community and others as well a great deal of concern
+about the lack of communication that has come forward to
+explain exactly how this is going to work.
+ I have some exhibits we didn't have time for during the
+first round of questions with Mr. Bonner, but I will take the
+opportunity now, Mr. Chairman, and show you how complex some of
+these things are. These are not apples or oranges. This is the
+can of soup, Big Soup. It looks pretty innocent. It is not a
+U.S. product. It is a product of England and it is a banned
+product in the United States. It was seized at an airport by a
+trained agriculture quarantine inspector. It includes lamb
+ruminant, which is a risk for transmitting mad cow disease; and
+as many know, BSE caused a very serious problem in Europe. We
+have got to keep it out of the United States . It is heat
+resistant, survives the canning process, and BSE is listed as a
+select agent under the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection
+Act. I hope 16 hours of training for the frontline person will
+help to identify this innocent-looking thing as a problem.
+ [Information follows:]
+
+ [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1510.001
+
+ [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1510.002
+
+ [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1510.003
+
+ [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1510.004
+
+ [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1510.005
+
+ [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1510.006
+
+ [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1510.007
+
+ This is not even an agricultural product. It is a
+handicraft, but it contains raw cotton, cotton litter and
+cotton seed, and souvenirs such as stuffed toys and handicrafts
+can contain prohibited agricultural materials. And the risk is
+a number of insects and other disease-bearing items like pink
+boll worm, golden nematode and something called flag smut that
+I had never heard of before.
+ This is something called waniola jirardi. Its origin is
+Madagascarian, and the problem is that this can be mistaken for
+a small coconut and released. Coconuts are a municipal product,
+but actually this is a palm nut that is an endangered species.
+And the correct action is to authorize movement to the plant
+inspection station. Plant diseases in violations of the CITES
+regulations are the risk that is involved there.
+ This is a bonsai tree with silk flowers. The tree was
+declared as artificial but is actually a live bonsai with the
+leaves removed and replaced with silk flowers. Obviously the
+risk is that this importation could harbor diseases, insects
+and nematodes.
+ This one is boneless--if you can't read that, it is
+boneless duck from Taiwan simply labeled as jerry fish.
+Packaging can sometimes be misleading. At a glance this appears
+to be labeled as a fish. Actually, this is boneless duck from
+Taiwan. Animal products must be carefully examined to ensure
+that they are what they appear to be, and the risk here is very
+high. As many people from southern California know, we have
+just been through a very devastating experience, a hundred
+million dollar-plus problem with exotic Newcastle disease. That
+is exactly what the risk is with this product.
+ And finally, we have this strange looking thing. This is a
+decorative bird's nest made with rice straw. This is one of
+many types of handicrafts made from prohibited rice and wheat
+straw. These are typically declared as souvenirs, but the
+problem with a number of fungal and bacterial diseases for
+rice, another major California product, is very great.
+ So, Mr. Pauli, I would ask you, given the fact that if
+these products are not caught, they could expose American
+agricultural to tremendous risks of pests and diseases, do you
+believe that the proposed training program for primary
+inspectors at points of entry into the United States will be
+sufficient to safeguard American agriculture?
+ Mr. Pauli. We believe the answer is no. We are hopeful,
+because without additional training and fully understanding the
+consequences that could occur to California and to American
+agriculture, there has to be more than what they are currently
+telling us and showing us, and we are anxious to find out what
+that is.
+ I mean, in my comments I said initially on their Web site
+they said they would receive 16 hours of training. I now
+understand from them directly here today that that has been
+increased to 90. We hope that it is going to be adequate. We
+hope that it is enough detail. We hope that the personnel they
+have, have the kind of MO to try to deal with the scientific
+aspects of understanding these complex issues and the type of
+materials that can come forward. We have major questions about
+whether that is going to occur, and yet as Mr. Cox has said,
+you know, we support many of the concepts here in terms of some
+of the things that are necessary to streamline the process. It
+is just a question of how much streamlining we are going to do
+and how the process is going to evolve and how we can
+adequately ensure that these issues that you brought up and
+that I brought up are going to be addressed. And right now we
+simply haven't been able to get the answers to feel comfortable
+that those kinds of issues are going to be addressed.
+ Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you. Let me ask Mr. Keefe and/or Mr.
+Kuhn, you are experienced on the border dealing with things
+unrelated to APHIS. The APHIS inspectors have historically had
+qualified degrees or extensive previous experience, then go
+through not 16, not 90 but 400 hours of training before they
+are put on the front lines. How do you feel about taking over
+these responsibilities in addition to the other two? Do you
+think that is sufficient training?
+ Mr. Keefe. No, sir. And I say so--and I enjoyed your
+presentation, and I have seen similar things. And before this
+new position, I was able to say I don't know and refer it to an
+expert. Now I am going to say I don't know and refer it to
+somebody that may know more or less than me.
+ So I feel very, very uncomfortable, because the one thing I
+know about the APHIS function is if you really want to
+critically harm this country and its economy, that is a good
+way to do it, and you need a specialization that I know I do
+not possess. So I feel--I, the people I work with, feel very
+uncomfortable about that.
+ Mr. Goodlatte. So in other words, the training of the front
+line person as well as the training and the placement of the
+backup, the more specialized person, are both very critical.
+ I think we have, Mr. Chairman, an awful lot of unanswered
+questions here that pose a tremendous amount of risk. If hoof
+and mouth disease were to get into the United States, which we
+spend a tremendous amount of time at our borders preventing and
+so far have done successfully, it would be a multibillion
+dollar problem. For that matter, BSE would be a multibillion
+dollar problem for our livestock industry in the country. We
+know of the different types of invasive species that get into
+the country now and cause serious damage to a whole host of not
+just agricultural products but also to our environment that we
+have to deal with, and I am very concerned that more
+information needs to come forward to convince us that we are
+going to increase rather than decrease the expertise we have in
+catching these things at the border. They are very tricky
+problems, and the stories by which some exotic and invasive
+species have gotten into the United States through very
+unexpected means, those are not terrorist acts for the most
+part. They are very innocent acts in many cases, but
+nonetheless have equally if not greater devastation to our
+economy and potentially to the health of people.
+ So I hope that the Department will be more forthcoming and
+work with those who do have expertise in this area to design a
+plan that does achieve their goal, which I agree with the
+chairman is a worthwhile goal, at the same time assuring us
+that the goal achieves its real purpose, which is to be more
+effective in this area, not less effective.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you. I want to thank again this panel and
+the Commissioner for their testimony today. I note that some
+members may have additional questions for this panel, and which
+they may wish to submit into writing. Without objection, the
+hearing record will remain open for 10 days for members to
+submit written questions to these witnesses and to place their
+responses in the record.
+ There being no further business, again, I want to thank the
+subcommittee members and the witnesses for testifying here
+today. This hearing is adjourned.
+ [Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
+
+
+ A P P E N D I X
+
+ ----------
+
+ Material Submitted for the Record
+
+ Prepared Statement for the Record of Donna M. Garren, Ph.D. Vice
+ President, Scientific and Technical Affairs
+
+ United Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Association (United) is a national
+trade association representing member growers, shippers, packers,
+processors, marketers and distributors of fresh produce in the United
+States. United members provide the leadership to shape business, trade
+and public policies that drive our industry. Working with thousands of
+industry members, United provides a fair and balanced forum to promote
+business solutions; helps build strong partnerships among all segments
+of the industry, promotes increased produce consumption; and provides
+scientific and technical expertise essential to competing effectively
+in today's marketplace.
+ The dramatic impact of the terrorism attacks of September 11, 2001
+has led to a new focus in public policy aimed at promoting greater
+safety and security and preventing terrorist action. As our members
+provide over 1,000 different fresh fruits and vegetables to American
+consumers from both domestic growers and countries around the world, we
+take seriously our responsibility for prevention, detection, and all
+necessary actions to protect consumers from intentional contamination
+of our products. However, our world has changed and the produce
+industry must continue to change with it. Food security is a new issue
+for the entire food industry as a whole and this issue must be
+addressed to build a strong, safe and reliable food supply. Food
+security systems should be risk-based and recognize and respond to new
+risks as they arise, provide the same level of protection to consumers
+whether produced domestically or abroad, efficiently steward new
+technologies to the market; and effectively educate and communicate to
+stakeholders throughout the supply chain. The attention to food safety
+controls that operators in our industry have already proactively
+implemented in their operations can have a significant impact on food
+security.
+ While food security is a top priority for the produce industry,
+presently, economic damages from invasive pests and disease now exceed
+$120 billion annually. Toward this end, the fresh produce industry
+supports expedited and aggressive actions by the federal government in
+cooperation with the industry and stake holders at the state and local
+levels to eradicate and protect the domestic market from an increasing
+threat of exotic pests and diseases entering the United States. As a
+result of globalization, federal government action is critically
+important due to the increasing pathways for the movement and
+introduction of foreign, invasive agricultural pests and diseases as
+well as recent economic damages to the affected industries.
+ Increased importation of agricultural products into the United
+States has also increased the risk of the introduction of plant pests
+and diseases that threaten domestic production. Fruit imports increased
+from 1.35 million metric tons in 1990 to 2.82 million metric tons in
+1999. Imports of fresh citrus products alone increased from 101,000
+metric tons in 1990 to 348,000 metric tons in 1999. Vegetable imports
+increased from 1.90 million metric tons in 1990 to 3.73 million metric
+tons in 1999. Fresh tomato imports have doubled during that period as
+well. In addition, states such as California and Florida are seeing
+record numbers of tourists and other visitors arrive each year. Some
+330 million visitors entered California and Florida through airports,
+seaports and highways in 1998, a combined increase of over 4.5 percent
+over the previous year. These growth statistics only exacerbate the
+problems surrounding efforts to control and eradicate invasive pests
+and disease.
+ Recognizing the need to address this serious situation, we commend
+the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), Department of Homeland
+Security (DHS) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) for their
+leadership in working with the private sector, including our industry,
+to ensure that appropriate steps are in place to minimize the potential
+of terrorist action to contaminate foods. However, let us keep in mind
+the American food supply continues to be the safest in the world.
+Continuing to ensure the safety and security of fresh fruits and
+vegetables whether produced domestically or abroad is a top priority of
+the entire produce industry. With this in mind, we have serious
+reservations pertaining to the new activities and training of the new
+CBP Officers and Agricultural Specialists.
+ While the intention and in concept creating a CBP corps of officers
+who will present ``one face at the border'' to travelers and the
+importing community is good, we have doubts that these individuals will
+be adequately prepare to address invasive pests and disease issues. We
+support the creation of the CBP Agriculture Specialist position which
+will complement the work of the CBP Officers and be stationed at ports
+with large volumes of cargo importation, particularly in those hubs
+where the agriculture industry imports much of the flowers, fruits,
+vegetables, meat, and other products of an agricultural interest.
+However, the reality of most inspections and processing on the
+``frontlines'' will be managed by CBP Officers whose background and
+training will be seriously lacking for the identification of pests and
+disease. Also, the CBP's belief that there will be a unified cargo
+operation enabling a ``one-stop process'' for importers and that cargo
+can be examined more quickly and thoroughly, is misguided. Speed of
+inspections is secondary to thorough and accurate inspections.
+ In conclusion, United's members strongly support the goal of
+strengthening the safety and security of our food and the public.
+However, we must not neglect the federal government's responsibility of
+protecting our nation's agricultural crops from invasive pests being
+transported into this country. We need officials on the ``frontlines''
+of our borders and ports to take seriously their role in this endeavor.
+Thus, we recommend CBP work with the agricultural stakeholders to
+better prepare the corps of new CBP officers to protect our nation's
+agricultural industry. Thank you for the opportunity to comment. We
+look forward to continuing to work together with the DHS, CBP, and USDA
+on these important matters.
+
+ Prepared Statement of Thomas P. Kuhn
+
+ AMERICAN FEDERATION
+
+ OF
+
+ GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
+
+ (afl-cio)
+
+ NATIONAL IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE COUNCIL #117 BUFFALO
+ DISTRICT LOCAL NO.2580
+
+ January 23, 2000
+The United States House of Representative
+Washington, DC
+
+Dear Representatives
+ I would like to take this opportunity to present my views on the
+abdication of the Northern Border by the Immigration & Naturalization
+Service. I have been an Immigration Inspector for twenty-eight years,
+twenty of which I have spent in the Buffalo, NY district. In that time
+there has been no increase in the number of non-user fee positions for
+inspectors and only an increase of 19 user fee positions.
+ During that time traffic has risen dramatically, as has the
+criminal activity in the area. The rise in traffic has been most
+pronounced at the major Ports of Entry where the Interstate highway
+system connects to the Canadian highway system. Traffic has increased
+so much in Buffalo that they are proposing a second bridge to handle
+the traffic. At Niagara Falls they have built a new inspection
+facility, increasing from six to nineteen lanes but have not funded any
+additional positions. As a consequence of these increases, the Buffalo
+district has had to remove Immigration Inspectors from the following
+Ports of Entry: Fort Covington, Chateaugay, Churubsco, Cannons Corners,
+Jamison Line, Route 9B, and Route 276. All of these New York ports are
+land ports on the Quebec border. They leave a seventy-mile section of
+the Quebec border unprotected by Immigration Inspectors. Unlike the
+southern border, there and no great deserts to act as a natural
+barrier. In northern New York persons intent on breaking the law simply
+drive through an unmanned section at the and then avoid the five or six
+Border Patrol Agents assigned to monitor the area. Then they are in the
+US to do whatever they want. It is no great surprise that one of
+largest known Chinese smuggling ring was just broken in the Massena--
+Fort Covington, NY area.
+ The Buffalo District encompasses a five hundred-mile border with
+Canada; it also borders Canada's two largest cities, Toronto and
+Montreal. Both of these cities have major organized crime presence.
+Toronto has problems with the Asian gangs, the Russian underworld and
+Jamaican Posses, while Montreal has had open motorcycle gang warfare.
+Both of the suspected Algerian terrorists recently apprehended in
+Washington State and Vermont lived in the Montreal area. The area
+doesn't have large numbers of migrant workers transgressing the border
+looking for work, as the southern border does. Instead it has a very
+sophisticated criminal element, which is ruthless and extremely
+dangerous to contend with. I can tell you from first hand experience
+that there are times when Immigration or Customs Inspectors are forced
+to work alone and man a road block against criminals who would not
+hesitate to kill in order to complete their mission. I personally,
+while stationed at Fort Covington, NY, have had to detain over twenty
+motorcycle gang members alone while waiting for backup to arrive. The
+only reason I was successful in detaining them is because they let me.
+They could have killed me at any time but chose not to. I was not
+important enough to them. They knew that even if backup arrived, the
+worst that could happen is that they would be refused admission to the
+United States and then they would ride to an unguarded section and
+enter without inspection. In fact that may well have been their plan
+all along; knowing how few patrol agents there, they show up in mass at
+a small Port of Entry and when the inspector calls for backup they know
+exactly where the Patrol will be. Then they enter the people or drugs
+they had intended a few miles away.
+ There is no way the Buffalo District can complete it's mission of
+securing five hundred miles of border with a total inspections
+allocation of 113 FTE man years and 50 FTEO man years. There are no
+professional law-enforcement agencies that can operate with one third
+of its officers working part time. The Buffalo District needs at least
+one hundred inspection personnel, along with the increased overtime to
+support those numbers. As it stands now with Sunday and Holidays being
+overtime days, the Service reduces to skeleton staffing on the days
+when traffic is heaviest. The Service's small overtime budget further
+exacerbates the already short staffing problems.
+ In closing I can only hope that the members of Congress will answer
+the wake up call of the two terrorists caught and not wait until we
+have another Pearl Harbor, or Oklahoma City on their watch. If Congress
+does not act, the only people surprised by a terrorist attack will be
+the innocent victims who depended on the government to protect them.
+The law enforcement community is aware the problem and knows that the
+only people who can help prevent a disaster are the members of
+Congress. They are the only ones who can increase the staffing to
+levels necessary to protect our country.
+
+ Sincerely
+
+ Thomas P. Kuhn
+ President Buffalo Local 2580
+
+
+
+