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+ - INTEGRITY AND SECURITY AT THE BORDER THE US
+
+[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
+[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
+
+
+
+
+ INTEGRITY AND SECURITY AT THE BORDER
+ THE US--VISIT PROGRAM
+
+=======================================================================
+
+ HEARING
+
+ before the
+
+ SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFRASTRUCTURE AND BORDER SECURITY
+
+ of the
+
+ SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
+ HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
+
+ ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
+
+ SECOND SESSION
+
+ __________
+
+ JANUARY 28, 2004
+
+ __________
+
+ Serial No. 108-34
+
+ __________
+
+ Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security
+
+
+ Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
+ house
+
+ __________
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
+
+21-770PDF WASHINGTON : 2005
+_________________________________________________________________
+For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
+Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free
+(866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail:
+Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
+
+
+
+ Christopher Cox, California, Chairman
+
+Jennifer Dunn, Washington Jim Turner, Texas, Ranking Member
+C.W. Bill Young, Florida Bennie G. Thompson, MississPpi
+Don Young, Alaska Loretta Sanchez, California
+F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
+Wisconsin Norman D. Dicks, Washington
+W.J. (Billy) Tauzin, Louisiana Barney Frank, Massachusetts
+David Dreier, California Jane Harman, California
+Duncan Hunter, California Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland
+Harold Rogers, Kentucky Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New
+Sherwood Boehlert, New York York
+Lamar S. Smith, Texas Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
+Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Nita M. Lowey, New York
+Christopher Shays, Connecticut Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey
+Porter J. Goss, Florida Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
+Dave Camp, Michigan Columbia
+Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida Zoe Lofgren, California
+Bob Goodlatte, Virginia Karen McCarthy, Missouri
+Ernest J. Istook, Jr., Oklahoma Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
+Peter T. King, New York Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
+John Linder, Georgia Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
+John B. Shadegg,T1 Arizona Islands
+Mark E. Souder, Indiana Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
+Mac Thornberry, Texas Ken Lucas, Kentucky
+Jim Gibbons, Nevada James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
+Kay Granger, Texas Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
+Pete Sessions, Texas
+John E. Sweeney, New York
+
+ John Gannon, Chief of Staff
+ Uttam Dhillon, Chief Counsel and Deputy Staff Director
+ Steven Cash, Democrat Staff Director
+ David H. Schanzer, Democrat Staff Director
+ Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
+
+ ______
+
+ Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security
+
+ Dave Camp, Michigan, Chairman
+
+Kay Granger, Texas, Vice Chairwoman Loretta Sanchez, California,
+Jennifer Dunn, Washington Ranking Member
+Don Young, Alaska Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
+Duncan Hunter, California Norman D. Dicks, Washington
+Lamar Smith, Texas Barney Frank, Massachusetts
+Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland
+Robert W. Goodlatte, Virginia Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New
+Ernest Istook, Oklahoma York
+John Shadegg, Arizona Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
+Mark Souder, Indiana Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
+John Sweeney, New York Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
+Christopher Cox, California, Ex Jim Turner, Texas, Ex Officio
+Officio
+
+ (ii)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ CONTENTS
+
+ ----------
+ Page
+
+ STATEMENTS
+
+The Honorable Kay Granger, a Representative in Congress From the
+ State of Texas, and Vice Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
+ Infrastructure and Border Security
+ Oral Statement................................................. 1
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 3
+The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of California, and Ranking Member, Committee on
+ Infrastructure and Border Security............................. 4
+The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of California, and Chairman, Select Committee on
+ Homeland Security.............................................. 6
+The Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in Congress From the
+ State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Select Committee on
+ Homeland Security
+ Oral Statement................................................. 8
+ Prepapred Statement............................................ 9
+The Honorable Lincoln Diaz-Balart, a Representative in Congress
+ From the State Florida......................................... 13
+The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of Washington........................................ 47
+The Honorable Jennifer Dunn, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of Texas............................................. 10
+The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress
+ From the State of
+ Prepapred Statement............................................ 14
+The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress
+ From the State of New Jersey................................... 12
+The Honorable John B. Shadegg, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of Arizona........................................... 43
+The Honorable John E. Sweeney, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of New York.......................................... 11
+
+ WITNESSES
+
+Mr. Asa Hutchinson, Under Secretary, Border and Transportation
+ Security Directorate, Department of Homeland Security
+ Oral Statement................................................. 15
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 19
+The Honorable Maura Harty, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
+ Consular Affairs, Department of State
+ Oral Statement................................................. 28
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 30
+Mr. James May, President and CEO, Air Transport Association
+ Oral Statement................................................. 57
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 58
+Ms. Kathleen Campbell Walker, Testifying on Behalf of American
+ Immigration Lawyers Association and Foreign Trade Association,
+ Inc.
+ Oral Statement................................................. 59
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 61
+Mr. Dennis Carlton, Director of Washington Operations,
+ International Biometric Group, LLC
+ Oral Statement................................................. 71
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 73
+
+ Appendix
+ Material Submitted for the Record
+
+Questions and Responses of The Honorable Maura Harty............. 85
+Questions and Responses of The Honorable Asa Hutchinson.......... 93
+Questions and Responses of Air Transport Association of
+ America.Inc.................................................... 110
+
+ Additional Material Submitted for the Record
+
+Questions and Responses of Mr. Dennis A. Carlton................. 111
+Prepared Statement of Mr. Edward K. Pultorak..................... 112
+Prepared Statement of Mr. J. Clark Robinson, President,
+ International Association of Amusement Parks and Attractions... 114
+Prepared Statement of The Travel Industry Association of America. 116
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ INTEGRITY AND SECURITY AT THE BORDER
+
+ THE US--VISIT PROGRAM
+
+ ----------
+
+
+ Wednesday, January 28, 2004
+
+ House of Representatives,
+ Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security,
+ Select Committee on Homeland Security,
+ Washington, D.C.
+ The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:04 a.m., in
+Room 345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Kay Granger [vice-
+chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
+ Present: Representatives Granger, Dunn, Diaz-Balart,
+Shadegg, Sweeney, Cox, Sanchez, Markey, Dicks, Pascrell, Turner
+and Christensen.
+ Ms. Granger. [Presiding.] The Subcommittee on
+Infrastructure and Border Security hearing will come to order.
+ As vice chair of the subcommittee, I am sitting in for
+Chairman Dave Camp who is prevented from attending by a
+Michigan snow storm. I know we will all understand that.
+ I would like to welcome and thank you for attending today's
+hearing.
+ I see that the gentlelady from the Virgin Islands is here.
+ The chair asks for unanimous consent that Ms. Christensen
+be allowed to sit and question the panel.
+ Today's business is to receive testimony regarding the new
+border management system to record the arrival and departure of
+foreign nationals into the U.S.--the United States Visitor and
+Immigrants Status Indicator Technology program, which we call
+US-VISIT.
+ This hearing will have two panels. The subcommittee will
+hear first from Border and Transportation Security
+Undersecretary Asa Hutchinson from the Department of Homeland
+Security, and Consular Affairs Assistant Secretary Maura Harty
+from the Department of State.
+ We will then hear from a second panel comprised of James
+May, the president and CEO of the Air Transport Association;
+Kathleen Campbell Walker, a member of the board of directors of
+the El Paso Foreign Trade Association and a member of the
+American Immigration Lawyers Association; and Dennis Carlton,
+the director of Washington operations for the International
+Biometric Group.
+ Thank you all for your participation.
+ The subcommittee is also expecting several additional
+statements from outside groups that will be included in the
+hearing record.
+ The chair would like to remind members that we have two
+very qualified panels here with a great deal to contribute to
+the discussion of the US-VISIT program.
+ In order to allow sufficient time for their testimony and
+questions, the chair will urge members to give short statements
+and to submit their full opening statements for the record. The
+record will remain open for ten days after the close of the
+hearing. Members are advised that they will receive an
+additional three minutes during the question time if they waive
+their opening statement.
+ The chair will begin with a short opening statement.
+ The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 highlighted the
+need to improve our national security by improving integrity in
+the U.S. immigration system.
+ As a nation, we must have reliable methods for identifying
+aliens who are inadmissible to the country as well as those who
+overstay their lawful admission period.
+ At the same time, we cannot create policies or programs
+that discourage or delay or prevent legitimate travel, commerce
+and tourism.
+ The US-VISIT is an extensive border management system
+developed to monitor the arrival and departure of foreign
+nationals within the United States and to improve the
+reliability and security of their travel documents.
+ The US-VISIT program will be implemented in phases over the
+next several years to comply with congressional mandate.
+ As envisioned, foreign nationals traveling to the United
+States will have their fingerprints captured and authenticated
+at U.S. ports of entry. This biometric information we enter
+into and compare with prints already in the automated biometric
+identification system called IDENT.
+ Additionally, the biometrics will be checked when the
+individual exits the country to confirm identity.
+ The alien's biographic information, including name and
+place of birth, are checked through the Interagency Border
+Inspection Systems, IBIS, which includes law enforcement,
+immigration and intelligence databases to determine whether the
+individual is a threat to national security, public safety or
+is otherwise inadmissible.
+ Travelers entering the U.S. through the visa waiver program
+will not be affected by the biometrical requirements of US-
+VISIT. This program allows nationals from 27 countries to enter
+the U.S. as temporary visitors without first obtaining a visa.
+ Travelers entering through this program are still screened
+through the IBIS database. However, under current law, by
+October 26, 2004, visa-waiver countries have to issue biometric
+passports. Under this mandate, the biometric requirement for
+visa-waiver travelers will be similar under US-VISIT.
+ The State Department plays a complementary role in the US-
+VISIT program. State is in the process of equipping overseas
+embassies and consular posts with the ability to capture
+biometrics at the time of interview.
+ The key benefit of this initiative is that by comparing the
+visa information from State with that taken at primary
+inspection, Customs and Border Protection inspectors will have
+additional assurance that an alien's visa is reliable.
+ Currently 50 consular posts are equipped to capture
+fingerprints and photographs, and the remaining facilities are
+on schedule to begin capturing biometrics by the congressional
+deadline of October 26, 2004.
+ In November 2003, DHS began the pilot for the
+implementation of phase one at Hartsville-Jackson International
+Airport in Atlanta. During the voluntary pilot, over 20,000
+individuals were screened through US-VISIT. And the system
+turned up over 20 hits on inadmissible or wanted people.
+ DHS estimates that capturing the biometric information adds
+approximately 15 to 18 extra seconds to an individual's
+processing time.
+ On January 5, 2004, DHS added biometric collection for all
+arriving visa holders at 115 airports and 14 seaports.
+ Two pilot programs for the exit component are under way at
+Baltimore-Washington National Airport and the Port of Miami.
+ A persistent issue in all border security programs is
+finding the right balance between security and legitimate
+travel for tourism and commerce. There is concern from several
+stakeholders about the impact US-VISIT will have on travel and
+trade, particularly at the land borders. Some fear that the
+program will create massive delays at border crossings.
+ The United States has more than 300 land, air and sea ports
+of entry where international travelers are inspected and
+permitted to enter the United States. Each year, more than 500
+million people enter the United States. This hearing will
+provide an opportunity to explore the implementation at the
+land border and the different options under considerations for
+the rollout.
+ Coming from a border state, I am particularly interested in
+different plans and proposals for the ports of entry. Any
+additional delays will have serious consequence for communities
+on both sides of the border.
+ Over time, US-VISIT promises to strengthen the integrity of
+the border security system.
+ The US-VISIT will improve the accuracy and consistency of
+detecting fraudulent travel documents, verifying traveler
+identity and determining traveler admissibility.
+ Again, I would like to thank our witnesses for being here.
+I will conclude my remarks and enter my full statement for the
+record.
+
+ Prepared Opening Statement of The Honorable Kay Granger, a
+ Representative in Congress From the State of Texas, and Vice Chair,
+ Infrastructure and Border Security Subcommittee
+
+ The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, highlighted the need
+to improve national security by improving integrity in the U.S.
+immigration system. As a nation, we must have reliable methods for
+identifying aliens who are inadmissible to the country as well as those
+who overstay their lawful admission periods. At the same time, we can
+not create policies or programs that discourage, delay or prevent
+legitimate travel, commerce, and tourism.
+ The US-VISIT Program is an extensive border management system
+developed to monitor the arrival and departure of foreign nationals
+within the United States and to improve the reliability and security of
+their travel documents.
+ The US-VISIT Program will be implemented in phases over the next
+several years to comply with Congressional mandates. As envisioned,
+foreign nationals traveling to the United States will have their
+fingerprints captured and authenticated at US ports of entry. This
+biometric information will be entered into and compared with prints
+already in the Automated Biometric Identification System called IDENT.
+Additionally, the biometrics will be checked when the individual exits
+the country to confirm identity.
+ The alien's biographic information, including name and place of
+birth, are checked through the Interagency Border Inspection System
+(IBIS), which includes law enforcement, immigration and intelligence
+databases to determine whether the individual is a threat to national
+security, public safety, or is otherwise inadmissible.
+ Travelers entering the U.S. through the Visa Waiver Program will
+not be affected by the biometric requirements of US-VISIT. This program
+allows nations from 27 countries to enter the U.S. as temporary
+visitors without first obtaining a visa. Travelers entering through
+this program are still screened through the IBIS database. However,
+under current law, by October 26, 2004 Visa Waiver countries have to
+issue biometric passports. Under this mandate, the biometric
+requirements for Visa Waiver travelers will be similar to those under
+US-VISIT.
+ The State Department plays a complementary role in the US-VISIT
+Program. State is in the process of equipping overseas embassies and
+consular posts with the ability to capture biometrics at the time of
+the interview.
+ The key benefit of this initiative is that by comparing the visa
+information from State with that taken at primary inspection, Customs
+and Border Protection Inspectors will have additional assurance that an
+alien's visa is reliable. Currently, 50 consulate posts are equipped to
+capture fingerprints and photographs and the remaining facilities are
+on schedule to begin capturing biometrics by the Congressional deadline
+of October 26, 2004.
+ In November 2003, DHS began the pilot for the implementation of
+Phase One at Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport in Atlanta.
+During the voluntary pilot over 20,000 individuals were screened
+through US-VISIT and the system turned up over 20 hits on inadmissible
+or wanted people. DHS estimates that capturing the biometric
+information adds approximately 15-18 extra seconds to an individual's
+processing time. On January 5, 2004, DHS added biometric collection for
+all arriving visa holders at 115 airports and 14 seaports. Two pilot
+programs for the Exit component are underway at Baltimore Washington
+International (BWI) Airport and the Port of Miami.
+ A persistent issue in all border security programs is finding the
+right balancing between security and legitimate travel for tourism and
+commerce. There is concern from several stakeholders about the impact
+US-VISIT will have on travel and trade, particularly at the land
+borders. Some fear that the program will create massive delays at
+border crossings. The United States has more than 300 land, air, and
+sea ports of entry where international travelers are inspected and
+permitted to enter the United States. Each year, more than 500 million
+people enter the U.S. This hearing will provide an opportunity to
+explore the implementation at the land border and the different options
+under consideration for the roll-out.
+ Coming from a border state, I am particularly interested in
+different plans and proposals for land ports of entry. Any additional
+delays will have serious consequences for communities on both sides of
+the border.
+ Over time, US-VISIT promises to strengthen the integrity of the
+border security system. The US-VISIT Program will improve the accuracy
+and consistency of detecting fraudulent travel documents, verifying
+traveler identity, and determining traveler admissibility.
+ Again, I would like to thank our witnesses for being here. I will
+conclude my remarks and enter my full statement for the record.
+
+ The chair now recognizes Ms. Sanchez, the ranking member of
+the Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security for any
+statement she may have.
+ Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California. Thank you Madam Chair.
+And it is a shame that Chairman Camp could not be here, but we
+will slog on, as they say.
+ I appreciate all of you here today also.
+ Welcome back to our former colleague.
+ Because this US-VISIT program is very important to us, I
+doubt that there is one member on this subcommittee who
+disagrees how important and with the aims of this program.
+ But I have to admit that some of us on this subcommittee
+wonder if the US-VISIT program, as it currently operates, is
+really the most effective tool to deter potential terrorism for
+the United States.
+ Also, Customs and Border Protection officers are already
+being stretched thin under the new US-VISIT entry system. And
+we still have not really added the exit system and implementing
+phase two and phase three.
+ I think we will only strain them further.
+ A true entry-exit system makes a lot more sense than the
+system that US-VISIT is in the process of checking people as
+they arrive in the country but having no idea when they have
+left.
+ I also think that most of us believe it is a good idea to
+have more sophisticated visas and passports that contain more
+information about these people, including the biometric
+information that can give us a better verification of a
+person's identity.
+ And I know that others share them, are with the efficiency
+of the US-VISIT as a security tool, and also with the
+implementation of this program.
+ I know that the program will enhance security to some
+degree, but I am wonder how much. If the visa-waiver countries
+are not required to participation in the US-VISIT, then isn't
+that a big security hole?
+ I know that there are also plans for secure passports from
+these visa-waiver countries. We were just in Europe discussing
+some of these issues with some of those countries, some of
+which, to tell you the truth, are having some difficulty trying
+to figure how they are really going to comply with this by the
+deadline that we set.
+ I guess I don't understand the relationship between the US-
+VISIT program and this issue of the biometrics involved in the
+passports of these visa-waiving countries. For example, will
+there be different databases used?
+ And my number one concern is simply the overextension of
+the people that we have doing this work. Are we making enough
+investment in personnel and the infrastructure necessary to
+ensure that all these components come together and that in fact
+we have a system that is going to work for entry and exit into
+this country?
+ Because the implementation of phase one of the US-VISIT
+means that the entry and exit data from airplane passenger
+manifests at the 115 airports and the cruise-ship passenger
+manifests at the 14 seaports must be reconciled, thereby being
+able to tell us if people are actually overstaying their visas.
+ It is a very complicated issue. And so I hope that today
+you can shed some light on this.
+ I would just give one example that I just see as being a
+major problem. Because right now, the checkouts that we have is
+this pilot program with the kiosk at the airport, for example.
+What if somebody forgets to do that or does not do that?
+ And then they are a legitimate good person, they are coming
+back into the country the next time, and now we have all these
+false positives and we have got to pull these people aside, and
+it requires more resources and more of our time.
+ And in talking to some of my customs and border people,
+they are already feeling like they are being pulled off of
+cargo inspections in order to do green card holders and others
+to try to get the entry portion of this US-VISIT going.
+ So maybe what we are doing is, possibly making ourselves
+safer in one aspect, but really taking the eye off another area
+that might be of concern to us, that of checking the cargo.
+ So I look forward to hearing from our panels and getting
+some answers to these question.
+ And, again, thank you, Madam Chairman, for the time and for
+having this hearing.
+ Ms. Granger. Thank you very much.
+ The chairman now recognizes Representative Cox, chairman of
+the Homeland Security Select Committee for any statement he may
+have.
+ Mr. Cox. Thank you Madam Vice Chairman.
+ Let me begin by commending our absent Subcommittee Chairman
+Camp, who as you heard is bogged down in a Michigan snowstorm,
+for scheduling this important hearing today. I know he did a
+lot of work on this and looked for to being here, and he would
+be very pleased to welcome our witnesses himself.
+ This is important to him and to all of us because our
+country faces no greater challenge today than monitoring over
+300 U.S. ports of entry for potential terrorist crossings,
+while at the same time facilitating the legitimate trade and
+travel and tourism that are the hallmarks of our free society.
+ The US-VISIT program is designed to meet this challenge.
+And our witnesses today will give us an update on the progress
+we are making.
+ I am especially pleased to welcome back Undersecretary Asa
+Hutchinson to this committee. I, along with many on this
+committee, know him as an esteemed former colleague and a
+friend, and most importantly, as an extraordinarily capable
+leader who is well equipped to lead the Department of Homeland
+Security on border transportation and security issues.
+ Since assuming his position, Undersecretary Hutchinson has
+supervised one of the largest reorganizations of our government
+in history.
+ Among other accomplishments, his tenure has seen the
+successful implementation of the first phase of the US-VISIT
+program on schedule and indeed ahead of schedule with respect
+to the use of biometric identifiers.
+ The department should be commended for meeting the
+statutory requirement and deadline for an automated entry and
+exit system.
+ And all air-and sea-port passenger arrival and departure
+information is now collected and processed through the US-VISIT
+program. This gives us the ability for the first time in our
+history to create a list of those overstay their visas.
+ Undersecretary Hutchinson, we look forward to hearing from
+you today on how DHS is implementing this program at our air
+and sea ports of entry. We were especially interested in your
+plan for the eventual rollout of the program to all of our
+border points of entry, including land ports, and the handshake
+that US-VISIT will make with interior enforcement.
+ I also look forward to hearing from Ms. Harty on the State
+Department's efforts to ensure greater security with respect to
+visa applicants. The State Department can also inform us of the
+status of the 27 visa-waiver countries we have asked to add
+biometric identifiers to their passports.
+ The role of the State Department's Bureau of Consular
+Affairs has been vital to the effective implementation of US-
+VISIT. Consular officials at 211 visa processing posts are the
+frontline in our efforts to prevent would-be terrorists from
+entering the United States.
+ When precise biometric data is captured overseas and linked
+in real time to the Department of Homeland Security and other
+federal agencies, we will be able to screen each visa applicant
+against federal law enforcement databases and terrorist watch
+lists.
+ We will also be able to ensure that a person arriving at
+one of our ports of entry is the same person who obtained a
+visa at our overseas consulate.
+ The US-VISIT program is a work in progress. But it is a
+work that is moving ahead very rapidly.
+ During the recently concluded pilot phase at Atlanta's
+Hartsville International Airport, US-VISIT stopped several
+dangerous criminals and others using false information from
+entering the United States.
+ The biometric enter-exit system contemplated by US-VISIT
+will add integrity to our immigration progress. Just as
+importantly, it is consistent with maintaining a defining
+American tradition: opening our nation to legitimate travel,
+business and tourism.
+ In just 15 seconds per visit, US-VISIT adds a layer of
+protection to our border security system and permits our Border
+Protection officers to focus their efforts on those that
+warrant closer scrutiny.
+ But as I say, this is a work in progress and we have a lot
+more hard work to do.
+ The US-VISIT program has not yet integrated all of the
+existing law enforcement and terrorist databases into its
+search capabilities. This is a complex task, and it needs
+additional attention.
+ And while the rollout of the entry portion of the solution
+has achieved great success, the exit portion of the program is
+not yet fully delved with respect to the capture of biometric
+data. This, too, is an important element because it allows the
+system to verify that the person leaving our country is the
+same person who entered.
+ We also need additional procedural guidance for travelers
+trying to comply with the biometric exit requirements of the
+US-VISIT program.
+ There are many questions about how this exit system
+actually will be implemented.
+ There are also many questions about the eventual rollout of
+the US-VISIT program at all of our land ports of entry.
+ Current law requires that DHS expand the entry-exit program
+to the top 50 high-traffic land border ports by December 31st
+of this year and the remaining entry points by December 31,
+2005.
+ Is this a realistic goal? Do we have the technology? Do we
+have the other essential infrastructure in place to accommodate
+this plan without severely compromising the free flow of goods
+and people.
+ Finally, under the visa-waiver program, citizens of 27
+nations are not required to obtain visas to enter the United
+States and thus are not part of the US-VISIT program. But under
+current law, these countries will have to encode all of their
+newly issued passports with biometric data beginning on October
+26th of this year.
+ Reports indicate that the majority of the 27 visa-waiver
+countries will not be able to meet this deadline. As a result,
+current law could be interpreted to require that the citizens
+of these countries obtain visas. This would cause a dramatic
+increase in visa applications to our consulates and strain
+relations with our closest allies.
+ It is also uncertain whether we would be able to
+accommodate any such increase in applications.
+ Next month, members of this committee will visit Miami, the
+U.S. Virgin Islands and Guantanamo Bay as part of our homeland
+security oversight responsibilities. We will examine security
+at air and sea ports in those locations, and we will witness
+the US-VISIT program in practice.
+ This visit will be another expression of the committee's
+interest in this important program and of our intention to
+exercise responsible and effective oversight in this area.
+ Again, I want to thank our witnesses for coming to today's
+hearing.
+ I want to thank our vice chairman for your consideration
+during this opening statement, and I yield back the balance of
+my time.
+ Ms. Granger. Thank you.
+ The chair will now recognize Ranking Member Turner for any
+statements he may have.
+ Mr. Turner. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
+ I am very pleased that the subcommittee has taken up the
+issue of US-VISIT. Over the past two days I have been watching
+some of the hearings before the National Commission on
+Terrorist Attacks and the witnesses that have appeared before
+the commission. And those hearings remind us once again of the
+gravity of the responsibility that we have before us.
+ This Select Committee on Homeland Security is very much the
+place where this issue must be vigorously examined and where we
+must exercise strong oversight.
+ We all have a duty to make America safer.
+ And I thank the chairman and the ranking member of this
+subcommittee for calling this hearing.
+ One month into the launch of US-VISIT is certainly the time
+to ensure that we begin rigorous oversight.
+ Our obligation is to assess the effectiveness of the
+program as a counterterrorism tool. And while I believe that
+US-VISIT has potential, there are many questions that we must
+all be willing to address.
+ First, will the US-VISIT program be implemented with a
+comprehensive terrorist watch list so as to be most effective
+in identifying and assisting in the apprehension of suspected
+terrorists.
+ Secondly, do the program's current exemptions as to who
+must participate create vulnerabilities that diminish the
+effectiveness of US-VISIT as a counterterrorism tool?
+ And thirdly, can it be implemented effectively at all of
+our air, sea and land ports of entry?
+ Obviously, much of the success of US-VISIT depends upon
+intelligence information. I am a strong believer that border
+security systems and programs are only as good as the
+intelligence they are able to access. The information must be
+reliable and provided to those who make decisions allowing the
+entry of foreign visitors to our country in a time frame that
+is meaningful. And I look forward to hearing testimony that
+addresses these issues.
+ I also believe that while we are securing our borders, we
+must not change the vision of America as a welcoming nation. We
+are enriched by the cultural, political and social
+contributions of those who visit our country.
+ As a Texan, I am also very much aware of the economic need
+to ensure that our borders function smoothly, that our homeland
+and economic security are closely linked, and that if we are to
+succeed in securing our homeland, facilitating cross-border
+trade and travel must be a part of the equation.
+ We can achieve all of these goals--homeland security and
+growth and trade and travel--if our vision includes the
+willingness to make the necessary investments in ports of entry
+in our border and border communities.
+ We know that implementing US-VISIT is not going to be easy.
+The challenges are greatest at our land borders. Land border
+crossings are fundamentally different from airports and
+seaports. You don't receive much advanced data on people or
+cargo coming to a land border crossing. At many border
+crossings, you have to deal with both passenger and cargo
+inspections. If there is a backup either entering or leaving
+the United States, our border communities pay a high price.
+ Lastly, US-VISIT implementation at our land borders must
+involve the full participation of our neighbors to the north
+and the south. If US-VISIT is going to be effective, we must
+work with Mexico and Canada to ensure that implementation does
+not result in a gridlocked border that benefits no one. If we
+can secure the full cooperation of our neighbors, implementing
+US-VISIT will be much more likely.
+ I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses today.
+ And again I thank the chairman of the full committee and
+the chairman of this subcommittee for holdings this hearing at
+this time.
+ I thank you, Madam Vice Chairman.
+
+ Prepared Statement of the Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in
+ Congress From the State of Texas
+
+ I am very pleased that this subcommittee has taken up the issue of
+US-VISIT. Over the past two days I have been paying careful attention
+to the hearings before the National Commission on Terrorists Attacks
+and the testimony of witnesses before that Commission. The hearings
+once again remind us of the gravity of the responsibility before us--
+that this Select Committee on Homeland Security has the very great
+obligation to find existing holes in homeland security and address
+those vulnerabilities.
+ We have a duty to make America safer.
+ I thank the Chairman and the Ranking Member in calling for this
+hearing. One month into the launch of US-VISIT it is certainly time to
+ensure that we have rigorous oversight of the program.
+ Our obligation is to assess the effectiveness of this program as a
+counter-terrorism tool. While I believe US-VISIT has potential, there
+are many issues that need to be addressed:
+
+ Will the US-VISIT program be implemented with a
+ comprehensive terrorist watch list, so as to be most effective
+ in identifying and assisting in the apprehension of suspected
+ terrorists?
+ Do the program's current exemptions as to who must
+ participate create vulnerabilities that diminish the
+ effectiveness of US-VISIT as a counter-terrorism tool?
+ Can it be implemented effectively at all of our air,
+ sea and land ports of entry?
+ Much of the success of US-VISIT depends on intelligence
+information.
+ I am a strong believer that border security systems and programs
+are only as good as the intelligence they are able to access. The
+information must be reliable, and provided to those who make decisions
+allowing the entry of foreign visitors to our country.
+ I look forward to hearing testimony that addresses these issues.
+ I also believe that while we are securing our borders, we must not
+change the vision of America as a welcoming nation. We are enriched by
+the cultural, political and social contributions of those who visit our
+country.
+ As a Texan, I also understand the economic need to ensure that our
+borders function smoothly, that our homeland and economic security are
+closely linked and that if we are to succeed in securing our homeland,
+facilitating cross border trade and travel must be a part of the
+equation.
+ We can achieve all of these goals- homeland security and economic
+security--if our vision includes investing in ports of entry and in the
+border and border communities.
+ We know that US-VISIT implementation is not going to be easy. The
+challenge is greatest at our land borders. Land border crossings are
+fundamentally different from air ports and sea ports. You do not
+receive much advance data on the people or cargo coming across the
+border. At many border crossings you have to deal with both passenger
+and cargo inspections. If there is a backup either entering or leaving
+the US, our border communities pay the price.
+ Lastly, US-VISIT implementation at our land borders must involve
+the full participation of our neighbors to the north and the south. If
+US-VISIT is going to be effective, we must work with Mexico and Canada
+to ensure that implementation does not result in a gridlocked border
+that benefits no one. If we cannot secure the cooperation of our
+neighbors in implementing the US-VISIT system, it simply will not
+succeed. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses today.
+
+ Ms. Granger. Thank you.
+ The chair now recognizes Representative Dunn, who serves as
+vice chair of the full committee.
+ Ms. Dunn. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
+ Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.
+ I am glad we have a full house today because it is
+important that we all understand exactly how this program came
+into being and where it is going.
+ The US-VISIT program has been the focus of much attention
+in the last few months. And I look forward to learning about
+the progress, for example, that the Department of Homeland
+Security is making in implementing the new system at airports
+and seaports.
+ I also look forward to discussing the challenges that are
+certain to come along with the starting of such a program at
+our land border crossings.
+ This program is of particular interest to this committee
+because it is an example of federal partnership that were
+envisioned during the actual creation of the Department of
+Homeland Security.
+ The US-VISIT program is a result of the pooled resources of
+and the open communication among the State Department, TSA, the
+Department of Justice, Immigration and Customs Enforcement--or
+ICE as we now know it--and Customs and Border Protection.
+ The program is of particular interest to me because I come
+from Washington State, a border state, where residents and
+businesses depend on open lanes at the border to get themselves
+or their goods to or from a Canadian destination on time.
+ We are committed to maintaining American strong trade
+partnerships while continuing to be innovative with programs at
+the borders to track the movement of people and goods.
+ The Department of Homeland Security will turn one year old
+in just about a month. In that time, it has developed and
+implemented ground breaking programs at the borders.
+ The One Face at the Border Initiative is one example that
+comes to my mind, and another, of course, is US-VISIT.
+ For the first time, we will be able to track foreign
+visitors. We will be able to cut down on identification
+document fraud. And we will make use of numerous databases to
+identify terrorist suspects before they enter this country.
+ I will have questions that relate to a number of areas.
+ For example, as we move toward the more complex exit
+portion of the system, I will be curious about your strategy,
+Director Hutchinson, for collaborating with airport operators
+such as those at Sea-Tac and others in my state but, also, all
+over the country.
+ I would like to know if the new US-VISIT database links up
+with and interfaces with others, for example, as Congressman
+Turner suggested, the terrorist watch list.
+ I know you agree we must not forget about commerce as it
+moves across our borders: What specific steps is the US-VISIT
+team taking to make sure that we don't stop traffic at our
+ports of entry and slow the movement of commerce?
+ And lastly, I realize that upgrading all United States
+passports will need to include biometric data and that that is
+a huge undertaking.
+ And I will be curious, Ms. Harty, to see how you see this
+new priority changing the daily operations of the United States
+embassies and consulates around the world.
+ I yield back.
+ Ms. Granger. Thank you.
+ The chairman now recognizes Representative Dicks for any
+statement he may have.
+ Mr. Dicks. I want to welcome our witnesses, but I am going
+to keep my time for questions.
+ Ms. Granger. Thank you.
+ The chair now recognizes Representative Sweeney for any
+statements he may have.
+ Mr. Sweeney. I thank the vice chairwoman. I am going to
+submit for the record. I think it is important that we hear
+from our witnesses. I, as you know, Vice Chairwoman, I have to
+leave at 12 o'clock for a meeting, but I will come back.
+ I just want to make two brief statements and thank the
+witnesses for being here.
+ Yesterday I, too, watched the testimony of the 9/11
+commission. Customs Inspector Jose Melendez-Perez testified. It
+is widely believed that that inspector kept the 20th hijacker
+out. However, unfortunately 19 others were let in.
+ I most particularly--this may be a rehash for some--really
+would like to hear the witnesses expound on how this system
+will have the desired effect of changing that process within
+the nation.
+ And I also want to congratulate the Secretary, because as I
+understand it, the department is some nine months ahead of
+schedule on a number of directives. And it is at a time when
+there is waning confidence. Because of all the confusion it is
+nice. I think that is an important point that we stress so the
+American people understand we are moving in the right
+direction.
+ Ms. Granger. Thank you.
+ The chair now recognizes Representative Pascrell for any
+statements he may have.
+ Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Madam Chairlady.
+ I want to welcome good friend, Asa Hutchinson, who did a
+terrific job at the DEA and is doing a great job at Homeland
+Security.
+ Richard Reid was a British citizen--better known as the
+``shoe bomber.'' And Zacarias Moussaoui--I believe I am
+pronouncing that correctly--was a French citizen. They arrived
+here legally, as far as know--as far as I have been able to
+ascertain--from exempt countries.
+ And I hope that we keep this in mind as we, Madam Chair,
+look through this very important effort to implement the
+Patriot Act. After all, this comes out of the Patriot Act.
+ And everything that comes out of the Patriot Act is under
+careful scrutiny by this Congress--and should be.
+ When our rights are reviewed, substantiated, supported I
+think, Mr. Hutchinson, you would agree that--and this is my
+opening statement, I realize that--that that is the main
+business of why we are in the Congress in the first place.
+ The attacks of September the 11, 2001, emphasize the urgent
+need to secure the visa-issuance process at our consulates and
+the inspections process at our ports of entry.
+ We all know the grim truth: All 19 hijackers entered United
+States ports easily.
+ This can simply never happen again.
+ Yet our country is still vulnerable. That is why we are
+discussing this. Our borders are still arguably too porous, too
+penetrable.
+ This, of course, is the uncomfortable reality of homeland
+security. While we need to act with absolutely urgency to
+improve our security levels, to do so in a truly effective
+manner often takes time.
+ We see this with the US-VISIT program. In concept, security
+our borders to protect our nation by identifying every person
+who enters the country is an ideal solution. I think the
+government, we all agree, has a right to know who is coming
+into this country and who is leaving. We have a right to know
+that as a very basic tenet of securing our neighborhoods and
+our streets.
+ In reality, this is an enormous undertaking. It will be
+costly. And many times it will be inconvenient. It will take
+time. And as we have already seen, it can be ineffective as
+well as being effective.
+ There are big holes in the program's ability to work. Among
+other shortfalls, it does not compare the foreign nationals
+entering this country against a list that we have waited for a
+long time: the integrated terrorist watch list. You have heard
+that mentioned before I bring it up. That is critical.
+ It would seem to me that that should be the main priority
+that will help our law enforcement agencies, both national and
+local, now that we have opened up the process of communication,
+for the first time in a long time.
+ Individuals from 27 countries participating in the visa
+waiver are currently exempt from the US-VISIT. In an age where
+terrorism can strike any place, this to me is non-sensical.
+ Additionally, there are still serious questions about the
+general ability of biometric identifiers. We know that we have
+used the biographic identifiers in the past. We will continue
+to use that.
+ And I am interested to find out whether you are going to
+add fees to the biographic ones that already exist.
+ To say the least, while we need to secure our ports is
+critical, we have a long way to go before we effectively
+accomplish this goal.
+ This hearing will give us an exemplary opportunity to
+discuss where we are in this difficult process, where we are
+expected to be in the future, how we can help, because that is
+what we are all about. We are all on the same page.
+ I look forward to the remarks.
+ And I thank you, Madam Chair, for your courtesy.
+ Ms. Granger. Thank you.
+ The chair now recognizes Representative Lincoln Balart for
+any statement he may have.
+ Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
+ And I join in welcoming our distinguished guests this
+morning.
+ It is important, I think, to put a spotlight on the issue
+of US-VISIT. It is a critical issue. Protecting our citizens
+from future terrorist attack is of the highest priority, not
+only for me as a representative from southern Florida, but as a
+member of this committee.
+ Our physical land borders and ports of entry must remain a
+critically important line of defense. And I believe the
+department, with the leadership of Undersecretary Hutchinson,
+is doing just that.
+ I look forward to monitoring the progress of US-VISIT to
+ensure that it is an effective tool in protecting the homeland
+and not just a hindrance for travel and a deterrence to tourism
+into the United States.
+ We must find the appropriate balance that allows the
+department to utilize the most effective tools to combat
+terrorism and allows commerce and transit to flow.
+ I would like to use this opportunity to raise another issue
+that is critical to South Florida: the international transit
+program, ITI.
+ The ITI program allows certain international air passengers
+to travel through the United States for transit purposes
+without first obtaining a visa. These are international
+passengers whose final destination is not the United States,
+but transfer at the airport on to another international flight.
+ The suspension of ITI, and in particular the suspension of
+the Miami International Airport's use of its secure transit
+lounges, could have an adverse impact on South Florida.
+ MIA receives more ITI passengers than any other U.S.
+airport. America Airlines alone carries approximately 700,000
+ITI passengers annually into Miami International Airport.
+ Iberia Airlines of Spain carries approximately 250,000 ITI
+passengers annually.
+ Iberia Airlines, which uses MIA as hub for in-transit
+passengers, reacted by initiated very serious plans to move
+their hub to foreign airports. This airline alone generates
+approximately 2,000 jobs and almost $200 million in business
+revenue in South Florida's economy.
+ I commend Undersecretary Hutchinson for his attentive
+response by authorizing Miami International Airport's temporary
+use of its satellite transit lounge. This matter is critical
+for the well-being of South Florida's economy.
+ I look forward to working with Undersecretary Hutchinson to
+find a permanent solution that will protect our homeland and
+allow Miami International Airport to continue as a hub for
+flights to and from Latin America.
+ And again, I thank you, Madam Chairman.
+ Ms. Granger. Thank you very much.
+ Seeing no additional requests for time, we will proceed.
+ I would like to again thank our witnesses for being here.
+ I am sorry, you are not a member. You are not allowed to
+make an opening statement.
+
+ Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a
+ Representative in Congress from the State of Texas
+
+ The Department of Homeland Security launched US-VISIT at 115
+airports and 14 seaports on January 5, 2004. The stated objective for
+US-VISIT is to enhance the nation's security while facilitating
+legitimate travel and trade through our borders.
+ The security measures employed by this program begin overseas at
+the U.S. consular offices that issue visas. Digital fingerscans are
+taken at these offices and used to determine whether the applicant is
+on a database of known or suspected criminals or terrorists. When a
+foreign visitor with a visa reaches our border and seeks admission into
+the United States, the fingerscans are used to verify that the person
+seeking admission is the same person who received the visa. And,
+another check is made for information about any involvement in
+terrorism or crime.
+ US-VISIT also will include departure confirmation systems,
+including an automated, self-service kiosk where visitors with visas
+will scan their travel documents and repeat the digital finger scanning
+process. The exit confirmation will be added to the visitor's travel
+records to demonstrate compliance and record the individual's status
+for future visits to the United States.
+ US-VISIT already has systems in place at airports and cruise ship
+terminals. In addition, Congress has mandated that an automated entry-
+exit program be implemented at the 50 busiest land ports of entry by
+December 31, 2004, and at all land ports of entry by December 31, 2005.
+ I am very much in favor of improving security at our borders. I
+support the efforts of the Homeland Security Department to implement
+new programs that will achieve that objective without impeding
+legitimate travel and trade through our borders. I am concerned,
+however, about whether the US-VISIT program ultimately will be
+successful.
+ The difficult challenges that this program faces are set forth in a
+report issued on September 2003, by the General Accounting Office
+(GAO). According to GAO, the scope of US-VISIT is large and complex; it
+must meet a demanding implementation schedule; and its potential cost
+is enormous. GAO observes in the report that many of the difficulties
+are inherent to the program and cannot easily be changed. However, GAO
+says, compounding these inherent problems are a number of others that
+are attributable to the program's current, inadequate state of
+governance and management. GAO questions whether US-VISIT will be able
+to measurably and appreciably achieve the Homeland Security
+Department's goal of enhancing national security while facilitating
+legitimate travel and trade.
+ Implementation of the program is not my only concern. Even if the
+Department of Homeland Security is successful in implementing US-VISIT,
+the program may not make our country more secure in any significant
+way. In 1998, a Senate Judiciary Committee Report (No. 105-197) found
+that, ``implementing an automated entry-exit control system has
+absolutely nothing to do with countering drug trafficking, with halting
+the entry of terrorists into the United States, or with any other
+illegal activity at or near the borders. An automated entry-exit
+control system will at best provide information only on those who have
+overstayed their visas.'' I am not convinced that the Senate Judiciary
+Committee was wrong.
+ In its present form, US-VISIT only will apply to foreign visitors
+seeking admission on the basis of non-immigrant visas. It will not
+include aliens presenting lawful permanent resident documents. It will
+not include visitors from the 27 countries participating in the Visa
+Waiver Program. Most Canadians are not subject to US-VISIT. And, it
+will be years before the system is fully operational at all of the land
+borders. I do not believe that we can rely on this program to secure
+our borders. Thank you.
+
+ We will begin with Under Secretary for Border and
+Transportation Security at DHS, Asa Hutchinson.
+ We have received your written testimony. I ask you to
+briefly summarize in five minutes your statement.
+ I want to add: All the accolades that have been heaped your
+way are certainly deserved. I enjoyed coming into Congress and
+serving with you. And you have done an excellent job in all the
+ways you have served us.
+
+ STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ASA HUTCHINSON, UNDER SECRETARY,
+ BORDER AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF
+ HOMELAND SECURITY
+
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Madam Chairman. It is good to be
+with you and the committee, Ranking Member Sanchez, Chairman
+Cox, Ranking Member of the Full Committee Turner--thank you for
+leadership and your partnership in the development of US-VISIT.
+ And it is a pleasure to be before you today to discuss this
+important program of the Department of Homeland Security.
+ US-VISIT represents the greatest advance in border
+technology in three decades. It is an historic achievement in
+which we, for the first time in history, can use a biometric
+ability to confirm the identity of those traveling to our
+country with visas.
+ The Department of Homeland Security deployed the first
+increment of US-VISIT on time, within budget, and has exceeded
+the mandate established by Congress.
+ We also met the challenge that was given by Secretary Ridge
+to include biometrics ahead of schedule.
+ This US-VISIT is in response to a congressional mandate--
+the leadership of Congress long before the attack on America of
+September 11 set the stage to develop a comprehensive entry-
+exit system.
+ And some people would like to measure the effectiveness of
+US-VISIT simply as a counterterrorism tool. But it is more than
+that. That is an important measuring stick. But also, as
+Congress well knew when it was first mandated, they would also
+build the integrity of an immigration system to know who
+overstays a visa, and that is also a measuring stick.
+ The deterrent value, the reduction of reliance upon
+fraudulent documents and the security of our country all are
+important goals of US-VISIT.
+ On January 5, US-VISIT entry procedures were operational at
+115 airports and 14 seaports.
+ Our exit procedures, which fully comply with the
+requirements of law, we based upon passenger departure
+information that will allow the Department of Homeland Security
+to identify visa overstays.
+ In addition, we have begun pilot testing biometric exit
+procedure at one airport and one seaport.
+ As of today, more than 600,000 foreign visitors have been
+processed through US-VISIT entry procedures without increasing
+wait times. And more than 30 known criminals have been
+prevented from entering our country.
+ Let me take a few minutes to explain how US-VISIT works.
+Many of you have seen it at our airports already.
+ But currently, prior to US-VISIT, at a port of entry many
+of the same procedures were still applicable today as was
+previously. For example, a Customs and Border Protection
+inspector still reviews each visitor's travel documents, such
+as a visa and a passport, still asks the question about the
+visitor's stay in the United States.
+ What is new under US-VISIT is that the inspector now uses
+an inkless digital finger scanner to capture two finger scans
+of arriving, non-immigrant visitors holding visas. The visitor
+puts the left index finger and the right index finger on the
+scan, and it very quickly checks it against the operable
+databases. This check takes a matter of seconds.
+ The officer also takes a digital photograph of the visitor.
+ The biographic and biometric data are used to verify the
+identity of the visitor against the data captured by the State
+Department to ensure that the person entering the country is
+the same person that receives a visa.
+ Those biometrics are also compared against a watch list.
+ In addition, the digital picture was taken at the visa
+issuing post that is displayed to the CBP officer allows for a
+visual comparison.
+ These are important tools for Customs and Border Protection
+officers in their decision whether to admit a visitor to the
+country or not.
+ Since the US-VISIT entry procedures were implemented, we
+have significantly increased our capability to uncover
+criminals, to enhance security and to increase the integrity of
+our visa system.
+ A few examples, I think, would be appropriate. And these
+are all since January 5.
+ A citizen of Colombia convicted of statutory rape was
+intercepted on January 6 at the Miami International Airport
+after he failed to appear for sentencing in New York City and
+fled the country. He was arrested when he attempted to re-enter
+the country and turned over to New York for sentencing.
+ One day later, on January 7, a citizen of El Salvador was
+caught at JFK International Airport in New York City through
+the use of the US-VISIT biometrics. This individual had
+previously managed to leave and re-enter the U.S. 12 times over
+the past year until he was caught by the US-VISIT. He had been
+convicted of numerous driving offenses.
+ A citizen of El Salvador was intercept in New York on
+January 10th who had previously been convicted of a DUI hit-
+and-run death under another identity. This individual had been
+able to successfully leave and re-enter the United States
+despite outstanding warrants for his arrest, including a visit
+as recently as December 12. US-VISIT caught that individual.
+ On January 14th, officers in Miami encountered a Peruvian
+national attempting to enter the United States. He had
+previously visited the United States in May of 2003, but his
+name did not appear on any biographic watch list. A biometric
+check under US-VISIT disclosed that he was in fact a convicted
+cocaine trafficker wanted for escaping from a federal prison in
+1984. He had previously entered the United States under a
+fraudulent identity. He was caught under US-VISIT.
+ The same day in New York City, an officer intercepted a
+female citizen of Trinidad after she had attempted to enter the
+United States under a false identity. She admitted to officers
+that she had paid $2,000 in Trinidad for a new passport and
+visa under an alternate identity--only caught through the
+biometrics.
+ One day later in Los Angeles, US-VISIT biometric checks
+resulted in the interception of a Chinese national wanted for
+probation violations following convictions for wire fraud,
+conspiracy, food stamp trafficking and use of false Social
+Security numbers. He had been attempting to enter the United
+States through use of a false identity. He was successfully
+caught by US-VISIT.
+ A citizen of Russia, on January 16th, attempted to enter
+New York City after he had attempted to enter the United States
+on an alternate identity. He was arrested for an assault case--
+captured by US-VISIT.
+ In Tampa, Florida, on January 17th, a citizen of Jamaica
+attempted to enter the United States but was caught by US-
+VISIT. Officers learned that previously he had been arrested
+and convicted in both federal and state courts on cocaine
+trafficking charges. He had been able to successfully evade
+detection and enter the United States over 40 times in the last
+year prior to the implementation of US-VISIT.
+ On January 17th, officers in Miami intercepted a citizen of
+Honduras after the biometric check disclosed that he had been
+previously deported from the United States following drug
+convictions.
+ January 18th, officers caught a Colombian national who had
+used five different identities and three different dates of
+birth as he attempted to enter the United States. Because of
+the US-VISIT biometrics, that individual was apprehended.
+ In Atlanta, on January 19th, we intercepted a citizen of
+Mexico after she attempted to enter the United States by using
+false documents. The biometric checks discovered that she had
+previously attempted to enter the United States in 1996 through
+the use of false documents.
+ The illustrations go on and on and on.
+ One instance they had used eight different aliases and
+three different dates of birth, and they were intercepted by
+US-VISIT.
+ And so it is important to note that these important
+security measures currently are capturing those that are
+attempting to enter our country under false identity and with
+previous convictions, many times under orders to be expelled
+from the country.
+ But it also serves as a deferent as the word goes out that
+we have this capability and you cannot underestimate the
+importance of that deterrent.
+ It has not a negative impact on our wait times, which is a
+commitment that we engaged in from the very beginning as we
+developed this.
+ We have respected the privacy of our foreign visitors, and
+the privacy assessment was published prior to the
+implementation of US-VISIT.
+ Our partners have been very important in this endeavor. I
+am delighted to be with Maura Harty, assistant secretary at the
+Department of State. We could not have engaged and had the
+success of US-VISIT without their partnership. That is an
+ongoing effort, and I applaud the efforts of the Department of
+State in working in partnership with us.
+ I also appreciate the private sector. James May will be
+testifying later, who has done a terrific job with the ATA in
+working with us, giving us their advice on what are the proper
+solutions that we look to.
+ The airlines and airports have all been very valuable
+partners as we have developed this.
+ As we look to the future, I know that the job is not
+finished. And clearly, you can look at what has been
+accomplished and say there is much more to be done, and that is
+absolutely correct.
+ I am pleased to advise the committee that today we are
+submitting to Congress the 2004 spend plan, which gives
+Congress adequate time to review that in conjunction with the
+GAO.
+ We are pleased with the 2004 spend plan that will outline
+in a little bit more detail what we will be doing as we try to
+accomplish the 2004 deadlines of US-VISIT of implementing this
+at the 50 busiest land border ports of entry. And as has been
+indicated, that is a huge list and challenge for us.
+ Another part of the 2004 spend plan will be to complete the
+exit portion for our airports.
+ We currently have, let me emphasize, the biographic data
+that will allow us to determine visa overstays. We want to be
+able to enhance this with the biometric feature. We are testing
+this with various pilots, one of them being at Baltimore
+International Airport. We will test it in other arenas to
+determine what is the best exit solution with a biometric that
+we can work to implement as we continue to work with our
+partners to see what is the best solution.
+ We have done this with the 2003 budget of $367 million to
+achieve this successful deployment. In 2004 we have $330
+million that has been allocated and appropriated by Congress
+for this purpose.
+ The biggest challenges is to do this in the 50 busiest land
+ports by the deadline of December of 2004.
+ I wanted to recognize the tremendous work of the program
+director, Jim Williams, who is behind me, as well as his deputy
+director, Bob Mockney and the entire Homeland Security team
+that has worked together to meet the current goal and will be
+working with the partners on the border to implement the 50
+busiest land borders requirement in a way that does not
+compromise the commerce that flows through the border each and
+every day.
+ We are committed to building a program that enhances the
+integrity of our immigration system by catching the few and
+expediting the many. And we recognize that the U.S. is leading
+the way internationally in this effort, but we will continue to
+work with our international partners.
+ [The statement of Mr. Hutchinson follows:]
+
+ Prepared Statement of the Honorable Asa Hutchinson
+
+ Chairman Camp, Ranking Member Sanchez and other distinguished
+Members, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the
+Department of Homeland Security's US-VISIT program and how this fits in
+with our commitment to protect the homeland.
+ US-VISIT represents yet another major milestone in enhancing our
+nation's security and our efforts to reform our borders. It is a major
+step towards bringing integrity back to our immigration and border
+enforcement systems.
+ US-VISIT procedures are clear, simple, and fast for foreign
+nationals. Upon arrival at the air or seaport, visitors will see
+signage that clearly explains the US-VISIT procedures. This signage, as
+well as explanatory boarding cards that many airlines are distributing
+to their passengers, is translated into multiple languages and features
+the campaign iconography to ensure people understand what to do when
+they get to the primary inspection booth.
+ For foreign visitors traveling with visas, the additional US-VISIT
+steps are simple. First, the officer directs the visitor to place his
+or her left index finger on the small red window of the digital
+fingerscanning device. Next, the visitor places his or her right index
+finger on the scanning device. Finally, the officer takes a digital
+photograph of the visitor. These procedures add, on average, 15 seconds
+to the overall inspection process. There is no ink involved in the
+digital fingerscanning process. The officer will then ask the visitor
+standard, routine questions about his or her visit. The biometric data
+and biographic information are compared to a series of watchlists and
+databases, and within seconds the officer has the information he or she
+needs to admit the visitor into the country or refer the visitor to
+secondary inspection for further review.
+ The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) deployed US-VISIT on
+time, on budget, and has met the mandates established by Congress as
+well as the challenge by the Secretary of Homeland Security to include
+biometrics (fingerprints) ahead of schedule. Senior U.S. Customs and
+Border Protection management has hailed it as the biggest improvement
+to border inspection in more than three decades. By January 5, 2004,
+US-VISIT entry procedures were operational at 115 airports (covering 99
+percent of all foreign visitors entering the country by air) and 14
+seaports, and we began pilot testing biometric exit procedures at one
+airport and one seaport. As of January 23rd, more than 600,000 foreign
+visitors have been processed under the new US-VISIT entry procedures.
+ Our border management system impacts the security of our citizens
+and our visitors, affects billions of dollars in trade and travel, and
+helps define relations with our international partners. There is a need
+to improve this system and bring it into the 21st century with a new
+integrated system of technological processes that will keep our
+country's economic and national security strong. This 21st century
+technology will provide an important step toward achieving the
+President's goal of secure U.S. borders.
+ In just a few short weeks the first release of US-VISIT has
+improved the security of our citizens and visitors. Our Customs and
+Border Protection Officers are saying that the new tools we have put in
+place truly help them do their jobs more effectively. They say it's a
+major advancement in border control. US-VISIT integrates multiple
+sources of information spanning multiple agencies and departments in
+order to identify visitors who may pose a threat to the security of
+this country. A primary source of information supporting the
+identification of foreign-born criminal violators is the FBI's
+Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System. (IAFIS) To
+facilitate the inspectors' job at the border, the entrants' screening
+results are processed and displayed on one screen in less than 15
+seconds. Included in this processing time is the collection of the
+entrants' fingerprints and photograph and matching certain information
+with that collected by the Department of State at the time of visa
+issuance. We intercepted a fugitive who had escaped from prison over 20
+years ago. We caught and extradited a felon wanted for manslaughter in
+San Diego. We finally stopped one drug dealer who had entered the U.S.
+more than 60 times in the past four years using different names and
+dates of birth. We continue to identify criminals every day at our
+borders, and on January 19, we supplied crucial biometric information
+to our partners at the Department of State and prevented an individual
+from ever obtaining a visa.
+ The increase in security has not had negative effect on our wait
+times or our commitment to service. But you don't have to take my word
+for it. Albert Park, a Korean visiting his sister and arriving at John
+F. Kennedy International Airport, told the New York Sun (January 6th
+edition): ``I expected a lot more delays, but it was all pretty
+smooth,'' and said, ``It definitely makes me feel safer.''
+ ``We at the airport believe that this is a true enhancement,'' said
+Bruce Drum, associate director of the Miami-Dade County Aviation
+Department.'' (The Associated Press, January 5th)
+ And, there was this excerpt from the Washington Post (January 6th):
+Some travelers who were fingerprinted and photographed at airports
+across the country yesterday said the security procedures were swift,
+and most said they were resigned to the new rules. ```I don't really
+mind,'' said D.C. resident Salome Nnanga, a native of Ethiopia. ``I
+think it's a very, very good idea to protect the country.''
+ We want to ensure that we continue to be a welcoming nation, a
+nation that invites visitors to study, do business, and relax in our
+country. We also owe it to our citizens and visitors to deny entry to
+persons wishing to do harm, or who are inadmissible to the U.S. . Few
+would dispute that these steps are necessary.
+ As we evaluate the first month of the program, it seems clear that
+visitors appreciate the effort we are making to deliver security while
+simultaneously facilitating the process for law-abiding, legitimate
+travelers. We must continue to respect our visitors' privacy, treat
+them fairly, and enable them to pass through inspection quickly so they
+can enjoy their visit in our country. As people attempt to enter our
+country, we must know who they are and whether they have committed a
+crime that would make them inadmissible to the U.S. Moreover, as they
+leave, we must know that they have not overstayed the duration of their
+visa. This ability to verify identity means we can have security and
+control without impeding legitimate travelers, and we can also help
+protect our welcomed visitors by drastically reducing the possibility
+of identity theft.
+ But we are not finished. This is a complicated job that will take
+time to complete. In fact, US-VISIT is designed to be rolled out in
+increments to ensure that the foundation is strong and the building
+blocks are effective. With the deployment of the entry components at
+air and sea ports, we have made a strong beginning, and going into
+2004, we are on track to meet the December 31, 2004 deadline to
+integrate entry-exit databases at the 50 busiest land border ports of
+entry and to deploy biometric capabilities to verify certain visa
+holders. We are seeing that we can accomplish what we set out to do:
+keep out criminals and terrorists, enhance the integrity of our
+immigration system, facilitate legitimate travel and trade and help
+protect the privacy and identity of our visitors.
+
+A Brief Overview
+ The US-VISIT program is a high-priority initiative of DHS. Working
+with the Department of State, the Department of Justice, and other
+federal agencies, we have made great strides in improving overall
+border management through the collection of pre-arrival, arrival, and
+departure information on foreign visitors and immigrants who apply for
+visas and travel through our nation's air and seaports. The program
+will ultimately record the entry and exit of certain visa holders at
+our land ports of entry as well. The information will be used to report
+on the numbers of aliens who have overstayed their periods of
+admission. Ultimately these reports will enable DHS to seek aliens who
+have not departed.
+ By recording more complete arrival and departure information, the
+US-VISIT program will meet various Congressional mandates for an
+integrated, interoperable, and automated entry exit system for foreign
+visitors. More than that, it will also enhance the security and safety
+of citizens, residents, and visitors by verifying foreign national
+travelers' identities through the comparison of biometric identifiers,
+by authenticating their travel documents, and by checking their data
+against appropriate law enforcement and intelligence systems.
+
+The goals of US-VISIT are to:
+
+Enhance the security of our citizens and visitors.
+US-VISIT is a history-making achievement that begins overseas with our
+partners at the Department of State's visa-issuing posts, and continues
+upon entry at Customs and Border Protection inspection booths. Already
+US-VISIT has prevented 30 people who matched criminal databases from
+entering the U.S.--one even before the visa was issued overseas. And,
+just by implementing US-VISIT procedures, we have sent a warning to
+those who believe they can skirt the system, to not even try.
+
+Facilitate legitimate travel and trade.
+ The Department believes that, over time, US-VISIT will actually
+speed up the processing times. Reports indicate that capturing
+biometrics (two fingerscans and a digital photo) takes less then 15
+seconds. The Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) system
+takes only seconds to capture the person's information. The CBP
+Officers often can ask fewer questions once the identity of the visitor
+has been captured. Fewer people are being sent for secondary
+inspection, and the overall time to `clear' a plane has not been
+significantly impacted. We have also developed responsible mitigation
+strategies if circumstances dictate that wait times have become
+unacceptable at a port of entry. All of these improvements help to keep
+trade booming and contribute to the economy of our nation.
+
+Ensure the integrity of the immigration system.
+ Inherent in the US-VISIT program is its ability to identify
+fraudulent documents. This tool aids in bolstering the integrity of the
+immigration system. As we test various exit components, we further
+strengthen the immigration system by identifying people who do not
+comply with the terms of their admission.
+ US-VISIT also allows DHS to identify those visitors who have
+overstayed their allotted time in the U.S. and will be available to
+determine the future admissibility of such visitors. Through the use of
+airline and ship manifests, US-VISIT already tracks who has arrived to,
+and departed from, the U.S. Those departures are matched with US-VISIT
+databases against the recorded entries. Information received from other
+DHS databases, such as the Student and Exchange Visitor Information
+System, or SEVIS, will be used to confirm a visitor's compliance with
+U.S. immigration policy. Individuals for whom an entry exists, but for
+whom there is no record of departure, are referred to U.S. Immigration
+and Customs Enforcement for further investigation. If these overstays
+are located, they may be placed in removal proceedings in accordance
+with applicable immigration laws.
+ By providing vital data and assisting in the enforcement of
+immigration laws, US-VISIT strengthens the overall immigration process
+and ensures the integrity of our immigration system.
+
+Safeguard the personal privacy of our visitors.
+ Biometric identifiers make it harder to steal someone's identity
+even if their travel documents are lost or stolen. This is a
+significant benefit US-VISIT delivers for the millions of legitimate
+travelers we welcome each year. In addition, we must continue to
+respect our visitors' privacy. We have a Privacy Impact Assessment
+(PIA) being reviewed by external audiences and DHS has the first
+statutorily created Chief Privacy Officer, Nuala O'Connor Kelly. Ms.
+O'Connor Kelly along with the US-VISIT privacy officer has worked
+closely with privacy experts at the Office of Management and Budget,
+and with independent privacy consultants to prepare a PIA that
+addresses the beginning increments of this program.
+
+The Identity Verification Continuum
+ The Department of Homeland Security and Department of State
+together have created an entire continuum of identity verification
+measures that begins overseas, when a traveler applies for a visa, and
+continues upon entry and exit from this country. Today, more than 50
+visa-issuing posts have begun to capture fingerscans and photographs of
+foreign nationals when they apply for visas, regardless of their
+country of origin. This process will be in place at all 211 visa-
+issuing posts worldwide by October 2004.
+ US-VISIT supports pre-entry processes by using information from the
+Advance Passenger Information system (biographic, biometric, and
+previous travel and visa information) to match information to
+watchlists. This pre-entry processing establishes a single identity for
+each foreign national that will be used in all interactions with US-
+VISIT.
+Program Implementation
+ The program is being implemented in increments. The first increment
+was implemented on December 31 of last year. The other increments will
+be deployed over the coming years with the ultimate goal of having a
+robust system that can deliver all of the US-VISIT goals. The steps to
+this program include:
+
+ Increment 1--12/31/03:
+ Collect and verify biometrics for foreign nationals
+ arriving with nonimmigrant visas at air and seaports of entry
+ Check admissibility against watchlists using
+ biographic and biometric data
+ Establish exit pilots
+
+ Increment 2A--10/26/04:
+ Issue U.S. biometric travel documents following
+ International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards (all
+ countries)
+ Visa Waiver Program applicants must have machine
+ readable passports with biometric indicators in compliance with
+ ICAO standards
+ Deploy capability to read biometric travel documents
+ at air and sea POEs
+
+ Increment 2B--12/31/04:
+ Extend Increment 1 capability to 50 highest volume
+ land POEs
+
+ Increment 3--12/31/05:
+ Extend Increment 2B to remaining land POEs
+
+ Increment 4:
+ Launch initial roll-out of US-VISIT envisioned system
+
+US-VISIT's Budget
+ We deployed US-VISIT on budget. During Fiscal Year 2003 we used
+appropriated funds of $367 million to achieve successful deployment to
+115 airports and 14 seaports. Specifically we have:
+ Implemented/interfaced systems to reduce redundancy
+ and make more information available
+ Upgraded our infrastructure to support added
+ biometrics
+ Deployed the US-VISIT system to 115 airports and 14
+ seaports on January 5, 2004
+ Initiated the exit pilot at one airport and one
+ seaport
+ Established the US-VISIT program office
+ During fiscal year 2004, we have a total of $330 million plus an
+additional $10 million in no-year funds that we intend to use to
+continue meeting our goals. Currently, our fiscal year 2004 Expenditure
+Plan is in review; when these funds are released, we plan to:
+ Analyze, field test, and initiate deployment of
+ alternative approaches for verifying identity on exit at air
+ and sea ports of entry
+ Implement US-VISIT Increment 1 capabilities at the 50
+ busiest land border ports of entry by December 2004
+ Install biometric readers at all air, sea, and land
+ ports of entry
+ Continue building our program management capabilities
+In addition, we plan to award a contract to a prime contractor for
+further development of our end vision. This long-term vision will cover
+foreign nationals and their interactions with U.S. officials before
+they enter, when they enter, and when they exit. This comprehensive
+approach to border management will lead to the creation of a virtual
+border and will set the course for improved processes for management of
+data on foreign visitors.
+ We have also requested that $25 million be released in the interim,
+while the current year expenditure plan is in review. This will allow
+us to continue our efforts without interruption and avoid impact to the
+program that delays in schedule may cause.
+
+Entry Procedures
+ US-VISIT procedures are already in place at more than 50 visa-
+issuing posts, and all 211 visa-issuing posts will be deploying US-
+VISIT technology by October, 2004. By capturing biometrics overseas,
+before visas are issued, we are working together to strengthen national
+security.
+ Once at the port of entry, visitors will find that many of the
+procedures remain unchanged and are familiar to international
+travelers. For example, a U.S. Customs and Border Protection Officer
+still reviews each visitor's travel documents, such as a visa and
+passport. The officer still asks questions about the visitor's stay in
+the U.S.
+ What's new under US-VISIT is that the U.S. Customs and Border
+Protection Officer now uses the inkless, digital ``fingerscanner'' to
+capture two ``fingerscans'' of arriving nonimmigrant visitors holding
+visas. The visitor puts the left index finger and then the right index
+finger on the scanner. The officer also takes a digital photograph of
+the visitor.
+ The biographic and biometric data are used to check the identity of
+the visitor against the data captured by the State Department to ensure
+that the person entering the country is the same person who received
+the visa. Biometrics are also are compared against watchlists. At that
+point, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Officer will either admit
+the visitor or conduct additional inquiries based on the verification
+results. These procedures reduce fraud, identity theft, and the risk
+that terrorists and criminals will enter the U.S. undetected.
+
+A True Partnership
+ The Department is not doing this alone. We are collaborating with
+other government agencies, most notably the Department of State, to
+implement US-VISIT and inform the traveling public. We are working
+closely with the air and sea travel industry regarding the requirements
+of the US-VISIT program, as well as speaking with constituencies along
+the land borders. We see our relationship with these groups as a
+partnership.
+ We are also partnering with private industry to develop the best
+technological solutions. In accordance with our published schedule, a
+Request For Proposals (RFP) was issued in November 2003. The RFP
+incorporates an acquisition strategy to ensure that the latest
+available technologies will be incorporated into US-VISIT. The contract
+for this technology is expected to be awarded in May 2004.
+ An important part of the program is public education. Travelers are
+getting educated about the program before they arrive at the port of
+entry. We are engaged in a worldwide campaign to inform them. This
+campaign includes public service announcements, signage at ports of
+entry, explanatory cards on airplanes and cruise ships, news media
+coverage, and on-board explanatory videos.
+
+Statutory Mandates
+ The principal law that mandates the creation of an automated entry
+exit system that integrates electronic alien arrival and departure
+information is the Immigration and Naturalization Service Data
+Management Improvement Act of 2000 (DMIA), Pub. Law No. 106-215 (2000),
+114 Stat. 339, codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. section 1365a.
+ But there are many other laws that also impact this program. In
+order to handle all of the legal requirements and be able to best
+monitor the progress, meet the requirements, and measure the success,
+Secretary Ridge established US-VISIT.
+
+(See Appendix I for details of these statutory mandates.)
+
+ We have prepared a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA), which is being
+reviewed by external audiences including several privacy advocacy
+groups. This process is being spearheaded by DHS's Chief Privacy
+Officer, Ms. O'Connor Kelly, the first statutorily mandated privacy
+officer, to ensure that US-VISIT is in compliance with the appropriate
+privacy rules and regulations. The PIA has been developed and published
+in the Federal Register, and DHS is currently considering all comments
+received.
+ The Chief Privacy Officer (Ms. Nuala O'Connor Kelly) and the US-
+VISIT Privacy Officer (Steve Yonkers) have met with numerous advocacy,
+privacy and immigration groups to solicit input and hear concerns,
+which have been taken into account in the development of the program.
+ The US-VISIT PIA was hailed by many in the privacy community as an
+excellent model of transparency, including detailed information about
+the program, the technology and the privacy protections.
+
+A copy of the PIA is attached as Appendix II.
+
+Success Stories on Violators and Deployment of US-VISIT
+ Since US-VISIT entry procedures were implemented, it has resulted
+in the interception of dozens of individuals who matched various
+criminal databases. These included rapists, drug traffickers, credit
+card and visa fraud criminals, and a convicted armed robber.
+
+Here are details of a few examples.
+ (1) Interception of Drug Trafficker who Escaped from Prison
+ On January 14, 2004, at Miami International Airport, a man from
+ Peru was traveling to the U.S. When he arrived at the CBP
+ Officer's booth for admittance, he was enrolled in US-VISIT.
+ His fingerprints matched the ones already in a federal criminal
+ database. This man was wanted by the U.S. Marshals for escaping
+ from Latuna Federal Correction Facility where he had been
+ serving a sentence for a conviction of dealing cocaine. After
+ his escape, an arrest warrant was issued. In May of 2003 he re-
+ entered the U.S. without incident. Now, with the help of US-
+ VISIT biometric processes, this man was caught and extradited
+ by U.S. Marshals for the warrant. US-VISIT prevented a drug
+ trafficker from roaming the streets of Miami.
+
+ (2) Closing a Deportation Loop Hole
+ On January 18, 2004, a man who has had four aliases tried to
+ enter the U.S., even with a ``failure to appear'' warrant for
+ him. DHS/ICE issued the warrant on August 8, 2003, and since
+ then this man had entered the U.S. at least five times. Now,
+ with the ability to match fingerscans with those in a criminal
+ database, this man's luck ran out. He was extradited from the
+ U.S. and put on the next flight back to Columbia.
+
+ (3) Passport Fraud Uncovered
+ On January 14, 2004, a British West Indies Airways flight
+ arrived at JFK International Airport in New York carrying a
+ woman from Trinidad. Because US-VISIT begins at the visa-
+ issuing post, a photo of the visitor was on file and accessible
+ by the Customs and Border Protection Officer, who determined
+ that she had used a false name. In reality, the traveler was a
+ woman who had been arrested in April 2000 in New Orleans and
+ convicted of passport fraud. The woman was placed on five
+ years' probation and ordered not to enter the U.S. without the
+ attorney general's written permission. The woman, whose husband
+ lives in the U.S., had obtained a passport and U.S. visa by
+ fraud in Trinidad for $2,000. She was removed from the U.S.
+
+A CBP Trainee Rises to the Occasion
+ U.S. Customs and Border Protection Officer Trainee Rafal Izycki was
+working at primary inspection at Chicago O'Hare International Airport.
+An Albanian national seeking admission into the U.S. appeared before
+him and presented an Albanian passport. When Inspector Izycki compared
+the State Department photo image provided by US-VISIT against the
+photographs on the passport and visa, he realized that the person in
+front of him was not the person who had obtained the visa. He
+immediately referred the Albanian national for a secondary inspection
+where it was determined that the passport had been photo-substituted
+and the non-immigrant visa had been altered. The capability to access
+the State Department photographs of visa applicants provides a powerful
+tool for inspectors working to protect the U.S.
+
+Land Issues
+ US-VISIT Increment 1 capabilities will be in place at the 50
+busiest land ports of entry (POEs) by December 31, 2004, with processes
+in place at the remaining land borders by December 31, 2005. Land
+borders present a unique challenge in and of themselves, and each of
+the 165 land ports of entry is different and challenging. We do know
+that an inspection conducted at an air or sea entry point and one
+conducted at a land border will be different.
+ We are currently developing the best solution for a technology to
+be used at land borders to leverage biographic and biometric data.
+
+US-VISIT Program Office Update
+ Secretary Ridge approved the creation of a US-VISIT program office,
+and positions have been approved to fill the organization and manage
+the program. The US-VISIT program team consists of representatives from
+the various components of DHS responsible for border security,
+including the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Customs
+and Border Protection, and the Transportation Security Administration.
+U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services is also represented. Other
+DHS components that assist the US-VISIT team include the Directorate
+for Management and the Science and Technology Division. In addition,
+outside DHS, the team consists of representatives from the Departments
+of Transportation, State, Commerce, Justice, and General Services
+Administration.
+
+Conclusion
+ US-VISIT is critical to our national security as well as our
+economic security, and its introduction has been successful. But US-
+VISIT can not be left unfinished. We must build upon the initial
+framework and solid foundation to ensure that we continue to meet our
+goals to enhance the security of our citizens and visitors while
+facilitating travel for the millions of visitors we welcome each year.
+We are committed to building a system that enhances the integrity of
+our immigration system by catching the few and expediting the many, and
+we recognize that the U.S. is leading the way in helping other
+countries around the world keep their borders secure and their doors
+open.
+
+ Appendix I
+
+ Statutory Mandates:
+
+The principal law that mandates the creation of an automated entry exit
+system that integrates electronic alien arrival and departure
+information is the Immigration and Naturalization Service Data
+Management Improvement Act of 2000 (DMIA), Pub. Law No. 10.6-215
+(2000), 114 Stat. 339, codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. section 1365a.
+DMIA amended previous legislative requirements for an entry exit system
+that would record the arrival and departure of every alien who crosses
+the U.S. borders. See section 110. of the Illegal Immigration Reform
+and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Div. C, Pub. Law No.104-208
+(1996), 110. Stat. 3009-558, codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.
+(later amended by DMIA). DMIA requires that the entry exit system
+consist of the integration of all authorized or required alien arrival
+and departure data that is maintained in electronic format in
+Department of Justice (DOJ) (now DHS) or Department of State (DOS)
+databases. 8 U.S.C. section 1365a. This integrated entry exit system
+must be implemented at all air and sea ports of entry by December 31,
+2003 using available air and sea alien arrival and departure data as
+described in the statute. DMIA also states that the system must be
+implemented at the 50. most highly trafficked land border ports of
+entry by December 31, 2004, and at all ports of entry by December 31,
+2005, with all available electronic alien arrival and departure
+information. DMIA also requires DHS to use the entry exit system to
+match the available arrival and departure data on aliens and to prepare
+and submit to Congress various reports on the numbers of aliens who
+have overstayed their periods of admission and on implementation of the
+system. 8 U.S.C. section 1365a(e). DMIA authorizes the Secretary of
+Homeland Security, in his discretion, to permit other Federal, State,
+and local law enforcement officials to have access to the entry exit
+system for law enforcement purposes. 8 U.S.C. section 1365a(f).
+ In addition, section 217(h) of the Visa Waiver Permanent Program
+Act of 2000. (VWPPA), Pub. Law No. 106-396 (2000), 114 Stat. 1637,
+codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. section 1187(h), requires the creation
+of a system that contains a record of the arrival and departure of
+every alien admitted under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) who arrives
+and departs by air or sea. The requirements of DMIA effectively result
+in the integration of this VWP arrival/departure information into the
+primary entry exit system component of the US-VISIT program.
+ In late 2001 and 2002, Congress passed two additional laws
+affecting the development of the entry exit system, partly in response
+to the events of September 11, 2001. Section 40.3(c) of the Uniting and
+Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
+Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act). Pub. Law No. 107-56
+(2001),115 Stat. 353, codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. section 1379,
+required the Attorney General and the Secretary of State jointly,
+through the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and
+in consultation with the Secretary of Treasury and other appropriate
+Federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and in consultation
+with Congress, to develop and certify a technology standard, including
+appropriate biometric identifier standards, that can be used to verify
+the identity of visa applicants and persons seeking to enter the United
+States pursuant to a visa and to do background checks on such aliens.
+In developing the entry exit system required by DMIA, section 414(b) of
+the USA PATRIOT Act directed the Attorney General and the Secretary of
+State to ``particularly focus on the utilization of biometric
+technology; and the development of tamper-resistant documents readable
+at ports of entry.'' 8 V.S.C. section 1365a note.
+ The legislative requirements for biometric identifiers to be
+utilized in the context of the entry exit system were significantly
+strengthened with passage of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa
+Entry Reform Act of 2002 ``Border Security Act'' or EBSVERA) Pub. Law
+No. 107-173 (2002), 116 Stat. 553, codified in scattered sections of 8
+U.S.C. Section 302(a)(1) of the Border Security Act states that the
+entry exit system must use the technology and biometric standards
+required to be certified by section 403( c) of the USA PATRIOT Act.
+Section 303(b)(1) requires that ``[n]o later than October 26, 2004,''
+only machine-readable, tamper resistant visas and other travel and
+entry documents that use biometric identifiers may be issued to aliens
+by DHS and DOS. 8 U.S.C. section 1732(b)(1). This section, however,
+does not invalidate unexpired travel documents that have been issued by
+the U.S. government that do not use biometrics. Section 303(b)(1)
+further states that the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State must
+jointly establish document authentication and biometric identifier
+standards for alien travel documents from among those recognized by
+domestic and international standards organizations. Id.
+ Section 303(b)(2) requires that ``[n]o later than October 26,
+2004,'' all ports of entry must have equipment and software installed
+``to allow biometric comparison and authentication of all United States
+visas and other travel and entry documents issued to aliens, and
+passports'' that are required to be issued by VWP countries. 8 U.S.C.
+section 1732(b)(2). The current statutory language also requires that
+by that same date, VWP countries must have a program in place to issue
+tamper-resistant, machine-readable, biometric passports that comply
+with biometric and document identifying standards established by the
+International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). 8 U.S.C. section
+1732(c)(1). The statute also states that on or after October 26, 2004,
+any alien applying for admission under the VWP must present a passport
+that is machine readable, tamper-resistant and that uses ICAO-compliant
+biometric identifiers, unless the unexpired passport was issued prior
+to that date. 8 U.S.C. section 1732(c)(2). The entry exit system must
+include a database that contains alien arrival and departure data from
+the machine readable visas, passports, and other travel and entry
+documents. 8 U.S.C. section 1731 (a)(2). In developing the entry exit
+system, the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State must also make
+interoperable all security databases relevant to making determinations
+of alien admissibility. 8 U.S.C. section 1731(a)(3).
+ In addition, the entry exit system component must share information
+with other systems required by the Border Security Act. Section 202 of
+the Border Security Act addresses requirements for an interoperable law
+enforcement and intelligence data system and requires the integration
+of all databases and data systems that process or contain information
+on aliens.
+ The US-VISIT program requirements that foreign nationals provide
+biometric identifiers when they seek admission to the United States are
+further supported by the Department's broad authority to inspect aliens
+contained in section 235 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. section 1225. Pursuant to
+section 215(a) of the INA, the President also has the authority to
+regulate the departure of aliens, as well as their arrival. President
+Bush has issued Executive Order titled Assignment of Functions Relating
+to Arrivals In and Departures From the United States delegating his
+authority to promulgate regulations governing the departure of aliens
+from the United States. In accordance with section 215 and with this
+new Executive Order, the Secretary of Homeland Security, with the
+concurrence of the Secretary of State, has the authority to issue this
+rule which requires certain aliens to provide requested biometric
+identifiers and other relevant identifying information as they depart
+the United States. For nonimmigrant aliens, the Department may also
+make compliance with the departure procedures a condition of their
+admission and maintenance of status while in the country under INA,
+section 214.
+ Many other provisions within the INA also support the
+implementation of the US-VISIT program, such as the grounds of
+inadmissibility in section 212, the grounds of removability in section
+237, the requirements for the VWP program in section 217, the
+electronic passenger manifest requirements in section 231, and the
+authority for alternative inspection services in sections 286(q) and
+235 of the INA and section 404 of the Border Security Act. These are
+but a few of the most significant provisions that support US-VISIT from
+among numerous other immigration and customs statutes.
+
+ US-VISIT Program, Increment 1
+
+ Privacy Impact Assessment
+
+ Executive Summary
+
+ December 18, 2003
+
+Overview
+ US-VISIT, the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator
+Technology, is a legislatively-mandated DHS program that is designed
+to:
+
+ Enhance the security of American citizens, permanent
+ residents, and visitors
+ Expedite legitimate travel and trade
+ Ensure the integrity of the immigration system
+ Safeguard the personal privacy of visitors
+
+When fully implemented, US-VISIT will provide a dynamic, interoperable
+system involving numerous stakeholders across the government. Increment
+1, as the name suggests, is the first step in the implementation
+process. Increment 1 proposes to integrate and modify the capabilities
+of several information systems in order to accomplish the mission of
+US-VISIT.
+This Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) focuses on Increment 1 of this
+entry exit system.
+What Information is Collected
+ The US-VISIT program will collect and retain biographic, travel,
+and biometric information (i.e., photograph and fingerprints)
+pertaining to visitors.
+ Individuals covered by Increment 1 (``covered individuals'') are
+nonimmigrant visa holders traveling through air and sea ports.\1\ The
+DHS regulations and related Federal Register notice for US-VISIT
+Increment 1 will fully detail coverage of the program. Information is
+in the Committee file.
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ \1\ Nonimmigrant visa entrants comprise a small percentage of the
+330 million non-citizens admitted annually through ports of entry.
+Establishing US-VISIT incrementally with this population will allow DHS
+to test implementation of the system and to make revisions as needed
+for future increments.
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+Why the Information is Being Collected and Intended Use of the
+Information
+ In accordance with Congressional mandates for an entry exit system,
+information is collected from and used to verify the identity of
+covered individuals who enter or leave the United States. This enables
+U.S. authorities to enhance the security of the United States by more
+effectively identifying covered individuals who are:
+
+ Known to pose a threat or are suspected of posing a
+ threat to the security of the United States;
+ Known to have violated the terms of their admission to
+ the United States; or
+ Wanted for commission of a criminal act in the United
+ States or elsewhere.
+
+Information Access and Sharing
+ Information collected and retained by US-VISIT will be accessed by
+employees of DHS components--Customs and Border Protection, Immigration
+and Customs Enforcement, Citizenship and Immigration Services, and the
+Transportation Security Administration--and by consular officers of the
+Department of State. Strict security controls will be put in place to
+ensure that only those personnel with a need for the information in the
+performance of their official duties will be able to access information
+in the system.
+ If necessary, the information that is collected will be shared with
+other law enforcement agencies at the federal, state, local, foreign,
+or tribal level, who are lawfully engaged in collecting law enforcement
+intelligence information and who need access to the information in
+order to carry out their law enforcement duties.
+
+Consent Mechanisms
+ The admission into the United States of an individual subject to
+US-VISIT requirements will be contingent upon submission of the
+information required by US-VISIT, including biometric identifiers. A
+covered individual who declines to provide biometrics is inadmissible
+to the United States, unless a discretionary waiver is granted under
+section 212(d)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Such an
+individual may withdraw his or her application for admission, or be
+subject to removal proceedings.
+
+Security
+ Information accessible to US-VISIT will be protected through multi-
+layer security mechanisms that are physical, technical, administrative
+and environmental and that are in compliance with the DHS IT Security
+Program Handbook and DHS Baseline Security Requirements for Automated
+Information Systems. These security mechanisms provide access control
+to sensitive data, physical access control to DHS facilities,
+confidentiality of communications, authentication of sending parties,
+and careful screening to ensure that all personnel with access to data
+are screened through background investigations commensurate with the
+level of access required to perform their duties.
+
+System of Records
+ A system of records notice (SORN)--normally required under the
+Privacy Act--is not necessary for US-VISIT because no new system is
+being developed for Increment 1. However, the ADIS and IDENT SORNs have
+been revised to reflect US-VISIT usage.
+ Although US-VISIT derives its capability from the integration and
+modification of existing systems, it nevertheless represents a new
+business process that involves new uses of existing data and the
+collection of new data items. As a result, there is a potential for new
+privacy risks, which are addressed in the PIA.
+
+Privacy Controls
+ US-VISIT collects, integrates, and shares personal information of
+covered individuals. Covered individuals must consent to the
+collection, use, and disclosure of this personal information if they
+wish to enter or leave the U.S.
+ To address the privacy concerns associated with the program, US-
+VISIT will implement comprehensive privacy controls, which will be
+modified and updated as the system is revised and expanded. These
+controls consist of:
+ Public education through transparency of the program,
+including development and publication of a Privacy Policy that will be
+disseminated prior to the time information is collected from potential
+visitors; \2\
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ \2\ A copy of the Privacy Policy is appended to the full report.
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ Establishment of privacy sensitivity awareness programs for
+US-VISIT operators; \3\
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ \3\ The legacy systems on which Increment 1 is built include
+privacy sensitivity training requirements. This training will be made
+mandatory for US-VISIT operators.
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ Establishment of a Privacy Officer for US-VISIT and
+implementation of an accountability program for those responsible for
+compliance with the US-VISIT Privacy Policy;
+ Periodic strategic reviews of US-VISIT data to ascertain that
+the collection is limited to that which is necessary for US-VISIT
+stated purposes;
+ Usage agreements between US-VISIT and other agencies
+authorized to have access to US-VISIT data;
+ To the extent permitted by law, regulations, or policy,
+establishment of opportunity for covered individuals to have access to
+their information and/or allow them to challenge its completeness;
+ Maintenance of security safeguards (physical, electronic and
+procedural) consistent with federal law and policy to limit access to
+personal information only to those with appropriate rights, and to
+protect information from unauthorized disclosure, modification, misuse,
+and disposal, whether intentional or unintentional; and
+ Establishment of administrative controls to prevent improper
+actions due to data inconsistencies from multiple information sources.
+
+Contact Point and Reviewing Official
+ Contact Point: Steve Yonkers, US-VISIT Privacy Officer, (202)
+ 298-5200
+ Reviewing Official: Nuala O'Connor Kelly, Chief Privacy
+ Officer, DHS,
+ (202) 772-9848
+
+Comments
+ We welcome your comments on this privacy impact assessment. Please
+write to: Privacy Office, Attn.: US-VISIT PIA, U.S. Department Of
+Homeland Security, Washington, DC 20528, or email [email protected].
+Please include US-VISIT PIA in the subject line of the email.
+
+
+
+
+
+ Ms. Granger. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, I appreciate that
+very much. We will be back with some questions in just awhile.
+ The chair now recognizes Assistant Secretary Maura Harty
+for her testimony.
+
+ STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MAURA HARTY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
+ BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
+
+ Ms. Harty. Thank you, Madam Chairman, members of the
+committee. Thank you very much for inviting me here to testify
+before you today on the role of the Bureau of Consular Affairs
+in implementing biometrics programs in U.S. visas and
+passports.
+ The inclusion of biometrics in international travel
+documents is an important step in enhancing the security of our
+nation's borders.
+ The Department of State's visa work abroad constitutes a
+vital element in providing for our national security. We have
+no higher responsibility than the protection of our citizens
+and safeguarding our country's borders through the visa
+process.
+ The consular officers of the foreign service who adjudicate
+visas at our embassies and consulates abroad truly are the
+first line of defense. Through them, our goal in fact is to
+push the borders of the United States out as far from our
+shores as possible to stop questionable or problematic
+travelers overseas long before they ever reach our shores.
+ The biometric visa program will allow us to do just that by
+helping consular officers identify visa applicants already
+known to U.S. law enforcement.
+ The Border Security Act requires that no later than October
+26, 2004, the Secretary of State issue to aliens only visas
+that use biometric identifiers. To comply with this
+requirement, the State Department began deployment of the
+biometric visa program last September.
+ I am pleased to report that 55 posts now are already
+enrolling fingerprints, and with a very aggressive rollout
+schedule, the program will be in effect at all visa
+adjudicating posts by the congressionally mandated October 26
+deadline.
+ We will start issuing immigrant visas with the same
+biometric features next month and have this program operational
+at all immigrant-visa-issuing posts on the same date.
+ Under the biometric visa program, consular officers abroad
+will enroll applicants' fingerprints with electronic scanners
+at the visa interview windows, which will then be matched
+against the fingerprint files of DHS's IDENT system.
+ Our scanner looks almost exactly like the scanner that
+Undersecretary Hutchinson has already shown to you.
+ We are currently doing the match procedure at four pilot
+posts and are experiencing a return time of approximately seven
+to eight minutes at all four posts.
+ If the fingerprints match fingerprints in the IDENT
+database, no action is taken until the derogatory information
+is reviewed by a consular officer overseas.
+ We are currently discussing with the FBI the means to
+readily access these files so that consular officers in the
+field will have the necessary information to efficiently
+adjudicate the visa application to conclusion.
+ The most important here that I would like to underscore is
+that an IDENT hit overseas will freeze the visa application
+process until that hit is resolved, meeting that very first
+goal of pushing that border out as far from our own physical
+borders as a nation as possible.
+ Now moving on to cases with no hits, once the visa has been
+issued, our non-immigrant visa system sends the issued visa
+data, including the visa applicant's photo and the fingerprint
+identification number, to DHS. When the traveler arrives at a
+port of entry, the US-VISIT system will use the fingerprint
+identification number to match the visa with the file in IDENT
+and compare the visa holder's fingerprints with those on file.
+ This one-to-one fingerprint comparison ensures that the
+person presenting the visa at the port of entry is in fact the
+same person to whom the visa was issued.
+ To guard against impostors and forged or counterfeit visas,
+our visa data-share program has been upgraded for us with US-
+VISIT so that CBP officers at ports of entry have complete
+access to the travelers' visa files from the consular
+consolidated database at their primary stations.
+ CBP officers at ports of entry sees the same photo and the
+same bio data that the consular officer entered into the
+consular consolidated database at posts overseas at the time of
+the interview. This is a seamless operation.
+ The Border Security Act also established October 26, 2004,
+as the date by which visa waiver program countries must issue
+to their nationals only machine-readable passports,
+incorporating biometric identifiers that comply with the
+standards established by ICAO.
+ ICAO's decision to make facial-recognition technology the
+standard passport biometric was not made until May of 2003,
+leaving visa-waiver countries approximately 17 months to bring
+a biometric passport from design to production--a process that
+normally takes several years.
+ Although VWP governments share a commitment to making this
+change--and all are making varying degrees of progress toward
+complying with the biometric requirement--they have indicated
+at this point that they will be unable to meet the deadline.
+ The legislative requirements of the Border Security Act
+apply only to passports issued by visa-waiver program
+countries, but not the U.S. passport, which I firmly believe is
+the world's single most valuable travel document.
+ Although the law does not require of us what we are
+requiring of the VWP countries, the Department of State has a
+program that will produce the first biometric U.S. passport,
+using the ICAO standard official recognition, in October of
+this year.
+ We have planned to complete the transition to biometric
+passports by the end of 2005.
+ Embedding biometrics into U.S. passports to establish a
+clear link between the person issued the passport and the user
+is an important step forward in the international effort to
+strengthen border security. The Department of State is working
+hand in hand with our colleagues and friends at the Department
+of Homeland Security to ensure that we have a system that
+continues to facilitate legitimate international travel and
+properly identifies those who pose or could pose a threat to
+prevent them from entering our country.
+ I think I speak for all of us here today when I say that
+the continued commitment to ensuring the sanctity and security
+of our borders and our nation is our number one priority.
+ I am happy to answer any questions you might have.
+ Thank you very much.
+ [The statement of Ms. Harty follows:]
+
+ Prepared Statement of The Hon. Maura Harty
+
+ Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
+ Thank you for inviting me to testify before you today on the role
+of the Bureau of Consular Affairs in implementing Section 303 of the
+Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act (Border Security
+Act). The inclusion of biometrics, in addition to the photograph that
+has always been collected, in international travel documents is an
+important step in continuing to improve our ability to verify the
+identity of prospective travelers to the United States. In the process
+of screening visas and passports domestically and abroad, additional
+biometrics can serve as a useful adjunct to existing screening
+processes that identify individuals who might be terrorists, criminals,
+or other aliens who might represent a security risk to the United
+States. The Department of State has invested substantial time, money,
+and effort to implement the additional biometrics and ensure that
+international visitors are aware of changes to the visa application
+process and admission procedures in the United States. In so doing, we
+have worked, and will continue to work, closely with our colleagues at
+the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice (including the FBI).
+ As you know, the Border Security Act requires that no later than
+October 26, 2004, the Secretary of State issue to aliens only visas
+that use biometric identifiers. To comply with this requirement with
+respect to nonimmigrant visas, the State Department began deployment of
+the Biometric Visa Program on September 22, 2003, at the U.S. Embassy
+in Brussels, Belgium, and quickly followed suit at the U.S. Consulate
+General in Frankfurt and Embassies in San Salvador and Guatemala City.
+I am pleased to report that the program is now operational at 55 visa-
+issuing posts and with our aggressive rollout schedule the program will
+be in effect at all visa-issuing posts by October 26 of this year. With
+regard to immigrant visas, we will start issuing biometric visas in
+February and have this program operational at all immigrant visa-
+issuing posts by October 26, 2004.
+ The success we are having with the rollout of the Biometric Visa
+Program should not detract from the accomplishments of the process
+itself. I would like to walk you through the nonimmigrant visa process
+from visa applicant enrollment to the traveler's arrival at the U.S.
+port of entry.
+ Consular officers abroad oversee the fingerprint enrollment of the
+visa applicants with fingerprint scanners at the visa interview
+windows. Enrollment time averages about 30 seconds. As soon as the
+fingerprints are enrolled they are sent electronically, along with the
+photo of the applicant and biographic data, to the Consular
+Consolidated Database (CCD) in Washington. The CCD relays the
+fingerprint files to DHS's IDENT system in Rockville over a reliable,
+direct transmission line, which sends the results back to the CCD for
+relay back to the post. The current return time is approximately seven
+to eight minutes at three pilot posts.
+ No visa can be issued until a response of no derogatory information
+found is returned from the IDENT system. Until such information from
+IDENT is received, the visa system is locked with regard to that visa
+application. If the fingerprints match fingerprints provided by the FBI
+in the IDENT lookout database, the IDENT system returns to the post an
+FBI file number.
+ At present, Consular officers at posts overseas do not have desktop
+access to the FBI record associated with that file number. As an
+interim procedure, we are processing such cases through our National
+Visa Center, where an FBI official receives and analyzes the FBI's
+records and then forwards the information to post. We are discussing
+means to enhance the efficiency of the process with the FBI, so that
+consular officers in the field will have more direct access to National
+Crime Information Center (NCIC) information that will be of use in
+adjudicating the visa to conclusion.
+ If there is no match against the IDENT lookout database, then the
+visa applicant's fingerprints are stored in the US-VISIT database in
+IDENT, and a fingerprint identification number (FIN) is returned to the
+post. Once the visa has been issued, our nonimmigrant visa system sends
+to the DHS Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) the issued visa
+data, including the visa applicant's photo and the fingerprint
+identification number.
+ When the visa applicant arrives at a port of entry, the US-VISIT
+system will use the fingerprint identification number to match the visa
+with the file in IDENT, and will compare the visa holder's fingerprints
+with those on file. This one-to-one fingerprint comparison ensures that
+the person presenting the visa at the port of entry is the same person
+to whom the visa was issued.
+ As I mentioned before, biometrics (including photos and
+fingerprints) are a useful adjunct to the existing screening
+procedures. Even though fingerprint data has only recently begun to be
+incorporated into the U.S. visa issuing process, through our visa
+datashare program, which has been upgraded for use at primary
+inspection under US-VISIT, we are able to ensure the integrity of valid
+visas that do not have associated fingerprint data captured at visa
+issuance.
+ I will quickly outline the process by which visa datashare helps us
+accomplish our goal of securing further the integrity of the U.S. visa.
+Under visa datashare, the biographic data and current biometric data
+(i.e. photo) from the issued nonimmigrant visa are stored on the IBIS
+computer. When the DHS officer scans the visa at primary inspection,
+the photo and biographic data of the applicant are extracted from the
+database and projected on the screen. If the traveler has altered the
+photo on the visa, the DHS officer will be able to make a comparison
+with the original photo. In one such case under US-VISIT, a woman's
+photo appeared on the screen, but the traveler presenting the visa was
+a man.
+ If the visa is a complete counterfeit, nothing will appear on the
+DHS officer's screen. In this way, US-VISIT is combating fraud and
+protecting the integrity of the U.S. visa. At the same time, this
+system facilitates travel for the legitimate traveler because the DHS
+officer need not spend time examining the visa to ensure its
+authenticity--the US-VISIT system is ensuring the visa authenticity.
+ The process for the biometric immigrant visa that includes a
+fingerprint will be very similar. The visa itself will be printed on a
+tamper-resistant document. There will be reliable datashare with DHS so
+that the DHS inspector at the port of entry can verify the identity of
+the traveler and the authenticity of that individual's status as a new
+immigrant.
+ Let me now turn to the issue of the U.S. passport, which I firmly
+believe is the world's most valuable identity and travel document.
+First, I think it is important to note that improving passport security
+is not a one-time effort. Instead, we are involved in a process of
+continuous improvement that affects not just the physical passport
+carried by an American citizen, but also the adjudication process that
+determines whether an applicant is in fact a U.S. citizen.
+ Our latest efforts to improve the U.S. passport began in the late
+1990's with the introduction of photodigitization technology to support
+passport printing. Instead of gluing a physical photograph of the
+applicant into a passport and protecting that photo with a laminate, we
+introduced an entirely new technique that takes advantage of the many
+improvements in digital technology during the last decade.
+Photodigitization has been an unqualified success. Any passport with a
+physical photograph is inherently susceptible to photo substitution. We
+have now produced over 25 million passports using photodigitization and
+the number of credible alterations we have encountered still number in
+the single digits. I should add that domestic photodigitization has
+been so successful that we have, in turn, returned the production of
+passports issued abroad to our U.S. domestic production facilities so
+that we can take advantage of the significant security improvements
+embodied in the photodigitization process.
+ But, as good as photodigitization is, it is not the end of our
+efforts. We are currently undertaking a total redesign of our passport
+book to introduce the latest generation of security features as well as
+a total update of the physical appearance of the inside of the book.
+More significantly, we are also undertaking a massive effort to
+introduce embedded biometrics into the U.S. passport through the
+insertion of a contact-less chip, which will store biometric and
+biographic data including digital photos. I think it is important to
+note, however, that the legislative requirements in that section do not
+apply to U.S. passports, only to passports issued by our partner
+nations in the Visa Waiver Program.
+ Embedding enhanced biometrics into passports so that a clear link
+can be established between the authorized bearer of that passport and
+the user is an important step forward in the international effort to
+strengthen border security. We recognize that convincing other nations
+to change and improve their passport requires U.S. leadership both at
+the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and practically by
+introducing these changes into the U.S. passport. Thus, the Department
+of State has underway a program that should result in the production of
+our first enhanced biometric passports using the ICAO standard of
+facial recognition techniques in October of this year and we plan to
+complete the transition to this new biometric passport by the end of
+calendar year 2005.
+ In addition to our enhanced biometric initiatives, we are moving
+forward aggressively on two other programs to further improve further
+the U.S. passport. The first of those programs is to redesign the
+passport itself. We are well advanced on this project and expect to
+have these new books in large-scale production later this year. We have
+also implemented and expanded our data base which immediately alerts
+ports of entry to any passports reported lost or stolen.
+ The second is to strengthen further our passport adjudication
+process. We are negotiating new datasharing agreements with agencies
+such as the Social Security Administration (SSA) so that we can gain
+access to SSA data, which when combined with data from other sources,
+will help to identify possible irregularities in passport applications.
+We are also receiving additional data from the law enforcement
+community to help prevent issuance of passports to persons who may be
+flight risks. We are examining the possible uses of decision based
+software techniques and commercial database searches as part of a
+longer range effort to give passport adjudicators every possible tool
+to ensure the accuracy of their decisions. We will complete the
+scanning of applications with images for all currently valid passports
+by April, making them available at the desktop level worldwide to
+assist in adjudication. Finally, we should soon sign an agreement with
+DHS that will allow border inspectors access to these electronic copies
+of passport applications as a way to help strengthen our processing
+systems for returning American citizens.
+ Now that I have addressed the accomplishments that we are making
+towards improving the biometrics currently in our passports, I would
+like to focus on other countries efforts towards the same end. The
+Border Security Act set October 26, 2004 as the date when VWP travelers
+with passports issued on or after that date must also have biometrics
+(digital photos) incorporated in those passports that meet the ICAO
+standard for use in visa-free travel to the United States. Visa Waiver
+Program (VWP) governments have indicated that they will be unable to
+meet the legislatively mandated deadline to issue to their nationals
+only machine-readable passports (MRP) incorporating this enhanced
+biometric identifier that complies with the standards established by
+the ICAO.
+ ICAO's decision to make facial recognition technology the standard
+passport biometric was not made until May, 2003, leaving countries only
+17 months to bring a biometric passport that meets that standard from
+design to production, a process that normally takes years.
+ Moreover, while the VWP country governments share a commitment to
+make this change, many of them are encountering the same problems being
+experienced by the Department of State in our effort to introduce
+embedded enhanced biometrics into the U.S. passport. These issues
+include needing final decisions through the ICAO process on security
+matters, resolution of interoperability matters, as well as
+comprehensive testing to ensure that the chips work successfully and
+that they will continue to do so through the validity of the passport,
+which is 10 years in most cases.
+ We have vigorously encouraged VWP countries to issue biometric
+passports that meet the ICAO standard by the October 26, 2004,
+deadline. The U.S. has played a leadership role in ICAO working groups
+to advocate the successful inclusion of biometrics in travel documents.
+In the G8 we strongly advocated support for ICAO leadership in
+biometrics and participated fully in a special working group on
+biometrics established by the G8 ministers of Home and Justice Affairs.
+We are fully engaged in the group of 5 (US, UK, New Zealand, Australia,
+Canada) in which there are continuing discussions on progress regarding
+each country's efforts to produce the passport.
+ On the margins of international conferences, we have had repeated
+meetings with VWP representatives to explain the process; at trade
+conferences, State Department officials have made many public
+appearances to educate VWP government representatives about the
+requirements and deadlines. Many VWP countries have sent
+representatives to Washington to meet with U.S. government
+representatives and had full and open discussions on the issue. In
+December, the Secretary of State sent a diplomatic note to the VWP
+Embassies in Washington that conveyed the criteria for certification of
+a biometric passport program and also noted that there is no waiver
+available for the production deadline. The State Department followed up
+by sending the text of the note to U.S. Embassies in the VWP countries
+and requested the Embassies deliver the information to the host
+government and have them reply by January 10. We are still receiving
+responses from those countries.
+ In testament to our efforts, all VWP countries are making varying
+degrees of progress toward complying with the requirement to have a
+program in place to issue biometric passports; however, only one or two
+countries may have production capability in place by October 26, 2004.
+None of the larger countries (Japan, the U.K., France, Germany,
+Ireland, Italy or Spain, for example) will begin issuing passports with
+the ICAO biometric by October 26, 2004. Japan and the United Kingdom
+say they will begin in late 2005; others may not come on-line until a
+year after that.
+ Since travelers from VWP countries with non-biometric passports
+issued on or after October 26, 2004 will need visas to travel to the
+U.S., we estimate that the demand for nonimmigrant visas will increase
+significantly over fiscal year 2005 to over five million applications,
+nearly double last year's workload. However, once VWP countries begin
+issuing passports with biometrics, the increased workload will
+disappear. For example, in fiscal year 2003, mission Japan (Tokyo,
+Osaka, Kobe and Naha) processed approximately 111,000 nonimmigrant visa
+cases. The Japanese estimate that between October 26, 2004, and the
+introduction of their biometrics-bearing passport projected for
+November 2005, between 1.2 to 1.5 million Japanese would need visas. In
+fiscal year 2006, the number would likely drop back to current levels.
+ The Department of State is working hand in hand with our colleagues
+at the Department of Homeland Security to ensure that we have a system
+that continues to facilitate legitimate international travelers and
+properly identifies those who pose a threat to prevent them from
+entering our country. I think I speak for all of us here today when I
+say that the continued commitment to ensuring the sanctity and security
+of our borders and our nation is the number one priority. I am happy to
+answer any questions you may have. Thank you very much.
+
+ Ms. Granger. And I thank you very much.
+ I have a couple of questions. But, first, Undersecretary
+Hutchinson, you gave some excellent examples of people we have
+stopped from coming into this country because of this system.
+ But can you tell me specifically if someone gets to the
+airport, what databases exactly does the biographical and
+biometric information run through?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. The check goes through the Interagency
+Border Inspection System, the IBIS system, which is a database
+that includes information from 26 other databases, including
+the Department of State's CLASS, the TIPOFF databases.
+ And so the various interagency databases that would give
+you the necessary information to trigger a hit would be
+included in the IBIS.
+ In addition, we are linked to the TSC, the Terrorist
+Screening Center, for their list that they put together for
+strictly the terrorist watch list.
+ Ms. Granger. Very good. And when the traveler is screened
+through US-VISIT, does the IDENT start to take place in the
+primary inspection? Does it go through the primary inspection?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Yes, this is all done in the primary
+inspection.
+ Ms. Granger. And you told us, again, how long does that
+take and how much does that add to the time?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Actually we are measuring it very
+carefully, and the time for the system to do the check is on
+average eight seconds. And that would be from when the finger
+scan is taken, running through the system and back, eight
+seconds.
+ We have not noticed any appreciable difference in any wait
+times, which we have been monitoring. And one of the reasons
+is, the inspectors obviously are conducting other business as
+these checks are going on and asking other routine questions.
+ The eight seconds is actually cutting in half the response
+time under the previous system because of the upgrades in the
+system that we have been able to implement through US-VISIT.
+ Ms. Granger. Oh, very good, thank you.
+ Secretary Harty, there have been press reports criticizing
+US-VISIT because the 27 visa-waiver countries will not be
+processed through the system. But can you tell me what the
+State Department is doing to enhance the security in those
+passports?
+ Ms. Harty. Thank you for the question, ma'am.
+ The visa-waiver program administered by DHS with State
+Department concurrence in various aspects of it is a
+congressionally mandated program by which the meets and bounds
+are defined.
+ The 27 countries in the program now have been judged to be
+low-risk countries, travelers presenting less of a risk than
+others out there. That implies, to a degree, a face in the
+issuance ability and the integrity of the documents as issued
+by their own respective countries.
+ We are always eager to continue to work together. We have
+very, very good relationships with the 27 countries in the
+program. We have been very communicative with them about the
+deadline that Congress has set for next October 26, 2004.
+ This does give us pause and I am glad that you raise it. It
+gives us pause because this is a challenge for us that has a
+rather finite sort of beginning and end to it.
+ All of the countries in the program, about 80 percent of
+visa-waiver travelers, come from Japan, the United Kingdom,
+Germany, France, Italy and The Netherlands. All of the
+countries in the program are striving to make the deadline.
+ As they do make that deadline, the problem in their
+countries of our having to issue visas to their nationals will
+in fact wane.
+ If I were to have to begin to issue visas to all visa-
+waiver countries right now, it would, we estimate, be upwards
+of 5 million additional visas we would have to adjudicate. That
+would cause me to think about having to hire hundreds of more
+consular officers and even foreign service national employees--
+again, for a challenge that is somewhat finite in nature--as
+the visa-waiver countries come into compliance with the October
+26 deadline, at whatever point they are able to do that.
+ As a manager, I cannot, in all honesty, justify hiring so
+many more people, perhaps even looking at constructing some
+sort of additional space at consular sections or consulates
+around the world to handle that workload.
+ So what we are doing is making sure the countries
+understand the deadline.
+ We are making sure that our own procedures will call for us
+to be as agile as possible, being concerned with what another
+member of the committee spoke about earlier, a facilitation of
+travel, also important to us.
+ The visa-waiver countries in the last five years have
+accounted for some 68 percent of people who have come into this
+country--exclusive of those who come in from Mexico and Canada.
+This is a huge number of people. We do not want to deter that
+travel.
+ What we do at all of our consulates and embassies is make
+sure that the emergencies are taken care of, that students who
+have a need to be here at a certain date will go to the front
+of the line, that medical cases will go to the front of the
+line, that business people who have a precipitous meeting of
+which they were previously unaware go to the front of the line.
+ We will handle it just as efficiently as we possibly can.
+We have asked for 161 new officers for this fiscal year, and
+123 for next fiscal year.
+ We will do the very best we can to facilitate legitimate
+travel to this country, but always keeping security as job one,
+ma'am.
+ Ms. Granger. I am still a little unsure about what specific
+security procedures they will go through, then. I understand
+putting emergencies at the front--.
+ Ms. Harty. Thank you for that question, ma'am. I should
+have added that visa-waiver-country travelers at the ports of
+entry go through exactly--their names are checked through
+exactly the same procedures as a namecheck is done overseas,
+simply done by an inspector at a port of entry rather than at
+an embassy overseas.
+ Ms. Granger. One last question for you, Secretary Harty: Do
+you know if primary inspectors have access to the State
+Department consular consolidated databases? And how does this
+improve their screening ability?
+ Ms. Harty. Oh, yes, they do, and we are very proud of that
+partnership.
+ I think that there is nothing better than an inspector at a
+port of entry being able to know that he or she is in fact
+absolutely and without a shadow of a doubt looking at the same
+person who a consular officer has already looked at overseas.
+And they do that by being able to pull up the photo that we
+capture overseas. And that is done very, very quickly.
+ So if you were to apply for a visa this morning in Buenos
+Aires, Argentina, and show up at Miami airport this afternoon,
+that inspector would have that.
+ It is refreshed every seven or minutes around the world, so
+it is very real time access to data that I think is very useful
+to both sides.
+ Ms. Granger. Thank you very much.
+ Ms. Harty. Thank you.
+ Ms. Granger. And, Secretary Hutchinson, you talked about
+how important US-VISIT is because it checks the people that are
+coming in and all the security. But, then, the other thing is,
+as they leave to make sure that they have left and who is
+leaving was the same person that came in.
+ So what mechanisms are used to ensure that those people go
+through the US-VISIT exit process and actually leave the
+country?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. First of all, the exit procedure would be
+information-base at our airports, and seaports, in which we
+would get the departure passenger information from the airlines
+or the cruise lines which would indicate that they left.
+ So biographically we can determine visa overstays who
+leaves.
+ Your question is, how can you confirm their identity?
+That's what we are testing at the Baltimore airport in a kiosk-
+type solution, that we would have assistance provided to the
+passenger as they check out.
+ The question would be: What mandates them to do that? How
+can you guarantee that they do that?
+ We are looking at different solutions. There are
+significant issues there, whether we put a gate solution,
+whether we put it near the TSA screening counter.
+ But it is a mandatory requirement for the visitor to check
+out. And if they fail to do that, we can monitor that with the
+passenger information that is provided by the airlines.
+ And then there obviously would be a penalty attached to it
+in the sense that they would have a more difficult time re-
+entering if they did not exit in a proper fashion.
+ Ms. Granger. And what is the date that you are looking at
+to have that completely operational?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Well, as soon as we can. But that is a part
+of the goal that we would have for calendar year 2004, would be
+to formalize the exit system and to have the final exit
+solution determined for our air and sea ports.
+ As to the full implementation date, we have not set that
+yet.
+ Ms. Granger. One of the concerns that has come up so many
+times is, people who come in the country, whether they are
+students, whatever, a particular period of time, and there was
+no tracking and so they actually didn't either return to school
+or go to school. That will be a part of what you are doing
+also, will issue a report to say who has overstayed their visit
+also, isn't it?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Well, first of all is to have the
+information. And we do. You mention the foreign students, of
+course, would be under our SEVIS, student exchange visitor
+information system, which is tied into US-VISIT, in which we
+would have the information when they left the university and
+also left the country.
+ We are setting up and have set up an office of compliance
+in ICE, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, which will be
+responsible for handling this information for visa overstays.
+It will be a vast amount of information that is created from
+US-VISIT, the SEVIS system. We are building that capacity, but
+that will be the enforcement responsibility of ICE.
+ Ms. Granger. Thank you very much.
+ Ms. Sanchez may inquire now.
+ Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California. Thank you, Madam Chair.
+ And once again, thank both of you for being here.
+ Madam Chair, before I ask my questions, I would like to
+submit for the record some testimony from Ed Petrarch, who is a
+senior Customs and Border Protection Officer at LAX, which
+respect to what is going on with U.S. visa.
+ In his testimony, Assistant Secretary, that I just
+submitted, one of the things that this senior Customs and
+Protection officer says is that they are pulling off of cargo
+screening to process low-risk U.S. citizens and green-card
+holders so that there is an acceptable flow of passengers in
+the international terminals under this US-VISIT.
+ In other words, they are getting pulled off cargo
+inspection to process people.
+ So my question is: What have you asked for with respect to
+personnel needs for this coming year? How many more people do
+you need if you are pulling people off of one situation to try
+to work on another situation?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, and that should not be the case.
+ The same individuals prior to January 1 of this year that
+did the inspection at our ports of entry in terms of processing
+people are still doing it. There has not been a shift in
+resources.
+ There may be emergency circumstances. But I do not believe
+there has been any significant shift of resources to implement
+US-VISIT. It is the same people that were there before to do
+it.
+ In terms of new resources, that will be a part of the
+budget submission in our testimony this year. We have enhanced,
+thanks to the help of Congress, our inspection resources. And
+we, with monitoring the wait times and not adding additional
+resources for the US-VISIT implementation, I think we have been
+successful with our existing resources.
+ Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California.That is nice. Again, the
+testimony says that this is just not the case at LAX. So I
+would ask that you might follow upon that and that you get back
+to us about just what resources are required.
+ [Copy maintained in the Committee files.]
+ Now, there is also an internal memo that was done by
+Assistant Commission Ahearn that outlined some mitigation
+strategies when US-VISIT wait times exceed one hour.
+ The strategy simply is a series of fall-backs where you
+collect biometric fingerprints from fewer and fewer people.
+ First, if it is over an hour, don't do those who are under
+17.
+ Then if the wait is still too long, don't do those that
+have biographical and photo data from the State Department.
+ Next, if there is a family traveling together, only do the
+head of household.
+ And finally, move to sampling from certain types of visa
+holders.
+ Why is your mitigation strategy to just keep letting more
+people go through without doing what you just told us is the
+intent of this program rather than to assess high-peak times,
+or suggestive high-peak times, and figure out how much
+personnel you really need to do that?
+ Can you explain why this memo and?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you. This is a new system. And so as
+it was rolled out on January 5th, even though we had great
+faith in it, we didn't know exactly how it would progress,
+whether there would be difficulties.
+ We wanted to have some flexibility in the early stages of
+this implementation that we didn't clog up our airports.
+ Well, it wasn't an hour tied to mitigation strategy; it was
+if the wait times exceeded 10 percent over the normal wait
+times, then they could implement a mitigation strategy.
+ But the good news is that there has been no instance in
+which that mitigation strategy has had to be implemented,
+because the wait times have not increased to that level. And we
+have no reason to expect that it will.
+ So it was a precautionary step at the initial phases of the
+implementation of US-VISIT.
+ Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California. So you are saying that
+this memo in effect has no relationship to what is really going
+on.
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Well, it had a very important foundation of
+starting this rollout on the first day. But it was a backup
+plan in the event that there was delays caused, or unforeseen
+circumstances, as we processed US-VISIT visitors.
+ That has not been the case. I do not anticipate it being
+the case in the future.
+ Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California. But if you had longer
+waits, what was stated in this memo is the way that things
+would be implemented currently.
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Correct. That was a memo that we did send
+out. What you recited was not precisely what the plan was. But
+there was a mitigation strategy.
+ You know, we have electrical outages from time to time.
+Well, there is a mitigation strategy. When the system goes
+down, you do things in the old way.
+ And in the same the US-VISIT, if we had to go to orange, we
+might increase and broaden the requirements in a time of
+heightened alert.
+ That is one of the benefits of this system is, there is
+some flexibility in it.
+ And if from whether a power outage or other problems, it
+can be adjusted in other ways.
+ Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California. I just find that not
+collecting the information when really that is the main reason
+for having this program is certainly a very strange way to
+mitigate, not having enough resources.
+ I have some other questions, Madam Chair, but I see that my
+time is over. So I don't know if we are coming back for a
+second round, or I will submit--.
+ Ms. Granger. Then we can.
+ Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California. --to be answered by both
+the undersecretary and the assistant secretary.
+ Thank you both for being here.
+ Ms. Granger. Thank you very much.
+ The chair now recognizes Chairman Cox for five minutes.
+ Mr. Cox. Thank you, Madam Vice Chairman.
+ Again, welcome Undersecretary Hutchinson, Ambassador Harty.
+ There has been a bit of news recently from the 9/11
+commission. The 9/11 commission reported that more than one, at
+least a few, of the 9/11 terrorists, possibly as many as eight,
+forged their passports.
+ We also know that when they filled out their visa
+applications, they either lied or in other cases just did it
+differently than they were supposed to.
+ If US-VISIT is in place in the future and that pattern were
+to repeat itself, what difference would it make?
+ And, Undersecretary Hutchinson, if could begin with you.
+ Mr. Hutchinson. It would make a significant difference.
+That is one of the benefits is that there is less reliance on
+fraudulent documents.
+ Usually a false passport has a false identity.
+ First--and I am sure Maura Harty would want to comment on
+this--that would probably be prevented at the consular post
+when the biometric is taken there. We will not have an
+assurance that the person passing through the port of
+inspection is the same person that they actually gave the visa
+to.
+ And then secondly, we will be relying upon their biometric
+to confirm that identity rather than simply the passport.
+ Mr. Cox. Ambassador Harty, do you want to address that as
+well?
+ Ms. Harty. Certainly, thank you, sir.
+ I agree completely with what Undersecretary Hutchinson
+said, that it would be our very strong belief, and our
+experience even, in the information base of this new program
+that the inspector at a port of entry is going to know, flat
+out know, if the person in front of them is the person who was
+seen at the embassy. They have a photo right there in front of
+them.
+ And they also have what we have done. Using our reader, we
+have taken a biometric, we have taken their fingerprint at our
+embassy or consulate. We have run that name against the IDENT
+system so we will know if there is any previous information on
+a person already in the system.
+ Should we then move to the next step of issuing a visa,
+then that same process will in fact occur at the port of entry.
+ So it is really a second check on the identity of a person
+and something that knits up and marries up the bearer of the
+passport with the face, with the person we have seen at a port
+of entry.
+ So that in fact would be a little bit different than the
+scenario in the past.
+ Mr. Cox. Now, this recent news from the 9/11 commission
+also informs us that at least one of the 9/11 planners applied
+for a visa using an alias in Saudi Arabia. Would this program
+have stood in the way of that?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Two things would happen there.
+ You mentioned Saudi Arabia, that the consular offices there
+would receive the application for a visa. We also have a visa
+security officer of the Department of Homeland Security in
+Saudi Arabia that would add a security perspective on that visa
+check.
+ So that is something that is new that we did not have two
+years ago.
+ And then that name, if it is an alias, would be checked
+against all of the watch lists.
+ I believe that we have an enhanced capability to determine
+that that is an alias to the checks that we have if it is not a
+legitimate name. That is the purpose of the background check.
+ Mr. Cox. Ambassador Harty?
+ Ms. Harty. Sir, if someone were to come into a consular or
+an embassy overseas, and have a completely clean background,
+such that they had never been in the United States before, or
+had never come to the attention of any of the various entities
+who contribute to the watch list that we have as a nation, it
+is in fact possible that we would not know it were an alias, if
+they had never come to our attention before.
+ But we do have another thing that we are working now.
+ One is, if they have ever come to our attention before in
+that we have previously seen them and issued or refused a visa,
+now that US-VISIT is up and running, now that we are enrolling
+people overseas, we have their fingerprint, so that if we have
+ever seen them before, despite the fact that they have used an
+alias, we have their print and we will know that.
+ While that is one program as we have described up and
+running now and getting better every day, we do have another
+thing that we are looking at, and that is facial recognition.
+It is a technology that is maturing.
+ However, we have a program at 13 different posts overseas
+as well as what we are exercising in conjunction with the
+diversity visa lottery to begin to explore yet another
+technology beyond the fingerprint that we already have.
+ So we have technology we are using as well as technology
+that we are experimenting with. We are always trying to push
+the envelope, sir.
+ Mr. Cox. Just lastly on this watch-list question, I want to
+ask you about the testimony that the 9/11 commission received
+yesterday, that apparently having your name on a list of
+suspected terrorists does not guarantee you a place on the
+FAA's no-fly list.
+ And as I understood the testimony, that may still be the
+case. Is this correct? And what impact would a suspected
+terrorist presence, or non-presence, on FAA's no-fly list have
+in the contest of the US-VISIT program?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Well, the no-fly list, of course, would
+certainly--one, they would not be flying on the airplane to
+enter our airports, if they were on the no-fly list. They
+should not be on there to begin with.
+ And so as part of our security measures, that should be
+caught before they would get on that aircraft. And then in the
+event that the system failed in a foreign country, we would
+know about that before they landed by checking the biographical
+data.
+ Your question is about whether everybody on other watch
+lists, FBI's and so on, is on the TSA no-fly list. And the
+answer there is that any agency can submit a name for the no-
+fly list--CIA, FBI--but it has to be more than just a name.
+ We obviously want to have the biographical data, either an
+address, a date of birth, because if you submit just a name, it
+might hit against 200 different people that would be flying,
+particularly if you used a very common name, ``John Smith in
+the United States,'' or a very common name in the Arab world,
+then it is not really accomplishing anything by putting that on
+the no-fly list.
+ And so that is part of the distinction and discussion. We
+are obviously wanting any information that would help us
+identify those people that would be at risk. But we also want
+as much information from the agencies as we can get.
+ Mr. Cox. Thank you, Madam Vice Chairman.
+ And I thank our witnesses once again.
+ Ms. Granger. Thank you.
+ The chair now recognizes Representative Pascrell for five
+minutes.
+ Mr. Pascrell. Thank you.
+ Just some quick--.
+ Ms. Granger. Can I stop you? I am sorry, I didn't see Mr.
+Turner come in. I apologize.
+ I recognize Mr. Turner now for five minutes.
+ Mr. Turner. Thank you, Madam Vice Chairman.
+ Mr. Hutchinson, I understand Ms. Sanchez was asking you
+about the problem of wait time, particularly at the airports.
+And I have taken a look at this memo that was issued by the
+department to field operations on January 2nd. And that was the
+memo that lowered the wait time--or stated that if the wait
+times exceeded one hour, then you could waive the US-VISIT
+process, and prior to that, your regulation was that if the
+wait time exceeded two hours.
+ Now, it is strange to me that during a period of orange
+alert, you changed the rules and you told field operations that
+if there is a wait time that exceeds an hour, you can just
+waive all these requirements, when previously at least you had
+a two-hour rule.
+ So it seems like you sent a terrible signal to field
+operations with regard to the meaning of US-VISIT.
+ Because--.
+ Ms. Granger. Representative Turner?
+ Mr. Turner. If I read this--.
+ Ms. Granger. Would the gentleman yield, please--.
+ Can the witness have a copy, please--.
+ Mr. Turner. Sure.
+ Ms. Granger. --before you question him about that. He does
+not have a copy of that memo.
+ Mr. Turner. Asa, would you like a copy of this?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. I would be happy to look at it, but go
+ahead and ask me questions.
+ Mr. Turner. There was an article that I read on a Web site,
+World Daily Net, where several of the frontline screeners were
+quite upset with this change, because they felt very strongly--
+and I could quote a couple of them to you.
+ But the bottom line is, we know that the intent of US-
+VISIT, according to Secretary Ridge, is to add about 15 seconds
+to the wait time of an average passenger. That is what we are
+told anyway.
+ And so to me it seems like at the very point in time when
+you are implementing the system to say that if the lines get so
+long and the backup such that we are going to have an hour
+wait, then you can just waive the program and bring people in.
+ Not only is it a significant security risk?because as you
+know, you are building a system that obviously will do what you
+said in your opening statement. It will catch a lot more
+criminals and a lot more immigrations violations than we have
+ever caught before just because we are creating the system.
+ But that is not the standard.
+ You know, this system, unfortunately, has got to be
+airtight. And if we already are loosening the rules, then I
+think we are moving in the wrong direction. And more important,
+I think it sends a terrible signal to those frontline workers
+who are out there dedicated to making this work and knowing the
+importance of what they are doing, and then to say, well, if
+the wait lines are too long, just waive all this stuff and let
+everybody on in.
+ So I would urge you to take a look at that, to make
+hopefully a reassessment of that, and certainly make it clear
+to those who are out there on the frontlines, working for your
+agency, that we want this system to work and be implemented,
+and that this is not a system that just because the lines are
+long we will waive it.
+ Now, I recognize that we are going to have a lot of
+pressure?and I am sure you felt it--from those who are
+concerned about backlogs and the effect on travel.
+ But the way we have to deal with that is reallocation of
+resources to be sure that we move people on through in a timely
+way.
+ And to send a message this early that we are going to
+loosen the rules, I think is a bad signal for us.
+ The other area that I have concern about is one I have
+expressed on numerous occasions, is about your linkage to the
+Terrorist Screening Center.
+ We all know that the Terrorist Screening Center is not yet
+collecting on a real-time basis the information from other
+databases. In fact, in many cases the information on many
+government watch-list databases haven't yet been incorporated
+into the unified terrorist watch list.
+ But in terms of the way it is working for you now, I want
+you to describe for me, if you will, whether the data used by
+US-VISIT is adequately comprehensive and up to date? And
+describe the relationship between US-VISIT and the Terrorist
+Screening Center.
+ My impression is, that is not a real-time linkage. And even
+when you submit information to the Terrorist Screening Center,
+they have to manually check all these other databases.
+ And even on the important FBI list that they maintain, that
+you utilize, through the IDENT program, the FBI doesn't update
+that list but once every two weeks.
+ So what I am interested in is, what is the state of
+achieving what I hope some day we will be able to say is a
+real-time system of screening for terrorists that will be
+available to your frontline inspectors so that when somebody
+walks through and enters our country and walks through the
+inspection station, they can get the information back in real
+time to know whether that person is a dangerous person.
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Well, the check is first against the
+Interagency Border Inspections System, our IBIS database, that
+has 26 different databases, including the State Department's,
+including the Department of Justice, other databases that make
+that up, including Treasury, with our tech system, including
+the Justice Department.
+ And then it is also checked against the terrorist list from
+the Terrorist Screening Center.
+ Now is it real time?
+ If a name is added by the Terrorist Screening Center to the
+watch list, it is in real time communicated and refreshed with
+our databases so it can be an immediate hit if that passenger
+would try to come through.
+ Now can the system be improved? Absolutely. This is a new
+system. We are building the capacity. The TSC is strengthening
+its ability as well. This is being refined every day.
+ But I believe that with the technology that we have, being
+ahead of the schedule, the biometrics, that we have enhanced
+the ability of increasing our security at our ports of entry
+with US-VISIT even over and above what the congressional
+mandate was.
+ If I might go back to your first question about the memo
+that was sent out, it was not a change--it had nothing to do
+with whether it was two hours at our land borders during
+orange, because there was different wait times if it was at a
+heightened alert level.
+ As we implemented US-VISIT, we specifically looked at what
+happens if the system does not work right or it takes longer.
+And on the first initial phases of it, this memo was sent out.
+For example, we are not including in the regulation people who
+are older than 79. Well, I think that is a reasonable exclusion
+from those that we would have finger scans on. But if we saw
+excessive problems, we would reduce that to age 69.
+ Now, I think that is a reasonable step in the initial
+phases as we implement US-VISIT. It has not been used. But if
+it was necessary, it would not be by a line inspector, it would
+be by a supervisor that would have to make that decision.
+ And we have not had to use that. I do not expect we will
+have to use that. But I think it was a prudent step to take as
+we rolled this out in 150 airports on the first day.
+ Mr. Turner. Well, I just want you know, I have talked--.
+ Ms. Granger. Mr. Turner, your time has expired. We will
+have a second round.
+ The chair now recognizes Representative Shadegg for five
+minutes.
+ Mr. Shadegg. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
+ I want to follow up on a question both by Mr. Cox and by
+Mr. Turner and have you clarify for me.
+ I recognize that biometrics do a great job of ensuring that
+the person who showed up to obtain the visa at the consulate
+outside this country is the same person who then shows up at
+the port of entry coming into the country.
+ But Mr. Cox asked I think what is the critical question and
+that is, what if that person, intent on deceit from the get-go,
+and they show up with the intent of using a false name to apply
+in the first place.
+ Mr. Under Secretary, you indicated that they check at I
+think you call it--is that interagency border data system? Is
+that right? And is that checked when they show up at the port
+of entry? Or is that checked when they show and apply for the
+visa at the consulate outside the United States, I guess is my
+first question.
+ And second question would be: Is that the only database
+that is checked, or are there other databases that are checked
+as well at that initial stage to try to find out if the person
+presenting himself or herself is who they claim to be?
+ Ms. Harty. Thank you for the question, sir.
+ With reference to what happens at a consular section
+overseas the consular officer runs what we call a CLASS
+namecheck, that is what we call our system. There are other
+systems of the government that feed into that.
+ CLASS is built, and in fact the U.S. government's
+counterterrorism watch list at this point, is built on a system
+started by the State Department in 1987 called TIPOFF.
+ Recently, over the last several months, TIPOFF's database
+has migrated over to TTIC and TSC.
+ TIPOFF had 120,00 names in it. It is being augmented every
+day per Homeland Security Presidential Directive No. 6, so that
+all agencies are beginning to feed as TIPOFF did. But TIPOFF
+formed the very spine of the new single database that we are
+all working towards.
+ The consular officers cannot, as they adjudicate a visa,
+hit the print key on a visa until they have run that namecheck,
+first and foremost.
+ Now, with US-VISIT, what we have done in the 55 posts where
+we are already up and running is, we are adding to that, the
+biometric collection. So, in addition to running our CLASS
+namecheck, based on the TIPOFF watch list, we also now run the
+biometric namecheck in four posts, at this point: Riyadh,
+Jeddah, Sanaa and San Salvador.
+ We are waiting until we get the namecheck back from the
+IDENT system, DHS's IDENT system, before we actually go ahead
+and issue the visa.
+ We will, of course--it is brand new; this is a pilot--but
+we will be bringing each of those online in the days, weeks and
+months ahead.
+ The time that it takes from the time that we ask IDENT,
+``What about this fingerprint? What do you know?'' and by the
+time we get an answer back, it has been about seven to eight
+minutes; again, not adding too much.
+ Mr. Shadegg. I think you have just told me what you told
+Mr. Cox, which is that if they haven't encountered the system
+already and if they are not in our database as having an issue
+as to whoever they are, that person, they can get by the
+system.
+ And I guess my question would be: How do we go beyond our
+own database to look at the individual? Is there a way that we
+coordinate with host countries to find out some verification
+that this person is who they say they are?
+ Ms. Harty. Thank you, sir.
+ One of the things that changed dramatically in the post-
+September 11 world is our strong, strong emphasis on
+interviewing techniques and on using the visa interview as a
+genuine tool to spot people who might or might not be exactly
+what they say they are.
+ So we have at the consular officer training at the Foreign
+Service Institute added additional courses on detecting
+deception, added additional courses taught by other agencies of
+the government who give us up-to-date information on trends out
+in the field of a counterterrorist nature.
+ We have taken a detecting deception course and added it to
+the basic officer training course. We have also taken it on the
+road so that mid-grade and more senior officers can also get
+this training.
+ In addition to that, several years ago we formed what is
+called a VISAS VIPER Committee meeting at post. That is where,
+on at least a monthly basis, all officers at an embassy in law
+enforcement--I am sorry.
+ Mr. Shadegg. I am running out of time and I wanted to get
+in one more question, but go ahead.
+ Mr. Hutchinson. There is layered protections from the
+interviews and to the checks that are done. But certainly,
+theoretically someone could come in with a clean record, with
+an alias name, and if they are not in the system before, if we
+don't have their fingerprints, the first time through it would
+not be a catch.
+ Mr. Shadegg. I appreciate your candor on that. And I think
+you will never build a system where that cannot happen. I just
+wanted to know if they were working at it.
+ Let me ask the last question: When I go home to Arizona and
+I describe all the work of your department and the efforts that
+are being made to deal with people that present themselves at a
+border checkpoint, or a port of entry, to tighten down and US-
+VISIT and all these other efforts, they kind of tilt their
+heads and look at me as if to say, ``Congressman, you are
+crazy. Have you ever looked at the border?''
+ What difference does it make if we do all these things at
+our ports of entry when, on the southern border of my state,
+there literally is not even a three-strand barbed wire fence
+for the majority of the border?
+ And I guess I would be interested in how you would respond
+to that question from a constituent.
+ Mr. Hutchinson. They are related. And obviously you have
+got to have two tracks going in the same direction. One is
+tightening it up at the ports of entry, which we are doing.
+That, in essence, could force illegal entrants to come across
+the land borders. And so, you have got to tighten that up as
+well. We are addressing that through technology in the same
+way, but they are related, and we have to do both.
+ Mr. Shadegg. Thank you.
+ Ms. Granger. Thank you.
+ The chair now recognizes Representative Pascrell for five
+minute.
+ Mr. Pascrell. I have some quick questions, and then I have
+some ones that perhaps you can elaborate on, Mr. Secretary.
+ Have we tested and come to the conclusion as the reason why
+we are concentrating on fingerprints in this biometric quest,
+here, has it proven to be more conclusive than facial
+identification, hand geometry, handwriting, retinal tests and
+voice? Is that the conclusion you came to?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. The conclusion is that it is more widely
+accepted in the international community, and we have obviously
+the added feature with finger scans that you have databases of
+criminals and terrorists that are taken in that fashion. You
+don't have the same databases of retina scans, for example.
+ Mr. Pascrell. Is it more accepted than it is accurate?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Well, I think it is both accepted and
+accurate.
+ Mr. Pascrell. Okay, my next question is, if I may:
+Approximately how many photographs do we have of suspected
+terrorists that we can compare to the digital facial
+photographs we now take of foreign visitors, approximately?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. I don't have that exact number for you.
+ Mr. Pascrell. Could you get that to us, please?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. I would be happy to.
+ Mr. Pascrell. Is there a database of fingerprints that we
+have of suspected terror?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Yes.
+ Mr. Pascrell. We do have that database?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Yes.
+ Mr. Pascrell. You have that database?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Well, it is accessed through?
+ Mr. Pascrell. No, I don't mean you personally, but your
+department?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Yes, absolutely.
+ Mr. Pascrell. Okay, my next question is this: You referred
+to the history of security in terms of trying to see who is
+coming in and out of this country.
+ I want to go back to 1998, in the Senate Judiciary
+Committee. In fact, a few people mention this in their
+testimony. And in that report to the Congress of the United
+States on border improvement and immigration, it is
+interesting. You go back to see, you know, where we have come
+in four years due to the tragedy of 2001.
+ ``The committee is keenly aware that implementing an
+automated entry-exit control system has absolutely nothing to
+do with countering drug trafficking, halting the entry of
+terrorists into the United State or with any other illegal
+activity near the borders. An automated entry-exit control
+system will at best provide information only on those who have
+overstayed their visas.
+ ``Even if a vast database of millions of visa overstayers
+could be developed, this database will in no way provide
+information as to which individuals might be engaging in other
+unlawful activity. It will accordingly provide no assistance in
+identifying terrorists, drug traffickers or other criminals.''
+ I would like your brief comment on that, if I may.
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Well, again, you point out that one of the
+original focuses was that you would be able to identify visa
+overstays to add integrity to our immigration system. As that
+was in 1998, that changed somewhat after the attack on America,
+and there was a renewed focus by Congress that not only is it
+important for the integrity, but also for security purposes.
+ And so, there was additional features and requirements that
+were made and probably a little bit different perspective was
+added after that.
+ Mr. Pascrell. And my final question is this?and I thank you
+for your candidness. We can go back over this again at another
+time. I think it is important enough.
+ Once the visa holder is enrolled in US-VISIT, his or her
+arrival information will be stored in the automated fingerprint
+identification system, better known as IDENT. It is a biometric
+database. That is correct, isn't it?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. That is correct. That is correct.
+ Mr. Pascrell. Am I right in thinking that the information
+for applicants for admission under the US-VISIT with no
+criminal record are contained in the same database as
+individuals for whom DHS is on the lookout for? Is that
+accurate?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Well, they are contained in the same IDENT
+system, but there would be an individual file, really, for each
+individual traveler, and it is separated from the criminal
+databases that would be associated with that.
+ Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Secretary, in conclusion, let me say
+this: I think that is unacceptable. I think to include within
+the same database of criminals or those that have been
+identified with criminal activity. All immigrants is an insult
+to every immigrant that comes into this country under this
+particular program.
+ I would suggest through the chair that you examine that
+situation, separate these folks out, because they are not
+criminals. You know that just as well as I do.
+ Ms. Granger. Thank you.
+ Representative Dicks is now called on for eight minutes.
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Madam Chairman, could I respond to this--.
+ Ms. Granger. Yes, you may.
+ Mr. Hutchinson. --very appropriate question by Mr.
+Pascrell?
+ And I thank you for that comment. And we certainly would
+not want to do anything that would denigrate or be offensive to
+our immigrant population.
+ I would just emphasize that, for example, IDENT has the FBI
+database as part of that. And there are separate databases
+within that, so it would be a separate system for those people
+that would be coming in, myself--or not myself--but any foreign
+visitor that would be traveling. That is held in there for
+facilitating their travel and the second time around.
+ So I appreciate your point, and we certainly want to make
+that distinction.
+ Ms. Granger. Thank you.
+ Representative Dicks?
+ Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
+ The first increment of the US-VISIT program relies on two
+fingerprints, isn't that correct?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Yes.
+ Mr. Dicks. One from each index finger for the purpose of
+checking that individual's identity against the various
+databases.
+ As we have discussed before, two prints are not always
+reliable for finding a person's records in some of our
+databases. For example, the FBI's IAFIS system uses all ten
+prints and will often not return a match when only two prints
+are used.
+ GAO and some of the biometric industry have said that more
+prints may be necessary for US-VISIT to work as well as it
+needs to.
+ Now, you and I had this discussion, but to hear the
+discussion today, 600,000 people have come in and, through this
+system, used their two index fingers.
+ Now, if we had done this right and had them do either eight
+or ten, we would have a much more reliable system. We are going
+to have to go to that at some point in order to make this thing
+work properly, as you and I have discussed--and I know there is
+very strong feeling, both in the House and Senate, that two
+fingers are inadequate.
+ I would just like to have your comment here on the record
+for why we did it that way. I know we were trying to rush and
+do it, but now it looks to me like we are going to have to go
+back and redo this. And we missed the opportunity to get these
+600,000 people the first time.
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you.
+ And the two fingerprints are sufficient for identification
+purposes, that you confirm their identity, which is the first
+responsibility. If there is an identity question, they are
+referred to secondary, where the multiple prints can be taken
+to have a more accurate check against the FBI databases, to
+make sure there is not any confusion.
+ And so it is a limited purpose of identity with the two
+fingerprints.
+ And the State Department is a key in this, that they have
+invested in the fingerprint scans that they are deploying as to
+whether down the road there has to be additional fingerprints
+that are added. But that is a question of our systems
+development, a question of resources with the State Department.
+ But this is an immediate added security value for a very
+low-cost amount. I think it was like $1 million for these and
+all of our ports of entry. We were immediately able to get the
+security benefit, and then we will see where the system has to
+gravitate down the road.
+ Mr. Dicks. Ambassador Harty, what do you think? I mean,
+would we be better off to do all ten or eight fingerprints at
+first and get this thing right?
+ Ms. Harty. Sir, thank you for the question.
+ I would like to agree with Under Secretary Hutchinson that
+in the first instance, we were in fact very much consumed with
+getting the identity right, identifying a traveler, getting to
+the issue of document fraud and making sure that the people who
+showed up at ports of entry were the people we had seen
+overseas.
+ I am not an expert on this subject, but I know that there
+have been a number of studies done, and not all conclusive,
+that you can find a number of different entities out there,
+some who say eight or ten are better. Let me just say maybe
+that is not the case. I think what we have is a very strong
+desire at the beginning of the program to meet the
+congressional deadlines to get the identification in place.
+ Mr. Dicks. I think the deadlines are somewhat more created
+by the administration. The secretary said, ``We will do it by a
+certain date.''
+ I think we ought to make sure we are doing it right by a
+specific date. Because if we go to a two-finger system, and
+then we have to go back to a ten-finger system because we
+didn't get it right, that is a waste of a lot of money and
+effort, it seems to me. My view is we should have done it the
+more comprehensive way at first if there was any question about
+it.
+ And the issue is that you have got the IAFIS database at
+the FBI that is a ten-finger system. So, you are not going to
+have this relationship, according to the experts that I talked
+to.
+ I just wanted to bring that up, and hope you will take
+another look at it.
+ Ms. Harty. Certainly, sir.
+ Mr. Dicks. We have talked about the southern border. The
+northern border is of concern to me, being from Washington
+State.
+ I noticed in the statistics that the CBP has assigned 9,539
+border agents to the southern border compared with 990 on the
+4,121-mile northern border. How do we explain the difference,
+here?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Well, we have added 1,000 agents to the
+northern border, which is 1,000 increase. And obviously the
+northern border has not been a focus prior to the security
+lessons that we learned from 9/11.
+ So we are continuing to enhance that, but it is a challenge
+on both the northern and the southern border.
+ Mr. Dicks. You know, I usually don't quote from The
+Washington Times, but The Washington Times, in December, did a
+very comprehensive article about the problems and challenges we
+face in Canada. One thing it said was that since 1995, at least
+15 persons identified to federal authorities as known
+terrorists have been caught crossing the border from Canada.
+Two in Blaine, in Washington State.
+ And also that there are Al Qaida sleeper cells, even today,
+in Canada.
+ Are we talking to the Canadians about trying to get them to
+strengthen their system? We may make this enormous effort here
+in the United States, but if these people can enter into
+Canada, be in sleeper cells, come across the border, that this
+may become--we have already seen with Ressam that this has
+happened once before.
+ Thank goodness for a great agent who found this person up
+in Port Angeles in my district, or we may have had a major
+incident at the Los Angeles airport or in Seattle.
+ What are we doing with the Canadians to try to get them to
+cooperate with us on this?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. You are absolutely correct that there are
+vulnerabilities in the northern border that have to be
+addressed.
+ We are working with the Canadian counterparts. We have our
+integrated border enforcement teams, which the Royal Canadian
+Mounted Police and our Border Patrol are working together. We
+have moved air assets to the northern border, including the
+building of new facilities to accommodate those air assets. We
+have put new technology there, surveillance equipment, sensors.
+ It is a vast, open border. There is a tradition of openness
+there that we have had to take a much closer look at and
+enhance the security on since 9/11.
+ We will continue to do that, but we are working closely
+with the Canadian government.
+ Mr. Dicks. Are they doing a better job of trying to screen
+people--do what we are trying to do in terms of keeping these
+terrorists out of their country?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. They are. We are wanting them to do some
+additional things, working with them. Obviously if you get to
+North America, whether it is Canada or the United States, and
+you have an open border, you can traverse back and forth.
+ And so, we need to on the front end have a common policy on
+who gets into North America. That would enhance our security.
+And we are working with them and with the State Department to
+accomplish.
+ Mr. Dicks. I urge you to keep that up.
+ Now, let me ask you one more thing: When they go across the
+border, you have trucks, you have cars. I know if you slowed it
+down, you would have a backup for miles and miles and miles.
+ What kind of equipment are we using to scan these trucks
+and cars? Do you know what we are using?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Each inspector has their personal radiation
+equipment. We also have non-intrusive inspection equipment, and
+then we have radiation portals for the larger vehicles that go
+through.
+ So a variety of different technologies that will accomplish
+the inspection, both radiation detection as well as X-ray
+examination to detect any anomalies in the shipment.
+ Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
+ Ms. Granger. Thank you very much.
+ I have no additional questions.
+ I will call on Chairman Cox.
+ Do you have additional questions?
+ Mr. Cox. Madam Vice Chairman, I have a great many further
+questions for our panel. I know we have another panel. And I
+would yield to the vice chairwoman to excuse our witnesses,
+provided that we might have the opportunity to follow up with
+written questions.
+ Ms. Granger. Thank you.
+ Representative Turner, do you have additional questions?
+ Five minutes.
+ Mr. Turner. I just have one follow up.
+ Mr. Secretary, you made the comment about the inspections
+going on at our land borders. You mentioned that we have
+radiation detection portals. You mentioned the hand-held
+devices.
+ Where do we have radiation portals that you were referring
+to on our land borders?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Well, if you are looking at the cargo
+shipments, the trucks, we have portals in a whole host of
+places on the northern and the southern border. I would be
+happy to provide you with a precise list as to where they are.
+ Mr. Turner. And what is the criteria for utilizing them?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Well, if, for example, a personal radiation
+detector triggered, indicating there was some radiation being
+admitted, then if it was a truck, it would be brought through
+for closer examination in the larger portal.
+ In other places, where we have perhaps more equipment in
+place, they are automatically run through the portal.
+ I was at a land point of entry on the northern border in
+which every truck vehicle was being passed through the
+radiation portal.
+ Mr. Turner. Well, in regard to radiation portals, I know
+you have deployed some of those at seaports. And we don't yet
+have enough at our seaports to really screen all the cargo
+containers. And I was wondering if you have a plan and a cost
+estimate of what it is going to take to have radiation portals
+at all of our border crossings, including the seaports and the
+land crossings?
+ Is this a goal of the department? Could you provide us with
+a number as to what it would cost to have that kind of
+capability?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. It is a goal. And I would be happy to
+provide you with where they are deployed at the present time
+and the schedule this year for deploying additional portals at
+our land-and our sea-ports.
+ Mr. Turner. Well, do you consider it an appropriate,
+pressing, and urgent need to have the capability at both
+seaports and land crossings, to be able to have sufficient
+radiation detection portals so that all cargo containers coming
+across the land borders and into our seaports could be screened
+for radiation?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. I would underscore the word ``could be
+screened.'' It is important. And we consider it a high priority
+to make sure this equipment is deployed. Obviously, we are not
+deploying it in sufficient quantity, nor do I think we should,
+that every container coming through the seaport would go
+through that portal.
+ Those that we identify for further inspection or at risk
+should go through there, and do go through there. And
+sufficient portals should be deployed for that purpose.
+ Mr. Turner. How much money is requested in your most recent
+budget request for radiation portals?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. The budget will be announced on I believe
+next Monday. And we will be able to provide that figure for
+2005.
+ Mr. Turner. You won't give me a little advance briefing
+here, then?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. No, but I will go back and look it up.
+ Mr. Turner. Well, let me say this: I heard you state that
+you weren't--and I understand this is the department's
+position, that we do not need to screen all cargo containers
+for radiation. And I really think you ought to rethink that
+position.
+ I have been told--and I would invite you to check it out--
+that we could have sufficient radiation detection portals at
+all seaports, sufficient to allow all cargo containers coming
+in on ships to be run through them and checked for radiation
+for $75 million. Not a big price tag, if accurate.
+ And if you go down to the port of Norfolk, you can see
+where they on their own, with their own money, have purchased
+sufficient radiation portals to check for radiation. And as you
+know, these hand-held devices that these folks have, they are
+not really so much for screening as for really measuring the
+dosage that they may be exposed to.
+ So I would urge you to reconsider that and to look at your
+budget request and see if perhaps we couldn't get that taken
+care of.
+ Are there deployed at any of our ports, particularly our
+land crossings--.
+ Ms. Granger. Mr. Turner, you have gone over your five
+minutes.
+ Mr. Turner. All right, I am sorry.
+ I will ask you again.
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you for those comments. And we will
+continue to evaluate. As the technology improves, it might be
+more cost-effective, and we can do more.
+ Ms. Granger. Thank you.
+ The chair now recognizes Representative Shadegg for five
+minutes.
+ Mr. Shadegg. Madam Chairman, I know you want to move on to
+the next panel, so I will try to be as brief as I can.
+ Undersecretary Hutchinson, I know the deadline for the 50
+highest volume land borders is at the end of this year. As I
+understand it, your goal is to have contracts in place with the
+private sector by May 1 to meet that deadline, is that correct?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. That's correct.
+ Mr. Shadegg. I will just ask one question with two parts to
+it: One, can you briefly describe the challenges you face to
+implementing this program at those land borders? In my State of
+Arizona, we have a number that will fall into that category,
+but some are very high volume crossings. Nogales is a hub of
+commerce on the southern border of Arizona.
+ What challenges do you face, number one?
+ And number two, what are you doing to work with the
+community to give them advance knowledge and kind of prepare
+them for the shock of the new program, so that there is not a
+negative reaction?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Challenges and what we are doing to
+prepare.
+ First of all, a good communication plan. We want to spend a
+lot of time on the border, working with the communities and
+bringing them in the process as we develop these solutions.
+ And I hope that there is some level of confidence--the fact
+that we are trying to do this in the air and sea ports without
+backlogs will indicate we have the same intent on the land
+borders.
+ This illustrates some of the vastness of the problem. We
+have the traveler population, air, sea and land, and you see
+the land categories which we will face on the borders, you have
+citizens, 120 million; permanent residents, 75 million; visa
+exempt, which are primarily Canadians, 52 million; visa waiver,
+1.8 million; regular visas, 4.5 million, but the border
+crossing card, 104 million. And you compare that to the
+airports and seaports, you are looking at 79 million versus 358
+million.
+ So the challenge is multifold, compared to what we have
+just done.
+ And with great respect to Congressman Turner who asked
+about the mitigation strategy, we almost have to have a
+mitigation strategy when it comes to land borders.
+ You know, we cannot just simply clog it. And so, we have to
+implement this in a way that gives us a measure of security,
+that has some flexibility to it but still is consistent with
+the commerce that needs to flow through.
+ That is our challenge. We are looking at new technology.
+First of all, in the 2004 spin plan, we are looking at having
+the same solution that we have at our airports at our land
+borders for regular visa holders that travel through.
+ And so, they would go to secondary inspection, be enrolled
+in US-VISIT, just as they are now, but it doesn't clog the
+border. That's 4.5 million visitors.
+ Visa waiver, obviously they go to our secondary inspection
+now as well.
+ The big challenge is the border crossing card, which, if
+they are used as a visa, would go to secondary inspection, can
+be enrolled, but if they are just used for the crossing card
+purposes, you are looking at 104 million people going through.
+ We are looking at R.F.-technology. We are looking at
+different technologies that can accomplish some objectives of
+what we want to do, consistent with the congressional mandate.
+We are looking forward to working with this committee to meet
+that challenge that we have.
+ Mr. Shadegg. I wish you luck.
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you.
+ Mr. Shadegg. I yield back, Madam Chairman.
+ Ms. Granger. The Chair now recognizes Representative
+Sanchez for five minutes.
+ Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California. Thank you, Madam Chair.
+ I just have a couple of questions--more that I will put
+in--but I am really concerned about the accuracy and the lack
+of connectedness of the different databases that we are
+searching to find these people to check against them, to see if
+they are bad people or good people.
+ I have been told that the databases contain a lot of
+errors, conflicting information. And I guess my question is to
+the policy or lack of policy that allows these problems to be
+addressed, the erroneous data to be changed.
+ For example, let's say that I am mistaken for another
+Loretta Sanchez who has a warrant out for her arrest. And I go
+through the airport. And I have to sit down. I have to talk to
+the CBP officer. I prove to him that in fact I am the
+congresswoman that is Loretta Sanchez, not the fugitive. And he
+sees that.
+ But there is no procedure in place right now from what I am
+told to be able to change that in the database.
+ Which means that the next time I come to the airport, I get
+treated in the same way, I get pulled aside as the bad Loretta
+Sanchez. I have to sit down. I have to explain to this guy or
+lady that, you know, that is just not the case.
+ So I guess my question goes to how are we integrating these
+databases? What kind of policies do we have to ensure accuracy
+and to eliminate mistaken identity problems, for example,
+because, you know, it is not only a waste of my time, but it is
+a waste of valuable resources in these officers on the front
+line.
+ Ms. Harty. While I hesitate to speak for my colleague of
+the Terrorist Screening Center, I did sit with her two days ago
+at another hearing, so I would just like to give you in part
+her answer and in part my own.
+ On the overseas side, we do often have that, as
+Undersecretary Hutchinson alluded to earlier, where there might
+be another person with your same name out there. We see that
+somewhat regularly. That is why we have a very strong emphasis
+on getting not only the name of the person, but a date and
+place of birth, so that we can make sure that we are talking
+about the right person.
+ We have procedures at State to remove somebody from the
+system if in fact that information is erroneous.
+ On the part of my colleague from TSC, she mentioned exactly
+the same thing, that one of the things of course they are very
+interested in is facilitating legitimate travel by legitimate
+people. That, in fact, she said, they do have a procedure and
+have employed it--they haven't been up and running very long,
+but have employed it on a number of occasions already,
+specifically to make sure that honest, decent people who are
+not the subject of a hit should not in fact have to fear
+traveling through a U.S. port of entry.
+ You might want to add something to that, but that is, in
+fact, what I heard her say just the other day.
+ Mr. Hutchinson. We have processes in place as well that
+someone who is mistakenly identified can be removed.
+ But the problem you have expressed very well: If we have
+information--intelligence that is received--that Asa Hutchinson
+is planning a terrorist attack. And that is intelligence that
+we get, perhaps it is electronic, maybe it is a human source.
+And that is all we have. What do we do with that one name?
+ Now, I think the public would expect that that name would
+be entered so we can be on the lookout for an Asa Hutchinson.
+But there is not a date of birth with it. There is not an
+address with it.
+ And so, sometimes you have bits of information. Sometimes
+it is more limited. And so, we have--you are right--policy
+questions. But we also have some huge responsibilities when we
+have little bits of information to share it with the right
+people.
+ Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California. You know, it really is a
+problem. And even when you have the date of birth, for example,
+because there is, in fact, another Lorena Sanchez that was born
+on the same day, that lives in the same city that I live in.
+So, you know, constantly confused.
+ And so, if we do it there, I can just imagine doing it at
+the airport.
+ But more importantly, I represent the largest Vietnamese
+population outside of Vietnam in the world. They all have the
+same name, practically. And I don't know how that happens.
+Maybe it was when everybody was being processed, it was easier
+to give them Tranh or Wen, rather than, you know, what their
+name was. Or maybe it is all the same family.
+ But they have the same names over and over and over again.
+And this is one of the issues that they bring up to me.
+ As well as a very large Arab-American community in my area,
+largest in California, that, you know, their names are
+butchered all over the place.
+ So if it even looks close to something, they are being
+stopped at LAX or other airports.
+ Mr. Hutchinson. And you are right. And so that is why we
+want to have identifying information for the passengers who fly
+that can distinguish them from just simply a name on a
+terrorist list. And that is why we are developing our CAPS II
+system, working with the airlines and the European Commission
+to get the passenger name record data that will eliminate--help
+reduce--the problem that you articulated.
+ Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California. And the other problem, I
+would say, is just that the--just because one data base has the
+new Loretta Sanchez or don't get this Loretta Sanchez, it
+doesn't seem that a lot of the databases are also being updated
+at the same time.
+ Thank you, Madam.
+ Ms. Granger. Thank you very much. That concludes the
+testimony and questions for this panel. We thank both of our
+witnesses very much. And the second panel can come to the
+witness table now.
+ We are expecting a vote, probably between 1:45 and 2:00, we
+understand.
+ Let me clarify, for the record, there was a question from
+Mr. Dicks concerning the two prints in the IAFIS system that
+comes from the FBI. And when the two prints are made, they can
+still match with two points on the IAFIS system. If that is
+true, after that match is made, that there is an indication
+that there could be a match because there are only two prints
+compared to 10 prints, there still could be a match on the two
+prints.
+ Thank you.
+ I thank you for being here. We will now begin testimony
+from Mr. May, from the Air Transport Association; followed by
+Ms. Campbell Walker from the El Paso Foreign Trade Association;
+and then by Mr. Carlton with the International Biometrics
+Group.
+ Mr. May, we have received your written testimony, and ask
+that you briefly summarize in five minutes your statement.
+
+ STATEMENT OF JAMES MAY, PRESIDENT AND CEO, AIR TRANSPORT
+ ASSOCIATION
+
+ Mr. May. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And since over the
+years I have learned not to put you to sleep by trying to read,
+I will just do that very thing.
+ Number one, we think the US-VISIT program is working well.
+It is something that we had the pleasure of doing a test based
+on at the Atlanta Hartsfield airport with Delta Air Lines, as
+you are well aware.
+ We were very concerned that it would in the final analysis
+significantly delay the process of passengers coming into the
+United States. We were concerned that it would delay connecting
+flights and so forth.
+ To date, it has worked well. The capture of the biometric
+information has worked well. We are looking at probably 10 to
+15 minutes on average on waits in there and 20 at the outside.
+There are certain longer periods of time, but for the most part
+the system is working well as it gets rolled out across the
+country, with 115-some odd points of capture.
+ We have roughly 17.5 million passengers that we carry that
+are arguably subject to the US-VISIT program, so it has a real
+potential impact on us. So far, the entry program is working
+well.
+ Exit, as you are well aware, is being tested at BWI. It is
+a far more challenging environment going out than it is coming
+in. To date, we are using DHS is using kiosks. They are set up
+inside the security perimeter.
+ I think there are a couple of issues that we have raised
+with DHS on the workability of those projects. The first is, I
+think they need to do a little bit better job of signage. The
+second is that they probably need to think about having sort of
+an audio component to those kiosks, conceivable even multi-
+lingual.
+ I think they are using one employee per five right now, and
+they may have to kick that up a little bit along the way.
+ The goal for us on the exit is to make sure, as was the
+case on the entrance, that we don't turn airline personnel into
+immigration agents, number one; number two, we don't have a
+system that ends up costing the airlines an additional millions
+of dollars in security costs which we can ill afford--we are
+already spending $3 billion a year on unreimbursed security
+costs; and to have it be a process that works through quickly,
+so as not to delay unduly our passengers and to have the
+facilitation process work well.
+ To date, we are pleased with the cooperation we are getting
+from DHS and the State Department. We think the program is
+working well from our perspective. I am happy to answer any
+questions you may have.
+ [The statement of Mr. May follows:]
+
+ Prepared Statement of James C. May
+
+ Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, my name is James C.
+May and I am President and CEO of the Air Transport Association of
+America (ATA). ATA is the trade association for leading U.S. airlines.
+Our members transport over 95 percent of all the passenger and cargo
+traffic in the United States. Thank you for inviting me to appear
+before you today to discuss the United States' Visitor and Immigrant
+Status Indicator Technology Program--more commonly known as ``US-
+VISIT''.
+ Congress mandated the US-VISIT program in the Enhanced Border
+Security and Visa Reform Act of 2002. This statute established the
+requirement that all foreign national visa holders be photographed and
+fingerprinted upon arrival and prior to departure from the United
+States. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) broad Congressional
+mandate to create an integrated, automated entry/exit system, recording
+the arrival and departure of travelers is both ambitious and important.
+Because the airline industry transports 51 million international
+passengers each year, it is essential to our industry, and our
+passengers, that this program improve overall border management while
+further enhancing our Nation's security. We support DHS in its efforts
+to create and implement US-VISIT.
+ While the airline industry is pleased to work with DHS and our
+national security leaders to participate in these programs, we believe
+it is critical that DHS adhere to the planned schedule for deploying
+US-VISIT at the northern and southern land borders. This is especially
+important since airline passengers make up only 4 percent of all U.S.
+entrants subject to US-VISIT requirements while land borders make up 37
+percent of such visitors. Until US-VISIT is deployed nationwide at all
+border crossings, the system will not be effective in enhancing our
+national security
+ We compliment the Department of Homeland Security, and
+specifically, Undersecretary Hutchinson and the Office of Border and
+Transportation Security, the US-VISIT Program Office, and the Bureau of
+Customs and Border Protection (CBP), for working together to carefully
+and completely plan for a successful implementation. Their attention to
+careful planning, in full consultation with all interested parties has
+been first rate. We look forward to continuing this cooperative
+approach.
+ First, I will offer some lessons learned and observations about the
+entry portion of US-VISIT. Second, I will address on-going concerns
+with the exit pilot program. Finally, I will briefly mention some
+overarching screening program concerns.
+US-VISIT--ENTRY
+ As you know, the pilot for entry was conducted at Atlanta's
+Hartsfield/Jackson International Airport, in partnership with Delta Air
+Lines. We believe it was an excellent opportunity to test the process
+both from the government and the industry perspective. The pilot
+allowed everyone involved to become familiar with the newly deployed
+equipment and to provide input at the implementation phase.
+ In the short time that the US-VISIT entry process has been
+operational, the airlines have been very pleased with its smooth
+operation. Airlines believe that a key to the initial success of the
+US-VISIT entry process can be attributed to the increased federal
+inspectors associated with the program.
+ We initially were wary of the decision to place the entry process
+at the primary immigration inspection stanchions due to concerns over
+staffing levels. Ensuring an adequate number of federal inspectors,
+whether legacy INS or legacy Customs, has been a longstanding and
+significant concern of the airline industry. If not adequately staffed,
+such placement in the current configuration of most airports could not
+accommodate the inevitable long lines due to the US-VISIT processing
+requirements. In addition, these long lines not only delay our
+customers and but also could possibly delay airport operations.
+ This DHS worked with us to address this staffing level issue;
+therefore, we are satisfied that the US-VISIT entry process has not
+inhibited or lengthened the overall passenger processing times as we
+had feared.
+
+US-VISIT--EXIT
+ As with the entry process, we appreciate the open communications we
+have had, and are having, with DHS on the development of the exit
+portion of the program. As you are aware, a kiosk approach is being
+piloted at Baltimore/Washington International Airport (BWI). This
+approach versus other possibilities--for example, processing eligible
+US-VISIT passengers at the TSA checkpoint--remains an open question.
+ Given the opportunity to evaluate the exit pilot thus far, we have
+some remaining issues we would like to see addressed. First, due to the
+voluntary nature of the current pilot, we are concerned that the
+underlying purpose of US-VISIT, monitoring both the entry and exit of
+foreign nationals will not be met. Without government enforcement, the
+airline industry could be put in a position of transporting an
+ineligible passenger to the United States only to have to absorb the
+expense of returning that passenger back to his originating airport.
+ Second, at the BWI pilot, the kiosks are located immediately beyond
+the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) checkpoint. US-VISIT
+has placed signage both within the TSA checkpoint and immediately
+beyond the checkpoint, directing passengers to the kiosks. We believe
+that the signage is insufficient. At the TSA checkpoint, passengers are
+too busy concentrating on keeping on eye on their belongings--coats,
+shoes, jewelry, etc. to notice the signage.
+ Third, the kiosks are silent. Currently, the system relies on a
+touch screen with icons to direct the passenger through the process.
+From our observation, this is inadequate. More work remains to be done
+to make the process easily understood and user friendly, particularly
+for non-English speaking travelers.
+ As we continue through this pilot program, we understand that the
+Office of Management and Budget has directed DHS to explore
+alternatives to the kiosk system in capturing the biometric data. The
+airline industry asks to participate in any discussions on this topic.
+As you are aware, ATA opposes any requirement that airline staff
+collect the biometric data, either at the check-in counters or at the
+departure gates. Airline personnel should not be used as quasi-
+immigration officers.
+
+OTHER SCREENING ISSUES
+ We are aware that DHS is developing other passenger screening
+capabilities, most specifically the CAPPS II program that may be
+adapted to also readily identify US-VISIT exiting passengers. We would
+urge that, as these programs develop, consideration be given to
+combining screening and exit processing to better meet the needs of the
+traveling public and continue to enhance vital security needs. We
+believe that the nation's interests will best be served by a seamless,
+fully integrated approach to passenger processing and screening. When
+fully implemented the US-VISIT entry/exit program must be enforceable
+and integrated into any new technologies and programs under development
+at the DHS.
+ In conclusion, I want to reiterate our support for the
+comprehensive and efficient implementation of the US-VISIT entry
+program. We look forward to working with both the Congress and the DHS
+to fine tune the processes and develop an exit policy that meets the
+requirements of the law, but does not discourage travel to the United
+States.
+ Mr. Chairman, thank you again for inviting me to testify on a very
+important component to the nation's overall security policy. I will be
+happy to answer any questions that you may have.
+
+ Ms. Granger. Ms. Campbell Walker?
+
+STATEMENT OF KATHLEEN CAMPBELL WALKER, A MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF
+DIRECTORS OF THE EL PASO FOREIGN TRADE ASSOCIATION AND A MEMBER
+ OF THE AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOCIATION
+
+ Ms. Campbell Walker. Madam Chairperson and distinguished
+members of this subcommittee, thank you very much for the
+opportunity to be presenting testimony before you today.
+ I am currently on the executive committee of the American
+Immigration Lawyers Association, an association of over 8,500
+lawyers representing thousands of individuals who are trying to
+comply with our immigration laws.
+ And in addition to that, since 1985, I have been a member
+of the board of the El Paso Foreign Trade Association, now
+known as the foreign trade association, on which we worked for
+four years on establishing the first dedicated commuter lane in
+the State of Texas. And in addition to that, we also worked on
+the project, just recently implemented and introduced by
+Secretary Ridge, the new FAST lane, concerning commercial
+traffic.
+ The history that I am trying to bring is one of cooperation
+and work with federal, state and local officials, trying to
+create realistic solutions when we are talking about where the
+rubber hits the road. And that is where I am down in El Paso
+for the past 18 years.
+ I have got to say that we are extremely concerned that
+unless a deadline is pushed regarding implementation of the 50
+busiest land ports, which will include El Paso and many others
+in the State of Texas and elsewhere, that we will have total
+gridlock.
+ And I find it interesting in the analysis of the success so
+far of US-VISIT. I would like to just make a few points. But I
+am trying to make constructive comments, because if we don't
+understand the reality of the process, we cannot give the
+process the attributes and enhancements that it needs to
+accomplish its objectives.
+ So I hope that these comments are taken in that light.
+ US-VISIT is supposed to be an exit and an entry system.
+Obviously, as of January 5th, we don't have the exit part. And
+if we did have the exit part, we would have a serious problem.
+ On the entry segment, as well, the Ahern memo you
+referenced earlier is a logical memo, based on the realities
+that we have economic trade interdependence here, and our trade
+is paying for our security. So we have got to manage that
+balance.
+ I think that it is an indicator that the memo was issued
+that indeed additional resources are necessary to properly
+implement. And that is all it states, a truism that needs to be
+addressed.
+ From the perspective of land ports, for me the easiest way
+for me to take a quick snapshot of what we are dealing with is
+for hopefully those who haven't visited our land borders down
+South, we hope that you will come visit and be our guests.
+ But on a different note, where do we stand right now on our
+land borders, at our land ports?
+ First of all, we are not addressing that obvious point that
+was raised earlier in testimony, that we don't have control of
+our borders. We still have migration flows between our ports.
+ That is an issue that hopefully we will address with
+comprehensive immigration reform legislation.
+ But on a different note about what are we dealing with
+right now, we have pedestrians, a huge volume, coming through
+our ports. In addition to that, commercial vehicles and
+passengers vehicles.
+ We don't even have a basis IBIS check that takes a few
+seconds being conducted on 100 percent of our pedestrians.
+There is a 40 percent minimum requirement.
+ We don't have mandatory checks at all at that level being
+conducted at our passenger vehicle lanes. The reason is that
+they are lucky to have these mobile tech units in which they
+are able to access IBIS if they type it in.
+ We don't have time to be able to actually get people
+through and indeed access that information on everybody with
+what we have in place right now.
+ And we cannot get it there by December 31st.
+ Another point is just flat infrastructure, land and people.
+We don't have a spot for exit control at all of our ports. And
+recently someone talked about they are going to buy 1,000
+scanners. And 1,000 scanners to scan these biometric documents,
+I am sorry, doesn't even begin to address the situation.
+ At one point in time they were saying if we got one scanner
+a port, we would be doing great. Well, at one of our ports, we
+have like 10 passenger vehicle lanes, 10 pedestrian, and five
+or six commercial. So that is just at one port. How does one
+scanner deal with that issue?
+ So what I am concerned about is, if we are going to make
+the system work, let's assess it realistically and give it the
+tools that it needs to be a success.
+ And I am not going to sit here and denigrate the efforts
+made by the Department of Homeland Security and the Department
+of State. Laudable efforts. Amazing work so far.
+ But there is a reality check that needs to be made before
+we end up lulling ourselves into a false sense of security. And
+I think that is the path we are going upon.
+ As far as the biometric check issue, I hope that someone
+will ask me a really hard question later on, really about that
+IDENT point, because if you look at your normal inspector--and
+I have got to shut up very quickly, the normal inspector does
+not have access to something called CLAIMS 3 regarding
+immigration status. The normal inspector doesn't have access to
+the CCD database they were talking about on the primary
+inspection line.
+ So I would just like those issues described and discussed
+later.
+ Thank you for the opportunity.
+ [The statement of Ms. Campbell Walker follows:]
+
+ Prepared Statement of Kathleen Campbell Walker
+
+ Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, I am
+Kathleen Campbell Walker, Treasurer of the American Immigration Lawyers
+Association (AILA). I am honored to be here today representing two
+organizations, AILA and the Foreign Trade Association of the Paso del
+Norte region.
+ AILA is the immigration bar association with more than 8,500
+members who practice immigration law. Founded in 1946, the association
+is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization and is an affiliated
+organization of the American Bar Association (ABA). AILA members
+represent tens of thousands of: U.S. families who have applied for
+permanent residence for their spouses, children, and other close
+relatives to lawfully enter and reside in the United States; U.S.
+businesses, universities, colleges, and industries that sponsor highly
+skilled foreign professionals seeking to enter the United States on a
+temporary basis or, having proved the unavailability of U.S. workers
+when required, on a permanent basis; and healthcare workers, asylum
+seekers, often on a pro bono basis, as well as athletes, entertainers,
+exchange visitors, artists, and foreign students. AILA members have
+assisted in contributing ideas for increased port of entry inspection
+efficiencies and continue to work through their national liaison
+activities with federal agencies engaged in the administration and
+enforcement of our immigration laws to identify ways to improve
+adjudicative processes and procedures.
+ The Foreign Trade Association of the Paso del Norte region was
+originally incorporated in 1985 as the El Paso Foreign Trade
+Association. The mission of the Foreign Trade Association is to enhance
+and advance bilateral trade in the Paso del Norte region, which
+includes El Paso, Texas, southern New Mexico, and the northern part of
+the State of Chihuahua in Mexico, which includes Ciudad Juarez. The
+Association's membership includes maquiladora executives and service
+industry leaders from both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border. The
+Association has a history of working with federal, state, and local
+officials on both sides of the border to implement projects for the
+improvement of cross-border trade and commerce. For example, the
+Association spearheaded a four-year project partially funded by the El
+Paso community to construct the first dedicated commuter lane in Texas
+using Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI)
+technology. It also helped to implement the first FAST lane on the
+southern border for commercial traffic in the past few months.
+ Both organizations appreciate the opportunity to testify today on
+``Integrity and Security at the Border: The US-VISIT Program.'' While
+our organizations differ in many respects, we both strongly hold the
+view that it is vitally important to enhance our nation's security in a
+way which balances our need for enhanced security with our economic
+dependence on the international and the cross-border flow of people and
+goods, which helps to pay for our national security.
+ I am here today to testify on the US-VISIT program and to offer
+suggestions to help potentially ensure that this program works
+efficiently and effectively, so that we can achieve a viable inspection
+process and enhance security at our borders. Living in a post September
+11 environment demands that we develop new programs that balance a
+recognition of the fact that our nation is inextricably linked to the
+world around us with the need to protect ourselves from those who would
+do us harm. We all have much to learn from our past mistakes as well as
+our past successes. I hope this testimony contributes to a productive
+discussion.
+ What is US-VISIT? The United States Visitor and Immigrant Status
+Indicator Technology program (US-VISIT) is the new automated entry/exit
+system that is being implemented at our nation's ports of entry. It is
+designed to collect and share information on foreign nationals
+traveling to the United States (including travel details and biometric
+identifiers), confirm identity, measure security risks, and assess the
+legitimacy of travel in an effort to determine who is welcome and who
+is not, and help speed traffic flow. The overall plan for the
+implementation of US-VISIT calls for the collection of personal data,
+photos and fingerprints, at U.S. consular offices abroad and at our
+ports of entry, as well as broad database and information sharing. The
+system also is intended to track changes in foreign nationals'
+immigration status and make updates and adjustments accordingly.
+Ultimately, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) plans to make
+available information captured through US-VISIT at all ports of entry
+and throughout the entire immigration enforcement system.
+ US-VISIT is the latest manifestation of an earlier program, Section
+110 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
+of 1996 (P.L. 104-208) (IIRAIRA). The concept of an entry/exit system
+to monitor entries at and exits from our nation's ports of entry was
+first articulated in Section 110, which created an entry/exit system
+that would have applied to all non-U.S. citizens who entered or exited
+the United States at any port of entry to identify visa overstayers.
+Although subsequent laws altered both the deadline and the parameters
+of the Section 110 entry/exit program, the general framework of Section
+110 entry/exit remains the same today. [The Congressional deadline for
+the entry/exit system was delayed by P.L 105-259 to October 15, 1998.
+In P.L. 105-277, the deadline was pushed back to March 30, 2001, for
+land ports of entry and seaports. This law did not affect the deadline
+for implementation at airports.]
+ The Data Management Improvement Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-215) (DMIA)
+amended Section 110 to require that the entry/exit system use data that
+already was being collected from foreign nationals and prohibited the
+Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) from imposing additional
+entry or exit documentary or data collection requirements for purposes
+of the entry/exit system. The act mandated the development of a
+searchable centralized database and staggered the entry/exit
+implementation deadlines into three very difficult to achieve time
+frames as follows:
+
+ Airports and Seaports--December 31, 2003
+ Top 50 high traffic land border ports--December 31,
+ 2004
+ Remaining implementation for all other ports--December
+ 31, 2005
+
+ While the system set forth by Section 110, and amended by the DMIA,
+must record entry and exit for foreign nationals without establishing
+additional documentary or data collection requirements for the purposes
+of the entry/exit system, the laws do not prohibit DHS from developing
+new documentary or data collection requirements to implement provisions
+contained in other laws. Certainly, the mandate of US-VISIT--to enroll
+applicants for visas and admission to the U.S. via the collection of
+two print fingerprints and a digitized photograph--is beyond current
+procedures. The potential remains for DHS to include within US-VISIT
+categories of foreign nationals now exempt from program participation,
+including legal permanent residents, Canadian citizens, and Visa Waiver
+Program participants.
+ In the post-9/11 environment, Congress took another look at the
+Section 110 entry/exit system in the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-
+56) (PATRIOT Act). The law encouraged the development of the entry/exit
+system with ``all deliberate speed'' and as ``expeditiously as
+practicable,'' and established a taskforce made up of governmental and
+private industry representatives to review the establishment of an
+entry/exit system. The law also mandated that the entry/exit system use
+biometric technology and requires tamper-resistant documents readable
+at all ports of entry.
+ With the passage of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry
+Reform Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-173) (Enhanced Border Security Act),
+Congress addressed the entry/exit system as a program that balances
+security with the economic realities of our busy ports. To strike this
+balance, the act mandated that the entry/exit program utilize
+technologies that facilitate the efficient flow of commerce and travel,
+including interoperable data bases that aid in the determination of who
+should be allowed entry into the U.S. Congress here clearly recognized
+the need to balance improved border security with our nation's economic
+security as it relates to the flow of people and goods through our
+nation's ports of entry.
+
+The First Phase of US-VISIT
+ Testing for the first phase of the US-VISIT program's
+implementation at airports and seaports began in the Hartsfield
+International Airport in Atlanta during November 2003. DHS reported
+that during the pilot testing phase, over 140,000 individuals were
+enrolled in US-VISIT and 21 individuals were intercepted upon entry.
+DHS has not indicated whether these individuals would have been
+admitted to the U.S. if the typical pre-VISIT inspections process had
+been used.
+ On January 5th, the first phase of US-VISIT became operational at
+14 seaports and 115 airports nationwide. DHS explained the five-day
+delay in implementation (the program was originally set to begin on
+December 31, 2003) as an effort to avoid disrupting holiday travel.
+This delay, however, was more than a magnanimous overture, because the
+first part of the year is traditionally a slow travel season.
+Implementing US-VISIT while travel is light has led to reports that US-
+VISIT's procedures do not cause appreciable delays. US-VISIT, as
+currently implemented at our ports of entry, does not involve any
+biometric security check prior to admission. And, subsequent
+applications for admission by US-VISIT enrollees will only require a
+biometric check to verify the identity of the enrolled foreign
+national.
+ US-VISIT currently is set-up so that nonimmigrant visa holders
+applying for admission to the U.S. through one of the US-VISIT
+designated airports or seaports will undergo the standard inspection
+process and simultaneously will be enrolled in the US-VISIT system. If
+these individuals leave through a port with US-VISIT exit capabilities
+(of which there currently is only one airport and one seaport), these
+travelers must comply with US-VISIT exit procedures upon their
+departure from the U.S. Unfortunately, such procedures are still
+sketchy at best and the consequences for failure to comply can be
+severe, according to the US-VISIT interim final implementing
+regulations published at 69 Fed. Reg. 467-481.
+
+Enrollment at the Ports of Entry under US-VISIT
+ During the first phase of US-VISIT's implementation, only
+nonimmigrant visa holders who enter the U.S. through an air or seaport
+that has US-VISIT capability will be enrolled in the program. The first
+time DHS enrolls a traveler into US-VISIT at a port, the individual's
+travel documents will be scanned, a digital photo and inkless
+fingerprints of both index fingers will be taken, and the individual's
+name will be checked against the Interagency Border Inspection Service
+(IBIS) database and the wants and warrants section of the National
+Crime Information Center (NCIC) database. Both of these checks are text
+(not biometric) checks. IBIS contains certain terrorist watch list
+information from the TIPOFF database maintained by the Department of
+State (DOS).
+ The enrollment process is supposed to take about 10 to 15 seconds.
+The primary reason for the speed of this process is that the security
+check against the applicable biometric database, Automated Biometric
+Identification System (IDENT), occurs after the visa holder is admitted
+to the U.S. If DHS inspectors ran the IDENT checks during the
+admissions process, it would add about five minutes to every US-VISIT
+enrollment, thus generating such lengthy backlogs that the ports of
+entry would essentially shut down.
+ The IDENT database, is a legacy INS database based on the same two
+index prints as US-VISIT as well as a digitized photograph. The system
+was created in 1994 and widely deployed from 1997 to 1998. It
+originally contained a recidivist database and a lookout database
+including all foreign nationals apprehended by the INS. The DOS also
+maintains such a biometric database of all Mexican laser visa holders
+(formerly known as border crossing cardholders). These laser visa
+holders all were vetted through an IDENT check. Except for in the US-
+VISIT context, the IDENT checks at ports of entry currently always
+occur during secondary and not primary inspection, where the time
+required to process information through IDENT is less of a concern.
+ Once the visa holder is enrolled in US-VISIT, his or her arrival
+information will be stored in the IDENT biometric database. Therefore,
+the information for applicants for admission under US-VISIT with no
+criminal record or apprehension record with legacy INS or DHS are
+contained in the same database as the individuals for whom DHS is on
+the lookout. Such proximity between two distinct classes of foreign
+nationals will lead to confusion as inspectors will have to determine
+which individuals in IDENT are inadmissible to the U.S. and which have
+merely been enrolled in US-VISIT.
+ After visa holders enroll in US-VISIT, they still will have to
+provide fingerprints and have a digital photograph taken upon each
+application for entry to the U.S. Ideally, future enrollees will be
+able to swipe their biometric passport or visa, provide index
+fingerprints and photo, and be checked for identity against the US-
+VISIT database without further delay. This system would rely on US-
+VISIT to identify the enrollee and the usual text-based IBIS database
+check. Again, this procedure will not provide for a rapid biometric
+check against any criminal or other biometric watch list database.
+
+Departure from the U.S. under US-VISIT
+ Nonimmigrant visa holders are required to document their departure
+from the United States with US-VISIT only if they depart the U.S.
+through an air or seaport that has US-VISIT exit capability. Since
+January 5, 2004, US-VISIT only has exit capability at the Baltimore-
+Washington International (BWI) airport in Baltimore, Maryland and at
+the Miami seaport. However, DHS plans to expand US-VISIT exit
+capabilities to other ports of entry throughout 2004. At the moment,
+the exit stations for US-VISIT are self-service kiosks that closely
+resemble automated teller machines (ATMs). DHS has indicated that the
+kiosks will be located within the secure area of air and seaports. The
+Department also has stated that attendants will be assigned to monitor
+the kiosk area and offer assistance. In addition, DHS has announced
+that during 2004, it will test various exit methods, possibly including
+a hand-held device that will permit DHS personnel to register the
+departure of nonimmigrant visa holders. One of the problems with such
+mobile units in the past has been lack of database connectivity. For
+example, at land ports, passenger vehicle lanes are usually not
+equipped with machine readable document scanners and mobile units with
+access to the TECS (Treasury Enforcement Communications System)
+database are used. Information has to be typed into the system and
+database access is limited. Upon departure, database review is again
+limited and not conducted against a criminal biometric database such as
+IDENT.
+ DHS considers exit registration mandatory for visa holders who
+depart from an air or seaport with US-VISIT exit capability. According
+to DHS, entry/exit information is constantly updated, and if a visitor
+overstays his or her authorized period of stay, US-VISIT will record
+the failure to depart. However, prior experience with databases
+designed to display the status of a foreign national indicated that
+inspectors are not often given access to these resources. Legacy INS
+experimented with the CLAIMS III database, which indicated the
+immigration status of foreign nationals. Unfortunately, the use of that
+database was frustrated by the fact that it was often down and not
+accessible. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services also maintains an
+internet-based on-line case status inquiry system which is not hooked
+up to inspection lanes, and inspectors have a difficult time utilizing
+this resource.
+ In addition to concerns about the usability of the US-VISIT
+database, there are serious concerns regarding the accuracy of the
+entry/exit information it contains. Inaccurate entry/exit data can have
+a serious impact on visa holders in a variety of ways since presence in
+or out of the U.S. is a critical issue for certain immigration benefits
+such as: eligibility in terms of overstays and removals; physical
+presence requirements for substantial presence determinations under our
+tax laws; legal permanent residence abandonment issues; time spent in
+the U.S. for naturalization purposes; etc.
+ Statements made by the DHS indicate that the Department appreciates
+the potential negative effects of recording exit information before the
+exit systems are fully operational and is considering a grace period
+regarding exit requirements. However, there has not been any
+confirmation of whether such a grace period exists, or whether failure
+to exit properly will result in a case-by-case review similar to the
+review permitted under Special Registration/National Security Entry/
+Exit Registration System (NSEERS).
+
+U.S. Consulates' Role in US-VISIT
+ Certain U.S. consulates have begun enrolling nonimmigrant and
+immigrant visa applicants into the US-VISIT system when processing the
+new biometric visa. Individuals enrolled at the consulates will still
+be ``visited'' upon their entry to the U.S., in that they will have
+their entry recorded via a biometric identity review. Currently, only
+certain consular posts are issuing biometric visas. However, the State
+Department is required to start issuing these visas at all 211 consular
+posts by October 26, 2004--an extremely ambitious deadline. As with
+port VISIT enrollment, two digital index finger prints and a photo are
+taken of visa applicants. Such biometric information, however, is
+checked against the IDENT database before visa issuance. Recently, at
+the U.S. Consulate in Vancouver, visa issuance times were increased
+from same day processing to 3-day processing due to the IDENT
+clearance. This delay is marking the end of same-day visa issuance and
+results in additional processing burdens on consular officers without
+the necessary staff increases to attend to such demands in a more
+timely manner. In addition, insufficient additional resources are
+apparently being allocated to address these database check delays at
+the source.
+ This IDENT requirement subsumes the personal appearance waiver
+policy announced in 2003 by DOS that required interviews of applicants
+between the ages of 16 and 60. Note that the IDENT check done by DOS
+applies in both the nonimmigrant and immigrant visa application
+process. Currently, US-VISIT only applies to nonimmigrant visa holders.
+ In addition to these delays, consulates in Visa Waiver countries
+will likely suffer from additional delays due to an increased number of
+visa applicants. A congressional mandate in the PATRIOT Act requires
+Visa Waiver countries to issue tamper-proof machine-readable passports
+(MRPs) that include biometric identifiers by October 26, 2004.
+Individuals without a biometric MRP will have to apply for a visa at a
+U.S. consulate and will be subject to US-VISIT enrollment at the post.
+Their admission will then be recorded under US-VISIT procedures at the
+port of entry.
+
+ The Relationship between NSEERS and US-VISIT
+ Special Registration/NSEERS at the ports of entry continues even
+after the launch of US-VISIT this January. Registration for NSEERS and
+enrollment for US-VISIT will continue to be separate processes until
+US-VISIT incorporates NSEERS. (Such incorporation is not anticipated
+until US-VISIT is fully developed.) Also, the two processes involve the
+intake of different levels of data. Thus, it is difficult to
+conceptualize an NSEERS process without a secondary inspection
+component, which is typically not involved in most US-VISIT admissions.
+ Persons subjected to call-in or port of entry Special Registration
+still must register their departure via NSEERS and must leave the U.S.
+through a designated NSEERS port of departure. According to preliminary
+reports, if US-VISIT has an operational exit kiosk at this port, and an
+individual already has registered his or her departure at that airport
+via NSEERS, the visa holder is not obligated to document his departure
+with US-VISIT. Thus, someone subject to NSEERS departure control will
+not need to register departure via both methodologies. There is,
+however, no written confirmation of this procedure. Considering that
+those who fail to comply with departure control rules under NSEERS may
+be subject to inadmissibility under INA section 212(a)(3)(A)(ii), many
+foreign nationals subject to both US-VISIT and NSEERS exit requirements
+(as well as their counsel) are not clear on how to ensure that their
+compliance is well documented in both systems. A public information
+program is critical to help those wishing to comply to do so.
+
+Expansion of US-VISIT to Land Ports of Entry
+ Although DHS has not announced a timeframe for the implementation
+of new exit capabilities at our nation's airports and seaports, DHS
+plans on deploying biometric document readers to all air, sea, and land
+ports of entry by October 26, 2004. (Of course, the Mexican biometric
+laser visa for business and tourist admissions has been in existence
+for years, and yet such scanners have not been deployed to all ports.)
+ Implementing US-VISIT at our land ports of entry must take into
+account the complex realities of these ports. For instance, after
+September 11, 2001, when port officers attempted to subject all
+applicants for admission to IBIS (text based) database reviews, the
+resulting delays led to a modification of the policy. Such checks were
+not conducted at passenger and commercial vehicle lanes due to
+infrastructure limitations.
+ Unless Congress acts to delay the implementation of US-VISIT
+deadlines, DHS will be required to expand the entry/exit program to the
+top 50 high traffic land border ports by December 31, 2004 and to the
+remaining ports of entry by December 31, 2005. Expanding US-VISIT to
+land ports of entry raises a multitude of issues beyond those that
+arise at airports, and presents a host of infrastructure, staffing, and
+database challenges.
+ Border communities depend on the cross border flow of goods and
+people for their economic survival. For example, in 2001, $22.7 billion
+in imports and $16.1 billion in exports passed through El Paso's
+international bridges, constituting 19 percent of total trade through
+southern U.S. Customs Districts. Local El Paso economists estimate that
+between 15 and 30 percent of El Paso's retail sales are derived from
+Mexican nationals. Just in time inventory management in cross-border
+manufacturing operations requires that Mexican and Canadian suppliers
+make their deliveries to the U.S. in predictable intervals. Delays in
+these cases can translate into disasters for these communities.
+ A June 1998 Senate Judiciary Committee report offers a compelling
+example of the challenges faced at our land border ports of entry. The
+report cites information from Dan Stamper, President of the Detroit
+International Bridge Co. Mr. Stamper noted that the Ambassador Bridge
+handles approximately 30,000 vehicle crossings per day. He calculated
+that, ``assum[ing] the most efficient and remarkable entry and exit
+procedures in the world [that] will take only 30 seconds per vehicle,
+and making the equally optimistic assumption that only half of the
+vehicles have to go through procedures, that would amount to an extra
+3,750 minutes of additional processing time each day.'' As he sagely
+pointed out, ``There are only 1,440 minutes a day.'' Thus, the
+implementation of Section 110 would effectively close the border.
+ Unique infrastructure concerns also arise. The DMIA Task Force's
+Second Annual Report to Congress notes that in fiscal year 2002, there
+were 358 million land border entry inspections of people and 11 million
+inspections of commercial vehicles. There are over 300 ports of entry
+to the U.S. The report further states that as to current port
+infrastructure: 64 ports have less than 25 percent of the required
+space; 40 ports have between 25 and 50 percent of the required space;
+13 ports have between 50 and 75 percent of the required space; and some
+existing ports lack ``any land for expansion.''
+ In addition, the high cost involved in developing an appropriate
+infrastructure also must be recognized. Along with the physical exits,
+these ports need adequate lanes, technologies, and trained officials,
+all of which costs, according to experts, more than $10 billion
+dollars. Furthermore, in contrast to airport ports of entry, land ports
+must deal with pedestrians, passenger vehicle occupants, and commercial
+vehicle occupants. Our current admissions procedures at land ports
+sheds some light on the complex environment in which US-VISIT will
+supposedly be implemented.
+ Pedestrians: Currently, most pedestrian admissions are not
+recorded. When randomly checked, pedestrians are checked against IBIS
+(text-based) and the person and document are ``eye-balled'' for a
+match. The current minimum mandated IBIS check is 40 percent. The
+inspector may ask about the purpose of entry, where the person is from,
+or why he or she has been outside the U.S. This process often takes
+less than 5 seconds.
+ Occasionally, inspectors may check the person's visa against the
+DOS Consular Consolidated Database (CCD), which houses a copy of the
+visa the U.S. Consulate issued to that person. This additional check
+helps to target those who use other's documentation or fraudulent
+visas. Unfortunately, CCD access is not typically available in primary
+inspection. Currently, no review done at the primary inspection area
+verifies the identity of the person through a biometric check other
+than via the human eye.
+ In order for a biometric check to be done, the person is taken to a
+secondary inspection area where two fingerprints and a photograph are
+taken. The person's biographical and biometric information is run
+through the IDENT database, which then determines if this individual
+has violated immigration status. If merited, some applicants for
+admission may also be checked against the Integrated Automated
+Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), which is maintained by the
+FBI. This database compares all ten fingerprints of the person against
+its records. The IDENT checks typically take 5 minutes or less, and the
+IAFIS checks can take 15 to 30 minutes or more depending on a variety
+of factors.
+ Most foreign nationals are required to apply for an I-94 admission
+document and pay a $6 fee upon application for entry to the U.S. The
+procedures surrounding issuing the I-94 card often result in delays.
+For example, there are often wait times of 30 minutes or more to be
+interviewed to obtain the I-94. After the interview process, the
+foreign national must go a separate location to pay the $6 fee and
+receive the I-94. Too often, the official taking the fees is
+unavailable and applicants must wait for more than 15 minutes for an I-
+94 admission document to be issued. Currently, there is no exit
+inspection for pedestrians and usually no space or personnel to perform
+such an inspection.
+ Passenger Vehicle Occupants: Most passenger vehicle lane checks do
+not involve checking databases against the applicant's visa. Often,
+passenger vehicle inspectors will have access to Treasury Enforcement
+Communications System (TECS), which is a database managed by legacy
+Customs. It is possible to access IBIS via a mobile TECS unit, but the
+system is not amenable to scanning documents, so data must be typed in
+manually. In addition, to access CLAIMS III for immigration status
+information, the person must be sent to secondary inspection for
+further review. Therefore, if vehicle inspectors want to conduct
+further checks on applicants, the applicants for entry must park their
+car and walk in front of oncoming lanes of vehicles to get to the
+secondary inspection area.
+ Exit lanes are usually not available to allow for exit inspection.
+This fact is confirmed in the DMIA Task Force's First and Second Annual
+Report to Congress. Obviously, in the passenger vehicle context, even
+fewer IBIS checks are conducted than of pedestrians.
+ Commercial Vehicle Occupants: Commercial vehicle occupants
+basically go through the same process as passenger vehicle occupants.
+However, the commercial parking lot often is far away from the
+secondary inspection area and commercial vehicle occupants must be
+escorted to secondary by a port employee. Due to inadequate staffing,
+often no staff is available to perform this function and foreign
+nationals are often left waiting for long periods of time for further
+review.
+ The DHS has indicated that enrollment in US-VISIT at land ports of
+entry would occur in secondary inspection. [What DHS terms ``secondary
+inspection'' in this context, is the point at which foreign nationals
+obtain the I-94 admission card.] In order to speed processing of
+automobile traffic at the land ports, DHS is investigating the use of a
+radio frequency (RF) technology, which would transmit biographical
+information to the inspections officer. This technology would be
+similar to the SENTRI or NEXUS commuter programs implemented along the
+southern and northern border, respectively. However, RF technology does
+not resolve identity--and security-related database issues without
+either pre-clearance review of the applicant or at least text-based
+checks, as in airports upon admission. As noted by Jeane J.
+Kirkpatrick, Director--Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task
+Force on Homeland Security Imperatives, in her March 12, 2003 testimony
+before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Border Security,
+Citizenship, and Immigration, ``There will never be enough inspection
+resources and it would prove self-defeating to subject every person,
+conveyance, and cargo to the same inspection regime.'' She further
+notes that the, ``inspections processes at a port of entry must be an
+exercise in risk management.''
+ DHS issued a request for proposal (RFP) on November 30, 2003 for
+US-VISIT, and is now considering three primary bidders: Accenture, CSC
+and Lockheed-Martin. Award of a contract is expected by May 31, 2004.
+
+US-VISIT_A Tool to Enhance Our Security?
+ Will US-VISIT help to enhance our security? While the jury is still
+out, serious questions need to be addressed as to the achievable
+mission of US-VISIT. A June 1998 Senate Judiciary Committee Report
+(Senate Judiciary Report 105197 on S. 1360, Border Improvement
+and Immigration Act of 1998, June 1, 1998) makes the following apt
+comment:
+ The Committee is keenly aware that implementing an automated
+ entry/exit control system has absolutely nothing to do with
+ countering drug trafficking, and halting the entry of
+ terrorists into the United States, or with any other illegal
+ activity near the borders. An automated entry/exit control
+ system will at best provide information only on those who have
+ overstayed their visas. Even if a vast database of millions of
+ visa overstayers could be developed, this database will in no
+ way provide information as to which individuals might be
+ engaging in other unlawful activity. It will accordingly
+ provide no assistance in identifying terrorists, drug
+ traffickers, or other criminals. (emphasis added)
+
+ With regard to tracking visa overstayers, the report further
+states:
+
+ Even if a list of names and passport numbers of visa
+ overstayers would be available, there would be no information
+ as to where the individuals could be located. Even if there was
+ information at the time of entry as to where an alien was
+ expecting to go in the United States, it cannot be expected
+ that 6 or more months later the alien would be at the same
+ location. Particularly, if an alien were intending to overstay,
+ it is likely that the alien would have provided only a
+ temporary or false location as to where the alien was intending
+ to go.
+ AILA has previously testified that immigration can best contribute
+to our national security by enhancing our intelligence capacities. To
+that end, AILA strongly supported the Enhanced Border Security Act. The
+goal of this law is to make our borders the last line of defense. To
+that end, it includes the following provisions: authorizes increased
+funding for the DOS and INS, requires federal agencies to coordinate
+and share information needed to identify and intercept terrorists;
+encourages the use of new technologies by authorizing funds to improve
+technology and infrastructure at INS, the Customs Service, and DOS,
+targeting much of this effort at strengthening our nation's borders;
+mandates the transmittal of advance passenger lists; and implements a
+study to determine the feasibility of a North American Perimeter Safety
+Zone. (This study includes a review of the feasibility of expanding and
+developing pre-clearance and pre-inspections programs).
+ Given this law's ambitious provisions, Congress needs to step up to
+the plate and provide the federal agencies impacted with the staffing
+and funding levels they need to implement this measure's provisions, as
+well as perform adequate oversight. It is simply unacceptable for
+Congress to pass this bill and not give the federal agencies the
+funding they need to do a good job. It is also unacceptable for the
+agencies not to implement the mandates of this law.
+
+ Recommendations: Based on the above discussion and in order to
+implement feasible security objectives without seriously harming the
+international and cross border flow of trade and people, we submit the
+following recommendations:
+
+Realistic Assessment of the US-VISIT Program's Capabilities
+ 1. Determine the limits of US-VISIT: Congress and the DHS must
+step-back and determine the program's true capabilities and assess the
+feasibility of every aspect of the program while US-VISIT is still in
+its infancy. The 1998 Senate report on the entry/exit program
+challenges the notion that an entry/exit system can be used as a tool
+to prevent terrorism. If that is true, Congress must determine it now
+rather than after billions of US tax dollars have been spent. If the
+mission of US-VISIT is instead to catch visa overstayers and those with
+a criminal record, the mission should be clarified. On the issue of
+national security, a false sense of security is a failure.
+ 2. Develop a comprehensive plan for US-VISIT: The Administration
+and Congress should use the above assessments to develop a
+comprehensive plan for US-VISIT that takes into account the achievable
+goals of the program, necessary funding levels, infrastructure needs,
+and appropriate deadlines.
+ 3. Do not use US-VISIT as a substitute for increasing our
+intelligence capacity: Security experts agree that our national
+security is best enhanced by increasing intelligence and database
+security checks performed outside the country. DHS should examine ways
+to expand the use of pre-inspection stations and authorize pre-
+clearances for low-risk travelers. By clearing travelers before their
+voyage to the United States, inspectors will have more face time with
+applicants and could better scrutinize each applicant for entry. Such
+practices would reduce delays at the border and allow inspectors more
+time to do their job. Pre-clearances also would provide international
+travelers with a sense of certainty that they will be admitted into the
+U.S.
+ 4. Ensure US-VISIT receives the billions of dollars necessary for
+adequate implementation: Congress must be prepared to spend the money
+necessary to properly implement US-VISIT to achieve its mission. In
+addition, Congress must conduct continual oversight to determine if US-
+VISIT objectives are being met due to the alleged security importance
+of the project. According to the DMIA Task Force's first report to
+Congress, the U.S. government needs to appropriate billions of dollars
+to purchase real estate, upgrade facilities, develop infrastructure and
+technological capabilities, and hire inspectors to manage the entry/
+exit program. With a preliminary estimated price tag of billions of
+dollars, the $380 million appropriated in FY 2003 was grossly
+insufficient to fund even the beginnings of this system. Without
+sufficient funding, US-VISIT will not operate properly and will impede
+the flow of the people and trade essential to our economic well being.
+
+Database Recommendations
+ 1. Make enforcement databases accurate: The concept of a watch list
+database is dependent on accurate information. There must be
+accountability to ensure accuracy. In addition, all public inquiries
+concerning enforcement-related database entries should be consolidated.
+The general public should be able to contact a central office to timely
+remove inaccurate information so as to avoid the continuation of
+injustices tied to the dissemination and provision of any inaccurate
+information.
+ 2. Increase the interoperability of database systems: DHS should
+prioritize its efforts to increase the interoperability of the database
+systems to give inspectors a more thorough and streamlined review of
+each applicant requesting entry into the U.S. Currently, the separate
+databases from the three immigration bureaus have not been fully
+integrated into US-VISIT. Due to this lack of information transfer,
+visitors who have applied for visa extensions might be detained for
+overstaying their visas, when in reality; they had maintained proper
+visa status. Having complete and correct information will make the
+difference between having a workable secure system or a discredited
+inefficient one.
+ 3. Increase funding and oversight for IDENT to ensure that it is
+efficient, reliable and accurate: Currently IDENT checks are being run
+at the time of US-VISIT enrollment at the U.S. Consulates (thereby
+delaying visa processing for each applicant by roughly three days in
+some cases) and are run at the ports of entry after the foreign
+national has entered the U.S. With the current IDENT processing times
+and infrastructure capacities at the ports of entry, it would be
+impossible to conduct IDENT checks upon admission without shutting down
+the borders. Congress and DHS must determine if IDENT can be modified
+so that checks can be done at the time of admission and then commit
+funding to making that happen. If it is not possible, Congress must
+understand that US-VISIT does not enhance our security checks through
+the use of a biometric security database check upon admission. Instead,
+US-VISIT runs a text-based security database check at the time of
+admission and creates a catalog of established identities for foreign
+nationals who have enrolled in the program.
+ 4. Develop a biometric US-VISIT database: Currently, the biometrics
+and biographical data of foreign nationals enrolled into US-VISIT is
+warehoused within the IDENT biometric database. By lumping US-VISIT
+enrollees in with criminals, we are sending the message that immigrants
+are criminals. Furthermore, commingling these two groups makes it more
+likely that errors will occur within the database and innocent
+travelers will be denied entry into the U.S.
+
+Infrastructure & Staffing Needs
+ 1. Don't implement US-VISIT until an adequate infrastructure
+assessment is done and put into place: The procedures for port
+enrollment in VISIT versus consular post enrollment do not mirror one
+another from a security review perspective. The reason for this
+dichotomy is based on logistical limitations. Reassess the use of IDENT
+checks and consider applying them only to higher risk segments of the
+population. Currently, the only ``low-risk'' populations identified are
+those under 14 or over 79. This method of exemption appears overbroad.
+Exemption from the IDENT check and US-VISIT enrollment should be based
+on intelligence, not stereotypes.
+ 2. Realistically assess the staffing and infrastructure necessary
+to implement US-VISIT: Such an assessment would involve answering many
+questions including: How many ports have scanners, which read
+passports, laser visas, etc. at commercial, passenger vehicle and
+pedestrian lanes? What is the current level of overtime at the ports?
+What are the processing times for I-94, immigrant visa processing, and
+other adjudications before deciding the impact on our tourism and trade
+of US-VISIT requirements?
+ 3. Delay implementation at land border until an adequate
+infrastructure is in place: The Border Security Act requires that DHS
+not impede the flow of goods and people across our nation's borders.
+Considering that the U.S. has over 300 ports of entry and, in 2001,
+over 510 million people entered the U.S. (63 percent of whom were
+foreign nationals) and over $1.35 trillion in imports entered the U.S.,
+the potential devastating effect of delay at the land ports of entry
+becomes clear. Furthermore, such delays would undermine the entire
+effort to maintain an efficient border, and efficiency is a vital
+component in increasing security.
+ 4. Clearly define what constitutes an exit and allow for
+flexibility in compliance with the exit requirements in the early
+stages of US-VISIT: At this time, the airport and seaport exit
+functions of US-VISIT are being piloted. DHS is testing an exit kiosk,
+but it has also indicated that it will test handheld exit devices. DHS
+must clearly define what constitutes an exit and ensure that the exit
+function is clearly marked and cannot be ignored by an oblivious
+foreign national. In addition, the government should clarify that the
+negative consequences of those failing to properly exit during the
+first few years of US-VISIT will only be applied to willful violators.
+At land ports the lack of infrastructure makes it necessary to think
+creatively about exit control (such as allowing frequent travelers to
+skip the exit requirements since their multiple entries will verify
+that they previously departed the U.S. in a timely fashion) or possibly
+abandon exit controls there all together unless funding is allocated to
+the infrastructure and personnel investment required.
+
+Operational Assistance
+ 1. DHS must increase its outreach to the public concerning US-
+VISIT: DHS must inform US-VISIT enrollees of the program's
+requirements, and information must be widely disseminated and presented
+in a timely manner. Without adequate public notice on how to comply
+with these new US-VISIT requirements, the program will not operate
+properly and will impede the flow of people who are essential to our
+economic well being.
+ 2. Give US-VISIT enrollees a receipt and issue regulations allowing
+leeway during the program's infancy: Without giving US-VISIT enrollees
+physical proof of their entry and exit into US-VISIT, enrollees will
+have no way to rebut system errors or to identify informational
+mistakes inputted into the system. Additionally, during US-VISIT's
+infancy, enrollees are facing much uncertainty regarding their
+responsibilities under this program. A grace period for exit control
+compliance and alternative methods by which visa holders may comply
+with exit control without penalty are necessary to ensure that innocent
+travelers are not unfairly penalized by US-VISIT.
+ 3. Limit the US-VISIT process for our Mexican neighbors who hold
+laser visas: Only require US-VISIT compliance for laser visa holders
+when they would need an I-94 for admission. Do not require these
+frequent travelers to enroll or be tracked by US-VISIT when they do not
+go beyond 25 miles from the border (75 miles in Arizona) or remain in
+the U.S. over 72 hours. The laser visa biometric database maintained by
+State should be integrated into the US-VISIT biometric database. This
+merger would update the US-VISIT database for all laser visa holders
+without subjecting each laser visa holder to an initial US-VISIT
+enrollment. Still apply random IBIS checks for security updates.
+
+General Recommendations
+ Our nation's ports of entry are complex environments into which US-
+VISIT has been thrust. The following recommendations will help provide
+order and accountability to that complex environment, thereby creating
+a more stable foundation upon which US-VISIT can be built.
+ 1. Establish an immigration specialist position at the ports of
+entry: It is important that immigration specialists be designated and
+accessible to apply our immigration laws. For consistency and accurate
+applications of our complex immigration laws, the decisions of these
+specialists should be directed and coordinated by immigration counsel
+within the office of the DHS General Counsel. Such legal counsel must
+be coordinated with benefit-related adjudications housed in United
+States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and enforcement
+policy and procedures applied by United States Immigration and Customs
+Enforcement (ICE).
+ 2. Don't conduct redundant security checks: Many border residents
+cross the international border several times per day. It is critical to
+integrate existing voluntary frequent traveler programs so that
+enrollment in one provides a uniform access process at all our ports of
+entry. There should be one consistent enrollment process for air, land,
+and sea admissions. The Application Support Centers in the U.S. could
+help facilitate the process for those already here to enroll in such
+programs by providing biometrics. The former U.S. Customs Service
+created the C-TPAT program, which is a joint government-business
+initiative to build cooperative relationships that strengthen overall
+supply chain and border security. Why not allow and encourage employees
+of qualifying employers to enroll in frequent traveler programs as
+well? In addition, the NEXUS and SENTRI programs should merge and
+become the same uniform process. Why not allow such enrollment
+eventually at consular posts overseas as well? These actions require
+major funding and staffing, and yet they improve security and reduce
+congestion at our ports.
+ 3. Access to counsel: Title 8 to the Code of Federal Regulations
+was modified to restrict access to counsel at ports of entry based on
+the law in existence at the time, which did not provide for expedited
+removal at ports of entry with no right to any administrative review.
+One of the bases cited for the ability to restrict such access was
+administrative remedy. When the law was changed to allow expedited
+removal from the U.S., no correction was made to the regulations.
+Legacy Customs has long allowed access to legal representation at ports
+of entry to deal with issues arising concerning the admission of goods.
+For example, the ability to contact a fines, penalties, and forfeitures
+officer to work on the release of goods held for some reason from
+import to the U.S. Such a practice should be extended to foreign
+nationals visiting our country. Just put yourself in their place
+applying for admission to a foreign country. Would a U.S. citizen want
+to be denied access to counsel or even an embassy representative due to
+some misunderstanding or error at a foreign port of entry? If the
+Golden Rule was ever needed, it is at our ports.
+ 4. Place cameras at the ports of entry: Cameras have been used
+successfully at many ports to record the behavior and statements of the
+applicant and the officer. Inspections supervisors have praised the
+tool from a personnel perspective and embassies and applicants for
+admission have benefited from the recordings of this silent and
+objective witness. In addition, in some cases, these cameras could also
+implement cutting edge facial recognition technology to assist
+inspectors. These cameras should be installed at least in all secondary
+inspection areas.
+ 5. Equal benefits and treatment and the development of a DHS
+culture: In order to ensure that CBP functions properly, it must
+develop its own unique culture in which immigration, agriculture, and
+customs functions are treated with equal respect. In addition, a
+continuing education component focusing on security and legal issues
+must be linked to pay increases and advancement to improve the quality
+of those guarding and applying the laws at our ports.
+ 6. Rethink the I-94 card: I-94 cards and I-94W cards for visa
+waiver applicants have never been secure documents, and there are a
+myriad of ways to make these documents both more secure and more
+efficiently distributed: issue I-94 cards with the approval notices for
+initial grants of nonimmigrant work related visas; for business visitor
+or tourists (B-1/B-2), tie the admission date stamped in the passport
+to a default admission period (such precedent already exists in the 90-
+day admission period under the Visa Waiver Program, and the prior
+typical default admission period of six months for tourist admissions);
+allow business visitors and tourists to apply for their admission
+document via the internet before their travel and confirm identity upon
+admission. In addition to these possibilities for issuing the I-94
+card, fees for the card should never have to be collected by personnel.
+Instead, metro/subway type toll collection machines could be utilized,
+which would also result in decreased need for personnel oversight on
+collection issues.
+
+ Ms. Granger. Mr. Carlton?
+
+STATEMENT OF DENNIS CARLTON, DIRECTOR OF WASHINGTON OPERATIONS,
+ INTERNATIONAL BIOMETRIC GROUP, LLC
+
+ Mr. Carlton. I would like to thank the committee for the
+opportunity to address you. I am Dennis Carlton. I am the
+director of Washington operations for International Biometric
+Group. On behalf of our company, I would like to talk to you
+today about biometrics in the U.S. border management system.
+ Let me begin with a brief description of International
+Biometric Group, so you better understand who we are and our
+unique position in the world of biometrics.
+ IBG provides independent consulting services to government
+and private industry customers interested in implementing
+biometric technologies. We take a practical, hands-on approach
+toward biometrics, having tested more than 50 different
+biometric solutions over the past five years, so we know how
+they are likely to perform in the real world.
+ IBG holds to a strict vendor-neutral policy, which enables
+us to maintain close relationships with biometrics vendors
+while ensuring our clients receive accurate and independent
+advice on which biometric systems can best meet their needs.
+ One year ago, IBG delivered a report to the White House
+Office of Science and Technology Policy entitled ``The Use of
+Biometric Technologies in the United States Visa Issuance and
+Border Entry-Exit Systems.'' I was the principal investigator
+and author of this report.
+ In conducting research for this study, we visited several
+U.S. consulates around the world, as well as American sea, air
+and land ports of entry.
+ The OSTP report is a no-holds-barred look at the practical
+challenges of implementing biometrics in the field, both at
+consulates and at ports of entry.
+ IBG's report to the OSTP highlighted several issues related
+to integrating biometrics within US-VISIT that are worthy of
+re-emphasis before this committee. Biometrics should be
+implemented in a manner that augments, rather than replaces,
+existing border management I.T. systems. Biometrics alone
+cannot replace the professional judgment of experienced border
+management personnel.
+ The system also must be designed with an eye toward
+continuing technology refreshment. The life cycle of biometric
+products turns over at least as fast as other I.T. components.
+ The government must invest in continuing research and
+development into improving biometric products. In the past few
+years, there has been an explosion in new biometric
+technologies being introduced into the marketplace, many of
+which warrant the nurture of federal government.
+ The success of any biometric solution depends in great
+measure on its stakeholders establishing realistic performance
+expectations for the system. And given its unprecedented scale
+and visibility, this will be especially true of US-VISIT.
+ Stakeholders need to have practical expectations as to the
+performance of biometric technologies. The current generation
+of biometric systems is not 100 percent accurate, but
+biometrics don't need to be perfect in order to enhance border
+security.
+ The mere presence of a device can positively link an
+individual with the documentation that they carry. And this
+will serve as a deterrent to many impostors.
+ In addition, the system design must incorporate a
+comprehensive security and privacy architecture. Good security
+and privacy practices are not antithetical and can both be
+accommodated in US-VISIT. Biometrics themselves are privacy
+neutral. It is the way they are employed and the protections
+put in place to limit misuse that makes biometrics either
+privacy invasive or privacy protective.
+ What is essential is that individuals are fully informed on
+how their biometric data is collected, used, shared and
+secured.
+ The advent of US-VISIT and biometric technologies at U.S.
+ports of entry need not result in delay and inefficiency. There
+are several means for mitigating the impacts of these changes.
+ First, border management solutions must be prepared to
+accommodate multiple forms of biometric technologies. Although
+the International Civil Aviation Organization has specified
+facial recognition as the universal biometric for securing
+machine-readable travel documentation, the U.S. will continue
+to leverage its investment in fingerprint databases to identify
+travelers who might pose a security threat.
+ A universal biometric solution is not necessary in order to
+achieve a secure border management solution, so long as
+countries agree to provide one another with the ability to
+decode and match the specific biometric data associated with
+the travel document.
+ Secondly, although the challenge of implementing biometric
+identification at land ports of entry is daunting, it is not
+insurmountable. IBG believes that portable fingerprint reading
+devices can be employed to match the index fingers of
+passengers in a vehicle with the travel documents that they
+carry.
+ The capture of fingerprints must take place upstream from
+the primary inspection station, so that a biometric search can
+be completed before the vehicle reaches the primary inspection
+position. In this way, the biometric search does not impact the
+overall primary inspection time, and the primary inspector is
+not distracted from conducting a thorough assessment of the
+vehicle, its occupants and its contents.
+ At exit points from the U.S., the government should provide
+a self-service kiosk type of solution that would allow an
+exiting U.S. citizen a means for self-enrollment of their
+travel-related documentation and biometrics.
+ In exchange for taking the time to scan an identity
+document and provide a biometric sample, the citizen would be
+entitled to use a type of blue lane that would offer expedited
+processing upon their return to the U.S.
+ And finally, we should expect that most problems associated
+with biometrically secured travel documents would be of an
+innocent or inadvertent nature, rather than a fraud attempt.
+ The U.S. should provide travelers with a real-time problem
+resolution solution, such as a phone number or e-mail address,
+where they can immediately reach someone in an ombudsman-like
+role who can begin the process of resolving the travel
+documentation problem.
+ I will finish my remarks here and answer your questions.
+ [The statement of Mr. Carlton follows:]
+
+ Prepared Statement of Dennis Carlton
+
+ My name is Dennis Carlton and I am the Director of Washington
+Operations for International Biometric Group of New York City. On
+behalf of our company, I'd like to thank the committee for the
+opportunity to talk to you about the technology called biometrics and
+some of the likely the issues associated with introducing biometrics
+into the border management system.
+ Let me begin with a brief description of International Biometric
+Group so that you better understand who we are and our unique position
+in the world of biometrics. International Biometric Group, or IBG,
+provides independent consulting services to government and private
+industry customers interested in implementing biometric technologies.
+Our organization focuses on three primary functions: (1) evaluating and
+reporting on biometric products and vendors, as well as the markets in
+which they compete, (2) advising clients on how to implement biometric
+systems, and (3) integrating a wide range of biometric hardware and
+software to meet the security needs of our customers. We take a
+practical, hands-on approach toward biometrics. We have conducted
+extensive comparative performance testing of more than fifty different
+biometric solutions so that we know how they're likely to perform in
+the real world. IBG holds to a strict vendor-neutral policy, which
+enables us to maintain close relationships with biometrics vendors
+while ensuring that our clients receive accurate and independent advice
+on which biometric systems can best meet their needs.
+ I'd like to take a moment to review some of the basics of
+biometrics. A technical definition of biometrics is the automated
+measurement of behavioral or physiological characteristics of a human
+being to determine or authenticate their identity. In other words, it's
+the use of computers to confirm who a person is by matching a behavior
+or a permanent physical characteristic with similar records in a
+database. Biometrics alone can't determine an individual's identity but
+they can effectively distinguish one person from another. There is a
+wide range of products in the market that can acquire and match a
+person's biometric data to perform a quick and accurate identification.
+With respect to border management, the U.S. has focused its attention
+on fingerprint matching and facial recognition biometrics, although
+other biometrics such as iris recognition, hand geometry, and speaker
+authentication technologies are also being assessed.
+ One year ago, IBG delivered a report to the White House Office of
+Science and Technology Policy entitled ``Use of Biometric Technologies
+in the United States Visa Issuance and Border Entry/Exit Systems''. I
+was the principal investigator and author of this report, a summary of
+which has been included in the material provided to committee members.
+In conducting research for this study we visited several U.S.
+consulates around the world as well as American sea, air and land ports
+of entry. The OSTP sought a no-holds-barred look at the practical
+challenges of implementing biometrics in the field both at consulates
+and ports of entry--I like to think we accomplished that goal. From the
+OSTP research and our subsequent participation in several ongoing
+initiatives involving biometrics and international travel security, IBG
+has gained significant insight into the integration, performance, and
+workflow challenges associated with implementing biometrics within US-
+VISIT and our border management system.
+ IBG's report to the OSTP highlighted several issues related to
+integrating biometrics within US-VISIT worthy of reemphasis before this
+committee:
+
+ Biometrics should be implemented in a manner that
+ augments rather than replaces existing border management IT
+ systems. The fact that an individual matches the biometric
+ associated with a travel document does not ensure that the
+ individual qualifies for admission to the United States.
+ Biometrics alone cannot replace the professional judgment of
+ experienced border management personnel.
+ Since the current generation of biometric technologies
+ is not 100 percent accurate, a seamless exception handling
+ process must be incorporated throughout the design of the
+ system.
+ The system also must be designed with an eye toward
+ continuing technology refreshment. The lifecycle of biometric
+ products turns over at least as fast as other IT components--
+ US-VISIT should be designed with seamless transitions to newer,
+ more accurate solutions in mind.
+ The government must invest in continuing research and
+ development into improving biometric products. The centennial
+ of the Wright Brothers first powered flight serves as a
+ reminder that significant innovations may come from unlikely
+ sources. In the past few years there has been an explosion of
+ new biometric technologies being introduced into the
+ marketplace, many of which warrant the nurture of the federal
+ government. In addition to financial support, the federal
+ government may need to approve regulatory and legislative
+ changes to authorize the development of databases that can be
+ used to test the effectiveness of new biometric solutions.
+ The success of any biometric solution depends in great measure on
+its stakeholders establishing realistic performance expectations for
+the system; given its unprecedented scale and visibility, this will be
+especially true of the US-VISIT system. Among the key performance
+considerations are:
+
+ Stakeholders need to have practical expectations as to
+ the performance of biometric technologies. The current
+ generation of biometric systems is not 100 percent accurate but
+ biometrics don't need to be perfect in order to enhance border
+ security. The mere presence of a device that can positively
+ link an individual with the documentation they carry will serve
+ as a deterrent to many impostors. Border inspection personnel
+ use their professional judgment to resolve exception situations
+ every day; biometrics problems can be resolved in much the same
+ manner as any other identification document discrepancy.
+ The system design must incorporate a comprehensive
+ security and privacy architecture. Good security and privacy
+ practices are not antithetical and can both be accommodated in
+ US-VISIT. Biometrics themselves are privacy neutral--it's the
+ way they are employed, and the protections put in place to
+ limit misuse, that make biometrics either privacy-invasive or
+ privacy-protective. What is essential is that individuals are
+ fully informed on how their data is collected, used, shared,
+ and secured. For more information about biometrics and privacy
+ I commend to you an IBG-sponsored website dedicated exclusively
+ to the subject, www.BioPrivacy.org.
+ Reaching a consensus with our international partners
+ on privacy policy will be difficult because of significant
+ differences in our privacy expectations. In general, while
+ Americans often don't hesitate to provide personal data in
+ exchange for commercial benefits but frequently oppose sharing
+ such data with government, their counterparts in Europe and
+ Asia view cooperation with their government as a duty of
+ citizens in a civil society but don't feel similarly compelled
+ to provide personal data to commercial concerns. For the time
+ being, some parties have staked out extreme positions.
+ Compromise will mostly likely be achieved when views converge
+ toward a standard that defines a minimal exchange of a
+ traveler's personal or biometric data to effect efficient
+ commerce between governments.
+ The advent of US-VISIT and biometric technologies will certainly
+alter the primary and secondary inspections processes at U.S. ports of
+entry but these changes need not result in delay and inefficiency. Some
+of the measures that can be taken to reduce the impacts caused by these
+changes include:
+
+ U.S. border management solutions must be designed to
+ accommodate multiple forms of biometric technologies. Although
+ the International Civil Aviation Organization has specified
+ that facial recognition is the universal biometric to secure
+ machine-readable travel documentation, the U.S. will continue
+ to leverage its investment in fingerprint databases to identify
+ travelers who might pose a security threat. A universal
+ biometric solution is not necessary in order to achieve a
+ secure border management solution so long as countries agree to
+ provide one another with the software necessary to decode and
+ match the specific biometric data associated with a travel
+ document--this approach would allow Visa Waiver Program
+ participating countries to confirm the identity of one
+ another's citizens. A travel document that is secured by
+ multiple forms of biometric technologies would significantly
+ complicate the job of a forger or impostor. Eventually the U.S.
+ will need to employ biometrics to secure the travel documents
+ it issues its own citizens or risk having a U.S. passport
+ become the document of choice for fraudsters or terrorists
+ seeking to avoid being exposed by biometric identification.
+ The challenge of implementing biometric identification
+ at land ports of entry is daunting but not insurmountable. IBG
+ believes that portable fingerprint reading devices can be
+ employed to capture images of the index fingers of all
+ passengers in a vehicle in order to authenticate them with the
+ travel documentation they carry and to check against watch
+ lists of undesirable individuals. The capture of fingerprints
+ must take place `upstream' from the primary inspection station
+ so that a biometric search can be conducted before the vehicle
+ reaches the primary inspection position. In this way, the
+ biometric search does not impact the overall primary inspection
+ time and the primary inspector is not distracted from
+ conducting a thorough assessment of the vehicle, its occupants,
+ and its contents.
+ At exit points or other U.S. government service
+ centers such as post offices, the government should provide a
+ self-service kiosk that will allow exiting U.S. citizens a
+ means for self-enrollment of their travel-related documentation
+ and biometrics. In exchange for taking the time to scan their
+ identity documentation (e.g., driver's license, passport, etc.)
+ and providing a biometric sample, the U.S. citizen could use a
+ `Blue Lane' that would offer expedited processing when
+ returning. The success of solutions like the SENTRI system on
+ the U.S.-Mexico border and the U.S.-Canadian cooperative
+ program called NEXUS shows that both U.S. and foreign citizens
+ are willing to provide personal and biometric data to the
+ government in exchange for the very tangible benefit of
+ expedited border crossing. If they become widely used, these
+ solutions could help make a dent in the rise in identity theft
+ crimes by making it much more difficult for an identity thief
+ to travel internationally on a stolen U.S. identity document.
+ We should expect that most problems associated with
+ biometrically secured travel documents would be of an innocent
+ or inadvertent nature rather than a fraud attempt. It won't be
+ a sufficient solution to just turn away at an airline counter
+ or border post a traveler who has a problem matching a
+ biometric sample with a travel document. The U.S. should
+ provide travelers with a real-time problem resolution
+ solution--a phone number or email address where they can
+ immediately reach someone in an ombudsman-like role who can
+ begin the process of resolving their travel documentation
+ problems.
+ In summary, biometrics will play an increasingly important role in
+enhancing the integrity of U.S. border management systems. With clear
+guidelines and careful compliance with the rules of how, when, and
+where biometrics will be collected and employed, these tools can
+improve border security while at the same time protect the privacy and
+dignity of the legitimate traveler.
+ I look forward to responding to the committee's questions.
+
+ Ms. Granger. Thank you.
+ We will now go to questions. We will adhere to the five-
+minute rule, including my questions.
+ I will start with Mr. Carlton first.
+ You talked about the concern about mistaken or inadvertent
+biometric identity mismatches. How would you propose to best
+address those occurrences, especially from the perspective of
+safeguarding privacy?
+ Mr. Carlton. Right now, the current border processes handle
+that on a daily basis. There was earlier discussion about
+common names--if a name of John Smith is entered into a text
+database, you get all kinds of John Smith responses back. Some
+of them may be wanted criminals. But it doesn't mean that you
+push the button to bring in the SWAT team immediately because
+there is a namecheck match.
+ The same thing would happen with a biometric search. From
+the data I have heard so far from the folks at DHS, they have
+been able to clear false matches of their current system in
+about a minute--just over a minute right now. So they have
+actually been able to resolve problems very quickly, even when
+there is a biometric mismatch.
+ Ms. Granger. Thank you.
+ Ms. Campbell Walker, in your written testimony, you mention
+that travelers going through primary don't have their biometric
+data checked through IDENT prior to their admittance to the
+country. That is in your written testimony.
+ But the panel that we had made it very clear that the US-
+VISIT has provided primary inspectors with the new mission
+capabilities allowing them to do immediate IDENT verifications.
+ Do you have an inside question about that?
+ Ms. Campbell Walker. Thank you.
+ Yes, I do, and thank you for the opportunity to address it,
+because it is a very--well, to me it is--a very complex issue
+in trying to figure out how to relay this information to the
+panel.
+ The IDENT check pre-US-VISIT is a check of legacy INS
+database. And it is a database of recidivist people who were
+caught by Border Patrol and then brought back, trying to make
+sure that you had a record so if they came back again, you
+would know that they did this before, and then a look-out
+database.
+ And what happens right now, is that if you are going to be
+checked in IDENT, at where we are, you go into secondary and
+they have an average of a three to five minute response time.
+That is a full IDENT check, where it is a biometric check
+against the full IDENT biometric database.
+ My understanding is that that same full biometric database
+is being conducted by the Department of State in US-VISIT
+enrollment abroad at our consular post. And Ms. Harty just
+mentioned that it was seven to eight minute time frame for the
+Department of State.
+ And now, let's compare it to the story about the enrollment
+process for US-VISIT at our ports of entry, and here is where I
+have a basic disconnect. Three to five minutes, seven to eight
+minutes, 15 seconds.
+ When I asked the question to various port directors in
+different states, what I am being told is that, yes, there is
+an IDENT check, because, remember that when they are enrolled,
+they go into the US-VISIT database as a part of IDENT, so the
+identity is being confirmed. But the full IDENT check that we
+all know and respect is not able to be conducted in a timely
+manner, in 10 to 15 seconds.
+ So there is a modified version of it that they run the data
+against, so that the time frame is shorter.
+ So, yes, I see in some ways that we have got an identity
+check being conducted. But they are still basing the primary
+watch list on the text check, so it is not the same thing. We
+are not comparing it apple to an apple.
+ Ms. Granger. Thank you.
+ That is all the questions I have.
+ They are going to the IDENT in the State Department,
+overseas, that is right. The question is the 15 seconds and
+what that--it is confirming the identity, is that right?
+ We will have more information on that in the report.
+ Ms. Sanchez?
+ Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California. Thank you, Madam Chair.
+ Ms. Walker, I have several questions for you.
+ First of all, how would you characterize the US-VISIT
+program? What I mean by that, we conceived it to be an entry-
+exit system, predominantly to catch people with overstayed
+visas, et cetera. Now it is more of a security tool.
+ What do you think are its positives and its negatives as an
+immigration tool and as a security tool, given the years of
+experience you have had in El Paso in particular?
+ Ms. Campbell Walker. From a positive perspective, it
+definitely--if you are able to confirm someone's identity
+timely, that is a positive thing. Definitely, if one is able to
+run theoretically these IBIS text-based checks. The litany of
+examples given by Undersecretary Hutchinson were very
+instructive, and also the examples regarding Assistant
+Secretary Harty.
+ But the class check, when it was being done, before US-
+VISIT, would have brought up these examples that we are talking
+about. Also the IBIS check would have brought up some of these
+examples that we are talking about, if they were in the
+database.
+ The patina being placed on this scenario by US-VISIT is the
+possibility of identity verification, a great positive.
+ But let's face the situation: Once they are admitted and
+they are in overstay, we don't have sufficient interior
+enforcement to deal with it as it stands, to be able to follow
+up on this.
+ There are several facets of this that we need to address to
+make US-VISIT even have a possibility of success.
+ From a terrorist perspective, I am sorry, I still think we
+have a very limited number of terrorist fingerprints that we
+can run against, and we are not able to do that quick biometric
+check against the full IDENT database now.
+ And I wanted to address a very quick point that Madam
+Chair, Ms. Granger, mentioned earlier, on this IDENT issue and
+IAFIS. And I hope that our biometric expert will speak in a
+moment about that point.
+ IDENT and IAFIS, they are not fully integrated. There have
+been several reports to that effect and the fact that we don't
+have sufficient funding to allow said integration. That is a
+critical component to eventually allow for further database
+review.
+ Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California. Thank you.
+ You know, looking at this Phase 1, it has been pretty
+successful, the implementation and the agencies getting this
+all up. I think it is a decent start of where we are.
+ But I am really taking a look at the fact that we are
+strained with respect to personnel and the resources just to
+get that first phase. Now we are looking at Phase 2, Phase 3,
+we are talking about land borders. What are your concerns,
+knowing what you do, especially on the land border situation,
+at the enormity--I mean, what are the lessons learned or what
+do we have to watch out for, in particular with respect to
+resources, to get this implemented elsewhere?
+ Ms. Campbell Walker. There is a great provision in the
+second annual report of the Data Management Improvement Act
+task force, report to the Congress, reflecting right now the
+challenges at land borders, just in infrastructure and physical
+facility alone.
+ I will try to remember this off the top of my head, they
+indicate that there are several ports that have absolutely no
+additional infrastructure to allow for expansion. This is
+important if we are going to try to deal with exit at all and
+for that matter increase the level of staffing necessary to do
+these biometric checks of people coming in.
+ They have a chart showing that maybe 60 of them only have a
+20 percent expansion capacity.
+ And already I believe Jim Williams has been quoted in the
+paper indicating that he is concerned about the ability to
+implement US-VISIT timely at land borders.
+ We don't have people for exit; we don't have land and
+infrastructure; we don't have scanners; we don't have--people
+right now, if you want to look at overtime that is being logged
+in and paid by the government right now, just implementing our
+current systems, it is out the window.
+ Plus people are leaving in droves because of the level of
+stress they are put under and the demands placed upon them
+right now.
+ These are incredibly difficult jobs these people are
+carrying out, and they need support. And we just don't have the
+capacity to do this in the time frame necessary.
+ Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California. Only 5 percent of the
+people who are crossing our land borders actually are using
+some type of visa. I know when I cross and they just kind of
+look at me and they wave me on or what have you. I mean, what
+does that signify with respect to trying to really figure out
+who is coming in and who is going out under these phased
+implementations to the program?
+ Ms. Campbell Walker. Well, let's face it, right now, I
+mean, U.S. citizens are one of the least well documented, and
+Mexican citizens are one of the best documented. Mexican
+citizens--those who have laser visas--have a document that has
+a biometric embedded in it with two prints and the digitized
+photograph that is the basis for US-VISIT going forward.
+ We are not even able to merge that database with the IDENT
+database right now, so that we don't have to enroll Mexican
+citizens as they come across. The idea that every Mexican
+citizen, when right now it is less than 5 second coming in, is
+going to be two-printed and it is going to be 10 to 15 seconds,
+it is quick to see what we are going to deal with as far as
+time frames and backups on doing it.
+ It makes sense to deal with risk management at this point.
+And why can't we go ahead and merge those databases and give
+some relief to at least our Mexican neighbors as we are doing
+to our Canadian neighbors to the north?
+ Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California. Thank you.
+ Ms. Granger. I now recognize Representative Turner for five
+minutes.
+ Mr. Turner. Ms. Walker, I want to thank you for sounding
+the alarm for us, because I completely agree with you. I think
+we are ill-equipped and ill-prepared to be able to efficiently
+and effectively implement US-VISIT at our land borders. And I
+hope that this committee in a bipartisan way will call upon the
+Department of Homeland Security to do the necessary analysis to
+submit to the Congress what the needs are in terms of
+personnel, infrastructure, data integration, in order to be
+able to successfully implement US-VISIT at our land border
+crossings without creating a crisis.
+ And it will be a crisis for many of our border communities
+if we fail to provide the necessary support. And to my
+knowledge, to date I have not seen--and I don't think the
+department has prepared--a plan that would lay out for us what
+the true cost of effective implementation of US-VISIT less than
+one year from now should be in order to carry it out in an
+effective way.
+ And so, we have got to do that. As you said, it is a
+reality check.
+ And I was interested, you made mention of the deployment of
+1,000 biometric scanners, and I don't know that you got to
+expand upon that, about how inadequate that actually is. But I
+would invite you to kind of talk about that, as one example of
+how far we have to go.
+ Ms. Campbell Walker. Well, for me it is easiest just to
+take a home example, so if you will indulge me, let me just try
+to do that.
+ One of our major ports of entry is the Bridge of the
+Americas. We have anywhere between four to six pedestrian lanes
+there and then we have the Paso del Norte Bridge, where there
+is maybe five to six pedestrian. And then you have maybe 10--
+and they are trying to up it to 24 lanes--of passenger vehicle
+traffic. And then we have at just the one, Bridge of the
+Americas, and then there is the other 10 at the Paso del Norte
+Bridge.
+ So there is no way that 1,000 is going to cut it. And so,
+right now, the only thing they have right now at a passenger
+vehicle lane is that I have a mobile text unit, which is that
+legacy Customs-based system in which I type in to hook into the
+IBIS check on someone.
+ But you don't IBIS check everyone in a passenger vehicle
+lane.
+ And in fact, post-9/11, what happened was that they pushed
+IBIS inspection percentages higher on pedestrians. So as our
+pedestrian lanes bumped back because of the slowdown, people
+got in cars.
+ Well, it doesn't take a rocket scientist, if you are a
+really savvy terrorist, indeed if we are talking terrorism
+here, to say, well, okay, if get on wheels versus walk across,
+then, okay, the percentage is going to be less that I may get
+caught. It is just mindboggling.
+ So what I am just hoping is that there is a realistic
+assessment of where we are. The questions need to be asked: How
+many lanes do you have? How much overtime do you have? How long
+does it take you to get the checks?
+ Right now, in mobile text, what information can you
+get?which I am pretty clear about that right now. And how long
+is it going to take you and what is the implementation schedule
+necessary to be able to accomplish ``X'' goals?
+ And I think we just had a recent GAO report stating that
+Department of Homeland Security doesn't know how much it is
+going to take to get some of these things done.
+ So it is a logical response.
+ It is a hard time frame to get this done. Heck, it has been
+going on for seven years, trying to figure out how to implement
+this. How are they supposed to do it in a matter of a few
+months?
+ Mr. Turner. Thank you, Ms. Walker.
+ Ms. Granger. The chair recognizes Mr. Dicks.
+ Mr. Dicks. I want to compliment the panel on their
+testimony.
+ Mr. Carlton, tell us about 10 fingers versus two fingers--
+and I know you know the answer. Explain this. I think with the
+IDENT system and the IAFIS system there is an example of flat
+fingerprinting versus rolled. And because of the difference in
+the two, there was a 40 percent discrepancy. Is that not
+correct?
+ Mr. Carlton. I don't have the exact data, but let me try
+and?
+ Mr. Dicks. Explain it for us. I think it is important.
+ Mr. Carlton. --discuss the general topic.
+ Mr. Dicks. Right.
+ Mr. Carlton. The issue with only capturing two flat fingers
+from everyone is going to become a problem later on down the
+road. As the size of the database gets bigger, the limited
+amount of data that can be acquired from the two fingerprints
+means that the system is going to start returning more and more
+false matches, because there just isn't sufficient data to find
+the matching record in the database.
+ So the issue you raised earlier is, you are pushing out
+into the future a challenge of either re-enrolling everyone to
+get eight or 10 fingers or some interim policy there.
+ But, yes, sir, eventually you are going to start running
+into problems there.
+ Now, the data I have so far, that I heard just today from
+my DHS colleagues, is that the performance of the fingerprint
+systems they are using is actually very, very good. Their false
+match rate is significantly lower than they had expected. And
+that would be consistent with this initial rollout, when the
+database is relatively small. It is a problem that will be
+manifest later on.
+ Mr. Dicks. Well, why not do it right from the start? I mean
+this idea that 600,000 people have come in, we have done it
+with two when we could have very easily done it with 10. How
+much longer does that take?
+ Mr. Carlton. See, I think the challenge right now is, in
+part, that the technology is much better understood for the
+single finger matching, both the hardware and the process of
+using a single finger match. There is still work to be done in
+the human flow of work from the employee side and let's say the
+customer-client side in actually capturing all 10 fingerprints.
+ So there is the human element of being able to use the
+technologies. It is just easier to use the flat finger, single
+finger capture right now.
+ Mr. Dicks. Why were they doing it with flat fingers in one
+situation and then rolled fingers in the other, which causes 40
+percent discrepancy?
+ Mr. Carlton. The distinction is the requirements for law
+enforcement versus a civil identification system. A law
+enforcement system is typically based on fingernail to
+fingernail roll of the fingerprint. And that is, as my
+colleague is here, reaching for cup, that often from a crime
+scene standpoint, it is not actually the flat part of the
+fingerprint that is left behind. And so for forensic research,
+you really need the whole fingerprint.
+ The other thing you have to understand is those
+fingerprints that are captured in a rolled process, that takes
+a long time and almost always requires a human being to help
+guide the process of capturing those 10 fingers.
+ That is going to be very complex for people in consulates
+overseas, because often they operate on the opposite side of a
+hardened wall and glass from the public that they are trying to
+serve, so you cannot actually even help someone if you wanted
+to roll fingerprints.
+ So the practicality is, the capturing of fingerprints
+overseas is going to have to be flat fingers.
+ Mr. Dicks. Okay.
+ I just would mention in the GAO report, currently FBI IAFIS
+is only 40 percent accurate in matching their database of
+rolled fingerprints to the flat prints in the IDENT system.
+Does that make sense?
+ Mr. Carlton. It is entirely possible, yes, sir.
+ Mr. Dicks. So we have a problem here. The Appropriations
+Committee is certainly trying to take steps to push them to do
+the right thing here and at least to know that they have a
+problem.
+ Thank you, Madam Chairman.
+ Ms. Granger. Thank you.
+ Mr. May, I appreciate your comments on the US-VISIT program
+and I am certainly pleased to hear about the cooperation
+between DHS and the private sector.
+ You had a concern about airline personnel playing a role in
+collecting exit information from passengers. This is a little
+information sheet that has been prepared by Homeland Security.
+This is in English and Spanish and also visual. Do you think
+the airlines would be willing to hand out these small
+information cards to help people understand better?
+ Mr. May. Madam Chairman, we do hand out cards of that sort
+in the one test area that exit is under way today. And so, I
+mean, there are a number of areas where we can be helpful to
+DHS in helping implement this program.
+ What we are not interested in doing, I would like to re-
+emphasize, is having the exit program executed, if you will, at
+the ticket counter or at the gate, which in effect turns my
+agent into immigration's agents. And that is a non-starter from
+our perspective.
+ Ms. Granger. I understand.
+ Ms. Sanchez, do you have further questions?
+ Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California. I just wanted, very
+quickly, to ask Mr. May, you had some testimony about exit fees
+and charging some exit fees in order to pay for some of this.
+And I wondered if you had any comments you wanted to give to
+this committee?
+ And lastly, Ms. Walker, I just wanted to make sure that the
+initial question that you wanted to pose from your beginning
+testimony about the IDENT system, if you had gotten everything
+out that you think this committee should know about.
+ Mr. May. I think the key that this committee should know
+about is, first of all, the fee issue: The airlines industry,
+which already lost about $5 billion last year, is currently
+spending today, now, probably $3 billion annually to comply
+with federally mandated security measures.
+ We believe very strongly that federal security is a
+function of the federal government, soup to nuts, start to
+finish. That is point one.
+ Point two, vis-a-vis this exit program, we are concerned
+about making sure that you capture information. It is voluntary
+today. I agree with everything that has been said about the
+magnitude of the problem when you expand to a land-based
+environment, because you are only capturing a very, very small
+percentage of the total traffic when you look at airlines, for
+example.
+ I think they are doing a great job of putting it in place
+for entry. They need to figure out how to better require people
+to do this on exit, because the other unfortunate byproduct is,
+you could sent somebody, when this becomes a regular part of
+the process, somebody didn't check out as they left the United
+States, they come back to the United States, they are
+inadmissible, to use a term of art I have learned, and at that
+point, we are responsible for returning them to their point of
+origin at our cost.
+ And I am not exactly excited about the prospect of having
+thousands of people being returned to their point of origin,
+for any good reason. But if it is simply because they didn't go
+through that exit process, that is going to further complicate
+it.
+ So I am not suggesting there are any issues here that DHS
+is not aware of. I am not suggesting that there aren't people
+of great faith that are working on all of these issues. But I
+think, as some of my colleagues on this panel have pointed out,
+the magnitude of the effort is huge and I am not sure fully
+understood by everybody to date.
+ Ms. Campbell Walker. In trying to shed myself of all of my
+IDENT issues, just one more point. There was a comment
+regarding the eight prints, why didn't we do the 10 prints from
+the beginning, a very cogent response on that.
+ In 2005, though, the Department of State has already
+indicated that they are planning on moving to eight prints as a
+part of their process. And a part of it is due to the fact that
+they expect the database to be so overloaded and unresponsive
+that they are going to have to do that and in addition to that
+provide additional documentation to help separate people.
+ So that is already a part of the issue.
+ But again, on the IDENT check, let us assume that they have
+done something incredible, and that is great, if they have
+managed to do a full IDENT check in 15 seconds, what a
+marvelous thing if that has been accomplished.
+ But even if it has been accomplished, that 15 seconds, and
+doing that check for every single person trying to be admitted
+in a land border--because you cannot separate them out. There
+is no place to say U.S. citizens go here, legal permanent
+residents go here, those other people go here--will back us up
+so far into Mexico on the southern border that we might as well
+go back into negotiations regarding treaty acquisition of land,
+which I don't think President Fox is going to appreciate.
+ So we need to really think this through before saying we
+have got to meet that December 31st deadline.
+ Thank you.
+ Ms. Granger. I appreciate both panels, your testimony, your
+attendance. The chair notes that some members may have
+additional questions for this panel which they may wish to
+submit in writing. Without objection, the hearing record will
+remain open for 10 days for members to submit written questions
+to these witnesses and to place their responses in the record.
+ There being no further business, I again thank the
+subcommittee members and our witnesses today, and the hearing
+is now adjourned.
+ [Whereupon, at 1:44 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
+
+
+ A P P E N D I X
+
+ --------__
+
+ Material Submitted for the Record
+
+Questions and Responses of the Honorable Maura Harty, submitted by the
+ Honorable Dave Camp
+
+Question: Could you provide us with an implementation schedule for
+posts as to biometric visa processing in the nonimmigrant and immigrant
+visa context?
+Answer: The implementation schedule is attached. The schedule indicates
+the post name, type of biometric installation, start and finish dates
+of the trip, and whether the post has gone live with biometrics. Each
+trip includes biometric installation as well as general training and
+hardware maintenance objectives. Before October 26, 2004 we will
+install and go live with biometrics at all nonimmigrant and immigrant
+visa issuing posts. As of March 10, 91 posts are processing biometric
+nonimmigrant visas, and one post is processing biometric immigrant
+visas.
+
+ CONSULAR AFFAIRS Biometric Installations Schedule for NIV and IV
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ Biometric
+ Post Implementation Start Finish Comment
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+FRANKFURT............................................ 2-print NIV 9/11/03 10/1/03 Completed
+BRUSSELS............................................. 2-print NIV 9/17/03 9/30/03 Completed
+SAN SALVADOR......................................... 2-print NIV 9/22/03 10/3/03 Completed
+MONTREAL............................................. 2-print NIV 10/6/03 1022/03 Completed
+CAIRO................................................ 2-print NIV 10/8/03 1016/03 Completed
+OTTAWA............................................... 2-print NIV 10/14/03 1022/03 Completed
+KAMPALA.............................................. 2-print NIV 10/15/03 1030/03 Completed
+LAGOS................................................ 2-print NIV 10/15/03 11/5/03 Completed
+DOHA................................................. 2-print NIV 10/20/03 11/3/03 Completed
+TALLINN.............................................. 2-print NIV 10/20/03 11/3/03 Completed
+RIGA................................................. 2-print NIV 10/22/03 11/6/03 Completed
+HALIFAX.............................................. 2-print NIV 10/24/03 11/7/03 Completed
+VANCOUVER............................................ 2-print NIV 10/24/03 11/10/03 Completed
+ABU DHABI............................................ 2-print NIV 10/27/03 11/10/03 Completed
+FLORENCE............................................. 2-print NIV 10/27/03 11/14/03 Completed
+BANGKOK.............................................. 2-print NIV 10/29/03 11/21/03 Completed
+COPENHAGEN........................................... 2-print NIV 10/31/03 11/14/03 Completed
+RIYADH............................................... 2-print NIV 11/4/03 11/19/03 Completed
+KUALA LUMPUR......................................... 2-print NIV 11/5/03 11/21/03 Completed
+JERUSALEM............................................ 2-print NIV 11/5/03 11/21/03 Completed
+TEL AVIV............................................. 2-print NIV 11/5/03 11/28/03 Completed
+ANKARA............................................... 2-print NIV 11/6/03 11/21/03 Completed
+DUBAI................................................ 2-print NIV 11/10/03 11/26/03 Completed
+PORT LOUIS........................................... 2-print NIV 11/10/03 11/21/03 Completed
+KUWAIT............................................... 2-print NIV 11/11/03 11/24/03 Completed
+MAPUTO............................................... 2-print NIV 11/12/03 11/25/03 Completed
+KOLONIA.............................................. 2-print NIV 11/12/03 11/24/03 Completed
+MASERU............................................... 2-print NIV 11/12/03 11/26/03 Completed
+SAN JOSE............................................. 2-print NIV 11/12/03 11/26/03 Completed
+DAMASCUS............................................. 2-print NIV 11/17/03 12/2/03 Completed
+BILISI............................................... 2-print NIV 11/17/03 12/2/03 Completed
+ORONTO............................................... 2-print NIV 11/19/03 12/9/03 Completed
+CALGARY.............................................. 2-print NIV 11/24/03 12/9/03 Completed
+CHIANG MAl........................................... 2-print NIV 11/24/03 12/9/03 Completed
+MOSCOW............................................... 2-print NIV 11/26/03 12/19/03 Completed
+JEDDAH............................................... 2-print NIV 12/2/03 12/16/03 Completed
+ASMARA............................................... 2-print NIV 12/3/03 12/16/03 Completed
+B.S. BEGAWAN......................................... 2-print NIV 12/3/03 12/17/03 Completed
+MUSCAT............................................... 2-print NIV 12/3/03 12/18/03 Completed
+PANAMA CITY.......................................... 2-print NIV 12/3/03 12/19/03 Completed
+ISLAMABAD............................................ 2-print NIV 12/3/03 12/19/03 Completed
+ISTANBUL............................................. 2-print NIV 12/3/03 12/17/03 Completed
+MINSK................................................ 2-print NIV 12/3/03 12/16/03 Completed
+TASHKENT............................................. 2-print NIV 12/4/03 12/19/03 Completed
+AMMAN................................................ 2-print NIV 12/5/03 12/23/03 Completed
+CHISINAU............................................. 2-print NIV 12/8/03 12/19/03 Completed
+KOROR................................................ 2-print NIV 12/8/03 12/19/03 Completed
+SANAA................................................ 2-print NIV 12/8/03 12/24/03 Completed
+QUEBEC............................................... 2-print NIV 12/11/03 12/23/03 Completed
+BELIZE CITY.......................................... 2-print NIV 1/5/04 1/16/04 Completed
+BRATISLAVA........................................... 2-print NIV 1/7/04 1/23/04 Completed
+WINDHOEK............................................. 2-print NIV 1/7/04 1/22/04 Completed
+CAPE TOWN............................................ 2-print NIV 1/7/04 1/20/04 Completed
+BISHKEK.............................................. 2-print NIV 1/8/04 1/16/04 Completed
+SURABAYA............................................. 2-print NIV 1/14/04 1/28/04 Completed
+YEKATERINBURG........................................ 2-print NIV 1/14/04 1/29/04 Completed
+DUBLIN............................................... 2-print NIV 1/14/04 1/27/04 Completed
+MILAN................................................ 2-print NIV 1/15/04 1/28/04 Completed
+BAKU................................................. 2-print NIV 1/22/04 2/4/04 Completed
+DURBAN............................................... 2-print NIV 1/22/04 1/30/04 Completed
+MELBOURNE............................................ 2-print NIV 1/22/04 2/4/04 Completed
+RECIFE............................................... 2-print NIV 1/22/04 2/4/04 Completed
+VALLETTA............................................. 2-print NIV 1/22/04 2/4/04 Completed
+JAKARTA.............................................. 2-print NIV 1/30/04 2/17/04 Completed
+BANJUL............................................... 2-print NIV 2/2/04 2/13/04 Completed
+HONG KONG............................................ 2-print NIV 2/2/04 2/13/04 Completed
+SAO PAULO............................................ 2-print NIV 2/2/04 2/25/04 Completed
+ST PETERSBURG........................................ 2-print NIV 2/2/04 2/20/04 Completed
+VLADIVOSTOK.......................................... 2-print NIV 2/2/04 2/9/04 Completed
+YAOUNDE.............................................. 2-print NIV 2/4/04 2/19/04 Completed
+ALMA TY.............................................. 2-print NIV 2/4/04 2/17/04 Completed
+JOHANNESBURG......................................... 2-print NIV 2/4/04 2/20/04 Completed
+N'DJAMENA............................................ 2-print NIV 2/6/04 2/18/04 Completed
+PERTH................................................ 2-print NIV 2/6/04 2/17/04 Completed
+SUVA................................................. 2-print NIV 2/6/04 2/19/04 Completed
+HAMIL TON............................................ 2-print NIV 2/10/04 2/19/04 Completed
+LUXEMBOURG........................................... 2-print NIV 2/11/04 2/27/04 Completed
+PORT OF SPAIN........................................ 2-print NIV 2/11/04 3/5/04 Completed
+ASUNCION............................................. 2-print NIV 2/11/04 2/24/04 Completed
+AUCKLAND............................................. 2-print NIV 2/11/04 2/27/04 Completed
+CASABLANCA........................................... 2-print NIV 2/11/04 2/24/04 Completed
+HONG KONG............................................ 2-print IV 2/18/04 2/26/04 Completed
+NIAMEY............................................... 2-print NIV 2/18/04 3/4/04 Completed
+SYDNEY............................................... 2-print NIV 2/19/04 3/3/04 Completed
+ASHGABAT............................................. 2-print NIV 2/25/04 3/9/04 Completed
+NICOSIA.............................................. 2-print NIV 2/25/04 3/10/04 Completed
+SANTO DOMINGO........................................ 2-print NIV and IV 2/25/04 3/16/04 Completed
+MANAMA............................................... 2-print NIV 3/1/04 3/15/04 Completed
+BEIRUT............................................... 2-print NIV 3/3/04 3/17/04 Completed
+OUAGADOUGOU.......................................... 2-print NIV 3/3/04 3/16/04 Completed
+PHNOM PENH........................................... 2-print NIV 3/3/04 3/15/04 Completed
+RANGOON.............................................. 2-print NIV 3/3/04 3/16/04 Completed
+HANOI................................................ 2-print NIV 3/4/04 3/18/04 Completed
+FRANKFURT............................................ 2-print IV 3/9/04 3/17/04 Completed
+BEIJING.............................................. 2-print NIV 3/11/04 4/2/04
+BRIDGETOWN........................................... 2-print NIV and IV 3/11/04 4/2/04
+GABORONE............................................. 2-print NIV 3/15/04 3/30/04
+ALGIERS.............................................. 2-print NIV and IV 3/17/04 3/31/04
+LJUBLJANA............................................ 2-print NIV 3/17/04 3/31/04
+NOUAKCHOTT........................................... 2-print NIV 3/17/04 3/31/04
+SKOPJE............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 3/17/04 3/31/04
+SAN SALVADOR......................................... 2-print IV 3/22/04 4/1/04
+BAMAKO............................................... 2-print NIV 3/24/04 4/7/04
+SARAJEVO............................................. 2-print NIV 3/24/04 4/9/04
+YEREVAN.............................................. 2-print NIV 3/24/04 4/8/04
+PRAGUE............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 3/24/04 4/9/04
+PRAIA................................................ 2-print NIV and IV 3/29/04 4/12/04
+ACCRA................................................ 2-print NIV and IV 3/31/04 4/20/04
+GUAYAQUIL............................................ 2-print NIV and IV 3/31/04 4/16/04
+QUITO................................................ 2-print NIV 3/31/04 4/16/04
+HO CHI MINH CITY..................................... 2-print NIV and IV 4/1/04 4/27/04
+KIEV................................................. 2-print NIV and IV 4/7/04 4/21/04
+DUBLIN............................................... 2-print IV 417/04 4/16/04
+ISLAMABAD............................................ 2-print IV 4/7/04 4/21/04
+TEL AVIV............................................. 2-print IV 4/17/04 4/13/04
+BELIZE CITY.......................................... 2-print IV 4/12/04 4/20/04
+MADRID............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 4/12/04 5/5/04
+MSTERDAM............................................. 2-print NIV and IV 4/12/04 4/30/04
+HELSINKI............................................. 2-print NIV and IV 4/13/04 4/26/04
+JERUSALEM............................................ 2-print IV 4/14/04 4/20/04
+GUANGZHOU............................................ 2-print NIV and IV 4/19/04 5/7/04
+ANTANANARIVO......................................... 2-print NIV and IV 4/21/04 5/6/04
+BANGKOK.............................................. 2-print IV 4/21/04 4/30/04
+LAGOS................................................ 2-print IV 4/21/04 4/30/04
+SINGAPORE............................................ 2-print NIV and IV 4/21/04 15/6/04
+RIO DE JANEIRO....................................... 2-print NIV and IV 4/22/04 5/20/04
+ABU DHABI............................................ 2-print IV 4/23/04 5/4/04
+TUNIS................................................ 2-print NIV and IV 4/26/04 5/12/04
+ULAANBAATAR.......................................... 2-print NIV 4/26/04 5/7/04
+TEGUCIGALPA.......................................... 2-print NIV and IV 4/28/04 5/14/04
+BELFAST.............................................. 2-print NIV 4/28/04 5/12/04
+CARACAS.............................................. 2-print NIV and IV 4/28/04 5/19/04
+DOHA................................................. 2-print IV 4/28/04 5/4/04
+LONDON............................................... 2-print IV 4/28/04 5/25/04
+MANAMA............................................... 2-print IV 5/3/04 5/12/04
+TBILISI.............................................. 2-print IV 5/3/04 5/12/04
+YAOUNDE.............................................. 2-print IV 5/3/04 5/12/04
+PORT MORESBY......................................... 2-print NIV and IV 5/4/04 5/18/04
+BOGOTA............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 5/5/04 5/28/04
+BUENOS AIRES......................................... 2-print NIV and IV 5/5/04 5/28/04
+ALMA TV.............................................. 2-print IV 5/5/04 5/11/04
+SANAA................................................ 2-print IV 5/6/04 5/13/04
+COLOMBO.............................................. 2-print NIV and IV 5/7/04 5/24/04
+HARARE............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 5/10/04 5/24/04
+SHANGHAI............................................. 2-print NIV 5/10/04 5/21/04
+PARAMARIBO........................................... 2-print NIV and IV 5/11/04 5/26/04
+JAKARTA.............................................. 2-print IV 5/12/04 5/21/04
+NAIROBI.............................................. 2-print NIV and IV 5/12/04 5/28/04
+NASSAU............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 5/12/04 5/28/04
+LISBON............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 5/13/04 6/4/04
+VIENTIANE............................................ 2-print NIV and IV 5/13/04 5/28/04
+CAIRO................................................ 2-print IV 5/18/04 5/27/04
+DAR ES SALAAM........................................ 2-print NIV and IV 5/19/04 6/1/04
+LOME................................................. 2-print NIV and IV 5/19/04 6/2/04
+ZAGREB............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 5/19/04 6/3/04
+CHENGDU.............................................. 2-print NIV 5/20/04 6/4/04
+KINGSTON............................................. 2-print NIV and IV 5/20/04 6/18/04
+KUWAIT............................................... 2-print IV 5/24/04 6/11/04
+NAPLES............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 5/24/04 6/16/04
+JOHANNESBURG......................................... 2-print IV 5/26/04 6/4/04
+STOCKHOLM............................................ 2-print NIV and IV 5/26/04 6/10/04
+BELGRADE............................................. 2-print NIV and IV 5/31/04 6/18/04
+MONTEVIDEO........................................... 2-print NIV and IV 5/31/04 6/16/04
+PANAMA CITY.......................................... 2-print IV 5/31/04 6/9/04
+ANKARA............................................... 2-print IV 6/1/04 6/11/04
+ATHENS............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 6/2/04 6/25/04
+BUCHAREST............................................ 2-print NIV and IV 6/2/04 6/18/04
+SANTIAGO............................................. 2-print NIV and IV 6/2/04 6/18/04
+MAJURO............................................... 2-print NIV 6/2/04 6/16/04
+BIDJAN............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 6/3/04 6/18/04
+BRASILIA............................................. 2-print NIV 6/7/04 6/30/04
+SOFIA................................................ 2-print NIV and IV 6/7/04 6/24/04
+LA PAZ............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 6/9/04 6/24/04
+DDIS ABABA........................................... 2-print NIV and IV 6/10/04 6/30/04
+SHENYANG............................................. 2-print NIV 6/10/04 6/23/04
+BUDAPEST............................................. 2-print NIV and IV 6/16/04 7/2/04
+DAMASCUS............................................. 2-print IV 6/16/04 6/25/04
+LILONGWE............................................. 2-print NIV and IV 6/16/04 6/28/04
+GUATEMALA CITY....................................... 2-print IV 6/16/04 6/22/04
+MANAGUA.............................................. 2-print IV 6/16/04 6/25/04
+MANILA............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 6/16/04 7/13/04
+KIGALI............................................... 2-print NIV 6/21/04 7/2/04
+MONROVIA............................................. 2-print NIV and IV 6/21/04 7/6/04
+TIRANA............................................... 2-print NIV 6/21/04 7/2/04
+LUSAKA............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 6/23/04 7/7/04
+CONAKRY.............................................. 2-print NIV 6/23/04 7/7/04
+GEORGETOWN........................................... 2-print NIV and IV 6/23/04 7/14/04
+REYKJAVIK............................................ 2-print NIV and IV 6/23/04 7/6/04
+SAN JOSE............................................. 2-print IV 6/23/04 7/2/04
+AMMAN................................................ 2-print IV 6/28/04 7/7/04
+LUANDA............................................... 2-print NIV 6/30/04 7/14/04
+DAKAR................................................ 2-print NIV and IV 7/7/04 7/22/04
+MATAMOROS............................................ 2-print NIV 7/7/04 7/30/04 BCC
+TOKYO................................................ 2-print NIV and IV 7/7/04 7/30/04
+ASUNCION............................................. 2-print IV 7/7/04 7/13/04
+MBABANE.............................................. 2-print NIV 7/7/04 7/13/04
+DJIBOUTI............................................. 2-print NIV and IV 7/8/04 7/23/04
+HAVANA............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 7/8/04 7/30/04
+SYDNEY............................................... 2-print IV 7/8/04 7/30/04
+NOGALES CONS/TPF..................................... 2-print NIV 7/12/04 7/30/04 BCC
+HAMILTON............................................. 2-print IV 7/14/04 7/20/04
+MUMBAI............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 7/14/04 8/6/04
+NEW DELHI............................................ 2-print NIV and IV 7/14/04 7/30/04
+AUCKLAND............................................. 2-print IV 7/14/04 7/23/04
+BRUSSELS............................................. 2-print IV 7/14/04 7/23/04
+PORT-AU-PRINCE....................................... 2-print NIV and IV 7/14/04 8/4/04
+LIBREVILLE........................................... 2-print NIV and IV 7/15/04 8/2/04
+CHENNAI.............................................. 2-print NIV and IV 7/21/04 8/6/04
+OSAKA-KOBE........................................... 2-print NIV 7/21/04 8/6/04
+BAGHDAD.............................................. 2-print NIV 7/26/04 8/6/04 Tentative
+ dates
+WARSAW............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 7/26/04 8/11/04
+CALCUTTA............................................. 2-print NIV and IV 7/28/04 8/11/04
+VANCOUVER............................................ 2-print IV 7/28/04 8/3/04
+MERIDA............................................... 2-print NIV 8/2/04 8/20/04 BCC
+SEOUL................................................ 2-print NIV and IV 8/2/04 8/20/04
+KRAKOW............................................... 2-print NIV 8/2/04 8/17/04
+OSLO................................................. 2-print NIV and IV 8/4/04 8/20/04
+PARIS................................................ 2-print NIV and IV 8/4/04 8/27/04
+BANGUI............................................... 2-print NIV 8/4/04 8/20/04
+LONDON............................................... 2-print NIV 8/4/04 8/17/04
+MEXICO CITY.......................................... 2-print NIV 8/4/04 8/24/04 BCC
+MONTERREY............................................ 2-print NIV 8/4/04 8/25/04 BCC
+RANGOON.............................................. 2-print IV 8/4/04 8/10/04
+VILNIUS.............................................. 2-print NIV 8/5/04 8/20/04
+VIENNA............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 8/11/04 8/26/04
+COTONOU.............................................. 2-print IV 8/11/04 8/17/04
+GUADALAJARA.......................................... 2-print NIV 8/11/04 9/1/04 BCC
+NUEVO LAREDO CONSITPF................................ 2-print NIV 8/11/04 8/31/04 BCC
+ROME................................................. 2-print NIV and IV 8/12/04 8/25/04
+KATHMANDU............................................ 2-print NIV and IV 8/16/04 8/27/04
+PONTA DELGADA........................................ 2-print NIV and IV 8/16/04 9/1/04 BCC
+TIJUANA CONS......................................... 2-print NIV 8/16/04 8/20/04 BCC
+NAHA................................................. 2-print NIV 8/18/04 9/2/04
+KINSHASA............................................. 2-print IV 8/18/04 8/25/04
+TIJUANA TPF.......................................... 2-print NIV 8/23/04 8/27/04 BCC
+COPENHAGEN........................................... 2-Print IV 8/25/04 9/10/04
+MUSCAT............................................... 2-print IV 8/25/04 9/3/04
+CASABLANCA........................................... 2-print IV 8/25/04 9/3/04
+PHNOM PENH........................................... 2-print IV 8/25/04 9/1/04
+IAIPEI............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 8/30/04 9/24/04
+CIUDAD JUAREZ CONS................................... 2-print NIV and IV 9/1/04 9/21/04
+HERMOSILLO........................................... 2-print NIV 9/1/04 9/17/04 BCC
+DHAKA................................................ 2-print IV 9/1/04 9/7/04
+CIUDAD JUAREZ TPF.................................... 2-print NIV 9/6/04 9/15/04 BCC
+NIAMEY............................................... 2-print IV 9/8/04 9/17/04
+OUAGADOUGOU.......................................... 2-print IV 9/8/04 9/14/04
+SUVA................................................. 2-print IV 9/8/04 9/17/04
+MOSCOW............................................... 2-print IV 9/15/04 9/24/04
+PORT OF SPAIN........................................ 2-print IV 9/15/04 9/24/04
+NICOSIA.............................................. 2-print IV 9/17/04 9/28/04
+MONTREAL............................................. 2-print IV 9/21/04 9/30/04
+KUALA LUMPUR......................................... 2-print IV 9/22/04 10/1/04
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+Question: 2. At how many of these posts will you assign additional
+personnel to assist in this processing?
+Answer: For Fiscal year 2004, The Bureau of Consular Affairs created 80
+additional overseas positions to meet both increased workload and
+overseas biometrics requirements. In addition, CA will have established
+186 new officer positions over a three-year period ending in fiscal
+year 2005 to replace consular associates as adjudicators.
+
+Question: 3. Is there sufficient staffing in State Department consular
+offices to carry out the visa issuance process, including interviews,
+US-VISIT enrollment and relevant security checks without causing delays
+in the visa issuance process.
+ a. If not, how many additional consular officers are necessary?
+ b. Is there a need for additional facilities or a change in the
+ facility? If so, where and what facilities are required?
+ c. What is the impact on customer service?
+Answer: a. The Bureau of Consular Affairs recently created additional
+consular positions in order to compensate for the expanded workload
+brought about by enhanced security procedures and biometric collection.
+These positions will allow efficient visa processing in most cases with
+few significant delays.
+ b. Many of our consular sections overseas operate without
+ adequate space. To ensure continued efficient and secure visa
+ processing, the State Department will require additional
+ funding for the construction of new overseas facilities with
+ sufficient consular workspace to meet existing demand and
+ growth.
+ c. Without adequate secure consular workspace, it is not
+ possible to deploy sufficient numbers of additional staff in
+ future to meet increased demand for visa services. The result
+ will inevitably be longer wait times for visas, decreased
+ waiting room space for visa applicants and inconvenience to
+ business travelers, students and tourists.
+
+Question: 4. Please provide the Committee with a list of consulates
+currently collecting biometric information and the types of data being
+collected, how the information is collected and the time required to
+collect the information.
+Answer: The attachment indicates the consulates that are currently (as
+of March 10) collecting biometric information for nonimmigrant and
+immigrant visas. The biometrics collected are two index fingerprints
+and a digitized photo. We also collect biographic data such as name,
+gender, and birth date that must be associated with this biometric
+information.
+ We collect biometric data during an in-person interview process at
+the consulate. The process begins by the applicant supplying biographic
+data and a photo. The biographic data is entered into a database and
+the photo is captured electronically and added to the applicant's
+record. The applicant's biographic information is sent to the CLASS
+database to determine whether a lookout exists.
+ The applicant then goes to the interview window where a Foreign
+Service Officer (FSO) or a cleared and trained Eligible Family Member
+(EFM) verifies the photo image. Next, the applicant is directed to
+supply two index fingerprints using an electronic fingerprint scanner
+located on the other side of the window in full view of the FSO or EFM.
+The fingerprints and photo are then sent electronically to DHS' IDENT
+database to determine whether they match existing lookouts.
+ An FSO then verifies the biographic data, and interviews the
+applicant. CLASS results are nearly always available before the
+interview begins.
+ Following a review of IDE NT and CLASS records, the applicant's
+documentation, and the interview responses the FSO then decides whether
+to issue a vIsa.
+ Based on field experience to date the time required to collect
+fingerprint data averages about 30 seconds per applicant.
+
+ Biometric Installations Completed as of 17 March 2004
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ Biometric
+ Post Implementation Start Finish Comment
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+FRANKFURT............................................ 2-print NIV 9/11/03 10/1/03 Completed
+BRUSSELS............................................. 2-print NIV 9/17/03 9/30/03 Completed
+SAN SALVADOR......................................... 2-print NIV 9/22/03 10/3/03 Completed
+MONTREAL............................................. 2-print NIV 10/6/03 10/22/03 Completed
+CAIRO................................................ 2-print NIV 10/8/03 10/16/03 Completed
+OTTAWA............................................... 2-print NIV 10/14/03 10/22/03 Completed
+KAMPALA.............................................. 2-print NIV 10/15/03 10/30/03 Completed
+LAGOS................................................ 2-print NIV 10/15/03 11/5/03 Completed
+DOHA................................................. 2-print NIV 10/20/03 11/3/03 Completed
+ITALLINN............................................. 2-print NIV 10/20/03 11/3103 Completed
+RIGA................................................. 2-print NIV 10/22/03 11/6/03 Completed
+HALIFAX.............................................. 2-print NIV 10/24/03 11/7/03 Completed
+ANCOUVER............................................. 2-print NIV 10/24/03 11/10/03 Completed
+lA.BU DHABI.......................................... 2-print NIV 10/27/03 11/10/03 Completed
+FLORENCE............................................. 2-print NIV 10/27/03 11/14/03 Completed
+BANGKOK.............................................. 2-print NIV 10/29/03 11/21/03 Completed
+COPENHAGEN........................................... 2-print NIV 10/31/03 11/14/03 Completed
+RIYADH............................................... 2-print NIV 11/4/03 11/19/03 Completed
+KUALA LUMPUR......................................... 2-print NIV 11/5/03 11/21/03 Completed
+JERUSALEM............................................ 2-print NIV 11/5/03 11/21/03 Completed
+ITEL AVIV............................................ 2-print NIV 11/5/03 11/28/03 Completed
+lA.NKARA............................................. 2-print NIV 11/6/03 11/21/03 Completed
+DUBAI................................................ 2-print NIV 11/10/03 11/26/03 Completed
+PORT LOUIS........................................... 2-print NIV 11/10/03 11/21/03 Completed
+KUWAIT............................................... 2-print NIV 11/11/03 11/24/03 Completed
+MAPUTO............................................... 2-print NIV 11/12/03 11/25/03 Completed
+KOLONIA.............................................. 2-print NIV 11/12/03 11/24/03 Completed
+MASERU............................................... 2-print NIV 11/12/03 11/26/03 Completed
+SAN JOSE............................................. 2-print NIV 11/12/03 11/26/03 Completed
+DAMASCUS............................................. 2-print NIV 11/17/03 12/2/03 Completed
+TBILISI.............................................. 2-print NIV 11/17/03 12/2/03 Completed
+TORONTO.............................................. 2-print NIV 11/19/03 12/9/03 Completed
+CALGARY.............................................. 2-print NIV 11/24/03 12/9/03 Completed
+CHIANG MAl........................................... 2-print NIV 11/24/03 12/9/03 Completed
+MOSCOW............................................... 2-print NIV 11/26/03 12/19/03 Completed
+JEDDAH............................................... 2-print NIV 12/2/03 12/16/03 Completed
+ASMARA............................................... 2-print NIV 12/3/03 12/16/03 Completed
+B.S. BEGAWAN......................................... 2-print NIV 12/3/03 12/17/03 Completed
+MUSCAT............................................... 2-print NIV 12/3/03 12/18/03 Completed
+PANAMA CITY.......................................... 2-print NIV 12/3/03 12/19/03 Completed
+ISLAMABAD............................................ 2-print NIV 12/3/03 12/19/03 Completed
+ISTANBUL............................................. 2-print NIV 12/3/03 12/17/03 Completed
+MINSK................................................ 2-print NIV 12/3/03 12/16/03 Completed
+TASHKENT............................................. 2-print NIV 12/4/03 12/19/03 Completed
+MMAN................................................. 2-print NIV 12/5/03 12/23/03 Completed
+CHISINAU............................................. 2-print NIV 12/8/03 12/19/03 Completed
+KOROR................................................ 2-print NIV 12/8/03 12/19/03 Completed
+SANAA................................................ 2-print NIV 12/8/03 12/24/03 Completed
+QUEBEC............................................... 2-print NIV 12/11/03 12/23/03 Completed
+BELIZE CITY.......................................... 2-print NIV 1/5/04 1/16/04 Completed
+BRATISLAVA........................................... 2-print NIV 1/7/04 1/23/04 Completed
+WINDHOEK............................................. 2-print NIV 1/7/04, 1/22/04 Completed
+CAPE TOWN............................................ 2-print NIV 1n/04 1/20/04 Completed
+BISHKEK.............................................. 2-print NIV 1/8/04 1/16/04 Completed
+SURABAYA............................................. 2-print NIV 1/14/04 1/28/04 Completed
+YEKA TERINBURG....................................... 2-print NIV 1/14/04 1/29/04 Completed
+DUBLIN............................................... 2-print NIV 1/14/04 1/27/04 Completed
+MILAN................................................ 2-print NIV 1/15/04 1/28/04 Completed
+BAKU................................................. 2-print NIV 1/22/04 2/4/04 Completed
+DURBAN............................................... 2-print NIV 1/22/04 1/30/04 Completed
+MELBOURNE............................................ 2-print NIV 1/22/04 2/4/04 Completed
+RECIFE............................................... 2-print NIV 1/22/04 2/4/04 Completed
+VALLETTA............................................. 2-print NIV 1/22/04 2/4/04 Completed
+JAKARTA.............................................. 2-print NIV 1/30/04 2/17/04 Completed
+BANJUL............................................... 2-print NIV 2/2/04 2/13/04 Completed
+HONG KONG............................................ 2-print NIV 2/2/04 2/13/04 Completed
+SAO PAULO............................................ 2-print NIV 2/2/04 2/25/04 Completed
+ST PETERSBURG........................................ 2-print NIV 2/2/04 2/20/04 Completed
+VLADIVOSTOK.......................................... 2-print NIV 2/2/04 2/9/04 Completed
+YAOUNDE.............................................. 2-print NIV 2/4/04 2/19/04 Completed
+ALMA TY.............................................. 2-print NIV 2/4/04 2/17/04 Completed
+JOHANNESBURG......................................... 2-print NIV 2/4/04 2/20/04 Completed
+N'DJAMENA............................................ 2-print NIV 2/6/04 2/18/04 Completed
+PERTH................................................ 2-print NIV 2/6/04 2/17/04 Completed
+SUVA................................................. 2-print NIV 2/6/04 2/19/04 Completed
+HAMILTON............................................. 2-print NIV 2/10/04 2/19/04 Completed
+LUXEMBOURG........................................... 2-print NIV 2/11/04 2/27/04 Completed
+PORT OF SPAIN........................................ 2-print NIV 2/11/04 3/5/04 Completed
+ASUNCION............................................. 2-print NIV 2/11/04 2/24/04 Completed
+AUCKLAND............................................. 2-print NIV 2/11/04 2/27/04 Completed
+CASABLANCA........................................... 2-print NIV 2/11/04 2/24/04 Completed
+HONG KONG............................................ 2-print IV 2/18/04 2/26/04 Completed
+NIAMEY............................................... 2-print NIV 2/18/04 3/4/04 Completed
+SYDNEY............................................... 2-print NIV 2/19/04 3/3/04 Completed
+ASHGABAT............................................. 2-print NIV 2/25/04 3/9/04 Completed
+NICOSIA.............................................. 2-print NIV 2/25/04 3/10/04 Completed
+SANTO DOMINGO........................................ 2-print NIV and IV 2/25/04 3/16/04 Completed
+MANAMA............................................... 2-print NIV 3/1/04 3/15/04 Completed
+BEIRUT............................................... 2-print NIV 3/3/04 3/17/04 Completed
+BERN................................................. 2-print NIV and IV 3/3/04 3/19/04 Completed
+OUAGADOUGOU.......................................... 2-print NIV 3/3/04 3/16/04 Completed
+PHNOM PENH........................................... 2-print NIV 3/3/04 3/15/04 Completed
+RANGOON.............................................. 2-print NIV 3/3/04 3/16/04 Completed
+HANOI................................................ 2-print NIV 3/4/04 3/18/04 Completed
+FRANKFURT............................................ 2-print IV 3/9/04 3/17/04 Completed
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+Question: 5. To date, how many fingerprints and photographs have been
+collected in consulates?
+Answer: As of March 10 we had 34,748,844 NIV photographs and 8,137,267
+fingerprints in the Consular Consolidated Database. Of these
+fingerprints, 7,866,251 were collected from applicants in Mexico,
+primarily for Border Crossing Cards (BCCs), and 271,016 from applicants
+at posts where we began collecting fingerprints starting in September
+2003.
+
+Question: 6. Are there any technical problems consulates encountered in
+implementing this technology?
+Answer: We believe that all problems are being effectively addressed
+and that there are no major issues. As with any new system, areas for
+improvements and refinements have been identified. For example, the
+quality of some of the fingerprints captured by consulates had been
+identified as an issue by DHS. The Department is addressing this issue
+through improvements both in training and technology. Technical
+improvements include replacing the fingerprint scoring software, the
+software that determines the quality of the captured fingerprint, to
+use the same software that is being used by DHS. We believe that this
+will significantly reduce or eliminate the fingerprint quality problem.
+We are also making other modifications to the system to streamline the
+fingerprint capture process. Training is another significant issue, and
+we are taking steps to emphasize the fingerprint quality in our
+training, and developing detailed monitoring reports to identify posts
+that have low quality.
+ Early in the startup process, the Department encountered several
+instances of communications/data exchange problems with DHS' systems.
+These problems appear to have been resolved by DHS and the current
+workload is being processed in an expeditious manner. As workload
+begins to increase as more consulates come on-line, the Department will
+continue to monitor the situation and coordinate resolution of any
+communications and/or data exchange problems with DHS.
+
+Question: 7. What is the makeup of the State Department team
+implementing biometric equipment at consular posts? How much
+interaction and guidance does this team receive from US-VISIT in DHS?
+Answer: Implementation ofbiometric equipment at all consular posts is
+done with the on-site assistance of a team of contractors supplemented
+by Foreign Service Officers and other State Department employees. The
+same contractor carrying out the installations also produces the
+software used for biometric collection.
+ Interaction with DHS takes place daily, primarily regarding
+software development and data exchange. As installation teams identify
+problems and possible improvements, we discuss these with DHS to ensure
+that any changes we make will not interfere with the efficient
+operation of the IDENT database. As more posts are brought on-line, we
+also coordinate closely with DHS on data exchange issues to ensure
+IDENT response times remain within agreed limits.
+
+Question: 8. Please advise us of which posts have stopped issuing same
+day visas either in the immigrant of nonimmigrant context due to this
+requirement. Please advise us if each post is experiencing a turn
+around time of seven to eight minutes for IDENT checks and of any time
+frames over or under this estimate.
+Answer: Most posts have been able to continue same day visa issuance
+despite the new biometric requirements. CA is pleased with the
+performance of the IDENT check, and the majority of the responses are
+within our time budget. However we are still in the early stages of
+this project and are at less that 25 percent of the anticipated volume.
+We are monitoring this very closely and overall are cautiously
+optimistic.
+
+Question: 9. Please provide us with any case examples of potential
+terrorists refused visas since January of 2004 under these procedures.
+In specific, please advise us of the number of visa refusals/denials
+under section 212(a)(3)(B) or 212(a)(3)(A)(ii).
+Answer: So far there have been no examples of potential terrorists
+refused visas since January of 2004 because they were identified as
+potential terrorists under the new biometric procedures.
+ From January 2001 through March 07, 2004, there were 18 visa
+applicants denied visas under Section 212(a)(3)(B) of the INA, and 12
+applicants denied under section 212(a)(3)(A)(ii). They were initially
+identified as potential terrorists by name-based terrorist watchlist
+information that is included in the visa lookout system known as CLASS.
+
+Queston: 10. Will the state Department be able to meet the
+congressional deadline of issuance of biometric visas?
+Answer: Yes, we will be able to meet the October 26, 2004 deadline.
+
+Question: What action will the State Department take if Visa Waiver
+Program participants are unable to meet congressional deadlines for
+machine-readable and biometric passports?
+Answer: By October 26, 2004, VWP countries must:
+ Be producing machine readable
+ passports (original deadline of 2003 waived by
+ Secretary Powell and extended to October 2004);
+ Have a ``program in place'' to produce
+ biometric passports (mandated by Border
+ Security Act);
+ Be producing biometric
+ passports(mandated by Border Security Act).
+All VWP countries are now producing machine-readable passports. We
+expect that all but a few of the current VWP states will have a
+``program in place'' to produce biometric passports. However, it is
+unlikely that any government participating in the VWP program will be
+in large-scale production ofbiometric passports by the deadline. ICAO's
+decision to make facial recognition technology the standard passport
+biometric was not made until May 2003, leaving countries only 17 months
+to bring a biometric passport from design to production. While the VWP
+country governments share a commitment to make this change, many of
+them are encountering the same problems being experienced by the
+Department of State in our efforts to embed biometrics into the US
+passport. The need to resolve these significant technical problems to
+embed biometrics is the cause of these delays, not lack of will on the
+part of the VWP countries. Most governments are likely to reach full
+production of passports with embedded biometrics by late 2005 or early
+2006.
+ The US has played a leadership role in ICAO. We have had repeated
+meetings with VWP representatives to educate VWP governments about the
+requirements and deadlines. In December Secretary Powell sent a
+diplomatic note to the VWP countries regarding the criteria for
+certification of a biometric passport program and noting that there was
+no waiver for the production deadline. We are still receiving responses
+from those countries.
+ Travelers from VWP countries with passports issued on or after
+October 26, 2004 that do not contain biometrics will need visas to
+travel to the States. This means that the Department of State could be
+faced with an increase in demand of some 5.3 million visa applications
+in fiscal year 2005 and a somewhat smaller increase in fiscal year 2006
+as VWP countries come into compliance with the legislative requirement.
+We estimate that we will be able to process only a fraction of that
+additional workload with current resources and that the surge in
+applications will result in long processing backlogs.
+ Secretary Powell and Secretary Ridge recently wrote Judiciary
+Committee Chairman Sensenbrenner to advocate the need for prompt action
+to get a legislative fix to the deadline and to advise him that they
+welcome the invitation to testify before the Committee on April 21 on
+the subject. If legislative relief does not occur, State has prepared
+aggressive contingency plans to mitigate partially the impact of the
+deadline. However, the Department will not be able to identify, and
+mobilize resources to meet 100 percent of the demand before the problem
+will be resolved by the production of biometric passports by the VWP
+nations. The economic costs to the U.S. economy could be substantial.
+
+ Questions and Responses from the Honorable Asa Hutchinson
+
+Question: 1. Will you be able to meet the DMIA statutory requirements
+to collect arrival and departure information at the top fifty land
+ports of entry by December 2004?
+Answer: The US-VISIT strategy to meet the statutory guidelines of DMIA
+and other legislation is an incremental approach to implementation. On
+5 January 2004, DHS implemented the first phase to collect biographic
+arrival data and biometric data upon entry in the air/sea environments.
+This functionality was successfully expanded to capture arrival
+biographic and biometric information during US-VISIT processing in the
+passport control area in secondary of the 50 busiest land ports of
+entry by the DMIA mandated deadline of 31 December 2004. Please note,
+however, that the December 2004 deadlines imposed by DMIA require only
+the integration of arrival and departure information. To that end, US-
+VISIT is currently conducting exit pilot projects at several
+international airports and will expand exit data collection
+capabilities at land ports via additional pilot programs beginning no
+later than July 31, 2005.
+
+Question: 2. Please provide the Select Committee with an official list
+of ports of entry at which US-VISIT is operational and not operational.
+At ports where US-VISIT is not operational please provide a time line
+for full implementation of US-VISIT.
+Answer: The following lists all air and sea ports of entry at which US-
+VISIT is operational as of December 2004. On November 9, 2004, US-VISIT
+published a notice in the Federal Register (69 FR 64964) that lists the
+50 largest land ports of entry where biometric screening at entry was
+implemented by December 31, 2004. A copy of that notice is attached.
+Airports
+Agana, Guam (Agana International Airport)
+Aguadilla, Puerto Rico (Rafael Hernandez Airport)
+Albuquerque, New Mexico (Albuquerque International Airport)
+Anchorage, Alaska (Anchorage International Airport)
+Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland
+Albany, New York (Albany International Airport)
+Aruba (Pre-Flight Inspection)
+Atlanta, Georgia (William B. Hartsfield International Airport)
+Austin, Texas (Austin Bergstrom International Airport)
+Baltimore, Maryland (Baltimore/Washington International Airport)
+Bangor, Maine (Bangor International Airport)
+Bellingham, Washington (Bellingham International Airport)
+Boston, Massachusetts (General Edward Lawrence Logan International
+Airport)
+Brownsville, Texas (Brownsville/South Padre Island Airport)
+Buffalo, New York (Greater Buffalo International Airport)
+Calgary, Canada (Pre-Flight Inspection)
+Chantilly, Virginia (Washington Dulles International Airport)
+Charleston, South Carolina (Charleston International Airport)
+Charlotte, North Carolina (CharlottelDouglas International Airport)
+Chicago, Illinois (Chicago Midway Airport)
+Chicago, Illinois (Chicago O'Hare International Airport)
+Cincinnati, Ohio (Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport)
+Cleveland, Ohio (Cleveland Hopkins International Airport)
+Columbus, Ohio (Rickenbacker International Airport)
+Columbus, Ohio (Port Columbus International Airport)
+Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas (Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport)
+Del Rio, Texas (Del Rio International Airport)
+Denver, Colorado (Denver International Airport)
+Detroit, Michigan (Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport)
+Dover/Cheswold, Delaware (Delaware Airpark)
+Dublin, Ireland (Pre-Flight Inspection)
+Edmonton, Canada (Pre-Flight Inspection)
+El Paso, Texas (El Paso International Airport)
+Erie, Pennsylvania (Erie International Airport)
+Fairbanks, Alaska (Fairbanks International Airport)
+Fajardo, Puerto Rico (Diego Jimenez Torres Airport)
+Fort Lauderdale, Florida (Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport)
+Fort Lauderdale, Florida (Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood International
+Airport)
+Fort Myers, Florida (Fort Myers International Airport)
+Freeport, Bahamas (Pre-Flight Inspection)
+Greenville, South Carolina (Donaldson Center Airport)
+Hamilton, Bermuda (Pre-Flight Inspection)
+Hartford/Springfield, Connecticut (Bradley International Airport)
+Honolulu, Hawaii (Honolulu International Airport)
+Houston, Texas (Houston International Airport)
+Indianapolis, Indiana (Indianapolis International Airport)
+International Falls, Minnesota (Falls International Airport)
+Isla Grande, Puerto Rico (Isla Grande Airport)
+Jacksonville, Florida (Jacksonville International Airport)
+Juneau, Alaska (Juneau International Airport)
+Kansas City, Kansas (Kansas City International Airport)
+Kenmore, Washington (Kenmore Air Harbor)
+Key West, Florida (Key West International Airport)
+King County, Washington (King County International Airport)
+Kona, Hawaii (Kona International Airport)
+Laredo, Texas (Laredo International Airport and Laredo Private Airport)
+Las Vegas, Nevada (McCarren International Airport)
+Los Angeles, California (Los Angeles International Airport)
+Manchester, New Hampshire (Manchester Airport)
+Mayaguez, Puerto Rico (Eugenio Maria de Hostos Airport)
+McAllen, Texas (McAllen Miller International Airport)
+Memphis, Tennessee (Memphis International Airport)
+Miami, Florida (Kendall/Tamiami Executive Airport)
+Miami, Florida (Miami International Airport)
+Milwaukee, Wisconsin (General Mitchell International Airport)
+Minneapolis/St. Paul, Minnesota (Montreal, Canada (Pre-Flight
+Inspection)
+Nashville, Tennessee (Nashville International Airport)
+Nassau, Bahamas (Pre-Flight Inspection)
+New Orleans, Louisiana (New Orleans International Airport)
+New York, New York (John F. Kennedy International Airport)
+Newark, New Jersey (Newark International Airport)
+Norfolk, Virginia (Norfolk International Airport and Norfolk Naval Air
+Station)
+Oakland, California (Metropolitan Oakland International Airport)
+Ontario, California (Ontario International Airport)
+Opa Locka/Miami, Florida (Opa Locka Airport)
+Orlando, Florida (Orlando International Airport)
+Orlando/Sanford, Florida (Orlando/Sanford Airport)
+Ottawa, Canada (Pre-Flight Inspection)
+Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Philadelphia International Airport)
+Phoenix, Arizona (Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport)
+Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (Pittsburgh International Airport)
+Ponce, Puerto Rico (Mercedita Airport)
+Portland, Maine (Portland International Jetport Airport)
+Portland, Oregon (Portland International Airport)
+Portsmouth, New Hampshire (Pease International Tradeport Airport)
+Providence, Rhode Island (Theodore Francis Green State Airport)
+Raleigh/Durham, North Carolina (Raleigh/Durham International Airport)
+Reno, Arizona (Reno/Tahoe International Airport)
+Richmond, Virginia (Richmond International Airport)
+Sacramento, California (Sacramento International Airport)
+Salt Lake City, Utah (Salt Lake City International Airport)
+San Antonio, Texas (San Antonio International Airport)
+San Diego, California (San Diego International Airport)
+San Francisco, California (San Francisco International Airport)
+San Jose, California (San Jose International Airport)
+San Juan, Puerto Rico (Luis Munoz Marin International Airport)
+Sandusky, Ohio (Griffing Sandusky Airport)
+Sarasota/Bradenton, Florida (Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport)
+Seattle, Washington (Seattle/Tacoma International Airport)
+Shannon, Ireland (Pre-Flight Inspection)
+Spokane, Washington (Spokane International Airport)
+St. Croix, Virgin Island (Alexander Hamilton International Airport)
+St. Louis, Missouri (St. Louis International Airport)
+St. Lucie, Florida (St. Lucie County International Airport)
+St. Petersburg, Florida (St. Petersburg-Clearwater International
+Airport)
+St. Thomas, Virgin Island (Cyril E. King International Airport)
+Tampa, Florida (Tampa International Airport)
+Teterboro, New Jersey (Teterboro Airport)
+Toronto, Canada (Pre-Flight Inspection)
+Tucson, Arizona (Tucson International Airport)
+Vancouver, Canada (Pre-Flight Inspection)
+Victoria, Canada (Pre-Flight Inspection)
+West Palm Beach, Florida (Palm Beach International Airport)
+Wilmington, North Carolina (Wilmington International Airport)
+Winnipeg, Canada (Pre-Flight Inspection)
+Yuma, Arizona (Yuma International Airport)
+Seaports
+Long Beach, California
+Miami, Florida
+New York City
+Port Everglades, Florida
+Port Canaveral, Florida
+Port Canaveral, Florida (Terminal 10)
+San Juan, Puerto Rico
+San Pedro, California
+Seattle, Washington (Cruise Terminal)
+Seattle, Washington
+Tampa, Florida (Terminal 3)
+Tampa, Florida (Terminal 7)
+Vancouver, Canada (Ballantyne Pier)
+Vancouver, Canada (Canada Place)
+Victoria, Canada (Pre Inspection)
+West Palm Beach, Florida
+
+3. We understand that entry and exit enhancements at land borders will
+be phased in throughout 2005 and 2006. Provide a description of what
+enhancements are planned at land borders, including whether
+enhancements are new construction or renovation of existing land border
+facilities.
+Answer: By 31 December 2004, US-VISIT entry processing will be
+implemented at the 50 busiest land ports of entry and to all 165 land
+ports of entry (POEs) by 31 December 2005 in secondary inspection.
+ Modification to entry and exit facilities is needed to accommodate
+the technology required to implement the US-VISIT process. These
+modifications may best be described as upgrades where new equipment,
+power, conduit, and data connectivity are required to support the
+mission. These upgrades will include facility renovations and
+alterations to support the technology integration that will occur as
+the processes and technologies mature. These enhancements are focused
+on providing functionality to interior locations (typically secondary,
+or passport control, areas). Following this initial operating
+capability, modification to vehicle entry and exit lanes will be needed
+to expedite legitimate travel and trade. In addition, US-VISIT will
+begin pilot programs at 5 ports of entry by July 31, 2005, utilizing
+radio frequency identification technology in order to document the
+exits and any subsequent re-entries of persons both on foot and in
+vehicles.
+ The US-VISIT program does not anticipate that the implementation of
+the new process will result in additional delays at land borders, but
+is mindful of the concerns expressed by various individuals and
+organizations. The US-VISIT program has been meeting with various
+community groups along the border to discuss their concerns. The US-
+VISIT program anticipates utilizing advanced technology to meet
+statutory requirements as we move into the future in order to
+facilitate travel.
+
+Question: 4. In your testimony you stated that US-VISIT was ``linked''
+to the Terrorist Screening Center. Please provide a detailed
+description of this ``link''. It is our understanding that while US-
+VISIT uses data from the TSC which is resident in the NCIC, there is no
+actual real time link to the TSC as the TSC has not yet set up its own
+database. What is the eventual operational relationship you envision
+between US-VISIT and the TSC?
+Answer: It is correct that any TSC biographic record in NCIC queries
+TECS for every traveler coming into country. TSC terrorist prints from
+FBI IAFIS are also available if the FBI has provided said prints via
+the link to IDENT. We note, however, that currently there does not
+exist a real time link to the TSC. Our technical team is currently
+working with the TSC in order to further refine our mutual data
+sharing.
+
+ Question: 5. What checks are being conducted against passenger
+manifests for arriving passengers at air and seaports?
+Answer: Prior to arrival, information on passengers (including name,
+date of birth, and document (passport/visa type and number) is checked
+using the TECS/IBIS system
+
+Question: 5.1. Who conducts these checks and how long do they take?
+Answer: The TECS/IBIS checks are performed after departure from the
+foreign port and prior to arrival at the U.S. port of entry by the
+Customs and Border Protection (CBP) passenger analysis units located at
+each port of entry. The exact time needed to conduct these checks will
+depend upon the number of passengers, the number of officers to perform
+the checks, and the results of each check. However, since they are
+performed after departure and prior to arrival, they have no effect on
+passenger wait times. If a potential hit is made, the traveler will be
+flagged for further review. This same protocol is followed for
+passengers arriving on cruise ships.
+
+Question: 5.2. What specific checks do these include?
+Answer: TECS/IBIS contains data derived from a variety of sources.
+These include, but are not limited to, the following:
+ -- DHS immigration lookout data--NAILS;
+ -- Department of State terrorist and visa refusal data (CLASS
+ and TIPOFF);
+ -- DHS alien detention and removal information (DACS);
+ -- Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) data; and
+ -- Provides a conduit to the FBI's wants and warrants and
+ criminal information database (NCIC).
+
+Question: 5.3. What specific databases, systems and watch lists does
+IBIS interface or integrate?
+Answer: See the answer for Q01537(2) above.
+
+Question: 6. What checks are being conducted against passenger
+manifests for arriving passengers at air and seaports?
+Answer: See answer to Q01537.
+
+7. We understand that the self-service, automatic kiosks allowing a
+departing foreign visitor to automatically register their departure by
+scanning their visa and capturing a fingerprint. In scanning the visa,
+we understand that the proposed system will only read the information
+on the visa that is within the machine-readable zone. This is despite
+the fact that Congress has appropriated funds to increase the security
+of the U.S. visa by impeding security features (ink, laminate. etc.) so
+as to make the visa more tamper resistant.
+
+Question: 7.1. Is it indeed the case that the kiosks are not yet
+scanning and authenticating the special security features that are
+imbedded in the U.S. visa?
+Answer: At this time, yes. However, the scan of a U.S. nonimmigrant
+visa is for the collection of biographic information in order to
+provide a specific identifier to the biometric also collected at the
+kiosk. The machine-readable zone of a visa or a passport can be used.
+The biometric and biographic information from exit are then matched to
+the information collected at entry, confirming the identity of the
+individual.
+
+Question: 7.2. If the kiosks are not scanning and authenticating the
+special security features, does the Department plan to eventually do
+so? If so, when?
+Answer: There are no specific plans to incorporate authentication of
+the U.S. nonimmigrant visa into the exit process, as the use of the
+visa for departure is only needed to speed up the biometric matching of
+a person's identity to the biographic and biometric information
+collected during entry. DHS confirms the identity of the visa holder
+against government held records, through the biometric match of the
+individual.
+
+Question: 8. What are the current alternatives for exit control being
+considered at air and seaports?
+Question 8.1. What is the schedule for such exit controls being put in
+place at our air and seaports beyond the current one air and one sea
+port?
+Answer: A pilot test of alternative exit biometric collection devices
+began in the summer of 2004 at 15 locations (13 air and 2 seaports) and
+will continue until the end of March 2005. Once the device(s) is
+selected, deployment to the remaining departure locations will be
+completed. DHS anticipates that, depending on the receipt of funding
+and necessary approvals, this deployment will be completed in 2005.
+
+Question: 8.2. What are the staffing and infrastructure needs for such
+implementation?
+Answer: The staffing and infrastructure needs will be assessed as part
+of the pilot evaluation. Depending on the device or devices chosen, the
+needs may vary.
+
+Question: 8.3. What database checks will occur upon exit in this
+system?
+Answer: As with the entry process, checks will be made against systems
+in the US-VISIT environment. These include the Automated Biometric
+Identification System (IDENT), a fingerprint biometric database and
+against extracts provided through the FBI's Integrated Automated
+Fingerprint Identification System (IF AIS). (Note however that the
+IFAIS checks are currently not run in real time.) Additionally, the
+information will be transmitted to the Arrival Departure Information
+System (AD IS) to confirm the exit of an individual.
+
+Question: 8.4. How will the public be educated on the measures to take
+to comply with this system?
+Answer: The US-VISIT program has a robust outreach effort in place to
+educate visitors and explain US-VISIT procedures for both entry and
+exit. In addition to providing information to our international
+stakeholders in the travel and tourism industry and the business
+community, we are working with the media in the visa waiver countries
+to have them help us educate foreign visitors. We have provided
+information to our colleagues in the Department of State Consular
+Affairs Offices overseas so that they, too, can explain the required
+exit process.
+ We have also produced print materials. When foreign visitors arrive
+in the United States, they receive a card (exit card) that explains the
+requirement to check out upon departing the country. When the visitor
+leaves the country, he or she goes to the airline ticket counter to
+check in for the flight and the ticket agent hands him or her an exit
+card that explains the process and directs the traveler to an exit
+station to check out. There will be directional signs visible to lead
+the way once a visitor is through the Transportation Security
+Administration (TSA) security check point, and educational signs will
+be located near the exit stations to explain what to do to check out.
+And finally, an announcement will be made at the departure gates to
+remind visitors to check out before boarding the plane.
+
+Question: 8.5. What efforts have you made so far for this public
+information campaign?
+Answer: The public education campaign for exit has been coordinated
+with stakeholders through speaking events, e-mails, trade shows, and
+meetings. We have provided these valuable stakeholders with the
+information they need to tell their customers what to expect when they
+arrive in and depart from the United States. We have produced exit
+cards, educational signs, and directional signs.
+ Additionally, the entry and exit requirements are incorporated into
+the general US-VISIT materials, which include brochures, airport
+signage, and on-board handouts in multiple languages; in-flight videos
+in 15 languages; and public service announcements (PSA) being aired in
+airport lounges.
+ Finally, a growing group of more than 500 stakeholders receive US-
+VISIT information on a regular basis through our e-newsletter.
+
+Question: 8.6. Has a policy been established to determine penalties for
+those who are determined to have violated the terms of their visa
+through US-VISIT?
+Answer: An alien who fails to comply with the departure requirements
+may be found in violation of the terms of his or her admission, parole,
+or other immigration status. This rule states that an alien who is
+covered by the requirements to provide biometrics on departure at new 8
+CFR 215.8 may be found to have overstayed the period of his or her last
+admission if the available evidence indicates that he or she did not
+leave the United States when required to do so. A determination that
+the alien previously overstayed may result in a finding of
+inadmissibility for accruing prior unlawful presence in the United
+States under section 212(a)(9) of the INA, provided that the accrued
+unlawful time and other prerequisites of that statute are met, or that
+the alien is otherwise ineligible for a visa or other authorization to
+reenter the United States. An overstay finding could also trigger
+consequences for a nonimmigrant visa holder under section 222(g) of the
+INA. If the person is deemed to have overstayed his authorized period
+of admission, his visa (including a multiple entry visa) would be
+deemed void under section 222(g). Section 222(g) further states that
+where a visa is void because the alien overstayed, he or she is
+ineligible to be readmitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant
+except on another visa issued in the consular office located in the
+country of the alien's nationality, or where there is no DOS office in
+the country, in such other consular office as the Secretary of State
+shall specify. The requirement of obtaining a new visa from the
+consular office in the country of the alien's nationality may be waived
+where extraordinary circumstances are found. 8 U.S.C. 1202(g). The
+Department intends to focus its enforcement of departure requirements
+in this rule on cases where the alien willfully and unreasonably fails
+to comply with this regulation. The rule provides that an alien's
+failure to follow the departure procedures may be considered by an
+immigration or consular officer in making a discretionary decision on
+whether to approve or deny the alien's application for a future
+immigration benefit. The rule does not, however, state that an alien's
+failure to comply with departure procedures in every instance will
+necessarily result in a denial of a future visa, admission or other
+immigration benefit. For example, no alien will be penalized for
+failing to provide biometrics on departure where the Department has not
+yet implemented the departure facilities or procedures at the specific
+port where the person chooses to depart. There may well be instances
+where a consular officer or inspector, in his or her discretion and
+after reviewing the totality of the circumstances, determines that an
+alien's previous failure to comply with the departure procedures does
+not result in a finding of inadmissibility or the denial of an
+immigration benefit.
+
+Question: 9. Is any integration or discussion going on with TSA to
+possibly coordinate the Exit component with their plans to use
+electronic boarding passes during security checks? Is it possible to
+unite this process with the US-VISIT Exit to ensure that visa holders
+are ``checked-out?''
+Answer: US-VISIT is collaborating among multiple government agencies,
+notably among the components of the Department of Homeland Security
+(DHS) and the Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, and
+Transportation to take positive steps toward greater information
+sharing. These partnerships are leveraging resources to improve data
+availability to all agencies. Specifically, DHS is looking for ways to
+partner with TSA to meet joint objectives and analyze current business
+processes.
+ The award of the prime integration contract to the Smart Border
+Alliance will allow the US-VISIT program to look at all aspects of a
+traveler's entry and exit process and determine integration points from
+operational and technical positions, which could include TSA's
+processes. TSA is an integral partner in the ongoing exit evaluations.
+
+10. Ms. Harty testified that IDENT checks at the consulate were taking
+seven to eight minutes. A 001 Department of Justice Office of the
+Inspector General IG report indicates that an IDENT check takes an
+average of two minutes. US-VISIT enrollment takes ten to fifteen
+seconds. The US-VISIT office has indicated that certain biometric
+checks are conducted of US-VISIT enrollees after admission.
+
+ 10.1. Please advise what improvement has been made on the IDENT
+checks at ports of entry to allow a full IDENT check to occur in ten to
+fifteen seconds.
+Answer: The IDENT system is designed to be flexible and scalable. It is
+tuned to provide different response times for different operational
+requirements. For example, the system is sized to provide full lookout
+checks against a fingerprint database for every traveler entering an
+air and sea port of entry within 10 seconds. (In fact, the actual
+response time is nearer 5 seconds). Because the time constraints at the
+consular posts are different, IDENT is tuned to provide a response
+against the lookout database and the US-VISIT (all individuals
+enrolled) database in less than 15 minutes. Finally, IDENT is tuned to
+check newly enrolled individuals within a set period of time after
+admission. For future admissions, the individual is checked ``one to
+one'' against a previously established unique record. At this time, we
+do not believe it is necessary or feasible to run new enrollments
+against all IDENT records, including those previously enrolled, within
+the primary inspection process.
+
+ 10.2. Please clarify the nature of the actual check if a less than
+full IDENT biometric check is conducted at enrollment.
+Answer: Upon enrollment into US-VISIT, resulting either from a
+Department of State visa application or at a port of entry, a full
+check is performed against the lookout database and the US-VISIT
+database of enrolled travelers. When the individual arrives at the port
+of entry, her/his identity is confirmed against a previously enrolled
+identity, and a full lookout check is performed.
+
+10.3. What actual portion of the IDENT database is checked within this
+ten to fifteen second period?
+Answer: Please note that it is the time it takes to collect the two
+index prints from a traveler that is 10 to 15 seconds. This action is
+performed anytime IDENT is queried, regardless of which business
+process is being performed. Once the fingers are scanned, the IDENT
+system will return a one-to-one match instantaneously, and a lookout
+check in less than 10 seconds at primary.
+
+Question: 11. A May 2003 report the Department of Justice Office of the
+Inspector general indicated that the IDENT and IAFIS integration was
+``at least two years behind schedule'' and that staff focused on the
+integration were redirected to the NSEERS project. What is the current
+status of IDENT and IAFIS integration? What is needed to expedite the
+integration?
+Answer: DHS has begun the deployment of the integrated IDENT/IAFIS
+workstations. This provides for rapid identification of individuals
+with outstanding criminal warrants through electronic comparison of
+ten-print digital finger scans against a vast nationwide database of
+previously captured fingerprints. The newly advanced capability allows
+simultaneously search the FBI's fingerprint database--the Integrated
+Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS)--and DHS's
+Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT). As of September
+2004, integrated IDENT/IAFIS terminals with ten-print biometric
+identification technology was operational in every U.S. Customs and
+Border Protection (CBP) Border Patrol station throughout the country.
+This deployment was completed months ahead of schedule, and was
+expanded to include secondary inspection locations at all 115 air and
+sea ports of entry and the 50 busiest land ports of entry. The
+secondary inspection air, sea, and land port deployment was completed
+in November 2004.
+ In addition, in FY 2005 appropriations language, Congress directed
+the US-VISIT Program Office to report on the status of achieving real
+time interoperability between IDENT and IAFIS, including steps DHS will
+take to integrate IAFIS into IDENT, funds needed, and a time table for
+full integration. While the integrated workstations will permit a
+simultaneous search of IAFIS and IDENT, they will not allow local,
+state and other IAFIS users to access DHS repositories. The language
+also directs DHS to address recommendations in the Department of
+Justice Inspector General report. US-VISIT expects to submit this
+report in spring 2005.
+
+ The current biometrics being used at selected air and sea ports of
+entry call for two fingerprints and a photograph of the foreign
+national. While the Administration has maintained that it is currently
+in ``increment one'' in a four stage process and it may likely move
+towards using a ten-print system, will using two-prints impact the
+agency's ability to capture individuals who are listed in the Federal
+Bureau of Investigation's database, which uses ten-prints?
+Answer: US-VISIT is currently able to perform checks against FBI
+provided data utilizing the two fingerscan system. This ability has
+already resulted in the identification of individuals, who were wanted
+or had past criminal violations. As of 1/26/2005, approximately 2,300
+persons have been flagged at ports of entry as having a hit against a
+lookout system. Note however that the presence of a hit does not
+automatically render the person ineligible for admission. The
+Department of State has also flagged over 5,000 persons as hits when
+the individuals were applying for a nonimmigrant visa oversea.
+ Although there was some early concern about false positives in a
+two-print scenario, a recent National Institute of Standards and
+Technology (NIST) study of the US-VISIT IDENT system showed that the
+false positive or False Acceptance Rate (FAR) appears to rise in a
+consistent manner with the rise in the size of the fingerprint
+database. This has been born out empirically. The FAR has proved to be
+measurable and consistent. To deal with this, US-VISIT has developed
+processes to efficiently manage the false positives as they occur. For
+example, of the roughly 35,000 travelers who are processed through the
+US-VISIT IDENT system every day, about 30 of travelers are identified
+with a false positive against the lookout list and are sent to
+secondary. The average time for a fingerprint examiner to clear a
+lookout false positive is about three and a half minutes.
+ The NIST report cited here (C. L. Wilson, M.D. Garris, C.I. Watson.
+Matching performance for the US-VISIT IDENT system using flat
+fingerprints. NISTIR 7110) provides the justification for the
+statements give about FAR. The answer neglects to cite the results from
+another NIST report (R.A. Hicklin, H. Korves, B. Ulery, M. Zoepfl, M.
+Bone, P. Grother, R. Micheals, S. Otto, C. Watson. Fingerprint Vendor
+Technology Evaluation (FpVTE) 2003. NISTIR 7123) which clearly found
+that increasing the number of fingerprints used in matching from two to
+eight would substantially improve TAR (True Accept Rate) and
+substantially reduce FRR (False Reject Rate).
+ The performance of the US-VISIT IDENT system is monitored very
+closely. As the FAR rises with the size of the database, the US-VISIT
+program office will make the necessary adjustments in the numbers of
+fingerprint examiners and in the technology (which mayor may not
+include adding additional fingers) to manage this.
+ The current two-print capture provides the ability to match against
+appropriate records that are maintained by the FBI and provided daily
+to US-VISIT. This is done on a routine basis. There is no difficulty
+matching the two prints collected by US-VISIT against the 10 prints
+provided by the FBI.
+
+12. Please advise us of when and if you anticipate that an accurate
+Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) check
+could be conducted at time of US-VISIT enrollment.
+Answer: 12. At this time there are no plans to conduct such a check.
+Checking every traveler against all the fingerprints available is not
+operationally feasible, both because of the time it takes to capture 10
+prints and the time it takes for the FBI to respond to the queries. The
+capture of two prints takes between 10 to 15 seconds. Results are
+returned to an inspector within two to 10 seconds - well within the
+current time it takes to do an inspection. Even in a controlled
+environment with a willing subject, experience has shown that the
+capture time for taking 10 prints is anywhere from six to 10 minutes.
+Currently, the results take two to 10 minutes. DHS modeling has shown
+that even a few seconds can have a catastrophic effect upon wait times.
+ The answer that ``capture time for taking 10 prints is anywhere
+from six to 10 minutes'' would be correct for ten rolled fingerprints.
+NIST has never recommended the capture of rolled fingerprint as part of
+the US-VISIT system. The NIST recommendation is ``To perform background
+identifications, ten plain image impressions should be used for
+enrollment and retention.'' The collection often plain impressions has
+been demonstrated at NIST in approximately 20 seconds. Pilot tests by
+the Department of State in Mexico have collected ten plain impressions
+in one minute or less. Collection of ten plain prints does not require
+physical contact with the operator of the collection system.
+
+ Question: 12.1. What are the current rates of false positives in
+this scenario?
+Answer: According to the National Institutes of Standards and
+Technology (NIST) both two prints and 10 prints have a very high degree
+of accuracy. Both have a True Acceptance Rate (TAR) of over 95 percent
+(a measure of false negative). The US-VISIT IDENT system has TAR of 96
+percent. What this means in practical terms is that if an individual
+wishes to enter the country under a new name using a fraudulent
+document, she/he would have to pass the Department of State visa
+issuance and pre-entry processes, including checks against lookout
+databases, the normal inspections process, and then that person would
+only have a 3.5 percent chance of avoiding identification through
+biometric means. (Overseas, a person would first be measured against
+TAR as part of the DOS nonimmigrant visa issuance process, then again
+when applying for admission to the United States.)
+ The NIST report cited here (C.L. Wilson, M.D. Garris, C.I. Watson.
+Matching performance for the US-VISIT IDENT system using flat
+fingerprints. NISTIR 7110) provides the justification for the
+statements give about TAR of 96 percent. As with question 11, the
+answer neglects to cite the results from another NIST report (R.A.
+Hicklin, H. Korves, B. Ulery, M. Zoepfl, M. Bone, P. Grother, R.
+Micheals, S. Otto, C. Watson. Fingerprint Vendor Technology Evaluation
+(FpVTE) 2003. NISTIR 7123) which clearly found that increasing the
+number of fingerprints used in matching from two to eight would
+substantially improve TAR and reduce the chance of avoiding
+identification through biometric means.
+ False positives or the False Acceptance Rates (FAR) for the US-
+VISIT IDENT system have proved to be measurable and consistent. To deal
+with this issue, US-VISIT has developed processes to efficiently manage
+the false positives as they occur. For example, of the roughly 35,000
+travelers who are processed through the US-VISIT IDENT system every
+day, about 30 of them are false positives against the lookout list and
+are sent to secondary. On the rare occasion that there is a false
+positive, the average time for a fingerprint examiner to clear a
+lookout false positive is only 3 minutes and 40 seconds. And as already
+noted in answer to question 1548, the expanded deployment of the IDENT/
+IAFIS program to all secondary inspection and Border Parole stations
+allows our agents to simultaneously search both these data bases in
+instances where we suspect that people are attempting to enter the
+United States illegally.
+
+Question: 12.2. What is the current timeline and cost for such
+integration?
+Answer: As there is no operational need, and because the cost would
+prove prohibitive (in systems, facilities, and personnel), there is no
+plan to perform 10-print IAFIS checks for US-VISIT. However, NIST
+cannot comment on the projected cost of this integration but NIST
+studies of both the IDENT and IAFIS systems show that this integration
+would reduce the chance of avoiding identification through biometric
+means.
+Question: 14. How can inaccurate data in databases which US-VISIT is
+interfacing and integrating be collected by a member of the public
+subject to such errors?
+
+Question: 14.1. Will you consider a contact through which such
+corrections could be made?
+Question: 14.2. Has there been any thought to establishing a contact
+point at all field operation offices to correct erroneous admission
+documents issued at ports of entry?
+Answer: US-VISIT has established a redress process, giving travelers
+processed through US-VISIT a fast and easy way to have their US-VISIT
+records accessed and checked for accuracy, relevancy, timeliness, or
+completeness. The first stage in the process occurs at the primary
+inspection lane at the port of entry and provides immediate data
+correction by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer. The
+CBP officer can correct the traveler's name, date of birth, flight
+information, and country-specific document number and document type
+errors. Biometric errors are sent to US-VISIT for correction.Travelers
+no longer at the POE can contact the US-VISIT privacy officer, who has
+set a goal of processing redress requests within 20 business days. With
+almost six million travelers processed through US-VISIT, only 33
+individuals have contacted the Privacy Officer about their records. The
+US-VISIT redress process is available at www.dhs/us-visit.gov and the
+US-VISIT privacy officer can be contacted by telephone, fax or a new
+email address at [email protected].
+
+Question: 15. How is CLAIMS III being accessed during US-VISIT?
+Answer: DHS has created an interface between CLAIMS 3 and a component
+of the US-VISIT environment. This ensures that information about
+pending immigration benefit applications, approved or denied, is
+available to make determinations about whether someone is lawfully in
+the country or has overstayed her/his admission.
+
+Question: 16. Will Mexican biometric border crossing card holders be
+subject to enrollment in US-VISIT?
+Answer: Mexican nationals who present a Form DSP-150, B-1/B-2 visa and
+border crossing card (BCC) upon arrival in, or departure from, the
+United States, and who are not required to be issued a Form 1-94
+Arrival Departure Record at the time of admission, are exempt from the
+US-VISIT biometric data collection requirements. This means that
+Mexican nationals who will travel beyond 25 miles of the border (75
+miles if admitted in Arizona) or who will remain longer than 30 days
+are subject to the US-VISIT biometric data requirements. This exemption
+may change when the Department explores a longterm solution to record
+the entry and exit of visitors crossing our land ports of entry.
+
+Question: 17. Is it possible to integrate data that the State
+Department has on biometric border crossing card users into the US-
+VISIT database?
+Answer: Yes. We have included this task in the FY 2005 US-VISIT
+Expenditure Plan.
+
+Question: 18. How many land ports of entry have scanners to read
+biometric passports and visas?
+Answer: All ports of entry have optical character recognition (OCR)
+scanners to read machine-readable passports, visas, and other travel
+documents. In addition, 51 land border ports of entry have scanners to
+read the optical memory stripe of border crossing cards and alien
+registration cards. While the standards governing biometric passports
+have been developed, issues surrounding global interoperability,
+durability, skimming, and eavesdropping on personal data are in the
+process of being resolved. The Department of Homeland Security in
+conjunction with US-VISIT, ICAO, NIST, ISO, and others, tested chips
+and readers for e-passports/visas in July 2004 at the National
+Biometrics Security Project Laboratory in Morgantown, West Virginia.
+This was followed by a mock test at BWI airport in November 2004. Based
+on the findings of these tests, plans are now being developed for a
+live test, most likely at Los Angeles International Airport in June
+2005.
+
+Question: 19. How many inspection lanes (passenger, mass transit,
+commercial, pedestrian) currently exist at our land ports at each
+crossing? Please provide a list of this data?
+Answer: There are 165 land ports of entry, of which there are 490
+inbound primary noncommercial lanes, 176 primary commercial lanes, and
+118 primary pedestrian lanes. Attached is a spreadsheet with a
+breakdown by port of entry.
+
+20. How many of the above inspection lanes have the capacity to take
+fingerprints, which will be read against any portion of IDENT or any
+other biometric database? Please advise of which ones have this
+capacity.
+Answer: This function is not performed at primary lanes, but at all 165
+land ports, this function can be performed in secondary inspection in
+support of primary/enforcement activities.
+
+21. We understand that the State Department has refused to collect the
+Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) fee on behalf
+of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
+
+Question: 21.1. Have negotiations continued with the State Department
+on fee collection?
+Answer: The Department of State (DoS) and DHS have been working on fee
+collection methods. Specifically, DHS proposed a pilot project to have
+DoS collect the fee for DHS in China and India, where access to credit
+cards and local postal services may be limited. Both the Under
+Secretary for Border and Transportation Security, Asa Hutchinson and
+Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs, Maura Harty agreed to
+investigate the viability of the proposal. The proposal suggested
+leveraging the DoS relationship with local financial institutions to
+establish a collection process in China and to use the same collection
+process as the visa fee for the SEVIS fee at the embassies and
+consulates in India. This collection process would include allowing the
+student or exchange visitor to pay in local currency. DHS and DoS have
+formed a working group to evaluate this option and identify points of
+concern for further consideration. Discussions are ongoing on this
+issue.
+
+Question: 21.2. Because the proposed rule has no convenient way in
+which to pay the SEVIS fee, what has DHS done in order to make this
+easier for the student?
+Answer: There is, in fact, a convenient way to pay the SEVIS fee. SEVIS
+fee payment statistics illustrate that the students and exchange
+visitors are not having problems paying the fee. Of the SEVIS fees
+collected to date, 96 percent have been made via credit card. The
+Student Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) established several fee payment
+options that were available beginning on September 1 for fee
+collection. Students and exchange visitors have the option to pay with
+a check by mail, with a credit card or debit card via the Internet, or
+by third-party payment, such as through batch payment whereby sponsors
+pay for an entire group of individuals, or where the student selects a
+friend or relative to pay the fee on his or her behalf. SEVP continued
+to review alternate payment methods that would allow the student or
+exchange visitor to pay in local currency. Through no additional cost
+to the program, on November 1 SEVP instituted a new fee payment option
+with Western Union. This payment method allows applicants to pay the
+fee in local currency in over 130 countries where Western Union offers
+their QuickPayTM option. SEVP's relationship with the DoS
+Office of Consular Affairs--who quickly alerted overseas Posts to
+accept Western Union receipts as proof of payment--made this option
+possible. These payment methods are working well. However, when
+problems with fee payment do arise, SEVP has established the SEVIS fee
+Case Resolution Unit (CRU) to provide individual assistance. SEVP is
+aware of fee payment problems in Nigeria and Ghana, but those cases
+only represent approximately 1 percent of the total student/exchange
+visitor population. Western Union is expected to expand to Nigeria,
+resolving fee payment problems there by the end of 2005. SEVP is
+committed to ensuring that all students and exchange visitors are able
+to pay the fee, and will resolve these cases individually.
+
+Question: 21.3. Why isn't DHS collecting this fee once a foreign
+student enters into the United States and has access to a United States
+bank? Would this be a viable option for DHS?
+Answer: Congress mandated that the SEVIS fee be paid prior to visa
+issuance. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
+Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) requires the collection of information relating to
+nonimmigrant foreign students and exchange visitors and provides for
+the collection of the required fee to defray the costs. The initial
+1999 proposed fee rule required that educational institutions and
+exchange visitor program sponsors collect the fee, based upon then-
+existing law, and mandated that the fee be collected prior to visa
+issuance. Congress subsequently amended the law to permit DHS to
+collect the fee directly from the F-l, F-3, J-l, M-l, or M-3
+nonimmigrants, but did not change the requirement that the fee be
+collected prior to visa issuance. Based upon these amendments to the
+law, the Final Rule provided for fee collection by DHS and required
+that proof of payment be presented during the visa application process,
+as was intended by Congress. SEVP recognizes that fee payment prior to
+visa issuance can be a hardship for those students and exchange
+visitors who are denied a visa; therefore, SEVP established a policy to
+honor the initial fee payment for those students and exchange visitors
+who re-apply for a visa within a period of 12 months.
+
+Question: 21.4. If this requires a change in the law would DHS be
+receptive to a legislative fix?
+Answer: In principle, DHS does not object to exploring the possibility
+of changing the law to allow for fee payment after the nonimmigrant
+enters the United States. However such change may generate unique and
+unforeseen problems for fee collection and processing, such as how to
+guarantee fee payment. This issue would need to be fully analyzed to
+determine the impacts on the program. If the student or exchange
+visitor is given the option to pay the fee upon entry to the United
+States, currently there is no mechanism that would enforce the payment
+requirement.
+
+Question: 21.5. Is it true that the SEVIS fee has been lowered for a
+group of students (summer work travel/au pairs) to $35.00, and not any
+other group that may spend a limited amount of time in the United
+States such as a student participating in a six week Intensive English
+Program?
+Answer: Yes. Congress specified that the fee be reduced for only three
+categories of exchange visitors (Camp Counselors, Summer-work/Travel,
+and Au Pairs). Further, IIRIRA section 641 provides that an alien
+seeking J-l status to participate in an exchange visitor program that
+is sponsored by the Federal government is exempt from paying a fee. DHS
+has clarified that those potential J-1 exchange visitors exempt from
+the fee as participants in a Federal government sponsored exchange
+visitor program are those participating in an exchange visitor program
+with a program identification designator prefix of G-l, G-2, or G-3.
+Some comments received on the proposed fee rule suggested that other
+students and exchange visitors should be exempt from the fee.
+Similarly, a number of comments suggested that the fee for other
+programs be reduced below $100 to mirror the reduction that Congress
+expressly provided to certain J-l participants, including lower fees
+for short-term English language programs, for all English language
+programs, for some or all short-term programs, for commuter students,
+and for secondary school students. As noted in the Final Rule, Congress
+specifically exempted from the SEVIS fee only J-l nonimmigrants who are
+participating in an exchange visitor program sponsored by the Federal
+government, and explicitly reduced it only for certain other J-l
+nonimmigrants. DHS interpreted the Congressional mandate such that no
+other groups of nonimmigrants should be exempt from the SEVIS fee or
+have a reduced SEVIS fee based upon the principle of expressio unius
+est exclusion alterius: when one or more things of a class are
+expressly mentioned, others of the same class are necessarily excluded.
+
+Question: 21.6. Is this $100 fee not a disincentive for short-term
+study abroad in the United States when other countries not only have
+much less stringent visa requirements, less denial rates but also much
+lower fees?
+Answer: A number of comments received on the proposed rule suggested
+that the fee would deter participation of foreign students and exchange
+visitors in United States programs. However, the statistical evidence
+on the number of foreign students and exchange visitors recorded in
+SEVIS does not support the argument that the $100 fee is a disincentive
+to study in the United States. Between 2003 and 2004, SEVIS has seen a
+slight increase in the number of students and exchange visitors in the
+United States. The SEVIS fee was implemented on September 1, 2004. If
+it were a disincentive to students and exchange visitors we would
+potentially see a decline in the number of students and exchange
+visitors coming to the United States. Additionally, compared with the
+overall cost of a U.S. education or participation in an exchange
+visitor program, the SEVIS fee does not significantly increase the
+financial burden on foreign students and exchange visitor program
+participants. It is possible, however, that the fee might deter the
+participation of students and exchange visitors with the most limited
+resources, particularly those from the least developed countries. While
+DHS acknowledges this reality, the statute mandating the implementation
+of the fee allows for no specific fee reductions, exemptions, or
+delayed payments based upon a nonimmigrant's available resources or the
+infrastructure limitations of his or her country. Further, intending F,
+M, and J nonimmigrants are required by DHS and DoS regulations to
+provide evidence of sufficient financial resources to support
+themselves throughout their program. When considering the average cost
+of a temporary stay in the United States, including all related program
+costs, DHS does not believe that the SEVIS fee presents a burden
+sufficient to act as a deterrent to F, M, or J program participation.
+DHS notes that many schools and exchange visitor program sponsors, as
+well as other interested third party organizations (such as advocacy
+groups), already make special efforts to assist these nonimmigrants.
+DHS commends and encourages this assistance and, to facilitate such
+assistance, DHS will accept fee payments from third parties.
+
+Question: 21.7. Why has this not been implemented for all short term
+study groups, and not just the summer work-study group?
+Answer: Same answer as in Question 5 (QO1562).
+
+Question: 21.8. Could a blanket rule of three months study or less be
+implemented for reducing the fee to $35?
+Answer: DHS does not believe that this is a viable option, for two
+reasons. First, Congress mandated that SEVP be a fully fee-funded
+program and that the SEVIS fee be collected specifically to defray the
+costs associated with the program. Reducing the fee for a significant
+number of nonimmigrants would force DHS to increase the fee amount for
+other nonimmigrants in order to offset the reduction. Second, costs for
+administration of the program and the processing of non immigrants
+occur mostly up-front in the process and do not vary based on the
+length of time that the nonimmigrant is in the United States.
+Consequently, it is appropriate to spread the cost of the program as
+equally as possible among all of the participants.
+
+Question: 22. What is the current make up of the US-VISIT staff? Is
+current staffing sufficient to manage, implement and oversee the US-
+VISIT program?
+Answer: The current staffing level for US-VISIT is 115 federal
+positions. Weare currently in process of hiring up to the 115
+positions.
+
+Question: 23. We understand that US-VISIT may collect a different
+biometric for future use. Is this correct and which type ofbiometric
+does DHS expects to use in the long term.
+Answer: Currently, US-VISIT uses fingerscans and digital photographs.
+Other biometrics are being assessed, not only by US-VISIT but also by
+other DHS components, for potential use.
+
+Question: 24. Who will have access to US-VISIT biometric information?
+Answer: By collecting the appropriate biographic, biometric, and other
+immigration related information at the first contact with an
+individual, and sharing the information in a timely manner with
+appropriate decision makers, those charged with ensuring the integrity
+of our immigration system can make better decisions. These decision
+makers include consular officials from the Department of State, Customs
+and Border Protection officers, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
+agents, and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services officers from the
+Department of Homeland Security.
+ This critical information on foreign nationals must be shared, ,
+with other law enforcement and intelligence agencies as they, too, bear
+responsibility for protecting our country. This information is shared
+appropriately with law enforcement and intelligence agencIes.
+
+Question: 25. Will information be removed from US-VISIT when an
+individual becomes a US-citizen? How will removal of that information
+be accomplished?
+Answer: US-VISIT currently retains the information collected for a
+defined duration (100 years for ADIS and 75 years for IDENT), even if
+the individual later becomes a United States citizen. However, as US-
+VISIT matures and decisions are made regarding whether the existing
+systems will be integrated, modernized, and/or retired, the data
+retention periods for US-VISIT data will be reviewed and adjusted to
+reflect the redefined needs of the Department. One of US-VISIT's
+primary goals is to safeguard the personal information that is being
+collected in a way that is responsible and respectful of privacy
+concerns. The Department is achieving this goal by implementing a
+comprehensive privacy program that ensures personal information is
+protected from misuse and improper disclosure, and is destroyed when no
+longer needed for its stated purpose. DHS is committed to updating the
+US-VISIT database when a person becomes a U.S. citizen. DHS is
+currently working with USCIS.''
+
+Question: 26. What has DHS done to promote information and educate
+travelers about US-VISIT? I agree that we need to keep track of who is
+coming into our country, but I am not sure that US-VISIT program will
+help us significantly in our effort to keep terrorists out of the
+country. When do you estimate that US-VISIT will be deemed ``in place
+and fully functional?'' Can you enlighten me on the benefits that we
+can expect in our war against terrorism when US-VISIT is ``in place and
+fully functional?'' (Jackson-Lee)
+Answer: US-VISIT has a robust outreach effort in place to educate
+visitors and to explain US-VISIT procedures for both entry and exit. In
+addition to providing information to international stakeholders in the
+travel and tourism industry and the business community, US-VISIT
+personnel are working with the media in visa waiver countries to
+educate foreign visitors. Information has been provided to the
+Department of State Consular Affairs offices overseas so that they can
+explain the required exit process as well. The campaign has identified
+the basic points of contact (touch points) to help ensure that foreign
+visitors are fully aware of US- VISIT's goals and procedures. The
+continuum begins overseas, with outreach to media and stakeholders, and
+collaboration with the State Department and visa-issuing posts. The
+outreach touch points continue through the journey to the U.S., arrival
+at the port of entry, and departure. Campaign materials are itemized
+and described below.
+ US-VISIT is enhancing the integrity of all aspects of immigration
+and border management processes while also providing a significant law
+enforcement benefit. The system has already begun to demonstrate its
+value as a law enforcement and national security tool. For example,
+through September 30, 2004:
+
+ The system validated the identity and the
+ authenticated documents of 1,931,550 aliens.
+ Matches against biometric watch list records at entry
+ resulted in 333 adverse actions, including matches for
+ individuals convicted of rape, drug trafficking, manslaughter,
+ federal prison escape, visa fraud and immigration violations.
+ Recurrent biometric checks after entry identified 104
+ individuals who committed crimes, most notably rape, or
+ otherwise violated their immigration status, generating leads
+ to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for possible
+ removal from the United States.
+
+Question: 27. It will be enormously expensive to establish and fully
+implement US-VISIT. What security measures would you recommend if
+Congress provided the Department of Homeland Security with a matching
+amount of money to use for other purposes?(Jackson-Lee)
+Answer: The Administration is convinced that the money spent on US-
+VISIT is an extremely important investment in our nation's security.
+Congress should continue its support of US-VISIT. US-VISIT remains a
+top priority for DHS because it enhances security for our citizens and
+visitors while facilitating legitimate travel and trade across the
+borders. DHS deployed the first increment on time and within budget.
+During FY 2003, US-VISIT continued to make progress in achieving its
+mission by maintaining an aggressive implementation schedule. As a
+result, the US-VISIT program is reaching out to stakeholders in an
+organized fashion, complying with capital investment planning
+guidelines, and managing day-to-day activities in a controlled and
+effective manner.
+
+Question: 28. If US-VISIT had been ``in place and fully functional''
+when the 9-11 terrorists entered the United States, would it have made
+any difference? Why or on what basis? (Jackson-Lee)
+Answer: It is always difficult to predict what might have happened.
+However, the USVISIT system, when fully implemented, will provide a
+comprehensive picture of most foreign nationals, and will be able to
+identify those who--like three of the September 11 th hijackers--have
+overstayed the terms of their visas. In addition, US-VISIT has already
+enhanced the integrity of the immigration system by identifying
+imposters. To the extent that this acts as a deterrent for others who
+may intend harm to our citizens and visitors, US-VISIT may have already
+dissuaded terrorists from exploiting our system.
+
+ Attachment for answer to Q01556:
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ ENTRY--
+ Count LOCY--NEW LPOE NAME Non-- Entry--Commercial Entry--
+ Commercial Pedestrian
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ 1 SLU San Luis....................................... 5 1 2
+ 2 AND Andrade........................................ 2 0 2
+ 3 DOU Douglas........................................ 7 0 2
+ 4 LUKLukeville...................................... 3 0 1
+ 5 MAP Marisposa--Nogales West........................ 4 2 1
+ 6 NAC Naco........................................... 2 1 1
+ 7 NOG Nogales East................................... 6 0 6
+ 8 SAS Sasabe......................................... 1 0 1
+ 9 PNH Pittsburg...................................... 2 0 0
+ 10 ABG Alburg......................................... 1 0 0
+ 11 ABS Alburg Springs................................. 1 0 0
+ 12 BEB Beebe Plain.................................... 1 0 0
+ 13 BEE Beecher Falls.................................. 2 1 0
+ 14 CNA Canaan......................................... 1 1 0
+ 15 DER Derby Line BS--1-91............................ 4 1 0
+ 16 DLV Derby Line BS--Rte. 5.......................... 2 0 0
+ 17 ERC East Richford--Richford Rte 105................ 2 0 0
+ 18 HIG Highgate Springs............................... 5 1 0
+ 19 MOR Morses Line--Franklin.......................... 1 0 0
+ 20 NRN Norton......................................... 2 1 0
+ 21 NRT North Troy..................................... 1 0 0
+ 22 PIV Pinnacle Road--Richford........................ 2 0 0
+ 23 DRIF Richford Rte 139............................... 2 0 0
+ 24 WBE West Berkshire................................. 2 0 0
+ 25 BUR Burke--Jamisons Line........................... 1 0 0
+ 26 CHM Champlain...................................... 7 3 0
+ 27 CHT Chateaugay..................................... 2 0 0
+ 28 CHU Churubusco..................................... 1 0 0
+ 29 CNN Cannon Corners................................. 1 0 0
+ 30 FTC Fort Covington................................. 2 0 0
+ 31 MAS Massena........................................ 4 1 0
+ 32 MOO Mooers......................................... 2 0 0
+ 33 OGD Ogdensburg..................................... 3 0 0
+ 34 OVE Overton Corners................................ 4 0 0
+ 35 ROU Rouses Point--St. Johns Hwy.................... 3 0 0
+ 36 TRO Trout River.................................... 3 0 0
+ 37 EPI Eastport....................................... 3 1 0
+ 38 PTL Porthill....................................... 2 1 0
+ 39 BWA Boundary....................................... 1 0 0
+ 40 DVL Danville....................................... 1 0 0
+ 41 FER Curlew--Ferry.................................. 1 0 1
+ 42 FWA Frontier....................................... 1 0 0
+ 43 LAULaurier........................................ 2 0 0
+ 44 MET Metaline Falls................................. 2 0 0
+ 45 NIG Nighthawk...................................... 1 0 1
+ 46 ORO Oroville....................................... 2 0 0
+ 47 ROO Roosville...................................... 2 1 0
+ 48 OTM Otay Mesa--San Diego........................... 13 6 6
+ 49 SYS San Ysidro--San Diego.......................... 24 0 16
+ 50 TEC Tecate......................................... 2 1 1
+ 51 VAS Virginia Avenue--San Diego..................... 0 0 0
+ 52 BBM B&M--Brownsville............................... 4 2 2
+ 53 BRO Gateway--Brownsville........................... 5 4 4
+ 54 FAL Falcon Heights................................. 1 0 1
+ 55 HID Hidalgo........................................ 11 1 4
+ 56 LOILos Indios..................................... 4 4 2
+ 57 LSELos Ebanos..................................... 1 0 1
+ 58 PGR Progreso....................................... 4 2 2
+ 59 PHR Pharr.......................................... 4 4 1
+ 60 RIO Rio Grande City................................ 3 3 1
+ 61 ROM Roma........................................... 4 1 1
+ 62 VIB Los Tomates--Brownsville....................... 4 4 2
+ 63 PRE Presidio....................................... 3 2 1
+ 64 LARLaredo AF--Convent Street...................... 4 0 3
+ 65 LCBLaredo--Columbia............................... 4 3 1
+ 66 LLBLaredo-Lincoln--Juarez......................... 12 0 0
+ 67 LWTWorld Trade Bridge--Laredo IV.................. 0 8 1
+ 68 BWM Bridgewater.................................... 1 0 1
+ 69 CAM Calais--Milltown............................... 1 0 0
+ 70 CLS Calais--Ferry Point............................ 2 1 0
+ 71 COB Coburn Gore.................................... 2 1 0
+ 72 EAS Easton......................................... 1 0 0
+ 73 EPT Eastport....................................... 1 0 0
+ 74 EST St. Francis--Est Court......................... 1 1 2
+ 75 FOR Forest City.................................... 1 0 1
+ 76 FTF Fort Fairfield................................. 2 1 0
+ 77 FTK Fort Kent...................................... 2 1 0
+ 78 HML Hamlin......................................... 1 0 0
+ 79 HTM Houlton........................................ 6 2 0
+ 80 JKM Jackman........................................ 2 1 0
+ 81 LlMLimestone...................................... 1 1 0
+ 82 LUBLubec.......................................... 2 0 0
+ 83 MAD Madawaska...................................... 1 1 1
+ 84 MTC Monticello..................................... 1 0 1
+ 85 ORI Orient......................................... 1 0 1
+ 86 SPA St. Francis--St. Pamphille..................... 1 1 2
+ 87 SRL Jackman--St. Aurelie........................... 1 0 0
+ 88 STD St. Francis--Daaquam........................... 1 1 0
+ 89 VCB Vanceboro...................................... 2 0 0
+ 90 VNB Van Buren...................................... 2 1 0
+ 91 CHF Chief Mountain................................. 2 1 0
+ 92 DLB Del Bonita..................................... 1 1 0
+ 93 GOA Goat Haunt..................................... 0 0 1
+ 94 MGM Morgan......................................... 1 1 0
+ 95 OPH Opheim......................................... 1 1 0
+ 96 PIE Piegan......................................... 2 1 0
+ 97 RAY Raymond........................................ 1 1 0
+ 98 SCO Scobey......................................... 1 1 0
+ 99 SWE Sweetgrass..................................... 2 1 0
+ 100 WCM Willow Creek................................... 1 0 0
+ 101 WHI Whitetail...................................... 1 1 0
+ 102 WHM Wild Horse..................................... 1 1 0
+ 103 WHT Whitlash....................................... 1 1 0
+ 104 AMB Ambrose........................................ 3 1 0
+ 105 ANT Antler......................................... 1 1 0
+ 106 BAU Baudette....................................... 2 1 0
+ 07 CRA Crane lake..................................... 1 1 0
+ 108 CRY Carbury........................................ 1 1 0
+ 109 DNS Dunseith....................................... 2 1 0
+ 110 ElY Ely............................................ 1 0 0
+ 111 FRT Fortuna........................................ 1 1 0
+ 112 GPM Grand Portage.................................. 2 1 0
+ 113 HNN Hannah......................................... 1 1 0
+ 114 HNS Hansboro....................................... 1 1 0
+ 115 INT International Falls............................ 2 1 1
+ 116 LANLancaster...................................... 1 1 0
+ 117 MAl Maida.......................................... 1 1 0
+ 118 NEC Neche.......................................... 1 1 0
+ 119 NOO Noonan......................................... 1 1 0
+ 120 NOY Noyes.......................................... 2 1 0
+ 121 NRG Northgate...................................... 1 1 0
+ 122 PEM Pembina........................................ 6 3 0
+ 123 PIN Pine Creek--Roseau............................. 1 1 0
+ 124 POR Portal......................................... 1 3 0
+ 125 ROS Roseau......................................... 1 2 0
+ 126 SAR Sarles......................................... 1 1 0
+ 127 SHR Sherwood....................................... 1 1 0
+ 128 SJO St. John....................................... 3 2 0
+ 129 WAl Walhalla....................................... 1 1 0
+ 130 WAR Warroad........................................ 1 1 0
+ 131 WHO Westhope....................................... 1 1 1
+ 132 ANP Antelope Wells................................. 1 0 0
+ 133 BOA Bridge of the Americas (BOTA) El Paso.......... 10 4 4
+ 134 COL Columbus....................................... 2 1 1
+ 135 FAB Fabens......................................... 2 0 1
+ 136 FTH Fort Hancock................................... 1 0 1
+ 137 PDN Paso Del Norte--El Paso........................ 10 0 8
+ 138 SEL Stanton Street Bridge.......................... 3 0 0
+ 139 STR Santa Teresa................................... 2 2 1
+ 140 YSl Ysleta--El Paso................................ 12 6 4
+ 141 TUR Turner......................................... 1 2 0
+ 142 CAl Calexico....................................... 10 0 4
+ 143 IVP Calexico East--Imperial Valley................. 8 3 2
+ 144 DCB Detroit Ambassador Bridge...................... 10 7 0
+ 145 DCT Detroit Tunnel................................. 9 0 0
+ 146 PHU Port Huron--Blue Water Bridge.................. 8 6 0
+ 147 SSM Sault Ste. Marie............................... 2 1 1
+ 148 ADT Amistad Dam.................................... 1 0 0
+ 149 DLR Del Rio........................................ 4 2 1
+ 150 EGP Eagle Pass..................................... 5 0 1
+ 151 FDE Eagle Pass II.................................. 6 2 1
+ 152 LEWLewiston-Queenston Bridge...................... 7 3 0
+ 153 PBB Peace Bridge--Buffalo.......................... 7 4 1
+ 154 RAI Rainbow Bridge--Niagara Falls.................. 19 0 4
+ 155 WHL Whirlpool Rapids----Niagara Falls.............. 3 0 1
+ 156 THO Alexandria Bay--Thousand Island................ 6 2 0
+ 157 ALC Alcan.......................................... 2 1 0
+ 158 DAC Haines--Dalton Cache........................... 1 1 0
+ 159 SKA Skagway........................................ 1 1 0
+ 160 BLA Peace Arch--Blaine............................. 7 1 0
+ 161 LYNLynden......................................... 3 2 0
+ 162 PHY Pacific Highway--Blaine........................ 6 3 0
+ 163 SUM Sumas.......................................... 4 2 0
+ 164 PTR Point Roberts.................................. 4 1 1
+ 165 PKC Poker Creek.................................... 1 0 1
+ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ Total.......................................... 490 176 118
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+ Air Transport Association of America. Inc. Responses to Questions
+
+Question: 1. The US-VISIT Program is an extensive border management
+system that requires participation and cooperation from a wide variety
+of stakeholders. How has the Air Transport Association participated in
+the discussions leading up to the implementation of phase one of US-
+VISIT?
+Answer: ATA has participated extensively in discussions with DHS
+leading up to the implementation of phase one of US-VISIT. ATA's
+involvement dates back to working with and providing input to legacy-
+INS staff on the original ``entry/exit'' program. Coordination has
+continued with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and
+the announcement of US-VISIT in early 2003. US-VISIT staff have availed
+themselves to ATA and our carriers for advice and to answer questions.
+During the Atlanta pilot, US-VISIT staff conducted weekly conference
+calls with stakeholders. In addition, US. VISIT worked very closely
+with Delta Air Lines and ATA for the Entry pilot that was conducted at
+Atlanta's Hartsfield/Jackson International Airport late last fall. ATA
+continues to work with US-VISIT on the Exit phase. Coordination on the
+Exit phase includes bi-monthly conference calls to discuss.
+
+Question: 2. In an effort to better prepare passengers for Exit
+requirements, would airlines be willing to hand-out the small
+information card with a passenger's boarding pass?
+Answer: Yes, ATA carriers would be willing to assist the government in
+whatever means possible to better prepare passengers for the Exit
+requirements. We would ask that an adequate, ongoing supply of the
+information card be provided to the carriers at the full expense of the
+government. The information cards also need to be printed in multiple
+languages to better serve our passengers.
+
+Question: 3. What are your recommendations for additional public
+outreach and education for US-VISIT?
+Answer: US-VISIT has done an effective job of putting together a public
+outreach and education effort for US-VISIT. Their efforts have included
+updating U.S. government websites (DHS, CBP, ICE, and the State
+Department) to include information on US-VISIT; working with the State
+Department to provide the embassies and consulates abroad the necessary
+materials and information; issuing press releases and providing
+material to the news media.
+ ATA recommends that DHS consider creating a link on their homepage
+specifically for US-VISIT that could have timely updates on entry/exit;
+the where's, what's and how's of the program; Exit locations (both
+cities and airports); and user friendly airport maps detailing the
+location's of the Exit kiosks and how to use them. There could also be
+information directed to passengers who are coming to the United States
+about what to expect when they go to U.S. embassies and consulates for
+their visas.
+ ATA also recommends that US-VISIT consider posting signs at
+departure gates in foreign airports informing passengers what to expect
+upon arrival into the United States. We would hope that DHS would work
+with foreign governments and/or the foreign airport authorities to
+provide signage as a customer service notification.
+
+Question: 4. Has ATA membership noticed additional passenger wait times
+during immigration and customs processing due to new US-VISIT data
+collection?
+Answer: ATA member airlines have not noticed significant increases in
+wait times during immigration and customs processing due to new US-
+VISIT data collection. We have been impressed with the coordination
+between US-VISIT and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to ensure a
+careful and successful implementation of phase one. However, we will
+continue to monitor the issue as we move into the summer peak travel
+season which begins in April. Adequate levels of CBP inspectors on the
+primary lines are paramount to avoiding long lines in the FIS
+facilities which delay our passengers and could cause disruptions for
+airport operations.
+
+Question: 5. Current Federal law requires that by October 26, 2004, all
+Visa Waiver Program (VWP) countries must have capabilities to produce
+biometric passports in order to remain in the program. Concern has been
+expressed that many of the 27 VWP countries will be able to meet this
+deadline. Has ATA done any studies looking into the impact this
+deadline may have on the travel industry?
+Answer: No, ATA has not done any specific studies on how the October
+26, 2004, deadline will affect the travel industry. However, in 2003,
+ATA was a strong advocate for delaying the October 1, 2003, requirement
+for all Visa Waiver Program travelers to have a valid Machine Readable
+Passport (MRP) for visa-free entry into the U.S. ATA was concerned that
+insufficient preparatory work had been completed and that serious
+disruptions of the processing of visitors into the United States could
+occur. As you know, Secretary Powell exercised his waiver authority and
+extended the deadline to October 26, 2004--which now coincides with the
+requirement for VWP countries to begin producing biometric passports.
+ Many of the same issues surrounding the October 1, 2003,
+requirement for MRPs also apply to the upcoming October 26th date.
+State Department Assistant Secretary Maura Harty has testified several
+times that most VWP countries will not be capable of issuing passports
+with biometrics by the deadline. Premature implementation of the
+requirement will cause a great deal of confusion for the traveling
+public and will contribute to a world-view that travel to the United
+States is an unpleasant hassle. That will greatly discourage travel to
+the United States, which will significantly harm the national economy
+as well as the airline and travel and tourism industry.
+
+ Additional Material Submitted for the Record
+
+ Questions and Responses of Dennis A. Carlton, Director Washington
+ Operations International Biometric Group
+
+ Question: 1. The current biometrics being used at selected air and
+sea ports of entry call for two fingerprints and a photograph of the
+foreign national. While the Administration has maintained that it is
+currently in ``increment one'' in a four stage process and it may
+likely move towards using a ten-print system, will using two-prints
+impact the agency's ability to capture individuals who are listed in
+the Federal Bureau of Investigation's database, which uses ten prints?
+ Answer: In the near term, the Department of Homeland Security's
+decision to capture and match the flat impressions of the two index
+fingers of foreign nationals seems a practical compromise. To comply
+with the aggressive deadlines imposed by federal legislation and to
+achieve the programmatic milestones set by the Secretary of Homeland
+Security, the US-VISIT Program Office chose to implement technologies
+the department had successfully deployed in the recent past. Since it
+is an extension of the existing IDENT system, the two flat finger
+capture/matching solution being employed in US-VISIT Increment One is
+fully compatible with the two-print database format of IDENT. However,
+this means that the two flat fingers captured for US-VISIT will be
+subject to the same matching accuracy and throughput infirmities when
+searching against the rolled fingerprints contained in the Department
+of Justice's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System
+(IAFIS) as all other two-finger inquiries sent from IDENT.
+ Studies have shown that matching flat fingerprints against a
+database comprised of rolled fingerprints is not as accurate as
+matching rolled prints against rolled prints. The `disconnect' between
+rolled and flat prints is not likely to be resolved by US-VISIT--
+forensics specialists will continue to prefer the additional data
+available from rolled prints while civil government applications like
+US-VISIT will use flat prints because they are much easier to capture.
+ Over the longer term, as the US-VISIT database grows to comprise
+tens of millions of records, two fingers will not provide sufficiently
+unique data to consistently return only one matching database record.
+As a consequence, queries are likely to begin returning several
+potential matching records, necessitating additional research to
+distinguish true from false matches. IBG and others in the biometrics
+industry believe that at least four or more fingers will need to be
+captured from each subject in order to maintain adequate matching
+accuracy and throughput. Individuals originally enrolled with just two
+fingerprints will need to be reenrolled using four or more fingers;
+this reenrollment could be accomplished when an individual appears for
+a visa renewal.
+
+ Question: 2. You characterized the challenge of implementing
+biometric identifier at land ports of entry as ``daunting,'' yet
+surmountable. Could you elaborate on how this challenge could be
+overcome, both at the ports and ``upstream,'' keeping in mind that the
+largest ports are extremely busy, handling millions of entrants year-
+round?
+ Answer: The key to successfully implementing biometric
+identification at land ports of entry is to provide multiple means by
+which travelers can be `pre-identified' before they reach the point of
+primary inspection. IBG believes the vast majority of travelers will
+readily cooperate with `pre-identification' programs so long as the
+enrollment process is considered reasonable and the enrolled traveler
+is provided expedited transit across the border. For instance, at the
+Peace Arch port of entry in Blaine, Washington almost 25% of annual
+border crossings are by enrollees in the joint U.S.-Canadian NEXUS
+alternative inspection program. Though NEXUS program participants must
+submit to an extensive background investigation by both American and
+Canadian customs and immigration authorities, their reward is being
+able to cross the border using a dedicated lane that can reduce what
+sometimes can be an hour+ wait in regular lanes to just a few minutes.
+ Travelers should have several options for identifying themselves
+prior to reaching the land port primary inspection point. Biometric
+matching need not and, in fact, should not be performed for the first
+time at the point of inspection--the inspecting officer must not be
+distracted from conducting a thorough evaluation of the demeanor and
+behavior of the traveler. In pedestrian lanes, biometrics could be
+matched through a combination of active (fingerprint capture) and
+passive (facial image capture) methods as travelers pass through pre-
+inspection choke points. In vehicle lanes, fingerprint samples could be
+captured prior to the inspection position, using portable devices that
+can both read data from travel documents and match fingerprints from
+inside the vehicle.
+ U.S. citizens could be encouraged to register their travel
+documents (e.g., their drivers license, passport, or other form of ID)
+and biometric samples prior to their departure at kiosks located at the
+land ports and other government offices, such as post offices,
+throughout the border region. Upon their return to the U.S., registered
+travelers would be afforded the privilege of using expedited processing
+lanes.
+ Question: 3. Based on what you have observed, to what extent has
+the US-VISIT program office given consideration to overcoming the
+challenge of implementing a biometric identifier at land ports of
+entry?
+ Answer: The US-VISIT program office has evaluated several
+alternatives for employing biometrics at land ports of entry. The
+Departments of State and Homeland Security have accumulated extensive
+experience capturing and matching biometrics as part of the Border
+Crossing Card enrollment process. This past year, DHS conducted a pilot
+program to assess the practical issues associated with matching the
+biometric data recorded on the BCC with a live biometric sample
+provided by the cardholder. In addition, DHS has been acquiring
+biometric samples from and conducting background investigations of
+thousands of NEXUS and SENTRI cardholders. Biometric identification
+procedures will have to be both flexible and creative in order to
+accommodate the wide range of port configurations and environmental
+conditions at U.S. land ports of entry.
+ Question: 4. How do you propose to best address the inevitable
+occurrences of ``mistaken'' or inadvertent biometric identity
+mismatches, especially from the perspective of safeguarding privacy?
+ Answer: Experience acquired from Increment One of the US-VISIT
+program has shown that DHS already has implemented effective methods
+for quickly resolving biometric identity mismatches. As part of the
+Increment One technology upgrades at the primary inspection positions,
+inspection personnel now have access to significantly more traveler-
+related data from both DHS and DOS databases. For instance, primary
+inspectors can now access records from the Department of State's
+Consolidated Consular Database to review the information upon which the
+DOS Foreign Service Officer adjudicated a visa application. When a
+biometric mismatch occurs, an inspector has real-time access to text
+data that can be used to quickly determine that the traveler's
+documentation doesn't match the record returned by the biometric
+search. Initial indications have shown that biometric mismatches have
+occurred at a rate far lower than had been predicted and that the
+primary inspector has resolved mismatch errors and sent the traveler on
+their way in an average of about one minute. Thus, travelers are
+subjected to minimal inconvenience and their privacy and dignity are
+protected.
+
+ Prepared Statement of Edward K. Pultorak, Senior CBP Officer, NTEU
+ Chapter 111--Lose Angeles International Airport
+
+ Chairman Camp, Ranking Member Sanchez, distinguished members of the
+Subcommittee; I would like to thank the subcommittee for the
+opportunity to testify on one of the Bureau of Customs and Border
+Protection's (CBP) newest programs--The U.S. Visitor and Immigrant
+Status Indicator Technology U.S. VISIT) program.
+ I am proud to have been part of Customs for over 32 years. In 1971,
+I started with Customs as one of the original sky marshals. In my
+capacity as a sky marshal I flew over 1 million miles on TWA Airlines
+over the course of three years. In 1974, I became a United States
+Customs Inspector at JFK International Airport in New York until 1976
+when I then began working Customs pre-clearance in Bermuda for six
+years. In 1983, I started working as a Customs Inspector at Los Angeles
+International Airport (LAX) where I have worked during the past 21
+years. In addition to my job as a Senior legacy Customs Inspector and
+now Senior CBP Officer, I have been an employee representative for
+NTEU, proudly representing over 400 Customs personnel at LAX for over
+10 years.
+
+ U.S. VISIT PROGRAM AND CBP OFFICER TRAINING:
+
+ The Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management
+Improvement Act of 2000 (DMIA) P.L. 106-215 mandated the creation of an
+entry/exit system for non-U.S. citizens into and out of the United
+States that would record all arrival and departure information of every
+alien who crosses the U.S. border. This system is now known as U.S.
+VISIT.
+ While the official roll out of the U.S. VISIT program is only 3
+weeks old, I would like to bring the subcommittee's attention a few
+concerns that legacy Customs and INS inspectors, such as my self, would
+like the subcommittee to be aware of with regard to the implementation
+and future use of the U.S. VISIT program.
+ On January 5, 2004 the U.S. VISIT program was introduced at 115
+U.S. international airports and at 14 seaports of entry across the
+country, including my port of entry, Los Angeles International Airport
+(LAX), one of three busiest international airports in the country with
+approximately 8 million international passengers annually.
+ As has been stated by previous members on the panel, the U.S. VISIT
+program is intended to process visitors holding visas as they enter the
+United States. The U.S. VISIT technology uses scanning equipment to
+collect ``biometric identifiers,'' such as fingerprints, in an inkless
+process, along with a digital photograph of the visitor. Together with
+the standard information gathered from a visitor about their identity
+and travel, the program is intended to verify the visitor's identity
+and compliance with visa and immigration policies. All data obtained
+from the visitor is then stored as part of the visitor's travel record.
+At exit points, visitors will check out at kiosks by scanning their
+visa or passport and repeating the simple inkless fingerprinting
+process. The exit confirmation will be added to the visitor's travel
+records to ensure compliance. It is my understanding that the U.S VISIT
+program will be expanded to include the 50 busiest land ports of entry
+by December 31, 2004, and all U.S. ports of entry by December 31, 2005.
+ As the subcommittee is aware, on September 2, 2003, Secretary Tom
+Ridge announced the creation of a new CBP officer position and the
+``One Face at the Border'' initiative. Under this plan, a new position,
+the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Officer would combine the
+duties of legacy inspectors from Customs, INS and APHIS into a single
+front- line border security position at the 307 official ports-of-entry
+across the United States.
+ As some of my fellow Customs inspectors have testified at previous
+hearings, I and the legacy Customs employees I work with believe that
+combining the border protection responsibilities that were held by
+three highly-skilled specialists into a single front line inspector
+position continues to raise some serious concerns. Each of the job
+responsibilities from the three legacy inspection agencies is highly
+specialized and distinct. By utilizing one employee to perform all
+primary and secondary inspection function programs, including the new
+US-VISIT program, the agency is diluting the expertise that has made
+the United States border inspection personnel second to none.
+ Prior to the creation of the CBP officer position, legacy Customs
+inspectors received 9 to 12 weeks of intensive basic training on
+Customs Service rules and regulations alone. Under the new CBP officer
+training guidelines legacy inspectors, such as myself, will be
+transitioning into the new CBP officer position in the spring of this
+year by way of classroom training, CD-ROM computer teaching and on-the-
+job training for programs such as US-VISIT. While the new training will
+lead to a broader knowledge of the INS rules and regulations of entry
+for passengers entering the United States, there remains a concern
+among the employees I represent as to whether it will provide the
+specialized expertise necessary to ensure the successful accomplishment
+of the other traditional legacy Customs and INS anti-terrorism missions
+that are now part of the Department of Homeland Security.
+ Currently, legacy Customs and INS inspectors are ``cross-trained''
+as to the most basic Customs and INS procedures for entry into the U.S.
+for passengers and goods. Traditionally, if a legacy Customs inspector
+was faced with a complicated visa entry situation at an airport or land
+border primary inspection station they had the ability to send the
+passenger to a more intensive secondary inspection where an experienced
+legacy INS inspector could make a determination as to the validity of a
+particular visa. It remains unclear as to whether experts in visa
+issues or other specific Customs and INS border protection matters will
+continue to be available for secondary inspection once the full
+implementation of the CBP officer training is completed for all legacy
+Customs personnel and new CBP Officers. I feel strongly that specific
+expertise must be maintained, especially in light of the ramping up of
+the US-VISIT program to all 317 official ports of entry by the end of
+2005.
+ With the recent introduction of the U.S. VISIT program the issue of
+staffing continues to be a concern. For example, at a number of
+airports across the country since the introduction of U.S. VISIT,
+legacy Customs inspectors who are highly trained in cargo inspection
+have been pulled from their current anti-terrorism cargo and passenger
+assignments to assist legacy INS inspectors by processing only low risk
+U.S. citizens and green card holders at airport immigration processing
+stations in order to maintain an acceptable flow of passengers in the
+international terminals. The CBP officers I represent hope that
+Congress will continue to provide additional CBP Officer staffing to
+enable legacy CBP Officers such as myself the ability to continue
+working in our areas of expertise to continue our traditional missions
+of facilitating legitimate trade and preventing terrorism.
+ Other issues of concern that have been raised by both the legacy
+Customs and INS personnel that I work with involve the current
+exemption of international travelers from countries who are part of the
+Visa Waiver Program (VWP) and how it relates to the U.S. VISIT program.
+In addition, there are also concerns about the use of only selected
+databases by the U.S. VISIT program.
+ Currently, the U.S. VISIT program applies only to foreign visitors
+seeking admission on non-immigrant visas but does not apply to visitors
+seeking admission from Canada and Mexico or countries participating in
+the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), or lawful permanent residents (green
+card holders). Also at this time, the U.S. VISIT program will not apply
+to foreign visitors seeking entry at land border ports of entry where
+over 81 percent of international passengers are processed. Currently,
+only 19 percent of international passengers are processed at air and
+sea ports of entry.
+ The fact that travelers from 27 countries who participate in the
+VWP and travelers entering through Canada and Mexico are currently
+exempt from U.S. VISIT should raise serious concerns with the members
+of this subcommittee. Future terrorists with no criminal or terrorism
+history could possibly exploit the waiver program that currently
+exempts such countries as Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
+Japan, Singapore, Spain and the United Kingdom to name a few.
+ In addition, front line legacy Customs and INS inspectors I have
+talked with have serious concerns with regard to the lack of federal
+watch list and criminal databases currently being used by the U.S.
+VISIT program. It in my understanding that currently the U.S. VISIT
+program uses the traditional Customs (TECS), INS and TSA databases, but
+does not fully utilize other terrorist and criminal watch lists
+maintained by other federal agencies such as the State Department and
+U.S. Marshal's Service. The success or failure of entry/exit programs,
+such as U.S. VISIT, rely entirely on the quality of information
+available to the DHS personnel using it. If U.S. VISIT is to be truly
+successful as a terrorist fighting tool the DHS must lead the effort to
+consolidate and standardize the federal government's watch list
+structures and sharing policies to enable front line CBP Officers to
+successfully accomplish their anti-terrorism missions.
+ The men and women I work with, as well as the thousands of other
+CBP Officers across the country are deeply committed to their mission
+of protecting our borders from terrorism. In order to do that, we must
+continue to provide these men and women with the resources they need to
+effectively do their job. Again, I want to thank the subcommittee for
+the opportunity to share my thoughts on the very important issues
+concerning the CBP's U.S. VISIT program. I would be happy to answer any
+questions that subcommittee members may have.
+
+ Prepared Statement of J. Clark Robinson, President International
+ Association of Amusement Parks and Attractions
+
+ As president of the International Association of Amusement Parks
+and Attractions, and on behalf the board of directors and our general
+membership, I appreciate the opportunity to submit testimony for the
+hearing record on this very important subject.
+
+Introduction
+ Founded in 1918, the International Association of Amusement Parks
+and Attractions (IAAPA) is the largest international trade association
+for permanently situated amusement facilities worldwide. Headquartered
+in Alexandria, VA, IAAPA represents over 5,000 member companies from
+more than 85 countries, including virtually all multi-park companies
+such as Disney, Universal, Busch Entertainment, Paramount and Six
+Flags. Our membership includes amusement/theme parks, waterparks,
+amusement manufacturers and suppliers, family entertainment centers,
+arcades, zoos, aquariums, museums, and miniature golf venues.
+ According to Amusement Business magazine and other industry
+analysts, America's 600-plus parks and attractions hosted approximately
+322 million visitors in 2003, generating over $10 billion in revenue.
+An annual compilation of the world's ``Most Visited Amusement/Theme
+Parks'' indicated that the United States had 16 of the top 25 most
+attended parks globally during the past year. American amusement
+facilities take great pride in their commitment to providing quality
+family entertainment to visitors from our own country and countries
+around the world.
+
+The Need for Safe, Open Borders
+ The amusement industry supports enhanced border security measures,
+understanding that seamlessly safe travel helps to bolster consumer
+confidence in our product. However, the industry is concerned about the
+implementation schedule of security measures and the adverse impact it
+might have on travel by foreign visitors.
+ Since 9/11, the travel and tourism industry has seen significant
+decreases in international travel to the United States. Over a two-year
+period following September 11, 2001, international travel to the U.S.
+declined twenty percent, resulting in a loss of $15 billion in visitor
+spending. Over 300,000 jobs in the travel industry were lost as a
+product of the decrease in international travel.
+ While the need to enhance physical safety is paramount, the United
+States must also be vigilant in ensuring enhanced economic security
+during that process. As a result, the amusement industry, in
+conjunction with the entire United States travel industry, cannot
+support the current congressionally mandated deadline of October 26,
+2004 for Visa Waiver Program (VWP) countries to begin issuance of
+biometric passports to their citizens. We request that VWP countries be
+provided extra time to phase in these new, more secure documents.
+
+Amusement Industry Supports Biometric Passports, Phase-In Needed
+ Both the United States and the international theme park community
+support implementation of a biometric passport program for Visa Waiver
+countries. Biometric identification will undoubtedly enhance security
+by allowing more vigorous screening of visitors. The further
+development and issuance of machine-readable, tamper-resistant,
+biometric passports will reduce the number of fraudulent and suspicious
+passports used to gain illegal entry into this country.
+ While illegal entry must be prohibited, legitimate travel into the
+United States must be permitted to continue without significant
+disruption. The State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs has
+indicated that VWP governments will be unable to meet the legislatively
+mandated deadline to issue biometric passports. It is currently
+believed that at best, only three of the twenty-seven Visa Waiver
+countries will be able to meet this deadline, and that none of the
+larger countries (United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, France, Italy or
+Spain) will be able to issue biometric passports by October 26, 2004.
+Officials have indicated that these VWP governments will not be capable
+of producing biometric passports until late 2005 or 2006.
+ Visa Waiver travelers with non-biometric passports issued on or
+after October 26, 2004 will be required to obtain a visa for travel to
+the United States. As governments in Visa Waiver countries will be
+unable to issue passports with biometric identifiers, the demand for
+nonimmigrant visas for travel to the United States will overload the
+processing abilities of U.S. consulates overseas. The State Department
+has indicated that the demand for non-immigrant visas would at least
+double, leaving them unable to process requests in a timely manner.
+ We fear that these requirements will serve as a disincentive for
+tourist travel to the United States. The biometric passport deadline
+for Visa Waiver countries will create an actual barrier for some
+international travelers and a perceived barrier for others. Fewer
+international visitors to the U.S. will result in less spending and job
+loss in the amusement industry across the country.
+ We suggest that at least a one-year extension of the October 26,
+2004 deadline for biometric passports be considered to allow Visa
+Waiver countries the necessary time to begin issuing biometric
+passports to their citizens. Extension of this deadline would give VWP
+governments the opportunity to complete development of these more
+secure documents while maintaining the flow of Visa Waiver travelers to
+the United States.
+
+Conclusion
+ As U.S. theme parks are just now beginning to recover from the
+events of the last two years, another barrier to inbound travel would
+be detrimental to the industry. In 2002, Visa Waiver travelers spent
+approximately $38 billion in the United States. Over 10 million
+international visitors traveled to the United States from VWP countries
+last year. Congress has recently recognized the importance of
+international inbound travel, appropriating millions of dollars last
+year to the Department of Commerce to establish programs that will
+promote travel to the United States in foreign markets.
+ Extending the biometric passport deadline for Visa Waiver travelers
+by at least one year would allow the seamless flow of legitimate travel
+into the United States to continue, while providing VWP governments
+with the opportunity to successfully meet and comply with requirements
+mandated by the Border Security Act. Homeland security must be defined
+as more than a mere protection of the physical. The implementation of
+security measures must account for the economic health of the nation as
+well.
+ I thank you again for the opportunity to submit this testimony for
+the official record.
+
+ Prepared Statement of The Travel Industry Association of America
+
+ The Travel Industry Association of America (TIA) submits the
+following comments for the record.
+ TIA is the national, non-profit organization representing all
+components of the $528 billion U.S. travel and tourism industry. TIA's
+mission is to represent the whole of the travel industry to promote and
+facilitate increased travel to and within the United States. Our more
+than 2,000 member organizations represent every segment of the industry
+throughout the country.
+ International business and leisure travel to the U.S. is a vital
+component of our national economy. In 2002, over 42 million
+international visitors generated $83.5 billion in expenditures, $12
+billion in federal, state and local tax revenue, and accounted for one
+million jobs nationwide. International travel and tourism to the U.S.
+is a service export, and in 2002, generated a positive balance of trade
+of $5.5 billion.
+ International visitation has continually declined over the past
+three years. Overseas travel to the U.S. was down 31.8 percent in 2003
+compared to 2000 levels. This decline has drastically reduced the flow
+of tax revenue to all levels of government and reduced our
+international balance of trade. Since 2000, the loss of international
+travel to the US. has cost our economy $15.3 billion in expenditures.
+ The decline in travel is due to a variety of reasons, including
+fear of travel because of terrorism, a downturn in the global economy
+and confusion over new US. visa and border security procedures. While
+some of the causes are beyond the reach of an individual country,
+actions by the U.S. government can either enhance or harm our nation's
+ability to attract increased international travel to the U.S. and
+create more jobs and economic opportunities for states and cities
+across the country. For this reason, the US-VISIT program must be
+implemented with traveler facilitation as one of its primary goals.
+Otherwise, international travelers might not wish to return to the
+U.S., or may be deterred from visiting in the first place.
+ TIA supports the US-VISIT program as envisioned for airports and
+seaports. TIA believes that the program meets the Department of
+Homeland Security's dual missions of protecting the nation's security
+and economy. By developing a system that verifies the identity of
+travelers quickly and efficiently, US-VISIT adds to the protection of
+the homeland while ensuring the continuous flow of legitimate
+international travelers entering and exiting the country.
+ However, TIA does have several concerns about the implementation of
+the US-VISIT program. Congress should seriously consider these issues
+as the program moves forward.
+
+Postpone Deadline for Biometrics Passports
+ The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002
+introduced a new security element to traveler documentation: biometric
+identifiers. Capturing a person's biometric and using it as part of the
+entry process will allow inspection officials to know the person before
+them is the same person to whom the passport or visa was issued.
+Biometrics are just now being incorporated into newly-issued U.S.
+visas. They will also be required in all new passports issued by the 27
+countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program beginning on October
+26, 2004.
+ TIA supports the use of biometrics in travel documents. However,
+most of the Visa Waiver Program countries will not be ready to issue
+these newer biometric passports until late 2005 at the earliest.
+Missing the deadline would mean that many tourist and business
+travelers from those countries would have to obtain visas for entry
+into the U.S. The State Department estimates that as many as 5 million
+VWP travelers would be affected by this deadline.
+ Forcing Visa Waiver Program travelers to get visas will deal a
+crippling blow to an already ailing travel industry. Approximately two-
+thirds of all overseas (excluding Canadian and Mexican) business and
+leisure travelers, or nearly 13.5 million visitors, enter the U.S.
+under the Visa Waiver Program. Overseas travel to our nation is already
+down 32 percent over the past three years. Additional losses will send
+even more workers from the travel and tourism industry to the
+unemployment line. It is unrealistic to expect travelers accustomed to
+visa-free travel to spend the money and time to obtain a U.S. visa to
+visit our country. Especially when these travelers have many other
+appealing intemationa1 destinations that are visa-free. Additionally,
+the State Department lacks the capacity to meet this potential increase
+in demand. A loss of those 5 million travelers would cost the U.S.
+economy $15 billion in sales and thousands of jobs.
+ It is important to note that the U.S. Department of State will not
+be able to start issuing biometric passports until well after the
+October deadline. While the State Department is not required by law to
+do so, it is hypocritical for the U.S. to require other countries to do
+what we cannot.
+ The October 26 deadline is a Congressional mandate. The
+Administration does not have the authority to extend the deadline.
+Therefore, TIA calls on the House Select Committee on Homeland Security
+to support at least a one-year extension of the October 26 deadline. By
+doing this, Congress will provide the time necessary to allow these
+important trade and political allies to begin producing passports in a
+way that will not discourage inbound international travel to the U.S.
+
+Concern Over Delays
+ TIA is very pleased that enrollment in the program has only added
+an average of 15 seconds to the normal inspection process. We commend
+Homeland Security for their efficiency.
+ It is critical that this level of performance be maintained during
+peak travel periods and also when the U.S. travel and tourism industry
+recovers its lost market share. As stated above, overseas travel to the
+U.S. has dropped by approximately one-third over the past three years.
+TIA is concerned that Homeland Security will not have sufficient
+personnel to maintain a 15second US-VISIT inspection time when
+international visitation returns to 2000 levels. TIA urges Congress to
+provide adequate funding so that Homeland Security will have sufficient
+inspectors available to immediately meet the demands peak travel
+periods.
+ While TIA is pleased with the efficiency by which individuals are
+processed, TIA also believes it is important to process entire flights
+in a timely manner. The time an individual spends at primary inspection
+is not the only time issue. There is also the concern over how long an
+individual waits to finally reach a primary inspection booth. TIA
+supports the original Congressionally mandated goal of a maximum wait
+of 45 minutes per individual. Although this mandate was repealed in the
+Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (PL 107-
+173), TIA believes it is still a useful and important goal for Customs
+and Border Protection inspectors to meet. TIA urges Congress to
+allocate funding to provide sufficient inspectors for the US-VISIT
+program both to meet the IS-second individual inspection time and to
+keep the wait in line to under 45 minutes.
+ If primary inspection is perceived to be too much of a hassle, many
+visitors will be discouraged from returning to the U.S. in the future.
+It is critical that the US-VISIT program have the requisite staff to
+keep wait times and inspection times to a minimum. Otherwise, both our
+security and our economy will suffer.
+Outreach to Traveling Public
+ TIA urges Homeland Security to increase efforts to educate the
+international traveling public about the US-VISIT program.
+International travelers coming to the U.S. for business and pleasure
+should be told who is impacted, and who is not impacted, by this new
+program. Visitors need to understand in advance what to expect in the
+process, and what they can do to make the process go more smoothly.
+ The international traveling public increasingly perceives that the
+myriad of new security rules is creating a ``Fortress America.''
+International travelers do not just consider the impact of a single
+rule, but view all rules and programs in total. They have noted the
+increase in visa fees, new visa interview requirements and growing visa
+denials. They are also aware of machine-readable passport deadlines,
+the future use of biometric identifiers in U.S. visas and Visa Waiver
+passports, collection and use of advance passenger information, or API,
+along with US-VISIT.
+ By and large, these new rules and requirements make sense from a
+homeland security perspective, and TIA supports these efforts to
+enhance national security. But for many prospective international
+visitors, wave after wave of new travel requirements paint a ``big
+picture'' that the United States is becoming a destination that is too
+difficult to enter, too expensive to visit and simply not worth the
+effort. In their opinion, the ``welcome mat'' has been pulled. TIA has
+heard accounts of how this negative perception has resulted in lost
+business. While the Department of Homeland Security cannot respond to
+every misperception and rumor, the opportunity exists to set the record
+straight on the US-VISIT program and tell international travelers
+exactly what the program is and who it affects.
+ In conclusion, Congress must act in two areas to ensure the
+continued success of the US-VISIT program and allow the U.S. to remain
+a viable destination for international travelers. Congress must act
+immediately to extend the October 26 deadline on biometric passports by
+a minimum of one year. Congress also must ensure that the US-VISIT
+program has sufficient funds and personnel to meet security and
+efficiency objectives. TIA also urges the Department of Homeland
+Security to increase outreach and education efforts to the
+international traveling public.
+
+
+
+