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+ - THE HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM
+
+[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
+[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
+
+
+
+
+ THE HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM
+
+=======================================================================
+
+ HEARING
+
+ before the
+
+ SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
+ HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
+
+ ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
+
+ SECOND SESSION
+
+ __________
+
+ FEBURARY 4, 2004
+
+ __________
+
+ Serial No. 108-35
+
+ __________
+
+ Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security
+
+
+ Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
+ house
+
+ __________
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
+
+22-132 WASHINGTON : 2005
+_________________________________________________________________
+For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
+Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free
+(866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail:
+Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001
+
+
+
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+
+ SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
+
+
+
+ Christopher Cox, California, Chairman
+
+Jennifer Dunn, Washington Jim Turner, Texas, Ranking Member
+C.W. Bill Young, Florida Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
+Don Young, Alaska Loretta Sanchez, California
+F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
+Wisconsin Norman D. Dicks, Washington
+W.J. (Billy) Tauzin, Louisiana Barney Frank, Massachusetts
+David Dreier, California Jane Harman, California
+Duncan Hunter, California Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland
+Harold Rogers, Kentucky Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New
+Sherwood Boehlert, New York York
+Lamar S. Smith, Texas Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
+Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Nita M. Lowey, New York
+Christopher Shays, Connecticut Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey
+Porter J. Goss, Florida Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
+Dave Camp, Michigan Columbia
+Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida Zoe Lofgren, California
+Bob Goodlatte, Virginia Karen McCarthy, Missouri
+Ernest J. Istook, Jr., Oklahoma Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
+Peter T. King, New York Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
+John Linder, Georgia Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
+John B. Shadegg, Arizona Islands
+Mark E. Souder, Indiana Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
+Mac Thornberry, Texas Ken Lucas, Kentucky
+Jim Gibbons, Nevada James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
+Kay Granger, Texas Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
+Pete Sessions, Texas
+John E. Sweeney, New York
+
+ John Gannon, Chief of Staff
+ Uttam Dhillon, Chief Counsel and Deputy Staff Director
+ Steven Cash, Democrat Staff Director
+ David H. Schanzer, Democrat Staff Director
+ Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
+
+ (ii)
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+ C O N T E N T S
+
+ ----------
+ Page
+
+ STATEMENTS
+
+The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of California, and Chairman, Select Committee on
+ Homeland Security.............................................. 1
+The Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in Congress From the
+ State of Texas, Ranking Member, Select Committee on Homeland
+ Security
+ Oral Statement................................................. 22
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 7
+The Honorable Benjamin L. Cardin, a Representative in Congress
+ From the State of Maryland..................................... 36
+The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Representative in Congress
+ From U.S. Virgin Islands....................................... 42
+The Honorable Jennifer Dunn, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of Washington........................................ 33
+The Honorable Kay Granger, a Representative in Congress From the
+ State of Texas................................................. 24
+The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress From the
+ State of California............................................ 25
+The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress
+ From the State of Texas
+ Oral Statement................................................. 46
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 9
+The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of New York.......................................... 44
+The Honorable Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of Massachusetts..................................... 31
+The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of California
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 9
+The Honorable John B. Shadegg, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of Arizona
+ Prepared Opening Statement..................................... 8
+The Honorable Christopher Shays, a Representative in Congress
+ From the State Connecticut..................................... 38
+The Honorable John E. Sweeney, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of New York.......................................... 28
+
+ WITNESSES
+
+The Honorable James Loy, ADM, Deputy Secretary, Department of
+ Homeland Security
+ Oral Statement................................................. 11
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 14
+Mr. John O. Brennan, Director, Terrorist Threat Integration
+ Center
+ Oral Statement................................................. 17
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 18
+
+ APPENDIX
+ Material Submitted for the Record
+
+Responses and Questions from The Honorable Loretta Sanchez....... 63
+Responses and Questions from The Minority Staff.................. 64
+
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+ THE HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM
+
+ ----------
+
+
+ Wednesday, February 4, 2004
+
+ House of Representatives,
+ Select Committee on Homeland Security,
+ Washington, DC.
+ The committee met, pursuant to call, at 12:38 p.m., in room
+2175, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Cox
+[chairman of the committee] presiding.
+ Present: Representatives Cox, Dunn, Shays, Camp, Linder,
+Shadegg, Gibbons, Granger, Sweeney, Turner, Sanchez, Markey,
+Frank, Harman, Cardin, Slaughter, DeFazio, Lowey, Norton,
+McCarthy, Jackson-Lee, Pascrell, Christensen, Etheridge, and
+Lucas.
+ Chairman Cox. [Presiding.] Good afternoon. A quorum being
+present, the Homeland Security Committee will come to order.
+ This committee is meeting today to hear testimony on the
+Homeland Security Advisory System.
+ I would like to thank the members in attendance, and thank
+both our distinguished witnesses--Admiral James Loy, the deputy
+secretary of Homeland Security, and John Brennan, director of
+the Terrorist Threat Integration Center--for their willingness
+to share their expertise with us.
+ This marks Admiral Loy's first testimony before the
+Congress in his new capacity as deputy secretary of Homeland
+Security.
+ Admiral Loy, we are honored to welcome you and look forward
+to working closely with you in guiding the department's
+progress, in meeting its Homeland Security Act mandate.
+ John Brennan has been with us before, and we welcome you
+back.
+ Since September 11, 2001, we have made dramatic, undeniable
+progress in securing the American territory. Everyone here
+agrees on that.
+ The president and the Congress have joined forces to lead a
+fundamental transformation in the way the Federal Government
+views the national security and how it should relate to state
+and local governments, as well as to the private sector, in
+order to promote the security of the American people and our
+territory.
+ The Department of Homeland Security is one important
+product of that dynamic policy reorientation. While the
+Terrorist Threat Integration Center was, like the Homeland
+Security Advisory System itself, called into existence without
+benefit of congressional action, the Congress are nevertheless
+delighted to note the constructive work it is doing in bringing
+together information and analysts to form a comprehensive
+picture of the terrorist threats we face.
+ In fact, TTIC is doing such good work, we are inclined to
+think it might be best internalized in the department and made
+answerable to the secretary of homeland security. That,
+however, is discussion for another time.
+ Today we want to get a better understanding of the Homeland
+Security Advisory System itself--our color-coded national
+warning system, it is purpose, how it actually works, and its
+potential, including how it could be improved.
+ The system's color-coded warnings have become the primary
+means by which the Federal Government communicates directly to
+the public, its bottom-line judgment on the risk of terrorist
+attack at any given time.
+ It is our inescapable reminder that the Nation is engaged
+in a global war on terror and that we ourselves may be at risk
+of attack.
+ The president's directive establishing the system puts it
+plainly, ``The higher the threat condition, the greater the
+risk of a terrorist attack.''
+ Adjusting the threat condition up or down is, in short, a
+very significant public statement to the American people by
+their government. As a result, we have learned that raising the
+national threat level can have direct implications, not only
+for personal safety, but also it may entail widespread changes
+in personal behavior, including travel and spending patterns,
+with corresponding if temporary effects on the nation's
+economy.
+ Government and private sector entities, too, must take
+appropriate measures to increase their security posture every
+time the threat level is raised. And those measures are costly.
+ I will get to that in a minute.
+ They key point is that the reliability and timeliness of
+the advisory system's national threat warnings must be
+unquestioned.
+ I want to stress at the outset the public nature of the
+color-coded warning system.
+ The Homeland Security Act provides, in Section 201, that
+the department's Homeland Security Advisory System
+responsibilities include, ``Exercising primary responsibility
+for public advisories related to threats to homeland
+security''--that is Section 201(d)(7)(a) of the Homeland
+Security Act.
+ I think it follows that what we use the system's public
+advisories--that is, its color-coded warnings--to say, we
+should be willing to say and to explain publicly. Because the
+Homeland Security Act goes on to note that the department's
+responsibilities have a second element that need not be public,
+the responsibility, ``in coordination with other agencies of
+the Federal Government to provide specific warning information
+and advice about appropriate protective measures and
+countermeasures to state and local government agencies and
+authorities to private sector, other entities and the
+public''--that is Section 201(d)(7)(b) of the act.
+ So we need to make sure that we use the public threat
+advisory system to advise the American public of threats that
+are truly national in scope, or to warn of region or sector-
+specific threats that we are able and willing to identify and
+discuss in public, including as a means of diverting or
+delaying potential attacks.
+ That is to say, we should not be using the public color-
+coded threat advisory system to warn of terrorist threats that
+are not national in scope if we are not willing to discuss them
+publicly. For them, we should be using the second element of
+the statutory provision I just quoted.
+ That brings me back to the cost issue.
+ Securing the homeland is expensive. Every national
+terrorist threat warning triggers a massive chain reaction
+throughout our society. Government officials at all levels,
+businesses of all sorts and sizes, as well as individual
+citizens are left with the fundamental question: What does code
+orange mean for me?
+ The answer in the absence of specific guidance as to the
+nature, potential targets and likely timing of the threat has
+been a nationwide piling on of enhanced security measures,
+breaking state and local overtime budgets and redirecting their
+personnel from their other duties. If we can avoid or diminish
+that effect, we should, and soon.
+ It is, after all, a fundamental part of the terrorist
+strategy to destroy our economy and our way of life. We must
+not, through our well-meaning efforts, give them any help.
+ All across America, in our public and private institutions,
+we are spending considerable sums of money to enhance our
+security, and we must do it wisely.
+ It is enormously intrusive and unnecessarily expensive to
+call a heightened state of alert across the Nation when hard
+intelligence shows that only certain parts of the country or
+certain sectors of our critical infrastructure are at increased
+risk.
+ This committee will soon be marking up H.R. 3266, the
+Faster and Smarter Funding for First Responders Act, voted
+unanimously out of our Emergency Preparedness and Response
+Subcommittee late last year. That bill contains a provision
+that requires the secretary of homeland security to revise the
+advisory system so that warnings can be issued to the
+geographic regions or economic sectors which analysts believe
+are actually at risk.
+ The case for such reform is in the numbers. Reports
+describing code-orange-related expenditures include, just by
+way of example, a January 23 Los Angeles Times article that
+cites LAX officials reporting that during the most recent rise
+to orange, their security costs amounted to more than $3.8
+million since December 21st; an Associated Press report that
+officials in New Orleans spent between $200,000 and $300,000 a
+week in police overtime because of the latest orange alert; a
+U.S. Conference of Mayors' survey that shows cities spent about
+$70 million per week in orange-alert-related expenses.
+ Phoenix, for example, spent $154,000 on a weekly basis. Los
+Angeles spent $2.5 million each week. And New York City racked
+up $5 million each week in additional expenses.
+ We cannot expect states and localities to sustain such
+unbudgeted expenditures indefinitely.
+ To take a closer and more comprehensive look at the
+incremental costs incurred by Federal, state and local
+government agencies in responding to the last three code orange
+alerts, this committee made a bipartisan request for a GAO
+study. Initial findings reported to the committee last week
+show that state and local officials would like to receive more
+detailed guidance to help them determine what protective
+measures to take in response to orange alerts.
+ They also want DHS to provide more information on region
+and industry-specific threats.
+ They are right. Responding aimlessly over and over to a
+generalized warning draws down resources without any assurance
+of enhancing anyone's safety.
+ It may over time actually contribute to a degradation of
+this nation's vigilance, so-called warning fatigue, and so
+diminish the utility of the Homeland Security Advisory System.
+ There are encouraging signs. This week and late last month,
+I think we did a good job of identifying aircraft and routes
+our analysts believe were subject to heightened risk.
+Preventive measures were tailored to the apparent threat. In
+the process, DHS demonstrated its ability to use hard
+intelligence in directing a clear warning message only to where
+it was needed.
+ Responsible suggestions for canceling flights enabled the
+airlines to respond effectively.
+ Alerts to the public should, by contrast, be made only
+where they can be publicly explained or when the increased risk
+is truly national in its scope.
+ Keeping the American people at a high level of anxiety is
+not a sustainable strategy. Throughout most of the heightened
+alert periods, including increasing the alert level from yellow
+to orange and back again, the public has been told at the same
+time to go about their normal everyday lives. The question
+remains: Why issue, then, a public threat advisory at all?
+ Great Britain's national alert system, for example,
+communicates warnings only to law enforcement officials. The
+general population is never notified because causing alarms to
+the general population would be counterproductive.
+ On the other hand, public alerts may serve to delay or
+deter terrorist attacks and may, therefore, enhance
+opportunities to prevent them.
+ We must, in some, strike an appropriate balance between
+providing meaningful warning where hard intelligence warrants
+it and causing a senseless, unfocused nationwide response to
+unspecific threat alerts.
+ I look forward to our witnesses' views on how best to
+strike that balance.
+ The chair now recognizes Mr. Turner, the ranking Democratic
+member, for any statement he might have.
+ Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Secretary Loy, let me congratulate you on your new position
+and thank you for appearing before our committee today.
+ As deputy secretary, you have the critical role of managing
+that department. I guess you have most of the duties that
+Secretary Ridge has except maybe you do not have to go to all
+the press conferences.
+ But we are pleased to have you.
+ And, Mr. Brennan, welcome back to you.
+ Both of you are here to talk about a subject that the
+chairman and I have both had a great deal of interest in: the
+Homeland Security Advisory System.
+ I have been able to observe the threat alert system over
+the last two years and have been able to view it in light of
+the briefings that we receive regularly regarding the threat.
+And I think it gives us a unique perspective on the system,
+being able to compare the threat information with the raising
+of the alert at the various times that it has been raised in
+the last couple of years.
+ And after thinking about ways we might change the system,
+and observing how I think the public has reacted over time to
+the warnings, it is my judgment that the color-coded system
+should be eliminated.
+ The system that we have today we all know was created very
+quickly after September 11th. It was our government's first
+attempt to establish a national system to alert our citizens
+and our economic sectors about homeland security threats. And
+while the system may have served some initial purpose, I do not
+believe that the color codes are serving us well today.
+ Americans understand that we are fighting a long war on
+terror, often fought in the shadows and without a clear
+understanding of when or where we might be attacked. Therefore,
+our intelligence, law enforcement and other security forces
+must remain vigilant all the time, not just when the color code
+is raised.
+ Specific threat advisories can help target the vigilance of
+these law enforcement and security forces by increasing their
+security measure at certain places and during certain times
+when they receive specific information.
+ And I think certain sectors of our economy, if given the
+direct and specific information, can make adjustments that are
+important.
+ But the color-coded threat alert system that we have does
+not meet, in my judgment, our true security needs.
+ First of all, I think that the color codes send very mixed
+messages. In December we raised the threat level to orange, and
+as the chairman said, we told the American people not to change
+their plans or take any specific actions to protect themselves.
+I think that leaves the public confused and somewhat agitated
+with a system that causes them alarm but gives them no specific
+guidance about what to do.
+ Constantly raising and lowering this color-coded level is I
+think making the public numb to the ongoing threat of
+terrorism.
+ People need to know that they should be constantly alert.
+We need a culture of awareness in this country to be alert to
+suspicious behavior that may be linked to terrorism.
+ Second, I believe the color-coded system is not providing
+threat information to the people that need it in order to make
+and take decisive action.
+ Our law enforcement, security and emergency personnel do
+not need a color; they just need the facts.
+ And if the governors and the mayors of this country need to
+order additional security measures, they need credible,
+actionable intelligence from the Federal Government.
+ The General Accounting Office and the Gilmore Commission
+both reported that state and local officials are not getting
+the specific information they need to do their jobs. They are
+looking for more help, for more information. It is a constant
+cry I hear every time that I travel into our communities.
+ Our state and local officials need to know the details
+before causing public concern and being asked to spend scarce
+dollars on unnecessary security measures.
+ In addition, I believe that the all-or-nothing nature of
+the current system fails to distinguish between areas and
+sectors of the economy that we believe are at heightened risk.
+When the threat level is raised, a wide range of Federal,
+state, local and private sector protection plans go into
+effect. Although the intelligence has not suggested that all
+sectors of our society are specifically threatened. State and
+local governments spend hundreds of thousands of dollars,
+perhaps millions, to defend against an unknown threat.
+ Finally, I think we also need to consider whether the alert
+system is helping terrorists more than it is helping us. When
+we raise and lower the threat level, we are also telling Al-
+Qa`2ida that we are strengthening our defenses. And then again,
+we tell them that we are lowering our guard when we lower the
+color.
+ I think I agree with the chairman that we need to look at
+our system and question whether or not we are giving our
+enemies as much information as we are giving ourselves.
+ Now, I recognize that the administration's in a very
+difficult dilemma here. Our intelligence agencies gather a lot
+of information, and very little of it relates to specific
+attack. And I can say, having received these intelligence
+briefings, that it is pretty clear to me that this general
+threat information is continuous and ongoing.
+ I think we should have a level of security deployed around
+the country that is appropriate in light of the ongoing and the
+consistent threat of terrorism that we face.
+ When we believe there is a greater risk of attack, those
+who are able to take specific action should be advised and
+should be given as much information as we possibly can share.
+But issuing general alerts does not serve a useful purpose and
+may well be counterproductive.
+ Another point that I think is worthy of some consideration
+here, and that is that the very existence of this color-coded
+system really creates a no-win situation for the department. If
+the department fails to raise the level of alert and an attack
+occurs, you will be severely criticized. If, on the other hand,
+you raise the alert and nothing happens, people are quickly
+going to say you are crying wolf once again.
+ And the political reality here is that the political
+pressure is always there for you to raise the alert level when
+threat information comes to you that indicates there may be
+some change.
+ And so I think the political reality is that political
+pressure itself may cause an over utilization of the color-
+coded system.
+ So I think we would be much better off if we shared with
+the public and with the communities and geographic areas and
+sectors what we have specific threat information about. And if
+we have general information that is more specific and may
+affect the entire country, let's just share it and tell them
+what it is. But to simply go through the motions of talking
+about color codes to me is not the America that I think we want
+to know, nor is it giving us the information that we need to
+have.
+ Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Cox. Thank you very much.
+ Under committee rule three, members who were present in the
+first five minutes can make opening statements of three minutes
+or reserve their time for questioning.
+ Does any member wish to make an opening statement?
+
+ Prepared Statement of the Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in
+Congress From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Select Committee
+ on Homeland Security
+
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Secretary Loy, let me congratulate you on your new position. The
+Deputy Secretary in any department is the person who makes sure that
+things get done. In this department, you will have your hands full, and
+I am pleased to see that you are on the job.
+ Mr. Brennan, welcome back. Thank you both for being here to discuss
+the Homeland Security Advisory System.
+ I have been closely observing the threat alert system closely over
+the past two years and have received threat briefings when the level
+has been raised to orange. After thinking about possible changes that
+could be made to the system, and seeing how the general public has is
+reacting over time to the warnings, my judgment is that this system
+should be eliminated.
+ The system we have today was created quickly after the September
+11, 2001 attacks. It was the government's first attempt to establish a
+national system to alert our citizens and our economic sectors about
+homeland security threats.
+ While the system may have initially served a useful purpose, it is
+not serving us well now.
+ Americans understand that we are fighting a long war on terror,
+often fought in the shadows, without a clear understanding of when or
+how we might be attacked. Therefore, our intelligence, law enforcement,
+and other security forces must remain vigilant, at all times. Specific
+threat advisories can help to target that vigilance, by increasing
+security measures in certain places and for certain sectors of the
+economy.
+ But the color coded threat alert system we have doesn't meet these
+security needs.
+ First, we send very mixed messages. In December, we raised the
+threat level to ORANGE, but told the American public not to change
+their plans or take any specific measures to protect themselves. This
+leaves the public confused and agitated with a system that causes them
+alarm but gives them no concrete guidance. Constantly raising and
+lowering the threat level is also making the public numb to the ongoing
+threat of terrorism. People need to know that they should be constantly
+alert to suspicious behavior that may be linked to terrorism.
+ Second, the color coded system is not providing threat information
+to the people that need it in order to take decisive action.
+ Our law enforcement, security, and emergency personnel don't need a
+color, they need the facts. If the governors and mayors of this country
+need to order additional security measures, they need credible,
+actionable intelligence from the federal government. However, as the
+GAO and Gilmore Commission have reported, state and local officials are
+not getting the specific information they need to do their jobs. They
+are looking for more help from the Department. Our state and local
+officials need to know the details before causing public concern and
+spending scarce dollars on unnecessary security measures.
+ In addition, the all-or-nothing nature of the current system fails
+to distinguish between areas and sectors of the economy that we believe
+are at a heightened risk. When the threat level is raised, a wide range
+of federal, state, local, and private sector protection plans go into
+effect, although the intelligence has not suggested that all sectors of
+our society are specifically threatened. State and local governments
+spend hundreds of thousands of dollars--perhaps millions--to defend
+against an amorphous threat.
+ Finally, we also need to consider whether the alert system is
+helping the terrorists more than it is helping us. When we raise and
+lower the threat level, we are also telling Al-Qa`ida when we are
+strengthening our defenses, and then again when we are lowering our
+guard. I agree with the Chairman that this alert system may present a
+roadmap, broadcasting our vulnerabilities to those who would do us
+harm.
+ I recognize that the Administration faces a difficult dilemma. Our
+intelligence agencies gather a great deal of information, and very
+little of it relates to a specific attack. We should have a level of
+security deployed around the country that is appropriate in light of
+the ongoing, consistent threat of terrorism that we face. When we
+believe there is greater risk of attack, those who are able to take
+specific action should be advised. But issuing general alerts does not
+serve a useful purpose and may well be counterproductive.
+ I urge our witnesses and the Department to reform the threat alert
+system. We need to create a system that is flexible, gets actionable
+information quickly to the people that need to take action, and
+underscores the need for our citizens to remain vigilant in the face of
+the threats we face.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing. I look forward
+to the testimony of our witnesses today.
+
+ Prepared Opening Statement of The Honorable John B. Shadegg, a
+ Representative in Congress from the State of Arizona
+
+ I commend Chairman Cox for holding this important hearing and look
+forward to the testimony of Admiral Loy.
+ Today we wi11 learn about the steps the Department is taking to
+improve the Homeland Security Advisory System. It is safe to say that
+overall homeland security in general has improved since 9/11.
+Awareness, intelligence sharing, and investment in our first responders
+have all increased. Likewise, states, localities, police and fire
+departments are becoming more comfortable with what it means to move
+from yellow to orange on the Homeland Security Advisory System.
+ At the same time, there is room for improvement. As you know, my
+Subcommittee passed the Smarter Faster Funding for First Responders
+bill on November 20th. That legislation would encourage the Department
+to make the warnings more specific, by including geographic information
+and a- description of what kind of industry or business is threatened.
+I applaud the Chairman and the Ranking Member for supporting that
+legislation. I believe that it is a step in the right direction, and I
+look forward to seeing it pass full committee as soon as possible.
+ I am still concerned, however, that we have not fully explained to
+the American people what moving from yellow to orange on the Homeland
+Security Advisory System means. Does that mean that they should fill up
+their gas tank, or buy reserve water, or give blood?
+ As the brave men and women on Flight 93 proved, Americans are ready
+and willing to join the fight against terrorism, but they need more
+tangible information about what they can do. Leveraging the support of
+the American public is critical to our future success. I applaud
+efforts like ready.gov and the citizens corps, but as the Department
+continues to refine the Homeland Security Advisory System, I strongly
+encourage a focus on what citizens can do.
+
+ Prepared Opening Statement of The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a
+ Representative in Congress From the State of California
+
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to start by welcoming our
+witnesses and thanking you both for being here.
+ Today, we're here to talk about the Homeland Security Advisory
+System. It is my hope that you are going to report to us that this
+system has proven to be ineffective that you have instead come up with
+a far improved method to keep our citizens safe and calm.
+ The mission of the Department is to protect the public from
+terrorists. And I am. quite sure it was not the intention of the
+Department to create a system that keeps us at an elevated state of
+alert at all times.
+ There are three main areas that are a source of concern for me that
+I'm hoping I will hear you address today in terms of the alert system
+as it stands today.
+ Those three topics are: (1) the WAY in which we obtain intelligence
+on terrorist activity; (2) the way we disseminate that information to
+the public-and in particular to law enforcement; and (3) the
+expectations of the public once they receive that information.
+ I've talked with several people in the law enforcement community
+across California about these issues and the various breakdowns in each
+area, and it would appear that we still have some real changes to make.
+ On the issue of intelligence, one only needs to read the papers
+lately to have real doubts about the quality of the information we are
+receiving. I'm hoping that Mr. Brennen can speak further about this
+issue. Have we been successful in our intelligence gathering? Are there
+areas in which we can make improvements?
+ As for dissemination of information once we identify threats, I'm
+told there are real breakdowns in this area, particularly as it relates
+to the law enforcement community.
+ I'd be willing to bet that every member on this panel has heard a
+complaint from local law enforcement that they've gotten a million
+calls from citizens asking what they should do because the threat level
+was raised to orange. Then the there are the obvious questions that
+follow from those law enforcement officers, "Why wasn't I notified? Why
+do I have to find out by CNN or a citizen's phone call?"
+ I am confident that you have some ideas on how we can better
+communicate with our First Responders.
+ Finally, the warning itself is far too broad and there is no
+suggested action to be taken.
+ It is unfair, even cruel, to tell the public: ``You are in more
+danger than you were yesterday. We have information that you may be
+attacked. This means someone is trying to kill you. What should you do
+about it? Nothing really. Go about your normal routine, just be a
+little extra afraid.''
+ I believe we can do better than saying: ``We think that somewhere
+in this huge country there might be a terrorist attack.'' How can we
+expect the public to have any confidence in our ability to protect
+them? More importantly, how do we expect them to feel safe?
+ I am interested in digging deeper into these issues, and I am
+hopeful that you have some ideas about some real changes with regards
+to the alert system that should replace this one, a tool that will
+really help protect the public. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+
+ Prepared Statement of The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a
+ Representative for in Congress From the State of Texas
+
+ Chairman Cox, Ranking Member Turner, I thank you for your efforts
+and energy in providing today's distinguished witnesses and for
+organizing this important hearing on the Homeland Security Advisory
+System. The alert system is of considerable controversy, and the
+testimony and analysis that will go on record today will allow us to
+improve the system. Thank you also to Admiral James Loy and to Mr. John
+Brennan for their time and testimony.
+ I join my colleague the Ranking Member Turner in his criticism of
+the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS). Philosophically, it does
+no more than incite fear and anxiety for American citizens. A true
+``advisory system'' would do just that-advise citizens rather than send
+them into a frenzy. Since the HSAS's inception on March 12, 2002, I
+have advocated the need for a system of relevant and concise
+instructions for citizens-information that is truly useful in the event
+of a threatening situation.
+ On December 31, 2003, I held a Homeland Security Taskforce Meeting
+in Houston, Texas and met with personnel from the Houston Police
+Department, School District Police Department, Fire Department, Mental
+Health Mental Retardation of Harris County, Office of Emergency
+Management, Health Department, Airport System, and the Houston chapter
+of the American Red Cross; members of the local branches of the Federal
+Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA);
+and the local academic and church communities to discuss the viability
+of Houston's threat assessment systems with respect to homeland
+security. As a Member of this Committee as well as Ranking Member of
+the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Control, it
+was critical that I bring back to my fellow Committee members an urgent
+initiative to analyze and improve the interoperability and
+functionality of our local and national First Responder corps. This
+improvement initiative begins with a threat advisory system that
+actually gives intelligent and articulable information that first
+responders can use in such an instance.
+ Among the issues that we discussed on December 31st were whether
+the funding levels, equipment availability, depth of personnel, and
+degree of interoperability between local, state, and federal systems
+are adequate to facilitate timely emergency response. Overall, some of
+the responses given were that intelligence-sharing has generally
+improved; however, other important aspects clearly require immediate
+attention. Monies that were promised back in 2001 by the federal
+government have not been received; more hospital beds and medical
+equipment are needed; and the first responder staff and equipment
+levels must be increased.
+ The orange alert issued on December 21st signified a `high' risk of
+terror threat. With an improved and more comprehensive advisory system,
+our local hubs perhaps would have already been prepared! The issues
+underscored in that Taskforce meeting are of grave importance in a city
+such as Houston, the fourth largest city in the nation. We are the home
+to many critical sites such as ports of entry, power grids, major
+medical centers, and central business facilities that need to have
+adequate training, a sufficient number of personnel, necessary
+equipment, and adequate funding in the event that DHS issues a high
+alert as we have today. Clearly, we in Congress must hold oversight
+hearings as to the degree of threat assessment operability and
+interoperability of our cities? first responder systems and whether our
+communities across the nation are prepared in addition to today's
+matter-more focused on the alert system itself.
+ Relative to suggested improvements to the system that will make it
+more effective, the Houston Chapter of the American Red Cross offered
+the following alert language to replace the ``orange threat level''
+indication:
+
+Individuals
+ Review your Personal Disaster Plan.
+ Ensure your Disaster Supplies Kit is stocked and
+ ready.
+ Develop alternate routes to and from work or school
+ and practice them.
+ Exercise caution when traveling.
+ Have shelter-in-place materials on hand and review the
+ procedure in Terrorism: Preparing for the Unexpected, a Red
+ Cross brochure.
+
+Families
+ Review Family Disaster Plan with all family members
+ Check items in your Disaster Supplies Kit and replace
+ items that are outdated.
+ If not known to you, contact your child's school to
+ determine their emergency notification and evacuation plans.
+ Ensure the emergency communication plan is understood
+ and practiced by all family members.
+ Discuss children's fears concerning possible terrorist
+ attacks.
+
+Neighborhoods
+ Check on neighbors who are elderly or have special
+ needs to ensure they are okay.
+ Review their disaster plan with them.
+ If a need is announced, contact nearest blood
+ collection agency and offer to organize a neighborhood blood
+ drive.
+
+Schools
+ Review the school's emergency plan that was developed
+ using the Red Cross Emergency Guide for Business and Industry.
+ Ensure all emergency supplies are stocked and ready.
+ Offer Masters of Disaster ``Facing Fear: Helping Young People
+ Deal with Terrorism and Tragic Events'' lessons in grades K-12.
+ Prepare to handle inquiries from anxious parents and
+ media.
+
+Businesses
+ Review the emergency plans, including continuity of
+ operations and media materials on hand.
+ Ensure that the emergency communication plan is
+ updated and includes the purchase of needed emergency equipment
+ as detailed in the Red Cross Emergency Management Guide for
+ Business and Industry.
+ Determine any need to restrict access to the business
+ or provide private security firm support/reinforcement.
+ Contact vendors/suppliers to confirm their emergency
+ response plan procedures.
+ I advocate an advisory system very similar to that which the
+American Red Cross presents. Because the alerts would be so narrowly
+focused, they would not cost cities, states, and municipalities the
+extraneous amount of emergency preparedness dollars that they struggle
+to produce to respond.
+ Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, for the above reasons, I recommend
+restructuring of the Homeland Security Advisory System. Thank you for
+assembling this meeting.
+ Hearing no requests, the chair is pleased to again welcome Admiral
+Loy.
+ Thank you again for being with us this afternoon, and thank you for
+your written testimony, which we have provided to the members in
+advance.
+ We would be pleased if you would take five minutes to summarize
+your testimony.
+
+ STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES LOY, ADM, DEPUTY SECRETARY,
+ DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
+
+ Admiral Loy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Good morning, Mr. Turner.
+ I would like to thank you as well as the other members of
+the committee for providing the chance to talk about the
+Homeland Security Advisory System.
+ First, let me publicly thank my colleague, John Brennan,
+sitting next door. Since I arrived on the scene at DHS in early
+December, I think I have spent more time with John than I have
+with my family.
+ TTIC's charter is to be the coordination point for the
+sharing of information related to terrorist threats for the
+intelligence community. In our day, every day at DHS starts
+with a TTIC review of current threat analysis. If it is about
+the terrorist threat, it goes to TTIC from any point now on the
+intelligence community compass, including some very new ones,
+like state, local and private sector information provided to
+them from DHS.
+ Armed with this all-source array, TTIC offers the analytic
+product for those of us charged with operational
+responsibility.
+ TTIC, like DHS, is an evolving organization, getting better
+at its job every day.
+ John and his team have done an exceptional job in starting
+up the center and meeting the charter in the law. They have
+become a key cog in the business of securing our homeland.
+ On March 11th, 2002, President Bush created the Homeland
+Security Advisory System, as the chairman said, as a tool to
+improve coordination and communication among all levels of
+government, the private sector and the American public in the
+fight against terrorism.
+ The advisory system is binding on all Federal agencies
+except the Department of Defense. And it is encourage for state
+and local governments and the private sector; 55 of the 56
+states and territories have adopted it.
+ During periods of heightened concern, the framework
+provides the ability to change the threat condition on a
+national level while also affording the opportunity to target
+communications to particular geographic regions, industry
+sectors or other affected entities.
+ The latitude provided by HSPD-3 allows the department to
+address unforeseen situations and continue to refine the
+advisory system as the need arises. This flexibility is
+critical to the success of the advisory system and essential to
+its effective implementation as both the chairman and the
+ranking member have commented.
+ With the creation of the department on March 1st, 2003, the
+advisory system has evolved into a framework that married the
+analytical assets of the intelligence community with the
+department's unique responsibility in IAIP, that directorate,
+to assess the nation's vulnerabilities and implement protective
+measures.
+ The system in its various dimensions continues to evolve.
+And I believe we have reached a threshold in that evolution
+where the system serves the Nation well.
+ When all the rhetoric is lifted, it is simply a tool in the
+system we have designed to secure our homeland. As part of a
+system that includes other tools and can be used selectively
+itself, the HSAS has demonstrated its utility on several
+occasions.
+ This evolution to date has revealed three basic ways, I
+believe, to use the system.
+ First, as a universal baseline, and as a universal
+adjusting tool, when and where the entire nation is alerted to
+a changed threat circumstance requiring across-the-board
+upgrades or downgrades of security activity.
+ Second, surgically, where the threat conditions can be
+changed geographically, by economic sector, or even by a
+combination of both, and if the first use is blunt, and
+certainly it is, this use is more sophisticated and it requires
+a more evolved system as exhibited in the just-passed December-
+January holiday period.
+ Third, using communication channels developed over the
+year, we now make adjustments within the existing threat
+condition to regions or sectors without a threat condition
+change at all.
+ All of these approaches are keyed to the best judgments we
+can make on the threat itself. It is a threat-based risk-
+managed system. It demands new and different thinking and
+judgment than has ever been necessary before.
+ We are getting better at it daily, and we look forward to
+working with the committee to work even better ideas into the
+HSAS framework.
+ We recognize that a decision to change the threat condition
+has significant economic, physical and psychological impacts on
+the nation. Therefore, decisions are taken by the secretary
+only after serious consultation with key colleagues around the
+Homeland Security Council table.
+ All the players at that table are now familiar with the
+range of actions the secretary has available to him. And in the
+final analysis, the HSAS is simply a communication tool.
+ We have developed other products to fill out that tool kit.
+Each can be used to inform a broad or narrow audience,
+depending on the threat. They range from information bulletins
+to advisories to conference calls to executive visits. And such
+products have enabled DHS to use the advisory system in a more
+targeted and flexible manner.
+ And as a result of this refined ability to target specific
+information with specific actions and prevention measures, the
+threshold for recommending changes to the threat condition has
+actually become more finely calibrated.
+ This evolution is best illustrated by the most recent
+threat period, the change over the December 2003 holiday
+window. At that time the threat condition was raised from
+yellow to orange based on a substantial increase in the volume
+of threat-related reports from credible sources across the
+board. These were the most specific threat reports that we have
+seen thus far.
+ When the threat condition was lowered on January 9th, DHS
+recommended that several industry sectors and geographic
+locales continue on a heightened alert status. And in this
+case, DHS utilized the HSAS communications tools to provide
+specific recommendations to particular industry sectors and for
+particular geographic areas in response to the specificity that
+we saw in the threat stream.
+ For the first time since the creation of the system, the
+department lowered the national threat level but recommended
+maintaining targeted protections for particular industries or
+geographical locales.
+ We are simply getting better at the decisionmaking required
+to meet our mission. In the end, it is about finding and
+building a flexible, effective system and then making good
+judgments and taking good decisions in the best interest of the
+American people.
+ Mr. Chairman, I had the pleasure of hearing your staff
+director in your absence and Mr. Turner at a dinner event
+Monday night. Each spoke about our common work together. It was
+almost uncanny how both gentlemen seemed to articulate loud and
+clear the thoughts and discussions we have every day in the
+department.
+ They spoke about focus and sacrifice across the board for
+this country and its citizens and strategic planning. They
+spoke about how the threat continues unabated and how we must
+be both offensive to rout out the enemy where he is to be found
+and equally aggressive in protecting our homeland. They spoke
+of building partnerships here and abroad and investing in
+technology as one of the keys to our eventual success--and they
+were on target on all counts.
+ Mr. Chairman, this is very hard work, as you have
+committed. We have immensely dedicated people doing it. And I
+am proud of the efforts invested in the work accomplished thus
+far, but we also have very far to go and much more to do. And
+we must hold on to a sense of urgency about getting that work
+done.
+ We at DHS are appreciative of your help, your ideas and
+your role as our conscience in this business.
+ This is my 44th year of public service, and the work I am
+immersed in with my colleagues has never been important to our
+country. We will get it done and we will get it done well. We
+will be on time and we will on budget. We will be innovative
+and we will be creative.
+ And we are trying hard not to be held back by the
+bureaucratic baggage of the past.
+ The American public deserves our very best effort and they
+will be getting nothing less.
+ Thank you sir, and I look forward to your questions.
+ [The statement of Admiral Loy follows:]
+
+ Prepared Statement of The Honorable James Loy
+
+ Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Turner. I would like to
+thank you, as well as the other members of the committee, for providing
+this opportunity for me to join my colleague from TTIC, John Brennan,
+to discuss the Homeland Security Advisory System.
+ On March 11, 2002, President Bush created the Homeland Security
+Advisory System (``HSAS'' or ``advisory system'') as a tool to improve
+coordination and communication among all levels of government, the
+private sector and the American public in the fight against terrorism.
+The advisory system is binding on the executive branch, and suggested,
+although voluntary, for State, local, territorial and tribal
+governments, and the private sector.
+ The system, created by Homeland Security Presidential Directive-3
+(HSPD-3) and now, pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002 ,
+administered by the Department of Homeland Security (``DHS'' or ``the
+Department'') identifies a flexible framework for communicating,
+addressing and mitigating terrorist threats to the nation utilizing a
+threat-based, risk-managed system. During periods of heightened
+concern, the framework provides the ability to change the Threat
+Condition on a national level, but also affords the opportunity to
+target communications to particular geographic locales, industry
+sectors or other affected entities. The latitude provided by HSPD-3
+allows the Department to address unforeseen situations and continue to
+refine the Advisory System as the need arises. This flexibility is
+critical to the success of the Advisory System and essential to its
+effective implementation.
+ With the creation of the Department on March 1, 2003, the advisory
+system evolved into a framework that married the analytical assets of
+the Intelligence Community (which includes DHS) with the Department's
+unique responsibility to assess the nation's vulnerabilities and
+implement protective measures. Since its creation on March 11, 2002,
+the HSAS Threat Condition has been changed on five separate occasions.
+In each instance, the condition was raised from Yellow to Orange, but
+the circumstances surrounding each decision to elevate the Threat
+Condition varied.
+ We recognize that a decision to change the Threat Condition has
+significant economic, physical and psychological impacts on the nation.
+Therefore, decisions made by the Secretary, in consultation with the
+Assistant to the President for Homeland Security to change the Threat
+Condition are made only after careful consideration and close
+coordination with other Federal agency heads, including other members
+of the Homeland Security Council. Let me take this opportunity to
+provide some insight into the decision making process.
+ In the regular course of business, the Intelligence Community
+constantly reviews available threat information. When that information
+provides sufficient indication of a plan to execute a terrorist attack,
+the source and origin of the intelligence are further analyzed to
+determine the specificity and credibility of the information. It is
+only when the information received is both specific and credible that
+the Department takes appropriate action under the advisory system. Even
+then, the Threat Condition is not automatically raised to the next
+higher level. The Secretary has a range of actions available to him.
+These actions range from the issuance of advisories or bulletins up to
+a determination to change the Threat Condition.
+ There are instances when the volume and credibility of the
+intelligence reaches a level that the Department believes it should
+notify the public of the increased risk and the actions professionals
+are taking in response to the threat. Although this is a subjective
+standard, this concept was demonstrated when DHS elevated the Threat
+Condition from Yellow to Orange for Operation Liberty Shield. The
+decision to change the Threat Condition was based on intelligence
+reporting indicating Al-Qa`ida's desire to attack the US in response to
+the US-led military campaign in Iraq. As you are aware, in this
+instance during a time of war, DHS recommended nationwide protective
+measures during a time of war.
+ Since then Advisory System has evolved as more specific threat
+information has become available and the Department's ability to
+communicate threat information and protective actions to those affected
+improved. One example of this evolution is the development of specific,
+audience-tailored communications tools to address specific threats and
+provide measures to be taken in response to threats or vulnerabilities.
+These products have enabled the Department to implement the advisory
+system in a more practical and flexible manner. In fact, since March
+11, 2002, the protective posture of our nation has increased based on
+our refined ability to respond to specific information with targeted
+actions and prevention measures. As a result, today's Threat Condition
+Yellow is yesterday's Orange, effectively raising the threshold for
+changing the Threat Condition.
+ This evolution is best illustrated by the most recent Threat
+Condition change over the December 2003 holiday period. At that time,
+the Threat Condition was raised from Yellow to Orange based on
+intelligence reports indicating a substantial increase in the volume of
+threat-related reports from credible sources that Al-Qa`ida continues
+to consider using aircraft as a weapon and other threat reporting
+targeting numerous cities in multiple geographic locales. These were
+the most specific threat reports that we have seen thus far. Even
+though the national Threat Condition was lowered on January 9, 2004,
+DHS recommended that several industry sectors and geographic locales
+continue on a heightened alert status. In this case, DHS utilized the
+HSAS communications tools to provide specific recommendations to
+particular industry sectors and for particular geographic areas in
+response to specific threat information. For the first time since the
+creation of the HSAS, the Department lowered the national threat level
+but recommended maintaining targeted protections for a particular
+industry sector or geographic locale.
+ In addition to the ability to change the Threat Condition, the
+advisory system also utilizes communications tools, defined as threat
+products, to provide more targeted and specific information to a broad
+or narrowly focused audience. In some cases, the protective actions
+taken by the affected entities affect decisions on raising or lowering
+the Threat Condition.
+ Threat products consist of warning and non-warning information
+designed to inform a particular audience about an existing threat or
+current incident. Two threat products used by the Department are Threat
+Advisories and Information Bulletins.
+ Threat Advisories contain actionable information about incident
+information or a threat targeting critical national networks,
+infrastructures, or key assets. These products may suggest a change in
+readiness posture, protective actions, or response that should be
+implemented in a timely manner.
+ Information Bulletins communicate information of interest to the
+nation's critical infrastructures and other non-governmental entities
+that does not meet the timeliness, specificity, or significance
+thresholds of threat advisories. Such information may include
+statistical reports, summaries, incident response or reporting
+guidelines, common vulnerabilities and patches, and configuration
+standards or tools. Because these products are derived from
+intelligence they are generally communicated on a need-to-know basis to
+a targeted audience, such as the intelligence that is shared at both
+the classified and unclassified level with State, local and private
+sector officials. Together, these products provide a thorough, well-
+calibrated system to prevent terrorist attack. The evolutionary nature
+of the advisory system, and the authority resident in HSPD-3, enable
+the Secretary to utilize a variety of tools to address terrorist
+threats that may affect the United States.
+ Like other advisory systems, the success of the HSAS also depends
+upon our ability to work closely with Federal, State, and local
+officials, the private sector and the public. DHS not only communicates
+threat information but must also provide our partners with specific
+actions that can be taken at all levels to protect against the threat.
+The cornerstone of the HSAS is the protective measures that are
+implemented at each Threat Condition. The Federal government, States
+and the private sector each have a set of plans and protective measures
+that are implemented when the Threat Condition is raised. It is these
+protective measures and those specifically recommended in the HSAS
+communications tools that reduce the nation's vulnerability to
+terrorist attacks. However, it must be noted that while DHS encourages
+the adoption of the HSAS at the State and local level, the HSAS is
+intended to supplement, not replace, other systems currently
+implemented by State and local authorities and the private sector.
+ Prior to announcing a decision to elevate the Threat Condition, DHS
+communicates directly with its Federal, State, local, private sector
+and international contacts as appropriate. These communications provide
+specific information regarding the intelligence supporting the change
+in the Threat Condition. As appropriate for the audience, protective
+measures are developed and communicated with the threat information
+prior to a public announcement of the decision. While at a heightened
+Threat Condition, DHS maintains regular contact with State and local
+officials and provides regular updates. In the event that threats are
+targeted to particular cities or states, DHS provides those State and
+local officials with the most detailed intelligence information
+possible at both the classified and unclassified level.
+ It is important to note that threat information that is shared by
+the Department, and the ultimate raising of the Threat Condition, are
+actions primarily intended for security professionals at all levels of
+government and the private sector. However, in this post 9/11 world, in
+some cases threat information distributed by the Department or other
+Federal agencies eventually becomes accessible in the public domain.
+Based on this reality, the HSAS has again evolved to include a clear
+public explanation of the threat information to avoid misinterpretation
+of the information. When a change is made to the Threat Condition, DHS
+Secretary Tom Ridge includes guidance to the public regarding specific
+actions that can be taken in response to the threat. In addition to
+encouraging increased vigilance, DHS has recommended specific actions
+for the public including guidance for expediting their interactions
+with Transportation Security Administration airport screeners when
+traveling by commercial aviation. Although information is provided
+publicly regarding protective measures, it is important for the public
+to understand that DHS implements and recommends additional and more
+specific protective measures to State and local officials that are only
+disseminated to security professionals.
+ Increasing citizen and community preparedness is a Departmental
+priority. One year ago, Secretary Ridge launched a multi-faceted public
+information campaignSec. conjunction with the Ad Council, which has
+received over $150 million in donated advertising. The public
+information campaign directs callers to a web site or and ``800''
+telephone number that provides critical information on emergency
+preparedness and different types of terrorist threats. Brochures on
+this effort are also distributed through Post Offices across the
+country and Salvation Army distribution centers as well as other
+private sector partners. The Ready information campaign works in
+concert with the American Red Cross and Citizen Corps, the department's
+initiative to mobilize volunteer leaders to increase their community's
+preparedness. The Ready.gov website provides specific actions
+individuals and families can take such as creating and testing a family
+emergency plan and assembling an emergency kit to ensure there are
+sufficient supplies available when needed.
+ Along with providing information to the public, DHS also works with
+State and local officials and the private sector in developing specific
+protective measures. The Department recognizes that each State,
+locality and private sector facility is unique and requires the
+development of different protective measures. For example, the
+protective measures required for and implemented by New York City are
+vastly different from the protective measures that Orange County,
+California will implement. In recognition of this difference, DHS
+communicates regularly with and provides technical advice to State and
+local officials to assist in the development of specialized and
+appropriate protective measures. Certain national law enforcement
+associations have also been awarded Homeland Security grant funding to
+further develop their own standard procedures for security measures to
+correspond with HSAS Threat Conditions.
+ DHS also works directly with critical infrastructure owners and
+operators to ensure that adequate protective measures and plans are in
+place to reduce the vulnerability to terrorism. Through this effort,
+DHS can deny terrorists the opportunity to use our infrastructure as a
+weapon. Let me offer two examples of this partnering:
+ DHS sends out teams consisting of DHS personnel and personnel from
+other agencies to critical infrastructure sites throughout the country
+to conduct site assistance visits. These visits are focused on
+identifying vulnerabilities and shared characteristics of that critical
+infrastructure sector element. After the visits, a report is prepared
+about the site and shared with local law enforcement, Federal law
+enforcement and the owner/operator of the facility. This procedure
+assists the owner/operator in identifying their vulnerabilities and
+adding appropriate protective measures.
+ However, it is not enough just to ``look inside the fence'' and
+identify the vulnerabilities of the site. We must work to remove the
+operational environment for a terrorist outside these facilities. To
+protect the area outside these critical infrastructure sites, DHS also
+conducts and prepares buffer zone protection plans. These community-
+based protection plans facilitate the development of effective
+preventive measures and make it more difficult for terrorists to
+conduct surveillance or launch an attack from the immediate vicinity of
+a high value or high probability of success site. The site assistance
+visits and buffer zone protection plans are just two ways in which DHS
+partners with critical infrastructure owners and operators to ensure
+that they have the best protective measures to guard against any
+terrorist incident.
+ Since the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the HSAS
+has experienced an evolution from the preventative elevation of the
+threat level from Yellow to Orange during Operation Liberty Shield to
+the most recent threat specific elevation during the December 2003
+holiday season. Over the past year, the system has been raised and
+lowered on three separate occasions, and each occurrence demonstrates
+that the Department's ongoing work to strengthen the system has
+improved the implementation of the system specific to each emerging
+threat. The evolutionary nature of the System, and the authority
+resident in HSPD-3, enable the Secretary to utilize a wide variety of
+tools to address threats that may affect the United States.
+ In the future as the Department matures and our implementation of
+the HSAS continues to evolve, we will work diligently to provide
+information that best suits the needs of Federal, State and local
+officials, the private sector and the public. We look forward to
+working with the Congress on ideas to improve the system. HSAS is
+simply a tool and is one of the many means to the end we all are
+working toward which is a secure homeland.
+ Thank you Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to answer any questions
+you may have.
+
+ Chairman Cox. Thank you, Admiral.
+ I now welcome our second and final witness, Mr. John
+Brennan, director of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center.
+Mr. Brennan is a 23-year veteran of the Central Intelligence
+Agency. He served as chief of staff to Director Tenet, and just
+prior to being appointed director of TTIC held the position of
+deputy executive director at the CIA.
+ Mr. Brennan, we are very appreciative of your being here
+today. I was going to say we have your testimony, but, do we
+have your testimony? We do, in fact, have your written
+testimony and we want to thank you for that, and also want to
+add five minutes for you to summarize that testimony.
+
+ STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN BRENNAN, DIRECTOR, TERRORIST THREAT
+ INTEGRATION CENTER
+
+ Mr. Brennan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
+ Thank you, Mr. Turner.
+ It is certainly a pleasure to appear before the committee
+today to be with my very good colleague, Secretary Loy, who, as
+he said, we have gotten to know each other quite well over the
+past many weeks.
+ I have submitted the written testimony and I look forward
+to answering your questions. But I would like to start off as
+we begin the hearing on the Homeland Security Advisory System,
+making three key points, important points, about the Terrorist
+Threat Integration Center's role in that system.
+ The Terrorist Threat Integration Center, which we refer to
+as TTIC, since its stand-up on 1 May of last year, has played I
+think an important role supporting the Department of Homeland
+Security during periods of heightened concern about terrorist
+attacks.
+ As you know, TTIC analysts have full, unfettered access to
+the full array of information available to the U.S. government
+related to the terrorist threat to the United States.
+ This access allows the analysts, who come from the
+Department of Homeland Security, the Central Intelligence
+Agency, Department of Defense, Department of State, the FBI and
+other departments and agencies of the government to produce
+integrated assessments of the terrorist threat facing U.S.
+interests, both at home and abroad.
+ As a recent example, in the very late hours of 20 December
+of last year, TTIC produced a terrorist threat alert and an
+analytic assessment of the Al-Qa`ida threat to the homeland,
+including against the aviation industry.
+ These TTIC products were key factors in the decision made
+the following day to raise the threat condition level to
+orange. Language from these TTIC products was provided to the
+Department of Homeland Security, to Secretary Loy and Secretary
+Ridge to use both publicly as well as in their interactions
+with state and local officials.
+ Second, even when the threat level is not heightened, TTIC
+has constant, in-depth interaction with the Department of
+Homeland Security intelligence components, indeed components
+throughout the Department of Homeland Security involved in the
+fight against terrorism. At least twice daily, TTIC and
+Department of Homeland Security officers are involved in a
+secure video teleconference with their colleagues from
+throughout the government to review the threat reporting and to
+look at it in terms of what type of threat it poses to U.S.
+interests.
+ In addition to these opportunities, there are also regular
+interactions between DHS and TTIC officers to include
+electronic connectivity between TTIC and the Department of
+Homeland Security. This greatly facilitates the flow of
+information that is necessary for the Department of Homeland
+Security to do its work.
+ Finally, TTIC, the Department of Homeland Security and
+other elements of the homeland security, law enforcement and
+intelligence communities engage in regular discussions on the
+many different factors that are taken into account when
+determining threat condition. This integrated effort allows
+threat information, which the TTIC provides, to be assessed in
+the context of the assessed capability of a terrorist group, in
+the context of the vulnerability of potential targets, in the
+context of extant mitigation and defensive measures that are in
+place, as well as in the context of the options available to
+enhance security.
+ In this manner, Secretary Ridge, Secretary Loy and other
+senior officials are able to gain a true appreciation of the
+prevailing threat condition, and then make the informed
+decisions as appropriate.
+ I look forward to taking your questions.
+ [The statement of Mr. Brennan follows:]
+
+ Prepared Statement for the Record of John O. Brennen
+
+ Good afternoon, Chairman Cox, Ranking Member Turner, and the
+Members of the House Select Committee on Homeland Security.
+ I appreciate the opportunity to join the Deputy Secretary of the
+Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to discuss how terrorist threat-
+related information supports the Homeland Security Advisory System
+(HSAS).
+ As Committee Members well know, U.S. interests at home and abroad
+remain at risk of terrorist attack. Usama Bin Laden and Al-Qa`ida
+represent the most significant terrorist threat; however, there are
+many other known and suspected terrorist individuals and groups with an
+interest and the capabilities to do us harm. Since the tragic events of
+September 11, 2001, many steps have been taken to prevent future
+attacks. One of the most significant steps has been the creation and
+implementation of a national, color-coded Homeland Security Advisory
+System.
+ The HSAS was originally established in March 2002 as a mechanism to
+inform the public during periods of elevated threats. TTIC supports the
+HSAS through the provision of terrorist threat-related information and
+analysis to those charged with administering the process.
+ TTIC is a multi-agency joint venture that opened for business in
+May 2003, to integrate terrorist-threat related information, collected
+domestically or abroad, to form a comprehensive threat picture. On a
+daily basis, TTIC coordinates terrorist threat assessments with partner
+agencies, including DHS, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central
+Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, and Department of State.
+Assignees from these partner departments and agencies have, of course,
+been involved in the production of these assessments prior to
+coordination with their headquarters. Twice daily, these assessments
+and others are discussed during interagency secure video teleconference
+meetings to discuss the current threat picture. DHS, TTIC, and others
+coordinate regularly on a product that combines threat information with
+actions being taken to protect the Nation against those threats. This
+multi-agency coordination process is enabling the USG to better know
+what we know, compare information, and make rational decisions based on
+a more comprehensive threat picture.
+ When threat information dictates, TTIC participates in special
+meetings that are convened to determine whether to recommend to the
+Secretary of Homeland Security and other senior officials that the
+Homeland Security Advisory System condition should be adjusted. Last
+December 2003, for instance, TTIC--in close coordination with our
+partner entities - published a Holiday threat assessment that
+facilitated multi-agency discussions resulting in a decision to elevate
+the national threat level to ``orange.'' TTIC's threat assessments
+played an important part of the risk evaluation strategy that was used
+in making decisions related to the threat level.
+ Another aspect of national preparedness and effective warning of
+terrorist threats to the U.S. and U.S. interests abroad, is more
+systematic information sharing across the intelligence, law
+enforcement, and homeland security communities. Progress has been made
+toward ensuring that all obligations are met, as detailed in applicable
+statutes and interagency agreements such as the Homeland Security Act
+and the Homeland Security Information Sharing Memorandum of
+Understanding (MOU) of March 2003, signed by Secretary Ridge, Attorney
+General Ashcroft, and Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Tenet. On
+behalf of the DCI, and in close coordination with all partner entities,
+TTIC is facilitating efforts within the Intelligence Community to
+provide the Department of Homeland Security access to all information
+and analytic products required to execute its mission.
+ Within TTIC, there is connectivity with 14 separate USG networks,
+allowing for unprecedented, near-real-time information sharing--the key
+to our support to the Homeland Security Advisory System. A primary
+conduit for information sharing across the intelligence, law
+enforcement, and homeland security communities is a TTIC-sponsored,
+classified website called TTIC Online. This website currently has over
+2,500 users throughout the Federal government, and it is being updated
+to support collaboration and information sharing at varying levels,
+from Top Secret to Sensitive-But-Unclassified. The website is also
+being updated to enable users to search across disparate USG-maintained
+data sets and to enable account holders from multiple Federal
+departments and agencies to post relevant information for collective
+access.
+ In addition, TTIC is working with DHS and the Federal Bureau of
+Investigation (FBI) to ensure that all relevant threat information and
+analysis is expeditiously passed to state and local officials and law
+enforcement personnel, so that they may re-evaluate and adjust
+protective measures to prevent a possible attack. This rapid sharing of
+threat information with those working to disrupt potential terrorist
+activity is a critical area of emphasis in the national homeland
+security effort--some call state and local officials and law
+enforcement personnel our ``first responders,'' but if the information
+reaches them in time to apply appropriate protective measures, they are
+really our ``first and last defenders.'' For this reason, TTIC and
+others across the intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security
+communities are working together to implement ``write to release'' and
+other innovative business processes to increase the number of sanitized
+and unclassified products available for rapid dissemination to better
+enable state, local, private industry, and foreign partners to
+implement protective measures in the Global War on Terrorism.
+ In conclusion, through collective effort, we are making daily
+progress toward improving National preparedness through the HSAS and
+the effective warning of the Nation.
+
+ Chairman Cox. I thank you both for your testimony.
+ Members will now be recognized for questions. We will be
+observing the five-minute rule with the exception that members
+that were here within five minutes of the gavel will be able to
+extend their time of questioning by three minutes.
+ The chairman recognizes himself for five minutes.
+ I would like to ask both of you or either of you, depending
+on how you care to respond, about the difference between the
+public and the nonpublic aspects of our national response to
+this heightened alert.
+ We have, as you both outlined in your testimony, an
+admirable system, still developing but very far advanced from
+where it was a few years ago, of sharing information among
+scores of government agencies at the Federal level and
+integrating that information also at the state and local level.
+ The TTIC online example that you provided, for example, is
+a secure network that can be accessed by many users all over
+the country. That is working, as I think citizens expect it
+should, so that our government springs into action, does
+everything it can to anticipate and prevent and prepare for
+terrorist attacks in response to actionable intelligence.
+ What we are also wrestling with here today, though, is the
+impact on the rest of the country, specifically everybody else
+who is not part of either law enforcement or intelligence.
+ The government in any way does not manage a large chemical
+facility or a nuclear power plant, does not run an airport or
+an airline, is not responsible for a high-rise office
+building--just somebody watching TV who is told, ``Now, we are
+at a heightened state of alert.''
+ Why are we asking that person to be at a heightened state
+of alert? What do we expect that person to do differently? And
+how do we expect that person to square that message with the
+simultaneous message, at least what we have seen was a
+simultaneous message in our recent experience, that you should
+go about your business just exactly as you were before?
+ I ask you this question because in my experience, these
+warnings are having a chilling effect. I have admittedly
+episodic evidence, but a lot of it, of, for example, school
+groups canceling their field trips to other countries that have
+nothing to do with terrorist attacks on the United States of
+America. They do not know that. They are just worried, and so
+they are playing it safe.
+ Business groups canceling conferences, even sometimes
+within the United States, in other cities, all manner of
+tourism being affected from small to large decisions that
+people make. They are behaving differently because a heightened
+state of alert means to them a heightened state of anxiety.
+ What is the payback for that? And how are we going to
+mitigate those effects of the public warning system?
+ And if you can in addressing that, also include in your
+answer the consequence and the way that you deal with this
+consequence of the fact that in communicating publicly with 280
+million Americans we are also communicating very publicly with
+Al-Qa`ida, or whoever it is that we must thwart.
+ And I would be happy to hear either of you.
+ Admiral Loy, you seem ready to begin.
+ Admiral Loy. I will take a stab at it, sir.
+ I think first and foremost, Mr. Chairman, we are all, as
+citizens and as responsible public servants, learning our roles
+in this very, very new security environment that we all woke up
+to on 9/11/01.
+ It is just so fundamentally different from--not that any of
+us are pining for the good old days of the Cold War. But the
+notion of what occurred from 1989 to 2001 was almost an
+interruption, when the wall fell and the Soviet Union imploded,
+that the whole notion of a complacency gene sort of rose among
+us.
+ And I saw that not only in individuals and people but
+perhaps in organizations and even in nations. And come 9/11/01,
+that cold pail of water in the face, offered a very different
+environment, an enormously different environment, an enemy that
+we do not understand, that we are just beginning to learn
+about, that we are just beginning to read about, with no flag,
+no president, no boundaries, no nation-state--all those things
+that were comfortable to us in the course of the Cold War
+window.
+ So as we try to learn our way through that fog, if you
+will, toward a more clear day when we will really be able to
+react much more adroitly and specifically to the things at
+hand, I think the challenges have to be about across-the-board
+notions.
+ But for the individual citizen, I think three things are
+important. I think it is about awareness, it is about
+preparedness, and it is about recognizing they, too, have a
+contribution to make, almost in the Rosy the Riveter notion of
+World War II, because this is really an all-hands evolution.
+Every citizen has the potential to be involved.
+ So on the awareness side, vigilance matters. And to make
+that an impression on the citizens of this country is an
+enormously important thing for us to do. We have to have every
+citizen understand it is important to hold the edge associated
+with this new security environment that we are grappling with.
+ So that means every citizen is a sensor. They have the
+opportunity to report things that are out of the ordinary, and
+they should be doing that.
+ And the notion of interoperable communications suggests
+that that citizen should have the capacity to report whatever
+they see out of the ordinary that makes good sense to them.
+ Preparedness is simple things as much as a family emergency
+plan, an emergency kind of support kit that would be
+appropriate, and finding their way, as a citizen must, in this
+new normalcy that we are trying to define for ourselves in the
+new security environment we are grappling with.
+ Chairman Cox. I take it that we do not wish that level of
+preparedness to evaporate if the threat level is at yellow?
+ Admiral Loy. Absolutely not, sir.
+ Chairman Cox. So that by ticking up the threat level, we
+are not telling them at that time to go do an emergency
+preparedness kit or at that time to start looking for
+suspicious activity?
+ Admiral Loy. No sir. If you look, for example, at the
+department's Web sites associated with such things, you will
+find counsel to the citizens at large that are directly along
+the line of both yellow and orange as a set of conditions that
+demand of them these kind of different behaviors in the
+security environment that we are all trying to understand.
+ Chairman Cox. Mr. Brennan, do you want to add to this?
+ Mr. Brennan. Mr. Chairman, I would just make reference to
+the TTIC online, which is the classified Web site that we in
+TTIC maintain to make information available to the Department
+of Homeland Security and other Federal departments and
+agencies.
+ We are working very closely with the department to in fact
+try to construct a multilayered and interconnected
+classification system as far as the flow of information
+downward.
+ And so as you pointed out, the Department of Homeland
+Security has a statutory responsibility for providing the
+information to the state and local officials. And we, with TTIC
+online, are working with the department to make sure that there
+can be that flow of information to the departments so that the
+department can then take the information and share it as
+appropriate.
+ Even though as a classified Web site, we put products on
+there that are at the unclassified level, or at the sensitive
+but unclassified level, that can be released. So we are working
+hand in glove with the department on that effort.
+ Chairman Cox. Well, I will reserve for a later round of
+questioning similar questions that get at that point, Mr.
+Brennan, about what state and local law enforcement can do and
+what specifically we are asking them to do when we change these
+alert levels. And certainly that access to information is a key
+starting point.
+ Mr. Turner?
+ Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Admiral Loy, Mr. Brennan, I, as you know, share much of the
+sentiment that the chairman just shared. I mean, I have many
+instances of folks saying they have canceled their plans to do
+things that, frankly, my better logic would say they had no
+reason to cancel, because they heard we changed the alert
+system to orange.
+ I think when we look at our efforts, there is no question
+that we need a threat advisory system and we need to see it
+continue to mature, as I think it is doing.
+ And I even noted on several occasions where Secretary Ridge
+has himself questioned the system and has made some adjustments
+already as your information gathering system matures.
+ But I really think the color codes, while may be useful two
+years ago when this was all new and we were in our infancy, and
+if you did not have a way to get the information out and you
+did not know exactly what you were hearing and how important it
+was, well, sure.
+ Let's say, yellow to orange--and I do not know what red
+means. I never did get a clear understanding of that. I had a
+lot of different people tell me what they thought it meant. But
+all I know is that if you said red today, it probably would
+just create mass panic. I do not know what it means.
+ But I really do think that you have reached the point where
+you could abandon these color codes and rely on specific threat
+advisory information. And if that information needs to go to
+the public, have a press conference and tell every network what
+it is we are worried about.
+ Much of the information, I think we all know, needs to be
+directed to local law enforcement and to the private sector
+that may be affected.
+ And that information sharing has not yet matured to the
+level it needs to. And we are going to have to, I think, get to
+the point where we have a greater willingness not only to
+sharing information among Federal agencies, which we always
+seem to have to struggle with, but with the Federal, state, and
+local officials who have a role in protecting the homeland.
+ But I agree completely, Admiral Loy, with what you said
+about the need to have the citizens involved. But I just do not
+believe the color code involves them. Because, clearly, as you
+stated, we need a culture, if you will, of vigilance in this
+country.
+ Every citizen has a role in protecting our homeland and
+they need to be reminded of that. But more often than not, I
+think, when the color code goes up, they do what the chairman
+said and they cancel some travel plans.
+ And think about it a bit, if you were the youth director at
+your local church and you had responsibility for 30 children of
+parents in your church, and you heard the alert system went to
+orange, your tendency would be to say, ``Listen, I better not
+risk anything here; we better cancel this trip.'' And that
+ripples all through the society every time you raise that
+level.
+ And I even think it goes on in the department. I think the
+political reality that I shared a minute ago is very much the
+case. And I really think the department would be better off if,
+when you have new information, the key players in the
+department and the FBI and the White House, if they were
+talking about, ``What is it we have on our hands and what
+information can we share and how quick can we share it?''
+rather than sitting around the table and getting on these phone
+calls that I am sure that take place, saying, ``OK, should we
+go to orange, should we not go to orange?''
+ It is just basically a judgment that somebody ultimately
+has to make. And I do not think there is any great precision in
+it. Because the flow of threat information, as I said earlier,
+I think we all understand it is fairly regular and continually
+constant.
+ And, Admiral, you said we need the citizens to be prepared,
+and we do. And we probably failed in this regard, because the
+color coded system has not prompted anybody that I know of to
+make different preparations for different levels.
+ And if you ask the average person on the street, when the
+level went to orange, they might have declined to go take a
+trip, but I doubt many of them would tell you, ``Yes, I made
+sure I had more water in the basement,'' or whatever it is that
+we all think folks are supposed to do when the level goes up.
+ So I guess my question for you is: Have there been serious
+discussions within the department about the color codes and
+whether or not the color codes are really an important element
+of an effective alert advisory system?
+ Admiral Loy. Yes, sir. There have been such discussions.
+ I, too, believe this is a work in progress, and there very
+well may come the day when categories, as are reflected by the
+colors, are no longer necessary when our citizenry and our
+private industry sectors and the state and local governments
+actually have the capacity and have internalized this new
+security environment that we are dealing with and are
+adequately prepared to deal across the spectrum from low threat
+to high threat as it really does change, perhaps not day to
+day, but over the course of time.
+ My sense is that we are not there yet.
+ There are very valuable levels of activity that are
+clarified for many of the industries that we are dealing with
+already. And as we reach out, just as we are speaking, to
+engage all of those economic sectors with respect to following
+on the president's homeland security Presidential Directive No.
+7 on critical infrastructure, we will be able to at least
+initially sort activity levels associated with those industrial
+sectors and geographic places according to a range from low to
+high of varying activities associated with a threat, if in fact
+a threat can be understood to be that and communicated to them.
+ The communications channels we have in place are very
+strongly now able to communicate that information. But what we
+are still working very hard on is the delineation of what is
+different between the activity set associated with yellow, for
+example, from that of orange.
+ I have run the Transportation Security Administration for
+the last couple of years, sir. And I can guarantee you that
+every airport in this country has a security plan that denotes
+a variety of activities that change as we go from one threat
+condition to another.
+ So for the moment, it is a very good set of anchors along
+the path to a spectrum perhaps of adjustment that can be made
+further down the road. I believe they continue to serve a good
+purpose for us today.
+ Mr. Turner. Thank you, Admiral. And I am not telling you I
+disagree with classifications that apply to sectors. I mean, I
+can see the wisdom of that.
+ Admiral Loy. Sure.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman's time has expired.
+ The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Granger, is recognized for
+eight minutes.
+ Ms. Granger. Thank you very much.
+ I appreciate your being here and the work you are doing.
+And not to beat a dead horse, as we would say in Texas, but let
+me add my concern about the color-coded system.
+ A little different, there are some people, yes, who do
+react. My concern are the people that listen to it and now have
+become very cynical and very angry--one or the other. And the
+cynicism will lead them to do nothing differently. And so that
+is a concern I have.
+ I am very aware the airports do make a change and are very
+aware of what they are supposed to do, but others are not,
+particularly at the local community. So when you go from one
+color to another, there is concern with what they do, and then
+of course the cost of doing that. And the local communities are
+having a real struggle keeping up with additional costs that
+are not being reimbursed.
+ Let me move from that to something else.
+ In the fiscal year 2004 Homeland Security appropriations
+bill, it required a report on the use of NOAA's radio network,
+what we call the weather alert system. And I was going to ask
+if that report has been written. If so, could you summarize the
+conclusions of the report, and then what steps DHS is taking to
+use the NOAA system.
+ Admiral Loy. I apologize, Ms. Granger, I simply do not know
+where the status of the report is. I will check that out today
+and call you.
+ Ms. Granger. Great, I would appreciate that very much.
+ And one of the committee's goals is to ensure that DHS
+utilizes an alert advisory system. That means it can
+disseminate local alerts and national alerts. Have you focused
+on the available technology that is out there already for that
+alert?
+ Admiral Loy. Yes ma'am. I think there is a couple of very,
+very real communications kind of challenges that are part of
+what we are doing.
+ One of the things I think we can do dramatically is set
+standards such that they are associated with grants in the
+future, such that when the acquisition of communications
+equipment is procured, it is procured according to the standard
+such that they have become interoperable.
+ One of the most dramatic lessons that we learned from 9/11,
+of course, was at the World Trade Center when this police
+officer could not talk to that fireman, could not talk to that
+emergency medical technician because of not having
+interoperable communications.
+ It is one of the absolute goals of Secretary Ridge, and we
+have done some very good work on that to this point. Out
+science and technology directorate is right on the verge of
+establishing and issuing those standards such that down the
+road that kind of procurement process will yield continuing
+interoperable communications.
+ Ms. Granger. That is extremely important, particularly at
+the local level if you are talking about from hospital to
+hospital--all of those first responders.
+ Admiral Loy. Responders, yes ma'am.
+ Ms. Granger. Thank you very much.
+ Chairman Cox. Does the gentlelady yield back her time?
+ Ms. Granger. I do.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentlelady from California, the ranking
+member of Intelligence, is recognized for eight minutes.
+ Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Welcome to our witnesses, both of whom are very competent
+managers and are doing an excellent job.
+ I want to commend you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
+hearing. Among the hearings I know of that this committee has
+held, this would be up there in terms of the most important.
+ I also want to commend you and the ranking member for the
+bipartisan collaboration on this issue. I think it is
+critically important, as you know, that we engage in oversight
+activities by our committees on a bipartisan basis, and this is
+happening in this case.
+ I also think it is useful for us to be offering
+constructive criticism to Federal agencies. This is part of
+what Congress is supposed to do. We pay the bills and the
+taxpayers expect us to do this.
+ And, Mr. Chairman, I noticed in your statement, a large
+amount of constructive criticism, and I applaud you for it, and
+I frankly agree with the comments that you made.
+ I think it is useful for us to criticize constructively our
+Federal Government, and I am sure our witnesses took it in that
+vein.
+ And, Admiral Loy, you said that things are evolving, you
+are operating a work in progress. We all understand that. And
+so this criticism is intended to help you shape your future
+steps toward an end that we all share, which is to make our
+homeland safe.
+ So, Mr. Chairman, I am happy to be in this room, and I
+commend this productive activity of the House of
+Representatives. Today, there are too few activities like this.
+And so it makes me feel good, and I hope it makes all of us
+feel good to be part of this one.
+ I have questions in two areas. One is your point about the
+public, and the second is more technical questions about the
+interface between DHS and TTIC.
+ And let me not forget to mention my valuable visit to TTIC
+a few weeks ago where I saw Mr. Brennan and his very talented
+work force. TTIC is a success story in this government. I
+commend you for your leadership and as important, I commend
+those from a variety of agencies who work for you for their
+part in helping make certain that we keep our homeland safe.
+ Admiral Loy, I look forward to visiting your folks as well
+sometime soon. I think it would be a very valuable visit for
+me, both in my role as a member of this committee and as
+ranking member on the Intelligence Committee.
+ My question on the warning for the public is this: A year
+ago, I mentioned to Secretary Ridge, my interest in a program
+called FLASH. That program is an acronym which I cannot
+remember, but the idea behind it is to invent a curriculum for
+our public schools which would be taught each year in the same
+week to all the children in the public schools by their regular
+teachers. And the point of this curriculum, which would become
+more complex with each year, is that both the teachers and the
+students would be trained in what to do in the event of a
+terrorist attack.
+ I am old enough, and I think you are, too, Admiral Loy, to
+remember the civil defense drills of the 1950's when I was
+trained on what to do in my public school, and it was valuable
+training.
+ It seems to me that in terms of an effective warning system
+for the public, making certain that every school kid and every
+school teacher knows what to do would go a long way toward
+reducing panic, improving response and giving parents the
+comfort that their kids will know what to do and be adequately
+protected.
+ But, I cannot get to square one on this issue. I have
+proposed a pilot project. I have offered, you know, five
+different permutations of how this thing could work.
+ Secretary Ridge sent me to the Education Department. They
+responded with a ``no''.
+ I think this is dead square in your jurisdiction, and I
+just want to mention it to you here, ask you if you have any
+comments about it, and urge you, please, to take back to
+Secretary Ridge at least one Member's opinion that this would
+be a very effective way to augment your threat advisory system.
+ Admiral Loy. My comments would go to be actually very
+supportive. I think the notion of what Mr. Turner and I spoke
+about just a moment ago of the holding the edge issue, the not
+allowing the complacency gene to kick back in place, of truly
+holding on to the sense of urgency that is associated with this
+global war on terrorism on the home front and then translating
+that to a consciousness, if you will, that is pervasive across
+our citizenry.
+ I believe it is in the very direct interest of all 280
+million of us to have that kind of sense about us in this
+dramatically different security environment that so many people
+actually would like to sort of just push away and return to
+normalcy, whatever normalcy used to be. But we have a new
+normal normalcy, and this has got to be part of it.
+ I will, in fact, carry your message back to the secretary.
+And we have initiated a number of educational notions inside
+our science and technology directorate which can translate to
+curriculum elements that would be very profitable.
+ Ms. Harman. Thank you for that answer. I will be following
+up. Be warned.
+ I hope we will do something like this, at least on a pilot
+project basis, in the school system in one or more states to
+see how it works.
+ But the curriculum has been developed. A very talented team
+of people, who happen to be based in California, has developed
+it and is trying it out, and I really think this will add value
+to the public piece of the threat warning and homeland security
+problem.
+ Turning to the interface between your two organizations:
+This is also critically important. Some members of this
+committee--I think all members of this Congress--were surprised
+when the president suggested that TTIC be stood up. It was not
+the way we had intended this to go in the way we drafted the
+homeland security law, but I, for one, am pleased with how it
+is going and am very pleased about the connection between the
+two of you.
+ My questions just want to probe this a little further, and
+I will observe my time.
+ First of all, Mr. Brennan, you mentioned in the past that
+one of the major strategic issues for you is figuring out where
+TTIC's counterterrorism job ends and the counterterrorism work
+of other agencies begin. You convened something called the
+Water's Edge Panel, and I am curious how that came out. And I
+do not want this clock to go off here.
+ I would invite both of you to tell me how you are working
+together, whether there are any problems with sharing
+information, sharing technology, interoperability, which was
+raised before, meeting each other's intelligence needs, or
+anything else out there that you did not cover in your
+testimony that this committee should be aware of.
+ Mr. Brennan. I would say that, first of all, there are a
+series of challenges as opposed to problems.
+ The challenges as far as bringing together different
+information systems--in TTIC we have 14 different information
+systems that come in from all the different departments and
+agencies. In trying to address the different information
+security policies, different infrastructure, hardware-software
+issues--those are challenges that we are overcoming.
+ So these are things that we are working very compatibly on.
+ We have, in fact, a joint program office: TTIC, the
+Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Justice, FBI
+to address these initiatives in a collective and a
+collaborative way as opposed to doing it individually.
+ So again, there are a series of challenges there, but it is
+something that I think we are able to attack together. And we
+are making progress every day.
+ Admiral Loy. I would just wholeheartedly agree.
+ I think the most important thing in here is that the law
+clarified the realities of 9/11, clarified intent on the part
+of all the players.
+ And at those twice-daily sessions, where each of us has an
+opportunity to hear John's analytical product be tabled and
+then the discussion offers the opportunity to come to a
+collective consensus onto what that threat piece really means,
+and then offer it forward as something that has really been
+kicked around among ourselves, us from the standpoint of the
+operator and the requirements to be met, John from the
+standpoint of attempting to meet those and helping us
+understand just what are to the possible is inside the
+intelligence community flow.
+ We also have people connections as well as technical
+connections.
+ The secunded DHS representatives to TTIC that staff is his
+world as well as those from across the Federal Government are
+such that all the players that have a contribution to make are
+at his disposal to gather and allow the analytical work to be
+done inside the organization. I think it is going very, very
+well.
+ Ms. Harman. Well, just keep at it.
+ My time is up, Mr. Chairman, but I would like to share a
+secret, and that is that the hard drives that are under the
+desks of the talented people at TTIC have names. And their
+names for the moment are Huey, Dewey, Louie and Fred.
+ And a little humor goes a long way, but it is important
+that we keep developing the IT and that we keep it compatible
+and we keep moving this mission ahead together, and we keep the
+public trained to understand what they are supposed to do too.
+ Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentlelady's time has expired.
+ The gentleman from New York, Mr. Sweeney, is recognized for
+five minutes.
+ Mr. Sweeney. Thank you, Chairman, and I appreciate the
+recognition. I also appreciate you conducting this hearing.
+Because I think as my prior colleague, Ms. Harman, just pointed
+out, this is one of the critical oversight responsibilities we
+have in Congress. And we oftentimes, I think, have not been as
+particularly focused as I would like.
+ I would like to thank Admiral Loy and Director Brennan in
+advance for their cooperation and their work both here today
+and prior to this.
+ You know, the principle piece of legislation this select
+committee has proposed has a number of very valuable and
+important components to it. And I think it is reflective of a
+bipartisan effort on this committee's part to really help you
+as you evolve this process and construct what is an entirely
+new concept in American government.
+ One of the pieces I think is particularly important in that
+legislation is when we call upon the Department and try to help
+you establish a sector-by-sector or regional threat assessment
+system.
+ There are a lot of reasons why there is great utility to
+that. There are a lot of reasons why it is important. And I
+will simply point out as a New Yorker, I know I would expect
+that my colleague, Congresswoman Lowey, will also follow up
+with some of this.
+ But New York, and New York City in particular, have huge
+costs that cannot be reimbursed right now by the Federal
+Government. And one of the tangible examples of that is when
+the rest of the country goes to yellow, New York City pretty
+much constantly stays at orange.
+ I will ask Admiral Loy this question--when do you think the
+Department can move to that kind of more specifically focused
+threat analysis and threat information system?
+ Admiral Loy. Mr. Sweeney, I think we are very close to
+being there. The capabilities that are now important for us get
+on with are the analytical work necessary in a partnered
+fashion with the stakeholders of all 13 economic sectors of the
+Nation and the four key assets inventories that are identified
+in the president's national strategy for homeland security.
+ Since the president has now signed HSPD-7, the ball is in
+our court to do that outreach. A series of meetings were just
+held this week with respect to internal to DHS. The next one is
+internal to the department.
+ And then the template associated with that has to be taken
+literally to each of those 13 economic sectors to discuss
+through, understand the requirements on their end, what can be
+provided on our end to establish that security paradigm, for
+lack of a better phrase, that we are all looking for.
+ Mr. Sweeney. So as we speak it is evolving and developing.
+ Admiral Loy. Absolutely. Yes, sir.
+ Mr. Sweeney. Within a year is practical or not?
+ Admiral Loy. Absolutely, it is, sir.
+ Mr. Sweeney. OK, good to hear.
+ Admiral Loy. We should have that done inside a year.
+ Mr. Sweeney. Director Brennan, thank you for all of your
+work and your interaction with my office.
+ How is the relationship with the FBI Joint Terrorism Task
+Force going?
+ Mr. Brennan. With the JTTFs that are located nationwide, it
+is a very strong relationship. We have had interactions, we
+have had TTIC officers who have been out to the JTTFs and have
+sat down with the FBI agents and analysts there to review
+different issues, review information.
+ We work very closely with the JTTFs through FBI
+headquarters in terms of the counterterrorism division that has
+sort of oversight on the terrorism matters.
+ So it very, very close.
+ Mr. Sweeney. Has the FBI retracted or taken back any of its
+analysts from your operation?
+ Mr. Brennan. Oh, no, sir. In fact we are getting more
+analysts from FBI. And in fact, I have been very impressed with
+some of the young FBI analysts in TTIC in terms of their
+dedication and the quality of their work.
+ Mr. Sweeney. Somewhere, there is that misinformation that
+recently in some sort of in-the-bowels kind of turf war, the
+FBI removed 70 of their analysts from your shop. We would like
+to know that, I think, on this committee. And I especially
+would like to know it as an appropriator who is both on
+Homeland and on Commerce-Justice-State. So I would like to know
+that if that happened.
+ Mr. Brennan. I have noticed none of them missing. If I do,
+I will let you know, sir.
+ Mr. Sweeney. Let me ask one final question, and it is
+really for Admiral Loy: New York Police Commissioner Ray Kelly
+testified on the record before this committee and the Judiciary
+Committee last year. Another important part of the principle
+piece of legislation relates to the formulation and how we are
+spending money and what you are allowed to do and what you are
+not allowed to do.
+ He noted that the personnel costs in New York City are a
+significant part of the expenses when the threat level is
+increased. I am wondering, your thoughts. Why shouldn't
+overtime costs, personnel costs, training costs associated with
+those increases be reimbursed?
+ Admiral Loy. Sir, I think the categorization of grants and
+the ability for state and locals to claim against those dollars
+over the course of time is the answer to that question. It,
+too, is something I think that is evolving.
+ The Congress was generous in the supplemental on all three
+till I identified $200 million in the aftermath of Liberty
+Shield as a pool of funds to be claimed against by the locals,
+state and local elements.
+ There is about 60 of those billions of dollars that have
+actually been claimed against as opposed to the $200 million
+that has been offered.
+ There is an exchange going on as we speak. We clarified
+that the 23rd of February was sort of a deadline that we would
+like to have people let us know what were the costs associated
+with this last experience at orange over the holiday period.
+That will give us another data point associated with the role
+of the Federal Government, as appropriated by the Congress in
+terms of the capacity to reimburse, and also help us all
+understand that as, again, we have talked about several times
+before this afternoon already, this is really an all-hands
+evolution.
+ And so to some degree, it is about state and local folks
+standing up to the task, including the financial end of
+whatever is appropriate for these evolutions, and the private
+sector as well.
+ So in threats to our national security historically, you
+know, when it was the artillery folks looking over the Folda
+Gap at each other or whether it was across the demilitarized
+zone in Korea, the notion there was the clarity with respect to
+Federal responsibility in taking care of that ``for the
+citizenry'' was very, very direct.
+ This is a very different security environment that we are
+grappling with in understanding. The rules as they play out,
+sir, are still literally being forged by the Congress and by
+the executive branch.
+ Mr. Sweeney. And I understand that. I know my time is
+expired, but I think we need to get specifically focused on the
+impacts in order to maintain the vigilance we seek here. And I
+thank you.
+ And I thank the chairman for his time.
+ Chairman Cox. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman's time
+has expired.
+ The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Markey--the proud
+owner of a Super Bowl trophy, almost, almost personally,
+derivatively. He is recognized for eight minutes.
+ Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. It is water
+on the desert up in Boston, I can promise you. It has been a
+long drought in every other sport but football.
+ Mr. Brennan, your job is to remedy the problem that we
+found before September 11, that there was fragmented
+dissemination of information across the Federal bureaucracy to
+state and local governments that did not effectively make it
+possible to coordinate in a way that could protect against a
+terrorist attack.
+ As the Senate office building, Mr. Brennan, remains closed
+for a second day due to ricin contamination, we have learned
+that three months ago the White House also was the target of a
+ricin attack. However, the information reportedly was not
+shared with congressional leaders until after the discovery of
+ricin in the Senate earlier this week.
+ Mr. Brennan, did this information, that is, the information
+about ricin attack on the White House, did that come to your
+attention three months ago?
+ Mr. Brennan. Sir, I would have to go back and check the
+record as far as when it came to my attention. And I can get
+back to you on that.
+ Mr. Markey. Did you know about the ricin attack on the
+White House before there was an attack on the Congress?
+ Mr. Brennan. As far as an attack, sir, I do not believe--
+and I also do not think, sir, this is the appropriate forum for
+discussion about the nature of particularly the terrorist
+threats that may exist to the White House. There are other
+venues.
+ Mr. Markey. Mr. Brennan, this is the forum. We are the
+committee given responsibility to make sure that the agency,
+which we have created, is working to protect the American
+public against attack.
+ If you had knowledge that there was a potential ricin
+attack on the White House, and you did not give that
+information to the Congress, or other relevant high-priority
+targets of Al-Qa`ida, then that is something that we have to
+talk about and you have to tell us what is your decisionmaking
+process as to who is on the list that receives this very
+important information.
+ Mr. Brennan. Mr. Markey, I would be glad to talk to you
+about the process. My comment that this is not the appropriate
+forum is because sometimes with threat information, as you well
+understand, there is classified information, and this is an
+open hearing. And so, any type of discussion about the
+underlying reporting or information regarding that should be
+kept in appropriate channels.
+ Mr. Markey. OK. Well, let us put it this way: Did you
+notify the Capitol Police when you found about the ricin attack
+on the White House?
+ Mr. Brennan. Sir, I would have to go back and I would have
+to check as far as what action was taken, when such information
+was known.
+ Mr. Markey. You do not know if you notified?
+ Mr. Brennan. I will have to go back, sir, and check on
+that. I do not want to give you--.
+ Mr. Markey. Doesn't an attack on the White House, Mr.
+Brennan, automatically trigger a set of responses in TTIC in
+terms of notification of other high-priority targets?
+ Mr. Brennan. Sir, I would like to get the facts in front of
+me first before I respond to your questions as far as what
+actions were taken.
+ Mr. Markey. To the best of your knowledge, did your agency
+notify mail processors handling mail bound for Capitol Hill or
+basically the same post offices that had to be shut down after
+the anthrax attack here in Washington? Did you notify them?
+ Mr. Brennan. It would have been our responsibility to
+notify the Federal departments and agencies that have a
+responsibility to share that information with the nonFederal
+family.
+ Mr. Markey. Well, I will tell you, Mr. Brennan, that if the
+White House took upon itself not to share this information with
+other potential targets in Washington, D.C., then that is a
+very serious matter.
+ We know that Al-Qa`ida was targeting either the White House
+or the capitol dome with the final plane that was pulled down
+in Pennsylvania. And we know that within that same timeframe,
+Congress was the subject of anthrax letter attacks, as were the
+networks and other high-visibility institutions in the United
+States.
+ So I believe that if that information was not shared, then
+there was a very serious mistake which was made.
+ Mr. Brennan. As I said, Mr. Markey, I will look into it and
+find out what the facts are.
+ Mr. Markey. Well, we cannot thwart--I would just put it on
+the record that we cannot hope to thwart terrorists who use the
+U.S. mail system and other means to threaten our homeland
+security without all the facts.
+ It is, to me, unnecessary. And as the facts unfold,
+potentially appalling, that innocent lives could be put at risk
+if they were not given the fundamental information that there
+was already a ricin attack that had occurred in Washington,
+D.C., that protective actions could have been implemented to
+lessen dramatically the likelihood that that could be a
+successful attempt.
+ Mr. Brennan. Mr. Markey, I can tell you that the Terrorist
+Threat Integration Center has looked very carefully at the
+potential use of CBRN materials by Al-Qa`ida. We have shared
+information with those respective departments and agencies that
+have responsibility for guarding against those types of
+attacks.
+ And we also have worked with the Department of Homeland
+Security and the FBI and others to ensure that the appropriate
+measures are put in place.
+ And so, as I said, on that particular case, on that
+particular day, as far as what happened, I will be glad to
+check the record on this.
+ Mr. Markey. You can understand that two days after this
+attack unfolds, the fact that you do not know the answer to
+that question as you sit here is something that in and of
+itself causes some concern to those of us who are in charge of
+overseeing the department.
+ Admiral Loy, you have Secret Service as part of the
+Department of Homeland Security. When did you learn of the
+ricin attack?
+ Admiral Loy. I was not in the department at that time, sir.
+But I did anticipate that this question might come fro the
+committee this morning. I touched a base with the director of
+the Secret Service who advises me that his recollection was
+that the reports were made constructively inside the executive
+branch. I did not ask him whether or not they had advised the
+Congress. I will go ask that question, sir, and get back to
+you.
+ Mr. Markey. Is that a decision that the White House has the
+right to make under these existing new share-the-information
+rules and regulations, that is, can the White House decide,
+just as a matter of executive branch authority, not to share
+that information with the Congress or other Federal
+institutions or other state and local institutions that might
+also be at threat? Is that a policy?
+ Admiral Loy. Of course not, sir.
+ Mr. Markey. It is?
+ Admiral Loy. Of course not, sir.
+ Mr. Markey. Of course not.
+ So if the Secret Service and the White House decided not to
+share this information with the Congress, knowing that we were
+a target just two yeas ago--the staffer over my shoulder here,
+she was on Cipro for two months--that is a very serious issue
+to those of us who lived through that. It touched the lives of
+the people who are here and working with us--and as proxies for
+all other Americans as well.
+ So do you think that the system works, Admiral Loy? That
+is, do you believe that the White House having obtained this
+information handled it correctly in terms of ensuring that the
+rest of the vulnerable targets would also be notified?
+ Admiral Loy. Sir, all I know is the conversations I had
+with Mr. Basham this morning. I will be delighted to found out
+who called who when and let you know.
+ Mr. Markey. Well, let me ask it another way: If Congress
+did not know, do you think the system worked?
+ Admiral Loy. No.
+ Mr. Markey. The system did not work.
+ Admiral Loy. Right.
+ Mr. Markey. OK.
+ Mr. Brennan. I might add, Congressman Markey, that there is
+a representative of the Capitol Police within the Terrorist
+Threat Integration Center who is fully cleared and authorized
+for access to information such as this.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman's time is expired, but we may
+return to this on a subsequent round.
+ The vice chairman of the committee, the gentlelady from
+Washington, Ms. Dunn, is recognized for five minutes.
+ Ms. Dunn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
+ And, gentlemen, I apologize for not having been here to
+hear your earlier testimony and the other questions, so forgive
+me if I overlap on some questions. I was in another committee
+meeting.
+ I wanted to ask you, Mr. Brennan, when we first heard about
+TTIC, my inclination was to recommend that it be under the
+Department of Homeland instead of the CIA. Have you had any
+reason to change your opinion of where TTIC should be located?
+ Mr. Brennan. First of all, Ms. Dunn, TTIC is not within the
+CIA. We are located right now, temporarily, at the CIA
+compound.
+ Ms. Dunn. But you are funded by the CIA, is that correct?
+ Mr. Brennan. We receive funding from the director of
+central intelligence budget. But in fact we see monies from all
+the different partner agencies.
+ So we receive it from CIA, FBI, Department of Homeland
+Security, Department of Defense and others.
+ So my view, though, is that we should not reside within in
+one department or agency because the fight against terrorism is
+a collaborative fight, and if we are really going to do this
+well, we need to have an organization or an entity such as TTIC
+that is able to represent the interests of those different
+agencies and departments.
+ Ms. Dunn. But the Department of Homeland Security has that
+as its primary focus.
+ Mr. Brennan. There are many different departments and
+agencies in the U.S. government that have a terrorism
+responsibility. The CIA has responsibility for transnational
+threats to U.S. interests, including at home.
+ The Department of Defense has that responsibility, the FBI
+and others.
+ So, yes, the Department of Homeland Security has the
+responsibility for homeland security. But the threat to the
+homeland from international terrorism is truly international,
+and TTIC has that worldwide responsibility to report and
+analyze on those threats to U.S. interests at home and abroad.
+ Ms. Dunn. What is your relationship to IAIP? Is that
+relationship and that coordination satisfactory to you now?
+ Mr. Brennan. It is very close. Information Analysis and
+Infrastructure Protection Directorate within the department, we
+have constant interaction with them. The assistant secretary
+for information analysis, for example, retired General Pat
+Hughes and I are on the phone constantly. We have daily
+meetings, several times a day.
+ The under secretary for IAIP, Frank Libutti, is also
+someone who I am in regular contact with.
+ So it is very satisfying. It is improving and growing
+stronger.
+ Ms. Dunn. In your opinion, do they have the adequate
+resources to perform the analysis of function after they get
+the information?
+ Mr. Brennan. We do not collect the material. But I would
+defer to Admiral Loy as far as whether or not they have the
+adequate resources to do their mission.
+ Admiral Loy. They certainly do, ma'am, and that is growing
+as part of the department's growth as we speak. Literally, they
+are physically moving to another building with adequate space
+to put analysts in seats, if you will. And so the growth is a
+work in progress as well.
+ But the notion that John cites I think is the important
+point here.
+ DHS is enriching TTIC's ability to do its work by the
+contributions and the flow of whatever our piece of the
+information and intelligence-sharing process is that our people
+at TTIC provide him.
+ At the same, he enriches our ability to do our work by
+having this full all-source array of material at his disposal
+to do his analysis, to create his products from, and then we
+accept those products back in the other direction for the
+mission of securing the homeland.
+ There is a very strong assessment process that I think is
+appropriate for us to go through as we then attempt to map that
+threat piece to the economic sectors, regions of the country or
+individual citizens, whatever might be highlighted in the
+threat piece that he has provided us.
+ So at this point, the free standing nature of TTIC as an
+entity is serving the best interests of the country very, very
+well.
+ Ms. Dunn. How does the organization work? Do you have
+regular meetings? Or do you meet on a needs basis? Or do you do
+work by e-mail or over your communications devices? Is it
+hierarchical? Is it that you reach out when you need to to the
+particular department that you are interested in talking with?
+How does it work?
+ Mr. Brennan. It works in all the above ways that you
+mentioned as far as we have regular meetings, we have twice
+daily secure video conferences with the Department of Homeland
+Security. We have electronic connectivity as far as sharing
+information both ways, between ourselves and Department of
+Homeland Security. We have officers from the department, not
+just IAIP but also from the various constituent agencies--the
+Coast Guard, the Secret Service, Customs, others--who actually
+are resident within TTIC performing the analytic function and
+liaising, then, back with their parent agencies.
+ So it is across the board, both in terms of information
+sharing, people, interaction meetings. There are regular
+meetings throughout the week where I, along with the DHS
+counterparts, get together to review threat information as well
+as the actions that DHS is taking.
+ Ms. Dunn. Just to finish my questioning: Is there any area
+where you believe that communications could be improved with
+regard to TTIC's relationship with these other agencies of
+government?
+ Mr. Brennan. I think as we referenced before, this is an
+evolving process. We have a number of challenges ahead of us as
+far as stitching together the different types of information
+systems. We have different metadata standards as far as how
+reporting comes into the government.
+ So there are a lot of challenges out there, and I think we
+are making progress on it, and we need to make further
+progress.
+ But I feel good about the progress that has been made to
+date.
+ Admiral Loy. Ms. Dunn, if I may, one other thought: The
+other value of the free-standing nature of TTIC is that, I
+believe that on down the road we will find valuable other kinds
+of data and pieces of information that heretofore have probably
+never been part and parcel of the thought patterns about
+analyzing the threat to the homeland.
+ For example, I believe much more can be done with respect
+to proprietary private sector data--what is in that container
+coming at us? What does the bill of lading say? What does the
+manifest say?--and the mixing bowl that TTIC represents by
+having all those kind of things in the future offered into that
+cauldron, so to speak, so that the mix is the product that is
+of greater value to those of us who are trying to secure the
+homeland, or to those of other executive functions that are
+trying to do their work overseas.
+ Projecting down the road, I think this freestanding nature
+represents a continuing positive opportunity.
+ Ms. Dunn. Thank you very much, Admiral.
+ Thank you, Chairman.
+ Chairman Cox. I would just observe, as I yield to the
+questioner, that TTIC is not, strictly speaking, freestanding,
+but rather it is under the direction of the director of central
+intelligence.
+ And when you talk about something that may well have
+fruitful ends for homeland security such as further mining
+private sector data, it is because of, among other things,
+civil liberties concerns, that many of us in Congress did not
+want the DCI to be in charge of the intelligence analytical
+portion of homeland security, that integrating fusion function.
+ And it is why if somebody is going to be in charge, I would
+much prefer that it were the secretary of homeland security. As
+I said in my opening statement, that is a carol for another
+Christmas.
+ And so I yield next to the gentleman from Maryland, Mr.
+Cardin, for eight minutes.
+ Mr. Cardin. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
+ And let me thank both of our witnesses that are here for
+their service to our country in this very important area.
+ Admiral Loy, I was listening to your response as to what we
+expect on the code changes from the different stakeholders,
+including local governments. And you point out, and I think
+rightly so, that we all have responsibilities, including local
+government, to do what is necessary for the security of our
+country.
+ I am not exactly clear what we expect, though, when we
+change the coding from local governments. Do we expect that
+they will increase their presence of law enforcement in the
+community? Will they tighten up their port securities, if they
+have ports? Will they do their critical assets, more police
+patrolling? And probably all of the above, you will say, and
+that this is something that is somewhat intuitive, although I
+think we should have better understanding as to what these code
+differences mean.
+ You then point out, though, that the funding for this
+additional burden is reimbursable under the general funding
+formula, or grants, that we make available to local
+governments. And that is at odds with what we are being told by
+the conference of mayors and our governors.
+ The chair of the Homeland Security Task Force is the mayor
+of Baltimore. And I have talked to him frequently.
+ Mayor O'Malley said: Cities are our front lines in ensuring
+homeland security. And America's cities need direct homeland
+security funding. We simply cannot fund robust homeland
+security on the proceeds of local property taxes and fire hall
+bingos.
+ The report that was issued pointed out that most--in some
+cases 100 percent--of the costs are borne solely by local
+governments and that there is no funds available under the
+current system.
+ Congressman DeFazio has a bill in Congress which has a lot
+of interest on both sides of the aisle to reimburse directly
+local governments when we change the code to a higher level for
+the additional cost.
+ I guess my question to you is: I would hope there would be
+some sensitivity to working with Congress to develop a more
+sensitive funding source to local governments to pay for the
+extra cost of when the security rise so that we have a national
+expectation as to what local governments will do but we are
+also providing the resources in order to carry that out.
+ Admiral Loy. It think it is a very, very difficult and
+appropriate question for us all to get on the table and grapple
+with, sir, until we have that resolution.
+ There are an existing inventory of grant systems in place
+as we speak today. Some of them are tailored to specific
+purposes--state formula grants, emergency management grants,
+Citizen Corps grants, law enforcement terrorism management
+grants, and the new grants associated with the urban areas.
+ And the formulaic approach to that I believe must be much
+more complex than the simple notion of a base-plus-per-capita
+kind of formula across the board.
+ And so the president's budget, for example, this year, when
+it came up, recognized by doubling the urban security grants,
+which are about a combination of population in general, the per
+capita notion, which remains sound; population density, for
+example, in terms of the likelihood of the targets there;
+critical infrastructure associated with that particular area,
+community or region; and the threat itself in terms of how it
+is focused toward those things.
+ And so I believe there remains a challenge for us across
+the board in a distribution of those monies for the purposes
+that have been outlined by the Congress and reinforced by the
+administration.
+ But there is a nature of changing that formula to
+recognize, for example, Baltimore as opposed to my hometown of
+Altoona, Pennsylvania. Maybe there is a greater population
+density, critical infrastructure inventory, threat notion that
+is more appropriate there.
+ Mr. Cardin. I appreciate that, and I agree with you said.
+ Our distinguished chairman and ranking member have been
+working very hard on the funding formula that, as the chairman
+indicated, will be marked up in the full committee soon, that
+is sensitive to the points that you raise.
+ I would point out, though, that I do not think it directly
+answers the concerns of local governments when we change the
+alert level in that there is some specific expenses that we
+anticipate will be incurred when we raise those levels. And the
+funding formulas really are not geared to dealing with that
+problem.
+ And I would hope that we could work together to try to
+figure out whether there is an appropriate way that we can help
+provide that assistance to local governments consistent with
+the national assessment on homeland security.
+ Admiral Loy. Yes, sir, I look forward to working with you,
+sir, on such things.
+ You know, again, the sort of shock value of what 9/11
+represented to all of us, in this particular instance, became
+$200 billion in the supplemental of 2003 as a pool of
+recognized funds to be dispersed.
+ As I mentioned earlier, only $60 billion of those $200
+billion have actually been claimed against to this point in our
+time line.
+ So we are sort of finding, like is often the case in the
+wake of a national tragedy, the mix between job description on
+one hand, so to speak, and the resources to do it.
+ Mr. Cardin. Of course, that brings up the second problem,
+and that is getting the money actually out there as quickly as
+possible. And that is another area that we hope that the
+legislation we are acting on will help in that regard.
+ I want to turn to the budget itself because you have
+mentioned that a couple of times.
+ I am trying to understand the president's budget, and I am
+hoping that you may be able to clarify this point.
+ Interoperability is the one area that is been a very high
+priority of this committee. And in testimonies before the
+committee, we have talked about that as a prerequisite to a
+national system. Yet it looks like the 2005 budget zeros out
+the specific grant for interoperability. Am I reading that
+wrong--I hope?
+ Admiral Loy. I do not know that I have a good enough
+understanding of it, sir. I will get back to you with that
+specific question.
+ Certainly the intention with respect to interoperability is
+among the secretary's four or five most important things to try
+to get accomplished for our country this year.
+ Mr. Cardin. Well, I appreciate that.
+ According to the information I have, it was zeroed out in
+2005.
+ I want to mention one other thing, which is port security
+grants for state and local governments. It was included in the
+2004 budget in transportation security administration at $124
+million. It looks like that it is now in the opposite, domestic
+preparedness, but at $45 million, which would be a substantial
+reduction in port security.
+ Next to the airports, I would say that the next highest
+priority has been in port security. And I can tell you, again,
+from the Port of Baltimore, but speaking to my colleagues that
+represent many other ports, there is tremendous need there, and
+I would hope that we would be increasing the Federal
+Government's commitment to local government for port security
+and not reducing it.
+ I appreciate perhaps you could look into that also and get
+back to me.
+ Admiral Loy. All right, sir.
+ Mr. Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Cox. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman's time
+has expired.
+ The chair recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr.
+Shays, for eight minutes.
+ Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Chairman, I have to control myself in this hearing
+because I find myself feeling like we are ships passing in the
+night. I find myself thinking, ``Maybe we don't have a
+terrorist threat. Maybe it is all in my imagination. Maybe the
+20 hearings I had before September 11 were really just, you
+know, make believe. Maybe the three commissions that we had''--
+talking about the terrorist threats--''we are just inventing
+this. Maybe September 11th didn't even happen.''
+ I vowed after September 11th that I would not be silent
+about the threat. And now I am hearing that we have a system
+that I think makes sense. I think it makes sense. I do not care
+what color you call it. We have low, we have guarded, we have
+elevated, we have high, we have severe. I think it makes sense.
+I congratulate you for having a system that warns the people
+who can protect us in the general public.
+ What I think is idiotic, foolish and stupid is to go to a
+high threat and then tell the public, ``Just do what you
+normally do.'' I cannot think of anything stupider than that.
+ Because it would seem to me that when you are going to high
+threat--now high threat is--a high condition is declared when
+there is a high risk of terrorist attacks in addition to the
+protective measures taken under the one below it.
+ How about just elevated condition? An elevated condition is
+declared when there is a significant risk of a terrorist
+attack.
+ You have low risk, you have general risk, you have
+significant risk, you have high risk, you have severe risk.
+ Maybe the problem is, on this committee, that we do not
+think you were right in going to high risk. But I think,
+Admiral, you thought you were. Correct?
+ Admiral Loy. Absolutely.
+ Mr. Shays. And we are now under significant risk. Isn't
+that correct?
+ Admiral Loy. Correct, sir.
+ Mr. Shays. Significant. Not general, not low, not no risk.
+ Admiral Loy. that is correct.
+ Mr. Shays. And it was based on the reality of information
+that was coming to you. Is that correct?
+ Admiral Loy. that is correct.
+ Mr. Shays. Why would the department tell people to do
+everything they would normally do? We are not at low risk, we
+are not at general risk, we are not even at significant risk.
+We are at high risk, second only to severe risk. Why should I
+just do what I normally would do?
+ Admiral Loy. I think it goes to both the comments from the
+chairman and from Mr. Turner that the notion of the secretary's
+comments when he has solicited awareness, when he has solicited
+preparedness and when he has solicited from the citizenry an
+understanding and even an endorsement, that their
+responsibilities entail recognizing there may very well be some
+inconvenience associated with what has just occurred.
+ Mr. Shays. So it is just about inconvenience? In other
+words, from the general public, we just have to know it is just
+about inconvenience?
+ Admiral Loy. Of course not, sir.
+ Mr. Shays. OK.
+ Admiral Loy. The reality here is that having solicited
+those senses of understanding from the American public, the
+secretary's also suggesting that they should go about their
+normal business as best they can under the heightened threat
+condition that has been established.
+ Mr. Shays. But maybe normal business does not mean you do
+not have to do something. Why would you have them do something
+that puts them at risk if they do not have to do it? Why would
+you put the general public at risk?
+ Admiral Loy. We are not trying to put the general public at
+risk, Mr. Shays.
+ Mr. Shays. In Israel, if they were at high condition, they
+would not invite people to assemble in a large crowd. Now, if
+you have to take a bus to get to work, they would tell you to
+take a bus. But they recognize there are certain things they do
+not want the public to do.
+ I have not heard one thing that you have said, even when
+you are at high alert, that you do not want the public to do.
+Tell me one thing they should not do.
+ Admiral Loy. I certainly do not think they should be doing
+things that are foolish as it relates normal activity.
+ For example, the question was raised in terms of whether or
+not the church group should go to Washington, D.C., to see the
+sites at orange as opposed to yellow.
+ My counsel is that having gone to orange, we have also
+raised the security paradigm to the degree that the secretary
+is encouraging that trip to be taken, and that trip can be
+taken safely and securely because of what we have undertaken to
+actually put into place activity-wise associated with the
+threat condition rise.
+ Mr. Shays. So if you think a plane is going to be hijacked,
+potentially from Europe to the United States, you would still
+tell your child to fly on any plane coming from Europe.
+ Admiral Loy. Sir, through the course of this last period,
+as a direct answer to your question, we thoughtfully, I
+believe, gathered all the right minds to the table, including
+our international colleagues at the government-to-government
+level and at the airline level, and arrayed what we felt would
+be the prescription of activities and mitigating strategies if
+in fact that plane were to fly.
+ And the choice, as you saw in the press several times along
+the way, made either by the government or by the airline--.
+ Mr. Shays. So it is a foolproof system? You are going to
+catch all terrorists?
+ Admiral Loy. Of course not, sir.
+ Mr. Shays. So isn't there a possibility that you know that
+a terrorist might be taking a plane from Europe and they might
+actually succeed, you might not catch them? Isn't that a
+possibility?
+ Admiral Loy. There is not a single moment where the
+secretary or the president or anyone else has said that we have
+a foolproof system. This is a journey, sir; it is not a
+destination.
+ Mr. Shays. I will tell you what I would do. I would do the
+following: If I knew a plane likely is going to be hijacked
+from Europe--because they do not have the same procedures we
+have, they do not have fire marshals--I would advise the people
+I love not to take a trip to Europe right now, just defer it
+until you go to code yellow or until you go to code blue.
+ Admiral Loy. And the point, sir, is if we provide the
+public with information, they can make those decisions. They
+can make those decisions.
+ Mr. Shays. So you want the public--so you do not want them
+do what they normally would do. You would like them to use
+their brains and maybe make a decision.
+ Now, if they want to make a statement of patriotism of not
+letting terrorists interfere with them in any way, let them
+make that. But shouldn't they be the ones to make that
+judgment?
+ Admiral Loy. And that is precisely why the secretary offers
+them both the combination of a threat condition change and the
+reflection that it represents in terms of additional activities
+security-wise, as well as, we heard earlier, the challenge to
+tell them in a public sector that it is their decision to make.
+ Mr. Shays. OK, I get your point.
+ We were concerned about planes being hijacked from Europe,
+particularly because they do not have air marshals and they do
+not do the same type of security.
+ Admiral Loy. No, sir. We were afraid--I will use that time
+loosely, to parallel your thought.
+ Mr. Shays. Concern.
+ Admiral Loy. We were concerned because of what we saw in
+the threat stream.
+ Mr. Shays. Well, but you do know the following: You do know
+they do not do the same process that we do. They do not have
+marshals on planes. Correct?
+ Admiral Loy. Many of them do not, that is correct.
+ Mr. Shays. And we encourage them to, but they still do not.
+We are encouraging them to do, and they are resisting.
+ Admiral Loy. Sir, in the case of many of--.
+ Mr. Shays. Isn't that true?
+ Admiral Loy. In the case of many of those, they in fact did
+exactly that.
+ Mr. Shays. OK, but we are encouraging them to. We are
+encouraging them to have marshals on a plane because we think
+there is a danger.
+ Isn't it not true that we were concerned about dirty bombs
+during this last code? Isn't that a concern?
+ Admiral Loy. Sir, I would take that one behind closed
+doors, if you do not mind.
+ Mr. Shays. Why? Why? Why would we take it behind closed
+doors? Why doesn't the public have a right to know? Why should
+I know and why should other people know and then tell their
+families to act accordingly but we are not going to tell the
+public? Why? Why? Why?
+ I want to know why, if we think there is a concern--I am
+not asking sources and methods. I want to know why the public
+does not have a right to know what you have a right to know if
+in fact it endangers the public?
+ If we are concerned about dirty bombs, why shouldn't the
+public know?
+ If we are concerned that it might be where a large
+congregation of people gather, why shouldn't the public know?
+ If we are concerned that it might be at a place where it is
+dramatic, why shouldn't the public know? Why should I know and
+you know but the public not know?
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman's time has expired.
+ But I think there has certainly been a number of questions
+put to you, Admiral Loy, so feel free to answer at whatever
+length you choose.
+ Admiral Loy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Shays, the notion is very complex. The challenge here
+for us as public servants is to develop that security paradigm
+that will allow us to have confidence that the threat as
+identified and the map to economic sector--in this case,
+airlines--have an opportunity to develop a set of mitigating
+strategies that takes that threat sense down from where it was
+that gave us pause.
+ So our challenge through the course of those hours and
+hours and hours of discussions around that table at the CVITS
+twice a day, in international discussions with the players that
+were a part of our identified threat stream this past holiday
+season, was to take as good a set of judgments as we could in
+the interests of the security and safety of the flying public
+and to so require of anyone that was heading this way and were
+going to penetrate U.S. air space and get landing rights here.
+ And in each of those instances, sir, we either had those
+mitigation strategies met and those aircraft flew. Or in those
+instances where that was not possible, or chosen not be on the
+part of the international lines, those governments or those
+airlines canceled their flights.
+ Mr. Shays. Sir, I have tremendous respect for you. You are
+an American hero.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman's time has expired.
+ Mr. Shays. Could I just please make this point?
+ Chairman Cox. I am sorry, the gentleman's time has expired.
+ Mr. Shays. I just would like to say--.
+ Chairman Cox. I am sorry, but the gentleman's has--.
+ Mr. Shays. --that it was a bureaucratic answer--.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman's time has expired.
+ Mr. Shays. The terrorists know--.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman's time has expired.
+ Mr. Shays. The terrorists know there there is a threat--.
+ Chairman Cox. The committee will be in order.
+ Mr. Shays. --shouldn't the public know?
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman's time has expired.
+ The gentlelady from the Virgin Islands, Dr. Christensen, is
+recognized for five minutes.
+ Ms. Christensen. Eight, but I will probably only take five,
+Mr. Chairman. I did not make an opening statement. But anyway,
+I only have a few questions.
+ But I want to thank you for this hearing, because the alert
+system is something that not only we in Congress but our
+constituents have to deal with on a regular basis. And to the
+extent that it can be clarified and brought to a level that is
+meaningful and where one is able to develop a specific
+response--which is what I think we are trying to get at today--
+this is a very important hearing.
+ I have, I think, three questions. Two to Admiral Loy.
+ And I want to welcome both of you for being here this
+afternoon.
+ And it goes back to the standardization of the responses at
+each terror level. Because you cited that in the area of
+airports, for example, I think in the instance of airports,
+they have clear responses as to what is supposed to happen when
+we go to an orange alert. But I think you allow that this is a
+work in progress and that other agencies, businesses, the
+public still have to develop a capacity and a knowledge base to
+be able to fine tune what needs to be done.
+ I wanted to know: Is there a systematic process ongoing to,
+one, develop those standards and then to communicate and put
+those standards in place? Or is this just kind of just flowing?
+ Is there something specifically being done to develop those
+standards, or communicate them and put to put them in place?
+ Admiral Loy. Absolutely.
+ Ms. Christensen. And what is the time line that you have on
+that?
+ Admiral Loy. Absolutely, Ms. Christensen.
+ With respect to geographic locales, we have just literally
+received on the deadline of yesterday representative security
+plans from state and territory that is associated with our
+work.
+ We are reviewing them very, very carefully so as to look
+for those things that have become common concerns among states
+and territories to be dealt with in that fashion.
+ In the notion of your parallel with aviation, ma'am, that
+is a piece of the transportation sector. The other 12 major
+economic sectors are each being reached so as to have not only
+a blueprint for what they should be doing but rather to have
+them also help us develop that blueprint. Because they know
+much better than we do what are the essential ingredients, for
+example, of securing their chemical plant or their nuclear
+plant or whatever it is that they are responsible for.
+ This is a very active and very ongoing outreach program.
+And I would like to think that by the end of this year we will
+have the national game plan for critical infrastructure
+protection in place.
+ The president has just recently signed, as I mentioned
+earlier, the homeland security presidential directive on that.
+The ball is now in our court to engage all the players as
+appropriate to do so. And we are very actively doing that.
+ Ms. Christensen. The agencies or the Federal Government--
+and I often come back to one that I have responsibility for,
+which is the National Parks Service.
+ When we go to orange alert, a lot of the agencies, all they
+can do is a shotgun approach to responding to that alert. Is
+there something being done to also prepare standards in terms
+of their response at different levels? What is absolutely
+required of them? Because they are not being funded to respond
+to these alerts. The money is coming from other operational
+dollars.
+ Admiral Loy. There is an interesting question there, ma'am,
+for an authorizing committee, for example.
+ The notion of whether or not the interior budget ought to
+be looked at through the lens of whether there is adequacy with
+respect to homeland security activities and responsibilities
+may be something of interest to the committee.
+ I only parallel my personal experience in the
+counternarcotics effort when, as a Coast Guard commandant, I
+was obligated to make sure my budget that had to do with
+counternarcotics was authored through the Office of National
+Drug Control Policy for their commentary on the way to OMB so
+that they could pass judgment on whether what I was asking for
+was going to be sufficient to the responsibilities that they
+saw me doing for them in the counterdrug effort.
+ There may be a parallel notion here that would be of value
+to the committee.
+ Ms. Christensen. I think they need some help. Many of the
+parks are areas where either illegal people or goods can pass
+through.
+ Admiral Loy. Yes, ma'am.
+ Ms. Christensen. They need some help in developing
+specifically what they need to be doing, what they need to be
+putting in place at different levels of alert so that they can
+plan.
+ Admiral Loy. You are absolutely right. This is an all-hands
+evolution. It is not only private sector, state and local, but
+it is of course all the Federal agencies and our
+responsibilities as well.
+ Ms. Christensen. And you said that as in the last orange
+alert for the country was dropped to yellow, there was still
+some targeted areas that remained at high alert. And I wanted
+to know to what extent were our members of Congress who
+represent those areas informed? Is that standard practice?
+ Admiral Loy. I personally picked up the phone and called
+several folks associated with helping them understand as the
+threat was going by. The secretary's judgment in terms of being
+lowered to yellow offered the opportunity for us to continue to
+concentrate on a couple of economic sectors and on several
+geographic locales. Those players were communicated with
+routinely, ma'am, including at the local level. For example--.
+ Ms. Christensen. But specifically members of Congress--.
+ Admiral Loy. Oh, yes, ma'am.
+ Ms. Christensen. --can be expected to be informed if an
+area in my district, or any of our districts, remain at high
+alert.
+ Admiral Loy. That would seem to be a reasonable thing to
+do.
+ Ms. Christensen. Any my last question--.
+ Chairman Cox. I am sorry, the gentlelady's time has
+expired, but I think we are going to have time for another
+round.
+ The gentlelady from New York.
+ Ms. Lowey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ And thank you, Admiral Loy and Mr. Brennan.
+ As you heard from many of my colleagues today, and you hear
+from members of the public, as well as state and local law
+enforcement officials, there are real concerns about the
+vagueness of the systems warning, its lack of preparedness and
+response recommendations to state and local governments and the
+public.
+ In fact, even Secretary Ridge, the top official in charge
+of HSAS, has even expressed concerns about its credibility and
+conceded that it needs to be further refined. And you both were
+talking about it evolving.
+ In my judgment we need a system that issues fewer national
+alerts and instead crafts targeted warnings to localities or
+industries with specific information indicating where or what
+the terrorist target might be. And this is exactly the reform
+called for in the first responder legislation, which was
+approved by the committee.
+ As you may know, I represent a large portion of Westchester
+County, one of the largest counties in New York State. Within
+our borders we have the Indian Point nuclear plant situated
+among 20 million people within a 50-mile radius. We have the
+Croton and Kensico reservoirs which supply drinking water for 9
+million residents of New York City and the lower Hudson Valley,
+the county airport, which houses the largest corporate fleets
+of planes in Westchester.
+ In light of the obvious threats to our region, our law
+enforcement officials work hard to protect these landmarks. So
+when the Federal threat advisory warning goes up, our local
+governments and local enforcement officials go into action,
+whether or not they have special intelligence from the Federal
+Government or guidance how to guard against these threats.
+ For example, Westchester County police department spent of
+$220,000 from December 21st through January 9th during the most
+recent heightened alert. Individual communities, smaller ones
+like Larchmont, spent $15,000; Ossining spent $8,000 for police
+officer overtime pay.
+ Now, on the surface--and I am right near New York City--
+these figures may sound small in comparison to some of the
+numbers that we hear. However, for towns of populations of
+fewer than 30,000 residents, these figures represent sizable
+portions of their local budget. And they simply cannot continue
+to bear these additional costs without substantial help from
+the Federal Government.
+ And as one first responder from my district who testified
+before the committee said, ``Look, we can't go to orange
+without first seeing green.''
+ Now that takes me a statement you made before, and I think
+it is important to clarify it.
+ You said the $60 billion in grants, February 23rd the
+deadline. Well, this is the first time I have heard that,
+unless you are talking about grants to the states. These are
+not grants, as I understand it, that are going to localities.
+ And as my police chief, Chief Kapica in Greenburgh, said,
+``Look, I can't wait for the feds, for the state. I have to do
+what I have to do.''
+ They need reimbursement.
+ So if you can tell me how much Federal funding has been
+allocated to reimburse localities for these costs and September
+11th, I would appreciate it.
+ And this program that you referred to, I am assuming is
+money that is going to the state. Because otherwise, none of my
+localities have heard about it.
+ Admiral Loy. that is correct.
+ Ms. Lowey. So it is going to the state?
+ Admiral Loy. Through the states, ma'am.
+ Ms. Lowey. Well, I think you should know that that is not
+good enough. Because the localities have to be able to apply to
+some source of funds to reimburse--and obviously there should
+be appropriate review. We do not expect you to be handing out
+these dollars willy-nilly.
+ We need to get legitimate expenses reimbursed.
+ And so I would appreciate if you would consider that.
+ One of my questions is: Will the Department of Homeland
+Security support legislation to reimburse local jurisdictions
+directly?
+ Second, to follow up on the interoperability issue, this is
+one of the top priorities of the secretary. Yet there are no
+specific funds set aside in this bill, in fiscal year 2005, to
+enhance state and local interoperability.
+ And last year, Congress put $85 million under the COPS
+program for this purpose, but this administration has proposed
+zero, no funds, in DHS or COPS for interoperability.
+ I mean, I do not understand. If this is a priority, how
+exactly are we enhancing interoperability?
+ And I would dare say--what, is it six months ago, since I
+am still on yellow and not red--there was a hearing where the
+gentleman was telling us--I forgot his name--that they are
+going out with an RFP with interoperability, and then they are
+going to be issuing guidelines with interoperability.
+ Frankly, all our local governments are just going ahead
+with it.
+ So I would strongly recommend that there would be some kind
+of reimbursement programs for essential expenditures, because
+our local governments just cannot deal with it anymore.
+ I do not know if you have time to respond.
+ Chairman Cox. Of course the witnesses may take as much time
+as they see fit to respond.
+ Ms. Lowey. Thank you.
+ Admiral Loy. Thank you, sir.
+ The president's budget asks for I think $3.5 billion. It is
+important for us to take the $200 billion worth of supplemental
+Liberty Shield dollars and separate them from the notion of
+annual grants--I do not want to confuse the two.
+ The claims process associated with those $200 billion is of
+course--those are dollars against which only $60 billion worth
+of claims have come toward us. So there was about--I am sorry,
+millions.
+ There was this pool of leftover dollars, if you will, that
+was very important for us to gain as quickly as we could a
+sense of what the period from the 20th of December to the 9th
+of January was costing the first responders in the local
+communities.
+ So the call has gone out to allow that claims process to be
+initiated.
+ As it relates to annual grants, the $3.5 billion worth of
+grant requests that are in the president's budget is back to
+the discussion we had earlier, ma'am, on the adjusting nature
+of how best to provide those dollars in a post-9/11 security
+environment that is just dramatically different than times
+before.
+ And where there are areas of greater population, greater
+population density, greater critical infrastructure elements,
+like you were just describing in Westchester County, the notion
+that that distribution algorithm should reflect that is I think
+something that is--we are sort of in violent agreement at this
+point between the committee and the administration to how we
+get down to--the devil is always in the details--but the notion
+of it being other than just an across-the-board base-plus per-
+capita distribution algorithm I think is clarified by what the
+president is requesting and a doubling of those UAC grants for
+2005.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentlelady's time has expired.
+ The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson-Lee, is recognized
+for five minutes.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman--and a
+very important hearing and one I hope that I can capture for
+both Mr. Brennan and Admiral Loy the frustration that you have
+heard on occasion among members.
+ For the last two State of the Union addresses, we have had
+the president dominate his message to the American public with
+the idea of either war or the war on terrorism.
+ We are living in a state of panic, a state of fear.
+ This committee, I believe one of the singular committees in
+this Congress and in this nation to able to be a partner when
+what is a 170,000-person department--that is a lot of people--
+are trying in essence to get its act together. And I do not say
+it negatively. I know there are hardworking individuals there.
+ If I recall correctly, the president's recent State of the
+Union address took 35 minutes on the issue of terror. And so,
+when we hear--keeping in mind the line of questioning of
+Congressman Markey--that there was an incident at the White
+House, obviously there is great concern that we now find a
+similar incident in the Congress. And who knows where else it
+might occur.
+ You can imagine the public's view of this incident, as to
+where it might occur next.
+ So I am going to ask the chairman of this committee--
+because we cannot be problem solvers if we cannot be part of
+the factual information--that we hold a secured briefing and
+meeting with the appropriate officials of the Homeland Security
+Committee to provide us with both the knowledge of the
+occurrence at the White House, how the information was
+disseminated, who it was shared with and its ultimate--I do not
+want to use the term tracking, but I will use it--to the point
+where we are now in the United States Congress facing a similar
+incident.
+ I am going to ask that to you, Mr. Chairman, that we have
+such a briefing.
+ We have had those. And I do not even like to call it a
+briefing. I want it to be a meeting where we are engaging on
+what I perceive to me a national problem that we have to
+address. And I would like to have that request made. And I am
+putting that on the record.
+ I do not know, Mr. Chairman, am I allowed to yield to you?
+I know I would be losing my time. I want to proceed. But I
+would like to make that offer, Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Cox. Well, I would advise the gentlelady that at 7
+p.m. this evening on the House floor there is precisely such a
+discussion, for members only, on the ricin incident in the
+Dirksen Senate Office Building.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. And Mr. Chairman, what I would offer to
+say to you is that I would prefer to have a separate meeting
+for members of the Homeland Security Committee, inasmuch as
+this takes a lot longer time. And as well, we are entrusted
+with the responsibility to secure the homeland.
+ So I will make that request still, recognizing there is a
+meeting this evening.
+ Let me also then continue--and I thank you, Mr. Chairman,
+very much--to lay that groundwork for why we are concerned with
+what I am hearing today.
+ Let me ask the question, or let me put on the record so
+that you also know the frustration with the reimbursement
+question that my colleague from New York has raised.
+ Cities nationwide are now spending $70 million per week.
+Houston, the fourth largest city in the nation, is obviously
+spending even more.
+ In a 145-city survey on either the homeland security, Iraq
+war on terrorism and war in Iraq, with the homeland security
+issues and the question of alerts coming and going, they may
+spend over $2 billion in the next six months.
+ So you did not answer the question of Ms. Lowey on the
+point of whether or not you are reimbursing cities now,
+directly, for the costs they have already expended. Can I just
+get a yes or no or where we are in that position?
+ Admiral Loy. Yes, ma'am. As I indicated, we have set a
+February 23rd deadline for the claims that are put together as
+a result of the experiences from 20 December to 9 January. And
+we expect to pay the bills when we get those claims and have
+reviewed them.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. And those will be directly to the
+locality?
+ Admiral Loy. I do not know that to be the case, ma'am. I am
+not personally familiar with the process of how the claim goes
+in and how the claim goes back out.
+ My sense is of course that the difference between working
+with 55 entities, the states and territories, as opposed to a
+countless number of entities, if you were dealing with each and
+every city in the country--.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. Let me stop you for a moment so I can get
+my other question on the record here, so you can answer it. Let
+me complain or raise a question of concern on the idea that it
+goes to the states and not directly to the localities.
+ I am going to research that with you. I understand that you
+do not have the specific information.
+ But let me move forward.
+ During the Super Bowl weekend, there was a decision for a
+flight leaving from London not to come into Houston. My
+question is whether the TTIC is involved in this kind of
+intelligence assessment.
+ If that is the case, I want to hear from Mr. Brennan
+whether or not he is comfortable in light of the
+vulnerabilities and failures of the intelligence system, as
+related to the Iraq war, as we are now seeing unfold.
+ Are you confident in the intelligence that is now moving
+this alert system up and down, up and down? And what is it that
+you are doing to vet the intelligence that is coming to ensure
+that even as we use the system that we are now critiquing, that
+you in fact have the information to make determinations that
+would then cause you to go to orange alert or yellow alert,
+which then generates this high cost that we are now expending
+in our local communities?
+ What is the basis upon which you are utilizing or
+collecting intelligence? And what is the basis upon which you
+are vetting intelligence to make sure that we have viable
+intelligence to make the right decisions?
+ Chairman Cox. The gentlelady's time has expired.
+ But both Admiral Loy and Mr. Brennan, please take whatever
+time you see fit to answer the questions.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. I thank the chairman.
+ Mr. Brennan. As you I am sure understand, there are many
+different types of information that come into the U.S.
+government regarding threat--some of high credibility, some of
+low credibility.
+ Analysts and TTIC, as well as in other organizations,
+constantly look at that information, evaluate it, assess it,
+digest it, challenge it and compare it with what we know about
+what terrorists are doing.
+ We then, as an intelligence analytic element, we interact
+then with those agencies that collect the information, whether
+it is collected from human sources or technical systems or
+whatever it is that they do, to make sure, then, that we
+provide them the feedback as far as what our questions, what
+our requirements are so they can then go back to do the vetting
+of the sources that is necessary.
+ But this is a constant back-and-forth process.
+ We get the information in, we look at it, we compare it,
+then we provide feedback to those organizations that are
+providing the information to us.
+ And so what we try to do is to appropriately characterize
+the nature of the information to the Department of Homeland
+Security so that they fully understand the nature of the
+information, any questions that we might have about it, as well
+as our assessment of its credibility and reliability of the
+sources.
+ So it is a cycle in terms of--a cyclical process. The
+information comes in. We provide it to customers. They have
+issues or questions about it, we have our own and we pass it
+back to the collectors so that they can better vet those
+sources.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. Admiral Loy, you are the recipient of the
+information, at least the department is.
+ Admiral Loy. Yes, ma'am. John describes it exactly the way
+we watched day after day through the course of those weeks, Ms.
+Jackson-Lee.
+ And the specificity and credibility of that intel stream is
+always going to be the judgment we need to take when that
+analytic product, as a result of that give and take John just
+described, is then offered to the Department of Homeland
+Security.
+ Our intelligence shop will give us a good assessment of
+that product that they just received and then map it across the
+vulnerabilities that we know to be in our country, in all those
+economic sectors.
+ And then our challenge is to make a good judgment, a risk
+assessment, if you will, knowing this threat piece that was
+just provided to us, knowing the vulnerabilities that are
+there--what are we going to do about it and what are the tools
+that we have to do it, including the communications tools to
+tell locales, economic sectors and indicate specifically, as
+you alerted with your question, the aviation industry as it
+related to the flight in question that was heading to Houston
+on the even of the Super Bowl.
+ That flight, as I can recall, would originally have arrived
+in Houston around half-time. And the combination of the threat
+piece that we received, and our engagement process with
+vulnerability, as we understood them at the time, caused us to
+engage with that particular airline, prescribe what would have
+been a set of mitigating strategies that we felt were
+appropriate if it was to fly and leave the judgment associated
+with flying to the airline.
+ That process worked through that particular event.
+ And frankly, the day-after-day engagement between TTIC as
+the threat collector--collector in the sense that it is
+provided as information for them to produce a tactically
+actionable product, if you will, and then offer that to the
+customers elsewhere in the business of securing our homeland.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ I think their answers evidence the need for a security
+briefing of this committee. Because as you well know, if our
+nation's citizens continue to hear about alerts and they do not
+respond, they are not being secure.
+ So I think it is very important that we have this closed-
+door meeting of the Homeland Security Committee.
+ Thank you.
+ Chairman Cox. The chair recognizes himself for five
+minutes.
+ Admiral Loy, Mr. Brennan, you have heard from a number of
+our members questions coming at you from I think both
+directions on the clarity or ambiguity of the threat-level
+message, not to law enforcement, not to Federal agencies, to
+governors, but rather to the general public.
+ And that remains a concern of mine.
+ I want to be absolutely clear and unambiguous in my
+compliments to TTIC, to the Department of Homeland Security, to
+the administration across the board on the progress that you
+are making, the very rapid changes that you are making in the
+way that government does business when it comes to sharing
+information among people in the government who can do something
+with it.
+ But I have great concerns about the adequacy of our system
+for dealing with the general public, because I think that the
+confusion that is sown is about equal with the benefit that it
+gained, and that tradeoff is not working as well as it might.
+ But let me turn now to the second part, which is actionable
+information in the hands of people who can act, people who are
+responsible because of their job descriptions for doing
+something with this information.
+ There are two main sources of responsibility for the
+department. We have Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3
+and we have the Homeland Security Act.
+ HSPD-3 tells departments and each Federal agency that they
+are responsible for developing their own protective measures in
+response to each threat level.
+ The directive also recommends, as you pointed out in your
+testimony, is binding on the Federal Government, advisory as to
+everyone else, it recommends that governors, mayors and others
+develop their own protective measures for each threat level.
+ Then we have the Homeland Security Act, which authorizes
+the department to provide guidance to state and local
+government--to the mayors, the governors, the police chiefs,
+the fire chiefs, the first responders and so on--about what
+they should do at each threat level.
+ And this includes also private sector entities and the
+public.
+ It is my understanding that we are not yet at the point
+where we can take a look at a classified document that says,
+``Here are the protocols for this sector,'' or ``Here are the
+protocols for this law enforcement arm when we go,'' for
+example, ``from yellow to orange.''
+ What guidance, if any, has DHS issued to Federal, state and
+local and private sector agencies regarding the appropriate
+protective measures at each level? In what form has that
+guidance been given? And is it sufficiently digestible that it
+would be sensible for the committee to review it?
+ Admiral Loy?
+ Admiral Loy. Sir, it varies across the board, if you will,
+in terms of sectors of the economy. The focus is associated
+with sectors of economy at this point in terms of being able to
+identify, with clarity, such that the state and local elements
+as well as the private sector elements, know what is expected
+of them, if you will, and what they should--the encouragement
+process here, of course, is to identify the kinds of things
+that they should expect of themselves.
+ And I go back to Mr. Turner's I think absolutely right-on
+commentary about all of us rising to the occasion in this very
+different security environment that we are all part of today.
+ So, for example, with respect to aviation security--one
+that I just happen to know a good about, based on what I have
+been doing for the last two years--there are very specific all
+the way down to encouraged additional patrols to be foot
+patrols, not in uniform, around the airport terminal building,
+looking for the briefcase that is left unattended.
+ It has to do with the parking lots and how we are actually
+going to be dealing.
+ It has to do with threat reduction plans associated with
+potential bombings, given that vehicle bombs remain one of the
+most dramatic potential sources of problem.
+ So in the case of the aviation piece of the transportation
+sector, enormously specific guidance has been provided--
+actually, I would call it worked through with the airport
+directors and with the airlines themselves.
+ It has to do with identify authentication of people in
+those airports.
+ It has to do with access control of how we deal with
+elements in those airports.
+ There are probably less robust but aggressive and growing
+interchanges with the rail industry, with the transit industry,
+with other elements in the transportation sector.
+ that is just one of this puzzle of sectors the secretary's
+responsible for across the board.
+ We have established ISACs, as they are called, information
+sharing and analysis centers, associated with each of the major
+economic sectors in the nation. The ability to exchange and
+hear from them so they are part of the design work of that set
+of things we would be expecting of them or ask of them at
+different threat condition levels, that process of engagement
+is robust as we speak at the moment and about to almost
+explode, sir, as we are moving with respect to this critical
+infrastructure national game plan that is going to be built.
+ Chairman Cox. So I do not want to use up any more of my
+time in asking new questions, but just to re-ask the question
+that I already put, is the information in digestible form for
+this committee?
+ Admiral Loy. There is absolutely a lot of it, sir, that we
+would be delighted to share and help you understand where we
+are trying to go and where we are with respect to--.
+ Chairman Cox. I say that because I think every member on
+the committee has had the same experience of a police chief in
+my hometown of Newport Beach, California. What is the Newport
+Beach police chief supposed to do? What should his department
+do differently when the threat level rises? Or is it up to him?
+After a fashion, HSPD-3 leaves it up to everybody to come up
+with their own.
+ Admiral Loy. To a degree there is a strong encouragement
+process and then there is absolutely an appropriate ``let the
+mayor define what is going to happen in his town, let the
+governor define what is going to happen in his state, let the
+police chief be part of the process of defining what is going
+to happen in his responsibility area.''
+ Yes, sir?
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for
+five minutes.
+ Mr. Turner. Admiral Loy, that reality that every mayor and
+every governor and every CEO of a corporation is complying with
+your alert level voluntarily--there are no requirements of law
+to do so--is the very reason I think it is so critical that we
+move forward to a more sophisticated system.
+ Because I heard an emergency manager at the U.S. conference
+of mayor's meeting just a couple weeks ago that I was a part
+of. He was from Arizona. He reminded everybody around the table
+at this meeting of the mayors and emergency managers that they
+did not have to comply with what the Federal Government was
+saying, that was theirs.
+ And some of them were somewhat shocked. They kind of
+thought, well, maybe they were supposed to do this.
+ And he reminded them, ``No, this is voluntary.'' And he
+said many times he has not complied when the alert level has
+gone up in recent times.
+ So I think there is beginning to be an erosion of
+confidence in the system.
+ You mentioned many times the importance of looking at
+threats and matching them against the vulnerabilities. And that
+is what the task is all about, as you go through analyzing
+these threats.
+ And yet, a few weeks ago, I read in some publication that
+Assistant Secretary Liscouski said that it would be five years
+before the department would complete the congressional-mandated
+national comprehensive threat and vulnerability assessment.
+ So it struck me that that time line is totally
+unacceptable. And so I would ask you: What do we need to do in
+the Congress and what do you need to do to be able to shorten
+that time frame to accomplish that very critical assessment?
+ Admiral Loy. I could not agree with you more, sir. That is
+unacceptable.
+ Someone was suggesting to me just the other day that the
+notion of standard-setting for interoperable communications was
+something that might be at 18 or 24 months out. And I had to
+help them understand that is totally unacceptable. It should
+have been maybe done by now.
+ But there are challenges associated with this, sir, that
+are enormously difficult. I do not think there is plenty of
+``authority'' in the Homeland Security Act and HSPD-3 to enable
+the secretary and I and others to get on with the business of
+these enormously important things that you described.
+ On the other hand, Congress has acted in addition to the
+Homeland Security Act in many ways. If you think, for example,
+of the MTSA, the Marine Transportation Security Act, an
+augmenting piece of legislation where the Congress felt for
+whatever correct set of reasons, probably that either we were
+not moving fast enough or the nature of the maritime
+transportation system deserved guidance in the form of
+legislation.
+ And in the president's budget today you will see a $100
+million worth of requests from the Coast Guard to get on with
+the implementation of the ingredients of the Maritime
+Transportation Security Act that the Congress passed last year.
+ I would offer in this greater sense, there is almost a
+repeatable series of things that must occur with respect to
+each of these sectors. There must be a standard-setting
+process.
+ There must be a vulnerability assessment process. There
+must be an identification of mitigating strategies. And there
+must be, then, an action plan that comes out as a result of
+that sequence of events with accountability at the bottom end
+of it as the most appropriate and final loop for us all to
+close.
+ Mr. Turner. You know, that description you just made there,
+what needs to be done, it would be very helpful if you could
+lay that out in a letter to the committee as to what the
+process is so we can have a better understanding.
+ And if you could, also let us know what we can do to help
+move it along. Because I think we have got to come to grips
+with the fact that five years is not acceptable.
+ There is another issue that I wanted to lay on the table
+before my time expires for you to respond to. And that is it is
+not only the collection of intelligence and the analysis of it
+and matching against vulnerabilities, but it is then turning
+around and providing information back to those who have a need
+to know.
+ And a few weeks, maybe it has been a couple of months ago
+or longer now, the department made an announcement that we are
+going to change the policy regarding information sharing. And
+the governors were able to designate, I believe it was three
+people, within their office that could receive classified
+information.
+ Now, the Gilmore Commission made some recommendations on
+this. And I think it is incumbent upon the department to take a
+look at this. And I think that we are all of like mind here,
+that if this information is going to mean anything, we have to
+be able to share it with people that can use it. Otherwise, you
+are in the same position that I am in when I get a briefing,
+and that is I cannot tell anybody this classified information
+or I violate the law.
+ And so, since I am not a first responder, since I am not
+out there on the front line anywhere, then it is good for
+educational purposes in terms of congressional oversight, but
+it is not making the country a lot safer in the short term.
+ And the Gilmore Commission said this: ``We should designate
+one or more security-clearance-granting authorities which can
+grant security clearances Federal Government-wide.'' In other
+words, we need some entity that can grant security clearances
+that will be recognized by all Federal agencies.
+ We also need to, I think, extend that to local and state
+governments. They said we need to develop a new regime of
+clearances and classification for dissemination of intelligence
+and other information to state and local governments and the
+private sector, and develop a training program for state, local
+and private sector officials for interpreting intelligence
+products. Obviously not only for interpreting but for
+understanding what the classification system means and what you
+can and cannot do with that information.
+ But to say that we are collecting all this information and
+we are understanding these threats and yet we are not passing
+this information down to those who need it, who could use it--
+and I am not just talking about passing it down to the folks
+that might be affected in a given area--because when you are
+relying on this color-coded system, you know the folks in
+Houston need to know just as much as the folks in Buffalo,
+because if the threat relates to Buffalo, they then know it
+does not relate to them.
+ But we have to get to the point where we broaden the number
+of people who we have enough trust and confidence in, and there
+is a lot of patriotic Americans out there working real hard on
+front lines that I would trust--.
+ Admiral Loy. Yes, sir.
+ Mr. Turner. --that we can share this classified information
+with and get them in a position where what we are collecting
+would actually be meaningful in the event that the worst
+occurred.
+ Admiral Loy. Sir, let me take a crack at it, if I may sir.
+And John probably has some thoughtful cautions along the way
+with respect to sources and methods and things that he is far,
+far, better to answer than I.
+ First of all, we may be able to take a lesson from, again,
+the aviation book, sir.
+ Well before 9/11, there was a category of information known
+as SSIs, sensitive security information, that had been part and
+parcel of the means by which airlines and airports worked with
+the FAA and others in terms of concerns that had been, of
+course, part of that community's interest since Lockerbie and
+since many, many years before 9/11, the means by which we could
+translate--I will use that word--the classified information you
+are describing such that it is totally there with respect to
+its import at that local chief of police station or JTTF
+locally in the city is absolutely a goal that we should all
+have.
+ To find the way, A, to communicate it, that is the
+technical end of the communications channels, and also so that
+the receiver, that first responder set that we are expecting so
+much of, to be as armed as possible in terms of understanding,
+sort of, what they are getting into.
+ And I could not agree with you more that we should find and
+are in the midst of trying to design better ways that will
+approximate that SSI system that served the aviation industry
+reasonably well.
+ John?
+ Mr. Brennan. Mr. Turner, I would not disagree with the
+comments that you read of the Gilmore Commission, first of all.
+ second, I think it is critically important that there be a
+national enterprise business process architecture. But
+honestly, the technical challenge I do not find as daunting as
+the engineering of the business processes that need to go on in
+terms of bringing together the different elements of the
+Federal family, then bringing in state and local and local
+police or law enforcement officials.
+ That type of architecture, as far as how information should
+flow, who it should flow to, under what circumstances
+individual components should receive information, that is a
+tough, tough challenge as far as, again, putting together a
+national architecture of moving information very quickly--which
+can be done--but as far as who has that responsibility in
+certain areas, I think this is still being worked out with the
+state and local officials and the Department of Homeland
+Security.
+ But what we are trying to do is to get the Federal system
+right as far as the terrorism intelligence feed to the
+departments so that they can then take it to the next level.
+ Admiral Loy. If I may, sir, just a closing comment on that
+if our answers of course have been adequate.
+ There is a system called JRIES, J-R-I-E-S, it is a Joint
+Regional Information Exchange System. I might not have all the
+acronym correct. But the notion there is that the technical end
+of being able to do the communication is a system that we need
+to build. that is the how to it.
+ Then the what to be shared and the means by which that
+classified matter through the JRIES can actually be exchanged
+between levels of government, for example, Federal, state, and
+local, is absolutely on point. And we are about to develop a
+couple prototypes to prove that it has its merit and move out
+on it, sir.
+ So we could not agree with you more. The rightness of being
+able to share the tactically sound and valuable information
+among those players that can best use it for our national
+interest is right on target.
+ Mr. Turner. Thank you.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentlelady from New York is recognized
+for five minutes.
+ Ms. Lowey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ And I want to thank you, Admiral Loy, and Mr. Brennan for
+being here today. And I want you to know that we appreciate the
+enormity of the task.
+ However, as a member of Congress--and I know I speak for my
+colleagues as this hearing winds down--we represent over
+660,000 people. I am the mother of three, a grandmother of six.
+As I travel around my district, the fear is palpable. These
+youngsters are not growing up the way I grew up.
+ And they all want to know, what should we do? Should we go
+to the mall? Should we go to Times Square? Should we take an
+airplane? Should we take the train?
+ So I want to make it very clear that although I understand
+how hard everyone is working, and I know we appreciate your
+efforts, when you look at 170,000 people that are making policy
+two years after 9/11, as someone who lives 30 minutes from New
+York City who has family and children in New York City, I
+frankly think in order to earn the public's confidence we have
+to move more quickly.
+ It is just not good enough to say that we are thinking
+about it and we are planning it, and a year from now and five
+years from now--we were talking about all the nuclear plants
+that are not up to standards that you and I would deem
+adequate--we just have to move more quickly.
+ And it seems to me that DHS should be able to not only
+decide that it is orange or green or yellow, but they should be
+able to provide some kind of standard, some kind of information
+to the locals. They are not receiving it.
+ In fact, I guess it was at the last time--I was looking
+through the dates. It was awhile ago, when Secretary Ridge
+appeared before the committee, and he testified before the
+Senate Government Affairs Committee last May. He also
+acknowledged that the process for notifying state and local
+agencies of the change in the threat level needs improvement.
+ I wonder: Have there been improvements made? It is my
+understanding from that hearing that when the secretary decides
+to raise or lower the threat level, DHS makes a conference call
+to as many state and local law enforcement agencies as can be
+reached.
+ Number one, approximately how many state and local law
+enforcement agencies are you able to reach through this method?
+My people, who I meet with regularly, tell me they hear about
+the threat level through the media.
+ Is this the best method in a time when you are trying to be
+as efficient as you can?
+ I would be interested to know who is on the conference
+call. I mean, fire departments, for example, are so critical to
+increasing security protections during an increased threat
+level. Are they part of this effort? Or are the mayors part of
+this conference call--and they are supposed to alert.
+ I just wanted to, as we close down this hear, let you know
+that I know your concern. But from the perspective of most
+members of Congress, you hear our frustration and we just do
+not feel that the department is moving as efficiently and as
+expeditiously as it should.
+ And I understand the complexity. But I just hope that you
+get that message loud and clear.
+ And perhaps you could answer that one question about who is
+on this conference call. Do you think it is working
+efficiently? Should we be e-mailing or BlackBerrying everybody?
+What kind of information are the locals getting?
+ And I believe you answered--I believe it was Chairman Cox--
+that you are not providing specifics. With all the expertise
+you have, with all the various people in play, not to provide
+some kind of directive to the locals, and just say, we are in
+alert, that does not seem to be as good as we could possibly
+be.
+ Admiral Loy. Yes, ma'am. To answer your question directly,
+the conference calls that are cited are with the homeland
+security advisory players in the respective states. And it is,
+for lack of a better analogy, it is a phone tree, if you will.
+And we count on those state officials to advise their local
+constituents as appropriate to what it is that has been passed
+to them.
+ Now, in addition to that, depending on what we are actually
+seeing in the stream. For example, in the holiday period, we
+were on the phone several times a day to Ray Kelly and his
+team; we were on the phone to Mayor Hahn and his team several
+times a day; we were on the phone to Las Vegas and their team
+several times a day to update them on whatever it was that the
+twice-daily sessions associated with TTIC re-analysis of the
+threat stream was helping us understand.
+ We made executive visits. We comprised teams from the
+Department of Homeland Security that went and visited Los
+Angeles and Las Vegas and New York and Washington, D.C.,
+because that is where the threat stream was telling us in this
+particular period these folks deserved a more wholesome review
+of the information that we have so they can understand what it
+is that is being asked of them.
+ Now, can we make, you know, 30,000 executive visits in a
+10-minute period, when we are trying to ``pass the word''?
+ There are technical and substantive values to both the
+technology that you are describing to help us do that better--
+whether JRIES is the answer, we will know very quickly and we
+will be able to do that or whether the holding on to the blunt
+instrument nature of HSAS in its color-coded fashion that we
+have it today may continue to have value there, when each of
+them who sees it occur understands what that translates to
+them--and then of course the follow-up that we would have with
+anyone that we would be getting more specific information for.
+ Ms. Lowey. Just let me thank you very much and thank the
+chairman.
+ And I just want you to know we feel as if we are all on the
+same team, Democrat and Republican, and whatever we can do
+legislatively or in any way cooperate, we recognize the urgency
+of this issue, and we applaud you for taking the
+responsibility.
+ Admiral Loy. Thank you, Ms. Lowey.
+ Ms. Lowey. Thank you.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentlelady's time has expired.
+ The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson-Lee, is recognized
+for five minutes.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
+ And gentlemen, let me do as I did earlier and give you a
+few pearls of thought, if you will. And then, if you would
+comment.
+ But allow me a moment of personal privilege to add my
+appreciation and applause for the law enforcement that included
+Department of Homeland Security, United States Customs and TSA,
+and my own Houston police department, and various country and
+other local law entities for this past weekend. I believe they
+did an excellent job in Houston with the Super Bowl. Massive
+number of people, massive number of potential activities that
+could have occurred, good and bad.
+ I think most of the good did occur and none of the bad. And
+so I want to acknowledge that and express the appreciation for
+the service that was rendered.
+ Chairman Cox. If the gentlelady would yield, I think the
+question was put earlier, you know, what should people do
+differently when we are at this heightened state of alert, and
+I think the example was given during half-time of the Super
+Bowl. People should not do that.
+ Admiral Loy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I could not agree
+more.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. Being a supporter of the First Amendment,
+and I appreciate and yield to the chairman on his views, I will
+just associate myself with the views that Houston did a great
+job. And of course the law enforcement did a very good job.
+ Chairman Cox. Of course I agree with the gentlelady, and I
+thought it was a great game as well. And Houston did a
+wonderful job of hosting the Super Bowl.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. Thank you very much.
+ A lot of interesting things occurred. We could have been a
+little better on the streaker that was on the field that no one
+was able to capture.
+ But let me proceed and be on the same theme, if you will,
+of the frustration is not with the hard work that you are
+obviously engaged in, it is that we want our fellow Americans,
+our nation, to be safe.
+ So let me ask some pointed questions.
+ I have held a number of meetings on terrorism in the
+Houston area--one, I want to thank the ranking member, who was
+present, and we look forward to the chairman being present--a
+very good meeting in the summer that we visited a lot of sites
+and heard from at least 50 or 60 witnesses on this question.
+ Subsequently I held another meeting toward the end of this
+last year, December 31st. And one of the questions asked was
+that monies seemingly had not been distributed to local
+entities that were promised since 2001.
+ That may require you to go back to your drawing boards.
+ And, again, this city is Houston, Texas. But this is my law
+enforcement that truly, I would say, is victimized or impacted
+by the fact that it seems that monies go to the states and not
+to the local entities. So I would like to have that
+information.
+ And then, to follow up, as to whether or not this
+application process for the 23rd will--and you were going to
+look into it because you were not sure--go directly to cities,
+or whether or not it will go to state entities. That is a
+definitive and a real problem for us.
+ In addition, one of the issues were that local communities
+need more hospital beds and medical equipment in time of
+tragedy. And how does the Homeland Security Department
+interface with them on that basis?
+ Let me cite for you out of the U.S. Conference of Mayors
+another point--I made one earlier: Cities have received little
+direct Federal assistance for homeland security since the
+attack on September 11th. The president's proposed an
+additional $1.4 billion in aid for local governments,
+recommending that all but $50 million of that funding be
+channeled first through state bureaucracies.
+ I think it is key that the Homeland Security Department be
+engaged with the administration--you are part of it--but with
+the White House on this fallacy, where monies are not coming
+directly to local facilities or local entities, because they
+are, in fact, spending the money.
+ I appreciate the states' role, but it is the Federal
+Government that the local communities look to. Those monies
+then are stopped, if you will, estopped, midway, and it is a
+long, long time before they get there.
+ And I think that is unfortunate.
+ I do not know where I am going to come down as it relates
+to alerts, orange, yellow and other colors. But I will say to
+you that I think it is imperative that we engage and not be
+afraid of each other. It appears that we are afraid of each
+other--it is the administration, it is the Congress. Because
+what is happening is that individuals are becoming less engaged
+when they hear the alert system.
+ that is the only criticism. that is what we are saying to
+you. Less engaged. While cities are either spending money or
+forgetting about it.
+ The Red Cross at one of my meetings suggested maybe in the
+alternative that you offer a plan, review your personal
+disaster plan, ensure you have supplies, develop alternative
+routes to and from work, exercise caution when traveling, have
+shelter in place, localities for you.
+ One of my big issues with respect to the schools, we need
+to think about them. And if you could comment on that.
+ Let me finish, however, by making this point: Citizen
+Corps, which is a very, very good promise and proposal, that is
+supposed to be organizing our citizen groups in our respective
+communities. Not many citizens are aware of Citizen Corps. They
+come in; they take up the larger entity, which is the county in
+my instance. They may be doing a great job. I want to
+compliment them. But neighborhoods do not know anything about
+it.
+ Citizen Corps needs to be diversified. It needs to be
+smaller. It needs to go into neighborhoods. And it needs to be
+funded.
+ Mr. Chairman, I see the gavel. I will say one last
+sentence. And that is: You might answer me on whether or not
+you have been able--if good intelligence is important, have you
+been able to diversify your analysts? Are you pulling from
+diverse populations? Do you have Arabic speakers? Do you have
+African-Americans? Do you have Hispanics? Do you have Asians?
+ That has been a key concern of many of my colleagues. And I
+might just add, Congressman Donna Christian-Christensen, who
+had to leave, we are very concerned about that issue.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentlelady's time has expired.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. I thank the distinguished chairman.
+ If you would answer the series of questions. I hope you
+were gathering notes. I was, so I hope you will be able to
+answer some of them.
+ Admiral Loy. I will try several, ma'am. And then John
+perhaps has more insight on the last one.
+ First of all, Citizen Corps, I think the public affairs
+dimension of that is enormously important. And we do need to be
+as understanding as we can with what the potential is there for
+its purpose. And its purpose is to basically enhance individual
+citizen preparedness.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. Right.
+ Admiral Loy. And the flow of the dollars through that
+particular process, in terms of community emergency response
+teams, and their ability to be adequately resources, so as to
+be able to do what they are supposed to do when they are
+supposed to do it, I think Citizen Corps is a great program. I
+think the president has asked for $50 million for the program
+for this upcoming year?
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. We may want to talk. That is not
+happening. I will just say on that point.
+ Admiral Loy. Yes, ma'am, OK.
+ As it relates to the flow of monies, first of all, I think
+it is enormously important as we look at the absolute dollar
+amounts asked for in grants this year to have some context to
+this over the course of a couple of years.
+ Over the window of 1999 to 2001, I think there was a $1.3
+billion total to the grants to be administered in that fashion;
+2002 to 2004, not counting the $3.5 billion the president is
+asking for this upcoming year, $13 billion, a 900 percent
+increase in those two windows of time.
+ So the context in which we think our way through numbers,
+in terms of their absolute value and potential value to
+preparedness in the nation, is very important.
+ And lastly, I could not agree with you more that we must
+have an efficient system for the distribution of those dollars.
+I am a new arrival to the department. I will guarantee you I
+will take on the challenge of looking very carefully at the
+efficiency of the system as you were describing your
+frustration in terms of the Federal through states on the way
+to the locals. I do not see any reason why that should not be
+as it is called for, as I understand, something like an 80 to
+85 percent pass-through, on to the cities and counties of our
+respective states.
+ I will take a round turn on that, ma'am, and look forward
+to working with you on it.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. I look forward to that.
+ Mr. Brennan?
+ Thank you, Admiral.
+ Mr. Brennan. Ms. Jackson-Lee, the Terrorist Threat
+Integration Center takes that word in its title,
+``integration,'' very seriously. From the standpoint of that,
+we recognize how much of a force multiplier the integration of
+those different perspectives and agencies within the U.S.
+government can bring to the fight against terrorism.
+ There is a rich diversity there. We are fortunate I think
+right now to have within the TTIC population African-Americans,
+Hispanics, Asians, Arabic speakers and others.
+ Since we are not an independent agency or department, we do
+not have direct hiring authority. So we receive the analysts
+who are sent to us from those departments and agencies. And one
+of the things that we are going to be looking at is ensuring
+that we have within the TTIC population that type of richness
+and diversity, not just in terms of departmental
+representation, but also in terms of the richness and diversity
+of America.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. I look forward to working with you further
+on that, and also tracking how those individuals are shared
+with you and what opportunities you will have to have your own
+impact on that diversity as well. I think it is key for good
+intelligence.
+ Mr. Brennan. I look forward to it. Thank you.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Cox. I thank the gentlelady.
+ Before we proceed, I have an announcement I would like to
+make. Today is the last day for our senior counsel, Mike
+Jeffroy, whom many of you know, who has ably served this
+committee. He is here on his last day for a while at least,
+because he is going to be leaving for six months. He has been
+called up by the United States Marines to go to Iraq.
+ And I want to wish him Godspeed and to thank you both for
+the outstanding work you have done in making America safer,
+working here in Washington in the Congress, and for what you
+are embarked upon to make Iraq and the world a safer place as a
+United States Marine. Thank you very much.
+ [Applause.]
+ I want to thank our witnesses. You have been very patient
+through 2.5 hours, nearly three hours of hearing here. We have
+covered a lot of ground. I think we have made a lot of progress
+in informing the Congress. And hopefully you have learned
+something from our questions.
+ There is, as you know, in progress a GAO analysis of the
+color-code threat warning system. The GAO has briefed both the
+Democratic and Republican staff. I believe it is GAO's habit to
+work with the department while they are preparing these
+reports, and I take it that you have heard from them in the
+process of this.
+ But I would just note that much of what you have heard from
+the members here has also been echoed in the interim report
+from GAO on this subject, specifically that Federal, state and
+local agencies wish for much more detailed information and
+advance information, separate from the color-code warnings.
+ Some 85 percent of GAO customers said that they got this
+information first from television, the same way, in other
+words, that Al-Qa`ida or Osama bin Laden's getting it, when it
+is made public to the world.
+ Second, GAO pointed out that nobody is doing a good job--
+nobody meaning not the Federal Government, state government, or
+local government--of tracking the costs associated with this
+system.
+ Perforce, we do not have a way in the Federal Government of
+measuring this system's effectiveness. Simply put, are the
+costs worth it? We do not know, because we do not know what it
+costs. There is no accounting system that is agreed upon by
+anyone.
+ Some people are keeping careful track of their costs, but
+others are using different methods completely. And there is not
+any common denominator.
+ I think as we go forward, we have to have some system of
+measurement, and that, thus far, is lacking.
+ Lastly, GAO reports that Federal, state and local
+government agency officials indicated that they would like to
+receive more information and intelligence on a regional, state
+and infrastructure sectoral basis . That is something, of
+course, that you have heard from this committee before.
+ So we hope that you take these suggestions to heart. And we
+look forward to working with all of you.
+ I would yield to the gentleman from Texas, if you have any
+closing comments.
+ Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman, I think it has been a productive
+hearing. And I join you in thanking our two distinguished
+witnesses, great patriots who are working hard to be sure this
+country is safe.
+ And we appreciate what you do and those who work with you.
+ I have often had the opportunity to be impressed with the
+quality of people that we have serving this country. And you
+two here today are fine examples of that. So thank you very
+much.
+ Chairman Cox. That is a fine comment. One I wish to join
+in. I want to thank you, Admiral Loy, Mr. Brennan, for your
+service to our country. And in addition, for your very close
+cooperation and work with this committee and with the Congress.
+We look forward to continuing that relationship.
+ This hearing is adjourned.
+ [Whereupon, at 3:29 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
+
+
+ A P P E N D I X
+
+ ------------
+
+ Material Submitted for the Record
+
+ Questions and Responses for the Record Submitted by Deputy Secretary
+ James LOy
+
+ Questions from Congresswoman Loretta Sanchez
+
+Question: 1. Since the inception of the Homeland Security Advisory
+System, the threat level has been raised to Orange 5 times. Thankfully,
+no attacks occurred at these five times. Do you have evidence that the
+increased threat level prevented attacks, or did the attacks simply not
+happen--in other words, were these false alarms?
+Answer: The protective measures and alerted posture the Homeland
+Security Advisory System elicits and the incredible work done by all
+members of the Department of Homeland Security and other Federal,
+State, local, tribal, major city, and private sector partners serve as
+a deterrent to terrorists and terrorist actions. Based both upon the
+scope of measures implemented and on the intelligence we have received,
+we believe that the current system is effective and that attacks
+against the homeland have been prevented. With each new threat and with
+the lessons learned from unfortunate international incidences, DHS is
+learning about how it can continue to secure the homeland and to
+provide a significant deterrent.
+
+ a. Is this a sign of the limitation of our intelligence
+ capabilities?
+Answer: The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP)
+Directorate and specifically the Office of Information Analysis (IA)
+believes it has the capabilities to adequately analyze all intelligence
+information, compare threat information, and issue timely warning
+products to state, local, tribal, major city, and private sector
+officials.
+
+ b. I know this is an unclassified setting, but can you tell us
+ about any activity that DHS or other law enforcement agency
+ thwarted that coincided with the Orange alert?
+Answer: The answer to this question is classified.Sec. he Department is
+willing to provide the answer by way of a secure brief or some other
+means acceptable to the Committee.
+
+ c. Can you tell us generally what you perceived as the threat
+ that made you decide to increase the threat level to Orange?
+Answer: In each case of the five times the threat level has been raised
+to Orange, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials, and
+specifically the Secretary of DHS, felt that the particular
+combinations, in each case different, of the credibility of the threat
+information, the degree to which information was corroborated, the
+specificity and imminence of the threat, and the gravity of potential
+consequences of an event were high enough to warrant alerting the
+Nation.
+
+ d. The second time the threat was raised was just after the
+ attacks in Bali and Kenya. The fourth time the threat was
+ raised was just after attacks in Saudi Arabia and Morocco. What
+ advanced intelligence did we have about these attacks? Did
+ These attacks correspond to increased levels of chatter? If so,
+ why wasn't the threat level elevated before these attacks?
+Answer: Beginning in the Fall of 2002, a body of intelligence
+originating from overseas suggested that Al-Qa`ida operatives were
+planning multiple operations against U.S. or Western interests.
+Although the Homeland was never directly or overtly mentioned in those
+reports, the possibility of an attack on US soil could not be
+dismissed. That particular body of reporting developed over a six-to-
+nine-month time frame in the period between the Bali and Kenya attacks
+in the Fall of 2002, and the May 2003 attacks in Morocco and Saudi
+Arabia. By the May 2003 timeframe, this body of reporting, combined
+with the Morocco and Saudi Arabia attacks, raised the potential that an
+operation in the Homeland was near or close to execution, which led to
+the decision to raise the Homeland Security Advisory System level.
+
+ e. Has anyone been apprehended as being part of a terrorist
+ plot in relation to previous Orange alerts?
+Answer: The answer to this question is classified.Sec. he Department is
+willing to provide the answer by way of a secure brief or some other
+means acceptable to the Committee.
+
+2. A U.S. Conference of Mayors survey conducted last year reports that,
+because of the war with Iraq and repeated elevations to high alert,
+cities were spending up to $70 million per week on extra security
+measures. Los Angeles alone was spending about $2.5 million a week.
+Clearly our First Responder community is taking the threat alert system
+seriously, even though it is far from clear what they should be doing.
+ In the First Responder bill that recently passed our Emergency
+Preparedness Subcommittee, and will go through the full Committee soon,
+we have included a provision which would allow for Federal Funds to
+support States and localities in covering the added costs associated
+with these changes in threat level. Would you support such a provision?
+Answer: We do not support such a provision. We have already
+significantly increased the funding to local communities to improve
+their capacity to respond to heightened threat levels. In FY 2004,
+programs such as the State Homeland Security Grant Program ($2.2
+billion) and the Urban Area Security Initiative Program ($727 million)
+both help local governments meet the preparedness costs associated with
+increased threat levels. In addition to the funds provided in FY 2004
+through SHSGP and UASI, the Department has provided additional
+significant support to our Nation's emergency prevention and response
+community, including more than $2 billion under SHSGP in FY 2003 and
+nearly $800 million under UASI in FY 2003. Similarly, in FY 2002, State
+and local agencies received more than $315 million to support a wide
+array of activities to enhance our Nation's preparedness through ODP's
+State Domestic Preparedness Program.
+ We have also created a Homeland Security Funding Task Force to help
+streamline the grant process and enable local governments to quickly
+receive the funding necessary to prepare for future threats. We think
+these measures--in addition to the over $8 billion that has been
+allocated and awarded for First Responders since March of 2003--go most
+of the way to helping defray the costs associated with increased threat
+levels. When we change the general threat level, state and local
+officials have a responsibility to decide how to address and resource
+the protective measures they implement. For the threat advisory system
+to be effective, it must be driven by actionable intelligence and
+public safety rather than the fiscal consequence of a particular
+advisory.
+
+Question 3. What new systems are you putting in place to make sure
+state and local first responders hear about and can react to changes in
+the alert system before the general public hears about the changes from
+their local news? Do you find this to be an important aspect of the
+threat alert system?
+Answer: We recently announced the expansion of the Homeland Security
+Information Network (HSIN). This system has been gaining ever expanding
+acceptance within the communities of users which are stakeholders in
+the DHS mission. This system, tested and now in use in the Homeland
+Security Operations Center, provides real-time connectivity between DHS
+and local communities in all 50 states and 50 major urban areas. This
+system already facilitates critical information sharing between federal
+and local governments, thereby strengthening our homeland security.
+This system is the most cost effective way to bring information and
+critical tools to first responders and decision makers at all levels of
+government. In addition, DHS in conjunction with DOJ is exploring all
+available avenues to make HSIN, RISS, and LEO more compatible to
+enhance information sharing across the Federal enterprise and with
+State and Local, Tribal, and private sector security providers. Within
+the next 60 days, the DHS and DOJ systems at the SBU level will allow
+cross posting of information, by later this year, we will have agreed
+upon a plan which will make these systems more compatible, as well as a
+longer term plan for making the networks fully interoperable.
+ At the Secret level, DHS is developing and fielding HSIN-Secret
+(HSIN-S) which will allow for more robust delivery of critical
+information to the State, major city, and private sector security
+decision makers and providers. A significant part of making prudent
+decisions about the level of response at the local and state level will
+be significantly enhanced by the ability to share at this level. In
+addition, HSIN-S will become the secret information and intelligence
+sharing backbone for the Federal government organizations which are not
+part of DoD. The network will interface with the DoD SIPRNET to assure
+robust sharing and exchange capabilities to deal with threats and
+incidents--whether natural or man made.
+ In the near future, this system will be accessible to select
+private sector critical infrastructure owners and operators as well as
+government officials. Users will have the ability to receive important
+threat information prior to the general release, providing the
+opportunity to prepare for, and possibly forestall, any potential
+terrorist activity. We recognize that information sharing is an
+important component to the success of the Homeland Security Advisory
+System (HSAS) especially as nearly 85 percent of the nation's critical
+infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector. HSIN will
+provide operators the necessary lead time to take protective measures
+on a real time basis--independent of a change in the threat level--as
+necessary to ensure the safety of their facilities.
+
+Questions4. A vague, color-coded terror threat advisory system has the
+potential to needlessly scare Americans living in relatively safe towns
+and cities, OR desensitize Americans to the real terrorist threats.
+Have you considered replacing the current broad terror threat advisory
+system with one that is more specific?
+Answer: The Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) has evolved
+throughout the history of DHS and currently includes the flexibility to
+assign threat levels for the entire nation, or a particular geographic
+area or infrastructure sector, depending on the credibility and
+specificity of available threat information. The HSAS is a
+collaborative process which takes into account current threat
+information and incorporates the perspectives of other federal entities
+(both within and outside of DHS); state, local, and tribal partners;
+and private sector stakeholders.
+ The elevation of the HSAS level to ORANGE for the financial
+services sector in New York, northern New Jersey, and Washington, DC in
+August of 2004 demonstrates how the HSAS has matured and is an example
+of its flexibility to adapt to available threat information. This
+flexibility allows DHS, local communities, and others to target
+resources appropriately and reduce resultant costs where possible.
+ DHS learns new lessons and continues to improve the system each
+time HSAS level changes are considered.
+
+ Questions from the Minority Staff
+
+Question: 1. The President included $10 million in the FY 2005 budget
+request for the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS). What
+specifically will these funds be used for? Are there personnel costs
+associated with this request? Are there technology costs? Will the
+funds be expended in a way that speeds notification and allows for more
+targeted warnings? If not, why not? If so, what specific steps will be
+implemented? What is the projected budget for the HSAS in the coming
+years?
+Answer: There is no specific $10 million line for the Homeland Security
+Advisory System (HSAS) in the FY 2005 budget request. It is important
+to understand that HSAS represents and encompasses the day-to-day work
+of the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate
+(IAIP) and the Department of Homeland Security: constantly monitoring
+the threat picture, mapping specific threat information against the
+nation's critical infrastructure, assessing preventive and protective
+measures already in place, issuing timely and actionable bulletins and
+advisories, and when necessary, recommending change in HSAS level to
+the Secretary. HSAS currently has the flexibility to allow us to, if
+the information is specific enough to support it, tailor an advisory or
+other activity to a specific area or critical infrastructure sector.
+Because level of activity and resources involved in administering the
+HSAS is dependent upon the daily situation in the homeland, it is very
+difficult to tie specific resources and requirements directly to its
+operation.
+
+Question: 2. What steps are being taken to ensure that information in
+the HSAS, especially recommendations for responsive action, reaches
+State and local first responders?
+Answer: We are implementing the Homeland Security Information Network
+(HSIN) of which the Joint Regional Information Exchange Systems (JRIES)
+is a part, to establish real-time connectivity between DHS and federal,
+state, and local governments. Eventually HSIN will link DHS to select
+owners/operators of private critical infrastructure. When fully
+developed, HSIN will substantially increase the nation's capacity to
+prevent a potential terrorist attack or effectively respond to one.
+
+Question: 3. Is the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) developing a
+plan to differentiate its warnings to targeted American communities as
+indicated by threat intelligence? How many times has a targeted, as
+opposed to a nationwide, alert system been used?
+Answer: The elevation of the HSAS level to ORANGE for the financial
+services sector in New York, northern New Jersey, and Washington, DC in
+August of 2004 demonstrated how the HSAS has matured and is an example
+of its flexibility to adapt to available threat information. This
+August 2004 elevation of the HSAS level was the first targeted HSAS
+level change.
+ As the HSAS has evolved, it has come to reflect the need for
+certain localities and/or specific areas of industry to be given the
+various threat related issues. As such, DHS has become adept at
+providing information to states and infrastructure sectors through
+Homeland Security Information Bulletins and Advisories. Additionally,
+Department officials speak personally with State, Local, and private
+sector partners when the need arises. This personal communication,
+along with the flexibility in the system to allow DHS to communicate
+broad, generic threats to the Nation and specific threats to a locale,
+embody the enhancements that have been needed this far. Additionally,
+DHS communicates with the officials described above through regular
+conference calls and through calls made to specific locales and sectors
+as the threat requires. Lastly, during specific events and periods of
+high alert, DHS sends officials to areas and events of concern.
+ With each raising and lowering of the Homeland Security Advisory
+System (HSAS), the Department of Homeland Security learns new lessons
+and improves its notification process.
+
+Question: 4. Admiral Loy, your testimony included reference to
+information bulletins, threat advisories, conference calls, and
+executive visits as means used to convey threat information without
+changing the threat level. Please provide additional information to the
+Committee on the use of these additional tools, including the number,
+types, and recipients of such past communications.
+Answer: Information sharing is one of the critical mission areas that
+the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has set as a priority for
+better preparing the homeland. The DHS Office of Information Analysis
+(IA) prepares warning products, in conjunction with the other DHS
+entities, and distributes them to state, local, tribal, and major city
+officials through the Office of State and Local Government Coordination
+(SLGC). These products, which include both Homeland Security Advisories
+and Homeland Security Information Bulletins, allow DHS officials to
+communicate threats and suggested protective measures to regions and/or
+sectors of concern, without changing the threat level. Additionally,
+unclassified information is shared through a daily Homeland Security
+Operations Morning Bulletin and the weekly joint DHS-FBI Intelligence
+Bulletin. SLGC also coordinates bi-weekly conference calls with all of
+the Homeland Security Advisors in all the states and territories to
+help relay important departmental information as well as respond to
+queries from advisors. The Department has also paid for and established
+secure communication channels to all of our state and territorial
+governors and their state emergency operations centers. This investment
+in communication equipment included secure VTC equipment along with
+Stu/Ste telephones. Additionally, DHS has worked to ensure every
+governor has been cleared to receive classified information and are
+working with the Governors and their Homeland Security Advisors to
+provide security clearances for five additional people who support the
+Governors? Homeland Security mission. This provides DHS an avenue for
+disseminating classified information directly to the location that
+needs the information.
+
+Question: 5. What steps has DHS taken, and what additional steps are
+planned, if any, to link the HSAS to other existing alert systems, for
+example the Emergency Alert System?
+Answer: DHS is working with the Department of Commerce's (DOC) Oceans
+and Atmosphere Undersecretary to provide in the near future the
+dissemination of emergency messages via the National Oceanic and
+Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) Weather Radio System. (Messages
+sent out on NOAA's Weather Radio System can also be disseminated via
+DHS/FEMA's Emergency Alert System--EAS). The Memorandum of Agreement,
+signed on 6/17/04, provides for enhanced DHS capability to provide
+warnings, advisories, and other vital information to the general public
+in a manner that allows for reaching the maximum population with
+minimum delay. Of note, messages can be targeted to the whole Nation,
+specific regions, and even to the urban area level.
+ DHS is also in the process of studying all alert and warning
+systems to seek other opportunities for linking the HSAS.
+
+Question: 6. The Gilmore Commission states that by providing real-time,
+useful guidance to federal, state and local government, an improved
+homeland security strategy can help create a ``new normalcy'' that
+acknowledges that the threat of terrorism will not disappear, but still
+preserves and strengthens civil liberties. The country has been under
+the ``Yellow'' alert level for most of the time that the Homeland
+Security Advisory System has been in effect. Should we regard
+``Yellow'' as normal?
+ Answer: While the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has kept
+the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) at ``elevated'' for a
+number of months, the ``Yellow'' alert level should not be viewed as
+normal. No matter how long it is employed, a ``Yellow'' alert level is
+still indicative of a significant risk of terrorist attack. The fact
+that the risk has remained elevated for an extended period of time
+should not preclude the country from going about business as usual;
+however being always mindful that increased vigilance for activity
+deemed out of the norm should be made aware to appropriate Federal,
+State and Local entities. ``Yellow'' indicates to our state, local,
+tribal, major city, and private sector partners that, given threat
+information communicated through Homeland Security Advisories and
+Information Bulletins, they should increase surveillance and security
+of areas of concern, coordinate emergency plans as appropriate, take
+into account suggested protective measures, and implement suitable
+contingency and response plans.
+
+Question: 7. Among the four criteria laid out in Homeland Security
+Presidential Directive-3 that underlies changing threat conditions
+(credibility of threat information, degree to which information is
+corroborated, specificity and imminence of threat, gravity of potential
+consequences), which factors weigh more heavily in the decision-making
+process? Or is each given equal weight?
+Answer: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials rely on
+judgment and experience to evaluate intelligence information received
+from the Intelligence Community, state, local, tribal, major city, and
+private sector officials, and DHS component entities. In any given
+situation, the credibility of threat information, the degree to which
+information is corroborated, the specificity and imminence of the
+threat, and the gravity of potential consequences can change. As such,
+DHS authorities, and ultimately the Secretary of DHS, weigh these
+factors against each other and determine the overall danger to the
+Nation.
+
+Question: 8. When local governments and entities undertake additional
+security measures in response to raised threat levels, substantial
+costs are incurred. The Congress provided $200 million for critical
+infrastructure protection in the FY 2003n Supplemental Appropriation to
+help reimburse State and local governments and first responders for
+additional costs incurred under heightened alert, but a significant
+amount of these funds have gone unspent.
+ A. Considering the statements of need from State and local
+ officials, why do you believe more of the available funds have
+ not been requested?
+Answer: The Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) has received state
+reported obligations of approximately $108 million dollars against the
+$200 million provided through the FY 2003 Supplemental appropriation.
+This number represents the amount of funding, reported by the states,
+as firm obligations at either the state or local level. States were
+required to provide at least 50% of the Critical Infrastructure
+Protection funds to local communities. Our initial information from
+some states indicated that they were holding a small portion of funding
+``in reserve'' for future alerts. However, ODP program guidance
+stipulated that states must obligate all funding within 45 days of
+grant award. As such, states and locals then began to re-direct those
+funds towards other authorized program costs. ODP's Information
+Bulletin #84, provided additional categories in which funds may be
+expended, such as equipment for target hardening, critical
+infrastructure site assessments, and protective security exercises and
+training. These numbers do not reflect the drawdown activity against
+these funds, and states reimburses themselves and their local
+jurisdictions on different schedules.
+ B. As additional security steps taken under periods of
+ heightened threat fall clearly within the federal government's
+ responsibility to ``provide for the common defense,'' do you
+ agree that it should be the federal government's responsibility
+ to reimburse State and local governments for additional
+ security costs incurred at times of heightened threat?
+Answer: Homeland security is a shared responsibility between Federal,
+State, territorial, tribal and local units of government. The Federal
+government's primary role, including that of the Department of Homeland
+Security, is to assist States in preventing, preparing for, responding
+to and recovering from acts of terrorism outside of their traditional
+incident management responsibilities. The Homeland Security Alert
+System was created as an information-sharing tool, not a rationale for
+additional Federal funds. DHS does not reimburse Federal agencies for
+additional security costs they might incur during heightened alerts.
+ The Department, through SLGCP, has provided States and localities
+more than $8.2 billion since March 2003. This support ranges from
+assistance to purchase specialized equipment needed to prevent and
+respond to a WMD event to training and exercise support. States and
+localities should be responsible to budget appropriate funds for their
+traditional homeland security missions, while receiving additional and
+supplemental support from DHS and ODP. Funds provided through DHS and
+ODP are meant to supplement, but not supplant State and local funds.
+
+
+
+