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+ - THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY PROPOSED INFORMATION ANALYSIS BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005
+
+[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
+[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
+
+
+
+ DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
+ PROPOSED INFORMATION ANALYSIS
+ BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005
+
+=======================================================================
+
+ HEARING
+
+ of the
+
+ SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
+ AND COUNTERRORISM
+
+ before the
+
+ SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
+ HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
+
+ ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
+
+ SECOND SESSION
+
+ __________
+
+ MARCH 10, 2004
+
+ __________
+
+ Serial No. 108-40
+
+ __________
+
+ Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security
+
+
+ Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
+ house
+
+ __________
+
+ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
+22-641 WASHINGTON : 2005
+_____________________________________________________________________________
+For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
+Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
+Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�0900012005
+
+
+ SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
+
+
+
+ Christopher Cox, California, Chairman
+
+Jennifer Dunn, Washington Jim Turner, Texas, Ranking Member
+C.W. Bill Young, Florida Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
+Don Young, Alaska Loretta Sanchez, California
+F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
+Wisconsin Norman D. Dicks, Washington
+W.J. (Billy) Tauzin, Louisiana Barney Frank, Massachusetts
+David Dreier, California Jane Harman, California
+Duncan Hunter, California Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland
+Harold Rogers, Kentucky Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New
+Sherwood Boehlert, New York York
+Lamar S. Smith, Texas Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
+Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Nita M. Lowey, New York
+Christopher Shays, Connecticut Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey
+Porter J. Goss, Florida Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
+Dave Camp, Michigan Columbia
+Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida Zoe Lofgren, California
+Bob Goodlatte, Virginia Karen McCarthy, Missouri
+Ernest J. Istook, Jr., Oklahoma Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
+Peter T. King, New York Bill Pascrell, Jr., North Carolina
+John Linder, Georgia Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
+John B. Shadegg, Arizona Islands
+Mark E. Souder, Indiana Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
+Mac Thornberry, Texas Ken Lucas, Kentucky
+Jim Gibbons, Nevada James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
+Kay Granger, Texas Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
+Pete Sessions, Texas
+John E. Sweeney, New York
+
+ John Gannon, Chief of Staff
+
+ Stephen DeVine, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel
+
+ Thomas Dilenge, Chief Counsel and Policy Director
+
+ David H. Schanzer, Democrat Staff Director
+
+ Mark T. Magee, Democrat Deputy Staff Director
+
+ Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
+
+ ______
+
+ Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism
+
+ Jim Gibbons, Nevada, Chairman
+
+John Sweeney, New York, Vice Karen McCarthy, Missouri
+Chairman Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
+Jennifer Dunn, Washington Norman D. Dicks, Washington
+C.W. Bill Young, Florida Barney Frank, Massachusetts
+Harold Rogers, Kentucky Jane Harman, California
+Christopher Shays, Connecticut Nita M. Lowey, New York
+Lamar Smith, Texas Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey
+Porter Goss, Florida Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
+Peter King, New York Columbia
+John Linder, Georgia James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
+John Shadegg, Arizona Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
+Mac Thornberry, Texas Jim Turner, Texas, Ex Officio
+Christopher Cox, California, Ex
+Officio
+
+ (II)
+ C O N T E N T S
+
+ ----------
+ Page
+
+ STATEMENTS
+
+The Honorable Jim Gibbons, a Representative in Congress From the
+ State of Nevada, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence and
+ Counterrorism.................................................. 1
+The Honorable Karen McCarthy, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of Missouri, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
+ Intelligence and Counterrorism
+ Oral Statement................................................. 9
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 2
+The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of California, and Chairman, Select Committee on
+ Homeland Security.............................................. 15
+The Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in Congress From the
+ State of Texas, Ranking Member, Select Committee on Homeland
+ Security
+ Oral Statement................................................. 13
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 3
+The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Delegate in Congress From
+ the U.S. Virgin Islands........................................ 17
+The Honorable Jennifer Dunn, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of Washington........................................ 11
+The Honorable Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of Massachusetts..................................... 21
+The Honorable Kendrick B. Meek, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of Florida........................................... 25
+The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, a Delegate in Congress From
+ the District of Columbia....................................... 27
+The Honorable Christopher Shays, a Representative in Congress
+ From the State Connecticut..................................... 19
+The Honorable John E. Sweeney, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of New York.......................................... 23
+
+ WITNESS
+
+General Patrick Hughes, Assistant Secretary for Information
+ Analysis,
+ Department of Homeland Security
+ Oral Statement................................................. 4
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 5
+
+ APPENDIX
+ Material Submitted for the Record
+
+Questions from The Honorable Jim Turner for General Patrick
+ Hughes......................................................... 33
+
+
+ THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
+ SECURITY PROPOSED INFORMATION
+ ANALYSIS BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005
+
+ ----------
+
+
+ Wednesday, March 10, 2004
+
+ House of Representatives,
+ Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism,
+ Select Committee on Homeland Security,
+ Washington, DC.
+ The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:55 a.m., in
+Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Gibbons
+[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
+ Present: Representatives Gibbons, Sweeney, Dunn, Shays,
+King, Thornberry, Cox (ex officio), McCarthy, Markey, (Del.)
+Norton, Meek, and Turner (ex officio).
+ Also Present: Delegate Christensen.
+ Mr. Gibbons. The Subcommittee on Intelligence and
+Counterterrorism will come to order. The subcommittee is
+meeting today to hear testimony on the Department of Homeland
+Security's proposed information analysis budget for fiscal year
+2005.
+ General Patrick Hughes, Assistant Secretary For Information
+Analysis, is with us today. Thank you, General, for being here.
+We look forward to your testimony. I ask unanimous consent that
+members' statements be included in the hearing record and
+encourage members of the subcommittee to submit their opening
+statements for the record.
+ I also ask unanimous consent that Ms. Christensen, who is
+not a member of this subcommittee, be allowed to sit and ask
+questions. Without objection so ordered.
+ Pursuant to the committee's rules, any member waiving their
+opening statement will have an additional 3 minutes for
+questions. The members of the committee may also have some
+additional questions, and we will ask you to respond to these
+in writing. The hearing record will be held open for 10 days.
+ I want also to let members know that we plan to proceed in
+open session this morning for taking testimony and questioning,
+and it is further my hope that we will be able to explore
+issues of concern without the need to close the hearing to the
+public.
+ However, if it becomes necessary to discuss classified
+information, we will at an appropriate time take all necessary
+steps to close the hearing and proceed in executive session.
+ I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
+ General Hughes, once again, thank you for being here today.
+ Your role in the Department is critical for the success of
+our homeland security efforts over the last few years. We have
+heard a lot about connecting the dots so that, we are sure that
+all of the intelligence information that we process is brought
+together in one big picture.
+ The Office of Information Analysis has a difficult task of
+ensuring that relevant information about terrorist threats to
+the homeland gets where it needs to go and gets there quickly.
+Without intelligence, and the talented men and women who make
+intelligence their business, we are blind to the intentions of
+our enemies. However, knowing your enemy is simply not enough.
+he information that we process must be brought together,
+analyzed and disseminated to the people on the front lines
+protecting our Nation from harm.
+ Because protection is so highly dependent on intelligence,
+I find it appropriate that in your budget submission it is
+difficult to determine where information analysis ends and
+infrastructure protection begins.
+ While this level of interdependence is appropriate, I hope
+you will be able to draw some lines for us here today so that
+we may more clearly see how your office fits into the big
+picture.
+ I look forward to your testimony and to hearing how we can
+help you accomplish your goals for the coming year.
+ When Ms. McCarthy arrives, we will offer her an opportunity
+for an opening statement. Until that point in time, is there
+any other member who wishes to make an opening statement?
+Seeing none.
+
+Prepared Statement of the Honorable Karen McCarthy, a Representative in
+ Congress From the State of Missouri, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
+ on Intelligence and Counterterrorism
+
+ Thank you Mr. Chairman, thank you Assistant Secretary Hughes for
+taking us through the Fiscal Year 2005 budget submission for the
+Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate Budget
+(IAIP).
+ Last week, Under Secretary Libutti testified before a joint hearing
+of the Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism and the
+Subcommittee on Infrastructure Protection and Border Security. I raised
+a number of issues with him that I would also like you to address
+today, hopefully in more detail, concerning the Department's real-time
+ability to assess threats to the homeland. This morning, we are
+interested in hearing about ongoing efforts to improve the depth and
+breadth of intelligence analysis at the Directorate, as well as the
+connectivity among all key units across government doing similar
+analysis.
+ Where are the existing gaps and weaknesses and what can our
+Committee do to help your office solve these problems rapidly in
+authorizing legislation that we expect to pass and enact later in the
+year? Also, what is the time frame within the coming fiscal year for
+showing results? Hopefully you can cover all this ground this morning.
+ Mr. Secretary, it would also be my hope that you will cast light on
+what is being done to speed the issuing of information warnings and
+advisories to state and local officials, and to improve the quality of
+those communications so that businesses, schools, churches and families
+across America have the best guidance in hand from the federal
+government when the threat level rises.
+ Secretary Ridge's announcement on March 1 of a new initiative, the
+Homeland Security Information Network, heads us in the right direction
+by creating a comprehensive, computer based counterterrorism
+communications system to all 50 states and 50 major urban centers. The
+Department has the right idea to strengthen the quality and flow of
+threat information. Now we'll need to assure that there is sufficient
+follow through.
+ If there is one universal cry from constituent groups, it is the
+need for DHS to provide timely and actionable information sharing
+between the federal agencies and state and local agencies, who look to
+the Department for reliable and accurate information concerning
+terrorist threats in local communities all across America.
+ Tim Daniel, the Director of the State of Missouri Office of
+Homeland Security, tells me that information sharing needs to go both
+ways. When Missouri state and local officials have information
+concerning possible terrorist activities, they need to know not only
+who to contact at the federal level, but also that state information
+will be considered in a timely way. The feedback loop is still under
+construction. Mr. Secretary, I would welcome your wisdom on how best to
+complete this information loop.
+ Since we're primarily focused today on the dissecting the
+Directorate budget, it would be helpful to have a clearer understanding
+of how many dollars are dedicated toward information sharing with
+localities and communities. The Homeland Security Operations Center is
+receiving a big plus up of funds, $10 million, in part to undergird the
+``implementation of national systems for information sharing'' and I
+would appreciate your sharing with the committee a Directorate-wide
+breakdown on how funds are actually expended for information sharing
+purposes.
+ It would be useful to hear a broader explanation, too, of where and
+how time is lost in the process of forwarding important real-time
+intelligence threat information to first responders. The First
+Responders in the Fifth District of Missouri and all around the U.S.
+need timely and actionable information from the federal government now.
+Mr. Secretary, please share your plans for enhancing communication at
+all levels and working to provide our local communities with the
+resources they need to respond to emergency situations. I hope you will
+provide more information on this topic so our Committee has a better
+sense of how to fix this nationwide dilemma.
+ A separate policy matter slow to develop involves IAIP completing a
+comprehensive threat and vulnerability assessment to guide spending
+priorities. In releasing our one year anniversary report last week, the
+Committee emphasized the need to have this blueprint in place,
+regardless of the cost, by October 1, 2004, and I'd simply like to
+reiterate that point with our distinguished panelists. Mr. Secretary,
+how realistic is our goal?
+ Let me close by saying that I have a deep appreciation I have for
+the work you are doing. Obtaining usable intelligence in order to
+protect the homeland is a mammoth responsibility given the many
+different avenues that exist for attacking our infrastructure. We are
+supportive of your intentions, efforts and long-term goals, and will
+continue, in a bipartisan way, to be a good faith partner in helping
+you close the security gaps facing our nation.
+ Thank you.
+
+ Prepared Statement of the Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in
+ Congress From the State of Texas
+
+ Good morning, General Hughes.
+ We are pleased to have you with us today. Your mission of
+identifying, assessing and mapping threats to the homeland is crucial,
+and we thank you for agreeing to lay aside the comforts of semi-retired
+life, after 37 years of distinguished military service, to serve our
+country once again.
+ We had a good give and take with your boss last week, General
+Libutti. Today we would like to pick right up with you and talk about
+the relevance and effectiveness of the Directorate's intelligence
+analysis given the existence of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center
+and other units doing similar work. The Directorate has faced criticism
+from Congress, the Century Foundation, the Heritage Foundation and
+others that it is just a junior partner in the analysis process given
+the emphasis and focus on TTIC, the CIA's existing Directorate of
+Intelligence and the military intelligence agencies. We would like to
+hear you clarify the roles, responsibilities and authorities of your
+unit and how it differs from the others.
+ In addition, two and one half years after 9/11, it is a good time
+to take stock of the government's efforts to do a better job of
+``connecting the dots'' in our intelligence analysis. We have seen the
+rapid creation of numerous new organizations--TTIC, IAIP, DoD's
+Northern Command, the FBI's Terrorist Tracking Task Force--to name a
+few.
+ To avoid repeating bureaucratic mistakes of the past, though, there
+ought to be a clear delineation of what your office is doing and the
+formal analytic interplay between IAIP, TTIC and other related
+organizations. The left hand needs to know what the right hand is
+doing, and that begins with a formal, clear, understandable structure
+to government-wide intelligence analysis. The plan ought to be in
+writing so there is a common understanding and so organizations can be
+held accountable. Right now we simply don't have that in place.
+ Now let me offer some constructive criticism in a number of other
+areas.
+ First, I am concerned that the practice of not sharing information
+within the Intelligence Community continues to be a problem. For
+example, 1 would be interested to know whether your office receives
+intelligence from DoD Special Access Programs relating to the terrorist
+threat? And with this new, hard push underway to locate Osama Bin
+Laden, I can only assume that sensitive covert operations are part of
+the effort. Are you regularly provided intelligence information
+attained through worldwide covert operations? In short we need
+assurance that you have access to absolutely all information the U.S.
+government has related to terrorism. If you have any doubt about that,
+we need to hear about it today.
+ Second, an important part of IAIP's mission is to receive the same
+intelligence data as TTIC and other organizations but to review and
+analyze it in a different way to ensure that we are thinking ``outside
+of the box''. Al-Qa`eda and others are considering creative and new
+means for attacking us, so IAIP is responsible for doing that cutting
+edge analysis that keeps us one step ahead of Osama bin Laden.
+ My questions is how vigorously is the Department pursuing this
+competitive intelligence analysis? If you could note some concrete
+examples of how your analysts have seen things differently than others
+in the Intelligence Community, that would assure us that this work is
+underway.
+ And on the same subject a Department organizational chart indicates
+that the JAIP Under Secretary's Chief of Staff is in charge of the
+Competitive Analysis and Evaluation Office. I would have thought that
+your office, General Hughes, particularly since you're the individual
+with the most senior intelligence experience in the Directorate,
+handled these matters. So I'm concerned that poor organization with the
+Directorate could be hampering this critical function.
+ Third, in closed session we'd appreciate hearing your thoughts on
+the extent and effectiveness of Al-Qa`eda operatives working inside the
+United States. We know they're actively recruiting individuals of non
+Middle Eastern extraction to blend into U.S. crowds. What about their
+logistics, financing, training, and attack planning--how boldly are
+they moving ahead?
+ Finally, let me comment about your responsibility to map threats
+against our vulnerabilities. Part of the Directorate's mission, as you
+know, is to identify threats as they relate to vital U.S.
+infrastructure, sites and potential targets. But General Libutti
+indicated last week that the Directorate is some time away from
+completing a national risk assessment. Since the vulnerabilities have
+not been determined, then it obviously prevents you and others from
+mapping threats against those key targets. I would submit that we have
+a long way to go in fulfilling this basic mission and ought to pick up
+the pace to complete it.
+ Let me end by saying thank you, again, General, for appearing
+before the Committee today. I look forward to hearing your testimony on
+these issues and fully recognize that you are working hard to defend
+and secure our homeland. We deeply appreciate your service and want to
+help you succeed in your mission in any way that we can.
+
+ All right. We will turn now to General Hughes. I want to
+thank you again for being here today, and I look forward to
+your testimony. And the floor is now yours.
+
+ STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL PATRICK HUGHES, ASSISTANT
+ SECRETARY FOR INFORMATION ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
+ SECURITY
+
+ General Hughes. Well, thank you. Good morning, Mr.
+ Chairman and members of the committee. I would like to read
+just a very brief summary of my statement for the record and
+for your knowledge and then turn over to the remainder of the
+time to your questions.
+ I am privileged to appear before you today to discuss the
+role of the Office of Information Analysis within the
+Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate
+of the Department of Homeland Security as well as the IA effort
+at intelligence coordination and information sharing. IAIP, and
+specifically IA, are moving forward in our statutory
+responsibilities, which include providing the full range of
+intelligence support to senior Department of Homeland Security
+leadership and component organizations and to State, local,
+tribal and private sector respondents; mapping terrorist
+threats to the homeland against assessed vulnerabilities to
+drive our efforts to protect against terrorist attack;
+conducting independent analysis and assessments; assessing the
+vulnerabilities of key resources, and critical infrastructure;
+merging relevant analyses and vulnerability assessments to
+identify priorities for protective, defensive and supportive
+measures; partnering with the Intelligence Community, notably
+the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, law enforcement
+agencies, notably the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
+State, local and tribal partners and the private sector, as
+well as all of DHS's components to manage the collection and
+processing of information involving threats to the homeland;
+and finally disseminating time sensitive warnings, alerts and
+advisories.
+ I have been the Assistant Secretary of Information Analysis
+now for less than 4 months. We have accomplished much in a
+short period of time, and we continue to press forward to
+strengthen this vital office in our ability to support the
+overall Department of Homeland Security mission to secure our
+homeland.
+ As I aim for this, we will achieve robust connectivity to
+all respondents. Indeed we have robust connectivity now. We
+will develop a world class information technology support
+system for the work of intelligence. We will bring on fully
+trained and cleared staff that will form direct relationships
+with intelligence persons at the State and local, tribal, major
+city, private sector levels, and with our partners in the
+Intelligence Community, and we will develop a full capability
+to engage in all source fusion and production.
+ We are and will continue to be a full partner in the U.S.
+Intelligence Community. Together we will help you and others in
+the government to protect the people of this Nation.
+ Thank you very much for your time and, Ms. McCarthy, it is
+nice to see you this morning, too.
+ [The statement of General Hughes follows:]
+
+ Statement of The Honorable Patrick M. Hughes, Assistant Secretary
+ Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate,
+ Department of Homeland Security
+
+ Good morning Mr. Chairman, Representative McCarthy, and
+distinguished members of the Committee. I am privileged to appear
+before you today to discuss the role of the Office of Information
+Analysis (IA), within the Information Analysis and Infrastructure
+Protection Directorate (IAIP) of the Department of Homeland Security
+(DHS), as well as IA's intelligence, coordination, and information
+sharing efforts to date.
+ Through the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Information Analysis
+and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, and consequently, the Office
+of Information Analysis, is charged with ``integrating relevant
+information, intelligence analyses, and vulnerability assessments
+(whether such information, analyses, or assessments are provided or
+produced by the Department or others) to identify protective priorities
+and support protective measures by the Department, by other executive
+agencies, by State and local government personnel, agencies, and
+authorities, by the private sector, and by other entities.''
+ The philosophical underpinning of IA as an integral part of the
+IAIP Under-Secretariat of DHS is to provide the connectivity, the
+integration, the communication, the coordination, the collaboration,
+and the professional intelligence work necessary to accomplish the
+missions of, and the products and capability necessary for the
+customers and the leadership of DHS. Simply put, we perform the
+intelligence work of Department of Homeland Security.
+ IAIP is moving forward in carrying out our statutory
+responsibilities which include:
+ Providing the full range of intelligence support to
+ senior DHS leadership and component organizations and to state
+ and local and private sector respondents.
+ Mapping terrorist threats to the homeland against
+ assessed vulnerabilities to drive our efforts to protect
+ against terrorist attacks
+ Conducting independent analysis and assessments of
+ terrorist threats, including competitive analysis, tailored
+ analysis, and ``red teaming''
+ Assessing the vulnerabilities of key resources and
+ critical infrastructure of the United States
+ Merging the relevant analyses and vulnerability
+ assessments to identify priorities for protective and support
+ measures by the Department, other government agencies, and the
+ private sector
+ Partnering with the intelligence community, TTIC, law
+ enforcement agencies, state and local partners, and the private
+ sector, as well as DHS' components to manage the collection and
+ processing of information involving threats to the Homeland
+ into usable, comprehensive, and actionable information.
+ Disseminating time sensitive warnings, alerts and
+ advisories to federal, state, local governments and private
+ sector infrastructure owners and operators
+ It is the mandate to independently analyze, coordinate, and
+disseminate the entire spectrum of threat information affecting the
+homeland that makes IA unique among its Intelligence Community
+partners. The analysts within Information Analysis are talented
+individuals who draw on intelligence from other components within DHS,
+IA's fellow Intelligence Community members, the Terrorist Threat
+Integration Center (TTIC), and federal, state and local law enforcement
+and private sector entities. The comprehensive threat picture produced
+is coordinated with the vulnerability assessment and consequence
+predictions identified by the Infrastructure Protection half of the
+IAIP Directorate.
+ The Office of Information Analysis is also unique in its ability to
+communicate timely and valuable threat products to state and local
+officials, federal sector specific agencies (as indicated in HSPD-7),
+and the private sector as is appropriate. The relationship IA and
+indeed the entire Department of Homeland Security has with these
+contacts results in the IAIP Directorate being in the position to
+effectively manage information requirements from the state and local
+governments and private sector entities that are vital to protecting
+the homeland. DHS will continue to work in close communication with
+these officials, as well as with the other organizations it receives
+inputs from, to maintain the effective relationships that have been
+established.
+ IA is the heart of the intelligence effort at DHS. It is
+responsible for accessing and analyzing the entire array of
+intelligence relating to threats against the homeland, and making that
+information useful to those first responders, state and local
+governments, and private sector. As such, IA provides the full-range of
+intelligence support to the Secretary, DHS leadership, the
+Undersecretary for IAIP, and DHS components. Additionally, IA ensures
+that best intelligence information informs the administration of the
+Homeland Security Advisory System.
+ Central to the success of the DHS mission is the close working
+relationship among components, the Office of Information Analysis
+(``IA'') and the Office of Infrastructure Protection (``IP''), and the
+Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), to ensure that threat
+information and situational awareness are correlated with critical
+infrastructure vulnerabilities and protective programs. Together, the
+three offices provide real time monitoring of threat information and
+critical infrastructure to support the Department of Homeland
+Security's overall mission. This permits us to immediately respond to
+and monitor emerging potential threat information and events, and to
+take issues or information for more detailed analysis and
+recommendations for preventive and protective measures. The integration
+of information access and analysis on the one hand, and vulnerabilities
+analysis and protective measures on the other, is the fundamental
+mission of the IAIP Directorate.
+IA and TTIC
+ The Office of Information Analysis and the Department of Homeland
+Security are fully committed to the mission driving the Terrorist
+Threat Integration Center. From a personal standpoint, I believe both
+organizations are fulfilling their missions and enriching both each
+other and the wider Intelligence Community. This opinion is backed by
+the tremendous track record of success TTIC has in supporting the
+Department of Homeland Security and its needs. As partners, IA and TTIC
+spend much time communicating, both through the DHS representatives
+located at TTIC and through direct communication of leadership.
+Personally, my relationship with TTIC Director John Brennan could not
+be better. At present, we talk at least daily and as specific threats
+pertinent to the homeland arise. The close professional associations
+that have been forged between the two offices will allow both
+organizations to work on complimenting each other in the best interest
+of the nation's security. For example, IA is responsible for
+translating the analysis done at the TTIC into actionable data for law
+enforcement officials.
+IA and TSC
+ The Office of Information Analysis has a similarly productive
+relationship with the Terrorist Screening Center. While both perform
+duties that result in information being passed to local first
+responders and state and local officials, both entities have separate
+missions. IA provides the full spectrum of information support
+necessary for the operation of the Department of Homeland Security and
+for the benefit of Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector officials
+throughout the United States, to secure the homeland, defend the
+citizenry and protect our critical infrastructure. In contrast, the TSC
+is in the process of developing a fully integrated watch list database
+which will provide immediate responses to federal border-screening and
+law-enforcement authorities to identify suspected terrorists trying to
+enter or operate within the United States.
+ Just as TTIC plays a vital role in supplying its federal partners
+with the broad threat picture, the TSC has quickly become an essential
+resource for local law enforcement, its federal government
+contributors, and other users. Already, over 1,000 calls have been made
+to the center, with over 500 positive identity matches. Through the
+matching and cross-referencing of lists, the TSC is allowing those
+first responders on the front lines of the fight against terrorism to
+access the information they need to identify and detain suspicious
+individuals.
+ DHS, IAIP, and especially IA will continue to work with the TSC to
+coordinate information sharing efforts and to establish requirements
+for accessing information. IA and the TSC will grow together in their
+effort to serve the people and guardians of this nation.
+ In Conclusion
+ I have been the Assistant Secretary of Information Analysis now for
+less than four months. Building up the IA office, increasing our
+information capabilities, and coordinating information sharing across
+the entire federal government has been a monumental task. And, while we
+have accomplished much in a short period of time, we continue to press
+forward to strengthen this vital office and our ability to support the
+overall DHS mission of securing our homeland. In order for the Office
+of Information Analysis to accomplish its unique mission, we need the
+right organizational structure, qualified and cleared personnel,
+resources, and technical capabilities.
+ As IA matures, we will complete a robust connectivity to all
+respondents. We will develop a world-class IT support system for the
+work of intelligence. We will bring on a fully trained and cleared
+staff that will form direct relationships with intelligence persons at
+the State and Local, Tribal, Major City, and Private Sector levels. We
+will develop full capability to engage in all-source fusion and
+production. We are and will continue to be a full partner in the
+Intelligence Community. Together, we will protect the people of this
+nation.
+
+ Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, General Hughes. We
+appreciate the information that you provided us. It is very
+helpful. And I want to remind the members of the panel again we
+limit our questions to 5 minutes, unless you have had an
+opportunity to make an opening statement, at which point you,
+if you have intended to put that in the record, then we will
+make it an 8-minute questioning period.
+ So let me recognize myself for the first 5 minutes. General
+there is always this question in everybody's mind about
+connecting the dots, but the real question is not so much
+connecting the dots as it is collecting the dots.
+ We have to have a robust Intelligence Community, a robust
+intelligence capability in order to get enough dots to be able
+to connect them so that we know we are looking at the right
+picture.
+ As I always say, if you have got only four dots you can
+make four dots look like anything you want. But if you have 24
+dots that makes a big difference in the picture you are looking
+at. How do you know you are getting everything you need in your
+office in the way of information from the Intelligence
+Community so that you are able to do your job?
+ And let me ask, is there a need for an information
+technology system that automatically shares intelligence or
+will that add some potential to overload, say, the DHS analysts
+that you have?
+ General Hughes. The first part of the question, sir, I
+think is a very interesting issue for me, because I am living
+through that part of the process now of determining whether I
+do get everything that is available.
+ My view to the answer is yes, I do, although, sometimes I
+have to work hard to get it. It would be better, and I hope to
+achieve this goal to have it come to me somewhat automatically,
+so that I don't have to reach out quite as much or to intercede
+on occasion and gain information.
+ But I would say that right now my direct answer to your
+question is that I am fully engaged, involved, and informed in
+the U.S. Intelligence Community, to include with the Central
+Intelligence Agency, some of their most sensitive information
+and operations, somewhat less so with the Federal Bureau of
+Investigation, somewhat less so with the Department of Defense
+and others.
+ But to be honest, that is probably the evolving form of
+this arrangement; in my view, the FBI and the TTIC as my prime
+two conduits for information, and then many others. Looking at
+the--away from the Federal family to the State, local, major
+city, tribal and private sectors, there are shades of gray and
+green there. Depends on the place and the connectivity that
+they have and the circumstances they find themselves in.
+ But especially in the major cities, the interaction is
+fairly good. When there is a reason for that interaction, my
+goal is to make that interaction rather autonomous and
+continuous. We have not yet achieved that connectivity. The
+interaction there isn't present for that yet, but I hope it
+will be soon, and the initiative by the Department to put in
+place an interactive system of communications and connectivity
+is part of that effort.
+ Mr. Gibbons. Okay. I didn't mean to interrupt you.
+ General Hughes. I was going to say with regard to the last
+part of the question it is my goal, and it is the Department's
+goal, to make this autonomous, to make it somewhat automatic,
+although we still want a human to make judgments about the
+information and whether or not it is sending the information or
+receiving the information. We must have human beings in this
+loop to make good judgments. So I am pressing for and hope to
+achieve within this year a very large degree of autonomy and
+automatic delivery and receipt of information. But I would like
+to emphasize that we want to make sure we exercise deliberate
+judgment by human beings at appropriate points along the way,
+especially at points that do not impede the flow of
+information, but actually assist in placing the information in
+context.
+ Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, General. Let me ask in the very
+brief time remaining, I know that DHS is working with both
+State leaders and DHS personnel in identifying and getting
+proper clearances for handling classified information. But how
+is DHS working with other agencies to identify those other
+people who may need access to this information in order to
+identify a sharing mechanism capability and assure that they
+have the proper clearances?
+ General Hughes. In the Federal family that does not seem to
+be a problem. By the person's specific positions with specific
+responsibilities, they are fairly clear, and I don't view that
+as an issue. Outside of the Federal family, at the State,
+local, through private, that is an issue, and we have to come
+to grips with it. We are requesting that persons who do not
+have security clearances get them at the Secret level, so that
+they are authorized under U.S. Federal policy and law to be
+allowed to have U.S. Federal Government information to at least
+the Secret level.
+ In some cases there is a fairly robust capability for that,
+and others there is less capability. So we have to proceed as
+rapidly as we can to build the capability out in the State
+through local, and to some perhaps lesser degree in the private
+sector we have to build that capability in.
+ Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, General. My time has
+expired. I turn now to my colleague, the gentlelady from
+Missouri, Ms. McCarthy, who has agreed to enter her opening
+statement in the record. It will be offered. She has 8 minutes
+for opening questions. Thank you.
+ Ms. McCarthy. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Secretary,
+it is a delight to have you with us today. I appreciate very
+much your testimony that you shared, particularly the bullets
+on partnering with State and local partners and private sectors
+so that the message, the material is usable, comprehensive and
+actionable information.
+ The time sensitivity of this is still problematic out in
+the heart of America with some of our State and local
+responders, and also a concern about closing the information
+loop to see that when State and local responders send word up
+to the agency at the Federal level about some time sensitive
+information they have, whether or not it is acted upon in--that
+the information loop doesn't seem to be quite complete.
+ Although the budget is recommending $10 million more to
+undergird the implementation of these national systems for
+information sharing, could you be a little more specific with
+us today about your vision of how best to make all of that
+information come together and complete the loop so it is
+actually a very effective system as you envision it?
+ General Hughes. Of course. We are trying to use the--any
+preexisting structure that already exists for the passage of
+classified information, and right now out to the State and
+local and other respondents away from the Federal family the
+prime conduit is the JTTF structure, operated by the FBI, which
+terminates in the State and major city level. And we do pass
+information via that conduit. We also pass it over secure
+telephones. We have an effort underway, and it is largely
+finished, to provide STU, STE, secure telephone capability out
+to at least the State and major city homeland security
+providers. And we also have similar capability, although we are
+not sponsoring much of it, it already exists in the private
+sector. So right now, today, I can get on the telephone to all
+of the 50 States, secure, and talk to them about information,
+and I have done that in a number of cases.
+ I can also pass classified information via the JTTF
+connection system, or in some cases we have used a preexisting
+military system where there is a coincidence between the
+National Guard office or some military office that has secure
+communications.
+ Our intent, our hope, and my vision, is to put in place a
+system which is actually called JRIES. It is really--a name is
+not really that important. The idea here is to put in place a
+Secret level connectivity to the State and major city to begin
+with, and then follow on with a broader fielding later to the
+State and major city homeland security advisers, a capability
+to communicate with them directly that is controlled by and
+supported by the Department of Homeland Security, yet would be
+in parallel with preexisting law enforcement connectivity and
+preexisting other Federal Government connectivity.
+ It is an issue, I believe, to manage that properly, and we
+have to manage that here at the Federal Government level by
+making sure that we don't unnecessarily duplicate or
+unnecessarily be redundant or unnecessarily flood the system
+with information.
+ Back to Chairman Gibbon's question here, we don't want to
+overload not only the Department of Homeland Security, but we
+certainly don't want to overload the responders out at the
+State and local, major city and private sector and tribal
+levels. So we have a management responsibility that goes along
+with this that is not part of the technical component
+necessarily, but it is probably more important in my view.
+ The last thing that I would like to tell you is that the
+vision that I have to be able to do this, and that the
+Department has, indeed is on the way to fruition. We have
+rolled out the information system to produce a Secret level
+connectivity, but we are only fielding it now at the
+unclassified level. We hope to encipher it later on and make it
+Secret.
+ Ms. McCarthy. If I might, General, thank you for that
+information. It is heartening to those of us concerned about
+our communities out there where we know that they are
+partnering and they are working together. But I am not sure
+they always are confident that they know what to do.
+ Prior to 9/11, for example, in my community there were a
+lot of individuals, immigrants wanting to learn how to fly crop
+dusters. In retrospect, we now understand why. But what I want
+to pursue in the limited time left to us is how do you perceive
+getting the knowledge out to the State and locals about what
+you are really looking for, based on your intelligence, so that
+they can be better prepared to respond to you with things that
+are insightful and timely?
+ General Hughes. We are doing that now by publishing and
+disseminating in a variety of different ways information about
+terrorist tactics, techniques and procedures. We are doing that
+largely at the unclassified level. So we take classified
+information into our system, we develop--and we do this by
+way--as well as the FBI and the Terrorism Threat Integration
+Center, we do it sometimes together and sometimes separately.
+But the net result is the same, an informed citizenry away from
+the Federal Government. And all of this information I guess
+that has come to us, and we have disseminated out, has greatly
+aided in an understanding out in the communities of our
+country, an understanding of how terrorists might act and what
+to look for, which was the kind of the construct of your
+question.
+ We hope to continue that in a more robust way with this
+enhanced communications system. I will also mention that we
+have an initiative to bring three or four, or however many can
+be supported, persons from each State and from a number of the
+major cities here to Washington this summer, to gather them
+here and teach them or train them about some of the information
+handling mechanisms that they are going to have to implement
+now that we are moving them into this classified environment.
+ Ms. McCarthy. Will the $10 million in the budget for
+security operations cover that, not just that training but the
+States' capacity or the--.
+ General Hughes. We hope to cover parts of it. I don't think
+$10 million will cover all of it. But in some cases,
+interestingly enough, the States have taken their own
+initiatives with their own money or their own resources, and
+once again, in some places this is extremely robust, like New
+York, Los Angeles, for example, and other places it is less
+robust. But we will help where we need to help and where it is
+appropriate to help in the best way that we can.
+ Ms. McCarthy. Thank you. I know that States like Missouri
+are broke. So I am sure that they will welcome that opportunity
+for your help.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
+ Mr. Gibbons. Thank you. We will turn to the gentlelady from
+Washington, Ms. Dunn, for 8 minutes.
+ Ms. Dunn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to
+our committee, General. It is good to have you here. I am very
+curious about TTIC, and I am not sure how it ended up under the
+aegis of the CIA in the beginning. I know that you are on that
+board.
+ I was a little concerned a couple of weekends ago, as we
+went to SOUTHCOM and had a session with them, that the
+Department of Homeland Security wasn't even on their chart for
+people who are receiving information from the task forces, and
+so forth, that are controlled by them.
+ I am wondering what your take is on TTIC. Many of us
+believe it should be under your aegis. Could you give me a read
+on that, tell me how it is working, whether you believe that
+you have adequate input and how it might work if it were under
+the Department of Homeland Security?
+ General Hughes. Sure. My view is that--and I should tell
+you, by the way, that before coming to this job I was a member
+of the Kerr Commission, which was put in place by the Director
+of Central Intelligence to study the Terrorism Threat
+Interrogation Center and to come up with some viewpoints about
+this issue by living and working in the Terrorism Threat
+Interrogation Center for about 2-1/2 months.
+ So I am pretty familiar with what they do and how they do
+it and why the decision was made to place them where they are.
+My view is that that decision to place them under the umbrella
+of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence was a
+very good decision for a couple of reasons. They formed this
+organization rapidly and brought it on line very rapidly within
+the support system, the structure of the Central Intelligence
+Agency. Without that structure or something similar to that, I
+think it would been a very slow start and much more difficult.
+They are a very robust organization now and getting more so all
+of the time. And I am directly connected to them, and I would
+say that they are today, as we speak this morning, the most
+robust information source for the Department of Homeland
+Security. We are a direct customer of theirs, and John Brennan
+and I directly communicate several times a day whenever he is
+here. He is right now traveling. But when he is here, we are
+very close and very much interacting.
+ My view, which has not changed, is that at some point we
+need to consider the Terrorism Threat Interrogation Center
+coming under a different kind of management structure, perhaps
+under DHS, perhaps under an association of structures of some
+kind, because it is a very broad organization in its charter.
+It is very connected to so many different kinds of
+organizations, which is a very interesting feature to have an
+organization like this when you build a kind of, let's call it
+a joint organizational or combined organization, in the context
+of the Department of Homeland Security. That means that it is
+connected virtually to every other correspondent in the
+environment of counterterrorism and securing the homeland.
+ The same thing is true at the TTIC. One should not view it
+as a central intelligence agency or just as an intelligence
+agency organizational entity. It is very interactive with law
+enforcement, with others in the Federal Government. I think it
+has an important place. I think we ought to let things evolve
+for a little bit.
+ With regard to your comments on--not your comments but Ms.
+McCarthy's comments perhaps on the way this information passage
+works, it is a very difficult kind of thing. The TTIC right now
+at the all-source Top Secret special compartment intelligence
+level acts as a hub for international and domestic terrorism.
+To the degree that international terrorism affects the United
+States I am interested, and that information comes to me. To
+the degree that I am connected to the TTIC all of the
+information on the domestic environment comes to me. And we
+work together in a very, what I would call synergistic way.
+They do first the line analysis, prepare products, put the
+information in context in a lot of ways and deliver it to us.
+My organization does more detailed analysis in some cases, or
+we work together to do it. My organization has an independent
+assessment of it. My organization deals with it with regard to
+the State through private sector entities very directly, and
+that is what we should do. I think it is working very well.
+ I do think, and I personally think that the Director of
+Central Intelligence would agree with this, at some point in
+time the placement of the organization and its roles, missions
+and functions with regard to central authority needs to be
+reconsidered. We might, by the way, in that reconsideration
+decide it is fine where it is. I don't know. But I do think
+that that should be done sometime after a little longer
+evolution.
+ Ms. Dunn. I appreciate your answer. I would think that
+since your department, the Department of Homeland Security,
+really is charged with the very responsibilities that TTIC is
+doing, I think the sooner rather than later that critique takes
+place and that analysis takes place of where it should be
+located, that would be good, because we may have to change the
+act, since it specifies that you do the very things that TTIC
+does yet they are housed in a completely different department.
+But I appreciate your flexibility on it.
+ General Hughes. Please keep in mind, ma'am, that--I wanted
+to make a point, and we don't do everything that TTIC does.
+With regard to international terrorism, we are not directly
+involved in the broadest scope of the Terrorism Threat
+Integration Center. The focus that we have is on the United
+States. Where international terrorism touches the United
+States, of course we are interested. Where it does not or where
+it seems apart from the security of our homeland, that is the
+business of others and TTIC serves them all; it broadly is
+serving the United States Government.
+ Ms. Dunn. Thank you, General. Let me ask you a couple of
+budget oriented questions quickly. Does the IA Directorate have
+an integrated cross-cutting budget or management focus that
+pulls together other intelligence components within the
+Department, such as those that are run by the Coast Guard and
+TSA, and if this is true, how is it being coordinated?
+ General Hughes. We do not have such a cross-cutting budget
+process. We have an interaction between the component parts of
+the Department of Homeland Security, of which there are some
+important organizations like the Coast Guard, the Secret
+Service, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Customs
+and Border Protection, the Transportation Security
+Administration, the Emergency Preparedness and Response,
+formerly the FEMA organization and the Federal Protective
+Service.
+ We are beginning the process of amalgamating the
+intelligence elements of those organizations in some ways. One
+of them will be better knowledge and oversight of the budgets
+that they have and the resources that they apply.
+ Ms. Dunn. Thank you.
+ Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, Ms. Dunn, and I will now recognize
+the ranking member of the full committee for 5 minutes. Mr.
+Turner.
+ Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Hughes, thank
+you for being with us today. I have just put a chart before you
+there that I wanted to direct your attention to. I think that
+you have a copy of it already.
+
+ Submitted for the Record from the Hon. Jim Turner
+
+ United States Government Intelligence
+
+ Analysis Organization
+
+Pre 9/11
+ CIA & FBI Counterterrorism Center (CTC)
+ DOD Intelligence Agencies
+ FBI's Counterterrorism Division
+ CIA Directorate for Intelligence
+ State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research
+Post 9/11
+ Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC)
+ DHS Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
+ (IAIP) Directorate
+ FBI National Joint Terrorism Task Force
+ DOD Undersecretary for Intelligence
+ Northern Command Combined Intelligence Fusion Center
+ (CIFC)
+ The Associate Director of Central Intelligence for
+ Homeland Security
+ FBI Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF)
+
+ [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2641.001
+
+
+ What it shows us is the intelligence analysis organizations
+that existed before September 11th. Do you see, five of them
+there? And then the new organizations that have been added
+since
+ September 11th, and of course all of the pre-9/11
+organizations are still in existence.
+ So it does give us some concern as to whether or not with
+this proliferation of new agencies we are going to be able to
+connect the dots, so to speak, with all of this information
+available coming from new sources. I guess in looking at that
+total picture, there was a National Journal article that came
+out this week. I don't know if you have seen it. It made a
+couple of comments that I suspect I should read to you and let
+you respond to it.
+ In that article it says, TTIC now produces a Top Secret
+daily report on threats to the Nation, but isn't required to
+share with Ridge and his key lieutenants the intelligence on
+which its conclusions are based. Is that a true statement?
+ General Hughes. That is false. Indeed, I receive that
+document every day directly on my desktop computer first thing
+in the morning in a very timely fashion, and the Secretary and
+ Deputy Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
+also receive it.
+ Mr. Turner. Well, the comment was not about you receiving
+the daily report. The comment that I read you said that you are
+not able to access the intelligence upon which the conclusions
+in that daily report are based.
+ General Hughes. That is false.
+ Mr. Turner. So you are telling me you can get any
+information you want to out of the CIA or these other agencies
+that are listed on this chart?
+ General Hughes. During my opening comments, and first line
+of questioning from Mr. Gibbons, I did relate that there are
+shades of autonomy or automatic mechanisms here. Sometimes I
+have to work a little harder to get that information, depending
+upon its compartmentalization and depending upon the nature of
+the information source. But to date I am not aware of
+information from the Central Intelligence Agency that has been
+directly withheld from me. There isn't any as far as I know.
+ Mr. Turner. But you are in the same position that we often
+find ourselves; you can't get behind some of that information
+because some of that is very well protected by the CIA and some
+of these other agencies?
+ General Hughes. Interestingly enough, sir, because of my
+previous position and my experience I am badged at the CIA, I
+have had direct working access at the CIA. I am invited to join
+the DCI's afternoon/evening meeting on the topic of countering
+terrorism, and I indeed do have very robust access personally.
+ Mr. Turner. In your division right now I understand that
+you have 60 employees. Is that a correct statement?
+ General Hughes. There are more employees than that at this
+time, but it is not as robust as we would certainly wish, and
+the total number of employees that you just quoted counts not
+only Federal full-time persons who are employees of the
+Department of Homeland Security, but indeed are detailees and
+are government contractors and IPAs from the laboratory and
+other government organizations.
+ Right now I am told by my staff that the total number this
+morning--by the way, it is changing every day--is 97.
+ Mr. Turner. When you said a minute ago that you have access
+to all information based on your previous work, do you have
+access to all covert action programs that the CIA conducts?
+ General Hughes. No, I do not. But--certainly not all, by
+any means.
+ Mr. Turner. You made mention a minute ago that you have
+access to information relating and are provided information
+relating to domestic terrorist activities and threats but not
+foreign?
+ General Hughes. I hope--I tried to say that if the foreign
+events or the foreign information touches on the security of
+the homeland, then I do have an interest in it and I get access
+to it.
+ Mr. Turner. But it is not routinely provided?
+ General Hughes. It is. There is an issue here of
+definition. Much of it does flow routinely. But there is some
+of it that is a little bit nebulous, maybe something that
+happens in a place like Afghanistan. The context of the
+conflict may not seem in the due course of events to touch upon
+the security of our homeland, but occasionally it does. And so
+when it does it is kind of the burden to decide that is placed
+on a number of intelligence organizations and officers along
+the way as to whether I need to know about it as the Department
+of Homeland Security intelligence chief.
+ So that is the kind of thing that we need to evolve into
+and have greater understanding than we do now.
+ Mr. Turner. Thank you, General. I see my time has expired.
+Thank you.
+ Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, Mr. Turner. We will turn now to the
+chairman of the full committee, Mr. Cox, for 5 minutes.
+ Mr. Cox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Secretary. As
+you know, your responsibilities are very near and dear to the
+oversight aims of this committee. We are very, very keen on not
+only the Department succeeding, but specifically your
+directorate succeeding and specifically IA, because it is the
+heartbeat of prevention. It is the best means that we will have
+to find these terrorists and stop them before it is too late.
+And it is for that reason that IA exists within the Department
+of Homeland Security, because the focus being the United States
+territory itself, there are great concerns about CIA taking on
+this new domestic responsibility.
+ The CIA, which houses TTIC, is of course ahead of IA in its
+development, and as the ranking member was just inquiring, we
+want to make sure not only that you have access to everything
+at TTIC and in fact access to everything else on the chart that
+was up there a moment ago, but that it is routinely provided as
+the statute requires and you don't have to pry it out like a
+dentist doing a root canal, that it is provided in real-time
+and that the purpose for which it is provided is your own
+analysis.
+ And beyond doing your own analysis, we want to make sure
+that you and your troops are the front line for the United
+States Government in analyzing this intelligence as necessary
+and providing it to U.S. domestic actors, particularly in the
+private sector. I am not entirely certain that at least thus
+far we have got DHS out in that lead role, and it needs to
+happen.
+ Likewise, we want to make sure that you are out in front
+and DHS is out in front using what you know and what you have
+learned to train people within the domestic hemisphere so that
+they can handle this information as well.
+ And so I wonder if you could talk to me about IA's role,
+first, in sanitizing intelligence and providing it to the U.S.
+domestic actors, and, second, training U.S. domestic actors on
+their part of this intelligence sharing network?
+ General Hughes. I am going to be duplicating a couple of
+things that I said earlier, especially in response to Ms.
+Dunn's question.
+ Mr. Cox. Well, you don't need to do that. If you want to
+refer me to that answer, that is sufficient.
+ General Hughes. Let me just make two replies to you, sir.
+First, we have not achieved the kind of connectivity yet that
+we need to achieve. We are working hard to do it, and this is
+both a technical issue and a policy issue, and it also
+encompasses the issues of training that you brought up.
+ One of the efforts we have ongoing is to try to figure out
+how to train a rather large number of persons who are in the
+State, local, tribal and private sector, and major cities,
+offices that have charged homeland security as a kind of a
+large topic area out there in the country. And we have a plan
+to bring some of them in here to the United States Capital this
+summer and train them over a 3-day period or so, both train
+them and inform them, by the way, and also get to know them
+better and make them part of this larger extended family of
+homeland security.
+ So we do have efforts that I think you will applaud, and I
+hope you will be part of in fact to do this activity. I want to
+make sure though and leave with you this final thought. This is
+an evolving thing. It is something that we are going to have to
+build over some period of time. It is not something that you
+can do very rapidly overnight.
+ I would say--I would give ourselves a B-plus right now for
+effort. We are trying hard to get this done. Where there is
+truly a piece of critical information I will do anything, and I
+have done a few things, to call, to communicate, to get it out
+there in some way.
+ One of the issues I covered earlier is that sanitizing it
+at the unclassified level does take away a good deal of the
+detail and some of the vital information that must be
+communicated at times. So my vision, my effort, is to put it
+out there at the unclassified level when we can, but when we
+can't, to have the option to put it out there at the Secret
+level, which seems to be the right working level generally. In
+some cases we might go beyond that, but in most cases that is
+the goal.
+ Mr. Cox. Well, you have nothing but support on this
+committee for what you are trying to do, and at least for my
+part I want you to understand that I fully appreciate the fact
+that this is an evolutionary undertaking and that no one here,
+1 year into the existence of the Department, expects that this
+is going to be a completed edifice. What we are interested in
+is the blueprint. We want to make sure that we know where we
+are heading and some day we can expect to reach these
+destinations, and I am particularly in agreement with you that
+our sharing, which I hope that DHS and you and particularly
+General Hughes will take the lead on, be not exclusively
+unclassified information. Part of the reason for wanting you in
+the forefront of training in fact is so that we will have
+people with experience and knowledge across the country who can
+instantly receive this information at the State and local level
+and at the private sector.
+ So you are to be commended for what you are doing. I am
+very, very appreciative that the President and the Secretary
+have selected you given your background, your experience, and I
+think the country is very well served by your being there. I am
+very pleased that you are using your background and experience
+in a muscular way to make sure that the blueprint in the
+statute is what is realized, and also that the good policy aims
+that are better than that statute which you share are realized.
+So thank you very much.
+ General Hughes. Well, thank you, sir.
+ Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, Mr. Cox. We will turn now to Mrs.
+ Christensen for 5 minutes.
+ Mrs. Christensen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
+welcome, General. I also share the concerns about TTIC and your
+agency, but I am not going to ask those questions again, but
+just to let you know that I think many of us on the committee
+share those concerns. And I realize that you have only been in
+your office for about 4 months, but many of us are also
+concerned about the slowness with which the Department has
+moved to get up to speed. And so my question is really a very
+basic one. Are you now in a permanent home, is your directorate
+now--.
+ General Hughes. Yes. I believe we are in a permanent home
+for the foreseeable future, I would say for 5 years or longer.
+I believe that I am in a permanent place, and the building that
+I am in, we are proceeding to finish it and make it more
+effective and capable, because we believe we are in a permanent
+place.
+ Mrs. Christensen. And your staffing level, with respect to
+the staffing level that has been set for you, where are you?
+ General Hughes. Staffing level is not yet at 50 percent of
+our hope. In fact, we are far short of it, but we are trying to
+hire people as rapidly as we can. If I may just elaborate on
+that for a moment.
+ We have to have people in the section that I am responsible
+for, intelligence, who are cleared for Top Secret, special
+intelligence or willing to take a polygraph examination, and
+persons who come into that office immediately get access to
+information that bears great responsibility personally. So we
+have to do this right. It is not simple or easy to go out and
+hire these kind of people. We are doing it as fast as the
+system can kind of bear, and we are doing it as well as we can
+right now.
+ However, I will tell you, this is one of my areas of
+greatest frustration. We have had a fairly large number of
+people apply for jobs. Some of them have had background issues
+that we found to be unsuitable. Some of them have not been
+willing to wait for background investigations of this nature to
+take place, and some of them frankly just haven't been suited
+to the work. But we are hiring people.
+ Mrs. Christensen. Well, not only am I concerned that you
+are not fully staffed for the very critical function of your
+office, but how are you set up to do the housekeeping, getting
+the offices set up, the staffing set up and still not have that
+detract from your statutory responsibilities?
+ General Hughes. Well, please keep in mind, ma'am, that we
+have used contractors to great effect, and we are continuing to
+do that. They are indeed responsible in many ways for the
+development of our information technology structure. They have
+built out the facilities that we now live in. We have fell in
+on a Navy facility, and some of that Navy infrastructure is
+still in place and supporting us. There is a transition period
+here where much of the support requirements will now begin to
+fall on the Department of Homeland Security, and we have to put
+in place our own infrastructure support mechanisms to do that.
+ Mrs. Christensen. It is not taking away from your direct
+staff's responsibilities on the intelligence side?
+ General Hughes. The way you phrased the question, ma'am, it
+is not talking away from it. It is something of a competitive
+issue at times. Information technology, as an example, has been
+a struggle, but we are now seeing a light at the end of this
+tunnel. We have gone to a new building. We now have computers
+that operate in the U.S. Intelligence Community structure in a
+pretty robust way and things are very rapidly improving, and we
+hope that that improvement will continue as it has.
+ Mrs. Christensen. Okay. Among the statutory
+responsibilities are of course assessing vulnerability of key
+resources and critical infrastructure and merging relevant
+analyses and vulnerabilities assessments, identify priorities.
+I am reading from your statement.
+ Where are we in that, assessing vulnerabilities of key
+resources and critical infrastructure, and doing those
+assessments to identify the priorities for protective and
+support measures?
+ General Hughes. In the structure that I am placed in, I
+don't think this is necessarily easy to understand without some
+kind of a diagram. But IAIP, Information Analysis and
+Infrastructure Protection, is two parts. I am the IA guy, the
+intelligence person. I provide the threat, and I provide
+assessments, judgment.
+ Mrs. Christensen. So do you have then the key resources and
+critical infrastructure--do you have the IP side information on
+which to do your IA side?
+ General Hughes. Yes. The other side of this organizational
+entity, infrastructure protection, is described in considerable
+detail, what is referred to as the critical infrastructure of
+the United States sometimes by way of excruciating detail. And
+I think over the months and perhaps a couple of years to now,
+that will be a continuing effort, to describe it more fully and
+in more detail. But as that description begins to occur and is
+occurring, that is then mapped against, or another way to put
+it, is threat information is mapped against it so that the two
+are kind of interactive against the infrastructure. And where
+there are vulnerabilities, where there is targeting ongoing
+against part of our infrastructure, where there are concerns
+and gaps and issues, those are being identified and they are
+being acted upon. But the action is left to others. We are the
+organization that characterizes the problem.
+ Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will give you
+back the balance of my time.
+ Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Mrs. Christensen. We turn
+now to the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Shays, for 8
+minutes.
+ Mr. Shays. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and, General
+thank you very much for your very important work.
+ One of the things that I am very convinced about is that as
+we set up this new Department of Homeland Security we have a
+wonderful reservation of very experienced people to draw on. We
+appreciate your experience.
+ I do want to say to you that I know that the Department is
+wrestling with a lot of issues and there will always be things
+that we don't like that it is doing, just by the nature of it.
+But when we wrote this bill and created you, you are now
+implementing that. We are trying to see if it is being
+implemented in the way that we thought. I view your effort as
+the receptacle of information. I didn't view that you sent
+people out and you did the work. And one reason we didn't want
+you to have a part in the Intelligence Community where you were
+directing their activities was that frankly a lot of us felt
+that this whole effort needs to be improved. And while we are
+doing the Department of Homeland Security, do we have the
+capability to also kind of rework intelligence?
+ Having said that, however, I believe that you should be
+privy to all information and that you shouldn't have to cajole,
+you should haven't to use charm, you shouldn't have to use your
+past experience. It is just part of the law and they should
+have to perform, and I would hope that one of the things that
+you will do is if you are not getting cooperation you will let
+the chairman of the full committee and the chairman of this
+subcommittee know, however you choose to, that it could be
+better.
+ I chair the National Security Subcommittee, and before 9/
+11, even though I have theoretical jurisdiction over some
+aspects of the Intelligence Community, they always gave us a
+permission slip not to show up for our full intelligence
+committee.
+ What I am interested in knowing is the following. I am
+interested to know what your role is in determining the
+terrorist threat level, whether it is low, green; guarded,
+blue; elevated, yellow; high, orange; or severe, red. What is
+your role in determining that?
+ General Hughes. Well, sir, I am happy to report to you, and
+kind of proud of this, that during the recent period when we
+did raise the threat level to orange, and even within that
+orange level perhaps raised some parts of it to a level of
+pretty intense defensive and protective activity, and then
+reduced the threat level back to the yellow elevated level that
+we remain at today, that I was the person who was directly
+turned to and asked by the Secretary of the Department of
+Homeland Security--both inside the Department's own
+deliberative group and externally in the security consultive
+body of our government, I was the person that he turned to and
+asked for the intelligence assessment about whether to raise,
+and which I actually advised him to raise, and whether to
+lower, and I advised him to lower and moderate.
+ Mr. Shays. Well, I appreciate knowing that you had this
+level of impact. I would love to then--it is comforting to know
+that I am finally speaking to someone who is taking some
+ownership.
+ What concerns me is I have heard Mr. Turner suggest that
+given how it works, we may not even want this warning system. I
+tend to view, given how it works, I think it needs to be
+improved. It is not a criticism of you in terms of knowing that
+we need to raise it, but it is a criticism of the
+implementation of it.
+ For instance, I am having a rough time understanding why we
+are at elevated when we are all acting like we are at guarded,
+and I am concerned that we only have one level to really go up
+to. I view red as basically under attack. And so we are at
+elevated, which is significant, but we are acting as a
+populace, and I think even our first responders back home, that
+they are under a general risk right now, and that they are
+under a guarded condition. I think you have a sense of what I
+mean here. I would love you to have some impact over maybe
+getting us to allow for another gradient.
+ The other thing I am interested to know is what is the
+benefit of having a yellow alert, which is elevated, around the
+country when we knew for a fact that the threat was not
+national, it was fairly geographical and urban in many cases.
+ General Hughes. It is--those are very complex questions.
+ I think I will answer it in two ways, two thrusts if you
+will.
+ First, I personally like the system as it is, and I think
+there is room for flexibility within each color zone. We have
+chosen to be at elevated for what I think are the reasons that
+I am going to explain in the second part of this answer.
+ General Hughes. But let us suppose for a minute that there
+are gradations, and I believe there are, and there are actually
+ways inside this threat advisory system for the Secretary of
+Homeland Security and others in the Federal Government to
+include the President to give directions that are very specific
+within the color codes and combinations; and those colors
+especially, but also the gradations within the colors, are
+meant to allow both for a national alerting mechanism, kind of
+a national view of the condition we are under and for some more
+specific, focused efforts to be delivered to particular people,
+particular groups, particular sectors, particular locales
+within our country that, for reasons of threat and perhaps for
+vulnerability, require a different sort of approach than merely
+the color and verbal or wordage definitions that are in the
+Homeland advisory system now.
+ I think it is okay, but others besides me--and this is not
+really my policy issue. I think that others will be able to
+decide whether or not changes are required. Whatever they are,
+I will honor them, but I need to give you the second part of
+this answer just briefly.
+ Mr. Shays. And then I am going to want to make a quick
+response.
+ General Hughes. Okay. I am an old soldier, and I am very
+familiar with war, and we are characterizing this as a war. But
+in the war that conventionally is thought of and understood,
+there is a time of development of the nature of the conflict
+and the conflict itself and the war that takes place and the
+post-conflict environment, and it is relatively slow, in many
+cases. In some few cases, it might be days to weeks, but in
+most cases it is weeks to months to years even that these
+approaches to the conflict, the conflict itself and the post-
+conflict environment takes shape.
+ We are dealing in a much different environment where,
+literally, my timeline for action with regard to information is
+one hour. That is what I tell people.
+ Mr. Shays. Let me say I am going to be having a hearing in
+my own committee on this issue and get in greater depth, but I
+still am concerned that we need a system that the public also
+understands and knows what to do. It cannot be that the public
+just does what it normally does when you are at yellow alert.
+It needs to be a geographic, I believe. I do think the system
+is worth using, but I think we need to improve it.
+ Thank you.
+ General Hughes. Sir, I am in favor of making sure that the
+citizenry understands what we are doing.
+ Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, Mr. Shays.
+ I turn now to the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Markey,
+for 5 minutes.
+ Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ At yesterday's hearing before the Senate Armed Services
+Committee, CIA Director Tenet revealed that he has spoken to
+Bush administration officials when he felt inaccurate
+statements were being made about the threats posed by Iraq.
+Specifically, CIA Director Tenet acknowledged yesterday that on
+more than one occasion he has noted questionable statements in
+defense of the Iraq war by Vice President Dick Cheney. As we
+all know, these private corrections did not prevent the Vice
+President from continuing to make assertions about the imminent
+threat posed by Iraq, statements which we know now were
+exaggerated and inaccurate.
+ Since you began serving as Assistant Secretary, have you or
+the information analysis group disagreed with intelligence
+assessments or statements about terrorist threats made by the
+Department, the White House, the CIA, the FBI or other members
+of the intelligence community?
+ General Hughes. Yes, we have had differing views and
+different view points at times. We have discussed them in the
+appropriate setting.
+ Mr. Markey. So please indicate in which instances you
+disagreed, the process you followed to register your
+disagreement, and whether your disagreement resulted in any
+adjustment in the intelligence assessment.
+ General Hughes. In most cases these disagreements are at
+the analytic level, where an analyst will have a different view
+and the analysts in IA may have one view of the importance of
+or the meaning of information and I will share their view or
+not, as the case may be. This is a very individual sort of
+thing. But at some point I need to make the difference mine,
+and then I will represent that to my associates, the heads of
+intelligence at the CIA, at the TTIC, at the FBI, and the
+Department of Defense, the appropriate people that I interact
+with. Quite often, it never reaches that level.
+ Mr. Markey. What about when it does?
+ General Hughes. When it does, then I am certainly very
+capable of expressing my view, and I do.
+ Mr. Markey. What happens when there is a disagreement with
+the intelligence assessment which the intelligence officer,
+you, is making?
+ General Hughes. To the best of my knowledge, there has
+never been an agreement--or disagreement, rather, that has
+risen to the level where I felt I had to take a note or make a
+public declaration of difference. That has not happened. We
+have been able to iron out our views.
+ Mr. Markey. Well, obviously, CIA Director Tenet felt the
+same way, that he never had to publicly criticize, but it is
+obvious now that CIA Director Tenet had not let the public know
+that he did not believe that there was no uranium found in
+Niger and that there were issues that were being completely
+distorted by the President and Vice President in terms of items
+that were dangerous that were inside of Iraq. It is obvious
+that he just kept quiet and never made it public.
+ General Hughes. Without my commenting on your statement
+there--I mean, there are so many issues there I don't know
+whether that is what Mr. Tenet did or did not do. I would
+rather not agree with your premise. I would rather just say
+that in my case I can assure you I can look you and anyone else
+in the eye and tell you that I am very capable of expressing my
+independent views. I have and I will in the future.
+ Mr. Markey. Well, you told Mr. Turner that sometimes you
+have to work a little harder to get the information which you
+need.
+ General Hughes. That is true.
+ Mr. Markey. Well, that doesn't make me feel comfortable
+that you have to work hard. My mother always said that you
+should always work smarter, not harder. That is the point of
+having you there. But what you are telling us is that you have
+to work harder than other intelligence agencies in order to get
+the information. That is a dangerous situation.
+ General Hughes. If I thought it was dangerous, I would tell
+you. At times I have certainly been frustrated by it, but it is
+not dangerous yet. It hasn't been dangerous, but I will have to
+tell you that it is very much a concern of mine. But please
+keep in mind, sir, I am giving you a characterization of many
+events over the 4 months that I have been at this job,
+approximately. My view is that we are improving this each and
+every day.
+ Mr. Markey. I understand that. But what you said was that
+your own past professional experience has helped you to gain
+access to information collected by the intelligence community.
+That doesn't make us feel good. Anyone who sits in your
+position, even if you are not an old war horse, should be able
+to get the information.
+ General Hughes. I agree with you.
+ Mr. Markey. The very fact that you are there and not
+someone else, that makes it possible for you to get specific
+types of information, then that is a very dangerous situation
+for the homeland security of our country.
+ General Hughes. I disagree completely, and I will tell you
+why. I think the reason I am there is because I am an old war
+horse. I was brought in to kind of know how things work in this
+large amalgam we call the U.S. intelligence community. What I
+am doing, sir, and I think you ought to be not only happy but I
+hope you will help me to do this, I am building the foundation
+that others can come in and then--.
+ Mr. Markey. Describe a situation where the old war horse
+was able to get information as someone else wouldn't. Could you
+do that for us?
+ General Hughes. As I answered Mr. Turner, I am
+knowledgeable of the U.S. intelligence community in a broad way
+because of my previous position. I am also invited specifically
+by the CIA and by others to come into their organization where
+others may not be invited or indeed might not be as
+knowledgeable as I am. There could be others that are just as
+knowledgeable. I think some of my predecessors in this job
+were, in the case of CIA. But if you will look over at my
+background and my record, I have been able to fill for about 3-
+1/2 years a position of the 1Director of Defense Intelligence
+Agency and before that the J-2 of the Joint Staff.
+ Mr. Markey. I understand.
+ I will just finish in 10 seconds and just say, if I may,
+Mr. Chairman, that it shouldn't take an old war horse. You used
+the word others might not be given access. All of that
+conditionality goes to the core of whether or not there has
+been a seamless information flow which has been put in place.
+Every time you use the word ``might'' during your testimony,
+you actually raise questions about whether or not this
+administration has come to grips with the necessity to connect
+the dots in a way that gets all the people who need the
+information into the flow as quickly as possible to prevent
+another 9/11, and that is very dangerous.
+ General Hughes. Just a brief rejoinder. I think that the
+last few words you stated, sir, are right. I am laying the
+groundwork, and it just happens to be me and my personality, my
+background, for this work. It has to be laid. It doesn't matter
+if I am a completely new person, but it helps if I am not, and
+that is the advantage I have, and I am taking full advantage of
+it. Someone, hopefully far younger and far less experienced,
+frankly, than me, is going to come into this job, and their
+foundation is going to be very, very good.
+ Mr. Markey. My only point is, when you walk into the room,
+you should walk in as though you are the President of the
+United States with his direct orders to give every piece of
+information to you; and what you are telling me is that they do
+not see you as a direct extension of the White House in
+ensuring that all information is given to you to prevent
+another 9/11. Unless the White House takes that step, I am
+afraid that you are playing a valuable role but in substitution
+for something which should be coming from a much higher level.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Gibbons. Mr. Sweeney from New York is recognized for 5
+minutes.
+ Mr. Sweeney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ General welcome. I don't consider you an old war horse. I
+consider you a patriot. Young or old, I thank you for what you
+are doing.
+ As you can tell by the questioning, there is a great deal
+of concern. We are in a new phase of developing the Department
+of Homeland Security, and I think some of this is natural, and
+you have made the point in reoccurring themes that is all
+revolutionary. The concern is, in merging these entities and
+creating what Mr. Turner referred to as a proliferation of
+agencies or certainly an expansion of agencies, it all seems to
+be centering on at this point in time TTIC. Whether this is
+normal response to bureaucracies or not, we are all concerned,
+as the chairman pointed out, that you need to be relevant and
+at the table and involved.
+ We had this line of questioning last week with General
+Lebutti. In fact, I know the chairman has asked and I have
+asked for some specific information back on staffing, et
+cetera; and we were told it was coming soon. If you could
+ensure that it comes today, for example, because it has been a
+week, that would be greatly appreciated.
+ This all really gets to the core of what you said, the
+issue of definition between the sharing of information and
+intelligence and defining between the domestic versus the
+international and its application. I understand that, but I
+have some real practical concerns.
+ For example, our view I believe when we passed this
+process, it is not that you necessarily had the ground forces
+to gather and collect, because that would duplicate something
+that already existed, but that you were right there in the
+filtering of that information. You were right there at the
+evolutionary parts of that process.
+ My simple question is, if you are 25 minutes away from
+TTIC, how are you going to do that? Really, I think it is at
+the core of questions on both sides of the aisle of this issue.
+We are very concerned that you are essentially being in some
+ways pushed aside and having to fight when Congress has already
+determined your role. Could you address that issue more
+specifically than you have thus far?
+ General Hughes. Well, I don't know if you were here when I
+did take up that issue at the beginning a little bit. My view
+is that we are about one millisecond away from TTIC. We are
+directly connected to them with regard to automation and
+communications.
+ One of the earlier questions was about the primary
+intelligence that is produced by TTIC for the national
+leadership and I receive that now on my computer desktop.
+ Mr. Sweeney. Do you need a physical presence there?
+ General Hughes. We do have a physical presence there. We
+have a representative there, and we are just changing that
+person out from one to another person. So our intent--my intent
+personally--is to sustain that relationship there. We also have
+a personnel bill which we are finding it very tough to honor,
+but we are doing our best to try to honor it, to put some
+fairly large number of persons in the TTIC, about 30.
+ Mr. Sweeney. I would like to work with you in this
+committee and the approps on that.
+ On the personnel end of it, you mentioned you have some
+frustrations in finding the right people, qualified people,
+etcetera, et cetera. We are hearing that you are losing people
+to TTIC because either the perception or the reality is they
+are really in the game and you are not, and I have heard this
+from a number of sources. Is there any truth to that?
+ General Hughes. Boy, I can give you the most--.
+ Mr. Sweeney. Your staff is nodding yes.
+ General Hughes. I can give you the most recent issue. I am
+not aware of anybody that has gone to TTIC. Is there someone?
+ I think there might be a huge misunderstanding here. Not
+only--I feel kind of funny giving you this answer. Not only
+have we not lost anybody to TTIC, to the best of our collective
+knowledge, but it is not really possible for us to lose anybody
+to TTIC because it is an amalgam of intelligence professionals.
+It is not a competitive environment.
+ Mr. Sweeney. Okay, I have some executive session questions.
+The last one involves the need for a comprehensive, all-hazard
+Federal emergency warning system. Currently, there are eight
+separate systems that exist to provide cognitive notification
+of imminent and potentially catastrophic threats to health and
+safety. What are we doing to integrate those systems and do you
+agree we need to integrate those systems, I guess I should have
+asked first.
+ General Hughes. The honest truth is, sir, I don't know what
+we are doing. This is out of my area of responsibility a little
+bit, and it is also something I just am not well informed on,
+but I would like to get back to you about that question, and I
+will. Do I think there should be a coherent warning system in
+the United States? Absolutely.
+ Mr. Sweeney. Okay. Thank you, General.
+ Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, Mr. Sweeney.
+ We turn to Mr. Meek for 5 minutes.
+ Mr. Meek. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
+ I appreciate your service to the country and also your
+coming before the committee today. I guess I want to ask a
+couple of questions that you have already heard, but I think
+that it is important enough to ask not the same question, but
+similar questions.
+ You are the gateway to information not only to the Federal
+law enforcement agencies but also State and local agencies, am
+I correct?
+ General Hughes. I don't think I am the only gateway. I am
+one.
+ Mr. Meek. Yes, but you are the gateway as it relates to
+real intelligence.
+ General Hughes. For the homeland security effort, yes.
+ Mr. Meek. That is correct. I think it is important--and I
+am sorry. I didn't hear your opening statement. I am a member
+on the Armed Services Committee, and we had a similar meeting
+going on.
+ I guess I want to pretty much address, from what I have
+read of your statement, your involvement not only with TTIC but
+with also the TSC, your personal involvement. I am glad that
+you have the CIA badge, I am glad you have the relationship
+with many others, but I am afraid that if you catch a cold, we
+are in trouble. I know that you are trying to build the
+infrastructure that is needed, and I think Mr. Sweeney--and I
+am glad that he is well-read and studied on this issue. I mean,
+I am concerned about this whole issue of physically not being
+with the rest of the team that is kind of moving in your
+direction, doing some of the same things--I think there is some
+value in having a cup of coffee with those folks. I think there
+is some value in running into them in the parking lot so they
+are thinking of not only you but your office. I know that you
+are building onto that, but I am very concerned about who is
+the number two and who is the number three person, since you
+are switching them out now--we know that attrition happens
+everywhere. How is that going to work towards the security of
+the country?
+ I think also, as we start looking at your testimony, and I
+am so glad that you broke it down so that people can understand
+the role of your office and other offices, but pulling from
+your testimony. It provides a full spectrum of information
+support necessary for the operation of Homeland Security for
+the benefit of Federal, State, local and private sector
+officials throughout the United States to secure the homeland
+and defend the citizenry and protect our crucial
+infrastructure.
+ Now that is important, and that is a very profound
+statement on your behalf. As we look at that in that mindset,
+the one hour, the human intelligence--the right here, right now
+--is so very, very important. I know, being someone who has
+been in law enforcement and sharing information--Ranking Member
+Turner talked about the pre-9/11 versus the post-9/11. We are
+looking at a lot more post-9/11. But is the information sharing
+really working? Are you getting the information that you need?
+You feel that you are, but what happens if you have to go on a
+trip or a conference or what have you?
+ That same automation as it relates to being secure, I don't
+know if that is real-time with you. They have the relation with
+you. So I would urge if you could possibly reevaluate your
+location, where you stand physically every day, even the time
+that you are here in the committee, and while you have been
+here over an hour and a half, who is sitting at the wheel? It
+may seem elementary, but it is very important if you can give
+us some response.
+ General Hughes. Well, first of all, a one-way pager from
+the Homeland Security Operations Center and from my staff,
+which is manned 24 hours a day, the intelligence analysis
+element of the Homeland Security Center. The people work
+directly for me.
+ They are in constant communication with me wherever I am.
+ I would like to introduce Mr. John Rollins behind me. If
+you will stand up, John.
+ John is my Chief of Staff, essentially my deputy. He does
+not have all of the same access that I do. In fact, just last
+night we had a conversation about that very issue. I know that
+what you are saying, the issues that you are pointing out, are
+important to solve; and I have to get that done.
+ Mr. Meek. Yes, General, that is important; and that is work
+that needs to be done.
+ You are fully aware of the 9/11 Commission and what they
+are doing. The whole issue on 9/11 was intelligence and sharing
+of information, and we have so many--and I am not saying that
+you or anyone in this building or in the Department devalues
+the importance of making sure that State, local, the frontline
+people that are putting their lives on the line every day, that
+they have good information right here, right now. Your office
+is responsible for that.
+ If something was to, unfortunately, take place or about to
+take place in this country, there is always going to be an
+evaluation of what took place; and I would say that in closed
+session that you really drive home the importance of pushing
+from the Hill of letting the intelligence agencies know that
+they must--if they like it or not, if it is a fraternity or
+sorority or whatever you want to call it, that your office has
+to be at the forefront. If not, they are at the table, when
+they get real information, to pass that on to those individuals
+that are on the front lines.
+ Mr. Chairman, thank you for the extra additional time I
+took myself.
+ But, General, I want to thank you. I believe that you are
+committed, from what I can see. I have read your background.
+You have been a patriot your entire life. But it is vitally
+important that we do that, and I don't care if other folks get
+upset about, oh, the Secretary went to the Hill and the next
+thing you know, we have all these Members of Congress that are
+barkingdown--I would rather barkdown their back. I would rather
+make them upset of your presence here today versus the latter.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, Mr. Meek. We will turn now to Ms.
+Norton for 5 minutes.
+ Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; and thank
+you, General Hughes, for your testimony and, of course, for
+this vital service you are rendering to our country.
+ I am interested in the fact that we may have gone from
+having too little intelligence to having your analysts
+bombarded with intelligence. I suppose that is better than if
+we had only those two choices. That would be the better choice.
+ This past weekend or the weekend before last, I was with a
+congressional delegation that went to Guantanamo. Actually, I
+was very impressed with Guantanamo. I was impressed with the
+kind of intelligence that our folks, most of them, Reserves,
+public school teachers who are now interrogators--I was
+particularly impressed with their methods which do not involve
+the kind of coercion you see in movies but very sophisticated
+rewards, harmless rewards, that are apparently getting real
+intelligence, according to all we heard from those who briefed
+us and from what we saw with our own eyes. We actually saw
+people being interrogated, some very dangerous Al-Qa`eda being
+interrogated.
+ At the same time, I represent the District of Columbia; and
+I saw the effect of what must have been good intelligence when
+at Dulles we had planes that were turned back or not allowed to
+leave from Europe. What I am interested is, given this
+intelligence from so many sources, how your analysts are able,
+given the load of intelligence the likes to which they have
+never seen before, to distinguish, for example, disinformation
+from credible information. Here you have it coming at you from
+all sources. We cannot tell whether some of what, for example,
+we see here is just a case of people covering their you-know-
+what just in case something happens could be disinformation--
+but even if it is, better to stop everything--or whether you
+are able, given intelligence and an intelligence load the like
+of which our analysts never had before, to decide whether or
+not anybody could decide what was credible and what is
+actionable.
+ Can you tell me how, given the fact that you are getting it
+now, not just as the CIA used to get it, as the FBI used to get
+it, but from any number of sources, how in the world you are
+able to tell whether we are dealing with something that ought
+to be acted on and particularly how you are able to distinguish
+disinformation from credible information?
+ General Hughes. It is hard for me to answer that question,
+and it is really a good topic for discussion. It might be a
+better thing to come out and visit anytime you wish. I am happy
+to have you and discuss that, or any member from this
+committee, and have you discuss that in person. But I will give
+you a brief answer.
+ The issues that you raised, whether or not we are getting
+too much or a lot of information in a very complicated
+information environment is accurate. We are getting a lot of
+information, and some of it has a different kind of weight.
+Some of it from law enforcement channels or from the local,
+State, private sector is different than the information flow
+that we normally were used to working with in the past. We are
+coming to grips with that issue.
+ If I may draw a picture in the air for you for just a
+moment, we are receiving foreign intelligence from the
+traditional sources. We are receiving law enforcement
+information from the law enforcement community. We are
+receiving domestic information from a whole variety of
+information sources, and we are also receiving information from
+other sources like academia, the Internet, that sort of thing.
+Bringing these four vectors together--foreign intelligence, law
+enforcement, domestic information, and other sources of
+information--together and associating them in the body of
+knowledge is something new. I do not believe it has ever been
+done before here in the United States.
+ So we are having to design a system--and that, actually, in
+my view, is something I--maybe I should have said earlier.
+ Part of this evolutionary process is good, in my view,
+because this is new and it is different. It is something that
+has to be carefully done to avoid impinging upon the civil
+rights and the constitutional rights of our citizenry while at
+the same time meeting the needs of our government to defend
+ourselves against people who will attack unwarned and
+unprotected citizens. There are many features and facets of
+this which I would have to tell you we have to defer to another
+time and place for discussion.
+ But the last point I would like to make to you is the
+information itself at times does seem to be faulty or flawed.
+In fact, I have kind of a saying that some of my staff make fun
+of me about. The first 12 reports are always wrong. The last
+report, the 13th report, might be an approximation of truth.
+That is kind of the way this is working. Because we are
+bombarded by initial information of various kinds. Some of it
+is truly intelligence about intentions and activities, some of
+it about events that are happening and ongoing, much different
+kinds of information realms; and when the information comes to
+us, frankly, it is quite often flawed. Sometimes it might seem
+to us to be disinformation, especially with regard to
+intelligence. That is a judgment, experience, cross-checking,
+cross-cutting kind of issue; and it is not easy to do,
+especially in a very timely manner.
+ Ms. Norton. I appreciate your candor. When you say that,
+essentially, one has to build a new system and you face that
+fact, it seems to me very important, given the new
+complications that have been now merged into intelligence
+activity.
+ If the chairman will indulge me with a brief additional
+question, there is, of course, and continues to be concern that
+much of our intelligence from Iraq and places like that does
+not come from the ground. We have difficulties that we are
+trying now to overcome with language and the rest of it so that
+on-the-ground intelligence, which means some kind of
+infiltration into groups, is difficult abroad.
+ Well, here in the United State we would expect to be
+further along with intelligence on the ground. I would like to
+ask you how much of your intelligence comes--I mean, in the
+United States, does a significant amount of your intelligence
+within the United States come from infiltration, on-the-ground
+intelligence that you are able to receive? I recognize that
+there are language problems even there, but clearly people in
+this country speak English. Is there yet a significant amount
+of intelligence that you can derive from on-the-ground here in
+the United States?
+ General Hughes. I think I understand your question. I would
+say that that is a growing body of knowledge. It is not fully
+developed yet. It is not being reported fully yet, in many
+cases, but it is certainly the effort that we are putting forth
+to try to get information from, actually, the people we serve.
+ I have addressed a number of forums now of State, local,
+major city, tribal and private sector groups and asked them to
+become part of our system; and to date all of them have been
+very happy to accept that challenge.
+ Ms. Norton. I am sorry. What kind of groups did you say?
+ General Hughes. From State--all different kinds of people,
+frankly--from local, tribal, major city, and private sector. So
+that is kind of the spectrum--.
+ Ms. Norton. I am talking about, for example, we are told
+over and over again there are cells across the United States.
+Fine. Are we now part of those cells so we know what is going
+on in those cells?
+ General Hughes. Yes, to the degree that we know about it.
+ I mean, there may be some things that I don't know, but I
+would say that I am pretty well informed where it counts.
+ Ms. Norton. That, of course, would be of great importance
+to us, given 9/11 and the fact that these men were on the
+ground all that time talking to everybody but, of course, with
+no intelligence coming back to us.
+ Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
+ General Hughes. I don't want to leave with you the thought
+this is perfect. It is not. We need to work on it with great
+effort.
+ Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Gibbons. Thank you Ms. Norton.
+ General Hughes, I have known you for a number of years,
+especially in your previous occupation as Director of the
+Defense Intelligence Agency, and you have been before our
+Intelligence Committee many times. I understand why you were
+chosen to lead this newly created organization; and I have the
+greatest respect for your background, your abilities, and look
+forward to your leadership as you lead this from its inception
+to its ultimate and hopefully effective utilization of this new
+body.
+ I did want to make sure that we get a firm commitment from
+you for an ultimate return to our committee for a classified
+session. We are not going to do that today simply because you
+have been very generous with your time. We have to be out of
+this room, and it would take an enormous amount of time to
+clear the room and make it right for a classified briefing.
+ Getting back to some of the things that I wanted to sort of
+wrap up with, it is normal in the analysis function of
+intelligence for people to disagree, because it is literally a
+form of art. It is not a science. People tend to expect that
+intelligence coming to us, raw intelligence, should lead a
+course of one and only one conclusion. Sometimes that works;
+sometimes that doesn't work. So a disagreement between educated
+individuals, knowledgeable people about the meaning of raw
+intelligence and sometimes disparate pieces of evidence can
+lead to differing conclusions, differing estimates. That is, of
+course, the part of the intelligence community that is one of
+art rather than science; and I am sure that you understand
+that.
+ With regard to your clearance and being where you are, as I
+said, your previous life as the Director of the Defense
+Intelligence Agency, you are the right person at the right time
+for the right job. If someone else were sitting in your chair
+without your experience, without your background, they would
+have to go through a clearance and security process even though
+they were the Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis
+under the Department of Homeland Security. If they had not
+previously acquired a classified background check, they would
+have to go through that process.
+ So to say simply that you and your previous military
+experience were immaterial to the process is wrong. I mean, the
+reason you are in the position you are in is to expedite the
+ability for the Department that you have to function
+effectively. So I wanted to bring those out.
+ I again want to thank not just all the members of the
+committee who have participated today but, most importantly, I
+wanted to thank you, General Hughes. I don't know if I should
+call you Secretary Hughes or General Hughes. You are very well
+respected in your position, but I did want to thank you for
+your candid assessment today.
+ We will have some questions that will be submitted to you.
+We would appreciate your responding to them.
+ The record will be held open for 10 days; and with your
+commitment, as I said earlier, to return for a classified
+briefing at which time we can get into some finer granularity
+on some of these intelligence issues, that would be great. Just
+to get your commitment on the record, General Hughes, if you
+could respond to that.
+ General Hughes. Mr. Chairman, I will certainly come before
+this committee anytime you desire for any reason. You can rest
+assured of that.
+ I would just like to say that I share a very positive
+view--I mean, my experience with you has just been great over
+these years and with some of the staff here. I hope you
+appreciate, too, this personal relationship between a person
+like me and some of the members here. It is a wonderful thing.
+I am looking forward to serving the country with you, sir.
+ Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, General; and we, too, are looking
+forward to your service again. It is always a pleasure to have
+you before this committee.
+ With that, since we have kept you here the requisite time,
+which has been 2 hours--and we know that you want to stay
+longer, but we are going to let you go--this subcommittee
+hearing is closed.
+ [Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
+
+
+ A P P E N D I X
+
+ ----------
+
+
+ Questions Submitted for the Record
+
+ Questions for the Record From The Hon. Jim Turner for General Patrick
+ Hughes
+
+Issue #1
+ During the hearing, when you were asked whether you have immediate
+access to relevant threat information from the Intelligence Community,
+you responded:
+ ``My view to the answer is yes, I do, although, sometimes I
+ have to work hard to get it. It would be better. . .that I
+ don't have to reach out quite as much or to intercede on
+ occasion and gain information.''Later in the hearing, you
+ noted:
+ ``. . .there are shades of autonomy or automatic mechanisms
+ here. Sometimes I have to work a little harder to get that
+ information, depending upon the nature of the information
+ source.'' You confirmed the point again stating that ``At times
+ I have certainly been frustrated by it. . .I will have to tell
+ you that it is very much a concern of mine.''
+ The fact that you are able to secure certain information because of
+your ``old war horse'' status is reassuring on the one hand but
+troubling in other respects. As you know, the Homeland Security Act
+requires that ``Except as otherwise directed by the President, the
+Secretary [ Homeland Security) shall have such access as the Secretary
+considers necessary to all information, including reports, assessments,
+analyses, and unevaluated intelligence relating to threats of terrorism
+against the United States. . .''.
+ Thus, I would appreciate hearing from you what information sharing
+mechanisms you believe ought to be in place right now to ensure that
+all relevant threat information is delivered to the IA Office,
+regardless of an Assistant Secretary's prior employment history
+handling these issues or ability to secure information from past
+colleagues still working in the Intelligence Community.
+
+ My questions are as follows:
+(1) What intelligence information is immediately accessible to the IA
+Office?
+(2) What intelligence information is accessible to the IA Office only
+through TTIC?
+(3) What intelligence information is accessible to the IA Office by
+request?
+(4) Can you provide examples of intelligence information that was
+accessible only through your own direct and personal efforts by the
+Assistant Secretary?
+(5) What steps ought to be taken to improve the intelligence
+information sharing process so that the IA Office Assistant Secretary
+is no longer ``frustrated'' by having to ``work hard'' to receive all
+related threat information, regardless of the ``nature of the
+information source''?
+
+Issue #2
+ I understand that the IA Office's ability to access information
+from law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community depends,
+in part, on the Homeland Security Information Sharing Memorandum of
+Understanding which was signed on March 4, 2003 by Attorney General
+Jolm Ashcroft, CIA Director George Tenet, and DHS Secretary Ridge. My
+great concern, of course, is that the most sensitive intelligence
+collected by the U.S. government, which I believe is more likely to
+provide you timely and useful information on terrorist motivations,
+strategy and actions, is too closely held and not always being
+disseminated to you and your colleagues serving at the Department of
+Homeland Security.
+ There is an element of arbitrariness, I would submit, about what
+information is shared with the IA Office and what is excluded from your
+review. Any light that you could cast on this subject, such as the
+basis under which sensitive raw and finished intelligence is
+disseminated to the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) and the
+IA Office, would be helpful in my understanding whether legislative
+action could improve the process and ought to be pursued.
+
+ Specifically, my questions are as follows:
+(1) Does it make sense for you to be briefed on covert action programs
+and terrorism--related DoD Special Access Programs so that you can
+determine whether information derived from those activities are
+relevant to securing the homeland?
+(2) Should you have authority to review any other Intelligence
+Community compartmented programs to determine, on an independent basis,
+what should be shared with Secretary Ridge?
+(3) Are there aspects to the MOU that require expansion or updating?
+(4) Does the MOU give the IA Office sufficient leverage to secure
+intelligence or law enforcement information that is highly classified?
+(5) Who is the official responsible within the Intelligence Community
+for deciding what intelligence threat information is shared with TTIC
+and the IA Office, and how does the process unfold for making those
+decisions?
+
+Issue #3
+ I concurred with your testimony about where TTIC ultimately
+ resides.
+ ``My view. . .is that at some point we need to consider the
+ Terrorist Threat Integration Center coming under a different
+ kind of management structure, perhaps under DHS, perhaps under
+ an association of structures of some kind . . .''.
+ Further, you noted:
+ I do think, and I personally think the Director of Central
+ Intelligence would agree with this, at some point in time the
+ placement of the organization and its roles, missions and
+ functions with regard to central authority needs to be
+ reconsidered.''
+ I am persuaded, too, that TTIC should be moved under the DHS
+umbrella in order to improve and refine overall intelligence sharing
+and am puzzled why, if you believe the DCI would view such action
+favorably, there is not more active consideration of this matter within
+the Administration.
+ Recognizing that DHS is a newly created organization and that
+bureaucratic obstacles continue to affect the Department's overall
+development, I would strongly urge you to press this issue with your
+senior colleagues within the Intelligence Community. I believe TTIC's
+separate operations from DHS hinders the level of connectivity
+necessary to allow the government to effectively, and on a real-time
+basis, integrate intelligence and disseminate threat analysis to our
+local, community and state responders.
+
+ My question is as follows:
+ (1) Would the connectivity between the DHS and TTIC be improved
+ if TTIC were moved to the Department? Short of moving TTIC,
+ what other steps should be taken to improve connectivity
+ between the two organizations?
+
+Issue #4
+ I would welcome continuing updates from your staff to mine about
+the IA Office's efforts to hire qualified personnel as quickly and
+efficiently as possible. I share your substantial concern about
+administrative delays inherent in the security clearance process and am
+prepared to do everything I can to improve the current system. Your
+testimony that the ``staffing level is not yet 50 percent of our hope''
+two and a half years after 9/11 leaves me discouraged and wondering why
+DFIS is unable to expedite the hiring process to ensure that we have
+sufficient intelligence and policy personnel onboard to help prevent
+terrorists from striking our homeland all over again.
+
+ Specifically, my questions are as follows:
+(1) How many Full Time Equivalent (FTE5) employees currently work in
+the IA Office?
+(2) How many FTE slots have been authorized for FY 2004?
+(3) How many FTE slots have been filled as of April 1, 2004?
+(4) How many individuals are ready to be hired once they obtain
+security clearances?
+(5) Besides security clearance issues, what are the other key
+administrative issues delaying the full staffing of the IA office?
+
+Issue #5
+ It would be useful to better understand the different kinds of
+analysis being conducted by your office on a daily basis. A February
+2004 DHS Office of Inspector General Report (Survey of IAIP
+Directorate--OIG-04-13) notes that intelligence information is
+``analyzed and processed into a usable format for distribution.'' The
+only documents that we receive directly from the IA Office are the
+occasional threat warnings distributed to local law enforcement. In
+furtherance of our oversight responsibilities, I would like to be
+provided example copies of bulletins, threat analysis assessments,
+competitive analysis documents, warnings and any other formats being
+used to inform relevant partners both internal and external to DHS in
+your return reply.
+ Moreover, I would like to receive an explanation regarding the
+primary means of disseminating your classified and unclassified
+analytic findings to entities within DHS and other federal, state,
+local, and private sector partners. The OJG report notes ``the lack of
+an agreed upon Information Technology (IT) infrastructure to
+communicate with these partners inhibits the exchange of information.''
+That being the case, a key concern I have is how we ensure that
+existing IT weaknesses are not the reason that we fail to detect
+another attack against the homeland.
+
+Issue #6
+ Since the IAIP Chief of Staff is responsible for managing the
+Competitive Analysis and Evaluation Office (CAEO), I would like to hear
+your views regarding why strategic red cell sessions and red teaming
+does not fall under the purview of the IA Office. The bulk of
+intelligence analysis is being conducted by your qualified staff, and I
+am not convinced that the small number of full time equivalent
+employees in CAEO (10 FTEs were authorized in this office in FY03) is
+sufficient to accomplish this critical task. More generally, I am
+concerned about the IA Office, and the Directorate as a whole, relying
+too heavily on detailees and outside contractors instead of Full Time
+Equivalent (FTEs) personnel, and would seek your views on the optimal
+mix of workers to carry out the threat analysis mission.
+
+ My specific questions, then, are as follows:
+(1) How many detailees, and from which other agencies, does the IA
+Office employ? How many outside contractor employees work in the IA
+office?
+(2)What role do you have in overseeing red cell sessions and red
+teaming, if any?
+(3)And should the functions of the CAEO fall under the jurisdiction of
+your office?
+ In closing, let me thank you again for your testimony last month. I
+look forward to learning more about your efforts to build an excellent
+foundation for the IA Office.
+
+
+
+