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+
+ - THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S BORDER AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY (BTS) BUDGET PROPOSAL FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005
+
+[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
+[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
+
+
+
+ THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
+ SECURITY'S BORDER AND TRANSPORTATION
+ SECURITY (BTS) BUDGET PROPOSAL FOR
+ FISCAL YEAR 2005
+
+=======================================================================
+
+ HEARING
+
+ before the
+
+ SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFRASTRUCTURE
+ AND BORDER SECURITY
+
+ of the
+
+ SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
+ HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
+
+ ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
+
+ SECOND SESSION
+
+ __________
+
+ MARCH 17, 2004
+
+ __________
+
+ Serial No. 108-41
+
+ __________
+
+ Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security
+
+
+ Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
+ index.html
+
+
+ __________
+
+ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
+21-023 WASHINGTON : 2005
+_____________________________________________________________________________
+For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
+Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
+Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�0900012005
+
+
+ SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
+
+
+
+ Christopher Cox, California, Chairman
+
+Jennifer Dunn, Washington Jim Turner, Texas, Ranking Member
+C.W. Bill Young, Florida Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
+Don Young, Alaska Loretta Sanchez, California
+F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
+Wisconsin Norman D. Dicks, Washington
+W.J. (Billy) Tauzin, Louisiana Barney Frank, Massachusetts
+David Dreier, California Jane Harman, California
+Duncan Hunter, California Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland
+Harold Rogers, Kentucky Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New
+Sherwood Boehlert, New York York
+Lamar S. Smith, Texas Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
+Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Nita M. Lowey, New York
+Christopher Shays, Connecticut Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey
+Porter J. Goss, Florida Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
+Dave Camp, Michigan Columbia
+Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida Zoe Lofgren, California
+Bob Goodlatte, Virginia Karen McCarthy, Missouri
+Ernest J. Istook, Jr., Oklahoma Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
+Peter T. King, New York Bill Pascrell, Jr., North Carolina
+John Linder, Georgia Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
+John B. Shadegg, Arizona Islands
+Mark E. Souder, Indiana Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
+Mac Thornberry, Texas Ken Lucas, Kentucky
+Jim Gibbons, Nevada James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
+Kay Granger, Texas Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
+Pete Sessions, Texas
+John E. Sweeney, New York
+
+ John Gannon, Chief of Staff
+
+ Stephen DeVine, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel
+
+ Thomas Dilenge, Chief Counsel and Policy Director
+
+ David H. Schanzer, Democrat Staff Director
+
+ Mark T. Magee, Democrat Deputy Staff Director
+
+ Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
+
+ ______
+
+ Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security
+
+ Dave Camp, Michigan, Chairman
+
+Kay Granger, Texas, Vice Chairwoman Loretta Sanchez, California
+Jennifer Dunn, Washington Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
+Don Young, Alaska Norman D. Dicks, Washington
+Duncan Hunter, California Barney Frank, Massachusetts
+Lamar Smith, Texas Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland
+Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New
+Robert W. Goodlatte, Virginia York
+Ernest Istook, Oklahoma Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
+John Shadegg, Arizona Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
+Mark Souder, Indiana Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
+John Sweeney, New York Jim Turner, Texas, Ex Officio
+Christopher Cox, California, Ex
+Officio
+
+ (II)
+
+
+ C O N T E N T S
+
+ ----------
+ Page
+
+ STATEMENTS
+
+The Honorable Dave Camp, a Representative in Congress From the
+ State of Michigan, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Infrastructure
+ and Border Security............................................ 1
+The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
+ Infrastructure and Border Security............................. 3
+The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of California, and Chairman, Select Committee on
+ Homeland Security.............................................. 25
+The Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in Congress From the
+ State of Texas, Ranking Member, Select Committee on Homeland
+ Security....................................................... 5
+The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Delegate in Congress From
+ the U.S. Virgin Islands........................................ 25
+The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress
+ From the State of Texas
+ Oral Statement................................................. 21
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 2
+The Honorable Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of Massachusetts..................................... 30
+The Honorable John Shadegg, a Representative in Congress From the
+ State of Arizona............................................... 23
+The Honorable Lamar S. Smith, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of Texas............................................. 18
+
+ WITNESS
+
+The Honorable Asa Hutchinson, Under Secretary, Border and
+ Transportation Directorate, Department of Homeland Security
+ Oral Statement................................................. 10
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 11
+
+ APPENDIX
+ Material Submitted for the Record
+
+Questions Submitted by The Honorable Lincoln Diaz-Balart......... 37
+Questions Submitted by The Honorable Mark Souder................. 38
+Questions Submitted by The House Select Commitee on Homeland
+ Security, Majority Staff....................................... 42
+Questions Submitted by The House Select Commitee on Homeland
+ Security, Minority Staff....................................... 56
+
+
+ THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
+ SECURITY'S BORDER AND TRANSPORTATION
+ SECURITY (BTS) BUDGET PROPOSAL FOR
+ FISCAL YEAR 2005
+
+ ----------
+
+
+ Wednesday, March 17, 2004
+
+ House of Representatives,
+ Subcommittee on Infrastructure
+ And Border Security,
+ Select Committee on Homeland Security,
+ Washington, DC.
+ The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:37 a.m., in
+Room 2237, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dave Camp
+[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
+ Present: Representatives Camp, Smith, Diaz-Balart,
+Goodlatte, Shadegg, Cox (ex officio), Sanchez, Markey, Jackson-
+Lee, and Turner (ex officio).
+ Also Present: Delegate Christensen.
+ Mr. Camp. The Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border
+Security hearing will come to order. Today's business is to
+receive testimony regarding the fiscal year 2005 budget request
+for the Border and Transportation Security Directorate, BTS,
+mission and its various programs. The subcommittee will hear
+from Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security
+from the Department of Homeland Security, the Honorable Asa
+Hutchinson.
+ Secretary Hutchinson, thank you for testifying today about
+your Directorate's fiscal year 2005 budget request. We
+appreciate your time and the effort that went into preparing
+your testimony. We look forward to the opportunity to ask you
+some specific questions regarding the BTS budget and how
+various programs and funding will impact the strategic
+objectives of the Department.
+ At this time, the Chair would urge--to allow sufficient
+time for testimony and questions will urge Members to give
+short opening statements and to submit their full statements
+for the record.
+ [The statement of Ms. Jackson-Lee follows:]
+
+Prepared Statement for the Record of the Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee,
+ a Representative in Congress From the State of Texas
+
+ Thank you, Chairman Camp and Ranking Member Sanchez for your
+diligence in holding today's hearing in order to allow this body to
+assess the President's Fiscal Year 2005 Budget proposal for the
+Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Border and Transportation
+Security (BTS) Directorate. This hearing is very critical in light of
+the March 11 bombing of a Madrid subway and the loss of over 200 lives.
+ In the wake of the events that have occurred in Madrid yesterday,
+it is critical to note that, in our own spending for the Department of
+Homeland Security, there has been no effort to increase funding or to
+authorize new railroad security legislation. This means that a whole
+mode of mass transportation represents a major source of threat
+vulnerability-yet another reason for us to believe that we are not as
+safe as we need to be, over two years after the tragic 9/11 incidents.
+ While it is true that because there are some 1.5 million trips per
+day on commuter rails and passenger trains alone, it will be extremely
+difficult to institute airline-like security measures, we are charged
+with having the foresight to initiate rail security improvement
+programs before an incident such as the Madrid bombings occurs. Our
+critical infrastructure can no less withstand the impact of region-wide
+blackouts than it could a series of explosions as occurred in that
+situation. In Houston, the new MetroRail system counted 558,000 riders
+in January, its first month. During the four-day Super Bowl weekend,
+rail riders outnumbered bus riders, even after the city shut down
+service during some nighttime hours because of safety concerns for
+crowds. Without the installation of rail security equipment and the
+hiring of DHS-rail security staff, this new light rail system will
+represent a major source of vulnerability for Houston.
+ Therefore, the Fiscal Year 2005 Budget proposal needs to be
+severely scrutinized for its shortfalls relative to rail security.
+ Several years ago, we debated the desirability of dividing the
+former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) into two bureaus,
+an enforcement bureau and a benefits bureau. I expressed concern about
+the possibility that the enforcement bureau would become the focus of
+most of our resources to the detriment of the benefits bureau. We no
+longer debate whether INS should be divided into different bureaus for
+enforcement and benefits purposes. The establishment of the Department
+of Homeland Security has made that separation a reality. On the
+enforcement side, we have the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
+(CBP) and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and,
+on the benefits side, we have the Bureau of U.S. Citizenship and
+Immigrant Services (USCIS).
+ I wish I could say that I was wrong, that my fears were unfounded,
+but my fears were not unfounded. The enforcement bureaus are receiving
+most of our resources to the detriment of the benefits bureau. The
+fiscal year 2005 request for the two enforcement bureaus is $10,214
+million, whereas the fiscal year 2005 request for the benefits bureau
+is only $1,711 million. In other words, the Administration is proposing
+to spend 6 times more on enforcement than on benefits. The real
+disparity, however, can be seen more clearly in the increases that
+these amounts represent. The Administration is requesting an increase
+of $538 million for the enforcement bureaus but only is requesting a
+$58 million increase for the benefits bureau. In other words, for every
+additional dollar the Administration is requesting for the benefits
+bureau, it is requesting 9 dollars for the enforcement bureaus.
+ I am not opposed to providing sufficient funding for the
+enforcement bureaus. My concern is that the Administration is not
+requesting adequate resources for the benefits operations. The Bureau
+of U.S. Citizenship and Immigrant Services (USCIS) has not been able to
+keep up with its work load. USCIS has a backlog of more than 6 million
+benefits applications.
+ The Texas Service Center presently is working on visa petitions
+that U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents filed for unmarried
+sons and daughters on October 30, 1998. These applications sit for more
+than 5 years before anyone begins to work on them. Such delays do not
+just affect the people in other countries who are the subjects of the
+petitions. The petitioners who file family-based and employment-based
+visa petitions are lawful permanent residents and citizens of the
+United States and American employers. In fact, when such a petition is
+denied, the foreign person who is the subject of the petition does not
+have standing to file an appeal. The right to the immigration benefit
+lies with the American petitioner, not with the alien who is the
+subject of the petition.
+ Despite this crisis, the Administration's proposed fiscal year 2005
+budget for USCIS only allocates $140 million for backlog reduction.
+Even with the addition of the $20 million USCIS expects to receive from
+increased processing fees, this is not sufficient to eliminate the
+backlog. The magnitude of the backlog problem can be seen in the fact
+that during the 3-year period from fiscal year 2001 through 2003,
+USCIS's reported operating costs exceeded available fees by almost $460
+million. Since the beginning of fiscal year 2001, the number of pending
+applications increased by more than 2.3 million (about 59 percent) to
+6.2 million at the end of fiscal year 2003. This increase occurred
+despite additional appropriations beginning in fiscal year 2002 of $80
+million annually to address the backlog.
+ Meanwhile, $340 million is allocated for the US-VISIT program,
+which may turn out to be a waste of resources that could have been used
+elsewhere, such as for reducing the benefits applications backlog. The
+stated objective for US-VISIT is to enhance the nation's security while
+facilitating legitimate travel and trade through our borders. According
+to a September 2003 report (GAO-03-1083) from the General Accounting
+Office (GAO), US-VISIT is a very risky endeavor, the potential cost of
+the program is enormous, and it may not be able to measurably and
+appreciably achieve its goals.
+ I am not sure that US-VISIT will increase the security of our
+borders even if it is fully and successfully implemented. US-VISIT only
+screens foreign visitors seeking admission on the basis of nonimmigrant
+visas, it does not screen nonimmigrant visitors from the 27 countries
+participating in the Visa Waiver Program or anyone who presents a green
+card, and it will be years before the system is fully operational at
+all of the land borders.
+ I believe that we need to pay more attention to benefits operations
+and that we much use our resources more wisely.
+ Thank you.
+
+ Mr. Camp. The hearing record will remain open for 10 days
+after the close of the hearing. Members are advised they will
+receive an additional 3 minutes during the questioning time if
+they waive their opening statement.
+ I will at this point submit my statement for the record,
+and ask the Ranking Member Congresswoman Sanchez if she has an
+opening statement.
+ Ms. Sanchez. I actually do. And thank you, Mr.Chairman.
+And the statement is actually quite long, but I am going to try
+to skip to a couple places to get it on the record, and I will
+submit the full thing.
+ Again, welcome, Secretary Hutchinson. As you and I were
+speaking earlier, I think I mentioned to you that I think,
+quite frankly, that you have the most difficult job of anybody
+over at DHS, maybe in the entire administration, because there
+is just so much to oversee in this entire area of Customs and
+Border Protection and infrastructure, et cetera. So you
+certainly have a lot of people under you, 110,000 people
+stationed all over the country and around the world.
+ Your Directorate also has a broad mission, and even though
+you have a request of $19.6 billion in the budget, I really
+believe that it is not enough, it is really not enough to get
+done what we hope that you can get done in this coming year. I
+think you need more resources. I think that within the
+different categories you might need to spread them over
+differently, and I hope that is some of the dialogue that we
+can have today.
+ One of the areas of particular mission that I would like
+you to address either in questions or during your testimony is
+the whole issue of the TSA, the Transportation and Security
+Administration, funding, mostly because we see a lot, almost
+all, of the budget being spent on the airports; and yet under
+the jurisdiction of that, of course, is quite a few other areas
+including rail security. And given what we see happen in Madrid
+just in the last week, obviously that is a hot topic, and there
+are questions about what are we doing as a Nation to protect
+ourselves in mass transit and on rail systems. And I think you
+only have about 2 percent of your total request going towards
+some of that.
+ The other issue, of course, is also what are you doing in
+the port system? And the last area of concern are the new
+regulations or the discussion going on about just what type of
+civil employment employees within your Directorate actually
+have. And I will ask those questions. But I hope you will
+address or give us some idea of the outline that you see with
+respect to hire and fire and some of the nontraditional
+grievance procedures that employees under your direction might
+have.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you.
+ Does the Ranking Member Mr. Turner have an opening
+statement?
+ Mr. Turner. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
+ Secretary Hutchinson, welcome. Good to have you with us
+once again. We are all very much aware that we are meeting here
+less than a week after the devastating explosions in Madrid
+that killed 200 and injured over 1,500 rail passengers, and our
+thoughts are still and our hearts go out to those victims and
+their families. It is again a reminder of how vulnerable we all
+are no matter where we may live around this globe.
+ It appears from all information I have heard, and you, I am
+sure, can verify this, that Al-Qa`ida was the culprit in this
+brutal attack. And it also, I think, serves as an ominous
+warning sign once again to us and this country that we must be
+ready and prepared to deal with whatever may come next to our
+people. You would have thought maybe that we wouldn't need a
+reminder, obviously we are 2-1/2 years after September 11th of
+2001, but it did strike me as somewhat disturbing when I looked
+at the House Budget Committee's proposal that Chairman Nussle
+is laying out that reduces the President's budget request for
+homeland security by some $887 million over the next5 years.
+Many of my colleagues, all of the Democrats on this committee,
+wrote to Chairman Nussle yesterday urging him to reverse those
+cuts, and, in fact, call for increases, in spending for
+security for the American people.
+ Many of those areas where we urged additional funding
+clearly fall under your umbrella, Mr. Secretary and your
+Department, of course, has about 60 percent, I think, of all
+the employees of the Department of Homeland Security.
+ It is clear we have made progress in the last year in
+border and transportation security, and I commend you on your
+efforts and your leadership, Mr. Secretary, but there are some
+concerns that I want to raise with you and hope you will have
+the opportunity to address them in your statement.
+ In light of the attacks in Madrid, I think it is important
+for us to focus renewed emphasis upon rail security. As you
+know, we have 140,000 miles of train routes in this country,
+500 Amtrak stations, and 500 major urban transit operators. Ten
+million trips are made on trains and subways every day in these
+United States.
+ While the TSA requests 5.3 billion for next fiscal year in
+your budget request, only 147 million, as I read it, or less
+than 3 percent of the total, is dedicated to modes of
+transportation other than airplanes. This striking disparity
+indicates to me that we are not placing enough emphasis on
+trail, trucking, buses, ferries, and other forms of
+transportation that clearly represent vulnerabilities.
+ I recognize that the Department has a $50 million grant
+program outside of TSA for rail and transit security, but
+estimates of what is truly needed across the country range
+upwards of $2 billion. That includes funding for items such as
+sensors, communications equipment, security cameras, which I
+understand you feel constitute the right approach to rail and
+transit security. This area obviously has not been a core
+concern of the Department nor of the Congress, and I think this
+must change.
+ You mentioned during an interview this week that perhaps we
+need to make greater investments in this area, and I certainly
+agree. And I hope you will share your thoughts with us on what
+additional efforts you believe the Department needs to make
+beyond what may be in the President's budget to do a better job
+of security transit systems.
+ Beyond rail security, I am concerned about other
+transportation issues. The TSA budget for next year is an $892
+million increase over the current level, and yet almost all of
+this increase is devoted to airport screening operations.
+Funding is flat, for example, for air cargo screening and
+technology development, and there appears to be no new
+initiatives in this critical area. Air cargo only undergoes, as
+we all know, random searches which are often conducted by
+shippers whose security practices are not regularly verified by
+the Department. I think it is important for us to come to
+grips, and perhaps if you could help us on this, give us some
+date by which you feel we will be able to screen all of our
+cargo that travels on passenger planes with us every day.
+ Another issue that gives me concern is the current pace of
+installing these radiation portals at our Nation's major border
+crossings. These portals are very valuable in helping to detect
+weapons of mass destruction.
+ Mr. Camp. The gentleman's time has expired.
+ Mr. Turner. I will try to follow up, Mr. Secretary, on the
+other items I have in my remarks as we get into your questions.
+But thank you very much.
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you.
+ Are there any other requests for opening statements?
+ Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Camp. Yes. I would recognize the Ranking Member for her
+comment.
+ Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Chairman, I just want to thank you for
+your recent pledge to work with me to schedule hearings that
+address budget details from the Border and Transportation
+Security Directorate component agencies, such as TSA and
+Customs and Border Protection. And I ask for unanimous consent
+to submit the letter from me to you with requests for that and
+your response. And there are copies for the members here of the
+committee to have, if they would like.
+ Mr. Camp. Without objection, those letters will be
+submitted to the record.
+ [The information follows:]
+
+
+ SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFRASTRUCTURE AND BORDER SECURITY
+
+ House of Representatives,
+ Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security,
+ Washington, DC, March 10, 2004
+Hon. Dave Camp,
+Chairman, Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security,
+ House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
+ Dear Mr. Chairman: As we approach the upcoming
+authorization legislation for the Department of Homeland
+Security, the Democratic members of our subcommittee are
+concerned that the Select Committee has not yet heard from a
+sufficient number of witnesses to properly guide our
+authorization process.
+ In light of this fact and pursuant to Rule 4 of the
+Committee Rules, we request that additional witnesses be added
+to the hearing of the Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border
+Security tentatively scheduled for Wednesday, March 17 at which
+Under Secretary Hutchinson is expected to testify. We
+respectfully request that officials from the Transportation
+Security Administration, United States Coast Guard, Office of
+Domestic Preparedness, Bureau of Immigration and Customs
+enforcement, and Bureau of Customs and Border Protection be
+called to testify about the agencies' budget submissions. As
+provided by Rule 4, these witnesses could either appear
+following Under Secretary Hutchinson or on a separate ``day of
+hearing.''
+ We realize this change could make for a long hearing, but
+it is our strong feeling that we must hear from these witnesses
+in order to get the information we need to make the proper
+choices as we go forward with the authorization process.
+ Very truly yours,
+ Loretta Sanchez, Ranking Member.
+ Benjamin Cardin, Representative.
+ Norm Dicks, Representative.
+ Sheila Jackson-Lee, Representative.
+ Bill Pacrell, Representative.
+ Peter DeFazio, Representative.
+ Barney Frank, Representative.
+ Edward Markey, Representative.
+ Louise Slaughter, Representative.
+
+
+ SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFRASTRUCTURE AND BORDER SECURITY
+
+ House of Representatives,
+ Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security,
+ Washington, DC, March 10, 2004
+Ms. Loretta,
+Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border
+ Security, Washington, DC.
+ Dear Ms. Loretta: Thank you for contacting me with your
+request to invite additional witnesses to the Border and
+Transportation Security Budget hearing on March 17, 2004. As
+you know, on February 13, 2004, we sent a joint invitation
+letter requesting that Undersecretary Asa Hutchinson appear
+before our Subcommittee on that date and did not request any
+additional witnesses.
+ As the head of the BTS Directorate, Undersecretary
+Hutchinson is accountable for the entire BTS budget request and
+can be expected to answer questions on the range of issues
+cited in your letter. Given the shortage of dates available to
+hold hearings, it is in the best interest of the Committee to
+move forward with our agenda and build budget and authorization
+components into those hearings. Your request for testimony from
+Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs
+Enforcement, Transportation Security Administration, and the
+U.S. Coast Guard is duly noted and I pledge to work with you on
+upcoming hearings to make sure that these agencies are
+represented.
+ I understand that there is concern that, due to the size of
+the BTS Directorate and the number of different programs,
+Members will not have sufficient time to address each issue. If
+time permits, please be assured that I will extend the
+questions for a second round during the hearing to give Members
+additional time to question the witness. Additionally, I will
+work with you to ensure that any outstanding issues are
+addressed in upcoming hearings.
+ Again, thank you for your request. I appreciate your hard
+work and dedication as a Member of the Subcommittee and I look
+forward to working with you to move the agenda of the
+Subcommittee forward as we conduct oversight of the Department.
+ Sincerely,
+ Dave Camp,
+ Chairman.
+ ------
+
+
+ Mr. Camp. And seeing no additional requests for time, I
+think we can proceed and welcome Under Secretary Hutchinson. We
+have received your written testimony, and ask that you would
+briefly summarize your statement in 5 minutes. Thank you for
+being here. You may begin.
+
+ STATEMENT OF ASA HUTCHINSON, UNDER SECRETARY, BORDER AND
+ TRANSPORTATION SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
+
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman
+Sanchez, Ranking Member Turner, Congressman Smith. I am very
+pleased to be with you today and the other members of the
+committee.
+ I want to, first of all, express my appreciation to the
+partnership that I believe that we have developed with this
+committee and with the Department on the ongoing security needs
+and assessments of where we are in Homeland Security. And we
+could not get the job done without your support, confidence,
+and counsel.
+ I do believe that we have accomplished a great deal in the
+last year together in enhancing security in every arena, and
+the President's 2005 budget that is the subject of this hearing
+reflects the continued enhancements of security. It includes a
+10 percent increase overall in the Directorate of Border and
+Transportation Security.
+ And if you look back on some of the things that we have
+accomplished that led to the 2005 budget, we have consolidated
+our border security efforts under one face at the border where
+Immigration, Customs, Agriculture are combined together into
+one effective organization. We have expanded the Container
+Security Initiative, the Customs-Trade Partnership Against
+Terrorism Program, protecting the supply chain in our supply
+routes of cargo coming into our country. We have enhanced
+substantially, as we have acknowledged, aviation security with
+increasing the effectiveness of the Federal air marshals,
+increasing the baggage screening, checking the names of master
+air crew lists, and additional measures in aviation security.
+We have implemented new technologies from US-VISIT to the
+SEVIS, which identifies and tracks foreign visitors and
+students, made those programs effective. We have enhanced air
+cargo inspections. We have increased the work on pursuing the
+illegal hiring of undocumented workers, and we have complied
+with the congressional requirements to develop visa security
+programs, which also gives the greater capability of looking at
+people who come into our country to make sure they do not pose
+a security risk.
+ The 2005 budget builds upon these initiatives by increasing
+the CSI initiative, Security Container Initiative, by $25
+million, increasing the funding for the Customs-Trade
+Partnership Against Terrorism Program, increasing the amounts
+for the National Targeting Center that will allow us to do more
+effective risk assessments.
+ One of the topics that has been mentioned today is what we
+are doing in rail and transit security, and as was mentioned,
+we certainly have looked at what has happened, the tragedy in
+Madrid. We obviously naturally look at what our vulnerabilities
+are in our transit systems here in the United States.
+ And it is important to note that this is not the first time
+we have looked at transit security. We are working very
+aggressively in this arena in which we allowed $115 million in
+grants since May of last year for enhancing security in the
+transit arena. We have in combination with that issued $894
+million in Urban Area Security Grants, some of which of that
+money can be used for enhancing the security of our transit and
+rail systems. In addition, the 2005 budget, of course, builds
+upon that with a $1.45 billion amount being provided for the
+Urban Area Security Grants.
+ But to give you a flavor for how we deal with this whenever
+we see an incident like what happened in Madrid, we, first of
+all, handle, from an operational standpoint, making sure that
+we are in communication and provide information to the major
+transit systems in the major cities. I personally talked with
+chiefs of police, the transit operators and got an
+understanding of what we are doing to enhance security, to make
+sure that is done; increase law enforcement presence, expanding
+the use of explosive detection equipment, public announcements,
+awareness as to the danger and what they can do to alert us to
+unattended packages. And many of them also instituted transit
+riders.
+ We have through the TSA the Maritime and Land Security
+Division, which is working with the rail security and the
+transit authorities to enhance security through best practices,
+through pilot projects, and we are going to continue to build
+upon that. We look forward to working with you to see other
+means in which we can make sure that our transit riders and our
+passengers and the rail are secure, and that we continue our
+efforts to secure the borders of the United States.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Camp. Well, thank you very much, Secretary Hutchinson.
+ [The statement of Mr. Hutchinson follows:]
+
+Prepared Statement of The Honorable Asa Hutchinson, Under Secretary for
+ Border and Transportation Secretary, Department of Homeland Security
+
+ Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Sanchez and Members of the
+Subcommittee:
+ I am honored and pleased to appear before the Committee to present
+the President's fiscal year 2005 budget for the Border and
+Transportation Security (BTS) Directorate. I want to thank you for your
+strong support of BTS components, especially for the resources you
+provided in fiscal year 2004, and look forward to working with you in
+the coming months on our fiscal year 2005 budget.
+ The $16 billion BTS request represents a 10 percent increase in
+resources over the comparable fiscal year 2004 budget, and reflects the
+Department's strong and continued commitment to the security of our
+homeland. The fiscal year 2005 budget is a $1.5 billion increase over
+fiscal year 2004, and it includes funding for new and expanded programs
+in border and port security, transportation security, immigration
+enforcement, and training.
+ The Border and Transportation Security Directorate made great
+strides during the first year of operations. Over 110,000 employees and
+a budget of $14 billion were reassembled and brought under BTS. The
+Directorate was quickly established and successfully began operations
+on March 1, 2003--bringing together the legacy agencies and programs
+that now make up BTS--Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration
+and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Transportation Security Administration
+(TSA), Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), and the United
+States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT)
+program. Customs, border, immigration, transportation security and
+training activities have been rejuvenated under their new agencies,
+increasing the effectiveness of our dedicated employees. BTS continues
+to create new ways to enhance security by sharing information and
+intelligence and by coordinating operations within the Department among
+levels of governments, and horizontally across agencies and
+jurisdictions. Through the hard work of our dedicated and talented
+employees, America is more secure and better prepared than we were one
+year ago.
+ In addition to the stand-up of the Directorate, we have achieved
+many results since our creation, including:
+ providing fused and enhanced security coordination
+ among our components and other federal, state and local
+ security providers and stakeholders, especially during
+ Operation Liberty Shield and the recent holiday season,
+ including the establishment of the Transportation Security
+ Coordination Center (TSCC) to coordinate intelligence sharing
+ and command and control activities for our national
+ transportation sector;
+ strengthening border security through the ``One face
+ at the border'' initiative, which is cross-training officers to
+ perform three formerly separate inspections--immigration,
+ customs, and agriculture--allowing us to target our resources
+ toward higher risk travelers;
+ expanding the container security initiative (CSI) and
+ Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) to provide
+ improved security to the global supply chain;
+ instituting new cutting edge systems, like US-VISIT,
+ to identify and track foreign visitors and students, recording
+ the entry and exit of foreign visitors to strengthen our
+ immigration system;
+ safeguarding air travel from the terrorist threat by:
+ increasing the presence of Federal Air Marshals, establishing a
+ Federal Flight Desk Officer program, instituting 100 percent
+ checked baggage screening, issuing new regulations for enhanced
+ air cargo security, expanding the use of explosives detection
+ canine teams, checking names of master cockpit air crew lists,
+ and streamlining and training federal passenger and baggage
+ screeners deployed at airports across the Nation;
+ eliminating potential weaknesses in security by
+ suspending transits without visa (TWOV);
+ negotiating an agreement with the European Union with
+ respect to Passenger Name Record (PNR);
+ negotiating a memorandum of understanding with the
+ Department of State to ensure a coordinated and increasingly
+ effective visa issuance process; and
+ establishing a visa security office to provide
+ oversight and guidance on Section 428 of the Homeland Security
+ Act, including establishing two offices in Saudi Arabia to
+ review 100 percent of visa applications;
+ standing up a SEVIS tiger team to process foreign
+ students during the summer 2003 back-to-school season; and
+ effecting improvements in security capabilities,
+ capacity, training, and infrastructure.
+
+Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Request
+ The Fiscal Year 2005 budget for the Directorate builds upon the
+significant investments and accomplishments effected and in progress.
+
+Strengthening Border and Port Security
+ Securing our border and transportation systems continues to be an
+enormous challenge. Ports-of-entry (POE) into the United States stretch
+across 7,500 miles of land border between the United States and Mexico
+and Canada, 95,000 miles of shoreline and navigable rivers, and an
+exclusive economic zone of 3.4 million square miles. Each year more
+than 500 million people, 130 million motor vehicles, 2.5 million
+railcars, and 5.7 million cargo containers must be processed at the
+border and POE.
+ In fiscal year 2003, CBP processed 412.8 million passengers and
+pedestrians arriving in the U.S.--327 million at land borders, 70.8
+million at international airports, and 15 million at sea ports. The
+fiscal year 2005 CBP budget seeks $2.7 billion for border security
+inspections and trade facilitation at ports of entry and $1.8 billion
+for border security and control between ports of entry.
+ During fiscal year 2005, we will continue to strengthen our border
+and port security. The CBP budget seeks an overall increase of $223
+million to maintain and enhance border and port security activities,
+including the expansion of pre-screening cargo containers in high-risk
+areas and the detection of individuals attempting to illegally enter
+the United States illegally.
+ Specifically, the budget includes an increase of $25 million for
+the Container Security Initiative (CSI) which focuses on pre-screening
+cargo before it reaches our shores, and an increase of $15.2 million
+for Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). C-TPAT
+focuses on partnerships all along the entire supply chain, from the
+factory floor, to foreign vendors, to land borders and seaports. As of
+late January 2004, nearly 3,000 importers, 600 carriers, and 1,000
+brokers and freight forwarders are participating in C-TPAT, surpassing
+the Department's original goal of participation of the top 1,000
+importers.
+ As well as continuing development for secure trade programs, the
+budget also seeks an increase of $20.6 million to support improvements
+for the National Targeting Center and for multiple targeting systems
+that focus on people, cargo and conveyances. These systems use
+information from diverse sources to provide automated risk assessments
+for arriving international air passengers, shipments of goods to our
+country, and land border passenger traffic.
+ The United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
+(US-VISIT) program's goals are to enhance the security of our citizens
+and our visitors; facilitate legitimate travel and trade across our
+borders; ensure the integrity of our immigration system; and respect
+the privacy of our welcomed visitors. US-VISIT represents a major
+milestone in our efforts to reform our borders. We deployed the first
+increment of US-VISIT on time, on budget, and met the mandates
+established by Congress, including biometric capabilities ahead of
+schedule. The budget seeks a total of $340 million in fiscal year 2005,
+an increase of $12 million over the fiscal year 2004 level for the
+program. As of late February, over 1.5 million foreign nationals had
+been processed for entry, generating 125 watch list alerts, and
+resulting in 51 criminals apprehended. The 2005 funding will further
+strengthen border security, and enable modernization of border
+management systems and capabilities. Specifically, funding will be used
+to expand the entry system to 115 land POEs, beyond the busiest 50 that
+will be covered by the US-VISIT program in fiscal year 2004. Funding
+will also be used to expand implementation of an exit solution at our
+air and seaports. Alternatives are being developed and tested, and will
+be implemented at 80 airports and 14 seaports in fiscal year 2004.
+ Within the BTS component budgets, over $100 million is included for
+detection systems, a critical element in the war on terrorism. The CBP
+budget seeks an increase of $64.2 million to enhance land-based
+detection and monitoring of movement between ports, and $10 million to
+deploy and operate unmanned aerial vehicles. In order to protect the
+homeland against radiological threats, the CBP budget seeks $50 million
+for radiation detection monitors and equipment. The ICE budget request
+includes an increase of $28 million to increase the flight hours of P-3
+aircraft by 200 percent. In addition to providing vital detection and
+monitoring capabilities in the source and transit zones containing
+mountainous terrain, thick jungles and large expanses of water, the P-3
+provides an important capability for domestic airspace security
+missions.
+
+Improving Aviation Security
+ We have made great strides in rebuilding and reinvigorating of our
+aviation transportation security system. We have made significant
+investments in baggage screening technology--over $2 billion to
+purchase and install Explosives Detection Systems machines (EDS) and
+Explosives Trace Detection machines (ETD) to the nation's airports--and
+established a robust technology research and development program. We
+have deployed 45,000 federal passenger and baggage screeners at the
+Nation's airports, expanded the National Explosives Detection Canine
+Team program, and trained pilots to be Federal Flight Deck Officers.
+ The fiscal year 2005 TSA budget seeks an increase of $892 million
+to enhance transportation security, a 20 percent increase over the
+comparable fiscal year 2004 level. Specifically, to strengthen
+interwoven, concentric layers of transportation security, the budget
+requests increases of $20 million for credentialing systems (i.e.,
+Transportation Worker Identification Credential, Hazardous Materials
+transporters, and foreign student pilots); $25 million for operating
+the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening II System; and $113
+million to and improve screener performance through training and the
+deployment of information technology. A substantially improved air
+cargo security and screening program was implemented last year, and the
+$85 million request sustains funding to continue program enhancements
+and associated air cargo screening technology research and development.
+We are providing another $400 million for EDS equipment to improve
+airport operational efficiency.
+
+Enhancing Immigration Security and Enforcement
+ The ICE budget request of $4 billion, which is an increase of $300
+million over the fiscal year 2004 level, seeks to strengthen
+immigration security and enforcement. Comprehensive immigration
+security and enforcement extends beyond efforts at and between the
+ports-of-entry into the United States. It extends overseas, to keep
+unwelcome persons from arriving in our country, and removing persons
+now illegally residing in the United States. Pursuant to section 428 of
+the Homeland Security Act, and the Memorandum of Understanding between
+the Departments of Homeland Security and State, the ICE fiscal year
+2005 budget request of $14 million includes an increase of $10 million
+to support a new visa security unit (VSU). The BTS personnel stationed
+at overseas posts, including Saudi Arabia, will continue to work
+cooperatively with U.S. Consular Officials to enhance security and the
+integrity of the visa process.
+ As announced on January 7, 2004, the Administration is committed to
+enhanced immigration integrity and border security. My Directorate will
+be working to implement a program that meets those goals, while
+benefiting the economy. Current ICE immigration enforcement programs
+and the enhancements in the fiscal year 2005 ICE budget request support
+and are consistent with a number of elements in this initiative,
+particularly worksite enforcement. Specifically, the fiscal year 2005
+request includes an increase of $23 million to more than double the
+number of investigations currently performed by ICE--providing an
+additional 200 investigators. With these resources, ICE will be able to
+facilitate the implementation of the President's temporary worker
+program initiative by establishing a traditional worksite enforcement
+program that offers credible deterrence to the hiring of unauthorized
+workers.
+ The request also includes nearly a $100 million increase for the
+detention and removal of illegal aliens. Detention and Removal of
+illegal aliens present in the United States is critical to the
+enforcement of our immigration laws, and the requested funding will
+expand ongoing fugitive apprehension efforts, the removal from the
+United States of jailed illegal aliens, and additional detention and
+removal capacity.
+ As part of our overall immigration enforcement strategy, ICE will
+continue to analyze data generated through the Student and Exchange
+Visitor Information System (SEVIS) and US-VISIT program to detect
+individuals who are in violation of the Nation's immigration laws and
+pose a threat to homeland security. The fiscal year 2005 budget
+requests $16 million to support these compliance efforts.
+ Immigration fraud poses a severe threat to national security and
+public safety because it enables terrorists, criminals, and illegal
+aliens to gain entry and remain in the United States. An aggressive,
+focused, and comprehensive investigations and prosecutions program will
+detect, combat and deter immigration fraud. The $25 million included in
+the fiscal year 2005 budget will provide stable funding to the benefits
+fraud program by replacing funding previously provided through the
+Immigration Examinations Fee Account.
+
+Building Departmental Infrastructure
+ The fiscal year 2005 request includes an increase of $5 million for
+the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center to support our security
+program enhancements and capability sustainment. The FLETC not only
+serves federal client groups, but also provides training to state and
+local law enforcement providers. In addition, to enhance global law
+enforcement efforts, FLETC develops and offers a curriculum that
+includes international applications.
+
+Conclusion:
+ Our homeland is safer and more secure than it was a year ago,
+thanks in part to the dedicated and talented team we have in BTS which
+excels at coordinating and effecting cross-component activities.
+Through their efforts, and with the support of our partners in
+government and the public and private sectors, we will continue to
+substantially improve our nation's security. I thank the Congress for
+its support, which has been critical to bringing us to this point. With
+your continued support for our fiscal year 2005 budget, we will
+continue to improve the security of our nation.
+ I am grateful to be here today to outline our efforts for a safer
+and more secure America. Thank you for inviting me to appear before you
+today, and I look forward to answering your questions.
+
+ Mr. Camp. It is clear that this budget makes significant
+progress in smart security initiatives and programs. And I
+think implementing prescreening programs such as Nexus, FAST,
+and C-TPAT, which really help commercial truckers, travelers
+who cross the border frequently and with some regularity--I
+think that helps us move these low-risk cargo and travelers
+through ports of entry and allowing the resources to be applied
+to high-risk and sort of unknown.
+ My question to you is can you just expand a little bit on
+these preclearance programs and what might be happening in
+terms of facilitating legitimate trade and travel in terms of
+your Department?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Well, the President's 2005 budget builds
+upon these initiatives that gives us more information in
+advance of when the cargo leaves the foreign ports. We have
+obviously implemented the 24-hour rule, which requires
+information of those cargo shipments before they leave the
+foreign ports.
+ The budget provides for $25 million to enhance the National
+Targeting Center, and this is money that will allow us to more
+effectively take the information that we get, analyze it, and
+target those at-risk shipments that should have physical
+inspections. We first, of course, invest in nonintrusive
+inspection equipment, and if that points out some anomalies, we
+take it a step further with a physical inspection. And it was
+actually a $20 million increase for the National Targeting
+Center. It is a $25 million increase for the Container Security
+Initiative. We have continued to expand from the megaports to
+the second tier of ports where we can deploy our personnel to
+help screen with our foreign counterparts those shipments that
+might pose a risk to us.
+ A big part of it is the partnership with industry, where we
+have 5,000 partners that have signed up to enhance their own
+security in the supply chain, and we are going to build upon
+that.
+ Mr. Camp. Are you looking at ways to have greater
+participation in these programs, such as additional enrollment
+centers or facilities, expanding dedicated lanes, adding
+programs at other points of entry? And I think particularly in
+the container initiative, I know that there has been a great
+effort in adding as many ports as possible. If you could talk a
+little bit about the progress that you have made there, I think
+that would be interesting to the committee.
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Well, we are working to expand the
+dedicated lanes for our FAST, which is Free And Secure Trade
+lanes, for those commercial trucks that have their drivers and
+their companies with background checks, with added security
+measures, where they could move through those dedicated lanes
+more rapidly. And we are expanding those lanes, Nexus on the
+northern border, and we are expanding that technology on the
+southern border as well. We will be continuing that rollout
+where you have infrastructure investment and the expansion of
+those lanes.
+ In terms of the enrollment centers that you mentioned, we
+are trying to make those accessible to those that want to
+utilize this and make them efficient with our Canadian
+counterparts for the processing of those. I would be happy to
+get the specific number that we will be expanding to this
+coming year, but we are working very diligently to expand the
+number of those dedicated lanes.
+ Mr. Camp. I think we are all very interested in the
+integration and coordination of the various marine functions
+that are in the Department of Homeland Security. Do you have
+some insight in how you are evaluating, developing the best
+strategy to maximize these resources? And does that include the
+acquisition of equipment, aircraft, detention machines, boats
+and that sort of thing?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. That is very important. And in reference to
+our air assets, we have a Joint Procurement Committee in which
+the Coast Guard, the Customs, Border Patrol, or ICE look at
+acquiring additional air assets. They are to coordinate through
+that Joint Procurement Committee to make sure we are not
+duplicating. And if there is some ability to achieve greater
+leverage by bringing those procurement bidding process
+together, we will do that.
+ But in addition, operationally, I just came back from the
+Arizona border, Congressman Shadegg's territory down there, and
+we rolled out our Arizona Border Patrol Initiative. One of the
+very important parts of it is having an integrator there that
+will integrate the coordination of the various assets that are
+used in patrolling the border. So we are doing operationally as
+well as from a procurement standpoint.
+ Mr. Camp. There has been a great deal of discussion
+regarding the Homeland Security Department's plans to develop a
+regional structure for Customs and commerce issues. And I
+understand there has been an announcement of 7 to 10 regional
+directors positioned around the country to be points of contact
+in the event of an emergency. Is this a priority in the 2005
+budget, the regional structure? And how would those regional
+centers differ from Customs management centers that are
+currently in place?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Well, the Customs management centers, of
+course, are solely focused on the organizations of Customs and
+Border Protection. And, of course, the regional concept would
+be DHS, which would include all 22 agencies that would be a
+part of DHS, and would give a regional director, through acting
+on behalf of the Secretary, the capability to coordinate the
+operations of those various Homeland Security agencies,
+particularly in the event that there was an incident or a
+crisis to manage. But it would also help to facilitate
+communication with our State and local counterparts, carrying
+out exercises and training programs more efficiently.
+ That program of regions was mentioned in the President's
+2004 budget. We continue to support that. We are working very
+diligently to make sure we have the right strategy and waiting
+to move forward with this before it is actually announced to
+the public and implemented. But we are getting much closer to
+getting a working model of that regional concept.
+ Mr. Camp. I think the concern is that all Federal policies
+and laws be enforced uniformly in that kind of a system. Do you
+have any management controls or policies in place to help
+ensure that?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Well, the first goal would be to make sure
+that there is the national policy that is implemented, so you
+don't want to wind up having, you know, regional directors
+determining various regional policies in terms of implementing
+our national strategy.
+ So it will be a national strategy that will have
+operational flexibility. And I think that might be what you are
+getting at, that they will have the flexibility to design
+operations consistent with what is needed in that particular
+region. And I think that is what has been somewhat missing in
+the past. So national policies, but regional flexibility in
+operations.
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you.
+ The gentlewoman from California, the Ranking Member, may
+inquire.
+ Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ And again, thank you, Asa, for being before us.
+ The first question I have for you has to do with the
+Transportation Security Administration, which has a mission of
+securing all modes of transportation, and the recent GAO report
+that talked about the lack of clarity or relationship between
+the transfer of all of this happening between TSA and
+Department of Transportation. In fact, quoting them, they said:
+The roles and the responsibilities of TSA and DOD and
+Transportation Security have yet to be clearly delineated,
+which creates a potential for duplicating or conflicting
+efforts as both entities move forward with their security
+efforts.
+ And it also said: DOT and TSA have not yet formally defined
+their roles and responsibilities in securing all the modes of
+transportation.
+ And in talking to staffs, we sort of get this, well, that
+is not ours, that is theirs. Everybody is pointing, but--a lot
+of it, but we are not getting answers about who is doing what.
+And I think it is reflective of the fact that we spend $92
+million a week, I think--is that true--a week on airport
+screening under TSA, but you only spent $115 million in all
+grants for public transit in the past year.
+ So I would like you to give me your idea of where you are
+in defining the roles of what you are going to take care of and
+what DOT is going to take care of, or not, if they are not
+really the ones that are supposed to do that, and a breakdown
+of the spending and the priorities for securing the different
+modes of transportation. What is the plan that you have in
+mind? How far along are you with that plan? What are the
+negotiations you have with DOT? What can we anticipate; again,
+going back to this whole issue that Americans are asking, what
+are you doing about rail? And, you know, everybody reacts to
+the latest thing that happens. First it was the airports, then
+it was the rails. Who knows what it will be next. So we have to
+have a plan. And who is in charge is basically what I am
+asking.
+ Mr. Hutchinson. We have a very good working relationship
+with the Department of Transportation. And certainly you could
+look at it that there is some areas of jurisdiction that you
+could say is covered by both. But I think the line of authority
+is very clear that the Homeland Security focuses on the
+security of our transportation system and is ultimately
+responsible.
+ We work in conjunction in carrying out that mission with
+the capabilities of the Department of Transportation, and they
+in turn have the lead in the safety area, which is somewhat to
+be distinguished from the security aspect. But they are clearly
+complementary of each other, so there is that close working
+relationship. But as we have the responsibility for the
+security of our transportation system, we utilize the
+capabilities and the strengths of the Department of
+Transportation.
+ Now, in reference to what our strategy is and the other
+modes of transportation, you are absolutely correct that there
+is much more invested in aviation security, substantially
+because Congress clearly defined exactly what we do in aviation
+security, and it was a comprehensive solution with 100 percent
+inspection of passengers and bags.
+ Ms. Sanchez. Asa, I don't anticipate we are going to do 100
+percent inspection of anything really on our mass transit. We
+have just, you know, millions of riders every single day who
+use this. But I think America wants to know, we want to know,
+you know, what kind of priority do you have? When I looked at
+the $115 million that are given in grants, they are pretty
+open, and they are pretty wide in interpretation on what you
+can spend them on. So is there a grand plan?
+ Are we just leaving it up to each transit system?
+ And when we talk to the transit system, they are telling
+us, you know, we need tons more money for keeping this system
+safe, and it is really a funding problem. And, you know, I used
+to work in Transportation. I don't know what the fare box
+recovery rate is these days, but it is probably 40 cents or
+less on the dollar. So they really are strapped for money.
+ So what is the grand plan? I mean, are you working with
+them on this? Are you working with Transportation? How do we
+know where to put the funds and what we need?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Well, we are absolutely working with them.
+And the grant money, I believe, has been effectively used and
+targeted with the transit authorities. It is very important
+that they help develop the solutions that is unique to their
+security requirements. The security requirements for the
+transit system in New York City might be different than the
+security requirements that are needed in Los Angeles or
+Chicago. And so there has to be some flexibility there.
+ What we are doing is very substantial through the
+investment in biosensors, through the development of new
+security measures that minimize the risk and the damage that
+could come out, insisting upon assessments that are being made
+that are actively being conducted, and making security
+judgments and applications based upon those assessments.
+ The TSA has a substantial investment in making sure that
+there is training. We have had exercises that brought together
+these authorities to look at our appropriate responses. But
+there is a different solution than what is in the aviation
+arena. As you pointed out, we have a very open system, and I
+don't think that the American public would expect to have that
+same solution of 100 percent screening. So we are looking at
+better ways of doing it, whether it is based upon intelligence
+applying a specific solution, maybe it is a screening response.
+The law enforcement presence is critical, and the explosive
+detection capability that we are building in these transit
+systems is an important response as well.
+ Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one real quick, quick
+question here, please?
+ Mr. Camp. The gentlewoman's time has expired, but I will
+let her ask one more question.
+ Ms. Sanchez. Any response to the fact that TSA's budget
+only puts 2 percent towards rail?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. I think it reflects the distinction in
+solutions, and that is an appropriate investment. As we
+continue to development this, it might need to grow, but at the
+present time, when you are looking at not doing 100 percent
+screening, but partnering with the local governments and
+transit authorities, that is the right approach. And that
+amount does not include the hundreds of millions of dollars
+that have been invested in grants through the Office of
+Domestic Preparedness.
+ Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for indulging me.
+ Mr. Camp. The gentleman from Texas Mr. Smith is recognized
+for 8 minutes.
+ Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Hutchinson, I would like ask my first question on
+behalf of a Texas colleague, Pete Sessions, who is not a member
+of this committee, but who has very much of an interest in your
+answer. And the question is this: TSA apparently is refusing to
+help Dallas-Fort Worth Airport pay for explosive detection
+equipment on a 90-to-10 ratio as they are required to do by
+law. Apparently TSA is agreeing to pay on a 75/25 percent
+reimbursement ratio, but is not providing the 90 percent of the
+cost of that type of equipment. Why is that?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. The original congressional mandate was 75/
+25, and that is the basis on which our agreements were entered
+into and the plans were made. I believe it was the FAA
+reauthorization bill changed that formula to 90/10. Obviously,
+that is problematic because we have moved forward on a 75/25
+basis, and you are going to--we are not going to be able to
+cover as many airports with the on-line solution. And so we
+want to cover the maximum number of airports.
+ So, obviously we will follow the law, but we are asking
+that Congress look at taking that back to a 75/25 ratio.
+ Mr. Smith. I can understand the rationale, but if Congress
+does not change the law, then you would expect to reimburse at
+the stated 90/10 ratio.
+ Mr. Hutchinson. We would fully comply with the law,
+whatever the law would require.
+ Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
+ And I would also like to ask you, and this is a tough
+question, and I am not sure that there is an easy answer, but
+is it possible, with the current funding levels, for you all to
+accomplish two goals? The first goal is to keep delays at the
+border of border crossers and the adverse economic impact that
+might accrue to a minimum at the same time you are protecting
+our homeland.
+ Now, those are sometimes conflicted goals, and obviously
+the top priority is to protect the homeland. But is your
+proposed funding sufficient to accomplish those two goals?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Yes. The funding that we have at present
+and with the request in the 2005 budget allows us to balance
+those two objectives, using technology, new systems, to move
+commerce and add to security primarily through the US-VISIT
+program, that, as you are very familiar with on the southern
+border, we are having to comply with the requirement for the 50
+busiest land ports. And we are making appropriate adjustments
+from the airport solution to the land borders so we don't clog
+the borders, but we can add a measure of increased security.
+ Now, we are also, through the FAST lanes, the sentry lanes,
+where you have the dedicated travelers with security background
+checks, with a laser card that can move through more rapidly,
+we are expanding the number of those dedicated lanes.
+Obviously, that is measured out as to how fast we go. I think
+we are at the right pace.
+ Mr. Smith. Mr. Secretary, to follow up on that point I just
+made, Homeland Security and protecting our homeland, I
+understand that the Department of Homeland Security is
+considering exempting the holders of border crossing cards from
+the US-VISIT program. I could understand that if we had readers
+available at the border to check the identity of those using
+the border crossing cards. At this point we do not. Apparently
+they are used secondarily in certain instances. But how could
+we be considering exempting all those individuals from a
+security check if those readers are not in place?
+ And let me add to that that I heard recently that there was
+a pilot program set up that did check the identities of those
+with the border crossing cards. And in this small pilot
+program, there were 350 individual whose IDs were not valid. So
+when you have that kind of a security gap, that kind of a
+security loophole, how can we afford to give a pass to
+individuals and not check their identities?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. You are correct. We absolutely have to have
+the readers deployed. I would say that the border crossing
+cardholders are subjected to a security check. They have their
+biometrics taken; they are run through our terrorist data
+bases; they have background checks, and they are issued the
+card. But it is also important to read those cards when they
+come through to verify identity. The readers I have given
+direction to be deployed. It is not just the reader, but it is
+the system that backs that up, and those should be in place by
+the end of June.
+ Mr. Smith. So you are saying, if I understand you
+correctly, that the border crossing cardholders will not be
+exempt from the US-VISIT program until there are readers
+available to check each one of those individuals?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. That is correct. Now, I mean, timingwise of
+course we are making decisions really for the end of the year.
+And so any exemption for the border crossing cardholders from
+US-VISIT will be an end-of-the-year solution. And before then
+we will have the readers all in place.
+ Mr. Smith. And the readers will not be used secondarily?
+They will be used for every individual coming through?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. No. The readers will be deployed in
+secondary inspection. So if an inspector has a question about
+the identity of a border crossing card, it will be referred to
+secondary inspection.
+ Mr. Smith. That still, in my mind, leaves a security gap
+when you are not checking each individual with a reader, as we
+saw from the pilot program. And I am just afraid that that is
+an invitation to some individuals to use a false ID to get into
+the country very easily.
+ Mr. Hutchinson. You are certainly correct that the most
+ideal system would be to have those readers at every primary
+inspection point. It would just be really impossible to have
+the flow of people that is necessary at the ports of entry and
+to do it in a fast enough fashion under the present development
+of that technology.
+ Mr. Smith. It seems to me that--and this may be a budget
+question. It seems to me that if you had the funds for a
+sufficient number of readers, you would not delay entry, but
+you would increase security. So is it a budget problem that
+we--is that the reason that we don't have enough readers?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Well, I am not sure we have enough readers
+for every lane at primary inspection. So it might partly be
+budget, but the primary issue, whether you are talking about
+US-VISIT or whether you are talking about the border crossing
+card readers, that means every person who comes through, you
+take their biometric. And if you added, you know, 60 seconds
+for everyone to take that and have it entered and read, it
+would just really exacerbate the lines.
+ Mr. Smith. What percentage of the individuals coming across
+using the border crossing cards would you expect to check on
+that secondary level with the readers?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. I think that it would be significant, and
+it would be sufficient, because the inspectors have got the
+best judgment. Well, first of all, you have got a photograph
+that you can compare to compare identity. If there is any
+question, they go into secondary. And second, I am sure you
+take a random sample and some verifications so that there would
+be a huge security value when those readers are in place.
+ Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Camp. I thank the gentleman.
+ The Chair now recognizes Ms. Jackson-Lee of Texas. The
+gentlewoman may inquire for 5 minutes.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. I thank the distinguished chairman.
+ And to the Secretary, thank you very much for your presence
+here. And let me acknowledge my colleagues and particularly the
+presence of Congresswoman Donna Christensen.
+ If I might, Mr. Secretary, just to offer a few remarks
+preceding my series of questions. I have filed most recently
+H.R. 3918, which is the Comprehensive Immigration Fairness Act
+of 2004. The focus is, I think, to deal head on with one of the
+singular issues that we are debating, and that is the question
+of the documentation or the existence of the illegal aliens in
+the United States. I think the administration and Congress will
+agree that the number varies from 8 million to 14 million. It
+may be just a little bit more.
+ I am concerned as we begin this debate that we don't look
+very carefully at the President's good intentions, but maybe
+the down side of what he has now created, and that is a
+guesswork program, proposal, or announcement with no teeth or
+no actual, if you will, process engaged.
+ And I raise this point because you indicated you have just
+come back from Arizona--most of us have focused our attention
+on the Arizona border, the California border, and the Texas
+border--with what I understand is a sizeable increase of
+individuals coming across the border who are now suggesting
+they are coming because of amnesty. There are two things that
+happen there. One, its jeopardizes their safety and their
+quality of life as well as those who are on the border. Two, it
+misrepresents what many of us have for many years advocated,
+and that is earned access to legalization which allows hard-
+working, tax-paying individuals in this country to access
+legalization through a process. Mine in particular, 5 years of
+presence here, taxpaying, a job, no criminal record, et cetera.
+That is a defined steady process for access to legalization.
+Now we have representation that there is something called
+amnesty or guest worker program, and look what you have.
+ My question to you is what--in addition to this border--
+expanded border program that you are having, are there
+resources in fiscal year 2005 that you are directing towards
+this enhanced effort? Is this a temporary effort?
+ And, two, on the policy question, will you engage with us
+on the fact that a represented amnesty program does nothing but
+undermine those who are already in line and also those who are
+here trying to access legalization and for a variety of reasons
+have not been able to do so?
+ Let me throw two other questions out to you. The other
+again is again on the US-VISIT program. I visited that with
+Chairman Cox and others at Miami International, and, of course,
+I studied my Houston Intercontinental Airport in terms of its
+process and how it works. Certainly the staff that are there
+are very diligent. My question, of course, is that the US-VISIT
+program, about 360 million will go through land ports of entry.
+The question is that is five times more that goes through
+airports and seaports, and whether or not we have the resources
+to collect the data and then enforce it on the basis of that
+kind of travel.
+ And the other point--and the last point tracks
+Congresswoman Sanchez's question. Certainly in the backdrop of
+the terrible disaster of Spain, my question is how we will
+design both policy and resources to look closely at some
+process, some method that answers the question of railway
+security, does not--I don't believe that we have the capacity
+to encompass every aspect of railway security, particularly
+both commercial and passenger. But my question to you is are we
+beginning to study this question because we have a real and
+serious problem? And I thank you for your presence here.
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Congresswoman. And, first of
+all, I would emphasize that the President's temporary worker
+program principles that were outlined is not an amnesty
+proposal. The President has made that absolutely clear. And
+from an old rule of law guy, I believe that it offers a new
+approach that is different than the immigration reform
+proposals in the past, and it would certainly increase the
+security of our borders and our Nation.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. And I think, as you know, it is being
+represented as an amnesty program because it is not geared
+towards earning access to citizenship.
+ Mr. Hutchinson. In reference to the apprehensions, I see
+across the border that they are declining, and there hasn't
+been any uptick as a result of any announcements. The only area
+that it has increased, and certainly a concern, is in the
+Arizona border arena where 40 percent of the illegal crossings
+occur in our Nation. And I think, though, that that is a
+reason, of course, for the Arizona Border Patrol Initiative.
+ You asked about the resources. Those are built into the
+base, except for the technology that we are piloting there
+including the unmanned aerial vehicles. And there is a request
+in the 2005 budget to continue the exploring and piloting of
+UAV projects. And so that is an important part of the
+President's request.
+ When it comes to rail security, we have done a great deal
+in that arena, and I think that is important for the American
+people to understand is that we didn't get a wakeup call last
+week; we were fully aware of what needs to be done in rail
+security; we have invested in that. It is a different system.
+We are going to continue to work in that. Intelligence is a
+very important part of it. The better our intelligence is, the
+more we can target our resources and our protective measures,
+and that really is critical when you are looking at a system
+that has been historically wide open. But we are doing much,
+and we will do more.
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
+ The gentleman from Arizona may inquire for 5 minutes.
+ Mr. Shadegg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Under Secretary, good to see you again. We enjoyed the
+same flight out from Arizona yesterday, and I want to thank you
+for coming to Arizona. I want to applaud you for the Arizona
+Border Control Initiative. I think it is a step in the right
+direction, and at least I would like to believe it is in
+response to our trying to point out to you the serious problem
+we have on the Arizona border. As you just noted, 40 percent of
+all of the traffic so far as the statistics show right now are
+coming across the Arizona border, and I appreciate your putting
+resources behind that initiative.
+ I also want to thank you for Operation ICE Storm. I don't
+know if you have noticed the daily press in Arizona, but
+literally that has had a tremendous impact in terms of
+disclosing safe houses where coyotes are stashing human cargo
+and making neighborhoods unsafe and flaunting our law. And I
+appreciate that.
+ I have a series of questions which I would like to get
+through before having to go vote. First, when originally
+announced, Operation ICE Storm was a temporary program that was
+to last, I think, until the end of this fiscal year. I know
+that a portion of the positions in Operation ICE Storm have now
+been made permanent; something close to a third of those
+positions have been made permanent. Do you know what the plan
+is for Operation ICE Storm as we go forward? Has a decision
+been made that it will end at the end of 2004, or is it still
+an open question?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Well, first of all, ICE Storm has been
+enormously successful, and for that reason we have continued
+the programs and folded it in as part of our ABC Initiative.
+The whole initiative will be evaluated October 1, and at that
+point we will see what adjustments should be made and what
+should be continued on a permanent basis. And I want to
+acknowledge that this whole initiative came about as a result
+of congressional education, including your own, invitations to
+the border, showing us what is needed there. So it certainly is
+in response to your efforts.
+ Mr. Shadegg. Well, and the Secretary himself was down
+there, spent a day on the border with Senator McCain and
+Congressmen Colby and Flake and myself, and I would like to
+believe that was helpful as well.
+ I believe you just answered this question, but I want to
+nail it down for sure. You have the funding for the ABC
+Initiative in your 2005 budget and adequate for you to proceed?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. The answer is yes. But it is a very
+significant investment from a Department standpoint, and it
+certainly puts a strain because of that investment. We find the
+money to make it work because we have the challenge that is
+there, but it is supported in the 2005 budget in every respect.
+ Mr. Shadegg. I am going to put these next two questions to
+you jointly and let you kind of pick amongst them.
+ Well, first let me tell you, I understand that the Hermes
+450 UAV has been selected for the program. I would like to sit
+down with you at some point in the near future and discuss that
+particular selection. I did go look at the Predator in
+operation and tried to make a separate visit to see a second
+UAV that was available. I am extremely pleased that you are
+going to put UAVs on the border, but I would like to be
+educated on why the Hermes was picked over its competitors.
+ Two questions. One, a lot of people say America isn't safer
+today. Some would likely contend that. I would like to hear
+your comments on why you believe that, kind of the highlights;
+if you were convincing somebody America is safer, what you
+would point to as kind of the top, ``Here are the most
+important things we have done to make America safer in the last
+year.''
+ And, second, with specific reference to biometrics, do you
+not believe that at some point in time there is going to be a
+need to, in fact, make biometrics a part of the entry process
+for every visitor?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Yes, I think biometrics is our future for
+border entry, but also for our foreign counterparts. I think
+there has been a huge wakeup call even in Madrid as to border
+security. And not just the United States is moving to
+biometrics, but internationally we are trying to move together.
+We are moving much more rapidly and setting the pace.
+ But going back to Congressman Smith's questions, we are
+limited now, but as technology develops, we will be able to do
+more, and we will probably be able to do it eventually at the
+primary points. But we are not there yet.
+ Mr. Shadegg. And the ``not there yet,'' I guess from your
+answer, is it takes too much time.
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Time, absolutely. Time and the technology
+has not developed sufficiently enough, but there are ways that
+we can do more. Technology is continuing to develop in this
+way. So that is our objective, and we are balancing commerce
+and security, but every step of the way we are enhancing
+security.
+ You asked--and thank you for the question--as to why
+America is safer. First of all, first the United States VISIT,
+US-VISIT, that allows us to have the biometric capability of
+confirmation that has allowed us to prevent over 100 criminal
+aliens trying to enter the country illegally that very well
+could have been a terrorist.
+ By the fact that we have increased our border capability in
+terms of security, more surveillance, more sensors, also in
+terms of aviation security, clearly we are more secure with the
+layered approach that we have. The fact that the American
+public feels confidence in what we are doing even in a time of
+heightened alert, they continue flying because they believe in
+what we are doing.
+ So all across the board from aviation to the organizational
+changes that we have made that enhance security at our borders
+where it is a--the communication with our State and local
+counterparts, sharing intelligence. When we had the incident in
+Madrid, intelligence was immediately out to the people that
+needed to have it. So I could go on, but obviously there is
+much more that needs to be done, but a substantial amount has
+been accomplished.
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
+ With unanimous consent, the gentlewoman from the Virgin
+Islands may inquire for 5 minutes.
+ Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr.Chairman, and I realize
+time is of the essence. I want to ask two questions, and I want
+to thank you for the response that I get from the bureaus that
+are in the Virgin Islands when we run into difficulty and need
+some adjustments. But I want to talk about the continuing
+efforts to secure the borders of the U.S., as you mentioned in
+your opening statement, on the territorial areas.
+ The Virgin Islands represents about 200 miles of pretty
+much unprotected border, and I would like to know what my
+constituents and I can expect in the 2005 budget to help us to
+secure those--that open border, where a recent trip to the
+Virgin Islands showed some increases in contraband and people
+coming through as you tighten up on the western side.
+ But I also want to ask a question about my Pacific
+territories. You may know that we have a special relationship
+with three independent governments in the Pacific known as the
+Freely Associated States, Palau, Marshall Islands and the
+Federated States of Micronesia, and under our relationship with
+them, they have the right to freely migrate to the U.S. and its
+territories. We also have many defense obligations to maintain
+the security of that region. Collectively these 3 governments
+cover some 3 million square miles of ocean that can be used as
+points of entry into the U.S.
+ Does the Department of Homeland Security have personnel and
+resources devoted to the challenges of homeland security
+presented to us by our unique relationship with these three
+governments? Are we working with them and providing them with
+assistance in border security, immigration and the maritime
+security issues?
+ So basically the question is for the Virgin Islands and
+these Pacific independent governments, are we on the radar
+screen? Is there funding in the 2005 budget to help with our
+issues?
+ Mr. Camp. Mr. Secretary, I am going to have to recess the
+committee for a couple minutes. I know the Chairman is on his
+way back, and we will continue when he comes back, but there is
+a vote on. So we will recess for just a few minutes.
+ Mr. Hutchinson. I will get you a better answer then.
+ Mr. Camp. I see Mr. Cox has just walked in. We will not
+recess the subcommittee, and Mr. Cox will take the gavel.
+ Mr. Cox. [Presiding.] Mr. Secretary, please give me a
+response.
+ Mr. Hutchinson. First of all, I am grateful for our
+partnership, and always the information that you have been able
+to provide me, and for the cooperation we have had with the
+Virgin Islands on security issues. And the funds that are
+available through our grant programs, it is my understanding
+that those apply to the territories just like the State and
+local governments, and so there is a funding mechanism for the
+security steps that can be taken, obviously based upon the
+security needs and the security plans that are in place.
+ And then in reference to the vast territories and the vast
+ocean that separates us by distance, those--you know, the
+United States Coast Guard has jurisdiction in those areas,
+Customs and border protection, and they are certainly more
+limited in those far-away areas, but they do have
+responsibility. We are trying to make sure that we fulfill our
+duties in reference to those. I would be happy to get you more
+specific answers, but we do certainly consider that as an
+important area of our responsibility.
+ Mrs. Christensen. Thank you. And for the Virgin Islands, we
+have been taking great advantage of the grants that are
+available, but we don't have a Border Patrol in place, and we
+feel that that is a real critical piece of homeland security
+not just for the Virgin Islands, but for the Nation, as we are
+a thoroughfare for people coming from mainland China and the
+Middle East as well.
+ Another question about airports. There are some airports
+that have that they have had some MOUs with the Department of
+Homeland Security that would help them in terms of funding to
+do the renovations and put whatever was needed in place to be
+able to meet that 100 percent baggage screening, and I don't
+want to be specific, but some of those airports are not
+receiving any funding to assist them, and they are going to
+have a lot of difficulty in meeting that requirement. What can
+you tell us in terms of how are those airports going to be able
+to do that 100 percent screening without your support, or do
+you have some support to give them?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Well, it is a challenge to the airports.
+You know, we put the equipment in place, but they want to be
+able to put it into a system and have to make renovations to
+accomplish that. We call it the on-line system. And that is the
+purpose of the LOIs, or the letters of intent, that allow that
+funding, and whether it is 75/25 or 90 to 10, we have to
+prioritize those projects. And we are working through the
+highest priority, the volume, the largest airports, and as soon
+as we are able budgetwise and systemwide to do it, we will move
+to the other airports that are certainly in need of this as
+well.
+ Mrs. Christensen. Mr.Chairman, I would like to get a report
+up of which are the airports that have been designated as top
+10 or what the priorities are, because as you know, there is
+some airports that don't seem to be on the priority list. By
+nature of their being large hubs and the number of planes that
+go through there, it should be on the priority list, and they
+don't seem to be getting that funding.
+ Mr. Cox. Well, Secretary Hutchinson, if you will consider
+that a formal request from Mrs. Christensen and respond to it,
+we would most appreciate it.
+ Mr. Hutchinson. We would be happy to.
+ Mr. Cox. The Chair would recognize himself for questions
+for just a moment and add my welcome to those of the other
+members of the committee. We appreciate your coming before us
+once more this time to talk about your budget, which is going
+to have grown from $14 billion to $16 billion. The 10 percent
+1-year increase that you are proposing is substantial, but
+particularly are large in comparison to what is occurring
+elsewhere throughout the executive branch, what Congress is
+looking at for the next fiscal year's budget. So we are
+preparing to entrust you and the Department with a great deal
+more resources not only than you have had, but that anyone else
+is going to be getting, because the mission of homeland
+security is important, and that is why this hearing is
+important. We want to find out both through this dialogue and
+also with our follow-up questions exactly where that money
+might go and what our priorities ought to be.
+ I want to ask you a very broad-brush question about your
+Directorate and also the Directorate of IAIP. The information
+that we are now gathering in the wake of the Madrid bombings is
+starting to paint a picture that we have seen before. Just as
+before September 11th, we had some information on some of the
+people that ultimately were involved in bombing the World Trade
+Center and Washington and killing people in Pennsylvania
+midflight. Here in this case in Spain, we also now have in
+custody people seemingly complicit or perhaps the planners of
+this bombing, planners or participants in it, who were within
+our grasp beforehand, and they seem to be connected to alQaeda.
+It suggests the importance of connecting the dots.
+ This one connection that we have been able to draw in
+particular between Jamal Zougam and the 9/11 planners, Yarkas
+who is in custody, is particularly disturbing. Of course,
+Zougam's apartment had been searched by Spanish authorities in
+August of 2001, August 10th, just a month before the September
+11 bombings, and what we discovered in his apartment were,
+first, phone numbers of other Al-Qa`ida suspected members in a
+cell that was purportedly organized by Yarkas, who is now in
+custody in Spain for allegedly planning the September 11th
+bombings. We discovered a tape in his apartment that showed
+jihadists in Dagastan. So obviously this international
+connection to international Wahhabists, to Al-Qa`ida, to the
+very same people that we have been tracking all along rears its
+head again.
+ It suggests to me, and I am just one Member, albeit the
+Chairman, that the resources that we might devote in Spain to
+hardening the train system, to putting armed guards everywhere
+and trying to search everyone who goes on to the train and so
+on, as expensive as that would be, would not be as well spent
+as resources connecting these dots, because we had some of
+these people--we almost had them, and had we connected the dots
+just a little bit better, we might have stopped this. Zougam
+was not one who was indicted by Judge Garzon, so he was at
+large, but we put him on our terrorist list here, and that
+group is on our terrorist list, and it is somebody who we meant
+to be keeping track of.
+ So I want to ask you as you take these enormous new
+resources, 10 percent bump in a $14 billion, how much of them
+can we expect will be devoted to this effort of connecting the
+dots? How much of it should go on in your Directorate, and
+alternatively, how much of it should go on in IAIP?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Well, the analytical part of intelligence
+should be conducted in IAIP. That is their responsibility for
+the analysis. We are a customer of theirs. We are also a source
+for them. Where we fit into the intelligence picture is that
+through the 110,000 employees, the inspectors, the agents in
+our arena, we work informants, we collect intelligence, and we
+provide that immediately to our intelligence counterparts in
+IAIP for their analysis. And so we are both a supplier of
+intelligence as well as a customer of their analysis. And it
+has been very effective, and it certainly improves every day.
+ I think your point is that--I certainly agree with--that we
+have to invest in intelligence, and that analysis pays huge
+dividends to us. We obviously continue having to recognize that
+there is going to be not a perfect system, and so we have to
+have the layered security that will complement and supplement
+their efforts.
+ Mr. Cox. Thank you. My red light is on. We have a brief
+opportunity for further questions if any Member would like to
+do so.
+ Ms. Sanchez. Yes, Mr.Chairman.
+ Mr. Cox. The gentlelady from California Ms.Sanchez is
+recognized.
+ Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr.Chairman.
+ Mr. Secretary, yesterday you announced the Arizona Border
+Control Initiative, and you stated that the initiative is
+designed to achieve control of the Arizona border by deterring,
+detecting, arresting and prosecuting all cross-border illicit
+trafficking by combining the assets from several agencies,
+Immigration and Customs Enforcement, CBP, Transportation
+Security Administration and other Federal agencies.
+ You also indicated that the initiative would transfer 260
+Border Patrol agents and CBP officers permanently or
+temporarily. I think you said 200 per minute and 60 temporary
+transfers.
+ My questions are how long will this initiative last? Is the
+260 figure an annual amount, or is it just cumulative over
+whatever time period you are thinking of doing this?
+ And the real reason I am asking this is maybe for you to
+identify if you have a plan that tells us where these 260
+agents are coming from. The biggest concern that I have is that
+we saw a tripling of agents up on the northern border because
+of the requirements of the Patriot Act, but those all came from
+the southern border predominantly, meaning it left open areas
+like Laredo very, very understaffed in Texas. And so the
+question is where are you going to get these agents from? Where
+are you moving them from? And, you know, what is that going to
+do to our Border Patrol?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. The initiative will go through October1,
+when it will be evaluated and a determination made then whether
+it needs to be beefed up, modified, what adjustments should be
+made at that point.
+ Ms. Sanchez. It starts from now to October 1st?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Correct. And it will be--for example, the
+200 agents will be in place gradually between now and June1,
+where they will be fully deployed. You are correct that 60 of
+those are BORSTAR agents that are temporary assignments, but
+200 Border Patrol agents are permanent assignments to the
+Arizona initiative. These come from not other areas that were
+diminishing, but based upon the new resources that Congress--
+capability Congress has given to us, it will be balanced
+between experienced agents and new agents that will be going
+out into the field.
+ So this is a great opportunity for us, and we will enhance
+those as necessary to get the job done.
+ Ms. Sanchez. So it is a combination of experienced agents
+and new agents. Where are these experienced agents--they are
+still coming off from--you are taking them from somewhere.
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Right, but the FTEs or the actual positions
+are new allocations that have been given to us. We will fill
+those in part by experienced agents that will be back-filled in
+another area with new graduates that will go out in the field.
+ Ms. Sanchez. So, in other words, in the fiscal year 2004
+budget, we have new positions for Border Patrol, and those
+new--those full-time equivalents will be where you are taking
+these 260 from basically?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. That's correct.
+ Ms. Sanchez. Will the increased resources be placed along
+the Arizona-Mexican border--with increased resources being
+placed along the Arizona-Mexican border, don't you think that
+it is going to push some of these smugglers to other crossing
+routes? I mean, we experienced that in the California side,
+where we clamped down heavily and ended up pushing everything
+out to Nogales and some of the other areas.
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Well, and that is the--hopefully this is
+the last squeeze by effective border enforcement in California,
+and, more effective in Texas, it has squeezed and pushed the
+traffic organization to Arizona. So we are addressing that last
+frontier there.
+ But secondly, we recognize as we increase our efforts
+there, there will be the possibility that they are going to try
+to try different routes. So we are going to be flexible,
+measure that, and if they do try new routes in different areas,
+we will have the flexibility to respond to that. So we are
+going to look for that squeeze and if it does, in fact, happen.
+ Ms. Sanchez. And my last question with respect to the
+Arizona issue is that the Federal Government--you are currently
+placing vehicle barriers to protect some of the Department of
+Interior lands where we see smugglers regularly drive across
+them. Has the placement of the barriers been completed? And do
+you intend to pay for additional barriers along the 200-plus
+miles that we have between Arizona and Mexico that is also DOI
+land?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Yes. That is a very effective tool. We
+continue to look at that, particularly in protecting the
+Department of Interior lands. I will say that Larry Parkinson
+was there with me representing the Department of Interior. They
+are a strong partner. They are adding personnel as well, and
+that capability with the other agencies really adds to the
+initiative, but we are continuing to look at the deployment of
+those type of barriers.
+ Ms. Sanchez. And I see that my time is up, so thank you,
+Mr.Secretary, and thank you, Mr.Chairman, for allowing another
+set of questions.
+ Mr. Cox. The gentlelady's time is expired.
+ Does the gentlelady from the Virgin Islands have further
+questions?
+ Mrs. Christensen. Thank you. I just wanted to ask one
+question and then make a point.
+ The Department of Homeland Security, your Directorate
+obviously has a great commitment to port security, but the
+budget request of $566 million is less than--$566 million less
+than what the Coast Guard estimates ports will have to spend to
+improve their security.
+ So could you just talk about how you are going to ensure
+the security of our ports when we are so far short of what the
+Coast Guard has estimated we need to have in place?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Well, the estimate that is being referred
+to is one estimate of security enhancements that very well will
+be needed in our ports. This is a shared responsibility, and so
+it is not our judgment that we ought to fund 100 percent of all
+of the port security enhancements. We do a share, but also the
+private sector has a responsibility as well, and so they are
+investing substantially to complement what we are doing in
+security.
+ Coast Guard's 2005 budget includes $1.75 billion for ports,
+waterways and coastal security. So there is many layers to it
+in addition simply to the grant funding that we are putting
+in--.
+ Mrs. Christensen. So you are saying that between the
+private sector, the Coast Guard and your Directorate, we will
+come close to approaching what is really needed?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. We will certainly come closer by that
+combined effort. You know, and those figures are rather rough
+estimates as to what is needed. Clearly, more is needed. We
+pick up some of the slack, but the private sector does as well.
+ Mrs. Christensen. And since we are talking about budget and
+your budget needs, are you satisfied that what is in your
+budget is sufficient for your contribution to this effort?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. I think it reflects a very good balance as
+to the shared responsibility.
+ Mrs. Christensen. I just wanted to go back to the
+territories that are freely associated with the United States
+just for a moment to say that these are independent countries
+in a free associated agreement with the United States. So they
+don't necessarily fall within our grant programs and will
+require some additional work with them to adjust those
+agreements and to make the assistance available to them as they
+are a part of the larger U.S. family and provide entry into our
+country.
+ Mr. Hutchinson. I will be happy to work with you on looking
+at that more closely.
+ Mrs. Christensen. Thank you.
+ Mr. Cox. The gentleman from Massachusetts is recognized.
+ Mr. Markey. Thank you very much, and welcome back, Mr.
+Secretary. Thank you for coming.
+ I sent a letter to Secretary Ridge to request information
+about the Department's efforts to strengthen rail security, and
+I would like to take this opportunity to ask you a few
+questions about this pressing homeland security issue. Does the
+Department of Homeland Security intend to establish voluntary
+security guidelines that transit operators may or may not
+choose to implement? Will the Department of Homeland Security
+require that operators implement specific security enhancements
+in response to the vulnerability of public transportation
+systems to attacks by terrorist groups?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Could you give me an example of what you
+are speaking of?
+ Mr. Markey. In terms of?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Well, when you say voluntary security
+guidelines versus mandatory security guidelines.
+ Mr. Markey. Will there be a duty for the transit operators
+to implement standards established by the Department of
+Homeland Security, or it will be left totally to the discretion
+of any of these railroads or transit systems, subway systems in
+the United States as to whether or not they will enhance
+security? Which is the policy which the Department will choose
+in order to increase the security on the rails of the United
+States?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. We have the authority to implement
+mandatory security requirements. We are not in a position to do
+that now. We are choosing to make sure that we have the right
+assessments, the right judgments of what security measures are
+in place, and that we evaluate it in the right way. That is an
+option that we would certainly look at whenever--if we
+determine that--if the private sector or our transit partners
+are not moving rapidly enough when they have the capability to
+do so, and that when we have the right judgment as to what that
+security measure should be.
+ Mr. Markey. And what is your guideline for finishing the
+assessments of what is needed and what your recommendations
+will be? What have you laid out in your deadlines?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. I believe that the assessments are
+substantially complete in terms of the review of the security
+requirements. We have, in fact, deployed a substantial number
+of security measures in accordance with the assessments that
+have been done, and we will continue to review those.
+ Mr. Markey. So will the assessments be done in the next
+month or 6 months?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. I will have to get back with you on the
+specific time frame as to how many have already been completed,
+which ones remain to be done.
+ Mr. Markey. So, for example, just, you know, put a little
+bit of a highlight on it, as you know, both the Fleet Center in
+Boston and the Madison Square Garden Democrat and Republican
+conventions will be situated on top of transit systems. So I
+know there will be some security put in place in those two
+venues, but I think the whole country deserves to know that
+there is some nonvoluntary system that is being put in place.
+ And towards, you know, exploring this a little bit further,
+given the funding shortfalls that many of these transit systems
+are facing anyway, how would we expect them, short of having
+larger grants from the Federal Government, to implement safety
+guidelines?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Well, and that is exactly the reason you
+want to be careful about doing the mandatory requirements,
+because, for example, Amtrak, not exactly financially wealthy,
+and we want to make sure if you put requirements on, that they
+are appropriate, and that they meet the security needs, and
+that they are manageable. That is also the reason, of course,
+we gave $115 million in rail security grants last year, and we
+will continue through the urban area security grants to have
+more funds available.
+ Mr. Markey. Are you going to increase your request for
+fiscal year 2005, for this coming fiscal year; are you going to
+increase your request for additional security funds for transit
+and railroads across the country?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Well, the budget is, of course, as
+submitted. Obviously if there is a determination that more
+funds are needed and appropriate, then that determination will
+be given, but at this time there is not any plan that I am
+aware of that will increase--make a budget amendment request.
+ Mr. Markey. So in the aftermath of the terrible tragedy in
+Spain, your administration has yet to reevaluate whether or not
+there should be an increase in funding for railway security
+built into this year's budget?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. I think the fair characterization would be
+that even prior to the tragedy in Spain, this administration
+effectively evaluated what we are doing in rail security, got
+ahead of the curve in the assessments, in the investment, and
+submitted a budget that anticipated what needs to be done in
+that area. As we get additional intelligence, we will continue
+to evaluate that.
+ Mr. Markey. But as of this moment, you are convinced that
+the work that you had already done has provided sufficient
+funds or has sufficient funds budgeted that will deal with the
+security issues that you have identified on transit in the
+country?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. It is a very appropriate start. More needs
+to be done. We are aggressively pursuing that, looking at the
+right requirements and completing all of the assessments, and
+then also continuing to invest in those security measures.
+ Mr. Markey. I would recommend honestly we double the
+security; $115 million is not going to be enough.
+ Have radiation portals been installed in all ports of U.S.
+entry? That would be my final question.
+ Mr. Hutchinson. The radiation portals have been installed
+in 2004 in 408 locations. Radiation portal monitors in 528.
+Number, specifically, the units that have been deployed, in
+2005, we will deploy an additional 465 portal monitors and 206
+radiation isotope identification devices, and that will
+continue until there is 100 percent coverage.
+ Mr. Markey. So are you talking about the personal radiation
+devices there, or are you talking about the actual portals
+that--.
+ Mr. Hutchinson. The personal radiation devices will be
+5,000 of those deployed this year, 1,000 next year. So what I
+was speaking of will be the large portal monitors.
+ Mr. Markey. Mr.Chairman, I see the red light is on.
+ Mr. Cox. I appreciate it--.
+ Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr.Secretary.
+ Mr. Cox.--your attention, and I recognize the gentlelady
+from California.
+ Ms. Sanchez. Great. Thank you. God, it is so great when
+other people don't show up. We get more lines of questions.
+ I wanted to talk about just the discomfort that is
+happening among a lot of the employees in your Directorate. As
+I mentioned earlier, you are probably in charge of about
+110,000 of them, and I know that the border officers, for
+example, are nervous about the new tasks that they are being
+asked to do in one phase of the border initiative, because
+former Customs inspectors, for example, are required to know
+the details about immigration and agricultural laws, but they
+only have minimal training in these additional areas.
+ So one of my questions was, you know, are you monitoring
+the uncomfortableness of your employees, because, of course, we
+want them to do a good job; and what are you hearing from them,
+because many of us are hearing that they are just having a hard
+time with this?
+ I also wanted to have you talk a little bit about the
+latest plans for your new pay and personnel system. The
+budget--for example, your budget asks for $100 million to
+design a new personnel system that appears in its current form
+to take away existing rights and guarantees afforded to these
+employees, and in DHS it would eliminate across-the-board
+annual raises and allow department managers to decide a
+worker's annual raise based solely on performance. And while in
+theory that sounds good, I am worried that maybe it gives
+managers a little bit too much unchecked authority. So I want
+to hear about that.
+ And in the light of actually these front-line personnel
+putting their lives on the line in some cases every single day
+that they go out and do their work, isn't $100 million a lot to
+spend on a pay system when maybe we could be using it on
+salaries for front-line personnel, considering we have so many
+shortages going on?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Well, in reference to the overall morale, I
+think it is very good. Any time there is uncertainty or change,
+that causes some discomfort, and that is understandable.
+ We have worked very hard to get information quickly to the
+employees. Secretary Ridge, myself and other leaders of the
+Department have conducted numerous town meetings where we have
+heard from them. They have raised issues, and so many of them
+have to do with some of the disparity in pay for doing the same
+work for the different 22 agencies that came together, and you
+mentioned the $100 million. I will have to check to make sure
+because that is really in a different directorate, but it was
+my assumption that some of that would be for helping to
+accomplish some of the pay disparity. So I think there is more
+to it than simply what is going to be needed from a technical
+standpoint.
+ One of the great motivators and morale boosters that the
+inspectors had was the implementation of US-VISIT, because they
+saw new technology, new capability because of their new
+mission, and it has really been a boost for them in the work
+that they do.
+ Ms. Sanchez. Can you tell me, speaking about US-VISIT, have
+we been able to catch a terrorist yet with US-VISIT? I know we
+have gotten a lot of criminals, but have we gotten the
+terrorists? I mean, because it is an elaborate program, and as
+you know, we have only done one small portion of what is going
+to take a lot of funds and a lot of effort, and to some people
+who have been talking to me about all this cyber situation,
+that, you know, it is a pie in the sky. So have we caught a
+terrorist yet from it?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. That is a very, very important question,
+and let me address that. We have not, and that should not be
+the measure of US-VISIT. US-VISIT was mandated by Congress
+before 9/11, and the original design of it was not to catch
+terrorists, but was to have an effective entry-exit system, to
+give integrity to our immigration system.
+ We have the added security benefit because we can deter,
+detect terrorists and criminals that might come in. So I think
+that it has to be measured by a much different standard going
+back to the integrity of the system as well as the deterrent
+value and obviously the checks that we have whenever we bring
+the people in.
+ Ms. Sanchez. And last let me ask you about a new provision
+in the personnel regulations that would essentially allow an
+employer to reassign a worker from one part of the country to
+the other without any input from the worker.
+ Why are we taking away the employees' options for
+reassignment? I mean, a lot of them have families, and they
+prefer a particular area. Why is that so--why is there such a
+great deviation in that from our regular personnel system that
+we have in other departments?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Well, first of all, the personnel
+regulations were put out for the purpose of getting comment,
+and employee comment will be very important in the evaluation,
+determination of which direction we go.
+ But in terms of reassignment, when you are dealing with
+responding to higher threat levels, emergencies, national
+security issues, we have to have the capability to effect
+reassignments without having to do collective bargaining or
+discussions prior to that.
+ Now--so that is the logic and concern in that arena, but we
+obviously want to be sensitive to the employees' concerns. I
+don't think there have been any instances where, you know, they
+have been redeployed without the appropriate communication and
+safeguards being in place.
+ Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr.Chairman. I see that the red
+light has come on.
+ Mr. Cox. Thank the gentlelady.
+ I want to thank Secretary Hutchinson for being here with
+us. As you can see, we have a vote on the floor. You have
+gotten some questions today about rail, naturally in light of
+Madrid, and I know that in particular the cooperation that IP
+has had with America's railroads and our public transit
+authorities lies without your direct responsibility. It is
+outside your directorate. But I want to give you an opportunity
+to answer generally the question of whether there is going to
+be an international lessons learned effort focused on Madrid
+and whether the Department of Homeland Security will be
+inferring from what we learn in Madrid ways to update our
+protocols for rail, particularly passenger rail in America?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. Certainly it requires us to look very
+closely at it. One, I have communicated with the Ambassador
+from Spain offering our technical assistance and having a
+transportation team that will go--security team that will go
+over and look at this together. I think that there will be some
+dialogues with all of the European countries on enhancing rail
+security, what more we ought to do, cooperation, best
+practices. And so there is going to be an increased
+concentration on that.
+ From our standpoint I think we were, again, ahead of the
+curve, have done a great deal, but the immediate reaction was
+let's see what more we can do, because clearly that is
+something that the terrorists have used very effectively in
+Spain.
+ You know, we are working closely with our colleagues in
+infrastructure protection and coordinating. We have some very
+substantial efforts going on right now in terms of additional
+steps that can be taken, evaluation, some more aggressive than
+others, policy decisions that will have to be made in that
+regard. But we expect that this will be a very robust effort,
+combining our efforts in border transportation security with
+what they are doing in IAIP.
+ Mr. Cox. I am very pleased to hear that, and we thank you
+very much for the time and help that you provided to the
+committee this morning.
+ The Chair notes that some Members may have additional
+questions for our witness, which they may wish to submit in
+writing. Without objection--I am sorry. Mr.Turner is here. I
+want to recognize the Ranking Member. I didn't realize that you
+had come here, and we have made heroic efforts to make sure you
+had another opportunity. So the Ranking Member is recognized--
+Ranking Member of the full committee, the gentleman from Texas,
+is recognized.
+ Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr.Chairman. I will be brief,
+because I think we have 10 minutes before the vote concludes.
+ Mr.Secretary, we have talked before about radiation
+portals. You have received to date $206 million to purchase and
+install these radiation portals at our ports of entry. You have
+asked for $43 million for the next fiscal year. By my
+calculation it will take another $247 million to install
+radiation portals at all of our border crossings, rail hubs,
+airports, et cetera. I am disappointed that that is not in the
+President's request, and I just wanted to know if the Congress
+could secure the support to get the additional $247 million,
+would you be able to complete the installation of these portals
+more rapidly, and particularly would you be able to do it prior
+to the fourth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, which is, I
+think, the date by which it will occur now based on the funding
+that is being requested--the rate of funding that is being
+requested?
+ Mr. Hutchinson. I will be happy to look very carefully at
+the time line for completion of 100 percent deployment. I have
+before me the deployment schedule for the radiation portal
+monitors, the radiation isotope identification devices and the
+other radiation detectors, and we have in 2004 a plan to deploy
+528 radiation portal monitors. This is a very aggressive
+schedule. In 2005, we have 165 that are scheduled to be
+deployed as well as 206 isotope identification devices. So I am
+happy to look at where that leaves us as far as the final
+completion. I will report back to you, but that is what is
+scheduled for 2004 and 2005 in deployment.
+ Mr. Turner. It just seems to me it would make common sense
+to try to get that job done quicker, and if you would look at
+that and see what it would take. Obviously I want to be sure
+that if we push for the additional funding, that you can expend
+it in a more rapid fashion.
+ Mr. Hutchinson. I think that is certainly a relevant
+consideration as to what could be our procurement and
+deployment schedule.
+ Mr. Turner. You know, there is no question that if we don't
+do this faster, that by September of 2005, the fourth
+anniversary of 9/11, we still won't have our southern borders
+protected, nor all of our rail hubs, nor all of our airports,
+nor all of our smaller ports of entry. And if we plan to do it,
+if that is the goal, it seems that that would be a prudent and
+wise investment.
+ Thank you. Thank you, Mr.Chairman.
+ Mr. Cox. I thank the gentleman.
+ And for the final time, I want to thank Secretary
+Hutchinson. Your willingness to stay with us throughout the
+morning and the afternoon is very much appreciated.
+ The record will remain open in this hearing for 10 days for
+Members to submit open questions and to place their responses
+in the record.
+ Mr. Cox. There being no further business, I want to thank
+all the subcommittee members who were here during the hearing.
+The hearing is now adjourned.
+ [Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
+
+
+ A P P E N D I X
+
+ ----------
+
+
+ Questions Submitted for Under Secretary Asa Hutchinson
+
+ Questions Submitted by the Hon. Lincoln Diaz-Balart
+
+ Thank you for coming before our panel today. In your testimony you
+list the elimination of potential weaknesses in security by suspending
+the Transit Without Visa (TWOV) program as one of the Department's
+successes.
+ While I believe the suspension of the TWOV program may have in fact
+increased security, I still remain concerned about its counterpart, the
+International to International (ITI) program.
+ I believe that your office has realized the significant economic
+impact that the cancellation of this program had on South Florida as
+demonstrated through the temporary relief provided through the
+reopening of the satellite transit lounge at MIA. However, this
+temporary solution has only partially mitigated the situation and has
+not provided a sustainable solution.
+ During a recent CODEL to Miami we engaged DHS officials and staff
+from Washington, D.C. and Miami on this issue. It was my understanding
+that the Department would be releasing guidelines for a new version of
+the ITI program this month. However, through our conversations in
+Miami, it appeared that there was a lack of communication between DHS,
+MIA, and the private sector companies directly involved in this
+process.
+ Under Secretary Hutchinson, has there been additional communication
+among all of the parties involved, including the private sector? If so,
+do we still expect to see this new program rolled out this month, and
+if we do, has it been modified from its original draft, which did not
+reflect the concerns of the airport or the private industry experts?
+ Answer: To clarify this issue, prior to August 2003, there were two
+transit programs available to travelers. The former Transit Without
+Visa (TWOV) and International-to-International (ITI) programs allowed
+an alien to transit through the United States without a nonimmigrant
+visa while en route from one foreign country to a second foreign
+country with one or two stops in the United States. Under the TWOV
+program, a passenger seeking to transit through the United States was
+admitted as a transit passenger by a DHS inspector and departed the
+Federal Inspection Service (FIS) area. A TWOV passenger was permitted
+to make one additional stop in the United States.Under the ITI program,
+the ITI passenger was inspected by a DHS inspector but was not admitted
+to the United States and did not leave the secure FIS area.
+ On August 7, 2003, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the
+Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs published regulations
+suspending the TWOV and ITI transit programs. The suspensions were
+based on specific, credible intelligence that certain terrorist
+organizations had identified these programs as a way to gain access to
+aircraft without first obtaining a visa in order to: (1) take over the
+aircraft to use as a weapon of mass destruction, or (2) to simply cause
+damage to the aircraft; or to abscond during their layover in the
+United States in order to gain illegal entry to the United States. In
+August and September 2003, the DHS Border and Transportation Security
+Directorate (BTS) conducted field visits and held meetings with airline
+industry and the Departments of State (DOS) and Transportation (DOT) on
+the possible reinstatement of a security-enhanced transit program. On
+September 22, 2003, the public comment period concerning the suspension
+of the TWOV and ITI programs expired.
+ DHS took the seventeen comments (one duplicate) received, including
+those from the State of Florida and Miami International Airport,
+regarding this proposed rule into consideration when formulating the
+new Air Transit Program (ATP).
+ BTS and CBP have met with carriers and industry representatives to
+solicit their opinions on the program. DHS and other agencies have
+worked to formulate a proposal for the new ATP which is currently under
+review within the Administration.
+
+ Questions Submitted by the Hon. Mark Souder
+
+ 1. What is the strategic vision for the Directorate of Border and
+Transportation Security? Do you believe you have adequate resources to
+accomplish that vision in the near and long term? If not, what
+additional resources do you require to meet your goals?
+ Answer: The strategic vision for the Directorate of Border and
+Transportation Security is to be ``a unified and innovative enforcement
+team, working as one to isolate terrorism Working in partnership with
+our components and with the U.S. Coast Guard, we will:
+ Promote new security ideas and opportunities;
+ Balance security with civil liberties and free trade;
+ Develop a unified and engaged BTS team within the
+ broad DHS effort;
+ Streamline operational and administrative procedures;
+ and
+ Build coalitions and partnerships.
+ Our fiscal year 2005 budget requested 8 additional FTE and funding
+to support the initial requirements of the staff of the Office of the
+Under Secretary. As the organization of the Directorate and the
+Department evolves, we will work within the Administration to request
+additional resources when necessary.
+
+ 2. I understand that in some locations where both the Bureau of
+Customs and Border Protection and Bureau of Immigration and Customs
+Enforcement operate, they maintain independent fleets of aircraft.
+Considering the overlap along mission lines to interdict ``weapons of
+mass destruction'', illicit narcotics and illegal migrants, has any
+thought been given to ``co-locating'' these air assets? The obvious
+benefit of such an arrangement would be: elimination of two separate
+hangars and equipment plant; two separate maintenance and fuel
+contracts; two separate aircrew training and certification programs,
+and so forth. Do you have any philosophical disagreement with the
+merits of ``colocating'' ICE and CBP air assets?
+ Answer: In fiscal year 2005, the air and marine assets within ICE
+and CBP will be consolidated within CBP. Efforts are underway to manage
+that consolidation to ensure the maximum operational and cost
+efficiencies.
+
+ 3. Late last year I met with CBP Commissioner Bonner to discuss the
+status of a special unit of Native Americans called the Shadow Wolves.
+In the legacy Customs Service they worked to detect narcotics smuggling
+along the Arizona border within the Tohono O'Odham Indian Reservation.
+Upon creation of the Department of Homeland Security they were
+transferred from ICE to CBP. During my discussion with Commissioner
+Bonner, he told me that the Shadow Wolves would continue their
+traditional mission.
+ Can you update us on the current status of the Shadow
+Wolves?
+ Answer: The unit remains intact and follows the Customs and Border
+Protection (CBP) mission of preventing terrorists and terrorists'
+weapons from entering the United States.
+ What steps have been taken to ensure that they Shadow
+Wolves preserve their unique identity and the vital mission of
+tracking/interdicting illicit narcotics?
+ Answer: There have been no changes to the CPO's mission of
+tracking/interdicting illicit narcotics. Narcotic seizures by the CPO's
+continue to be turned over to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
+(ICE).
+ During a Native American conference sponsored by Customs
+and Border Protection last year, during one of the breakout sessions,
+there was some discussion given to expanding the Shadow Wolf concept to
+other Native American reservations with a border nexus. Has this
+concept been expanded yet?
+ Answer: The Shadow Wolf/CPO concept is still being explored and
+discussed amongst the tribes and Border Patrol Sectors. In the interim,
+the Border Patrol and some of the tribes are continuing to work on
+Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBET) and joint operations.
+Cooperation continues with quarterly meetings to discuss issues,
+concerns, and strategies.
+
+ 4. I have visited the Air and Marine Operations enter (AMOC) in
+Riverside, California. That facility receives radar inputs and
+correlates intelligence and data on air traffic from virtually every
+conceivable source, and is one of the most impressive facilities I have
+visited in the government. AMOC is a ``critical'' center, unique in
+that it is the only facility in the federal government with all these
+capabilities under one roof.
+ Why aren't other BTS flight activities communicated and
+de-conflicted through AMOC? I understand, for example, that CBP
+aircraft frequently fly ``low and slow'' along the border, without
+notifying the AMOC. As a result, the AMOC scrambles ICE aircraft to
+intercept the suspicious aircraft, which results in needless
+expenditure of taxpayer money.
+ Answer: During Liberty Shield operations, Office of Air and Marine
+Operations (AMO) used AMOC to coordinate flying operations of
+Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border
+Protection (CBP). This effort was built upon AMOC's existing
+coordination with the DoD and FAA. This effort was a step in the right
+direction for coordination of DHS law enforcement aviation operations.
+A more permanent concept of operations is being developed in concert
+with the Department's Aviation Management Council, to minimize the
+possibility of intercepting other agency's aircraft. AMOC indeed has
+the capabilities to support and enhance other DHS/BTS air activities.
+As the primary command and control facility for the AMO, AMOC truly has
+the ``big picture,'' integrating multi-source radar inputs, the
+capability to track ``Blue Forces,'' and streamline coordination with
+multiple interagency partners in the course of their respective
+missions. AMOC has access to FAA flight plans, aircraft registration
+and air movement data, as well as specifically designed law enforcement
+databases. Recent modernization funding will allow AMOC to create a
+common operating picture that encompasses a wide portion of the Western
+Hemisphere.
+ To enhance the tracking of ``friendly'' aircraft AMO is developing
+a new SATRACK capability. Servers, with the ability to process all
+SATRACK formats, are being incorporated into the AMOC's radar display.
+Once installed and operational it will be as simple as inputting the
+tracking code, specific for each aircraft, from any agency into the
+server. This upgrade will allow the AMOC to follow and de-conflict CBP
+aircraft that frequently fly ``low and slow'' along the border.
+ I understand that AMOC sends its radar picture of the
+National Capital Region to a new inter-agency airspace security office
+called the National Capital Region Coordination Center. I understand
+the AMOC is the only source for this and there isn't a backup. Are you
+reviewing this?
+ Answer: AMOC is currently a single point of transmission; the air
+picture and data feeds in the NCRCC are slaved from the AMOC's system.
+We are reviewing this, and are studying the addition of high-end
+servers, communications suites and supporting telecommunications
+infrastructure to support the Air and Marine Operations functions for
+the National Capital Region, which could be developed as an independent
+facility and serve as a limited back-up capability for the AMOC.
+However, the NCRCC as a whole has four different agencies supplying/
+piping radar and communications data into the facility.
+ Are you considering any technological or personnel
+upgrades for the facility to enhance its capabilities against narcotics
+trafficking, alien smuggling and securing restricted airspace?
+ Answer: The AMOC has currently been funded to upgrade its servers.
+This upgrade will increase its capacity to accept all the available
+radar feeds nationwide, some 400 plus radars. Additionally, software
+has been developed and tested to provide AMOC with radar data from all
+20 FAA Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCCs), to include the
+correlated flight plans and air movement data from the 20 ARTCCs.
+ FAA Terminal Approach Radars will also be integrated into the AMOC.
+Advanced communications suites have been procured to replace the
+current aging and inadequate communications console. AMO is studying
+the feasibility of a satellite based communication infrastructure that
+will dramatically increase nationwide radio coverage and save the costs
+of expanding and maintaining hundreds of ground based radios.
+ AMOC personnel have served as a primary operations entity at the
+NCRCC since the facility opened in January 2003. Fifteen Full time
+Equivalents (FTE) on AMOC's existing Table of Organization have been
+permanently reassigned to address staffing the NCRCC. The backfill/
+permanent return of these FTE to their original locations will be
+addressed within future resource allocation initiatives.
+ Now that AMO and AMOC have moved from ICE to CBP, the staffing
+issues will be revisited in a broader context as part of the transition
+process. We anticipate that the staffing decisions will be concluded by
+the end of the transitioin process on September 30, 2005.
+
+ 5. Within DHS, Mr. Hutchinson, you have more armed law enforcement
+employees under your command than anyone else. Inherent in that
+distinction are significant management, policy and oversight
+responsibilities to promote accountability, competent weapons use and
+maintaining a ``zero tolerance'' for excessive force incidents.
+Terrorists and narcotics cartels have demonstrated their lethality all
+over the world. DHS agents and officers deserve to be sufficiently
+equipped and empowered to address this threat. It will not suffice to
+be ``out-gunned'' during an encounter with terrorists or drug
+traffickers, as the Los Angeles Police Department discovered during the
+North Hollywood bank robbery.
+ What are your plans to standardize a system of centralized
+inventory management for BTS weapons, to prevent the kind of
+accountability issues recently experienced by FBI?
+ Answer: We have engaged in collaborative efforts within the
+Department, the Federal Government, and industry to develop the best
+practices and procedures in asset management. With the implementation
+of eMerge2, the Department will standardize the accountability of all
+assets, to include the weapons inventory. The Department is finalizing
+the Management Directive for Personal Property Management that defines
+the policy regarding the accountability and physical inventory
+requirements for personal property, including weapons. The policy
+includes the requirement for an annual physical inventory and
+reconciliation of all firearms. Also, the Department is conducting a
+pilot program to evaluate the accountability and effectiveness of using
+radio frequency identification to track and monitor firearms.
+ How will your system of accountability mesh with the
+remaining armed employees of DHS, such as those in the Secret Service?
+ Answer: The Department established a Personal Property Management
+Council and consolidated various personal property systems, procedures
+and policies over the past year. With the implementation of eMerge2, we
+will migrate our asset records to one software solution to provide
+total asset visibility that will enable us to effectively reduce the
+cost of managing the Government's personal property while increasing
+accountability. The procedures and systems put in place will be
+deployed throughout the Department.
+ What are your plans for a new ``use of force'' policy? When
+will this new policy be published?
+ Answer: The DHS use of force policy was signed and effective July
+2004. It was developed by a committee which had representation from all
+DHS law enforcement components.
+ Does your fiscal year 2005 funding include any initiatives
+to ann your employees with a ``standard'' Department firearm?
+ Answer: No. There are no additional funds requested in the fiscal
+year 2005 budget above that which is contained in each component's
+base, to recapitalize a standard DHS firearm. The DHS Commodity Council
+for Weapons and Ammunition is analyzing Department-wide requirements to
+determine more efficient and effective strategies for the acquisition
+of this commodity area. Their initial effort identified a strategy to
+acquire known DHS requirements for a family of pistols under a
+specification agreed to by many of the organizational elements in the
+Department. On August 24, 2004 the Department awarded two contracts for
+handguns that can be accessed by all DHS organizational entities.
+Additional categories of weapons and ammunition are being analyzed by
+the Commodity Council to determine the need for strategic sourcing.
+ 6. I understand BTS Officers frequently pursue vehicles and vessels
+loaded with contraband that refuse to stop, and perform airspace
+security missions against small and slow aircraft. These high-risk
+enforcement operations can easily escalate to a situation where lethal
+force is required. What legislative assistance do you need to indemnify
+your officers involved in this type of situation?
+ Answer: We must unquestionably prepare and support our law
+enforcement personnel for the potential use of lethal force in their
+day to day environment, as well as for the possible but unintended
+results of their actions. The law enforcement officers, tasked by their
+organization and the nation to prevent or mitigate to the best of their
+ability a terrorist strike, will be faced with the options of allowing
+the terrorist to strike where and when chosen with planned maximum
+devastation, or applying the use of lethal force against the assailant.
+These Officers, acting within the scope of employment and in compliance
+with Departmental policies and procedures, should be protected from
+unwarranted lawsuits and liability. To this end the Department is
+exploring possible options, similar to other agencies, that would grant
+immunity or provide indemnification in certain circumstances.
+ 7. The fiscal year 2005 budget for CBP includes $10 million for
+Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). You announced the Arizona Border
+Control (ABC) Initiative yesterday in Tucson. I understand your
+directorate will test the Hermes UAV. I also understand your
+directorate tested a Predator UAV in the Southwest last fall, which
+culminated in several interdictions, seizures and arrests. Will the
+requested funding be used for UAVs capable of fulfilling the multitude
+of BTS missions?
+ Answer: The requested funding is specific to border security
+operations for which CBP is the lead agency. The funding will provide
+for further testing and evaluation of UAVs in general, and the needs of
+BTS and other DHS components will be considered during this project.
+ What will be the concept of operation (CONOP) for this new
+resource?
+ Answer: The pilot project we are conducting is designed to help us
+develop a CONOP over the life of the program. The intent is to operate
+in both interdiction and intelligence gathering missions to evaluate
+VAV technology in such roles. Specific CONOPS will be developed based
+on lessons learned during this test and evaluation.
+ At the conclusion of this latest test, will UAVs become a permanent
+tool within BTS to combat illicit narcotics smuggling and migrant
+activity?
+ Answer: Once the evaluation is completed, we will have a better
+understanding of how UAVs may be integrated into our border security
+operations on a long-term basis. The pilot program will determine the
+best type of platforms and sensor packages to use, where they will be
+most beneficial, and for what specific roles they are best suited.
+ 8. In the establishment of DHS, it was recognized that counter-
+narcotics is an important and necessary mission for the Department. In
+the Homeland Security Act, the Department was organized to include a
+dedicated Counter-narcotics Officer on the Secretary's staff who is to
+ensure adequate focus of homeland security resources to the counter-
+drug mission. This Counter-narcotics Officer is also designated as the
+U.S. Interdiction Coordinator (USIC) and reports to the Director of the
+Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) on the overall national
+interdiction effort. As the Under Secretary of BTS, you oversee some of
+the major agencies involved in the counternarcotics effort.
+ In your view, how is the set up of one individual with two
+lines of authority working?
+ Answer: The counternarcotics officer (CNO) serves in multiple roles
+as ONDCP Director of Intelligence, as United States Interdiction
+Coordinator, and as DHS counternarcotics officer. Given the division of
+CN responsibilities between BTS and other DHS entities, the DHS CNO
+serves a useful and valuable role in coordinating CN matters between
+BTS and those other non-BTS DHS agencies. The CNO also serves an
+extremely valuable function in providing recommendations to the DHS
+Secretary about development of departmental CN priorities, especially
+as they impact BTS agency responsibilities. The addition of the USIC
+position to the CNO has provided an opportunity for that office to
+serve as a bridge to non-DHS agencies on CN that would otherwise not
+exist; a bridge that has been extensively employed on behalf of DHS
+during the start up of the Department.
+ What is your relationship with the Counter-narcotics
+Officer?
+ Answer: I meet regularly with the CNO, and two of my staff are
+located in his office These actions help ensure the closest
+coordination possible on counternarcotics issues.
+ Do you feel DHS has the resources necessary to adequately
+attack the current drug threat while being vigilant to other DHS
+responsibilities?
+ Answer: The Administration and Congress have provided excellent
+support to the BTS components in support of all threats to homeland
+security. Many of the capabilities that provide border and
+transportation security are used to support the counter-narcotics
+mission. For example, the same resources used in the Container Security
+Initiative (CSI) enhance the ability to prevent and detect importation
+of illegal narcotics. Additional border patrol and CBP officers, as
+well as ICE agents perform their work in a multifaceted fashion,
+finding illegal substances and goods and looking for links between
+narcotics-related crime and terrorism. The same sensor systems and
+platforms that perform border security, like our AMO and Border Patrol
+aircraft, also detect and interdict illegal narcotics. In support of
+these continuing efforts, our fiscal year 2005 request included a
+number of systems that are multi-dimensional and support both missions:
+$28 million for increased AMO P-3 flight hours to interdict narcotics
+in the source and transit zone as well as fly CAP over cities during
+heightened alert periods, $64 million for Border Patrol surveillance
+and sensor technology; $25 million for CSI; $20 million for targeting
+systems enhancement which help identify shipments requiring inspection;
+$15M for Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) which
+strengthen the supply chain; $10 million for development and testing of
+UAVs; and $340 million for US-VISIT, which identifies travelers, some
+of which have warrants for outstanding narcotics charges. All of these
+initiatives received fiscal year 2005 appropriations at the level of
+the request.
+
+Questions Submitted by the House Select Committee on Homeland Security,
+ Majority Staff
+
+Criminal Intelligence Collection and Analysis
+ 1. How do BTS agencies analyze their collection of criminal and
+other intelligence, as well as share it within BTS or with other DHS
+and Federal agencies? What is the role of IA/IP? Do the BTS agencies
+and IA/IP have interoperable communication and data systems?
+ Answer: The Directorate of Border and Transportation Security (BTS)
+prepares a Daily Operations Report each day of the week. The BTS
+distributes the reports to Federal, state, and local law enforcement.
+The report encompasses significant operational events involving the
+Border and Transportation Security Directorate (BTS). Items include
+submissions from the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the
+Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Federal
+Protective Service (FPS), and the Transportation Security
+Administration (TSA). Submissions include noteworthy Homeland Security
+items such as the arrest or removal of terrorist organization members,
+financiers, and operatives. The report provides biographical
+identifiers such as names, dates of birth, passport numbers,
+nationality, associates, etc. State and local law enforcement agencies
+have used this information to supplement their intelligence/homeland
+security operations. The report also highlights events, efforts, and
+trends concerning airport screening and organized criminal activities
+such as narcotics and alien smuggling. A report typically is from five
+to seven pages and includes a list of acronyms and definitions.
+ Information sharing is one of the critical mission areas that the
+Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has set as a priority for better
+preparing the homeland. The DHS Office of Information Analysis (IA), in
+conjunction with other DHS entities, prepares warning products and
+distributes them to federal, state, local, tribal, major city, and
+private sector officials. These products, which include both Homeland
+Security Information Bulletins and Threat Advisories, allow DHS
+officials to communicate threats and suggested protective measures to
+regions and/or sectors of concern, within each threat level.
+Additionally, unclassified information is shared through a daily
+Homeland Security Operations Morning Brief and the weekly joint DHS-FBI
+Intelligence Bulletin. The Office of State and Local Government
+Coordination also coordinates bi-weekly conference calls with all of
+the Homeland Security Advisors in all the states and territories to
+help relay important departmental information as well as respond to
+queries from advisors. The Department has also paid for and established
+secure communication channels to all of our state and territorial
+governors and their state emergency operations centers. This investment
+in communication equipment included secure VTC equipment along with
+Stu/Ste telephones. DHS has also worked to ensure every governor has
+been cleared to receive classified information and are working with the
+Governors and their Homeland Security Advisors to provide security
+clearances for five additional people who support the Governors'
+Homeland Security mission. This provides DHS an avenue for
+disseminating classified information directly to the location that
+needs the information. Lastly, one of the primary ways in which DHS is
+improving its communication with its constituents is through the
+Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) and specifically through
+the Joint Regional Information Exchange System (JRIES). Using this
+network, federal, state, and urban area homeland security advisors will
+be able to communicate with each other and with DHS, as will federal,
+state, and urban Emergency Operations Centers, and the National Guard
+and the state adjutant generals. Once connected, user groups will have
+access both to communication streams with each other and DHS, as well
+as to DHS warning products distributed by IA.
+ All DHS entities (along with all IC members) share information with
+IAIP, which analyzes and distributes the information to State,
+territorial, tribal, local and private sector entities. IAIP receives
+this information not only through the described reports, but also
+through BTS representation in IA and the HSOC. The IAIP performs
+analysis and shares information to support its own mission and to
+provide information that meets the needs of other intelligence
+consumers.
+
+US-VISIT
+ 2. DHS submitted the fiscal year 2004 expenditure plan for US-VISIT
+to Appropriations several weeks ago. The fiscal year 2005 request is
+$340 million, which is a $12 million increase. How will this funding be
+allocated in order to implement US VISIT at the 50 largest land border
+ports of entry?
+ Answer: The fiscal year 2004 Expenditure Plan included resources
+for implementing US-VISIT functionality in secondary inspection at the
+50 largest land border ports of entry to meet the statutory requirement
+of December 31, 2004. The Expenditure Plan for fiscal year 2005
+includes funding to pilot US-VISIT functionality in entry and exit
+lanes for selected ports of entry.
+
+ 3. What is the ``end vision'' for the US-VISIT system? How and when
+does DHS anticipate reaching that objective?
+ Answer: US-VISIT has begun the effort to create a strategic plan
+that will establish an overall vision for immigration and border
+management and identify the mechanisms necessary, including technology,
+facilities, and data necessary to achieve the vision. Fundamental to
+this vision is ensuring that appropriate information is available to
+decision makers (e.g. consular officers, border officers,
+investigators, immigration adjudicators, intelligence entities) in real
+time. However, to introduce immediate security improvements, we have
+focused on an incrementally developing and deploying capabilities. US-
+VISIT faced some significant challenges, especially in the early days,
+but has overcome those challenges by phasing-in improvements over the
+past two years.
+ The end vision of the US-VISIT Program is to deploy end-to-end
+management of integrated processes and data on foreign nationals
+traveling to the United States covering their interactions with U.S.
+officials before they enter, when they enter, while they are in the
+U.S., and when they exit. This comprehensive view of border management
+leads to the creation of a ``virtual border'' and will set the course
+for improved business processes across the Government stakeholder
+community for management of information on foreign visitors.
+ US-VISIT Program responsibilities begin when a foreign
+ national petitions for entrance, applies for a visa at a
+ consular office, or applies for enrollment in an expedited/
+ trusted traveler program. The US-VISIT Program will support
+ pre-entry processes by using collected biographic, biometric,
+ and previous travel and visa information to authenticate unique
+ identity, match against watch lists, and support the issuance
+ of travel documents.
+
+ During the inspection process, machine-readable, tamper-
+ resistant travel documents will be read, biometrics collected,
+ and information regarding a foreign national's U.S. travel and
+ immigration will be available for decision-making purposes.
+ Foreign national visitors who appear on watch lists, whose
+ identities cannot be verified, or who attempt entry using
+ fraudulent documents will be efficiently sent to secondary
+ inspection for further processing.
+ The US-VISIT program will keep track of changes in foreign national
+visitor status as well as identify visitors who have overstayed their
+visas. This information will be reported to agencies, such as U.S.
+Immigration and Customs Enforcement, for appropriate action.
+ As foreign national visitors leave the U.S., their exit will be
+recorded. Entry and exit records will be matched and visa compliance
+will be determined and maintained along with travel history.
+ The data acquired by the US-VISIT Program should prove increasingly
+useful as it accumulates. Initially, this data will be used to develop
+resource and staffing projections for Ports of Entry and regional
+facilities. As more entry and exit information becomes available, the
+US-VISIT Program will enable traffic, travel, and traveler analysis.
+Travel and traveler analysis will contribute to foreign national risk
+assessment and intelligence.
+ When the vision is fully realized the US-VISIT Program will
+contribute to the border management goals and will provide our citizens
+and visitors with a more expeditious and secure border-crossing
+process.
+ The US-VISIT end vision will be achieved incrementally over the
+next several years. The priorities in fiscal year 2003-2005 are to meet
+the legislative mandates and demonstrate initial progress toward
+achievement of performance goals for national security, facilitation of
+trade and travel, and supporting immigration system improvements. In
+fiscal year 2006, US-VISIT will complete satisfaction of its
+legislative mandates. At this point, US-VISIT will have delivered an
+interim capability that addresses the first set of requirements levied
+on the program. However, the most crucial and challenging need of the
+program-that of transforming border management through the delivery of
+an endto-end, fully integrated set of processes and systems supporting
+interoperability across the stakeholder community-will only be in its
+early stages.
+ Transforming border management will require work on several fronts.
+First, it means reengineering the processes to fully address creation
+of the virtual border, development of integrated inspection processes
+that leverage access to integrated traveler data, and enhancement of
+analytical capabilities to support risk analysis and decision-making.
+ Second, it means tackling the challenging task of consolidating,
+replacing, and retiring aging legacy systems. Modernizing the systems
+supporting US-VISIT will require coordination of and collaboration on
+system decisions across the border management community including DoS,
+CBP, ICE, USCIS, DOJ, DOT, and Commerce. The need to improve system
+performance, interoperability, and data sharing along with reducing O&M
+costs will influence those decisions. Finally, it means ensuring that
+US-VISIT monitor the international environment and the potential
+threats and implement capabilities to address gaps in coverage of
+travelers and entry points; identify opportunities to integrate
+additional information sources, systems, and processes together to
+extend the web for border management; and apply new technology where it
+can help address mission goals.
+ US-VISIT will continue to work with its Federal stakeholders
+through its Advisory Board to guide the course set for the Program
+using the Board to identify issues that will require coordination and
+policies that need to be defined.
+
+ 4. In view of the prospect that few, if any, of the 27 Visa Waiver
+Program countries can comply with the October 26, 2004, deadline to
+begin issuing biometric passports, what steps does BTS expect to take?
+ Answer: All visa waiver program (VWP) countries had to certify by
+October 26, 2004 that they have a program to issue biometrically
+enhanced passports in order to continue in the VWP. Most, if not all,
+of the VWP countries have informed the U.S. that they will not be able
+to issue International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) compliant
+passports by October 26, 2005 due to technical and other factors. The
+Administration requested a two-year extension in order to allow the
+countries time to meet the requirement. A one-year extension was
+granted. As part of the decision to request the extension deadline, and
+in order to provide enhanced security, as of September 30, 2004, all
+VWP travelers will be enrolled in thru US-VISIT.
+
+ 5. What additional security measures are anticipated for persons
+holding Border Crossing Cards as US-VISIT comes into effect on the
+southern border?
+ Answer: In response to congressional mandate, US-VISIT will take an
+incremental approach to implementing enhanced security measures at land
+border Ports of Entry (POEs). Currently, Border Crossing Card holders
+who request a stay longer than 30 days (extended from 72 hours this
+summer) or anticipate traveling beyond the 25 mile limit (75 miles in
+Arizona) are required to provide biographic information regarding their
+stay using a paper process (Form 1-94). By December 31, 2004, US-VISIT
+will be deployed in the Secondary Inspection area of the 50 busiest
+land POEs, including 34 on the southern border. . With the deployment
+of US-VISIT travelers processed through secondary inspection will have
+an additional requirement to provide biometric information (digital
+photograph and fingerprints unless exempt by policy), which will
+provide the following additional security benefits:
+
+ 1. Improved traveler identification at Secondary Inspection
+ locations through use of biometrics.
+ 2. A traveler's identity to be can be established and verified
+ using biometrics.
+ 3. Improved document validation at Secondary Inspection
+ locations through expanded access to Department of State visa
+ data.
+ 4. Improved threat analysis and determination of admissibility
+ through enhanced access to biometric Watch Lists at Secondary
+ Inspection locations.
+ 5. The ability to present additional information to the CBP
+ officer in Secondary, which will allow the officer to view more
+ information in the same amount of time resulting in a more
+ informed decision regarding admissibility.
+ 6. I-94 Data will be made available to all Ports of Entry and
+ authorized users within hours rather than the current process
+ which can take weeks.
+ US-VISIT intends to expand this capability to all land POEs by
+December 31, 2005.
+
+Customs and Border Protection
+Cargo Security
+ 6. The fiscal year 2005 budget requests $50 million for radiation
+detection monitors. Is this funding for ``next generation'' or will it
+be used to purchase and deploy machines at remaining land and sea ports
+of entry?
+ Answer: The Department of Homeland Security anticipates that the
+$50 million request in the President's fiscal year 2005 budget request
+for radiation detection equipment will be utilized for next-generation
+technology deployment. DHS's Science and Technology Directorate is
+working closely with Customs and Border Protection, Office of Field
+Operations, to ensure that CBP has the best available radiation
+detection technology.
+ 7. The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) helps
+to ensure security of cargo all along the supply chain. Under this
+program, companies sign an agreement with CBP to conduct a
+comprehensive self-assessment of their supply chain security and to
+improve that security using C-TPAT security guidelines. Companies that
+meet security standards receive expedited processing through ports of
+entry, again enabling CBP to focus on higher risk shipments. As of
+August 2003, over 3900 companies are participating in C-TPAT to improve
+the security of their supply chains. Based on current rates of
+enrollment, this number is expected to reach 5000 companies enrolled by
+the end of fiscal year 2004. Were there standards and best practices
+developed for assessment and validation purposes of C-TPAT companies?
+If so, who developed them and how?
+ Answer: There are specific security recommendations for each sector
+of C-TPAT membership. These recommendations were developed by CBP, with
+substantial input from the trade community, and based upon our 20 years
+of anti-smuggling / industry partnership expenence.
+ What plans does BTS have order to ensure the continued integrity of
+the companies screened and subject to less scrutiny at our ports of
+entry?
+ Answer: C-TPAT Validations enable CBP to review the security
+measures and procedures of the member's supply chain for effectiveness,
+efficiency and for accuracy. Each Validation is customized based on the
+member's business model and according to the security profile approved
+by CBP.
+ Will DHS consider such options as random screening of ALL
+cargo containers, including C-TPAT company's containers?
+ Answer: C-TPAT members are not exempt from CBP examinations.
+ 8. The fiscal year 2004 budget request for CTPAT was 17.9 million
+with 79 Full Time Employees (FTEs). The fiscal year 2005 request
+represents a 111 increase in funding and 138 additional personnel. How
+will the additional funding and staff be allocated?
+ Answer: The fiscal year 2004 appropriated amount for C-TPAT was
+$14.1 million with 79 fulltime equivalents (FTEs), or 157 new
+positions. The fiscal year 2005 request of $15.215 million represents
+an increase in funding to cover an additional 60 FTEs, or 120 new
+positions. The requested funding will be used for expenses associated
+with the new positions, validations, equipment, training and outreach.
+ Is any funding directed toward engaging importers to join
+the program?
+ Answer: An appropriate amount of funding will be utilized to engage
+all sectors of CTPAT membership, including importers, for outreach and
+recruiting purposes.
+ How much will go into validating applicants?
+ Answer: The primary responsibility of our Supply Chain Specialists
+is to conduct validations. For this reason, the majority of our travel
+money will be used for validating certified members.
+ What is the timeline for completing those validations?
+ Answer: Over 700 validations have been initiated with over 240
+completed. Our goal for the current calendar year is to have completed
+a total of 400 validations.
+
+ 9. The fiscal year 2005 budget provides funding to hire 100
+additional supply chain specialists to validate C-TPAT companies.
+Currently there are 23 employees doing this work. There are roughly
+5,000 companies in the program with 141 validations complete and over
+700 in the process. What is the goal for completing the validation of
+the 5,000 companies once additional staff is hired? Will the
+approximately 120 FTEs provide some growth capacity for the program? At
+the same time that we are trying to complete the validations, we are
+trying to expand participation.
+ Answer: The validation process enables U.S. Customs and Border
+Protection (CBP) and the C-TPAT participant to jointly review the
+participant's security procedures to ensure that security measures are
+being effectively executed. The validation process also promotes an
+exchange of information on security issues by both CBP and the company,
+and the sharing of ``best practices'', with the ultimate goal of
+strengthening the partnership and the security of the international
+supply chain.
+ Over 700 validations have been initiated with over 240 completed.
+Our goal for the current calendar year is to have completed a total of
+400 validations.
+ The 120 new positions requested in fiscal year 2005 will also
+enable growth capacity for CTPAT and will allow CBP to meet current
+mandates, including conducting validations, performing trade outreach
+and antiterrorism training. In addition, the 120 positions will allow
+C-TPAT to continue to enable trade by improving supply chain security
+and increasing supply chain performance. This optimizes the internal
+and external management of assets and functions while at the same time
+enhancing security in order to prevent the introduction of implements
+of terrorism into legitimate trade entering the U.S.
+
+ 10. Will CBP preserve its Customs Management Centers with their
+existing organization and command structure?
+ Answer: The organizational structure was reviewed in fiscal year
+2004. CBP, within the Office of Field Operations, will maintain 20
+Directors of Field Operations--DFO's (formerly called Customs
+Management Center Directors) in their field organizational structure
+providing operational oversight to the ports of entry under their
+jurisdiction. The CBP Field Offices will remain in the same 20 cities
+where the Customs Management Centers were located.
+
+Port Security
+ 11. How are the respective DHS functions at seaports (i.e. Coast
+Guard, ICE, CBP and TSA) coordinated? What steps is the Department
+considering to integrate these functions?
+ Answer: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is implementing
+an integrated and collaborative process among Federal, state, local and
+private partners to gain the greatest intelligence about the people,
+cargo and vessels operating in the maritime domain and most effectively
+protect our ports and maritime infrastructure.
+ The principal coordination mechanism at the seaport level is the
+Area Maritime Security Committee (AMSC), authorized by the Maritime
+Transportation Security Act (MTSA). The Coast Guard Captain of the Port
+(COTP) directs the AMSC as the Federal Maritime Security Coordinator
+(FMSC). Local DHS and other federal agency representatives, including
+Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Customs and Border
+Protection (CBP), and Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), are on
+each committee. Forty-three AMSCs have been chartered across the
+country with emphasis on advance security measures and plans to deter
+threats and provide a strong framework for response and recovery in the
+event of attack. Under the AMSCs, Federal, state, local and private
+authorities work together as a team to maintain and enhance security.
+This type of teamwork enables the entire maritime community to rapidly
+respond to both general and specific threats. Increased communication,
+teamwork and coordination is an example of the public and private
+sectors working together to secure our homeland. As a result, the
+leadership team, the responders, and the organizations are in place and
+working together to ensure security in our ports.
+ In the intelligence arena, the COASTWATCH program is the only
+national level DHS node systematically fusing intelligence and law
+enforcement data to identify and warn of potential security and
+criminal threats in the commercial maritime realm far in advance of
+their arrival.COASTWATCH's screening is focused on identifying specific
+ships, people or cargo that DHS may wish to investigate for security or
+significant criminal concerns prior to even nearing the port.
+COASTWATCH results and warnings are shared widely with Coast Guard
+operational commanders, the FBI, the Department of Defense (DoD), other
+intelligence agencies, and our DHS sister agencies, including CBP, TSA,
+and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
+ On a daily basis, the Coast Guard, CBP and ICE work together to
+ensure a coordinated effort to screen and evaluate safety and security
+risk posed by vessels intending to enter a U.S. port. The Coast Guard
+and CBP have collaborated on a joint effort to enhance the Coast
+Guard's electronic notice of Arrival (e-NOA) system in order to meet
+both the CG and CBP's mandatory submission requirements for vessel,
+crew, passenger, and certain cargo information. Once completed, the e-
+NOA will allow vessels to electronically submit the required CG / CBP
+NOA information to one consolidated location. The e-NOA will reduce the
+burden on industry by offering an easy-to-use, consolidated submission
+method that will meet both the CG and CBP requirements thereby removing
+duplicate reporting requirements. Furthermore, development of this
+joint system will significantly enhance the processing and sharing of
+information between DHS agencies, increase identification of security
+and safety risk posed by vessels entering a U.S. port and increase our
+overall MDA. The Coast Guard and CBP are in the field testing phase of
+this process and anticipate the system should be available for full use
+by the maritime industry in the fall of 2004.
+ The Coast Guard is enhancing its command centers in 40 locations
+and is offering other DHS agencies and port partners the opportunity to
+leverage our investment by either collocating their command and control
+elements in our command center, or by participating on an ``as
+necessary'' basis. We are establishing communications interoperability
+with other agencies and, as our level of Maritime Domain Awareness
+increases through the implementation of better sensors and intelligence
+systems, the Coast Guard will be sharing portions of their Common
+Operational Picture with our local, state and federal partners.
+ With our federal government's Awareness, Prevention, Protection,
+Response and Recovery capabilities now under the roof of a single
+department, the level of communication and cooperation among the sister
+agencies of Coast Guard, TSA, ICE and CBP is stronger than ever. CBP,
+TSA and CG are working together to support and align efforts to
+implement MTSA through interagency working groups addressing cargo
+security standards, port security assessments, international port
+security and the development of the National Maritime Security Plan.
+
+Border Patrol
+ 12. How does CBP plan to incorporate Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
+(UAVs) into border surveillance programs? How will these be coordinated
+with aerial surveillance programs of the ICE Air and Marine Division)?
+How will surveillance data be shared among CBP, ICE and other agencies?
+ Answer: CBP is working through the DHS UAV Executive Steering Group
+and UAV Working Group to ensure maximum interoperability and
+commonality is achieved across all of DHS. The DHS VAV Executive
+Steering Group provides oversight and direction to the DHS UAV Working
+Group. The members of the UAV Working Group include Coast Guard,
+Science and Technology, and Border and Transportation Security (CBP,
+ICE and TSA). CBP, within the working group, is currently participating
+in an analysis of alternatives (AoA) for aerial surveillance needs
+within DHS. Once this report is complete the group will begin a process
+to establish a DHS-wide concept of operations (CONOP). At the
+conclusion of the AoA, BTS will determine the need for UAVs as a
+permanent asset for BTS in a CONOP. It is likely that UAVs will support
+other current and emerging sensing technologies to monitor the U.S.
+borders between ports of entry. The CONOPS for UAVs will identify
+unique needs and requirements stemming from each components missions
+and ensure that redundancy and overlaps are minimal. It will further
+ensure that systems procured and deployed on behalf of the DHS are
+interoperable, and that efficiencies are sought. Any data or
+information of interest to the security of the United States that is
+developed during the UAV test programs will be shared via existing
+intelligence and investigative mechanisms. The recent movement of AMO
+from ICE to CBP will enhance the development of the use of UAV's for
+border security programs.
+
+ 13. How will CBP and ICE coordinate expedited removal of illegal
+aliens detained at the southern border who are not Mexican? Has BTS
+adopted new removal procedures to support its Arizona Border Control
+Initiative Are their comparable procedures in place for non-Canadians
+detained at the northern border?
+ Answer: On August 11, 2004, DHS published a Notice in the Federal
+Register enhancing its ability to apply expedited removal (ER) between
+the ports of entry on the northern and southern borders of the United
+States. The enhanced ER authority is a border control measure, and for
+that reason, it will be applied only to those aliens who have been in
+the United States for less than 14 days and are apprehended within 100
+miles of the border. The enhanced ER is primarily directed at ``third
+country nationals'' who are not citizens of Mexico or Canada. ER will
+not be immediately extended to all land borders. It will first be
+extended between the ports of entry in the Laredo and Tucson border
+sectors and may be implemented in other border locations as needed. CBP
+and ICE are working together to ensure those aliens placed in ER are
+removed quickly. As for Canada, the United States and Canada have a
+longstanding repatriation agreement that covers the repatriation of
+third country nationals who have crossed the United States/Canadian
+border. The United States and Canada have also entered into a ``safe
+third'' agreement that requires (with significant exceptions) asylum-
+seekers who have crossed the border to return to Canada and pursue
+their asylum claim there. The ``safe third'' agreement was entered in
+December 2002; a notice of proposed rule-making was issued on March 8,
+2004, and the agreement will be implemented in the future.
+
+ 14. How is BTS integrating and coordinated CBP, ICE and related
+operations for the Arizona Border Control Initiative?
+ Answer: Border Patrol Tucson Sector Chief (David Aguilar) was
+originally designated as the Border and Transportation Security (BTS)
+Integrator for the execution of the ABC Initiative. Upon his promotion
+to Chief, Border Patrol, the newly appointed Tucson Sector Chief,
+Michael Nicley has taken over the role of Integrator. The Deputy is Mr.
+Phillip Crawford of ICE. The Integrator and Deputy Integrator have a
+combined planning staff in Tucson, Arizona. The Integrator provides the
+multiple federal, state, local and Tribal agencies as well as the
+public with a single point of contact for issues related to the
+initiative. The Integrator maintains frequent direct communication with
+the BTS Operations Staff for the purpose of rapidly sharing information
+between Headquarters and the multiple agencies on scene. These
+communications facilitate coordination on cross-cutting issues and
+assist BTS in maintaining situational awareness of the progress of the
+operation.
+
+Transportation Security Administration
+Air Security
+ 15. What planning activities are in place to study airport demand
+characteristics for the future and allocate screener staffing and
+resources accordingly for fiscal year 2005 and beyond?
+ Answer: TSA is in the process of conducting a needs assessment to
+determine the optimal number of screeners at each airport. To ensure
+the project's success, TSA has partnered with the aviation industry to
+form the U.S. Commercial Aviation Partnership, which is studying trends
+in aviation and providing better forecasting to TSA regarding changes
+that are expected in traffic patterns and airport demand. The needs
+assessment effort will also draw on TSA's operational experience. TSA
+believes that both precise forecasting and an operational record are
+critical enablers of an accurate needs assessment to ensure that
+resources are allocated in the most optimal manner in fiscal year 2005
+and beyond.
+ Additionally, the Science & Technology Directorate (S&T) has been
+tasked by Secretary Ridge to perform a Systems Engineering study of
+Civil Aviation Security. Under Phase I of that study, staffing levels
+have been obtained for representative alternative configurations for
+checked baggage, checkpoint, and air cargo screening. Under Phase II of
+that study, to be completed over the next several months, system-wide
+staffing estimates will be obtained for these alternatives. However, it
+is not intended that the S&T study will establish optimal staffing
+levels on an airport-by-airport basis.
+
+ 16. How will information technology tools like threat image
+projection (TIP) be used to improve staffing allocations, training, and
+so on at screener checkpoints? Have any justification studies been done
+to show the long term payoffs derived from the up front costs of
+implementing TIP and any other IT initiatives?
+ Answer: Threat Image Projection (TIP) is a valuable training and
+performance monitoring tool but is not used to determine airport-by-
+airport staffing allocations. The expanded 2400-image TIP library is
+used as a key performance measurement of screener effectiveness and to
+identify specific strengths and weaknesses in threat object recognition
+and identification. TIP performance information is used locally by the
+Federal Security Director to tailor weekly recurrent training for
+screeners based on the areas that are identified for improvement.
+National level trend data based on the new expanded TIP library is
+being compiled and analyzed, and national TIP performance standards
+will be issued once data integrity is assured. Analysis of TIP data is
+showing a nationwide improvement in identification of threats of
+approximately 2 percent per month. The Transportation Security Lab is
+developing the functional requirements for the next generation of TIP
+capable x-rays to include adaptive learning technology that reacts to
+the strengths and weaknesses of the individual screener in selecting
+the type of threat objects presented by increasing the difficulty as
+the screeners' performance improves.
+ TSA believes that TIP is a critical element of its overall plan to
+continuously improve screener performance, but has not yet conducted a
+long-term payoff analysis quantifying its benefits. Federal Security
+Directors have tools available to them to improve the management and
+scheduling of screeners. Tools such as Kronos for time & attendance and
+Sabre for screener scheduling provide real-time information which
+enables the FSD at each airport to forecast periods of peak demand for
+screening. Additionally, TSA uses more split shifts and part-time
+screeners to maximize the operational flexibility available to FSDs
+when scheduling screeners to satisfy varying levels of demand. These
+applications are important tools that assist TSA in creating additional
+capacity and greater efficiencies in the scheduling of screeners.
+
+ 17. How does the funding for canine teams and the number of canine
+teams for air cargo operations compare to the numbers of canine teams
+and funding for operations inside the airport terminal? Has the pilot
+program to study canine inspections of U.S. mail been continued/
+expanded, and if so does this fall under the air cargo canine
+operations or airport terminal canine operations?
+ Answer: TSA is currently authorized to deploy 341 explosives
+detection canine teams at the Nation's airports. These teams are
+trained, employed and their performance evaluated in airport terminals,
+cargo operations, vehicles/parking lots along with narrow and wide body
+aircraft. Based on each airports unique security requirements, the
+teams are employed in both general airport and cargo operations areas
+as needed. The total authorized number of canine teams nationwide is
+determined by each individual airport's canine team's work load and
+mission requirements. As an example, Miami International Airport would
+have a larger canine team work load than Boise International Airport.
+The TSA Explosives Detection Canine Team Program is a cooperative
+partnership with participating airports and airport law enforcement
+agencies. Currently, TSA provides partial reimbursement at $40,000 per
+canine explosives team to support explosives detection operations at
+each participating airport for costs associated with the teams, such as
+salaries, canine food and veterinary care. Under our current
+reimbursement guidelines, we have allocated a percentage of this figure
+from cargo funds and a percentage from aviation funds. These
+reimbursement percentages are based on the percentage of time canine
+teams are deployed for air cargo and airport terminal operations. As
+new teams are authorized, funded, and dedicated to cargo screening
+operations, these percentages may change.
+ In early 2002, TSA, the United States Postal Service (USPS), and
+the aviation industry, agreed that additional security screening
+measures needed to be identified and developed before resuming the
+transport of mail on passenger aircraft. In June 2002, TSA's National
+Explosives Detection Canine Team Program conducted Operational Test &
+Evaluation (OT&E) pilot testing at six (6) major airports with the
+assistance from the USPS and airline industry to determine and
+demonstrate the canine teams' ability to detect actual explosive
+targets within packages that simulated Priority Mail products that were
+independently introduced into actual mail. An additional purpose of the
+pilot testing was to compare the throughput capabilities of both X-Ray
+and canine resources under operational conditions. The results were
+successful. Consequently, in November 2002, TSA established canine
+screening operations for priority mail, in excess of 16 ounces, through
+partnership agreements with USPS and the airline industry at 10
+airports within the 48 contiguous states and at San Juan, PR and
+Honolulu, HI. By the end of fiscal year 2004 over 23,000,000 packages
+will have been successfully screened by TSA-certified explosives
+detection canine teams. The pilot program to study canine inspections
+of U.S. mail falls under the air cargo operations.
+ TSA is currently conducting additional Canine Cargo Pilot OT&E
+testing in two phases:
+ Phase I, tested various explosive targets/distracters
+ that were introduced into multiple cargo configurations at six
+ major airports. All testing was conducted under actual cargo
+ operations and various weather conditions. The OT&E is complete
+ and the preliminary results are promising. The final report is
+ expected in the coming weeks.
+ Phase II, OT&E started in June 2004 and was completed
+ on schedule in August 2004. The tests were conducted at six
+ major airports where expanded explosive detection investigation
+ took place using multiple cargo airline containers, airline
+ ground support equipment and USPS rolling stock equipment
+ configurations under actual cargo/mail operations and
+ environments. Testing evaluated TSA-certified canine teams'
+ ability to screen larger volumes of mail placed inside USPS
+ ``rolling stock'' equipment containers, which hold larger
+ volumes of bags/boxes. The final test results will be analyzed
+ and recommendations will be proposed for both cargo and mail,
+ in excess of 16 ounces, screening operations at other major
+ airports using TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams
+ along with other system technologies for mail and cargo
+ transported on passenger aircraft.
+
+Railway Security
+ 18. How are the responsibilities related to rail and transit
+security divided between the TSA and the FTA? Are there mechanisms in
+place to eliminate duplication of efforts, or do some of these
+responsibilities need to be further clarified by Congress?
+ Answer: DHS, DOT and component agencies including TSA, FTA, FRA and
+RSPA coordinated very closely on initiatives relating to rail and
+transit security, including the issuance of educational materials and
+security directives establishing a new baseline of security for transit
+and passenger rail operators after attacks on transit systems in Moscow
+and Madrid earlier this year and during both planning for and operation
+of short-term protective initiatives undertaken for various national
+special security events (NSSEs) this summer, including the two national
+conventions, and the period of time leading up to the elections. This
+coordination involved the identification and allocation of resources,
+assets and responsibilities. In addition, DHS and DOT have collaborated
+very closely on initiatives designed to improve the security posture of
+rail operators and shippers that transport Toxic by Inhalation (TIH)
+chemicals, and the major population centers through and near which such
+chemicals are shipped. DHS and DOT are also actively engaged in
+discussions regarding both a transit-specific Memorandum of
+Understanding to articulate DHS component (TSA, IAIP) and DOT modal
+administration (FTA) responsibilities for securing public
+transportation systems--responsibilities that are shared with the local
+system owners and operators, and an overarching MOU which will set
+forth very clearly how the two departments and the component agencies
+will communicate and cooperate with regard to specific initiatives
+designed to strengthen security in the transportation sector.
+ In general, on December 17, 2003, the President issued Homeland
+Security Presidential Directive-7 (HSPD-7), which established that the
+Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Transportation
+will ``collaborate on all matters relating to transportation security
+and transportation infrastructure protection.'' HSPD-7 ``establishes a
+national policy for Federal departments and agencies to identify and
+prioritize United States critical infrastructure and key resources and
+to protect them from terrorist attack.'' Under HSPD-7, the Secretary of
+the Department of Homeland Security has the lead role in coordinating
+protection activities for ``transportation systems, including mass
+transit, aviation, maritime, ground/surface, and rail and pipeline
+systems,'' while DOT is responsible for promoting the safety,
+efficiency, effectiveness, and economic well-being of the nation's
+transportation systems. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is
+responsible under HSPD-7 for developing a National Critical
+Infrastructure Protection Plan. TSA has been assigned primary
+responsibility for coordinating the development of the Transportation
+Sector Specific Plan among the various federal agencies with
+responsibilities in the transportation sector, including DOT and its
+modal administrations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the U.S.
+Coast Guard, and the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
+Directorate, among others.
+ DOT and its component modal administrations have subject matter
+expertise, substantial relationships, and frequent interactions with
+stakeholders and federal agencies involved in the entire Transportation
+Sector. For these reasons, and pursuant to HSPD-7, TSA collaborates
+closely with DOT's modal administrators, including the Federal Transit
+Administration (FTA) and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), on
+transportation sector security. In partnership with other component
+agencies of DHS and in coordination with DOT modal administrations and
+state, local and private sector partners, TSA leverages existing
+security initiatives; coordinates the development of national
+performance-based security standards and guidance; develops security
+plans; assesses security vulnerabilities and identifies needed security
+enhancements; identifies areas where regulations may be necessary to
+improve the security of passengers, cargo, conveyances, transportation
+facilities and infrastructures; and identifies areas where better
+compliance with established regulations and policies can be achieved.
+TSA is currently developing modal-specific security plans to flesh out
+additional details of each of the transportation modes encompassed
+within the Transportation Sector Specific plan. TSA is working with DOT
+modal administrators in developing these plans.
+
+ 19. What level of coordination of transit security efforts is
+currently taking place between the TSA, state and local transit
+authorities and Amtrak?
+ Answer: TSA works closely with FTA, state and local transit
+authorities and Amtrak on a regular basis. Before and since the
+issuance of the Security Directives (SD) on May 20, 2004, TSA has been
+in close communication with the FTA and FRA, and transit agencies and
+passenger rail operators throughout the nation. TSA's SDs have assisted
+in ensuring that best practices implemented by a number of the nation's
+largest transit systems both prior to and after the Madrid and Moscow
+attacks, due greatly to the significant effort undertaken by FTA in the
+wake of 9/11 to undertake comprehensive vulnerability assessments of
+major transit systems, are implemented consistently through all the
+nation's commuter rail and transit systems. Additionally, TSA, IP and
+FTA are coordinating very closely to conduct additional criticality
+assessments of the top rail-based mass transit assets.
+ TSA has initiated a project aimed at providing comprehensive
+security reviews of all owners and operators in the rail and transit
+environment. TSA meets with stakeholders to review and assess security
+plans and to ensure that baseline security measures have been addressed
+for different threat levels.
+ FTA and TSA receive and share information on threats and
+intelligence through the Surface Transportation ISAC (Information
+Sharing and Analysis Center) managed by the Association of American
+Railroads (AAR). TSA has also sponsored a tabletop exercise at Union
+Station Washington, DC involving stakeholders, emergency responders and
+enforcement agencies in implementing the station's Emergency Response
+Plan.
+ TSA, AMTRAK, and Federal Railroad Administration coordinated to
+institute a passenger and carry-on baggage-screening prototype for
+explosives in a rail environment called the Transit and Rail Inspection
+Pilot (TRIP). Phase I was conducted in partnership with DOT, Amtrak,
+MARC and Washington's Metro from May 4 to May 26 at the New Carrollton,
+MD, station. Phase II was conducted in conjunction with AMTRAK between
+June 7 and July 5 at Washington, D.C.'s Union Station, and Phase III
+was conducted from July 19 to August 20 and involved a partnership
+between DHS, DOT and the State of Connecticut's Shoreline East Commuter
+Rail.
+ Additionally, TSA, in coordination with the Department of Defense
+Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), initiated a project at Amtrak's
+30th Street Station in Philadelphia. The objective of the TSWG funded
+Mass Transit Video Surveillance project is to develop and deploy an
+integrated monitoring, detection, and alerting system with the ability
+to distinguish, track, and display anomalous human behavior in
+multiple-stream video feeds for the identification of possible
+terrorist attacks in a mass transit setting. The system is to be
+adaptable for monitoring a variety of mass transportation venues,
+including mass transit subway stations, light rail stations, bus
+terminals, tunnels, and bridges, and testing is expected to commence in
+late fiscal year 2004.
+
+ 20. What is the current status of TSA's planned threat based
+security management system for all modes of transportation, and
+specifically for passenger rail security? How does this system address
+passenger rail security?
+ Answer: Consistent with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7,
+governing protection of critical infrastructures, TSA is developing a
+national transportation security strategy that focuses on awareness,
+prevention, response, recovery, restoration of services, and restoring
+public confidence. In partnership with other component agencies of the
+Department of Homeland Security (DHS), modal administrations of the
+Department of Transportation (DOT) and industry stakeholders, TSA is
+working to assess security vulnerabilities and identify needed
+enhancements to the rail system and related infrastructure, develop
+national performance-based security standards and guidance to assess
+and improve the security of passengers, cargo, conveyances,
+transportation facilities and infrastructures; and ensure compliance
+with established regulations and policies. This information will be
+incorporated into the Transportation Sector Specific Plan (SSP), part
+of the National Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan pursuant to
+HSPD-7. The SSPs articulate and seek to better define and improve how
+federal and privatesector stakeholders communicate and work together;
+how important assets in the transportation sector are to be identified,
+assessed, and prioritized; how protective programs will be developed;
+how risk reduction will be measured; and how R&D will be prioritized.
+TSA and DOT Modal administrations are building the foundation of the
+SSPs to create modal security plans, including mass transit and rail,
+to provide overall operational planning guidance on transit and rail
+security. Development of the Transportation and other SSPs is nearly
+complete. Development of the modal plans will leverage the interagency
+working groups formed to develop the SSP, and is also underway.
+ Efforts in rail transit security over the past two years have
+focused on greater information sharing between the industry and all
+levels of government, assessing vulnerabilities in the rail and transit
+sector to develop new security measures and plans, increasing training
+and public awareness campaigns, and providing greater assistance and
+funding for rail transit activities.
+ TSA will continue to assess the risk of terrorist attacks on non-
+aviation transportation modes, assess the need for passenger, cargo,
+and supply-chain standards and procedures to address those risks, and
+ensure compliance with established standards and policies. The
+following are some of the activities and initiatives DHS has/will
+implement in partnership with TSA to strengthen security in surface
+modes:
+ Issued Security Directives (SD) to ensure that best
+ security practices are implemented throughout the industry. The
+ SDs establish 16 mandatory protective measures for commuter and
+ transit passenger rail, inter-city train, and regional
+ services.
+ Ensure compliance with security standards for commuter
+ and rail lines and better help identify gaps in the security
+ system in coordination with DOT, with additional technical
+ assistance and training provided by TSA;
+ Study hazardous materials (HAZMAT) security threats
+ and identify best practices to enhance the security of
+ transporting HAZMAT.
+ Conducted a pilot program to test the new technologies
+ and screening concepts to evaluate the feasibility of screening
+ luggage and carry-on bags for explosives at rail stations and
+ aboard trains;
+ Develop and implement a mass transit vulnerability
+ self-assessment tool;
+ Continue the distribution of public security awareness
+ material (i.e., tip cards, pamphlets, and posters) for
+ motorcoach, school bus, passenger rail, and commuter rail
+ employees;
+ Increase passenger, rail employee, and local law
+ enforcement awareness through public awareness campaigns and
+ security personnel training;
+
+ 21. When does TSA expect to complete (a) name-based checks and (b)
+criminal background checks for the Transportation Worker Identification
+Card (TWIC) Program? Does TSA intend to prioritize categories of
+workers for background checks?
+ Answer: The Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC)
+Prototype Phase has begun in three regional areas: LA / Long Beach, CA;
+Delaware River and Bay; and the State of Florida. Participation in the
+TWIC Prototype Phase is voluntary and expected to include not more than
+200,000 people. TSA intends to complete name-based checks on prototype
+participants against lists of known/suspected terrorists in all three
+regions during the Prototype Phase, but will not make a decision on
+conducting criminal background checks until after the prototype is
+complete. Florida, which is a TWIC Prototype Phase participant, will
+continue to conduct criminal background checks under that state's
+current statutory authority. This background check is a state
+requirement and not a federal or TWIC requirement.
+ In conducting the Prototype, TSA and transportation stakeholders
+intend to further evaluate background check approaches and their
+ability to meet the TWIC program's three goals of improving security,
+enhancing commerce, and protecting individuals' privacy. Planning for
+full implementation continues and will be significantly affected by the
+results and lessons learned in Prototype. This planning process will
+include a detailed review of the schedule for implementation, which
+will establish a timeline for completion of name based and criminal
+background checks for transportation workers.
+
+Immigration and Customs Enforcement
+Federal Air Marshals
+22. Does BTS expect that requiring air marshals on flights by foreign
+carriers to the United States would necessitate significant new
+resources, e.g. for training and liaison with foreign governments and
+airlines? How can BTS vet and certify foreign air marshals to ensure
+they have right level of training and professionalism?
+ Answer: The US Government does not require air marshals on foreign
+air carrier flights transiting to/from the United States. On Dec 28,
+2003, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) issued an
+Emergency Amendment (EA) making reference to placing foreign air
+marshals on flights to/from/over flying the U.S. ``where necessary''
+when threat information warranted such action. The EA did not stipulate
+that foreign air marshals were required, only that they may be
+required. However, this did prompt many foreign governments to
+reexamine their need for air marshals. As a result, the U.S. Federal
+Air Marshal Service (FAMS) has received numerous requests for FAMS
+provided air marshal training. If the US Government eventually requires
+air marshals on foreign flights, then, the FAMS can expect to see an
+escalation of foreign requests for training. The U.S. Government does
+not certify foreign air marshal programs nor is the U. S. FAMS vetted
+or certified by any foreign entity. Those countries that have air
+marshals transiting the U.S. have been allowed to do so by the
+Department of State (DOS) and the TSA. The DOS relies on TSA's input as
+to whether permission (through a visa) should be granted.
+
+Temporary Worker Initiative
+ 23. Is USCIS' Basic Pilot Program for employer verification an
+appropriate model for the President's proposal? How might this be
+linked with the ICE Worksite Enforcement Program to develop an
+effective long term, nationwide program? (Note: P.L. 108-156 mandates
+expansion of the Basic Pilot Program at a projected cost of about $5.0
+million more than the current $6.0 million budget.)
+ Answer: The concept behind the Basic Pilot Program can be an
+integral and effective part in ICE's overall Worksite Enforcement/
+Critical Infrastructure Protection strategy. The capability of
+legitimate employers to easily verify employment authorization will
+help to reduce the number of opportunities for undocumented aliens who
+gain employment in the United States through the presentation of
+fraudulent documents. As the program expands throughout the United
+States, ICE may use it to supplement its enforcement plan as an after
+action tool. For example, recent ICE operations have focused on the
+reduction of vulnerabilities to the nation's economy and critical
+infrastructure. As ICE reviews employers and employees in these areas,
+the employers may be enrolled in the Basic Pilot Program to assure that
+future employees are authorized for employment. This will reduce the
+need for ICE to continue to scrutinize a particular industry.
+ Given its expanded use and potentially growing role, it will be
+important to re-evaluate the technology incorporated in the Basic Pilot
+Program to ensure that it will continue to provide a fool-proof tool
+for employers.
+
+ICE Detention and Removal
+ 24. As the pace of ICE enforcement and removal activity quickens
+(with the $186 million increase in fiscal year 2005 programs), at what
+point will the number of detained aliens exceed the capacity of DHS to
+hold them or keep track of them?
+ Answer: Currently, ICE detains 23,000 aliens, on average, per day.
+However, ICE estimates that there is a potential requirement for
+detaining upwards of 36,000 aliens, on average, per day. Because
+detention is very expensive and because not all aliens must be detained
+in order to maintain effective control over them, DHS / ICE is
+developing more cost-effective alternatives to detention. Alternative
+to detention initiatives include electronic monitoring and intensive
+community supervision.
+ For fiscal year 2004, DHS / ICE is piloted eight intensive
+supervision sites, each with 200 participants. The fiscal year 2005
+budget includes funding ($11 million) to double the capacity at each of
+those sites and to add one new site. These enhancements allow for the
+controlled supervision of 3,400 low threat-risk aliens nationwide. Use
+of detention alternatives for low risk aliens allows for increased
+detention of higher risk aliens and results in better security for US
+citizens. This initiative received appropriations in fiscal year 2005
+at the level of the request.
+ It is difficult to estimate the precise point at which the number
+of detained aliens will exceed DHS' ability to either hold or keep
+track of them. Currently, DHS / ICE effectively detains or supervises
+approximately 1 million aliens nationwide. Clearly, initiatives such as
+alternatives to detention expand DHS's ability to control non-detained
+aliens, while initiatives such as expedited removals and institutional
+removals speed the process of deporting removable aliens and thereby
+reduce overall requirements for detention and tracking.
+ 25. Do the MOUs with Florida and Alabama on local enforcement of
+immigration laws provide a boilerplate for expanded interior
+enforcement? Does ICE plan any new MOU's as provided by the Illegal
+Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 and other
+legislation?
+ Answer: Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
+(I&NA) affords ICE and state and local law enforcement agencies an
+opportunity to address specific criminal activity and security concerns
+when dealing with foreign nationals residing in the United States. The
+Section 287(g) Program serves as a force multiplier for both ICE and
+the participating state/local agency.
+ The required Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is used to establish
+the parameters by which the cross-designated officers will use their
+ICE immigration authority. This allows both parties to address the
+public safety concerns in their geographical areas covered by the MOU.
+ ICE is currently developing MOUs with the Commonwealth of Virginia
+and Los Angeles County, under 287(g). ICE does not actively pursue or
+solicit state and/or local enforcement agencies to participate in the
+287(g) Program. The state and/or local political entity must initiate a
+request to DHS/ICE to participate in the 287(g) Program.
+
+ICE Air and Marine Operations (AMO)
+ 26. How have AMO's operations and responsibilities changed since 9/
+11, and what resource demands have these changes entailed? How are
+these needs being met?
+ Answer: In the post-9/11 strategic environment, a new national
+requirement for airspace and marine security has been identified and
+entrusted to AMO. This includes new missions such as airspace security
+over Washington, D.C., designated National Security Special Events,
+Continuity of Government operations and the launch of five new Northern
+Border Branches. This is a significant and rapid expansion of
+operations and responsibilities beyond AMO's legacy customs
+interdiction mission.
+ AMO covers the most pressing tasks and missions today by surging
+its personnel, resources and force structure that are still mainly
+sized against the pre-9/11 legacy missions. Supplemental appropriations
+have met some of the additional costs associated with the expansion in
+AMO missions and responsibilities. AMO is presently revalidating
+requirements and identifying the force structure and capital equipment
+needed to complete its transition into a force enabled to cover fully
+all of the new air and marine missions beyond its legacy Customs
+interdiction role.
+
+ 27. What plans are there to economize or integrate BTS and Coast
+Guard air and marine assets--e.g., capital acquisitions and facilities,
+support and maintenance programs?
+ Answer: In fiscal year 2005, BTS air and marine assets will be
+consolidated within the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection.
+Efforts are underway to manage that consolidation to ensure the maximum
+operational and cost efficiencies.
+ While this consolidation proceeds, the Department will continue to
+review additional operational and cost efficiencies that can be gained
+between CBP and Coast Guard air and marine personnel, programs and
+equipment. The Department manages this ongoing review through the
+Aviation Management Council which provides the leadership and oversight
+on joint DHS Aviation policy, operations, procedures, requirements,
+sourcing strategies and asset management to support the needs of the
+Department. This group is currently engaged in drafting a Department-
+wide Aviation Concept of Operations for review by the DHS Joint
+Requirements Council.
+ Similarly marine assets continue to be reviewed by the Department's
+Vessel Commodity Council. Although CBP and USCG have very different
+marine missions, efficiencies may be gained by consolidating hull
+designs and/or outboard engines, and standardizing maintenance
+procedures on similar platforms and equipment. Furthermore, other
+actions are being taken, for example: CBP is currently co-located with
+USCG at their Niagara facility; also, upon delivery of the SAFE Boats
+purchased from a Coast Guard contract, CBP plans to co-locate with USCG
+and ICE at their facilities in Bellingham, WA, and is exploring
+consolidated maintenance facilities with both USCG and ICE in
+Brownsville, TX; and CBP is in the process of scheduling
+representatives from the Coast Guard to provide an unbiased look at CBP
+boat operations (in selected sectors) and offering best practices for
+consideration.
+
+ 28. What will be the effect of the proposed threefold increase in
+flight hours on the AMO's aging P-3 surveillance aircraft? When will
+DHS need to start replacing or refitting these aircraft?
+ Answer: The flying constraint has primarily been adequacy of
+operations and maintenance funding. AMO's current P-3 inventory is
+capable of flying the requested increased flight hours. With minor
+manning augmentation, it will be very achievable to meet the increased
+and expanded mission requirements.
+ Recapitalizing or modernizing to meet the P-3 specific mission
+capability is part of AMO's deliberate modernization plan. This plan
+will be reviewed by both the Department's Aviation Management Council,
+and the Joint Requirements Council vis-a-vis all the other DHS aviation
+requirements. Once that review is complete a recapitalization plan will
+be developed.
+
+ 29. When will DHS submit to Congress its ``Assessment of Aviation
+Operations and Support?'' Will it conduct a similar review of AMO, CBP
+and Coast Guard maritime operations to assess benefits of integrating
+those activities?
+ Answer: The ``Assessment of Aviation Operations and Support'' has
+been conducted with the assistance of Booz-Allen-Hamilton. The
+Department has already initiated many of the recommendations stemming
+from the report. The Assessment of Aviation Operations and Support
+results have been made available to the Government Accountability
+Office to aid in their engagements pertaining to the Review of the DHS
+Efforts to Share Assets. Once the full report has been reviewed and
+accepted throughout the Department it will be available for
+distribution.
+
+ 30. What are DHS recommendations for closing gaps in low-level
+surveillance by Tethered Aerostat Radars (TARS)? How should this
+coverage be assured over the long term? Has DHS made an assessment of
+any new technology or systems which can fulfill this role?
+ Answer: TARS is a critical component in the interdiction of
+airborne threats to the U.S. and forms part of our last line of border
+defense. It is the only fixed system that provides low-level radar
+coverage of air targets, and can provide some surveillance of maritime
+and land targets.TARS currently provides the nation's most effective
+surveillance system against multiple threats, and serves many national
+objectives including homeland security; countering illicit traffickers
+(air, land and sea); air sovereignty; air traffic control, and flight
+safety. TARS is the only sensor system that can provide detection and
+monitoring (D&M) of multiple airborne threats (drug smuggling,
+terrorism, air-delivered WMD) on the southern approaches to the US--
+especially the southwest border.
+ Counterdrug D&M was made the statutory responsibility of DOD in the
+1989 Defense Authorization Act. Specific responsibility for funding and
+operation of TARS was assigned to DOD by separate statute in 1992. We
+believe that this critical system, by roles, missions, and governmental
+functions was properly assigned to DOD by Congress. DOD should retain
+responsibility for this critical system.
+ The Department of Homeland Security is a strong advocate for TARS
+and supports a complete TARS border surveillance system, until new
+technologies are developed to meet this operational requirement. This
+system would support air, land and sea surveillance requirements of
+Border Patrol, U.S. Coast Guard, Office of Air and Marine Operations
+and other DHS components as well as DoD.
+ DHS is exploring new technology to meet border security mission
+requirement. The border security mission will be supported through a
+variety of systems. Sensors such as TARS, UAVs, rotary and fixed wing
+aircraft, and ground-based equipment and personnel to operate and
+maintain these systems must be coordinated and aligned against the
+highest critical vulnerabilities and threats. TARS is one critical and
+cost-effective element of this system.UAVs hold promise in some
+applications.
+
+Overseas Programs (ICE and CBP)
+ 31. What plans does ICE have for expanding the reach of the Visa
+Security Program (mandated by P.L. 107-296, Section 428) to countries
+other than Saudi Arabia?
+ Answer: DHS plans to open additional overseas visa security offices
+during fiscal year 2005. DHS, in consultation with DOS Bureau of
+Consular Affairs, has identified the next priority sites based on a
+risk assessment. To extend the reach of the program, these next offices
+will cover defined geographic regions. As well, DHS is exploring the
+concept of ``rapid response teams'' that would deploy to posts for
+short periods of time to provide advice and training to the consular
+officers on emerging threats and various methods to enhance their
+adjudication activities.
+
+ 32. What value-added can VSP officers bring to overseas functions
+beyond what is already covered by Department of State officers (who
+themselves receive training in security procedures with DHS assistance
+under terms of a DHS-State MOU)? To what extent will VSP officers play
+a liaison role to build up cooperation with their host country law
+enforcement counterparts?
+ Answer: Each department has a separate focus, responsibility, and
+area of expertise. Visa Security Officers (VSOs) focus on visa issues
+and individual applicants that raise national and homeland security
+concerns, whereas Consular Officers manage the day-to-day adjudication
+of visa applications while also keeping security a high priority. VSOs
+bring extensive subject matter expertise to this process, including
+knowledge of immigration law, counter terrorism, document analysis,
+investigations, intelligence research and dissemination, interviewing
+and fraud detection. VSOs are seasoned, highly skilled officers with
+experience in criminal enforcement outside, at, and within the border,
+including potential abuses of the visa process. As law enforcement
+officers, VSOs are best equipped to interpret, evaluate, and apply this
+information. VSOs will coordinate with other law enforcement
+authorities and appropriate DHS headquarters components to gather
+information necessary to refuse visas to individuals who pose security
+concerns, and to investigate abuses of the visa system. At post, VSOs
+will participate in the terrorist lookout committee and other relevant
+groups, and will build relationships with the u.S. law enforcement
+community,. VSOs will assist with intelligence research, investigative
+activity, risk assessment, and other collaborative law enforcement
+efforts.
+
+ 33. What plans does DHS have for the reported ``Immigration
+Security Initiative,'' i.e. placing CBP inspectors at foreign hub
+airports to pre-screen U.S.-bound passengers? Have the concerned
+foreign governments agreed to this and, if so, with what conditions?
+How many inspectors might be required, and does the fiscal year 2005
+budget cover this program?
+ Answer: The Immigration Advisory Program (IAP), formerly known as
+the Immigration Security Initiative (ISI) began a pilot program on June
+26, 2004, with the deployment of four U.S. Customs and Border
+Protection (CBP) Officers to Schiphol Airport, the Netherlands. After
+the advice and consent of CBP's international partners in customs and
+immigration, CBP Commissioner Bonner renamed this program from ISI to
+IAP. A second effort began at Warsaw's Chopin Airport on September 15,
+2004, with the deployment of five CBP Officers.
+ The IAP is based on a concept that is recognized and endorsed by
+the International Air Transport Association/Control Authority Working
+Group (IATA/CAWG). In fact, IATA/CAWG developed a code of conduct for
+the Immigration Liaison Officer (ILO). Other like-minded countries,
+Canada, United Kingdom, Australia and the Netherlands have similar
+programs in place.
+ The number of officers needed depends on the flight and passenger
+volume at each location. At major overseas hubs many U.S. bound flights
+depart within a narrow time frame. Therefore, there will be a need for
+more officers at those locations.
+ Congress added $2 million in fiscal year 2005 to expand the program
+to new locations.
+
+ 34. How can BTS leverage its resources for greater effectiveness of
+its overseas personnel? For example, can VSP officers carry out pre-
+inspection tasks on behalf of CBP? How has BTS organized its component
+units overseas to ensure that they are coordinated and can complement
+one another?
+ Answer: The structure of the DHS international organization is
+currently under review. BTS in particular is considering ways to better
+share resources and responsibilities and to improve coordination and
+communication among overseas components.
+
+ 35. What plans does BTS have to attract qualified personnel and
+build up a cadre of officers with the necessary functional, linguistic
+and international expertise as mandated in Section 428 of the Homeland
+Security Act?
+ Answer: BTS has developed a staffing model for the visa security
+offices overseas and has defined selection criteria for Visa Security
+Officers (VSOs). These criteria include: law enforcement expertise,
+including investigations; counterterrorism experience; fraud document
+detection training and experience; knowledge of immigration law;
+experience working overseas in a diplomatic and interagency
+environment; and language capabilities. The law enforcement career
+tracks within the BTS components of ICE and CBP provide a large
+available cadre of personnel with these types of functional expertise,
+including experience working overseas. BTS has been very successful
+recruiting volunteers to serve in the program and will continue to tap
+this highly skilled pool of personnel. Once selected, the officers will
+receive mission-specific training that refreshes functional skills and
+prepares VSOs to serve in this unique capacity. BTS will continue to
+address the government-wide shortage of language-qualified personnel by
+providing significant language training to the VSOs.
+
+Counter-Narcotics
+ 36. In the Homeland Security Act, the Department was organized to
+include a dedicated Counter-Narcotics Officer on your staff who is to
+ensure adequate focus of homeland security resources to the counterdrug
+mission. This Counter-Narcotics Officer is also designated as the U.S.
+Interdiction Coordinator (USIC) and reports to the Director of the
+Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) on the overall national
+interdiction effort. How effective has this dual position been? What
+organizational relationship is there between the positions of the
+Undersecretary and the Counter-Narcotics Officer? Does the Department
+of Homeland Security have the resources necessary to attack the current
+drug threat while keeping up with its other responsibilities?
+ Answer: The position of DHS Counternarcotics Officer was created as
+an advisor to the Secretary of Homeland Security, not part of BTS
+staff. The current CNO serves in multiple roles as ONDCP Director of
+Intelligence, as United States Interdiction Coordinator, and as DHS
+counternarcotics officer. I meet regularly with the CNO, and two of my
+staff are located in his office. These actions help ensure the closest
+coordination possible on counternarcotics issues.
+
+Questions Submitted by the House Select Committee on Homeland Security,
+ Minority Staff
+
+ 1. According to recent testimony from Dr. Randy Null and additional
+discussions with TSA staff, there are 30--40 airports that would see
+security and efficiency benefits by implementing in-line screening
+systems. However, TSA has signed Letters of Intent with only eight
+airports, and does not plan to expand to significantly more airports.
+What is the Department's plan for implementing Letters of Intent at
+more airports, especially at those that aren't currently able to
+electronically screen all checked baggage?
+ Answer: While numerous airports have expressed interest in entering
+into an LOI for an in-line baggage screening solution, TSA continues to
+use its available funding for EDS installation work at airports that
+have yet to achieve, or cannot maintain, compliance with the 100
+percent electronic screening requirement at all airports. TSA is
+working with airports that will not be able to maintain compliance with
+the 100 percent electronic screening requirement because of increased
+passenger loads, increased and/or additional air carrier service, and/
+or airport terminal modifications and expansions. The President's
+Budget for fiscal year 2005 supports previously issued 8 LOIs for 9
+airports, and assumes a 75/25 cost share formula as set in the
+Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003. TSA also provides support
+to some airports that have not received an LOI, by providing additional
+funding to install equipment to accommodate increased passenger loads
+and new air carrier service. Although 8 LOIs have been issued, TSA
+continues to evaluate situations where an in-line solution makes sense
+from the standpoint of security, efficiency, and reduced staffing
+needs.
+
+ 2. Congress has instituted a cap of 45,000 TSA screeners. Recent
+reports indicate that many airports are understaffed, which leads to
+detection equipment going unused; transfer of screeners away from
+baggage checkpoints to passenger checkpoints, leaving too few screeners
+inspecting checked baggage, and an increase in delay times. Do you
+believe that 45,000 screeners is the optimal workforce size? Would you
+support a detailed study of how many people are needed to appropriately
+conduct airport screening?
+ Answer: TSA is committed to providing strong security and the best
+possible customer service while working within the 45,000 screener cap
+set by Congress. TSA is creating a more flexible workforce, better
+coordinating airline schedules and passenger load with staffing needs,
+increasing the proportion of part-time to full-time screeners, and
+strategically using its mobile National Screener Force to meet seasonal
+fluctuations in workload. TSA expects to have a parttime screener
+workforce of close to 20 percent by the end of 2004. Part-time
+screeners create additional operational flexibility when scheduling
+screeners to satisfy varying levels of demand. As a result of reducing
+excess capacity at periods of lower demand, TSA is seeking to make more
+FTEs available to the system as a whole during peak periods.
+ In the short-term, TSA is also revising its screener allocation
+methodology which will be completed in 2004.\1\ The approach calls upon
+modeling capabilities and actual operational experience. The revised
+allocation will not be similar to the right-sizing that occurred last
+year, but rather will be modest adjustments based on items such as
+forecasted air travel, hours of operation, baggage screening areas,
+passenger checkpoint lanes, types of equipment and screener Standard
+Operating Procedures as well as FSD input and involvement. TSA is
+shaping the airport's screener staffing levels based on direct input
+from FSDs and will regularly monitor these numbers to ensure staffing
+levels are appropriate based on work force needs.
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ \1\ After the date of this hearing, TSA completed its revisions of
+the allocation of screeners. The numbers were announced on May 14, 2004
+and reflect a modest adjustment to a workforce already functioning for
+the last six months at the 45,000 full-time equivalent cap.
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ Simultaneously, TSA is in the process of conducting a needs
+assessment to determine the optimal number of screeners at each
+airport. This is a longer-term project that will evaluate many
+different factors and variables need to be weighed in order to complete
+a thorough study that can be used for all airports across the country.
+To ensure the project's success, TSA has partnered with the aviation
+industry to form the U.S. Commercial Aviation Partnership, which is
+studying trends in aviation and providing better forecasting to TSA
+regarding changes that are expected in traffic patterns and airport
+demand. The needs assessment effort will also draw on TSA's operational
+experience. TSA believes that both precise forecasting and an
+operational record are critical enablers of an accurate needs
+assessment to ensure that resources are allocated in the most optimal
+manner.
+
+ 3. Why is the operations budget of the Federal Air Marshal Service
+being cut in this request? If it is because Secret Service and other
+federal law enforcement officers are substituting on some flights, what
+level of training are those officers receiving to act as air marshals?
+ Answer: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) continues to view
+the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) as a fundamental component of
+our national security plan and overall counter-terrorism efforts. The
+services provided by the FAMS are integral to our efforts to instill
+and sustain public confidence in our civil aviation system and for
+providing an expanded law enforcement capability in our skies that
+previously did not exist. In fact, within the span of roughly two and a
+half years the FAMS has fielded a trained work force of literally
+thousands of FAMSs to protect America's citizens and interests in our
+commercial air transportation system.
+ In this same time, DHS has also worked with the Congress to invest
+in, develop and implement a layered security plan that encompasses the
+coordinated efforts of an entire spectrum of Federal, State and local
+agencies. These agencies are working together to provide an array of
+intelligence, enforcement and protection services to our civil aviation
+system, our borders and to other areas vital to the nation. Under this
+strategy, we have established mechanisms and programs designed
+specifically to complement one another. For example, DHS has invested
+in cutting edge technology for airport and baggage screening
+activities; we have hardened cockpit doors; we have established a
+Federal flight deck officer training program; and we are continuously
+working to apply the latest intelligence information in shaping our
+decision-making and response to terrorist threats.
+ The fiscal year 2005 budget request reflects this layered approach.
+Not only does it include a request that represents a 32 percent
+increase over the fiscal year 2003 level but it also includes a $600
+million request for TSA to increase aviation security and a $10 million
+dollar request for Science & Technology efforts to supports the FAMS.
+ The Department is evaluating ways to best leverage the law
+enforcement resources of other ICE programs and federal law enforcement
+agencies in general, in improving our aviation security/counter-
+terrorism efforts. These initiatives include the Mission Surge Program,
+which pairs Federal Air Marshals with ICE agents during peak threat
+periods, and the Force Multiplier Program (FMP). Through the FMP,
+participating agencies are provided a computer based training to
+prepare Federal law enforcement officers to react within the unique
+aircraft environment in fan in-flight crisis. Participating Federal law
+enforcement officers traveling in their normal course of business are
+not replacements for Federal Air Marshals. However, the FMP is intended
+to allow FAMS planners to better manage and allocate Federal Air
+Marshal resources and otherwise improve coverage of priority flights of
+interest.
+
+ 4. The GAO recently reported that the CAPPS II systems had met only
+one of eight requirements and that several management and program
+objectives were still undeveloped. What is the Department's timeline
+for initial operating capability, full operating capability, and
+deployment of the CAPPS II system? What specific activities will be
+supported with the increased funding requested for fiscal year 2005?
+ Answer: After a lengthy review, DHS has announced the creation of
+the new Secure Flight program, which will serve as the next generation
+domestic airline passenger passenger prescreening program. Secure
+Flight will shift responsibility for conducting airline passenger pre
+screening from the airlines to TSA by checking domestic airline
+passenger name records against the consolidated terrorism watch list
+maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), and applying a
+modified version of the CAPPS I rules currently operated by the Air
+Carriers.
+ Secure Flight will only be implemented after it has undergone
+rigorous and complete testing to ensure that it effectively strengthens
+the security of travel by air, adequately protects passenger privacy,
+and enhances the free flow of commerce. Testing, using historical
+passenger name record information is slated to begin no later than
+December 1, 2004. Secure Flight is expected to be operational in fiscal
+year 2005. TSA will ensure that GAO has access to applicable
+information regarding Secure Flight.
+ TSA would spend the $60 million requested for fiscal year 2005 in
+the following manner:
+
+ TSA would spend the $60 million requested for fiscal year 2005 in the
+ following manner:
+
+
+
+Secure Flight Testing...................................... $5.25M
+Commercial Data Testing.................................... 2.50M
+Air Carrier Interface...................................... 15.50M
+Secure Flight Operations................................... 17.00M
+Physical Infrastructure.................................... 13.25M
+Technical Services......................................... 6.50M
+
+
+ 5. Provide funding levels for NEXUS and SENTRI programs for fiscal
+year 2003, 2004 and 2005. Please include vendor cost estimates on
+upgrade and maintenance as well as any estimates on equipment cost for
+expansion of NEXUS, and creation of enrollment centers.
+ Answer: The information follows. CBP has been unable to identify
+any appropriated funding for SENTRI.
+
+
+ Fiscal Year Fiscal Year
+ Current Budget & Projections Fiscal Year 2003 2004 2005
+ Budget Budget Budget
+
+NEXUS........................................................ $5,600,000 0 0
+SENTRI....................................................... 0 0 0
+
+Budget Requirements..........................................
+NEXUS Fiscal Year 2005
+Maintenance.................................................. $3,000,000
+Marketing.................................................... 500,000
+Pilot Programs............................................... 1,000,000
+New Sites.................................................... 3,000,000
+Miscellaneous Expenses 1,000,000
+ (training/signage/travel/etc.).............................
+Enhanced Enrollment Process.................................. 2,000,000
+Total........................................................ $10,500,000
+
+SENTRI-VehicIe Fiscal Year 2005
+SENTRI Expansion............................................. $8,400,000
+SENTRI Maintenance........................................... 3,300,000
+Marketing.................................................... 1,000,000
+Application Processing Center................................ 5,000,000
+Total........................................................ $17,700,000
+
+SENTRI Pedestrian Fiscal Year 2005
+Pedestrian SENTRI Expansion.................................. $7,800,000
+Pedestrian SENTRI Maintenance (not required.................. 0
+ 1st year)..................................................
+Total........................................................ $7,800,000
+
+NEXUS/SENTRI-Marine Fiscal Year 2005
+Expansion.................................................... $6,000,000
+Maintenance 0
+ (not required 1st year)....................................
+Marketing.................................................... 1,000,000
+Total........................................................ $7,000,000
+
+
+
+
+