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+
+ - HOMELAND CYBERSECURITY AND DHS ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE BUDGET HEARING FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005
+
+[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
+[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
+
+
+
+
+ HOMELAND CYBERSECURITY AND DHS
+ ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE BUDGET
+ HEARING FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005
+
+=======================================================================
+
+ HEARING
+
+ before the
+
+ SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY,
+ SCIENCE, AND RESEARCH AND
+ DEVELOPMENT
+
+ of the
+
+ SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
+ HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
+
+ ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
+
+ SECOND SESSION
+
+ __________
+
+ MARCH 30, 2004
+
+ __________
+
+ Serial No. 108-44
+
+ __________
+
+ Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security
+
+
+ Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
+ house
+
+
+ __________
+
+ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
+23-174 WASHINGTON : 2005
+_____________________________________________________________________________
+For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
+Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
+Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�0900012005
+
+
+ SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
+
+
+
+ Christopher Cox, California, Chairman
+
+Jennifer Dunn, Washington Jim Turner, Texas, Ranking Member
+C.W. Bill Young, Florida Bennie G. Thompson, MississPpi
+Don Young, Alaska Loretta Sanchez, California
+F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
+Wisconsin Norman D. Dicks, Washington
+W.J. (Billy) Tauzin, Louisiana Barney Frank, Massachusetts
+David Dreier, California Jane Harman, California
+Duncan Hunter, California Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland
+Harold Rogers, Kentucky Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New
+Sherwood Boehlert, New York York
+Lamar S. Smith, Texas Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
+Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Nita M. Lowey, New York
+Christopher Shays, Connecticut Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey
+Porter J. Goss, Florida Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
+Dave Camp, Michigan Columbia
+Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida Zoe Lofgren, California
+Bob Goodlatte, Virginia Karen McCarthy, Missouri
+Ernest J. Istook, Jr., Oklahoma Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
+Peter T. King, New York Bill Pascrell, Jr., North Carolina
+John Linder, Georgia Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
+John B. Shadegg, Arizona Islands
+Mark E. Souder, Indiana Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
+Mac Thornberry, Texas Ken Lucas, Kentucky
+Jim Gibbons, Nevada James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
+Kay Granger, Texas Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
+Pete Sessions, Texas Ben Chandler, Kentucky
+John E. Sweeney, New York
+
+ John Gannon, Chief of Staff
+
+ tephen DeVine, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel
+
+ Thomas Dilenge, Chief Counsel and Policy Director
+
+ David H. Schanzer, Democrat Staff Director
+
+ Mark T. Magee, Democrat Deputy Staff Director
+
+ Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
+
+ ______
+
+ Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, and Research & Development
+
+ Mac Thornberry, Texas, Chairman
+
+Pete Sessions, Texas, Vice Chairman Zoe Lofgren, California
+Sherwood Boehlert, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
+Lamar Smith, Texas Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey
+Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
+Dave Camp, Michigan Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
+Robert W. Goodlatte, Virginia Islands
+Peter King, New York Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
+John Linder, Georgia Ken Lucas, Kentucky
+Mark Souder, Indiana James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
+Jim Gibbons, Nevada Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
+Kay Granger, Texas Ben Chandler, Kentucky
+Christopher Cox, California, ex Jim Turner, Texas, ex officio
+officio
+
+ (ii)
+
+
+ C O N T E N T S
+
+ ----------
+ Page
+
+ STATEMENTS
+
+The Honorable Mac Thornberry, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
+ Cybersecurity, Science, and Research and Development
+ Oral Statement................................................. 1
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 2
+The Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Representative in Congress From the
+ State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
+ Cybersecurity, Science, and Research and Development........... 2
+The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of California, and Chairman, Select Committee on
+ Homeland Security.............................................. 22
+The Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in Congress From the
+ State of Texas, Ranking Member, Select Committee on Homeland
+ Security
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 4
+The Honorable Robert E. Andrews, a Representative in Congress
+ From the State of New Jersey................................... 33
+The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Delegate in Congress From
+ the U.S. Virgin Islands........................................ 27
+The Honorable Jennifer Dunn, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of Washington........................................ 29
+The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of North Carolina.................................... 31
+The Honorable Jim Gibbons, a Representative in Congress From the
+ State of Nevada................................................ 25
+The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
+ From the State of Rhode Island................................. 36
+The Honorable Kendrick B. Meek, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of Florida........................................... 41
+
+ WITNESSES
+
+Mr. Robert Liscouski, Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure
+ Protection, Department of Homeland Security
+ Oral Statement................................................. 5
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 8
+Mr. Steven Cooper, Chief Information Officer, Department of
+ Homeland Security
+ Oral Statement................................................. 14
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 18
+
+ APPENDIX
+
+Questions for Assistant Secretary Robert Liscouski:
+ Questions from Congressman Dave Camp........................... 45
+ Questions from Congressman Sherwood Boehlert................... 46
+ Questions from Congressman Mac Thornberry and Congresswoman Zoe
+ Lofregn...................................................... 47
+ Questions from Congressman Jim Turner.......................... 54
+
+Questions for Chief Information Officer Steven Cooper:
+ Questions from Congressman Mac Thornberry and Congresswoman Zoe
+ Lofgren...................................................... 56
+
+
+ HOMELAND CYBERSECURITY AND DHS
+
+ ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE BUDGET HEARING FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005
+
+ ----------
+
+
+ Tuesday, March 30, 2004
+
+ House of Representatives,
+ Select Committee on Homeland Security,
+ Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science,
+ and Research and Development,
+ Washington, D.C.
+ The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:06 a.m., in
+Room 2325, Rayburn House Office
+ Building, Hon. Mac Thornberry [chairman of the
+subcommittee] presiding.
+ Present: Representatives Thornberry, Smith, Camp, Linder,
+Gibbons, Cox (ex officio),
+ Lofgren, Andrews, (Del.) Christensen, Etheridge, Lucas,
+Langevin, Meek, and Turner (ex officio).
+ Also Present: Representative Dunn.
+ Mr. Thornberry. The hearing will come to order. I would
+like to welcome our witnesses and guests to this hearing of the
+Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, and Research and
+Development.
+ Last year, we received a number of perspectives on
+cybersecurity from academia, think tanks, the technology
+industry, government agencies, users, and others. All want the
+Department to succeed in its mission to protect our Nation. All
+emphasized the importance of cyberspace and the need for
+stronger cybersecurity in government, industry, academia, and
+at home.
+ Now, as we move into the second year of the Department of
+Homeland Security there remain many areas in cybersecurity in
+need of improvement. Cyber is an area that can touch across
+virtually every aspect of our lives, from electrical grids,
+airport control towers, manufacturing, banking, chemical
+plants, and many other areas.
+ With the creation of the National Cybersecurity Division
+last June, I was pleased the Department acknowledged the need
+to consolidate the cyber mission into an organization that
+could have one voice in dealing with international, Federal,
+State, local, and private sectors. However, over the course of
+recent months I have been concerned that many of the
+cybersecurity resources within the Department remain fragmented
+and have not been integrated under the Cybersecurity Division.
+ Our Nation needs a seamless, well-functioning organization
+within the Department to work with industry, other government
+elements, academia, and the home user. That is part of the
+external cybersecurity mission of the Department.
+ But there is also an internal cybersecurity mission for the
+Department. The Chief Information Officer has responsibility
+for protecting the Nation's most sensitive data that has been
+entrusted to the DHS to counter terrorism against the homeland.
+As the Department develops its enterprise architecture, privacy
+and classified information are two areas that must be
+considered as the networks from the 22 agencies are brought
+together.
+ I also believe that the Department must be a role model for
+the rest of government as well as the private sector in how
+they secure their own information infrastructure. DHS needs to
+``walk-the-talk'' and achieve the highest standards within the
+Federal Government and cybersecurity. The creation of the
+Department should also result in efficiencies through
+integration and also find the most effective use of resources.
+ I look forward to hearing about your progress in both areas
+over the course of the past year.
+
+ Prepared Statement of The Honorable Mac Thornberry, Chairman, Select
+ Committee on Homeland Security
+
+ I would like to welcome our witnesses and guests to today's
+hearing.
+ Last year, this subcommittee received a number of perspectives on
+cybersecurity, from academia, think tanks, the technology industry,
+government agencies, users, and others. All want the Department of
+Homeland Security to succeed in their mission to protect our nation.
+All emphasized the importance of cyberspace and the need for stronger
+cybersecurity in government, industry, academia, and at home.
+ As we move into the 2nd year for the Department of Homeland
+Security, there remain many areas in cybersecurity in need of
+improvement. Cyber is an area that cross-cuts virtually very aspect of
+our lives. Electrical grids, airport control towers, manufacturing,
+banking, chemical plants, and many other areas are dependent upon their
+computers, information, and networks to be reliable and secure from
+attacks.
+ With the creation of the National Cybersecurity Division (NCSD)
+last June, I was pleased that the Department acknowledged the need to
+consolidate the cyber mission into an organization that could have
+``one voice'' in dealing with international, federal, state, local and
+private sectors. However, over the course of recent months, I am
+concerned that many of the cybersecurity resources within the
+Department remain fragmented and have not been integrated under NCSD.
+ Our nation needs a seamless and well-functioning organization
+within the Department to work across industry, other government
+elements, academia, and the home user. That is part of the external
+cybersecurity mission for the Department of Homeland Security.
+ There is also an internal cybersecurity mission for the Department.
+The Chief Information Officer has the responsibility for protecting our
+nation's most sensitive data that has been entrusted to DHS to counter
+terrorism against the homeland. As the Department develops its
+enterprise architecture, privacy and classified information are two
+areas that must be considered as the networks from the 22 agencies are
+brought together.
+ I also believe the Department must be a role model for the rest of
+the government--as well as the private sector--in how they secure their
+own information infrastructure. DHS needs to ``walk the talk'' and
+achieve the highest standards within the federal government in
+cybersecurity. The creation of the Department should result in
+efficiencies through integration and also find the most effective use
+of resources. I look forward to hearing about your progress and plans
+for the coming year.
+
+ Before we turn to our witnesses, let me yield to the
+distinguished ranking member, the gentlelady from California.
+ Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry.
+ The Select Committee on Homeland Security is in the process
+of tracking the first ever authorization bill through the
+Department of Homeland Security, and I believe that today's
+hearing before this subcommittee will serve as an important
+part of the authorization process. We will focus on
+cybersecurity activities of the Infrastructure Protection
+Directorate and will explore the information technology and
+enterprise architecture issues facing the agency, and it will
+give us an opportunity to understand resource and policy issues
+pertaining to the budget request for the next fiscal year.
+ In addition, members may explore additional legislative
+issues relevant to the Director's activities for possible
+inclusion into the authorization bill.
+ Certainly, we have no shortage of issues to discuss with
+our witnesses today. Earlier this month President Bush and
+Secretary Ridge celebrated the first anniversary of the
+creation of the Department of Homeland Security. At the event,
+the President said, quote, one of the most important steps we
+have taken to fight terrorism is creating the Department of
+Homeland Security combined under one room with a clear chain of
+command many agencies responsible for protecting our Nation.
+Creating the newest department of our Federal Government was a
+tough task that required a lot of hard work, changing some old
+habits in order to merge into a new department. Unquote.
+ I think this assessment of the Department is pretty
+optimistic, and I know that while rank and file employees have
+worked very hard over this past year to get it up and running,
+I am not convinced that the leadership of the Department of
+Homeland Security should be celebrating at this time,
+particularly in the area of cybersecurity.
+ I am concerned about cyber policy in the Department. I am
+not convinced that cybersecurity is a priority within the
+overall Department of Homeland Security, and I am troubled by
+the lack of concrete cybersecurity accomplishments over the
+past year.
+ The release of the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace
+was at the beginning of 2003. This policy paper established
+cybersecurity goals. At the end of 2003, the Department of
+Homeland Security convened a cybersecurity summit with major
+players in the technology industry in the Silicon Valley. Other
+than these two events, I am just not familiar with the work
+that is going on in DHS, and I think I am safe in saying that
+members of this subcommittee are somewhat frustrated.
+ The threat of a cyber attack is very real. In 2003, we saw
+increasing worm and virus spreads, and Business Week estimated
+that the damage from worms last year alone was over $13
+billion.
+ Today's witnesses are Mr. Robert Liscouski, Assistant
+Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, Information Analysis,
+and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, and Mr. Steven
+Cooper, Chief Information Officer of the Department of Homeland
+Security. I hope that the witnesses today will be able to
+reassure this subcommittee that work is being done within the
+Department and that cybersecurity in fact is a priority for the
+administration.
+ I would also like to note my frustration at the tardiness
+with which the statements were delivered to the committee. The
+rules of the Homeland Security Committee prescribe that
+witnesses who wish to submit a written statement shall file
+them--not may, but shall file them 72 hours prior to the
+hearing. Mr. Liscouski's statement was filed 14 hours prior to
+this committee and Mr. Cooper's statement was filed 45 minutes
+before the committee hearing, and I think that that is a real
+disservice to every member of the committee as we obviously
+have not had the time to really study Mr. Cooper's statement or
+Mr. Liscouski's statement.
+ Before concluding, I would like to thank the chairman of
+this committee, Mr. Thornberry, who has led our committee with
+great skill and intelligence, and I appreciate his leadership.
+Thank you.
+ Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentlelady, and let me echo her
+frustration with the delays in having the statements before us.
+Obviously, it makes it more difficult for all of us to do our
+job well.
+ Let me just, as a brief aside on timing. My understanding
+is that we will have votes roughly around 11:30. Mr. Liscouski
+also has another hearing in the Intelligence Committee around
+that time, and so I don't want to limit anything but the
+briefer we can all be in our questions and responses we can
+cover more territory. I appreciate both of our witnesses.
+Without objection, other members of course may submit opening
+statements for the record.
+
+ Prepared Statement of the Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in
+ Congress From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
+ Cybersecurity, Science, and Research & Development
+
+ Thank you Mr. Chairman.
+ Good Morning Gentlemen. Mr. Liscouski, it is a pleasure to have you
+testify before our Committee again. Mr. Cooper, I believe this is the
+first time you have appeared before us--welcome.
+ The Department of Homeland Security's cybersecurity mission is two-
+fold. First, it is the key agency responsible for coordinating our
+nation's efforts to protect our computer networks and critical
+infrastructures. Second, it must ensure that its own information
+technology systems are well-integrated and armed with appropriate
+safeguards.
+ We recognize that these tasks are not easy but they must be done to
+help ensure the security of our homeland. The ever-changing nature of
+technology means that the Department must have the best expertise,
+personnel, tools, and full authority to effectively accomplish its
+mission.
+ Unfortunately, the Department is not making the progress needed to
+secure our nation from a cyber attack. It is also not moving quickly
+enough to integrate and protect its own information technology systems.
+ Mr. Liscouski, six months ago you appeared before this Subcommittee
+and told us that the Department, having finally found a Director to
+lead its cybersecurity efforts, was undertaking significant initiatives
+to further our country's efforts to secure cyberspace and prepare and
+respond to network attacks. To date, however, the cybersecurity
+initiatives that the have been unveiled have not gotten us much further
+than we were before the creation of the Department. Indeed, some of the
+initiatives appear to duplicate existing efforts.
+ Let me just mention a few specific areas in which I see the
+Department's efforts lagging.
+ First, it is not apparent to me that the Department
+ has in place the ability and authority to direct other agencies
+ with specific expertise in the event of a cyber crisis.
+ Second, the Department does not appear to have an
+ effective and meaningful public--private cybersecurity
+ partnership. Many in the private sector have little or no idea
+ what you are doing, what is expected of them, or how they are
+ supposed to integrate and coordinate with the Department.
+ Third, the Department has not sufficiently moved
+ forward with the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace
+ released by the Administration a year ago. Why haven't we yet
+ seen clear assignments of responsibilities and deadlines for
+ the Strategy's implementation? If it is because the strategy
+ won't work or is ineffective--we need to know that.
+ Lastly, Mr. Liscouski, the Department's 2005 budget
+ does not clearly lay out what your directorate is planning to
+ do to further our cybersecurity efforts. We've only seen broad
+ assertions and categories of activities. There seems to be
+ lacking a clear vision on what the Department is doing to
+ secure cyberspace.
+ Mr. Cooper, I must say I am equally concerned about the state of
+the Department's efforts to build robust information technology systems
+within the Department and secure its own internal networks. There are
+specific areas, in particular, for which I am concerned.
+ First, the Department's efforts to date have been too
+ slow. Just last week, I saw one official stating that simple e-
+ mail can't get passed to people in the same office and that it
+ takes hours for e-mail to bounce around the Department to reach
+ its destination. We won't win the war on terror if Homeland
+ Security officials can't even talk to each other.
+ Second, good and consistent information technology
+ policies can help speed the integration of terrorist watch
+ lists, strengthen the security of our borders, and allow us to
+ ``connect the dots'' to find terrorists. It worries me, Mr.
+ Cooper, that you have publicly suggested that a consolidated
+ watchlist may not be necessary. In my view, achieving this goal
+ is critical for making our homeland security programs work.
+ Third, it is not clear to me, Mr. Cooper, that you
+ have the sufficient authority to coordinate and direct the
+ divisional Chief Information Officers within the Department. If
+ this is a problem, I hope that you will be candid with us
+ regarding any additional authorities your position requires.
+ Lastly, this past December, the Department received a
+ 34--the lowest grade of any agency--in the Government Reform
+ Committee's annual grading of agencies on the security of their
+ computer systems. The Department should be setting an example
+ for the rest of government to follow--not trailing at the back
+ of the class.
+ Gentleman, I thank you for appearing before our Committee today to
+address these important issues.
+
+ I appreciate both of our witnesses being here today. Let me
+first call on Robert Liscouski, Assistant Secretary for
+Infrastructure Protection at the Department of Homeland
+Security.
+
+ STATEMENT OF ROBERT LISCOUSKI, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
+ INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
+
+ Mr. Liscouski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and distinguished
+members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to be
+here this morning.
+ As you pointed out, I am responsible for infrastructure
+protection at the Department of Homeland Security, and I am
+pleased to be here before you today to discuss our progress
+that we have made in the National Cybersecurity Division and to
+discuss the President's fiscal year 2005 budget request.
+ In today's highly technical and digital world, we recognize
+that attacks against us may manifest themselves in many forms,
+including both physical and cyber attacks. And in addition, we
+recognize the potential impact of collateral damage from any
+one attack to a variety of assets. This interconnected and
+interdependent nature of our infrastructure makes our physical
+and cyber assets difficult to separate, and it would be
+irresponsible to address them in isolation.
+ The integrated approach that DHS takes toward protection of
+physical and cyber assets and responsive threats and protection
+of its vulnerabilities enables us to consider the full range of
+risks to the Nation, including loss of life, destruction of
+infrastructure services, economic impact, and national security
+implications. Recognizing that future terrorist attacks may not
+be limited to either physical or cyber acts but rather a
+combination of the two to amplify the impact, my office is
+organized to examine and address threats and vulnerabilities
+across the nation's infrastructure by using a five-step risk
+management methodology that measures the Nation's risk profile
+in the context of and in the absence of threat information.
+Those major steps of the risk management methodology include
+the identification of the critical infrastructure assets, the
+assessment of vulnerabilities, the normalization analysis and
+prioritization of protective measures, implementing protective
+programs, and then finally the measurement of effectiveness and
+performance outputs so we can determine whether what we are
+doing is the right thing.
+ The National Cybersecurity Division was created in June of
+2003 to serve as a national focal point for the public and the
+private sectors to address the cybersecurity issues and to
+coordinate the implementation of a national cyber strategy to
+secure cyberspace.
+ Under that mandate, the National Cybersecurity Division has
+been working closely with our partners in the Federal
+Government, the private sector, and academia on a variety of
+programs and initiatives to protect our information
+infrastructure. We recognize that the challenge is vast and
+complex, that the threats are multi-faceted and global in
+nature, and that our strengths and our vulnerabilities lie in
+our interdependencies; that the environment changes rapidly,
+and that information sharing and coordination are crucial to
+improving our overall national and economic security.
+ The activities of the National Cybersecurity Division then
+are based on this understanding and designed to address each of
+the priorities set forth in the National Strategy to Secure
+Cyberspace.
+ Priority one, a national cyberspace secure response system;
+ Priority two, a national cyberspace security threat and
+vulnerability reduction program;
+ Priority three, a national cyberspace security awareness
+and training program;
+ Priority four, securing the government's cyberspace; and,
+ Priority five, national security and international
+cyberspace security cooperation.
+ When I appeared before the committee--before the
+subcommittee in September of 2003, I announced that Mr. Amit
+Yoran was to become the Director of the National Cybersecurity
+Division. Under his leadership, the division has aggressively
+pursued partnerships and programs and is building a strong team
+to meet its objectives. I also announced the creation of the
+U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, or the US-CERT. The US-
+CERT is a key component of our cyber strategy and readiness and
+response system and the National Cybersecurity Division's
+operational arm. The US-CERT provides a national coordination
+center that links public and private response capabilities to
+facilitate information sharing across infrastructure sectors
+and to help protect and maintain the continuity of our Nation's
+cyber infrastructure.
+ On 28 January of this year, the Department of Homeland
+Security through the US-CERT unveiled the National Cyber Alert
+System. It is an operational system developed to deliver
+targeted and timely and actionable information to Americans to
+secure their computers. At the U.S. government, we have the
+responsibility to alert the public of imminent threats and to
+provide protective measures where we can, and minimally to
+provide information necessary for the public to protect their
+systems.
+ The day we inaugurated the system, the US-CERT site
+received more than 1 million hits. And today, from the first
+few weeks of that site, we have more than 250,000 direct
+subscribers who receive the National Cybersecurity Alert
+information to enhance their cybersecurity. And I urge you all
+to visit that site at www.US-CERT.gov, to subscribe to our
+information services.
+ To facilitate the preparation interagency and public-
+private cooperation coordination during and to recover from
+cyber incidents, we have created the Cyber Interagency Incident
+Management group, or Cyber IIMG. The Cyber IIMG coordinates
+intergovernmental preparedness and operations to respond to and
+recover from cyber incidents and attacks. The group brings
+together senior officials from national security, law
+enforcement, defense, intelligence, and other government
+agencies that maintain significant cybersecurity capabilities
+and that can bring to bear in response to an incident and,
+importantly, possess the necessary statutory authority to act.
+ We have also broadened our interagency partnerships to
+create two new groups addressing the various challenges before
+us. The first is a Chief Information Security Officers Forum,
+CISO Forum, established to provide a trusted venue for our
+government information security offices to collaborate and
+share effective practices, initiatives, capabilities,
+successes, and challenges.
+ The second group is the Government Forum of Incidents
+Response and Security Teams, FIRST, a group of technical and
+tactical practitioners of security response teams responsible
+for securing government information technology systems. GFIRST
+members work together to understand and handle computer
+security incidents and to encourage proactive and preventive
+security practices.
+ One of our most important constituencies of course is the
+private sector, because as you well know it is estimated that
+85 percent of America's critical infrastructure is owned and
+operated by the private sector, and technology developed by the
+industry continues to fuel the growth and the evolution of the
+Internet.
+ In December 2003, the Cybersecurity Division co-hosted the
+first National Cybersecurity Summit, which allowed the
+Department to work side by side with leaders in industry to
+address key cybersecurity issues facing the Nation. The Cyber
+Division is also working closely with research and academic
+communities to better educate and train future cyber analysts,
+and we are participating in the National Science Foundation
+Scholarship For Service, or the Cyber Corps program as well as
+the National Security Agency's Information Assurance Centers
+for Excellence, academic excellence in 26 States, for which
+there are 50 centers.
+ The National Cybersecurity Division is only 9 months old,
+but these initiatives represent considerable progress toward
+making cybersecurity a reality and reflect our collective
+commitment to do much more. Each accomplishment fosters further
+activity which we have outlined in our fiscal year 2005 budget.
+The national cybersecurity budget for fiscal year 2005 request
+is $79 million, and it is based upon ongoing and future
+activities necessary to meet our mission.
+ The division is positively exploiting the work of its
+predecessors and building crucial partnerships as part of DHS's
+overall efforts to enhance the protection of our Nation's
+critical infrastructure. We have much to do and it will take
+time, resources, dedication, energy, and hard work to succeed.
+We are committed to that challenge, and we look forward to the
+opportunities to update the subcommittee on our progress.
+ We are also approaching the next National Cybersecurity
+Day, I would like to point out, which is this Sunday. And as
+Americans turn their clocks forward, we also urge them to take
+this opportunity to review and improve their cyber readiness.
+ Again, I thank you for the opportunity to testify before
+you today, and I would be pleased to answer the questions at
+your convenience.
+ [The statement of Mr. Liscouski follows:]
+
+ Prepared Statement of the Honorable Robert Liscouski
+
+ Good morning, Chairman Thornberry and distinguished Members of the
+Subcommittee. My name is Robert Liscouski, and I am the Assistant
+Secretary for Infrastructure Protection in the Department of Homeland
+Security (DHS). I am pleased to appear before you today to provide an
+update on the Department's National Cyber Security Division's efforts
+in coordinating cyber security initiatives since my appearance in
+September 2003 and to discuss the President's FY 2005 budget request
+for the Division. In my testimony today, I will share information on a
+number of initiatives that use diverse channels of communication to
+reach our government partners as well as our mutual constituents--home
+users, small and medium-sized businesses, and corporations.
+
+Introduction
+ March 1st marked the one-year anniversary of the Department of
+Homeland Security. In his remarks commemorating that day, Secretary
+Ridge stressed the Department's goal to strengthen information sharing
+and infrastructure protection over the next year. We in the Information
+Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP) take that
+mandate to heart in our collective efforts and activities to protect
+the Nation. Established by the Homeland Security Act, the IAIP
+Directorate leads the Nation's efforts to protect our critical
+infrastructures from attack or disruption, and under the leadership of
+Under Secretary Frank Libutti has made significant strides toward that
+objective.
+ The IAIP Directorate includes the Office of Information Analysis,
+the primary gathering and analytic center for threat information and
+intelligence within DHS, and the Office of Infrastructure Protection
+(IP), for which I am responsible. In today's highly technical and
+digital world, we recognize that attacks against us may manifest in
+many forms, including both physical and cyber attacks. In addition, we
+recognize the potential impact of collateral damage from any one attack
+to a variety of assets. This interconnected and interdependent nature
+of our infrastructure makes our physical and cyber assets difficult to
+separate, and it would be irresponsible to address them in isolation.
+The placement of our two offices within the Directorate underscores
+this linkage and enables us to work together to share intelligence and
+other information and coordinate our efforts to mitigate our
+vulnerabilities. Further, IP's component divisions work closely
+together to coordinate efforts regarding both physical and cyber
+threats and vulnerabilities and to develop plans that address the
+interdependencies between them.
+ Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD 7), released by
+President Bush on December 17, 2003, requires the development of a
+National Infrastructure Protection Plan that sets out a roadmap for
+assessing both physical and cyber vulnerabilities and, once the
+vulnerabilities are determined, articulating the protective actions
+that need to be taken. As such, IAIP takes a holistic view of critical
+infrastructure vulnerabilities and works to protect America from all
+threats by ensuring the integration of physical and cyber security
+approaches in the Directorate's Office of Infrastructure Protection.
+ This integrated approach to physical and cyber threats and
+vulnerabilities enables us to consider the full range of risks to the
+Nation, including loss of life, disruptions of infrastructure services,
+economic impact, and national security implications. Recognizing that
+future terrorist attacks may not be limited to either a physical or
+cyber act, but rather a combination of the two to amplify impact, IP
+includes the National Cyber Security Division, the Protective Security
+Division, the Infrastructure Coordination Division, and the National
+Communications System and is organized to examine and address threats
+and vulnerabilities across the Nation's infrastructure by using a five-
+step risk management methodology that measures the national risk
+profile in the context, and absence, of threat information. The major
+steps of our risk management methodology include:
+
+ Identification of critical infrastructure
+ Assessing vulnerabilities
+ Normalizing, analyzing, and prioritizing protective
+ measures
+ Implementing protective programs
+ Measuring effectives through performance metrics
+ By performing each of these steps continuously across and within
+each critical infrastructure sector, and by integrating threat
+information, we are continually improving our national critical
+infrastructure protection program--physical and cyber--and driving
+better correlation of protective programs to the dynamic threat
+environment.
+ National Cyber Security Division Mission: Coordinating our National
+Cyber Security
+ In support of the broader IAIP mission, the National Cyber Security
+Division was created in June 2003 to serve as a national focal point
+for the public and private sectors to address cyber security issues and
+to coordinate the implementation of the National Strategy to Secure
+Cyberspace released by the President in February 2003.
+ Under that mandate, the National Cyber Security Division has been
+working closely with our partners in the federal government, the
+private sector, and academia on a variety of programs and initiatives
+to protect our information infrastructure. We recognize that the
+challenge is vast and complex, that the threats are multi-faceted and
+global in nature, that our strengths--and our vulnerabilities--lie in
+our interdependencies, that the environment changes rapidly, and that
+information sharing and coordination are crucial to improving our
+overall national and economic security. The activities of the National
+Cyber Security Division, then, are based on this understanding and are
+designed to address each of the priorities set forth in the National
+Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (``the Strategy''):
+ Priority I:A National Cyberspace Security Response System
+ Priority II: A National Cyberspace Security Threat and
+ Vulnerability Reduction Program
+ Priority III: A National Cyberspace Security Awareness and
+ Training Program
+ Priority IV: Securing Government's Cyberspace
+ Priority V:National Security and International Cyberspace
+ Security Cooperation
+
+ Meeting the Mandate: Readiness and Response
+ The National Cyber Security Division's primary overarching goal
+since its creation has been to enhance the Nation's Cyberspace Security
+(Readiness and) Response System (Priority I) that will, where possible,
+deter and prevent a cyber attack from occurring, limit its scope and
+impact on the critical infrastructures, and expedite recovery. In
+October 2003, we participated in Livewire, the first ever national-
+level cyber exercise to baseline our capabilities and communication
+paths for responding to national attack. The exercise involved over 300
+participants representing more than 50 organizations across federal,
+state, and local governments and the private sector. Cyber attack
+simulation scenarios were developed to stress cyber interdependencies
+across our critical infrastructures and baseline our ability to
+collaborate across the public and private sectors. The information
+gleaned from Livewire validated the National Cyber Security Division's
+approach and activities. In that context, I will outline the National
+Cyber Security Division's accomplishments to date and discuss on-going
+and future programs that all serve to enhance our national cyber
+security.
+ When I appeared before the Subcommittee in September 2003, I
+announced the appointment of Mr. Amit Yoran as the Director of the
+National Cyber Security Division. Under his leadership, the Division is
+aggressively pursuing partnerships and programs and building a strong
+team to meet its objectives. I also announced the creation of the U.S.
+Computer Emergency Readiness Team, or US-CERT. US-CERT is a key
+component of our Cyber Security Readiness and Response System and the
+National Cyber Security Division's operational arm. Through its initial
+partnership with the CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC) at Carnegie
+Mellon University, US-CERT provides a national coordination center that
+links public and private response capabilities to facilitate
+information sharing across all infrastructure sectors and to help
+protect and maintain the continuity of our Nation's cyber
+infrastructure. The overarching approach to this task is to facilitate
+and implement systemic global and domestic coordination of deterrence
+from, preparation for, defense against, response to, and recovery from,
+cyber incidents and attacks across the United States, as well as the
+cyber consequences of physical attacks. To this end, US-CERT is
+building a cyber watch and warning capability, launching a partnership
+program to build situational awareness and cooperation, and
+coordinating with U.S. Government agencies and the private sector to
+deter, prevent, respond to and recover from cyber--and physical--
+attacks.
+ One direct impetus of the Livewire exercise was to validate the
+importance of building a cyber information dissemination mechanism to
+reach our stakeholders. On January 28, 2004, the Department of Homeland
+Security through USCERT unveiled the National Cyber Alert System, an
+operational system developed to deliver targeted, timely and actionable
+information to Americans to secure their computer systems. As the U.S.
+Government, we have a responsibility to alert the public of imminent
+threats and to provide protective measures when we can, or least
+provide the information necessary for the public to protect their
+systems. The offerings of the National Cyber Alert System provide that
+kind of information, and we have already issued several alerts and the
+initial products of a periodic series of providing ``best practices''
+and ``how-to'' guidance. We strive to make sure the information
+provided is understandable to all computer users, technical and non-
+technical, and reflects the broad usage of the Internet in today's
+society. I am pleased to report that Americans are exhibiting a keen
+interest in the alert system. On January 28th, the day we inaugurated
+the system, the US-CERT site received more than one million hits.
+Within the first few weeks, more than 250,000 direct subscribers
+received National Cyber Alerts to enhance their cyber security. For
+your reference and for your constituents, I urge you to visit www.us-
+cert.gov to subscribe to a number of our information services to
+facilitate protecting your computer systems. As we increase its
+outreach, the National Cyber Alert System is looking at other vehicles
+to distribute information to reach as many Americans as possible.
+ The Livewire exercise reiterated the critical need for government
+to share information and coordinate efforts at cyber incident
+preparation that enhance our effectiveness in responding to cyber
+activity. To facilitate preparation and interagency and public-private
+coordination during, and to recover from cyber incidents, we created a
+Cyber Interagency Incident Management Group, or Cyber IIMG. The Cyber
+IIMG coordinates intra-governmental preparedness and operations to
+respond to, and recover from, cyber incidents and attacks. The group
+brings together senior officials from national security, law
+enforcement, defense, intelligence, and other government agencies that
+maintain significant cyber security capabilities that they can bring to
+bear in response to an incident and, importantly, possess the necessary
+statutory authority to act. By meeting monthly, the Cyber IIMG is
+developing cyber preparedness and response plans that will help it to
+support the IIMG during national events with cyber implications, and
+ensure that during a cyber crisis the full range and weight of federal
+capabilities are deployed in a coordinated and effective fashion.
+ To enhance the level of communication among federal agencies in a
+crisis, DHS' IP is continuing to widen the reach of the Critical
+Infrastructure Warning Information Network, or CWIN. For those who are
+not familiar, CWIN is a technologically advanced, secure network for
+infrastructure protection, communication and cooperation, alert, and
+notification. As a private communications network, CWIN serves as a
+reliable and survivable network with no logical dependency on the
+Internet or the public switched network. In the event a significant
+cyber attack disrupts our telecommunications networks and/or the
+Internet, CWIN provides a secure and survivable capability for members
+to communicate. It is important for us to understand and prepare for
+any contingency. In this vein, DHS is extending the reach of CWIN's
+survivable architecture beyond federal agencies by working with
+critical private sector companies to establish CWIN nodes at their
+Network Operations Centers. The goal is to increase the number of CWIN
+nodes to 100 by the end of 2004, making it a robust and resilient
+capability that supports national cyber operations and response during
+times of crisis.
+ Key components of the National Cyber Security Division's efforts
+are laid out in Priority IV of the Strategy: Securing Government's
+Cyberspace. Consistent with law and policy, the National Cyber Security
+Division works with the Office of Management and Budget and the
+National Institute of Standards and Technology regarding the security
+of federal systems and coordinates with federal law enforcement
+authorities as appropriate. We have taken great steps to integrate
+existing frameworks into the system, such as the continued
+functionality of the Federal Computer Incident Response Center
+(FedCIRC) is being transitioned within US-CERT, as well as to create a
+new forum for coordination toward greater cyber security in the federal
+government.
+ We have also broadened our interagency partnerships to create two
+new groups addressing the various challenges before us. The first is
+the Chief Information Security Officers Forum (CISO Forum), established
+to provide a trusted venue for our government information security
+officers to collaborate and share effective practices, initiatives,
+capabilities, successes and challenges. The second is the Government
+Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (GFIRST), a group of
+technical and tactical practitioners of security response teams
+responsible for securing Government information technology systems.
+GFIRST members work together to understand and handle computer security
+incidents and to encourage proactive and preventative security
+practices. The purpose of the GFIRST peer group is to:
+
+ Provide members with technical information, tools,
+ methods, assistance and guidance;
+ Coordinate proactive liaison activities and analytical
+ support;
+ Further the development of quality products and
+ services for the federal government;
+ Share specific technical details regarding incidents
+ within a trusted U.S. Government environment on a peer-to-peer
+ level; and
+ Improve incident response operations.
+ The National Cyber Security Division has taken on aggressive plans
+for accelerated information sharing and collaboration efforts in both
+the CISO Forum and GFIRST. Already, both groups have increased
+information sharing horizontally across previously somewhat stove-piped
+organizations and improved the overall cyber preparedness of the U.S.
+Government.
+
+Meeting the Mandate: Assessment and Analysis
+ A major component of the National Cyber Security Division's mission
+is our focus within the Office of Infrastructure Protection to
+coordinate efforts on physical and cyber threat and vulnerability
+identification and assessment, and the implementation of protective
+measures to reduce vulnerabilities that will enable IAIP to
+systemically address the security status of U.S. networks and the cyber
+components and dependencies of our critical infrastructures. This
+effort directly responds to the calls in the Strategy and HSPD 7 to:
+
+ Develop a National Infrastructure Protection Plan;
+ Complete and maintain a critical cyber asset
+ inventory;
+ Implement and expand standard methodologies to perform
+ threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments;
+ Develop and maintain an interdependency analysis
+ capability to systematically understand the relationships
+ between cyber and physical assets; and
+ Identify and implement priority protective measures to
+ mitigate vulnerabilities.
+ The National Cyber Security Division currently houses a number of
+operational, data analysis, and other diagnostic tools to assist in
+assessing our vulnerabilities. The US-CERT is developing a
+comprehensive Watch Operation that will provide a 24x7 single point of
+contact for national cyber incident detection, evaluation, response,
+coordination, and restoration. Some key tools that US-CERT funded and/
+or executed include:
+
+ Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE), a dictionary
+ of standard names for vulnerabilities that makes it possible to
+ correlate information across vendor products
+ Malware Analysis, a laboratory operation performing
+ detailed analysis and characterization of malicious code to
+ adequately notify the Government of specific dangers and
+ threats to the critical infrastructure
+ Security Analysis Program (SAP), a set of analysis
+ tools and capabilities offered through US-CERT to (1) help
+ agencies better monitor network security activity; (2) assist
+ agencies in identifying configuration problems, unauthorized/
+ unnecessary network traffic, network backdoors, and routing
+ anomalies; and (3) gain better global situational awareness of
+ network health and malicious activity. The use of these tools
+ by the federal civilian agencies represents one way that we are
+ transferring technology used by the military to increase our
+ overall capabilities.
+ As part of our efforts to improve our situational awareness and
+analysis capabilities, the National Cyber Security Division is
+coordinating with the National Communications System (NCS) on the
+Global Early Warning Information System (GEWIS). GEWIS is an effort
+underway within IAIP to find a wide variety of sources, including open
+source and approved private information, which can be analyzed to
+provide better situational awareness of the Internet and its underlying
+infrastructures. GEWIS will allow DHS to assess the health of the
+Internet in a timelier manner and, as a result, coordinate with the
+appropriate stakeholders in responding to Internet events. GEWIS is
+currently being used by IP in conjunction with other resources to
+provide the current situational awareness capability. GEWIS is
+continuing to evolve, and over time will provide enhanced
+functionality.
+
+Meeting the Mandate: Awareness, Outreach, and Cooperation
+ So far I have discussed the accomplishments we have made in
+readiness and response, assessment, analysis, and warning efforts at
+the National Cyber Security Division. Another major component of our
+work lies in the outreach and awareness programs that support every
+aspect of our efforts to improve and sustain cyber security. The
+Strategy clearly identifies the users and stakeholders in cyber
+security in Priority III as home users and small business, large
+enterprises, institutes of higher education, the private sectors that
+own and operate the vast majority of the Nation's cyberspace, and state
+and local governments. In Priority V, the Strategy also emphasizes that
+international cooperation is crucial to protecting ourselves in a world
+where attacks cross borders at light speed. The following components
+make up the National Cyber Security Division's outreach and awareness
+programs and serve as the basis for our recently initiated Partnership
+Program.
+ One of our most important constituencies is the private sector. It
+is estimated that eighty-five percent of Americas critical
+infrastructure is owned and operated by private companies, and
+technology developed by industry continues to fuel the growth and
+evolution of the Internet. In December 2003, the National Cyber
+Security Division co-hosted the first National Cyber Security Summit in
+Santa Clara, California with the Information Technology Association of
+America, TechNet, the Business Software Alliance, and the U.S. Chamber
+of Commerce. This event was designed to energize the public and private
+sectors to implement the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. The
+Summit allowed the Department of Homeland Security to work side-by-side
+with leaders from industry to address the key cyber security issues
+facing the Nation. Five interest areas were established to focus
+specifically in the areas of:
+
+ Increasing awareness
+ Cyber security early warning
+ Best practices for information security corporate
+ governance
+ Technical standards and common criteria
+ Security across the software development lifecycle
+ Perhaps most importantly, the Summit served as a call to action. It
+represented a logical transition point from developing a national
+strategy to energizing the public-private partnership to implement
+concrete, measurable actions to improve the security of America's cyber
+systems. The efforts of these working groups as well as those of other
+industry leaders will be vital as we move forward in implementing the
+National Strategy.
+ In addition to the National Cyber Security Summit, the National
+Cyber Security Division is working with a host of groups to better
+understand and address their cyber security issues and concerns. These
+groups include, among others, the President's National Infrastructure
+Advisory Council, the President's National Security Telecommunications
+Advisory Committee, and the private sector Information Sharing and
+Analysis Centers (ISAC). As a result of the working relationships that
+have been developed among state and local cyber security
+representatives, we are also facilitating a multi-state ISAC that will
+even further enhance information sharing at the state and local levels.
+ The National Cyber Security Division is also working closely with
+the research and academic communities to better educate and train
+future cyber analysts. We are participating in the National Science
+Foundation's Scholarship for Service, or ``Cyber Corps'' program as
+well as the National Security Agency's fifty Information Assurance
+Centers for Academic Excellence in twenty-six states. We are looking at
+a number of additional ways to raise cyber security awareness in our
+educational and professional programs, including exploring the K-12
+curriculum with the Department of Education and exploring the
+possibility for the private sector to create independent information
+technology certification programs for IT security professionals.
+ A crucial role for the National Cyber Security Division is to
+cooperate and leverage expertise within the Department of Homeland
+Security. Within IP, the National Cyber Security Division coordinates
+with the Protective Security Division (PSD) on our physical and cyber
+interdependencies and activities. In addition, it works closely with
+the National Communications System (NCS), which runs the CWIN program
+and the Global Early Warning Information System (GEWIS) described
+above, and brings NCS's telecommunications system expertise to its
+efforts. Through its integrated approach to addressing the critical
+infrastructure, the Office of Infrastructure Protection also
+coordinates efforts with the 13 critical infrastructure sectors laid
+out in HSPD 7 and their respective Information Sharing and Analysis
+Centers (ISACs). The National Cyber Security Division coordinates
+closely with IP's Infrastructure Coordination Division on the cyber
+elements of their efforts.
+ In addition to our coordinated work within IP, the National Cyber
+Security Division works with a number of other DHS organizations. Close
+linkage between the Office of Infrastructure Protection and the Office
+of Information Analysis, led by Assistant Secretary Patrick Hughes,
+promotes the ability to map threat information with cyber
+vulnerabilities. This mapping allows for the effective prioritization
+of potential risks so agencies may implement remediation efforts as
+quickly as possible to limit the impact of computer incidents.
+ The technology that drives cyber security needs and product demands
+develops very rapidly in today's environment. Therefore, IAIP and the
+Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) are working together to
+coordinate research and development activities in the important areas
+of critical infrastructure protection and cyber security. A program of
+regular, interactive meetings between the two directorates ensures a
+two-way flow of information and coordination of technical activities.
+S&T's cyber security portfolio scope and activities are driven by the
+threats and issues that warrant national-level concerns, including
+cyber attacks by hostile adversaries against the Nation's critical
+infrastructures, or attacks whose consequences are of sufficient
+magnitude to cause widespread economic or social disruptions. The
+National Cyber Security Division provides important input regarding the
+research and development requirements for S&T's cyber security
+portfolio based on its activities and insight into the needs for
+greater protection of our cyber systems. Initial technical emphases for
+the Cyber Security Portfolio include:
+
+ Improving the security of Internet infrastructure
+ protocols and developing migration paths for these protocols
+ into commercial use;
+ Research, development, testing, and evaluation
+ investments aimed at next-generation cyber security
+ technologies aimed at prevention of and protection against
+ attacks; threat identification and tracking; monitoring,
+ detection, and attribution of attacks; and immediate as well as
+ longer-term response to attacks;
+ Economic assessment and modeling to support the
+ development of business cases for cyber security in addition to
+ providing a foundation for risk-based cyber security decision
+ making.
+ I have addressed many of our national efforts, but I want to
+emphasize our international partnership efforts as well. As the
+Strategy says, ``America's cyberspace is linked to that of the rest of
+the world.'' Cyberspace is truly borderless, and our communications
+networks are inarguably interconnected. We need to defend our systems
+from the outside, but we can only do so with global cooperation and
+coordination. Therefore, the National Cyber Security Division's
+Partnership Program includes outreach and advocacy efforts with our
+global partners, through US-CERT outreach activities and in bilateral
+and multilateral discussions in conjunction with the Department of
+State, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Defense.
+ The National Cyber Security Division is only nine months old, but
+these initiatives represent considerable progress toward making cyber
+security a reality and reflect our collective commitment to do more.
+Each accomplishment fosters further activity, which we have outlined in
+our FY 2005 budget request.
+
+National Cyber Security Division Budget Request FY 2005
+ The National Cyber Security Division Budget Request of $ 79 million
+for the fiscal year 2005 is based on the on-going and future activities
+necessary to meet our mission. The budget plan is organized around
+National Cyber Security Division's program initiatives in (1) Readiness
+and Response; (2) Strategic Initiatives; (3) Information Sharing and
+Coordination; and (4) Management and Administration. Please let me
+highlight some key initiatives in the plan.
+
+Readiness and Response
+ The core building block for an effective National Cyberspace
+Security Readiness and Response System is the U.S. Computer Emergency
+Readiness Team (US-CERT).
+ US-CERT will require full funding of $59.3 million for its various
+existing and projected programs, including sustaining and improving the
+GEWIS, CWIN, Watch, and other programs described above. In its
+inaugural year, US-CERT is making significant progress in establishing
+critical operational capabilities and building key relationships within
+government, private industry, and academia. To further these
+advancements, FY05 will be a significant year for the US-CERT to
+continue building and enhancing present capabilities into even more
+responsive and robust ones.
+
+ Strategic Initiatives
+ The National Cyber Security Division's Vulnerability Assessment and
+Reduction Program in response to HSPD 7 is a central aspect of its
+Strategic Initiative endeavors, and the requested funding of $7.0
+million will build upon the initial efforts undertaken in FY03 and
+FY04. Additional aspects of the Strategic Initiatives program include
+software assurance efforts, continued awareness and training efforts,
+and a series of tabletop and other exercises including a second
+Livewire exercise, our participation in the National-Level Exercise
+Program, and a planned set of cyber-specific tabletop exercises at the
+State and local level.
+
+Information Sharing and Coordination
+ A critical aspect of the National Cyber Security Division's
+activities is outreach to the public and private stakeholders in the
+U.S. and interaction with global partners. $8.7 million will be used to
+support a variety of public awareness campaigns and outreach efforts--
+such as continued support of the Stay Safe Online campaign--as called
+for in the Strategy. IAIP will also build and expand international
+partnerships to raise cyber security awareness and cooperation to
+promote a global culture of security. Most importantly, it accomplishes
+the operational partnership executive of information sharing and
+collaboration.
+
+Management and Administration
+ The National Cyber Security Division is building a significant team
+of technical and security experts and determining the infrastructure it
+needs in support of its numerous initiatives toward greater national
+cyber security.
+
+Conclusion
+ The creation of the National Cyber Security Division reflects the
+recognition that we as a Nation are utilizing sophisticated information
+networks to increase productivity, encourage innovation in products and
+services, enhance daily lives, and communicate globally in an instant.
+Importantly, we are also using these innovations to enhance our
+national and economic security, facilitate our law enforcement and
+public safety efforts, and protect our individual privacy. As
+technology has developed, we have found more exciting ways to use it,
+and we have become increasingly dependent on it. But, we have also
+acknowledged that its proliferation across our critical
+infrastructures--the very same proliferation that makes us more
+advanced as a society and an economy--also makes us vulnerable to those
+who would use it to harm us. IAIP, through the coordinated efforts of
+its component divisions including the National Cyber Security Division,
+is working diligently to address those vulnerabilities and provide
+greater security without stunting the growth and benefits of the
+digital economy for all Americans. We are approaching the next National
+Cyber Security Day this Sunday, and as Americans turn their clocks
+forward, we will also be urging them take the opportunity to review--
+and improve--their cyber readiness.
+ In its short life, the National Cyber Security Division is
+positively exploiting the work of its predecessors, leveraging the
+existing expertise around it, and building crucial partnerships as part
+of DHS' overall efforts to enhance the protection of our Nation's
+critical infrastructures. We have addressed crucial operational
+components of our program and are improving them, and we are developing
+strategic plans for the future. We know we still have much to do and
+that it will take time, resources, dedication, energy, and hard work to
+succeed. We are committed to that challenge, and we look forward to
+future opportunities to update the Subcommittee on our progress.
+ Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I
+would be pleased to answer any questions you have at this time.
+
+ Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
+ Now we turn to Mr. Steven Cooper, who is the Chief
+Information Officer for the Department of Homeland Security.
+
+ STATEMENT OF STEVEN COOPER, CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER,
+ DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
+
+ Mr. Cooper. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee,
+good morning. I am Steve Cooper, Chief Information Officer for
+the Department of Homeland Security. It is my pleasure to
+appear before the subcommittee, and I wish to thank the
+chairman and members for providing me the opportunity to update
+you on our efforts and progress in integrating and securing
+information systems within the Department and to discuss the
+President's fiscal year 2005 budget for information technology.
+I would request that my written testimony be entered into the
+record.
+ Mr. Thornberry. Without objection, your testimony shall be
+in the record.
+ Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
+ The challenges facing those of us who comprise the
+information technology function of the Department of Homeland
+Security is complex. There are three major areas of focus.
+ The first is to ensure that the women and men on the front
+lines of the Department have all of the information technology
+enabled solutions and tools they need to safeguard the United
+States and to deliver our safety and service-related
+operational functions and capabilities. The war on terrorism is
+real, and we must deliver new mission solutions with quality
+and speed in a cost effective manner while maintaining already
+existing mission solutions that we inherited when the
+Department was formed.
+ The second area addresses the integration of IT enabled
+solutions. Guided by our enterprise architecture, we are
+identifying opportunities to consolidate and streamline mission
+solutions. In mission areas like threat identification and
+management, identity credentialing, in collaboration we have
+identified multiple solutions in use within the various
+organizational elements of the Department. Our goal is to help
+facilitate and support the operators and subject matter experts
+in our business units, and determine the optimal number and
+nature of mission solutions needed.
+ And the third area is to realize efficiency and economies
+of scale that the President and Congress have set forward when
+creating the Department of Homeland Security. Here, we must
+rapidly identify and eliminate existing overlap or redundancy
+within our IT infrastructure within the Department. However, we
+must ensure that we do no harm to mission solutions while we
+restructure and consolidate our infrastructure. In this case,
+we really are changing the tires on the car while it is moving.
+ In order to guide the information technology function in
+achieving success in these three overarching focus areas, I
+have, in concert with our Department of Homeland Security CIO
+Council, set eight priority force the IT function. I would like
+to share these with the committee.
+ Very quickly, they are: Information sharing, mission
+rationalization, IT portfolio management, information security,
+infrastructure transformation, enterprise architecture, IT
+governance, and IT human capital.
+ These priorities are aligned with the strategic priorities
+of the Department set forth by Secretary Ridge and Deputy
+Secretary Loy. For each priority, we are in the process of
+developing a case for change, the business case, a road map
+that outlines the activities, tasks, and deliverables needed to
+achieve the desired objectives and metrics by which we will
+measure success. I would like to highlight two of these eight.
+ First is enterprise architecture. In my previous
+testimonies, I have discussed the vision of strategy of DHS and
+how that strategy must be supported by a disciplined capital
+planning investment control process that is guided by business-
+driven enterprise architecture. With the release of the first
+version of enterprise architecture in September 2003, we made
+progress toward the goal of achieving, one, Department of
+Homeland Security IT infrastructure. Version 1 of the
+enterprise architecture describes a target information
+management infrastructure that will be dramatically different
+from the one we have today, one that will provide timely,
+accurate, useful, and actionable information to all individuals
+and stakeholders who require it all of the time. We believe
+this effort was truly unique in the Federal Government, and
+that we delivered a comprehensive and immediately useful target
+enterprise architecture in less than 4 months.
+ Version 1 of our enterprise architecture contributed to
+some of our investment decisions for fiscal year 2005. Work is
+currently under way on Version 2 of the enterprise
+architecture. This work will develop additional detail around
+the target architecture and enhance the transition strategy
+from Version 1 into a more detailed transition plan that will
+specifically enable the implementation of the target enterprise
+architecture.
+ Version 2 is currently on track for completion by the end
+of this fiscal year. Along with continuing the hard work of
+developing greater detail, we will continue reaching deeper to
+find more opportunities to consolidation and begin to develop
+new and improved mission support capabilities enabled by
+information technology.
+ Version 2 of the enterprise architecture, together with the
+associated transition plan, will serve as the basis for further
+improving DHS mission performance and facilitating information
+technology, alignment, integration, and consolidation.
+ DHS is a new organization formed a little over a year ago
+from 22 legacy agencies, each with their own culture,
+processes, and legacy information technology systems. Many of
+these legacy agencies had developed their own enterprise
+architectures prior to the establishment of the Department. The
+challenge for us is to implement an integrated DHS enterprise
+architecture, bringing together the good work that has been
+done within each of the organizational elements and, during
+that process, ensuring that the entire Department has the IT
+capabilities needed to accomplish our mission capabilities
+every day.
+ One challenge to achieving integrated homeland security
+enterprise architecture is having enterprise architecture that
+is sufficiently mature to support detailed alignment and
+analysis for IT investment management decision making. We used
+Version 1 to identify what we called quick hits, and these are
+outlined in release one of our enterprise architecture; we are
+currently developing Version 2 to support more detailed
+investment decision making.
+ Another potential challenge is overcoming resistance to
+change and obtaining management and organizational buy-in into
+our enterprise architecture initiative. The Department has
+placed a very high priority on our efforts. Deputy Secretary
+Loy has directed the major organizational components of DHS to
+participate in the development of Version 2. As we speak, there
+are more than five different business focus area teams
+comprised of subject matter experts from across the Department
+working in facilitated team sessions to make sure that the
+business model for enterprise architecture Version 2 accurately
+and comprehensively captures the capabilities and requirements
+needed to accomplish the Department's mission. The extent of
+each organizational element's participation in these business
+area focus teams is reported to the DHS Management Council and
+monitored on a bi-weekly basis.
+ The development of an enterprise architecture is an
+enormously complex process requiring considerable resources and
+a systematic methodology. However, DHS has already made good
+progress in meeting the goals of our desired target enterprise
+architecture. We are well on our way to consolidating many of
+the management functions from each of the 22 agencies,
+including financial and human resources. We have reduced to 10,
+19 financial management service providers. We have moved from
+13 separate contracting offices to eight. We have moved from 22
+human resource offices to seven. We have moved from eight
+different payroll systems to three, and department experts
+expect to reduce this to one by the end of the year. And we
+have moved from 22 property management systems to three.
+ These are a few up-to-date examples of the progress we are
+making. It is, however, clear that we still have a long way to
+go.
+ I would like to highlight our fiscal year 2005 budget
+request very quickly.
+ Information contributes to every aspect of homeland
+security and is a vital foundation of the homeland security
+effort. My office has responsibility for providing IT
+leadership that will foster best management practices in
+managing IT, enhance efficiencies through shared services and
+coordination of acquisition strategies, ensuring systems are
+properly accredited and certified as secure, and being an
+advocate for business transformation, all necessary toward
+ensuring that our homeland is more secure. The leadership and
+funding provided through the Department's IT investments are
+crucial for maintaining an enterprise architecture that is
+fully integrated with other management processes, and for
+allowing the Department to participate in many of our e-Gov
+initiatives across the Federal enterprise.
+ The President's budget request for fiscal year 2005
+includes a request for 226 million for departmentwide
+information technology investments. Included in the request is
+$95 million for information technology services, a portion of
+which will provide funding for the departmentwide geographic
+information system capability to improve the Department's
+enterprise portal. This funding provides for continuation of
+our enterprise architecture and planning efforts to address our
+evolving financial management system, eMERGE2, and funding to
+enable the development, the beginning of the development of our
+human resources information technology solutions.
+ Additionally, the request includes $31 million for
+information security-related activities.
+ Finally, the fiscal year 2005 budget request includes $100
+million for wireless communications.
+ I would like to highlight some key things related to one of
+our eight priorities in closing, and that is information
+security.
+ Since its creation, the Department of Homeland Security has
+moved out aggressively to design and implement an information
+security program that will not only ensure compliance with all
+appropriate standards and regulations, but to also ensure that
+the entire Homeland Security community has a secure and trusted
+computing environment from which to operate. The heart of our
+reporting structure is built around the congressional
+requirements expressed in FISMA, the Federal Information
+Security Management Act. In order to effect a comprehensive
+information security program, and in accordance with the
+provisions of FISMA, I have designated a Chief Information
+Security Officer who manages and oversees all the internal
+Homeland Security Department's information systems security
+activities. The FISMA report details compliance with Federal
+laws and policies and DHS information security policies and
+standards. DHS is in the process of implementing enterprise
+management tools to ensure the accuracy and completeness of
+FISMA reporting across the Department.
+ FISMA requires each agency to perform for each program and
+system periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of
+information security policies, procedures, and practices. We do
+follow and will apply the Self-Assessment Guide for Information
+Technology Systems from the National Institute of Standards and
+Technology and as mandated by law. This self-assessment guide
+utilizes an extensive questionnaire which we have already begun
+using in delivering our first Department of Homeland Security
+report.
+ I have selected a commercial off-the-shelf product called
+``Trusted Agent FISMA''. This is an automated enterprise based
+management tool that maintains FISMA reporting data from all of
+our components and their plans and activities that captures and
+tracks security weaknesses and associated corrective
+milestones. In addition, it collects, processes, and stores all
+of the self-assessment information in accordance with the NIST
+guidance. We have deployed this system throughout DHS and have
+generated our first quarterly report. We expect this to improve
+the timeliness and accuracy of our reporting as this
+information is available real-time to the Secretary and other
+cognizant officials.
+ I thank you again for the opportunity to testify before you
+today, and am pleased to answer questions that the committee
+may have.
+
+ Prepared Statement of Steven Cooper, Chief Information Officer, U.S.
+ Department of Homeland Security
+
+ Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
+ Good morning, I am Steve Cooper, Chief Information Officer for the
+Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It is my pleasure to appear
+before the Subcommittee, and I wish to thank the Chairman and Members
+for the providing me the opportunity to update you on our efforts and
+progress in integrating and securing information systems within the
+Department and to discuss the President's FY 2005 budget request for
+Information Technology. I will also update the Subcommittee on our
+Enterprise Architecture program efforts.
+
+ Enterprise Architecture
+ In his proposal for creating the Department over a year ago the
+President highlighted the use of enterprise architecture techniques to
+improve both the sharing and use of information. The President stated
+that the ``development of a single enterprise architecture for the
+department would result in elimination of the sub-optimized,
+duplicative, and poorly coordinated systems that are
+prevalent in government today. There would be rational prioritization
+of projects necessary to fund homeland security missions based on an
+overall assessment of requirements rather than a tendency to fund all
+good ideas beneficial to a separate unit's individual needs even if
+similar systems are already in place elsewhere.''
+ In my previous testimonies, I've discussed the vision and strategy
+of DHS and how that strategy must fulfill the President's vision.
+Additionally, it must be supported by a disciplined capital planning
+and investment control process that is guided by business-driven
+enterprise architecture. With release of the first version of the
+enterprise architecture in September 2003, we made progress toward the
+goal of one DHS infrastructure. Version 1 of the enterprise
+architecture describes a target information management infrastructure
+that will be dramatically different from the one we have today, one
+that will provide timely, accurate, useful and actionable information
+to all individuals who require it all the time. We believe this effort
+was truly unique in the federal government in that we delivered a
+comprehensive and immediately useful target enterprise architecture in
+less than four months.
+ However, Version 1 of the Homeland Security Enterprise Architecture
+(HLS EA) defines the enterprise architecture at a conceptual level and
+outlines a general transition strategy that must be broken down further
+for the architecture to be implemented. Version 1, which was published
+at the end of September 2003:
+ Identified common activities
+ Proposed conceptual projects
+ Proposed reusable business components
+ Proposed Technology Patterns
+ Began communications effort
+ Increased understanding of EA planning and
+ integration
+ Increased the knowledge of the target
+ architecture
+ Work is currently under way on Version 2 of the enterprise
+architecture. This work will develop additional detail around the
+target architecture and enhance the transition strategy from Version 1
+into a more detailed transition plan that will more specifically enable
+the implementation of the target enterprise architecture. This effort
+currently consists of 5 business teams composed of about 45 business
+people charged with the responsibility of decomposing the common
+business activities. During this effort for Version 2, we will:
+ Verify and augment transitional projects
+ Verify and augment reusable business components
+ Verify and augment technology patterns
+ Prepare an HLS-EA Framework that identifies the
+ products that will be produced by the department and that are
+ expected to be produced by the Transitional Project Managers
+ Prepare governance procedures and bodies to ensure
+ alignment with the HLS-EA
+ Ensure the integration of the transitional projects
+ Concurrently with the Version 2 effort, the enterprise architecture
+team is working with several large project offices, e.g., ACE and US-
+VISIT, to determine alignment to the transition strategy so that these
+project offices can immediately begin building to the target
+architecture.
+ Version 2 is currently on track for completion early in the 4th
+quarter, FY04. Along with continuing the hard work of developing
+greater detail, we will continue reaching deeper to find more
+opportunities for consolidation and opportunities to develop new and
+improved mission support capabilities enabled by information
+technology. Version 2 of the enterprise architecture, together with the
+associated transition plan, will serve as the basis for further
+improving DHS mission performance and facilitating IT alignment,
+integration, and consolidation.
+
+Technical Reference Model Status
+ In Version 1 of the EA, we developed the DHS Technical Reference
+Model (TRM) by extending the TRM from the Office of Management and
+Budget Federal (OMB) Enterprise Architecture (FEA). The value of the
+TRM is to provide a common set of terminology for describing and
+organizing technology. We are currently working on further developing
+the DHS TRM by improving the structure of technology categories so that
+they promote consistency and are more meaningful across the Department.
+ In addition, we have made progress on filling in the Standards
+Profile (SP). The Standards Profile provides guidance to the components
+and major programs on what technologies to use to implement solutions
+to ensure consistency and interoperability with other solutions within
+the Department and the homeland security community. Our approach is to
+collect all of the technology standards from the component CIO offices
+and to organize them into the revised TRM for analysis. In many cases,
+the standards in place are consistent across the components and these
+consensus standards will be adopted as the Departmental standard.
+Standards that are adopted fall, generally, into four categories: Move-
+to, Divest, Hold, or Contain. As part of the process, we have assigned
+``stewardship'' of specific standards to individuals within my CIO shop
+or to other appropriate individuals in the Department. As the standards
+are developed, they reviewed by the Applied Technology Working Group,
+in accordance with the EA Governance Process as a part of the IT
+strategic management framework, and are adopted by the Enterprise
+Architecture Board (EAB).
+ One particular area where the TRM from the EA Version 1 has been
+useful is in guiding investment in IT is in the area of ``technology
+patterns.'' Patterns are repeatable solutions to recurring technical
+challenges that are based on best practices, typically from industry.
+In Version 1 of the EA, we identified over a dozen patterns that have
+significant applicability within the Department. As a result, one of
+the major business/IT initiatives within the Department, the
+eMERGE2 program of the Resource Management Transformation
+Office (RMTO) has adopted the pattern approach and is in the process of
+acquiring technologies that implement several of the patterns
+identified. These patterns and technologies will form a technology
+foundation for other programs to leverage.
+
+Implementation of ``Quick Hits''
+ Definitions for the Quick Hits, foundational elements and
+activities that had to be in place to support achievement of an
+integrated enterprise architecture, have been completed and stewards
+have been recommended. The Quick Hits have begun to be integrated into
+existing projects. For example, RMTO will soon begin implementing some
+of the technology patterns included in the Technology Patterns Quick
+Hit. The Consolidated Enforcement Environment (CEE) project has formed
+a case management working group and is incorporating the Standardized
+Investigation Case Management Quick Hit into their plans and will be
+coordinating with the Department of Justice on a long term solution.
+The One Face at the Border initiative met the requirements for the
+Integration POE Workforce Quick Hit. The Office of Infrastructure
+Management, within the DHS CIOs office, is working toward Network
+Integration as part of their One DHS Infrastructure project.
+
+Challenges Achieving an Integrated Enterprise Architecture, Timelines
+and Implementation
+ DHS is a new organization, formed a little over a year ago from 22
+legacy agencies, each with their own culture, processes, and legacy IT
+systems. Many of these legacy agencies had begun development of their
+own Enterprise Architectures prior to the establishment of DHS. The
+challenge for DHS is to implement an integrated DHS Enterprise
+Architecture while ensuring that, during the process, the entire
+Department has the IT capabilities needed to accomplish the mission.
+ One challenge to achieving an integrated HLS EA is having an EA
+that is sufficiently mature to support detailed alignment and analysis
+for IT investment management decision-making. As I've noted previously,
+DHS developed Version 1 of the DHS EA in 4 months ending in September
+2003. We also used Version 1 to identify Quick Hits and we are
+currently developing the HLS EA version 2, to support IT investment
+management.
+ Another potential challenge is overcoming resistance to change and
+obtaining management and organizational buy-in into the EA. The
+Department has placed a very high priority on the HLS EA. Deputy
+Secretary Loy has directed the major organizational components of DHS
+to participate in development of Version 2 of the DHS EA. As we speak,
+there are more than 5 different Business Focus Area Teams, composed of
+subject matter experts from across the Department, working in
+facilitated team sessions to make sure that the business model for EA
+Version 2 accurately and comprehensively captures the capabilities
+needed to accomplish the Department's mission. The extent of each
+organizational element's participation in these Business Area Focus
+Teams is reported to the DHS Management Council and monitored on a bi-
+weekly basis.
+ The development of an EA is an enormously complex process. The goal
+was to produce a foundation for enabling DHS to make decisions about
+DHS investments immediately and to begin to direct its resources away
+from stove-piped, duplicative systems and move to interoperable,
+enterprise wide systems providing improved mission capability. Although
+Version 1 of the EA is relatively conceptual in nature, it does provide
+a foundation for implementation. As noted, DHS has been using the
+principles and transition strategy as a basis for beginning to redirect
+resources from current investments.
+ As we speak, DHS is working on Version 2 of the EA. This version
+will include a transition plan that will be completed in June 2004.
+Version 2 will continue to build on the hard work of the first version
+by developing greater detail, reaching deeper to find more
+opportunities for consolidation, and establishing a consolidated
+framework for meeting mission need.
+ One of the difficulties in expediting implementation of such a
+major change, such as EA, is the degree to which that change can be
+managed and accepted by an organization. However, DHS has already made
+significant progress in meeting the goals of the EA. We are well on our
+way to consolidating many of the management functions from each of the
+22 agencies, including financial and human resources systems.
+ 19 financial management service providers were reduced
+ to 10
+ separate contracting offices were reduced to 8
+ 22 human resource offices were reduced to 7
+ 8 different payroll systems were reduced to 3 and DHS
+ expects to reduce this to one by the end of the year.
+ 22 property management systems have been consolidated
+ to 3.
+ These are just a few of the examples of progress. And it is clear
+we still have a long way to go.
+ One of the first things we need to do is implement a full
+governance structure with enforcement authority to ensure that
+investments are aligned with the strategic goals. We have already made
+progress in this area. This week the DHS Enterprise Architecture Board
+(EAB)is open for business. The EAB is charged with the responsibility
+of reviewing all investments for their alignment to our EA. What this
+means is that all investments going through the FY06 budget process
+will have to demonstrate that it is achieving the goals of our
+transition strategy and that it is aligned to the technology standards
+identified in the EA. This will mean that the EAB will be responsible
+for reviewing nearly 300 investments this year. That is a daunting task
+for an organization.
+ Another area we could focus on to expedite the implementation is to
+increase the number of working groups focusing on specific areas within
+DHS that support the DHS mission. Currently, DHS has the Resource
+Management Transformation Office (RMTO), which is consolidating an
+enterprise solution for DHS administrative functions, such as
+accounting, acquisition, budgeting, grants, and procurement.
+
+Department-wide Information Technology Investments Budget Request FY
+2005
+ Information contributes to every aspect of homeland security and is
+a vital foundation for the homeland security effort. My office has
+responsibility for providing IT leadership that will foster best
+management practices in managing IT, enhance efficiencies through
+shared-services and coordination of acquisition strategies, ensuring
+systems are properly certified and accredited as secure, and being an
+advocate for business transformation, all necessary toward ensuring the
+homeland is made more secure. The leadership and funding provided
+through the Department's IT investments are crucial for maintaining an
+enterprise architecture that is fully integrated with other management
+processes, and for allowing DHS to participate in many E-Gov
+Initiatives.
+ The President's budget request for FY 2005 includes a request for
+$226 million for Department-wide Information Technology Investments.
+Key strategic issues in FY 2005 will be to build and expand upon the
+foundational work completed in FY 2003 and FY 2004; to facilitate
+consolidation of management function capabilities; to lead the
+implementation of the Department's Enterprise Architecture; and, to
+continue to coordinate information integration efforts within DHS.
+ Included in the request is $95 million for Information Technology
+Services, a portion of which will provide funding for the Department-
+wide Geographic Information System (E-GIS) capability; to improve the
+Department's Enterprise Portal; this funding provides for continuation
+of the DHS Enterprise Architecture and planning; evolving the Financial
+Management System, eMERGE2; and, development of the Human
+Resources information technology solution.
+ Additionally the request includes $31 million for Security
+activities, which will provide funding for continuation of the Homeland
+Security Information Technology and Evaluation program; and for
+continued support of terrorist information integration and sharing.
+ Finally, the FY 2005 request includes $100 million for Wireless
+Communications, which includes funding for enhancement of the
+Integrated Wireless Network (IWN) and Tech Ops Support. The Expanded
+IWN initiative expands to other DHS agencies the pre-existing Justice-
+Treasury IWN partnership established prior to the inception of the
+Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and which includes mobile radio
+(MR) and the application of emerging technologies as it pertains to
+domestic law enforcement and counter/anti-terrorist operations
+(including missions in the U.S. Territories), tactical communications,
+legacy systems support, and airborne and non-Coast Guard marine
+communications. It also continues the funding for the SAFECOM project.
+
+Information Security
+ Since it's creation, the Department of Homeland Security has moved
+out aggressively to design and implement an Information Security
+Program that will not only ensure compliance with all appropriate
+statutes and regulations, but to also ensure that the entire Homeland
+Security community has a secure and trusted computing environment from
+which to operate. The heart of our reporting structure is built around
+the congressional requirements expressed in the Federal Information
+Security Management Act known as FISMA. In order to effect a
+comprehensive Information Security Program and in accordance with the
+provisions of FISMA, I have designated a Chief Information Security
+Officer (CISO) who manages and oversees all of the internal Homeland
+Security Department's Information Systems Security activities.
+ Due to the comprehensive nature of the FISMA reporting
+requirements, and to avoid duplication of effort, DHS uses the FISMA
+reports to satisfy the annual requirement to verify to the Secretary
+the status of the Information Security Program. Additional mechanisms,
+such as program briefings, status information and incident reports
+ensure continuous visibility to the Secretary throughout the year.
+ The FISMA report details compliance with Federal laws and policies
+and DHS information security policies and standards. DHS is in the
+process of implementing enterprise management tools to ensure the
+accuracy and completeness of FISMA reporting across the Department.
+ FISMA requires each agency to perform for each program and system
+``periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information
+security policies, procedures, and practices'' annually. NIST SP 800-
+26, Self-Assessment Guide for Information Technology Systems, is the
+required self-assessment guide required by OMB policy. This, self-
+assessment guide utilizes an extensive questionnaire (containing
+specific control objectives and suggested techniques which the security
+of programs and systems can be measured. OMB's FISMA implementing
+guidance also requires agencies to maintain a Plan of Action and
+Milestones process that captures and tracks security weaknesses, and
+associated corrective milestones.
+ I have selected a Commercial off the Shelf Product called ``Trusted
+Agent FISMA''. This is an automated enterprise based management tool
+that maintains FISMA reporting data from all our components and their
+POA&M's that will capture and track security weaknesses and associated
+corrective milestones; in addition it will collect, process and store
+self-assessment information in accordance with NIST SP 800-26. We have
+deployed this system throughout DHS and have generated our first
+quarterly report. We expect this to improve the timeliness and accuracy
+of our reporting as this information is available real-time to the
+Secretary and other cognizant officials.
+ With this tool we will be able to focus our compliance and as well
+as leverage the effort of the DHS Inspector General to corroborate the
+accuracy of the FISMA information and improve the compliance stature of
+the department.
+ I thank you again for the opportunity to testify before you today
+and I am pleased to answer any questions you may have.
+
+ Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
+ I will yield my time to the chairman of the full committee,
+Chairman Cox.
+ Mr. Cox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I take it that you mean
+you are simply postponing your own opportunity?
+ Mr. Thornberry. There may be another chance.
+ Mr. Cox. I hope you do not yield your time entirely.
+ I want to join in welcoming our witnesses, and thank you
+very much for your leadership in the Department, for being up
+here today, and for keeping us apprised of what you are doing.
+As you know, we are keenly interested, in fact most members of
+the subcommittee have been keenly interested in cyber as a
+priority since we were developing the Homeland Security Act in
+Congress. And we want to make sure that it gets all the
+attention that it deserves, and I know that you are doing that.
+ Let me begin by asking just what I hope is a trivial
+question. I am just trying to do the math in the testimony:
+That the $79 million dollar request for cyber; of that, 75
+percent is going to the program, 59.3. Then there was another
+8.7 that goes to outreach and public awareness, and 7 million
+that goes to vulnerability assessments and reduction. That
+leaves, by my math, 4 million unaccounted for, and I just
+wondered where it went.
+ Mr. Liscouski. Sir, if you would permit me to get back in
+writing on that so I can do the math myself, I am sure we can
+provide to you the balance of where that $4 million is.
+ Mr. Cox. It may be undistributed overhead. I don't know.
+ Mr. Liscouski. I could look through this, but I would
+prefer to get back to you in writing, if I may, sir.
+ Mr. Cox. Okay. Given the important role, as you outlined,
+Mr. Liscouski, in your testimony for the Computer Emergency
+Readiness Team, the CERT, the component of your efforts, how
+should we assess the other watch centers within DHS? There are
+several of them. If we are interested in consistency and
+overall cyber spec reporting, shouldn't we be concerned? Or
+should we welcome the fact that we have, for example, the IP
+National Communications System operating a 24/7
+telecommunications watch center; we have also within IP
+Cybersecurity Division operating a 24 by 7 cyber watch center;
+we also have within IP the Infrastructure Coordination Division
+operating a 24/7 watch for physical and cyber reporting. We
+have within IA a 24/7 Homeland Security Op Center with a
+dedicated cyber watch desk. We have Mr. Cooper, in your shop, a
+Cybersecurity Incident Response Center. And, we have at Secret
+Service a 24/7 watch operation for electronic crimes.
+ Mr. Liscouski. Sir, and thank you for the question. Let me
+get some clarity to the operations overall in terms of how the
+integration of the watch centers is being performed.
+ The legacy organizations that came in to us from Secret
+Service, from NCS that--and the Fed CIRC, that represent some
+of the watch centers you just articulated. With respect to the
+Fed CIRC, the NCC, the ones we have created with the HSOC, I
+will just quickly try to outline what those capabilities and
+mission requirements are and tell you how they are integrating.
+ The HSOC, the Homeland Security Operations Center is a 24
+by 7 watch center that on behalf of DHS or at large it provides
+situational awareness across all of our enterprise, across the
+entire United States, integrates information to ensure that we
+understand from all hazards what is going on at any given point
+in time. Information piped into that HSOC is analyzed,
+understood in the context of is it threat information, is it
+incident data? And then we share with the respective elements
+of DHS to ensure that the appropriate actions are followed
+upon.
+ In the context of other situational awareness types of
+watch centers, the ICD, the Infrastructure Coordination
+Division, is ultimately responsible for the coordination of
+activities as it relates to infrastructure protection and
+monitoring what is going on across all of our infrastructure
+components irrespective of incidents.
+ The distinction there is ICD is going to be creating--I
+will add one more acronym to you-- the NICC, the National
+Infrastructure Coordination Center, which is going to be the
+amalgamation of all these watch centers. This is just an
+evolutionary process to the comment of not breaking it as we
+are building it. We do not want to denigrate the capability we
+have with existing watch centers as we are building the one
+amalgam capability that is going to respond to our situational
+requirements, very large infrastructure protection, which will
+mean the incorporation of the NCSD's watch center, the NCC, the
+National Communication Coordination Center, and other elements
+for infrastructure coordination, all under the ICD.
+ The interconnectedness between the Homeland Security
+Operation Center and the NICC is paramount for us. We are
+looking to augment the capabilities of the HSOC. We have NCSD
+and as well as other infrastructure protection components on
+the HSOC which are responsible for doing incident management
+real-time.
+ The reach-back capability to determine what the impact of
+an incident may be is going to be through the Infrastructure
+Coordination Division and, through that center, the NICC. And
+it is really reflective of the complex nature of all of our
+infrastructure components. Instead of creating one gigantic
+coordination center, we are really looking to leverage the
+capabilities that we have established through DHS to ensure
+that we have got the right expertise coming to the table at the
+right times to provide the answers as necessary.
+ So it is not a redundant capability, sir, it is clearly an
+augmentation of the capability, depending on what function they
+are serving at a given point in time.
+ Mr. Cox. But I heard in what you said that you also are
+anticipating further consolidation.
+ Mr. Liscouski. That is correct, sir. We are consolidating
+the watch centers, the national, the NCS, the National
+Communications System. The NCD's watch center will be
+incorporated into the NICC. That is correct.
+ Mr. Cox. How is my time, Mr. Chairman?
+ Mr. Thornberry. The gentleman's time has expired.
+ Mr. Cox. All right. I thank the CHAIRMAN.
+ Mr. Thornberry. Although the Chair is trying to be lenient.
+ The gentlelady from California.
+ Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ I have had a chance to--although I didn't have a chance to
+read your testimony, Mr. Cooper, I did have a chance to review
+your comments to the House Government Reform Committee in
+October of last year. And in that testimony, you had given your
+first draft of the Department Enterprise Architecture Plan, and
+you provided what I think you called a Quick Hit Project that
+you thought could be accomplished within 6 months. And some of
+those quick hits were integrating watch lists, network
+integration, developing external information sharing strategy,
+completing a feasibility study on integrating Immigration and
+Customs case management systems, and a number of others.
+ Now, we don't have teams of people auditing your
+department, but I don't believe we yet have a unified watch
+list data base. And the Inspector General has told us that the
+lack of an agreed-upon IT infrastructure prevents the Office of
+Information Analysis Risk Assessment Division from
+communicating with State, local, and private sector partners,
+and that inhibits the exchange of information. And the IG also
+says that there is concern that the IAIP lacks connectivity to
+access sensitive data bases maintained in other Federal
+agencies, which hampered their efforts to conduct business.
+And, you know, you can't always believe what you read in the
+press, but Information Week has reported that your office has
+had problems handing over and receiving secured e-mail.
+ Can you provide us with an update and where we are on all
+the quick hits that you were going to get done by now?
+ Mr. Cooper. I can give you an initial update, and I would
+like to also provide information in writing on all of the quick
+hits represented in the first release of enterprise
+architecture. But let me address a couple that I think are
+very, very relevant to the points that you made.
+ With regard to an integrated watch list and with regard to
+information sharing, the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary
+have already initiated an information sharing program that is
+now under way within the Department. The business owner is
+General Frank Liboutti, who is our Under Secretary for
+Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. Under his
+guidance, he has named a program director, and a team has been
+established that has already begun work in addressing how we
+will move forward to better improve our connectivity and our
+ability to put in place a two-way exchange of information with
+all of our stakeholders, both internal and external.
+ Ms. Lofgren. Can I interrupt to try to understand?
+ Mr. Cooper. Yes, ma'am.
+ Ms. Lofgren. So this information sharing effort is only
+within the Department? Does it include the FBI and those
+agencies that are outside the Department?
+ Mr. Cooper. Yes, ma'am. It will address the full national
+scope.
+ Ms. Lofgren. It will but it does not currently?
+ Mr. Cooper. It does not currently. We are in the early
+stages of formation, and the team exists and is now working
+through the various requirements for the different communities
+with which we must interact.
+ Ms. Lofgren. When do you think that will be done?
+ Mr. Cooper. Our expectation is to hit the deadline set for
+us by Under Secretary Liboutti, and that means that we will
+have a significant amount of this in place operational and done
+by the end of this calendar year.
+ I also want to highlight that in the quick hits we have in
+place and operational what we are now calling our Homeland
+Security Information Network. We built off a program called
+JRIES, Joint Regional Information Exchange System, that is
+operational. It is in place. And we are rapidly expanding
+membership in that system and as part of our Homeland Security
+Information Network. In the next several months, we will expand
+from the current about 50 participating State, local, and
+Federal partners who are already connected to probably about
+five times that number in the next several months. And, again,
+I will be more than happy to provide detailed program plans
+related to information sharing and building upon what is
+already operational.
+ Ms. Lofgren. I see that I am just about to run out of time.
+But I would like to get, I am sure every member of the
+committee would want, a report on each one of the quick hits
+and the current status. Before--I guess my time has completely
+expired, so I will yield back to the chairman. I expect we will
+have a second round.
+ Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentlelady.
+ The gentleman from Nevada.
+ Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
+ Gentlemen, welcome to the committee. We are happy to have
+you. Your information has been extremely helpful to us.
+ Cybersecurity is not new. It is something that not only
+your agency but other Federal agencies have been working on for
+decades in some cases. If you could help us better understand
+how agencies like the NSA, National Security Agency, NGA,
+National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the CIA, the DOD, all
+of those other agencies' efforts have been or have not been, I
+don't know what the answer will be, integrated into your effort
+in cybersecurity. How do you leverage their experience, their
+efforts, their work product over these many years to help you?
+ Mr. Liscouski. Thank you, sir. And there is a couple of
+different perspectives on the roles and responsibilities within
+those agencies and how they would integrate and how we partner
+up.
+ DHS has got a protective mission and the protective mission
+we have in terms of looking at how we should best protect our
+critical infrastructure, the partnerships that we have got
+there clearly within the Intelligence Community and the NSA and
+the DOD specifically are we actively leveraging those. We have
+got a very strong partnership with NSA across a number of
+fronts. Up until just recently, until a recent transfer, the
+Deputy Director of the NCSD was in fact an NSA detailee, and it
+provided tremendous opportunity for us to leverage the
+experience that they have over the years of being able to gain
+an understanding of how to best protect those systems, and we
+are actively looking or looking forward to his replacement to
+come on board very shortly. Similarly, within DOD, who also has
+a protective mission for their dot-mil domain, we partner up
+with the Joint Task Force For Computer Network Operations. We
+have a very robust exchange of information between our US-CERT
+and their operations center. We have got very good personal
+relations as well as operational relationships with that
+agency.
+ On the offensive side, clearly within the domain of that
+realm, I speak at a very high level here, we are able to
+partner up with CIA and other Intel Community efforts to
+understand how they best look at their offensive mission to
+understand how we best need to look at our defensive mission
+based upon what the capabilities are out there.
+ On the intel side, in terms of the threat assessments, as
+you may know, through our Information Analysis Office we use
+them as the portal back into the Intelligence Community. We
+regularly drive requirements into the Intel Community to better
+understand how we can best protect our networks and our
+Nation's infrastructure from cyber threats.
+ So it is really a multifaceted approach. I would say it is
+highly integrative from the standpoint of either through
+people, exchange of people, or through active exchange of
+information.
+ Mr. Gibbons. Very quickly, who establishes the standards by
+which you integrate and take advantage of all of these multiple
+operations? Is there a common standard which is being
+established, and are you part of that? Do you control it, or is
+some other agency in control of the standard and definitions
+about how this cybersecurity program that you just described
+takes place?
+ Mr. Liscouski. Well, we have got the benefit of the
+Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, which was signed by
+President Bush on December 17th of 2003, which provides us the
+framework for integration of all of the--real large for
+infrastructure protection, not just for cyber, to ensure that
+we have appropriate roles and responsibilities laid out for
+that protection. We are actively engaged in framing out not
+just the strategy but the implementation of that strategy. It
+is a work in progress as we develop the plan we are
+implementing. But we are able to negotiate with respective
+sister agencies in the Federal Government as well as State and
+local and the private sector to understand how we have to,
+again from the total infrastructure protection picture, flesh
+out the responsibilities. Who is going to do what? What
+programs are necessary to be done? Where the gaps are? And,
+most importantly, from the perspective of outcomes, how do we
+measure the outcomes to ensure that we have effectiveness? That
+falls under the auspices of HSPD-7. I have direct
+responsibility for that. I have got a program office in my
+office to do this, and we are actively engaged in fleshing it
+out.
+ Mr. Gibbons. One final quick question. What degree does the
+DHS enterprise architecture plan to marry up with the Federal
+enterprise architectural efforts as well?
+ Mr. Liscouski. I will defer to Mr. Cooper for that. But I
+will just, as a segue into that, is we are wholly dependent on
+Mr. Cooper's efforts to provide us the backbone enterprise
+architecture for our operations.
+ Mr. Cooper. It is aligned. Even before the Department was
+formed, we actually began working with the Federal enterprise
+architecture framework to both work with Dr. Haycock, who was
+guiding the charge under Norman Ranscript of the Office of
+Management Budget, and we have continued that relationship
+since. So it is very much alive.
+ And in those business areas that are critical to Homeland
+Security, we become, if you will, the lead agency. So as the
+work we do to populate the business processes, the
+informational requirements and then supporting technology, that
+flows into the Federal enterprise architecture.
+ Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.
+ Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentleman.
+ The gentlelady from the Virgin Islands.
+ Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would like
+to welcome our two witnesses, also.
+ Mr. Cooper, do you feel that your office has the sufficient
+authority to drive IT integration within the Department of
+Homeland Security, even though you don't have direct line
+authority over divisional chief information officers? And, if
+not, is there anything that we can do to strengthen that
+position, the position you hold within the Department of
+Homeland Security?
+ Mr. Cooper. What I have done is to have created a
+Department of Homeland Security CIO Council, which is comprised
+of all of the named or titled CIOs who came into the Department
+with their respective agencies that now comprise the full
+Department. Additionally, I have asked the Chief Financial
+Officer and the Chief Procurement Officer to participate with
+us as full members of that council. Together, we have been
+participating in the investment review process of the
+Department. That is under the guidance of the Under Secretary
+for Management and Under Deputy Secretary Loy. I believe that
+in concert we have been appropriately bringing forward the
+proper recommendations, the proper decision-making framework so
+that we can make adjustments, if necessary, in some of the
+alignment that we inherited with regard to legacy applications
+and/or infrastructure investment. We will continue to learn, we
+will continue to grow, we will continue to refine these
+processes as rapidly as we can.
+ Mrs. Christensen. And to what extent also does your office
+interact with other Federal agencies outside of DHS?
+ Mr. Cooper. I personally participate in the Federal CIO
+Council. So there are regular meetings. I am also a member of
+the Executive Committee of the Federal CIO Council. We draw
+upon the Federal CIO Council for a lot of that interaction.
+Additionally, our Chief Technology Officer and our Deputy Chief
+Information Officer are also members of that committee. So the
+three of us participate very actively.
+ Mrs. Christensen. Do you provide standards for the other
+agencies that are outside?
+ Mr. Cooper. My office actually does not provide standards
+for other Federal agencies. But let me give you a real example
+of how it works. We, like other Federal Cabinet agencies,
+receive the direction and guidance that are set by Mr.
+Liscouski's area of responsibility, and we then apply, as all
+Federal CIOs would do, we apply that guidance and those
+standards, those accompanying standards within the Department
+of Homeland Security.
+ Mrs. Christensen. Assistant Secretary Liscouski, last week
+we had a briefing from two of the private infrastructure
+organizations, the financial and telecommunications sectors.
+Could you tell us how your office interacts with the private
+sector? And early on, in the early days of the Department there
+seemed to be not an easy relationship, or there were problems
+that needed to be resolved. Could you talk about the
+relationship within your office and those private sector
+agencies?
+ Mr. Liscouski. Yes, ma'am. We have a very aggressive
+outreach program with the private sector, and you are
+accurately portraying the relationships in the beginning. The
+legacy relationships that we inherited from the PDD-63 effort
+that ultimately authorized the establishment of the ISACs, the
+Information Sharing Analysis Centers, didn't allow for
+sufficient leadership and engagement at the private sector
+level to allow them to mature to a level of capability that
+would ensure that we had robust information sharing going both
+horizontally across information or industries as well as
+vertically back up to the government.
+ The first couple of months we were engaged with the private
+sector, we actively looked at that model to see how we could
+best leverage it, and the first part of that was to determine
+the validity or the value of those information sharing analysis
+centers. And I can tell you from my private sector experience,
+I looked hard at the efficacy of that effort.
+ To be candid with you, when I looked real hard at it. I saw
+there was a lot of opportunity there that we could leverage
+very well into a success story by enabling and empowering the
+private sector through the ISACs to develop their horizontal
+relationships, how they integrate and how they collaborate
+information. And that was the road that we embarked upon to
+ensure that we could establish that.
+ We have got a very good story to tell. I hope you heard
+that last week between the FS ISAC specifically.
+ Mrs. Christensen. What exactly is your current relationship
+with the ISAC Council?
+ Mr. Liscouski. Well, we have got an excellent relationship
+with the ISAC Council. They have stepped up to the leadership
+plate and they have provided what has been necessary and has
+been previously missing with the private sector, and that is
+the private sector leadership going back down into the private
+sector. They are actively engaged with my office both through
+the Infrastructure Coordination Division, which is responsible
+for managing ISACs and funding ISACs, as well as directly
+through my office I actively engage with them minimally once a
+month on a council level and much more frequently on an
+individual level. So I think we have got a very robust and a
+very successful story to tell as it relates to our private
+sector partnership there.
+ Mrs. Christensen. Thank you. I think my time is up.
+ Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentlelady.
+ The gentlelady from Washington, the Vice Chair of the
+committee.
+ Ms. Dunn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and welcome,
+gentlemen. It is very interesting as we begin to tie some of
+these responsibilities together to get a clear view from your
+point of view on how things are working.
+ Secretary Liscouski, in your written testimony and in your
+testimony before our panel today, you identified a couple of
+major steps in your management methodology that were
+interesting to me. One was the identification of critical
+infrastructure. Another was the assessment of vulnerabilities.
+I am especially interested in knowing how you work together
+with local government bodies and State government bodies and
+the private sector, what kind of input they have into these
+assessments, and whether they have a direct pipeline to you to
+know what you decided on.
+ Mr. Liscouski. Yes, ma'am. Thank you, and I appreciate the
+question.
+ As I pointed out, our partnership with the private.
+sector--and coming from the private sector, my bias is that we
+have to work closely with the industry to determine what they
+believe their priorities are, and we have to normalize those
+priorities with what we believe are our national level
+priorities.
+ We accept ready input from both the private sector, the
+associations and, importantly, the State and local and tribal
+governments to ensure that we have got their perspective on
+what has to be protected and how it can best be protected. We
+develop common vulnerabilities assessments, common best
+practice methodologies, which are vetted through our State and
+local and tribal contacts as well as the private sector to
+ensure that we have got, in terms of our achieving
+infrastructure protection at large, consistent, effective,
+sustainable, and measurable capabilities and results across all
+of our critical infrastructures.
+ Now, as a general statement, I will tell you that we are
+succeeding in that very well. The methodology that we have
+outlined is that, at a national level, is scalable right down
+to an individual company level. It is the type of methodology
+which is being adapted to ensure that we help the industry at
+the single entity level as well as those that are highly
+interconnected to ensure that we can identify those
+vulnerabilities, the assets that need to be protected, the
+vulnerabilities, and the appropriate levels of programs.
+ The reason integration is so important to us, not just
+within the Infrastructure Protection Office as it relates cyber
+and physical, but clearly as it relates to State and local
+involvement, is because these efforts cannot be done
+unilaterally. The private sector cannot afford to protect
+itself nor does it have the wherewithal to protect itself that
+the State and local governments do in their law enforcement and
+protective authorities. So all the programs that we have
+developed and designed have been in collaboration and
+coordination with all those stakeholders to ensure that we have
+both a rational approach and an effective approach, and one
+which is dynamic enough to be molded against the current threat
+at any given point in time.
+ As you know, it is a very dynamic threat environment, so it
+is a work in progress. Clearly, the engagement we have with the
+private sector, we are constantly being fed with new
+technologies and new ideas on how to best implement programs
+that can be effective. At the end of the day, it is the private
+sector who is responsible for ensuring that they are doing what
+they need to be doing to protect that critical infrastructure.
+So we have a significant effort there.
+ Ms. Dunn. The State and local governments are satisfied
+with the relationship they have with you?
+ Mr. Liscouski. At a general level, I would say they are,
+but as everything, I think there are different opinions.
+ We have clearly a lot of room for improvement across the
+board. We are not satisfied with where we are today. We are in
+the very early stages of building this program. It is a long-
+term approach, but I think we are satisfied with the approach
+we are taking.
+ Over the recent holiday threat period, we were actively
+engaged, and I am sorry to see Mr. Gibbons go because I had the
+opportunity to be out with Mr. Gibbons in Las Vegas during that
+period of time in which we had very robust meetings with the
+private sector, State and local governments. To be candid with
+you, I wasn't quite sure what kind of reception we were going
+to get, but we worked through many very difficult issues and
+came up with some very successful solutions to a response of
+that holiday threat period; and I think it is representative of
+the types of efforts we have out there that do tell a good
+story.
+ Ms. Dunn. That is good.
+ I think it is very useful that both of you have been in and
+out of the private sector, so you understand the value of what
+they can contribute and the kinds of communications that they
+need in order to be part of this whole thing. I think it makes
+us all stronger.
+ Let me ask you, Mr. Cooper, one question. The enterprise
+architecture team that you have started is going to come up
+with a plan to connect networks within the Department of
+Homeland Security. At the same time, you have new programs
+being started up, like U.S. VISIT. Do you believe that you are
+in contact with them to the extent that you know what sort of
+information-sharing requirements they have and is it working
+well together?
+ Mr. Cooper. Yes, ma'am. I am actually a member of the
+executive advisory committee of U.S. VISIT in that specific
+example and also participate in the advisory committees of all
+of our major programs. We are deliberately looking for major
+programs to leverage whatever capability is being established.
+For example, within U.S. VISIT, as we roll out new biometric
+capability at the borders and ports of entry, that requires
+some new underlying infrastructure. We are actually leveraging
+that new investment as part of the U.S. VISIT program to ensure
+that infrastructure enhancements that we are making become the
+foundation of the direction that our infrastructure requires
+and--as represented in our enterprise infrastructure
+architecture.
+ We are doing the same thing with Customs and Border
+Protection's ACE program. We are leveraging the legacy
+Immigration and Naturalization Service's Atlas program for
+which there is appropriated funding to better establish
+infrastructure, and we are working to coordinate all of those
+investments within our enterprise architecture activities.
+ Ms. Dunn. Are you going to be able to get the FBI and CIA
+to come together so the U.S. VISIT can use their information in
+a way that is consistent?
+ Mr. Cooper. I am confident we will do that. I am afraid
+where we might have a difference of opinion is the timing that
+it might take.
+ Mr. Thornberry. So the question is, are any of us going to
+be alive when it happens?
+ Gentleman from North Carolina.
+ Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me thank
+you gentlemen for being here this morning.
+ Mr. Cooper, I know--I think a question has been asked in
+one way on the testimony previously before the Government
+Reform Committee, and let me go back to that and ask my
+question a little different way, to some extent on the same
+subject as it relates to the 18 projects. Let me talk about two
+of them and one very specifically, I think, because right now,
+as you are trying to pull these together, and I guess I am very
+interested in particular--first, as you talk about the State
+and local industry needs survey, what do you hope to gain and
+what is its status is what I would like to know.
+ And let me go to another one that is very specific that I
+know my office and, I assume, many offices have problems with.
+This is an ongoing problem of getting information out of the
+Citizens Immigration Services, or CIS, because for my
+constituents they are constantly blaming the computer system.
+We call them, and they keep saying it is the computer system's
+problem. Well, garbage in, garbage out. You know what I am
+talking about in computer language.
+ And I am very interested in hearing about the feasibility
+study on integrating immigrations and Customs case management
+systems. Specifically, don't we need to fix the immigration
+computer problems first before we integrate those with Customs?
+Because if we don't get them fixed and integrate them, we are
+compounding the problem. I hope you will help me understand
+that so I can share that back with my staff who are quite upset
+about it.
+ Mr. Cooper. I understand. Let me take them in reverse order
+of your question. Let me go ahead and address citizenship and
+immigration services.
+ First, I do agree and the approach we are taking is exactly
+as you described. We have done a couple of things very
+actively. First we have--.
+ Mr. Etheridge. Can you give me a time line as to when we
+will have it fixed?
+ Mr. Cooper. I will give you our current working targets of
+timing. The first thing that I had done is I have worked
+directly with Director Aguirre and his staff. We have named a
+CIO in Citizenship and Immigration Services. That individual is
+already on board and working directly with his staff and
+directly with the program folks to first, as you properly point
+out, to fix the problems with both the process as well as the
+underlying information technology that supports those
+processes.
+ They will address, first, developing and reengineering any
+of the processes that they find to be inefficient or lend
+themselves to optimization. Only until that work is done will
+we then move forward to integrate with other component parts of
+the organization.
+ So we are following your advice. We are fixing the problems
+first, streamlining process, understanding requirements,
+understanding the information necessary to support those
+processes; then automating within CIS, then integrating. And
+there is opportunity to integrate in that case management
+arena.
+ We have also ongoing an integrated consolidated case
+management effort that is at the very beginning so that the CIS
+folks, who are developing the work that I am just describing to
+you, are also part of a larger interdepartmental working group.
+And then, in turn, we also have reached out to other Federal
+agencies, like the Department of Justice or the Department of
+Energy, who have automated solutions in place to then evaluate,
+might there be an already existing solution that we could reuse
+that we could bring to bear? And the goal is to optimize,
+streamline and modernize, but don't necessarily build all this
+stuff from scratch because we are suddenly a new department.
+ Does that give some guidance.
+ Mr. Etheridge. The time line?
+ Mr. Cooper. Here, again, we are moving forward. The time
+line to address the backlog is 6 months, the target that
+Director Aguirre has given us to direct the backlog and a lot
+of the cases kind of pending, from roughly this time period.
+ Another way of thinking about that is that our goal is to
+address this and have real solutions on the ground and to have
+cleared that backlog as fast as we can. But Director Aguirre's
+direction to me and to my team is help us do this by the end of
+the fiscal year.
+ Mr. Etheridge. October 1?
+ Mr. Cooper. Six months, that is the target, this fiscal
+year.
+ Very quickly, in the State and local information sharing,
+that type of thing, as part of the program that I mentioned to
+you that Under Secretary Libutti is guiding, as part of that, I
+actually have been working along with several of our other
+colleagues and leaders within the Department, particularly the
+office of State and local government.
+ We actually have been reaching out through the National
+Association of State CIOs and through a number of larger city
+CIOs, my office and me personally. We have been exchanging
+information. We have been working to better understand the
+requirements for information sharing from State and local and
+tribal government and from members of the first responder
+community. We are doing that not only through my office, but
+when we have something like Project Safecom which is also
+reaching out on the interoperability issue. That is how we are
+gathering requirements. We are then taking those and applying
+them and sharing them within the Department and working
+together within the Department and State and local partners to
+put solutions on the ground.
+ Mr. Etheridge. I know my time is up. Is that sharing a two-
+way sharing?
+ Mr. Cooper. It is a two-way sharing. In fact, we require
+them to guide us. We can't see the requirements from the
+Federal environment. We are dependent upon them to provide
+local requirements.
+ Mr. Etheridge. In a lot of cases, they are really our eyes
+and ears for those people who don't have the data.
+ Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentleman for his good
+questions.
+ The gentleman from New Jersey.
+ Mr. Andrews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank
+our witnesses for their testimony this morning and for their
+service to our country. I know they do it at some considerable
+sacrifice.
+ The first thing I thought about last August when I heard
+about the blackout that was rolling across the northeast United
+States was whether it was an accident or whether it had been
+deliberately caused.
+ Let's assume--and happily all the evidence from that is
+that it was an accident. Let's assume that, this morning, a
+utility company in Wisconsin found evidence that someone was
+hacking into their system with an apparent attempt to bring
+down the system and bring down the grid. How would you find out
+about that?
+ Mr. Liscouski. We learned a lot from the blackout, sir, and
+the processes we established with NCSD and through IP in
+general, particularly as it relates to situational awareness
+during that blackout period served us very well. For
+instance--.
+ Mr. Andrews. Not to interrupt, but if that happened this
+morning, who would tell you?
+ Mr. Liscouski. What we learned in the blackout period was
+the processes we put in place at that time were exactly the
+same processes we would learn from an event similar to the
+hypothetical you just provided. We work with FERC, NERC in
+particular, which is the North American Electrical Reliability
+Council, which establishes the ISAC management point for our
+relationships with all the private sectors that relate to the
+electric utility companies. They have a very robust capability
+and the communications across the grid to pick up on incidents.
+Most likely, that would be the first indication for us
+reporting back from the private sector back into the ISAC,
+directly back into DHS about any activity like that.
+ Mr. Andrews. Would the utility company be required to tell
+you this, or just do it as a matter of good practice?
+ Mr. Liscouski. There is a requirement--and I am getting a
+little bit out of my lane here as it relates to the regulatory
+requirements set forth by both the FERC and the NERC, FERC in
+particular; but I believe that there is a requirement to report
+those outages, but I can't specifically cite the authorization
+for that regulation.
+ Mr. Andrews. I know this is probably an unknowable answer,
+but give me your best guess.
+ How long would it take between the discovery of the
+intrusion by the utility company and report of the intrusion to
+responsible authorities within your division?
+ Mr. Liscouski. There are a lot of dependencies on that
+chain--in the chain of that reporting. The first indication
+would be the robustness of that particular enterprise that
+might be under attack to detect an attack. In some cases, it
+might be a failure that might be the first indication of an
+attack. Where there is more robust capability, they are doing
+network monitoring and there are standards that have been
+supplied by NERC for implementation for cybersecurity,
+particularly resulting from the blackout example that would
+allow a utility company to be able to detect what is going on
+and therefore report it.
+ It depends upon the magnitude of the type of attack, their
+capability to detect that.
+ Mr. Andrews. I think I just heard you say that your ability
+to know would be very dependent upon the robustness of the
+detection system the utility company has in place. So if they
+had a weak system in terms of detection, you all might miss it
+all together?
+ Mr. Liscouski. It really depends upon the type of attack.
+If it is a very specific attack against a specific company, a
+utility company or any other company that might be on the
+Internet, specifically targeting them, there are a couple of
+points we might be able to get information from, a, from the
+ISP which might be monitoring network activity that might see
+an increase of traffic to a specific IP address that might
+result in a denial of service for instance. The IP could report
+it to us, the target company could report it to us; it really
+depends upon the scenario. It is not easy to come up with a cut
+and dried answer to say, yes, it can happen, or no, it can't
+happen.
+ Mr. Andrews. Let us assume that the information was
+accurately reported and let us further assume that there were
+tools at your disposal that would stop the spread of the
+problem, that you could wall off other parts of networks and
+other parts of systems to protect other parts of the power
+grid. And let us assume that your best experts in your
+department said that is what you ought to do.
+ Do you have the authority to tell people to do that or not?
+Do you have the authority to tell the other people in the
+utility system that they have to follow those prescriptions or
+not?
+ Mr. Liscouski. Taking the example, in partnership with the
+Department of Energy with whom we have--and the FERC with whom
+we have a strong relationship in the protection of critical
+infrastructure, by extension, I would say we have the authority
+to initiate that activity.
+ The actual execution of that authority would be with those
+respective regulatory agencies that have that specific
+legislative authority. But in terms of taking an action and
+prescribing a specific action, going back to the earlier
+conversation I had about the HSPD7, we are exactly in the
+middle of framing out those roles and responsibilities and how
+we would broker those relationships.
+ Mr. Andrews. What I think I just heard you say was that if
+you detected the attack and if you had a clear recommendation
+as to what to do about it from your experts that you would have
+to have some cooperation from the Department of Energy to
+execute the solution, right?
+ Mr. Liscouski. I think it is more appropriate at the FERC
+level.
+ Mr. Andrews. You would have to have some cooperation from
+FERC and there are other regulatory bodies that might have some
+flow in this, too. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission might have
+a hand in it?
+ Mr. Liscouski. They might.
+ Mr. Andrews. I raise these questions not just to paint an
+interesting hypothetical, but I think we have a lot of
+technological issues, and we have a lot of very smart
+technological people to address them; but I think fundamentally
+we have a management problem, an analytical problem. And the
+analytical problem is, who is in charge when we have a crisis?
+ I don't pretend to have an answer, and I don't advocate the
+answer that government be in charge of private enterprises in
+these circumstances. I don't want to see that. But we need to
+think through, ``we,'' the committee, the administration,
+everyone, these protocols, because we don't have a lot of time
+to make these decisions. And even if we have honed the
+technology to the point where we know what is going on, and we
+have some good ideas what to do about it, we have created
+confusion or dysfunction--you haven't--as to who is in charge
+of what.
+ Mr. Liscouski. I don't think that is the appropriate
+characterization. I think we have good leadership. I think DHS,
+the brilliant part about the creation of this department is it
+does pin leadership responsibilities on the Secretary in
+working through the relationships we have with sector-specific
+agencies. It may not appear to be a direct line of authority,
+but there is a clear line of communication that--we got
+activity going, and we have plenty of examples over the recent
+threat periods of how we have exercised that authority in
+cooperation.
+ Mr. Andrews. Can the Secretary order utility companies to
+do what your folks would say they should do?
+ Mr. Liscouski. I feel pretty confident we can exercise the
+necessary actions we would need to get to get the appropriate
+action at that level. We have a cyber IIMG, Interagency
+Incident Management Group, that was stood up subsequent to the
+live wire exercise that took place this past fall in which the
+lesson there was that we need a cyber response. We quickly
+created that capability.
+ I am confident, sir, that we have the leadership that we
+need. Do we need to refine that and figure out how we do it
+better? Absolutely.
+ Mr. Andrews. I realize my time is up. I am not in any way
+impugning the leadership capabilities of people in these jobs
+nor am I doubting our competence to do them. What I am
+wondering about is because of the relative infancy of this
+department whether a--knowing bureaucratic turf battles to be
+what they are, if we were find ourselves mired in a
+bureaucratic turf battle at a time that we had to make some
+very quick decisions, I think it behooves us to answer those
+questions in advance so people know clear lines of authority.
+ Mr. Liscouski. We are actively engaged in looking at those
+lines of communication. I would be happy to come back and talk
+to you about that. I wouldn't want you to leave this committee
+room thinking that we haven't thought about that or we haven't
+taken activity on that.
+ Mr. Andrews. I certainly don't think. I think we
+collectively need to think more about it and establish clear
+lines of authority.
+ Mr. Thornberry. Gentleman from Rhode Island.
+ Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ And, gentlemen, thank you for being here. I would like to
+touch on a couple of areas that have already been touched on
+this morning, first, dealing with JRIES and the second dealing
+with outreach to private industry.
+ First of all, can you tell us about the relationship
+between JRIES and RISSNet? Those people who may not be familiar
+with it, that is the Regional Information Sharing Network used
+by law enforcement. It is a highly effective tool for
+intelligence sharing and obviously it is a proven entity.
+ It was my understanding that JRIES was supposed to partner
+with RISSNet, but evidently that has not happened. And, in
+fact, from what I understand, RISSNet has been sidelined by
+DHS. So I would like to ask why it seems that you are pushing
+aside a proven system for a brand new one.
+ Second question for Secretary Liscouski: Last week I had a
+meeting with the IAIP directorate's enterprise architect
+Jonathan Houk and a company from my district, Ibis Consulting,
+to discuss how DHS is tapping the vast amount of expertise
+residing in the private sector. And I was pleased to hear that
+he is trying to leverage industry resources as much as possible
+in setting up IAIP's enterprise architecture, which is still
+obviously in the planning stages.
+ But aside from Mr. Houk's efforts, I would like to hear
+more on how effective DHS has been in forging industry
+partnerships. And I would like to hear more from you and Mr.
+Cooper about DHS's policies and guidance concerning industry
+outreach, if you would take the RISSNet question first.
+ Mr. Cooper. Let me address that for you, sir.
+ You are correct in that there was a period of time where
+the communication between the two programs was not occurring
+and was not anywhere near as effective as I think both groups
+and DHS want it to be. Much more recently, myself included, we
+have gotten that back on track and the RISS.Net team has met
+with the JRIES team and the program director to reengage and to
+actively build upon the work that RISS.Net has already done and
+to rapidly map into our homeland security information network,
+which is now what JRIES is evolving into as far as a label. It
+is a broader scoping. And that change in title properly
+reflects the broader scoping on behalf of DHS. So I do
+acknowledge that there was a temporary delay. We didn't have
+the effective communication. We believe very strongly that now
+has been corrected and I know that as of last week, there had
+been more recent meetings between the RISS.Net team and the
+JRIES team to move this forward.
+ Mr. Langevin. I am encouraged to hear that.
+ Mr. Liscouski. Sir, with respect to the private sector
+outreach program, we have it in many dimensions. Let me address
+the cyber one since that is the focus of this panel or meeting
+this morning.
+ Mr. Yannis has taken a very aggressive approach in
+establishing private sector partnerships. The first event that
+he participated in was the cyber summit back in December in
+which we were actually able to announce and get him engaged in
+the private sector outreach program. But subsequent to that,
+there have been a number of initiatives that he is engaged in.
+There is a US-CERT, private sector partnership program. They
+are on daily watch calls with the private sector either
+directly with private sector entities or through the ISACs. The
+task forces that have result from the cyber summit are also
+reporting back and are actively engaged with the NCSD in
+providing information and recommendations about how they can
+influence best practices throughout the industry.
+ Across infrastructure protection, we have traditionally
+have had--traditionally, in a year, if you can establish a
+tradition in the year, we have had active engagement with the
+NSTAC, the National Security Telecommunications Advisory
+Council, which is a presidential council established through
+the NCS; the NIAC, National Infrastructure Advisory Council,
+which was established through the legacy organization of the
+CAIO. Those are things we are actively engaged with.
+ The Homeland Security Advisory Council, which was
+established by the Secretary, has its own subcouncil, the
+Private Sector Advisory Council, with whom we are actively
+engaged. They represent, really, leadership of industries at
+the top level, at the CEO level, with whom we both exchange
+ideas and get influence from, again, the ISACs themselves
+across all the infrastructure components.
+ The private sector component is one in which I personally
+take an active leadership role, ensuring that we have got the
+right things going on there. We look for every form possible to
+ensure we get both feedback as well as getting our message out
+there. And importantly, when we get the feedback, it is, what
+do they believe they need to be doing to better protect our
+critical infrastructure; and we take that feedback into our
+thinking about how do we develop programs, realistic, going
+back to the consistent, effective, sustainable and measurable
+types of approaches we try to take.
+ I could, frankly, better take the remaining time here to
+talk about the different types of relationships and I would
+like to address something specific if you have it.
+ Mr. Langevin. Can you talk about your interaction with
+small business? Very often they are the innovators and
+entrepreneurs that are out there at your basic level that have
+a product they believe can fill a niche. This is what happened
+with Ibis Consulting, and I put them in touch with the right
+people.
+ But how easy is it for small business to reach someone at
+DHS and get some type of an answer or an action?
+ Mr. Liscouski. There are two parts to that question.
+ From a protection standpoint, we actively reach out to
+small businesses through our partnerships with our private
+sector outreach office, Mr. Al Martinez-Fonts, who you may know
+is a Special Assistant to the Secretary. His office is
+responsible for ensuring that we don't let any business fall
+through the cracks if they are not represented by a specific
+infrastructure sector themselves, so leveraging partnerships
+with U.S. Chamber of Commerce, for instance, or other industry
+groups to reach out to those small businesses to get the word
+about how to best protect themselves.
+ I was a small business owner and I am a staunch believer in
+what they add to the economy. That is the growth engine for the
+economy. We are very interested in protecting them. In terms of
+outreach and ways they can actually do business with us, I will
+defer to Steve, but the reality is we have a number of
+mechanisms by which companies can reach DHS.
+ Mr. Cooper. We have specific focus on small--and medium-
+sized businesses. My office works very closely with Kevin
+Boshears, who is the Director of our Office of Disadvantaged
+and Small Business Utilization; and we have actually, with his
+guidance, established some programs to flow and to make
+introduction connections with small businesses, in particular
+with my office.
+ I have named a Special Assistant For Industry Liaison, Tom
+Bold, and Tom has developed a program that then, in addition to
+Kevin's guidance to us, we have established a Web site that
+allows small businesses, medium-sized businesses--any business,
+but we are trying to focus on small and medium-sized
+businesses--to make their products and, services with specific
+areas they believe that they can help us address some of the
+business problems and challenges that we face, known to us.
+ We have--I personally, along with my team, have met with
+more than 3,000 businesses in the past year. We are trying to
+meet as many and talk with as many people as we can. We feel
+very, very strongly, and I have publicly spoken about the fact
+that we inside the Department don't have all of the technology-
+enabled answers. We are dependent upon a very cooperative,
+collaborative partnership with industry, particularly small--
+and medium-sized businesses where a lot of the innovation does
+occur.
+ Mr. Langevin. I am encouraged by your answer.
+ Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentleman.
+ Mr. Liscouski, let me try to see if I can ask a series of
+questions related to the national strategy to secure
+cyberspace, which the administration issued just before the
+Department really was up and running. But it still seems to me
+that to offer a good blueprint on the issues we need to be
+concerned about with regard to cybersecurity; and what I would
+like to do is go through some of the things they said we need
+to work on and have you just at least give us the name of a
+program or an effort. We can't get into the details of this
+stuff, or we will never get anywhere, but I am trying to get a
+feel, over the last year, how much progress have we made.
+ The first priority, as you know, is the National Cyberspace
+Security Response System. That is the first priority in the
+national strategy. And then they talk about public-private
+architecture for responding to national level cyber incidents.
+The first specific under that is analysis, tactical, strategic,
+and vulnerabilities.
+ Are we doing those things? Are we analyzing those cyber
+attacks?
+ Mr. Liscouski. We are, sir.
+ Mr. Thornberry. Do you do that or does IA do that; or does
+the Cyber Division, which is under you, do that? It says
+``analysis,'' so how does that work?
+ Mr. Liscouski. Let me take the first part of what we are
+doing, and I will tell you how we are doing it. There are a
+number of efforts that we have got under the priority one; the
+first--and no order of ranking here, just to give you the
+amalgamation.
+ There is the critical infrastructure--I am sorry, Computer
+Incident Interagency Management Group that I referred to
+earlier, first part of our response system. There are the
+alerts that we put out through the cyber alert system, as well
+as the efforts we are taking to build our national watch
+capability. We have got a--one effort dedicated to network flow
+analysis and situational awareness, and we have got our C1
+project, which is our secure and survivable communications.
+ But who does the analysis that is aggregated among these
+types of efforts is a combination of--we work closely with our
+information analysis colleagues. The unique thing is, you know,
+about IAIP as we are joined at the hip. We both are resources
+for each other. In the context of threats, IA has the
+responsibility of providing us with threat information and that
+can then be mapped over to vulnerabilities. The technical
+expertise to understand how those threats can manifest
+themselves and those vulnerabilities, particularly in the cyber
+world, is found in the NCSD.
+ So analysis occurs across the soft center of IAIP if we
+look at where really the heart of what the IAIP organization is
+providing in terms of value to DHS.
+ I don't mean to be overly complicated about this, but there
+is analysis on both sides of that equation. So as it relates to
+priority 1, we have a very distinct role from the NCSD's
+perspective providing that response capability as well as an
+analytic capability.
+ Mr. Thornberry. Number two under that same priority is
+warning, and you just referred to some organization, but that
+is kind of an operational role; it seems to me that is a little
+different from infrastructure protection. I presume that is the
+same thing. Cyber Division is doing all of that analysis and
+the operational things and yet they are under infrastructure
+protection. I think that is kind of a unique situation for
+cyber, but also raises some questions.
+ Mr. Liscouski. It is not unique for cyber. We are doing a
+similar way for telecommunications under the NCS. Similarly,
+within our protective security division, we are doing an
+analysis on threat information as it relates to mapping that
+threat information into vulnerabilities. As I point out, this
+is a very--you can't cut that Gordian knot. It is robustness of
+analysis going on both sides of the equation.
+ The one way that he might look at it is, threat information
+is sort of incident specific. Vulnerability analysis in terms
+of how vulnerabilities may be exploited might be end results
+specific. For instance, oftentimes we look at if we want to
+create--if a terrorist group is interested in creating a mass
+casualty type of event, they have a number of different ways
+they can use that: biological event, chemical event, bombing,
+using aircraft as missiles. We all know the results and we look
+at different ways we can affect that type of outcome.
+ The analysis that has to go on to exploit vulnerabilities
+in those particular modalities of attack are things that our
+organization is responsible for doing. The intent and who has
+got the capability of doing those things clearly resides on the
+side of the information and analysis.
+ Mr. Thornberry. Under, still, priority one, one of the
+things we need, the strategy says, is recovery mechanisms and
+continuity plans in Federal cyber systems. Are those under way?
+ Mr. Liscouski. Yes, sir, they are. The partnerships we have
+in cross-infrastructure components, but cyber in particular, is
+intended to be able to recover from an attack as quickly as we
+possibly can, reconstitute ourselves. That is an integral part
+of our protection program.
+ One of the things a good recovery capability does is it
+devalues the target. One of the protection priorities we have
+is not just hardened targets, but to quickly recover from an
+attack should an attack occur. That effectively devalues the
+target if we can recover quickly.
+ Mr. Thornberry. I am not going to go through all of these
+items. I will skip ahead for a second to priority two, which is
+threat and vulnerability reduction.
+ Among some of the specific items listed there are securing
+the mechanisms of the Internet including key Internet
+protocols, Internet routing, and management of the Internet.
+How are we working with the private sector to do those things
+that were specifically set out in the strategy?
+ Mr. Liscouski. We have a number of initiatives currently
+under way in which we are looking at both the vulnerability of
+the Internet as well as ways that we need to enhance the
+security of the Internet. One of those efforts, the GEWIS
+program, which was the Global Early Warning Information System,
+started out as an effort that the NCSD has enhanced
+significantly and gained ownership of, is looking broadly
+across the Internet at the network analysis activity that needs
+to be examined to ensure that we can see attacks coming over
+the horizon and take protective actions as necessary.
+ Mr. Thornberry. I think what we might like to do is submit
+some of these other types of questions for the record, going
+through the various elements of the strategy, again not looking
+for detail, because that is way too much, but I do think it is
+important for us and for all of those interested in this topic
+to have some idea that at least there are initiatives under way
+for the various areas, and some of them are not even in your
+bailiwick. But the initiatives that are under way, we need to
+know that they are under way.
+ I yield to the gentlelady.
+ Ms. Lofgren. I realize we are out of time and we have a
+series of votes. I have a lot of questions which I will submit
+and look forward to the written response.
+ But I did want to make sure that I understood Mr. Cooper's
+answer to Mr. Etheridge, because I wrote it down and want to
+make sure I was not mistaken.
+ Did you say that by the end of this fiscal year we will
+meet the President's 6-month goal on processing immigration?
+ Mr. Cooper. I am indeed saying that we are going to do
+everything that we possibly can to meet that goal. That is our
+direction, that is where I am placing additional information
+technology resources to help do that.
+ Ms. Lofgren. Thank you very much.
+ Mr. Thornberry. The chairman may have additional questions,
+particularly for Mr. Liscouski, who has another hearing. Maybe
+Mr. Cooper might be more flexible if we need to come back.
+ Mr. Cox. We don't need to come back. I intend to go to the
+floor for the vote, but I would take a few minutes before we
+leave.
+ Mr. Thornberry. We have the gentleman from Florida here.
+ Mr. Meek. I will yield to the chairman and I will submit my
+questions for the record.
+ Mr. Cox. I appreciate your courtesy.
+ On the subject of our overall strategic objectives, I am
+impressed and pleased that the number one strategic objective
+is preventing cyber attacks against America's critical
+infrastructures. When I look at the priorities as they are laid
+out, I find that the first priority is the response system. The
+second priority is threat and vulnerability reduction, which
+has as its analog the second of the two, the second of the
+three overall objectives for DHS itself.
+ Likewise, priority 3 is awareness and training. That gets
+to protection. Priority 4 is securing government cyberspace.
+That, of course, is defensive. And within priority 5, as it is
+outlined, even though it is described as international
+cooperation, there is a bit about intelligence sharing and so
+on.
+ But, you know, the main purpose of the Department of
+Homeland Security is to deal with the problem of T and T,
+terrorists and technology, the weapons of mass destruction plus
+terrorists, the possibility that mayone day be upon us. That is
+the worst thing that could happen to the country and,
+therefore, the first thing that the Department of Homeland
+Security needs to concern itself with.
+ Such things as pulse weapons directed at our country,
+therefore, mark what ought to be the top priority in prevention
+there is clearly superior to dealing with it after it happens,
+just as with any other weapon of mass destruction. So I wonder
+if I could inquire first whether you have it in mind to place
+increasing emphasis on the prevention piece, because while it
+is occasionally mentioned, I see that we are focused, for
+understandable reasons, elsewhere because it is more tractable;
+and specifically whether it is possible to initiate more
+meaningful collaboration between the National Cyber Division
+and the Department of Defense.
+ Mr. Liscouski. Yes, sir. From our perspective, these
+programs all roll up into a good preventive and protection
+approach. You can take apart elements and see that they
+contribute to protection. But every single one of these, from a
+response and recovery capability awareness, threat and
+vulnerability reduction, all really do constitute good
+protection programs. So I would, if I understand your question
+correctly, validate this approach in terms of what it
+accumulates--.
+ Mr. Cox. What I am trying to do is distinguish protection
+from prevention. We have prevention, protection response. I see
+a lot of protection, a lot of response, and I need to
+understand more about what we are thinking about doing in the
+prevention area.
+ Mr. Liscouski. In the context of prevention and again, I
+don't want to be definitionally based here, but as it relates
+prevention, typically the law enforcement component of
+interdicting, detecting and interdicting what is going on.
+Detection as it relates to prevention is clearly within the
+domain of what we do. The actual activity related to
+interdicting or reducing an adversary's ability to attack us is
+not something that my organization is charged with.
+ Mr. Cox. On the other side of IAIP, in the other half of
+Frank Libutti's brain, we have the essence of the prevention
+piece of DHS, and it would seem to me that that would apply
+just as thoroughly to cyberspace as anything else.
+ Mr. Liscouski. The full circle here--and again, this is
+trying to cut the Gordian knot, but we look at prevention in
+the context that you just provided it to occur at the target
+level. And the things that we can control in the world, that we
+do to protect--if I could take some time here for a moment--
+there are protective activities we engage in which increase
+awareness of group capabilities and tactics that could be
+affected against a specific target.
+ We go out and train the private sector on what to look for,
+the observables of preincident indication of activity of a
+terrorist attack. Those observables, while they may be
+disparate pieces of information not directly related to an
+imminent attack, but potentially future planning of an attack,
+are things we can pipe back into our IA folks to assist in the
+prevention role.
+ That is the value add that we have in the ability of
+providing information from the private sector that we directly
+gain on preincident information that we collect, that we share
+with our information analysis component that gets put back into
+the intelligence community to affect good prevention
+methodologies and good prevention activities. It is finding
+out--and the unique thing about this and the unique thing about
+what DHS does, particularly as it relates to IP, is that we
+deal in the target community; and as a result and as opposed to
+looking at just the criminal activity or the terrorist activity
+that goes into targeting the private sector, we are dealing
+with the targets that are the focus of those terrorist groups.
+ So if we know what to look for and we can train people in
+what the observables are, that observable information can
+significantly enhance prevention activities as it relates to
+law enforcement and the intelligence function.
+ As I pointed out earlier, it is a pretty complex process,
+but I think it is an extremely articulable one as it relates to
+what our role is and how we play together in this space. It
+happens in the cyber world routinely; as we found out, probing
+or potential exploit probes, things that can be detected in the
+cyber world contribute to that sort of knowledge as well.
+Terrorist groups, we know, use cyber activity to probe physical
+targets to see what the penetration capabilities are. That
+information gets collected similarly as observable--physical
+things that are observable get reported back to us.
+ I don't know if that responds to your question or not.
+ Mr. Cox. It amply responds given the time that we have. I
+appreciate very much your willingness to speak to the point.
+ I thank the chairman. Please keep in mind my suggestion
+about deeper cooperation with DOD. I think that that could be
+helpful.
+ Mr. Liscouski. I could respond to that, too.
+ We actively engage with DOD and we are looking at all
+levels between NORTHCOM as well as the Assistant Secretary of
+Defense Paul McHale. We have a good partnership there.
+ Mr. Thornberry. I thank the chairman.
+ I would like to ask both witnesses if we can have an
+agreement that because our time has been cut short, that you
+all will make an effort to respond to our written questions,
+try to within 2 weeks and less than 30 days, and I will commit
+to you to make sure that the questions are reasonable in length
+and scope. If we could have that agreement with both of you, I
+would appreciate it.
+ I am going to ask one other question at the risk of missing
+this first vote. You are free to go Mr. Liscouski, but I don't
+know if anybody is going to be over there anyway because we are
+all voting.
+ But, Mr. Cooper, I want to direct this to you because one
+of the primary reasons that the Department of Homeland Security
+was created was to integrate 22 different agencies into one
+seamless unit. Now, the total measurement of seamlessness is
+not having one IT architecture and system with which the
+Department can operate, but it is a pretty good one. And yet,
+when I look at some of the specifics that you have provided on
+the progress you have made, you have still got ten different
+financial management systems, you have still got eight
+different contracting offices, seven different human resources.
+ I guess it is an area where I am frustrated, frankly, and I
+want to ask, is the primary difficulty you face figuring out
+what you want to do? Is it resolving the technical difficulties
+of merging these 22 different agencies? Or is it something
+else? Is it money? Is it getting the decisions made to force
+people to go use somebody else's computer system even though
+that is not what they have been using?
+ If you had to summarize the difficulty you face in making
+this one seamless IT department, what is it?
+ Mr. Cooper. I would summarize it in this way: It is a
+combination of people, process and technology. The technology
+is in fact, honestly, from my professional and kind of sitting
+in the role that I currently sit in, is the least controversial
+and the easiest to effect.
+ However, having said that, it is--in and of itself, the
+technology challenges are complex. We know how to do them, so
+that is the easiest.
+ The second is process. What we don't want to do, if you
+pardon the expression, is pave the cowpath. We want to
+reengineer some of the processes that we now use or will use to
+effect threat identification and management or some of the
+cybersecurity activity that Bob has talked about or some of the
+back office processes that I spoke to briefly. That is hard
+work.
+ We do have--we are making progress. I mentioned the five
+business area focus groups. This is under way. We were a little
+bit slow to get going because we had to do some education. We
+had to help people understand why this is an important and
+valuable exercise.
+ We have had the support of the Secretary. We have had the
+support of the Deputy Secretary and now we are engaging. All
+areas of the Department are engaging. So that, I feel
+comfortable that we are under way.
+ Again, we will move as fast as we can move with quality and
+with speed. It may take us longer than all of us would hope
+that we could complete.
+ The last and the toughest is people. This is about change.
+And that means that in some cases, the right decision or what
+might come out of these business area focus groups might be
+suggestions or reengineering that says a process used to be
+done in many organizational elements and now it might be more
+appropriate to place it in one organizational element, name
+that organizational element, the managing partner or the
+business process owner to have reach and span of control across
+that process across the entire Department. That is change, it
+is difficult, and it is about thinking differently and about
+doing work differently.
+ I don't have exact answers. It is not quite a science yet.
+There is a little bit of art involved.
+ Mr. Thornberry. I appreciate your analogy of changing the
+tires as the car is moving, because while you are doing this
+stuff, you still have got to guard the borders and still have
+to process the people coming in. And I don't want to minimize
+that effort.
+ I will say this. I think a number of us will be looking for
+ways to help you, maybe even push you a little bit to make sure
+that this does move as fast as possible. And understanding
+culture and people and reluctance to change, we cannot let that
+obstruct the ability to have a department that is functioning
+as well as it possibly can, because so much is riding on the
+success of this department.
+ So I don't want to make your job more difficult, but on the
+other hand, separation of powers is here for a reason and maybe
+we can help give you some extra incentive or whatever to get
+the job done.
+ But I appreciate it. I appreciate both of you being here
+and your answers today, and I appreciate your willingness to
+answer our written questions promptly. And, with that, the
+hearing is adjourned.
+ [Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
+
+
+ A P P E N D I X
+
+ ----------
+
+
+ Questions Submitted for the Record
+
+ Questions for Assistant Secretary Robert Liscouski, From Congressman
+ Dave Camp
+
+ 1. Your office has the responsibility to communicate cyber threat
+information to the private sector. I am interested in understanding the
+different means you use to accomplish this task. What challenges do you
+face in communicating with large companies (the Financial Services
+Sector, for example) versus small business owners and private users?
+What are the different means you utilize to reach these different
+groups, especially given their varying levels of understanding of cyber
+threats?
+ The primary ways that DHS communicates cyber threat information to
+the private sector are: (1) through the U.S. Computer Emergency
+Readiness Team (US-CERT) public website at www.us-cert.gov, (2) through
+the US-CERT's National Cyber Alert System (NCAS), (3) through the US-
+CERT Portal, and (4) through the Information Sharing and Analysis
+Centers (ISACs) in each of the critical infrastructure sectors.
+ The US-CERT public website is our primary means to provide
+information to the public at large. It includes relevant and current
+information on cyber security issues, current cyber activity, and
+vulnerability resources. To date, the website has received over 3.8
+million hits at an average of 128,000 per day. It also provides a link
+to the National Cyber Alert System (NCAS).
+ NCAS is an operational system developed to deliver targeted,
+timely, and actionable information to Americans to allow them to secure
+their computer systems. Information provided by the NCAS is designed to
+be understandable to all computer users, technical and non-technical,
+and reflects the broad usage of the Internet in today's society. The
+NCAS provides a communication mechanism through website access and e-
+mail alerts for providing general guidance for users and the ability to
+reach millions of Americans at once with a variety of cyber security
+information materials on both a technical and non-technical level.
+There are currently over 270,000 unique subscribers to the various
+alerts provided by the NCAS, and our challenge is to increase its
+outreach to as many Americans as possible. We are working closely with
+the National Cyber Security Alliance on expanding the Stay Safe Online
+campaign, coordinating closely with the Federal Trade Commission on
+their information security campaign, and working with other trade
+groups and industry associations with key cyber security awareness and
+outreach programs.
+ In addition to the public website, US-CERT maintains an active
+secure online portal that enables the cyber security stakeholder
+communities including government and the private sector to communicate
+and collaborate on cyber security efforts. Groups that utilize the US-
+CERT portal include the Chief Information Security Forum (CISO Forum),
+the National Cyber Response Coordination Group (NCRCG), DHS's Office of
+Infrastructure Protection, the Government Forum for Incident Response
+Security Teams (GFIRST), the Multi-State Information Sharing and
+Analysis Center (MS-ISAC), and the US-CERT staff. One challenge to
+reaching the private sector communities has been creating a trusted
+protocol for sharing information. That challenge is being addressed in
+through the NCSD/US-CERT Outreach and Awareness efforts.
+ In the case of vendor-specific vulnerability or threat information,
+we communicate directly with appropriate and expert representatives in
+the individual company when that is possible. The recent Cisco
+vulnerability is a key example of how we communicated--and
+collaborated--with the private sector on a very specific vulnerability.
+The ability to communicate with specific companies in such cases is
+crucial. The appropriate contacts are being developed through the NCSD/
+US-CERT Outreach efforts and through participants in the US-CERT
+Portal. Outreach targets include the spectrum of the critical
+infrastructure sectors (through the ISACs, industry associations,
+etc.), software developers and researchers, academia, government, the
+information technology (IT) vendor and operator community, and others.
+DHS works with various vendors to understand, assess, and inventory
+vulnerabilities so that when threat information is transmitted, it
+includes specific instructions on how to mitigate or eliminate the
+vulnerability, and what resources exist to obtain help.
+ The ISACs were established as a primary mechanism for two way
+information sharing with the critical infrastructure sectors. Many
+critical infrastructure sectors have developed procedures to widely
+disseminate their alerts, warnings and advisories, to both large and
+small companies, throughout their sector. These sectors involve trade
+associations, representing smaller companies, who receive information
+from the ISAC and who then re-transmit that information to their
+members.
+
+ 2. How do you utilize Information Sharing and Analysis Centers
+(ISACs) to share and receive threat information? How do you recommend
+strengthening or improving the relationship between ISACs and DHS for
+this purpose?
+ DHS/IAIP's Infrastructure Coordination Division within the Office
+of Infrastructure Protection maintains an on-going relationship with
+the ISACs and is the focal point for all ISAC relationships for
+critical infrastructure issues. Threat information gained from the
+Intelligence Community through DHS's Office of Information Analysis
+alerts, warnings, and advisories applicable to the critical
+infrastructures and key resource industries are delivered directly to
+them through standard agreed upon procedures. DHS/IAIP also provides to
+them regularly scheduled daily situational briefings, and periodic
+classified briefings as needed as well as special briefings when there
+is a major change in the threat level. IAIP also meets periodically
+with the ISAC Council a cross-sector body representing a large number
+of the ISACs, to improve information sharing practices and strategies.
+Such meetings help to sustain the relationship with the ISACs by
+proactively identifying gaps that need to be mutually addressed.
+ DHS is constantly strengthening its relationship with the ISACs.
+One of its most critical programs is the implementation of a National
+Infrastructure Coordination Center (NICC) to serve as an operational
+nexus for all of the ISACs. The NICC allows representatives from the
+ISACs, industry groups, and key companies within each sector to share
+and receive situational awareness information. These sector experts
+work both within their areas of expertise and across sectors to
+maintain constant situational awareness of the status of the critical
+infrastructure. The NICC provides a centralized mechanism for sharing
+information with the ISACs and the private sector in response to an
+event or crisis. The ISACs will also be expanded to ensure that one
+exists for each critical infrastructure sector and key segments within
+each sector. DHS continues to work with industry to evaluate ways to
+reach the full breadth of each critical infrastructure sector, either
+through improvements in the ISAC mechanism or additionally through
+sector coordinating groups.
+ In addition to these regular, ongoing efforts, the Homeland
+Security Information Network, once functional, will facilitate real-
+time communication between DHS and the private sector through the ISACs
+or other sector groups as they form. DHS is also working with the ISACs
+on a number of exercises, on a national, regional, and sector basis
+that will help determine where communication and collaboration
+improvements can be made.
+
+ Questions From Congressman Sherwood Boehlert
+
+ 1. Mr. Liscouski, in a September 2003 letter to Governor George
+Pataki, you requested New York's initiative and leadership in the
+Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) and
+promised that DHS would assume a more 'formal' role in the MS-ISAC,
+once established. New York State and Mr. William Pelgrin, Director of
+Cyber Security and Critical Infrastructure Coordination for the state,
+have been proactive and effective in coordinating and leading the
+Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center. Mr. Pelgrin's
+efforts have resulted in the MS-ISAC involving 49 states and the
+District of Columbia and a business plan, submitted to DHS, which
+highlights roles, responsibilities, budgets, and additional steps
+needed for the MS-ISAC. Now that it has been established, what funding
+and support do you plan to provide the MS-ISAC as you work to formalize
+the relationship between DHS and this critical initiative that you
+requested?
+ DHS recognizes and appreciates Mr. Pelgrin's efforts to develop and
+expand the Multi-State ISAC. As part of this effort, we had requested
+that he engage other like entities within the states, which had
+information sharing initiatives on-going, such as NASCIO, and integrate
+their efforts. That work is in progress. We are currently reviewing Mr.
+Pelgrin's business plan that was developed prior to the implementation
+of new capabilities within DHS, such as the National Cyber Security
+Division, the US-CERT, and the announcement of the Homeland Security
+Information Network (HSIN) by Secretary Ridge in March 2004. All of
+these new capabilities are intended to assist and enhance the core
+capabilities of the ISACs and bring them up to a common level of
+effectiveness. The Multi-State ISAC will receive the benefits of all
+these new capabilities including the ability to share information and
+collaborate on cyber security issues on a 24x7 basis and to further
+integrate information sharing within and across State and local
+governments through the HSIN/US-CERT portal.
+ The Multi-State ISAC and Will Pelgrin have been extremely
+supportive of the US-CERT and our initiatives to increase national
+cyber security situational awareness. The NCSD has participated on a
+number of Multi-State ISAC monthly conference calls throughout 2004 and
+plans to continue to support the mission of the Multi-State ISAC to
+provide valuable cyber security vulnerability and incident information
+to the State level. Moving forward, NCSD plans to work along with the
+Multi-State ISAC to mutually improve cyber security on both the state
+and federal level. As such, DHS has entered into a contract with the
+MS-ISAC to provide $400,000 in FY04 funds, which the MS-ISAC is
+currently using for various outreach efforts such as conference, the
+webcast series, and other activities. DHS is exploring an increase in
+the funding for the MS-ISAC in FY05.
+
+ From Congressman Mac Thornberry and Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren
+
+ 1. Coordination for Threat Assessments
+ a. How is the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) working
+ with the Information Analysis Directorate (IA), which has
+ responsibility for information analysis of the threat?
+ The Office of Information Analysis (IA) is DHS' portal to the
+Intelligence Community and is responsible within DHS for all aspects of
+the intelligence cycle for cybersecurity, such as issuing additional
+collection or analysis requirements to the rest of the Intelligence
+Community. NCSD works with IA on the substance of the collection and
+analysis requirements.
+ Operationally, the NCSD works with IA through daily threat
+assessment meetings and on an as-needed basis in the case of a specific
+threat. One example of this coordination was the participation of NCSD
+in partnership with IA to develop the National Intelligence Estimate
+(NIE) ``Cyber Threat Against the Information Infrastructure.'' This
+classified document is an update of the 2000 NIE of the same title. In
+addition to the regular meetings NCSD participates in daily conference
+calls with the National Security Agency/NSIRC, the Central Intelligence
+Agency, and the Department of Defense's Joint Task Force Global Network
+Operations (JTF-GNO) to discuss classified cyber activity of note.
+ b. How does the NCSD interact with the Terrorism Threat
+ Integration Center (TTIC) for classified assessments? How are
+ these assessments used and what NCSD products have resulted
+ from TTIC derived information?
+ NCSD interacts with the Terrorism Threat Integration Center (TTIC)
+indirectly through the DHS Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC).
+NCSD shares the staffing of a 24x7 Infrastructure Protection desk at
+the HSOC that has direct reach back to the US-CERT, and the HSOC and
+TTIC work closely together on information for both physical and cyber
+threats. Additionally, NCSD interaction with the TTIC is accomplished
+through DHS/IA, law enforcement and intelligence community detailees on
+staff in IAIP and is developing a comprehensive threat, risk,
+attribution assessment, and response capability.
+ With regard to classified assessments, NCSD participated in
+National Intelligence Estimate's cyber threat assessment in conjunction
+with IA and other members of the law enforcement community.
+ To date there are no specific NCSD products that have been produced
+from TTIC-derived information.
+ c. Who within DHS has the authority and mission to correlate
+ cyber threat and vulnerability for an overall assessment? When,
+ how, and with whom will this information be shared?
+ As a focal point for cyber security issues related to reducing the
+vulnerability of critical infrastructure or key resources in order to
+deter, mitigate, or neutralize terrorist attacks, DHS' National Cyber
+Security Division (NCSD) has the authority and mission to correlate
+cyber threat and vulnerability information. The NCSD performs this
+correlation within the Division in a collaborative effort between the
+US-CERT Operations branch and the Law Enforcement/Intel branch as the
+lead entities but also in collaboration with other Divisions in the
+Office of Infrastructure Protection. In addition, as part of the
+National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), NCSD is responsible
+for: (1) conducting risk assessments and determining the necessary
+protective measures for the information technology industry, and (2)
+providing guidance to the sector specific agencies with responsibility
+for other critical infrastructure sectors on how to incorporate cyber-
+related vulnerabilities into their vulnerability assessments.
+ NCSD regularly shares information with key stakeholders within DHS,
+including the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) through
+existing daily conference calls or targeted communications, IAIP, and
+other components as appropriate as well as with interagency partners
+through the NCRCG, GFIRST, and the Chief Information Security Officer
+(CISO) Forum. As information is cleared through classification
+procedures, NCSD also shares information with the private sector
+through appropriate channels, including the ISACs, the HSIN/US-CERT
+Portal , and the US-CERT NCAS. The public at large can also access
+information provided through the NCAS as well as the US-CERT public
+website. In the event that a cyber threat rises to the level of
+national security, the public will be informed through the Homeland
+Security Advisory System (HSAS).
+
+2. Coordination for Cyber Advisories and Warnings
+ a. What organization within DHS is responsible for managing and
+ issuing cyber advisories and warnings?
+ Through its mission to serve as a national focal point for cyber
+security issues and to implement the National Strategy to Secure
+Cyberspace, NCSD is responsible for managing and issuing cyber
+advisories and warnings. Those advisories and warnings are issued to
+the public and our partners through the NCAS and to specific entities
+on an as-needed basis in the case of a targeted vulnerability or
+threat. Information that is less sensitive and for wider distribution
+is disseminated through the US-CERT public website and the US-CERT
+secure online portal, as appropriate.
+ b. How will DHS integrate cyber advisories and warnings into
+ the existing Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS), given
+ that cyber has a unique audience, particularly when those
+ people who must respond to an attack are not the traditional
+ First Responders used for physical national disasters?
+ NCSD provides information for use in the HSAS to be activated as
+appropriate. However, the nature of cyber attacks is that there are
+varying degrees of cyber activity at any given time that warrant
+advisory to the cyberspace stakeholder community that does not meet the
+criteria for raising the national alert status through the HSAS.
+Therefore, US-CERT utilizes the NCAS to notify the entire national, and
+international stakeholder community about activities that may warrant
+specific protective measures but that do not rise to the national
+security level of the HSAS. US-CERT is reaching out to key partners for
+incident response at various levels of sensitivity or urgency through
+the NCAS, the US-CERT secure online portal, the NCRCG, and the US-CERT
+public website to communicate with cyber ``first responders'' and other
+stakeholders.
+ In the event of a cyber incident of national significance (or an
+incident with both physical and cyber implications), the NCSD/US-CERT
+and/or NCRCG will provide analysis and recommendations to the IIMG or
+to the Secretary to help inform a decision about whether to raise the
+national alert level,
+ c. How is the cyber threat and warning mission being integrated
+ into the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC)?
+ US-CERT communicates regularly with the HSOC on cyber security
+issues, including participation in daily conference calls and regular
+e-mail and other correspondence. In addition, the NCSD shares the
+staffing of a 24x7 Infrastructure Protection desk at the HSOC that has
+direct reach back to the US-CERT for coordinated action as appropriate.
+ d. How will DHS work with other countries when responding to a
+ cyber attack, given that most attacks have effects on
+ information systems around the world?
+ Cyberspace transcends traditional borders and we recognize our
+international outreach is crucial to protecting ourselves. As such, DHS
+is active in a number of multilateral and bilateral activities
+addressing cyber security issues such as early warning, response, and
+information sharing. NCSD and US-CERT are reaching out to other
+countries to form strategic partnerships that we will be able to
+leverage in the case of a cyber attack. US-CERT is a member of the
+Forum for Incident Response Security Teams (FIRST), an international
+coalition of government, commercial, and academic organizations that
+aims to foster cooperation and coordination in incident prevention,
+prompt rapid reaction to incidents, and promote information sharing
+among members and the community at large. FIRST is one way that US-CERT
+works with computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs) in other
+countries when needed to share information, best practices, and
+experiences. US-CERT also communicates and collaborates with other
+CSIRTs directly.
+ For example, NCSD and US-CERT participate in the cyber security
+efforts of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the
+Organization for American States (OAS), and the Organization for
+Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Their respective programs
+seek to raise awareness about cyber security, provide technical
+assistance and capacity building for emergency response teams, help
+develop trusted relationships between response teams, and to build a
+global ``culture of security.''
+ On an operational basis, the NCSD and US-CERT are developing closer
+ties with the so-called ``Five-Eyes'' countries (United States, United
+Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), as well as other
+countries with key operational capability and interest through
+information sharing and cooperative mechanisms. The objective is to
+forge trusted relationships with our counterpart organizations abroad
+and develop the basis for a coordinated response in a cyber incident or
+attack. We seek and have created opportunities to build those
+relationships in a number of international forums and activities. The
+most recent example was the multilateral conference on cyber security
+that DHS/NCSD co-hosted with the German Ministry of the Interior in
+Berlin in October 2004. Government policy makers, managers of CSIRTs
+with national responsibility, and law enforcement representatives from
+fifteen countries in Europe, Asia Pacific, and the Americas
+participated in the conference. The conference focused on developing a
+framework for cyber information sharing and incident response, and
+included a tabletop exercise to examine international communication and
+collaboration channels as well as interactive sessions on international
+information sharing and incident response. The participants agreed to
+an initial framework for cyber information sharing and incident
+response by identifying points of contact cyber information sharing
+actions in the short term and, and are forming a cooperative mechanism
+to build a more mature framework in the longer term.
+
+3. Framework
+ a. Is DHS developing a cybersecurity framework for public and
+ private use and what is the status?
+ The cyber security framework for the nation is the National
+Strategy to Secure Cyberspace issued by President Bush in February
+2003. The Strategy put forth a framework of five priorities for all
+stakeholders in protecting our nation's information infrastructure and
+provided a roadmap for both the private and public sectors to undertake
+toward a more secure cyberspace. DHS is well on our way to implementing
+the Strategy with our counterpart agencies throughout the government
+and are actively partnering with the private sector to work
+collaboratively and create a set of public milestones to measure
+progress. We have consolidated and are leveraging existing programs and
+have identified new ones toward meeting the mandate of the Strategy.
+ b. What elements are being included in this framework? At a
+ minimum, please include an update for benchmarks, standards,
+ best practices, common criteria and other elements as
+ appropriate.
+ The elements of the framework are set out in the Strategy's five
+priorities:
+ Priority I:A National Cyberspace Security Response System
+ Priority II: A National Cyberspace Security Threat and
+ Vulnerability Reduction Program
+ Priority III: A National Cyberspace Security Awareness and
+ Training Program
+ Priority IV: Securing Government's Cyberspace
+ Priority V:National Security and International Cyberspace
+ Security Cooperation
+ Key elements of our program to meet the mandate of the Strategy are
+as follow:
+ US-CERT--established a 24x7 cyber watch and warning operation
+ with a secure online portal for collaboration, information
+ dissemination, and information exchange;
+ US-CERT Outreach--establishing regular communication and
+ collaboration mechanisms such as US-CERT Portal, US-CERT public
+ website, NCAS and other activities to reach critical
+ infrastructure sectors, software developers, academia,
+ government entities, and other stakeholders.
+ Strategic Initiatives--identification of cyber security
+ programs for the long term, including software assurance,
+ research and development, exercises, training, and education.
+ Law Enforcement and Intelligence Coordination--NCSD works with
+ key parties in the law enforcement and intelligence communities
+ to leverage information and coordinate response to cyber
+ security threats and events.
+ NCSD has identified a set of goals, corresponding objectives, and
+programs and initiatives to further these goals that map to the five
+priorities of the National Strategy. NCSD is working to develop a set
+of specific milestones to measure progress toward the goals articulated
+in the following strategic framework:
+
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ PRIORITY NCSD GOALS
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+I. National Cyberspace Security Response System #1 Prevent, predict, detect, and respond to cyber incidents,
+ and reconstitute rapidly after cyber incidents
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+II. National Cyberspace Threat and Vulnerability #2 Work with public and private sectors to reduce
+ vulnerabilities and minimize the severity of cyber attacks
+Reduction Program #4 Coordinate with the Intelligence and law enforcement
+ communities to identify and reduce threats to Cyberspace
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+III. National Cyberspace Security Awareness and #3 Educate and encourage Americans to secure their
+ Training Program cyberspace thought a National awareness and training
+ campaign
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+IV. Securing Governments' Cyberspace #1 Prevent, predict, detect, and respond to cyber incidents,
+ and reconstitute rapidly after cyber incidents
+ #2 Work with public and private sectors to reduce
+ vulnerabilities and minimize the severity of cyber attacks
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+V. International Cyberspace Security Cooperation #1 Prevent, predict, detect, and respond to cyber incidents,
+ and reconstitute rapidly after cyber incidents
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+Common to All Priorities #5 Build an effective organization
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+ NCSD has various opportunities and obligations to report to
+Congress on its programs and activities and will continue to do so as
+requested and on a timely basis.
+ c. How will progress and compliance with voluntary standards
+ and the framework be measured and certified, particularly in
+ the private sector, which owns and operates most of the
+ critical information infrastructure?
+ The private sector has a large role in increasing our nation's
+cyber security, and they are acting upon that responsibility. Private
+sector associations formed the National Cyber Security Partnership
+(NCSP) and are expanding it to include over 20 associations. NCSD is
+participating in meetings of the NCSP and others to encourage the
+articulation of a set of priority milestones for implementation of the
+priorities of the National Strategy that can track progress by the
+private sector and government.
+ d. What incentives will be provided, or are needed, in order to
+ have government and industry adopt this cybersecurity
+ framework?
+ Much of the Strategy calls for information sharing between the
+private and public sectors. Historically, companies and other entities
+have had concerns about the confidentiality of information shared with
+the federal government, either independently or through a mechanism
+such as the ISACs. Congress enacted the Critical Infrastructure
+Information Protection Act as part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002
+to facilitate sharing of the most valuable information about
+capabilities, threats, vulnerabilities, and deterrence programs
+possible. The law granted an exemption for voluntarily submitted
+critical infrastructure information from the Freedom of Information Act
+(FOIA) and state sunshine laws. To implement the law, DHS has created
+and led a working group to develop regulations and procedures for
+receipt, disposition, and use of Protected Critical Infrastructure
+Information (PCII). In February 2004, DHS created the PCII Program
+Office, which has developed rigorous safeguarding and handling
+procedures to manage the information flow and prevent unauthorized
+access to information submitted under the PCII program.
+ Separately, the market demand for cyber security presents a
+significant incentive for both government and industry to adopt the
+approach laid out in the Strategy.
+ e. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
+ has been active in developing cybersecurity requirements for
+ industrial control systems. Are these activities being included
+ in DHS efforts to develop cybersecurity standards? How will DHS
+ capitalize on these activities to decrease the vulnerability of
+ privately owned critical infrastructure?
+ Yes, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
+efforts to develop cyber security requirements for industrial control
+systems have been included in DHS' efforts to develop cyber security
+standards, particularly in NCSD's effort to develop a control systems
+framework.
+ The control systems framework will build upon the work already
+completed by the NIST-sponsored Process Control Security Requirements
+Forum (PCSRF) and developed in compliance with the ISO 15408
+requirements definition language (Common Criteria) to allow for
+international acceptance.
+ PCSRF has already developed a system protection profile for
+industrial control systems? components that serves as an appropriate
+starting point for this effort. Work continues on the profile, and once
+the reference components are defined, a vulnerability analysis will be
+conducted to enumerate the relevant operational security requirements
+for each class of component. These requirements will then be mapped to
+a set of security controls based on specific assurance levels and the
+criticality of the site in terms of impact on critical infrastructure,
+economic impact and/or potential loss of life due to an environmental
+manifestation of a successful cyber attack on a control system. Once
+this definition is complete, specific recommendations will be made to
+implement the appropriate security controls in each environment.
+ Currently there is a lack of specific guidance in the standards
+that are being developed for operational control systems
+implementations. NCSD will continue to work with the standards bodies
+and industry to define any specific sector operational requirements,
+and then to offer rigorously defined security requirements and specific
+recommendations for security and/or mitigation back to the standards
+bodies and to industry.
+ In addition to the framework, DHS has invested funds to augment the
+existing testing capability of the National Supervisory Control and
+Data Acquisition (SCADA) Testbed officially launched in May 2004 and
+run jointly by the Idaho National Environmental and Engineering
+Laboratory (INEEL) and Sandia. The National SCADA Testbed is aimed at
+SCADA systems only and aimed strictly at developing the capabilities to
+test energy sector systems. DHS' test center operates hand-in-hand with
+the SCADA Testbed, but the DHS effort is focused on the non-energy
+sectors and is trying to work with other existing private and public
+testbeds as to leverage their efforts and avoid duplication. The DHS
+Control Systems Security and Test Center (CSSTC) and the National SCADA
+Testbed was officially opened in August 2004.
+ Finally, with regard to control systems, NCSD is developing a
+control systems risk/impact decision tool that the US-CERT will be able
+to use for analysis and vulnerability evaluation for control systems.
+
+4. Management
+ a. How is DHS distinguishing cybersecurity roles and
+ responsibilities internally, e.g., NCSD, CIO, TSA, Secret
+ Service, NCS, and others?
+ By virtue of the mandate provided in HSPD #7, NCSD has been given
+the mandate to ``facilitate interactions and collaborations between and
+among Federal departments and agencies, State and local governments,
+the private sector, academia and international organizations.'' As
+such, NCSD is a national focal point for the public and private sectors
+on cyber security issues and it is responsible for coordinating the
+implementation of the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. NCSD
+recognizes that each of these entities may bring unique capabilities,
+responsibilities and/or authorities to bear on cyber security issues,
+and as such, NCSD must act as a coordinating body to ensure that these
+entities are acting in concert.
+ When dealing with the internal DHS information systems, the DHS CIO
+has the responsibility and authority to implement and assure the
+security of such systems. NCSD ensures that the office of the CIO is
+kept informed of the latest cyber threats and is provided with timely,
+actionable information to take steps to protect DHS systems from
+emerging malicious code occurrences.
+ The National Cyber Response Coordinating Group (NCRCG; previously
+known as the Cyber Interagency Incident Management Group) will
+coordinate interagency preparedness and operations to respond to, and
+recover from, cyber incidents and attacks. The role of the NCRCG is
+discussed in the Cyber Annex to the National Response Plan. The group
+brings together senior officials from DHS, law enforcement, defense,
+intelligence, and other government agencies that maintain significant
+cyber security capabilities. The combination of these officials/
+agencies provides the capability to analyze and coordinate a national
+level response to any incident that affects cyber assets. In addition
+to the ability to focus portions of their agencies? resources, they
+possess the necessary statutory authority to act.
+ The National Communications System (NCS) is responsible for
+coordination of the planning for and provision of national security and
+emergency preparedness communications for the Federal government under
+all circumstances. National security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP)
+telecommunications services are those that are used to maintain a state
+of readiness or to respond to and manage any event or crisis that
+causes or could cause injury or harm to the population, damage to or
+loss of property, or degrade or threaten the NS/EP of the United
+States. Both the NCS and NCSD report to the Assistant Secretary for
+Infrastructure Protection, which allows for close coordination on those
+cybersecurity issues that impact each organization.
+ The draft National Response Plan (NRP) is a set of defined
+processes that will bring together several DHS functions for cyber
+security. The Cyber Incident Annex of the NRP, as developed by NCSD in
+coordination with the NCRCG, establishes procedures for a coordinated,
+multidisciplinary, broad-based approach to prepare for, respond to, and
+recovery from cyber Incidents of National Significance impacting
+critical national processes and the national economy. For physical
+incidents, Emergency Support Function 2 (ESF #2)--with NCS as
+coordinating agency--would coordinate Federal actions to restore
+backbone connectivity for the Internet and provide priority service to
+NS/EP users. The draft National Response Plan includes tie-ins between
+ESF #2 and the Cyber Incident Annex to ensure these functions stay
+coordinated, which has been operationalized by cross-membership across
+the NCS, NCRCG and the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG).
+ Various DHS components, including Immigration and Customs
+Enforcement (ICE) and the Secret Service have statutory responsibility
+for investigating cyber crimes. DHS through NCSD has assumed a
+supporting role in this area. Among the efforts that have been
+undertaken are, the support and administration of the Cyber Cop Portal,
+the co-sponsorship (with the Department of Justice) of the first
+statistically valid survey of cyber crime in the US, and the initiation
+of a number of joint meetings to address the issue of cyber attack
+attribution.
+ The Cyber Cop Portal is one of the oldest and most widely used
+mechanisms for sharing information in the electronic crimes community.
+It consists of over 5,300 members from all 50 states and over 40
+countries. Its growth and use brought it to the point where it could no
+longer be maintained as a voluntary part time project, and it was in
+danger of being shut off. NCSD has decided to sponsor and administer
+the portal.
+ NCSD has agreed to provide funding and support to the DOJ Bureau of
+Justice Statistics to assist in the first ever statistically valid
+survey of cyber crime in the United States. The effort will involve
+questionnaires to over 36,000 US businesses covering all critical
+infrastructure sectors. The results of the survey will provide law
+enforcement and policy makers with a better understanding of the
+problem and how to allocate resources.
+ One key component in the ability to effectively respond to cyber
+attacks is attribution, determining the source of the attack. This is
+also one of the most difficult aspects of cyber attack investigations.
+The solution to the problem is not found in any one community of
+interest, but across a broad spectrum of disciplines (Intelligence,
+Counter Intelligence, Law Enforcement, private industry, etc.). Under
+the auspices of the NCRCG, and in conjunction with DOJ, a number of
+attribution meetings have been held or are being planned. These
+meetings are designed to develop an overall picture of the state of
+attribution throughout the various communities, and then to develop a
+plan to improve it. The plan is due during the second quarter of FY05.
+ b. What measures have been taken to elevate the importance of
+ cybersecurity within the overall mission of DHS and to improve
+ public awareness of cybersecurity issues? Specifically, should
+ cybersecurity be a part of ``READY.GOV'' public web site to
+ make Americans more aware of cybersecurity needs?
+ Cyber security is a priority issue for DHS and the mission for
+NCSD. We are improving public awareness of cyber security issues
+through the US-CERT public website and the NCAS launched in January
+2004 as well as through our engagement in the National Cyber Security
+Alliance's Stay Safe Online campaign, our Outreach and Awareness
+branch, and our partnership with the MS-ISAC to reach state and local
+government. The US-CERT public website provides information on cyber
+security issues, cyber activity, and cyber vulnerabilities. NCAS is our
+primary mechanism for communicating with the public on cyber alerts,
+security tips, and other useful notifications. We are pursuing ways to
+reach as many Americans as possible through the website, awareness
+campaigns, and the NCAS as well as other public awareness efforts.
+ DHS is currently expanding the Ready campaign and is developing
+Ready for Business and Ready for Kids. Ready for Business is designed
+to help small to medium business owners safeguard their business
+operations in the event of a terrorist attack or other emergency.
+ Preliminary messages for the campaign center around three key
+themes: Ensuring Business Continuity, Safeguarding and Preparing Your
+Employees, and Safeguarding your Computer Systems (cyber security). The
+third theme will help businesses owners understand better the need for
+cyber security and also how to achieve it. It will encompass topics
+such as how to prevent computer viruses, how to detect computer
+viruses, how to preserve and back-up computer data, and how to prevent
+hacker intrusion.
+ DHS is working with the Advertising Council to develop content and
+messages that will inform and motivate business owners to take action.
+The messages will be distributed through a variety of vehicles that
+will target business owners and operators.
+ c. Some have suggested that the NCSD should be elevated within
+ the DHS organization--either as a direct report to the
+ Secretary Ridge or to the Under Secretary for Information
+ Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. What is the
+ Department's view of such a change?
+ The Department is working closely with the Homeland Security
+Council to evaluate this and other policy and organizational options
+related to elevating and expanding the current role of the NCSD.
+
+5. Wireless Funding
+ a. The National Communications System program budget for
+ Wireless Priority Service is $78M. The office of the Chief
+ Information Officer (CIO) includes funding for wireless
+ activities at $100M. How are your office, the CIO, and Science
+ and Technology Directorate working together on developing these
+ programs?
+ In summary, each program has a very distinct mission employing
+different technologies. DHS/IAIP recognizes the need to continually
+assess opportunities to insure integration of communications as well as
+efficiencies of programs. DHS has established forums for the review and
+ultimate execution of such a strategy and is coordinating all of its
+programs efforts. The IAIP NCS is an inter-agency body responsible
+(through E.O. 12472) to support the President in providing priority
+telecommunications services across federal, state and local entities
+that assures the greatest opportunity to communicate during all crises.
+The NCS Wireless Priority Service (WPS) program was directed by the
+National Security Council and subsequently authorized by the FCC. WPS
+is a National Security/Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) priority service
+program utilizing based in the commercial/public cellular networks for
+designated Federal, State, Local and critical infrastructure owner
+leadership. The DHS CIO office focuses on managing the wireless assets
+for the department with a significant focus on the private Land Mobile
+Radio (LMR) network users of the federal entities transferred to DHS.
+They are also engaged with DOJ in leveraging its capabilities and
+development of LMR interoperable communications for the Federal law
+enforcement community. In terms of coordination, the NCS programs,
+through exhibits 300, are reviewed and approved by the DHS CIO office.
+The CIO office also has established a wireless management working group
+which IAIP NCS participates in regularly to review technology issues
+and evolution as well as identify areas that will create efficiencies
+of all programs. A primary long term objective, in addition to assuring
+interoperability of DHS assets, is to integrate WPS capabilities with
+all wireless solutions as technology enables.
+ IAIP, DHS' CIO Office and the S&T Directorate, along with other
+Directorates, also work together on common interoperability challenges
+through the Department's new Office of Interoperability and
+Compatibility. This Office, housed within the S&T Directorate, was
+created to coordinate the multiple interoperability efforts and needs
+of the Department as well as look to leveraging the vast range of
+interoperability programs and efforts within the Federal government.
+Additionally, the DHS S&T Directorate manages the SAFECOM Project
+charged with partnering with state and local governments to improve the
+interoperability of federal, state and local LMR communications for
+first responders. In this area as well, IAIP support to DHS S&T through
+participation and review of Project SAFECOM activities, includes
+assuring that the WPS can effectively interoperate with Project SAFECOM
+solutions as technology dependency eases to a more open environment.
+ b. Describe how First Responders will be able to benefit from
+ the results of these efforts.
+ First Responders are increasing their dependence on wireless
+communications for command and control during emergency operations. The
+WPS program provides government and private sector leadership, such as
+incident commanders, with priority access to the public cellular
+infrastructure. The WPS link improves the commander's ability to
+receive reports from and give instructions to First Responder teams and
+other supporting organizations. Without the WPS link, command and
+control could be degraded because of cellular call-congestion in the
+vicinity of the incident/ emergency for all government and private
+sector leadership.
+ Deployment of WPS across the wireless industry is essential to a
+full public network based emergency capability for response as well as
+COOP and COG needs. WPS is the cellular augmentation of the Government
+Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS). It is anticipated that in
+the future technology will enable the integration of these capabilities
+with the interoperable Land Mobile Radio (LMR) private systems employed
+by the broad based first responder community.
+
+ Questions From Congressman Jim Turner
+
+ 1. When the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) was created in
+June of last summer, the Department announced it would build upon the
+existing capabilities of several agencies with cyber responsibilities
+transferred to DHS, including the National Communications System (NCS).
+The NCS, however, has remained separate from the NCSD. Yet, the NCS
+remains responsible for several cybersecurity initiatives, including
+the ``Network Security Information Exchanges (NSIE)'' and the ``Cyber
+Warning Information Network.'' The proposed budget continues to keep
+the NCS activities separate from the NCSD. Isn't it counterproductive
+to have so many core cyber functions outside the National Cyber
+Security Division? Wasn't the creation of the National Cyber Security
+Division intended to provide a focal point for cyber security threat
+and vulnerability assessment, as well as information sharing, within
+the Department?
+ The June 2003 DHS announcement forming the NCSD was not intended to
+suggest that NCS would be fully absorbed into NCSD. The NCS is an
+interagency organization formed under Executive order 12472 to support
+the President in the provision of National Security/Emergency
+Preparedness (NS/EP) Telecommunications meeting the need of the federal
+government under all wartime and non-wartime crisis conditions. This is
+a critical mission that now addresses infrastructure protection issues
+in addition to its traditional COOP/COG focus.
+ The NSIE referenced in the question is a government and industry
+effort initiated under the auspices of the President's National
+Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) and is managed
+through the NCS National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications
+(NCC). It addresses a very broad range of security issues potentially
+affecting the telecommunications infrastructure. Cyber security is only
+one component of these issues and the NCSD sits on the NSIE to address
+these matters. Also referenced in the question is the Cyber Warning
+Information Network (CWIN). When first envisioned, this private network
+was focused on the cyber arena, as the development of the US-CERT
+became firm and with further analysis, IP recognized that this
+capability had far more utility than originally intended. CWIN is
+intended to provide information and warnings across all infrastructures
+to our State, local, and industry partners. CWIN has been transferred
+to the IP Infrastructure Coordination Division (ICD) where it will
+support the cross-sector needs for all IP divisions.
+ In order to facilitate coordination between these elements,
+Infrastructure Protection is currently building out a watch center
+facility, the National Information Coordination Center (NICC) that will
+include NCSD, US-CERT, NCS, and ICD. Co-locating these groups on in a
+single watch center facility will facilitate the fast and efficient
+sharing of information. Initial move in to this facility is scheduled
+for the first quarter of 2005.
+ 2. The IAIP budget includes a $1.9 million increase for conducting
+cyber exercises such as ``Live Wire,'' which was a simulation of a
+terrorist attack on computer, banking, and utility systems. There are,
+however, existing cyber exercises that are up-and-running. Over two
+years--since before the Department was created--the city of San Antonio
+planned and conducted ``Operation Dark Screen,'' a cyber terrorism
+exercise that involved both the public and private sector and was
+designed to help the city defend and respond to a cyber attack. Even
+within the Department, the Secret Service is reaching out to the
+private sector and supporting table-top exercises to address the
+security of private infrastructures. What is the IAIP Directorate doing
+to integrate and coordinate with existing cyberexercises such as these?
+How much of the requested $1.9 million will go towards these existing
+exercises that have been tested and proven? In addition, what is DHS
+doing to ensure that our local communities and towns, who will provide
+the cyber-first responders in the time of crisis, are prepared? Isn't
+it true that there is no individual entity or individual within IAIP
+responsible for coordinating all of the cyberexercises being put on by
+the government and, as a result, there may be duplicative efforts?
+ Whereas the first responder and emergency management communities
+have been exercising at national, regional, and local levels for many
+years, the cyber response community is quickly catching up. The U.S.
+Government has an active program of exercises to assess preparedness
+and processes in the event of an attack on the Nation. DHS has
+established a National Exercise Program Office (NEP) to coordinate
+scheduling and participation in the exercises sponsored by various
+agencies. The IAIP Directorate is coordinating its exercise planning
+with the NEP, which is the responsibility of the DHS Office of Domestic
+Preparedness. The IAIP Under Secretary's Office has an Exercise
+Management Program (EMP) that maintains regular contact with members of
+the exercise community and coordinates with the NEP to facilitate the
+Directorate's participation in exercises. NCSD's coordination efforts
+entail scheduling cyber security exercises with NEP as well as
+integrating cyber scenario components into other planned exercises as
+appropriate. These coordination efforts with NEP assist in minimizing
+the duplication of exercise efforts.
+ NCSD's involvement in the NEP is guided by two principles: (1)
+while cyber is only one element of a multifaceted NEP, cyber elements
+must be closely coordinated with other elements of that program to
+ensure efficient use of limited resources and the most effective return
+on exercise investments; (2) cyber exercise elements must not be
+sidelined or relegated to an ``afterthought'' category within the NEP.
+ In October 2003, numerous federal agencies participated in
+Livewire, the first ever national-level cyber exercise to baseline our
+capabilities for responding to national cyber attack. The exercise
+involved more than 300 participants representing more than 50
+organizations across the federal, state, and local governments, as well
+as the private sector. Cyber attack simulation scenarios were developed
+to stress cyber interdependencies across America's critical
+infrastructures and baseline government agencies' abilities to
+collaborate across the public and private sectors. Information gleaned
+from Livewire and similar exercises aimed at ensuring security of
+critical infrastructures are being used to improve our national
+incident response processes.
+ While Livewire brought together a number of players for a large-
+scale event simulation, other exercises target specific areas or agency
+concerns. For example, the United States Secret Service's (USSS)
+Electronic Crimes Task Forces (ECTFs) have been running smaller
+regional and sector-specific tabletop exercises over the past eighteen
+months. These exercises are designed to help coordinate efforts in a
+targeted geographic area and are tailored to a specific regional
+infrastructure, such as the energy industry in Houston, TX, the high-
+technology industry in San Francisco, CA, and the banking and finance
+industry in Charlotte, NC. In February 2004, the National Defense
+University ran its Dark Portal exercise and in August 2004, a cyber
+security workshop co-hosted by NCSD and the National Security Council
+was held at the National Defense University. This tabletop workshop
+exercise included members of the National Cyber Response Coordination
+Group (NCRCG), as well as multi-agency key decision makers in the U.S.
+Government cyber security realm.
+ NCSD has sponsored several exercises that test cyber readiness in
+various geographic locations and critical infrastructure sectors across
+the Nation. In September and October 2004, a series of regional
+exercises were held in Seattle, WA (Blue Cascades II) and New Orleans,
+LA (Purple Crescent II). Both exercises were successful in highlighting
+dependencies between cyber and physical infrastructures and
+interdependencies among critical infrastructures. These exercises also
+identified and tested the coordination and cooperation among federal,
+state, and local governments with the private sector in the case of
+attacks (both cyber and physical) on the critical infrastructures in
+those regions of the U.S. In addition, each of the exercises
+illustrated the need to continue to provide outreach and cyber
+education to local emergency management and physical security
+professionals as well as identify and improve shortfalls in emergency
+preparedness.
+ DHS EMP serves as the lead organization in the development,
+facilitation and participation of a week-long, cabinet-level national
+exercise (``TOPOFF3'') to be held in the summer of 2005. These national
+exercise programs occur every two years and involve the same basic set
+of participants. The exercise for TOPOFF3 represents a joint physical
+and cyber scenario, with NCSD leading the development of the cyber
+component for the exercise. It will test not only response to attacks,
+but also continuity of government and operations, emergency response at
+the state, regional and local levels, and containment and mitigation of
+chemical, nuclear, and other attacks, etc. NCSD is also working with
+DHS to ensure a more prominent cyber component in the follow-on TOPOFF
+series of exercises for 2007 and beyond.
+ The lessons learned from these and other exercises will form the
+backdrop for an NCSD-sponsored National Cyber Exercise planned for
+November 2005. Planning activities are currently underway with initial
+groundwork already laid for this effort. In September 2004, a key
+stakeholder meeting was held to discuss the scope and objectives with
+critical infrastructure sector lead agencies. NCSD is in the process of
+planning the Initial Planning Conference (IPC) for the National Cyber
+Exercise that will include representatives from various government
+agencies and the private sector. The IPC will allow the opportunity for
+the stakeholders to establish clear and concise goals and objectives
+for the National Cyber Exercise as well as to discuss and develop
+possible scenarios.
+
+ The objectives of the National Cyber Exercise are to:
+ 1. Sensitize a diverse constituency of private and public-
+ sector decision-makers to a variety of potential cyber threats
+ including strategic attack;
+ 2. Familiarize this constituency with DHS' concept of a
+ national cyber response system and the importance of their role
+ in it; and
+ 3. Practice effective collaborative response to a variety of
+ cyber attack scenarios, including crisis decision-making.
+ 4. Provide an environment for evaluation of interagency and
+ cross-sector business processes reliant on information
+ infrastructure.
+ 5. Measure the progress of ongoing U.S. efforts to defend
+ against an attack.
+ 6. Foster improved information sharing among government
+ agencies and between government and industry.
+ 7. Identify new technologies that could provide earlier warning
+ of attacks.
+ 8. Define the roles and responsibilities of government agencies
+ and industry.
+
+ Questions for Chief Officer Steven Cooper, From Congressman Mac
+ Thornberry and Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren
+
+1. Cybersecurity Standards
+ Question: a. How are technical cybersecurity standards being
+established and enforced across the Department for information
+technology purchases, processes, and practices?
+ Technical Cybersecurity Standards are promulgated through the
+Technical Reference Model portion of the Department's Enterprise
+Architecture Program. There are also mature standards established
+through the Federal Information Processing Standards. The Information
+System Security Managers at the organizational elements are responsible
+for ensuring compliance with standards. In addition, regular Program
+and Acquisition reviews check for compliance with published standards.
+ The Department's long-term strategic approach for the enforcement
+of information technology security standards is to verify policy and
+standards compliance during the Security Test and Evaluation phase of
+the system Certification and Accreditation (C&A) process. DHS is
+currently in the process of establishing an enterprise C&A application
+that will maintain an online repository of all C&A documentation and
+enforce the use of Department mandated C&A methodologies. This
+application will generate comprehensive system test procedures and
+processes to fully map system compliance with DHS policy and standards.
+The current status of implementing this C&A tool is that DHS has
+completed the Requirements Definition phase and product evaluation
+phase, and have an operational pilot system which has given phenomenal
+results. We expect to have a Department implementation in the near
+future.
+ The Department also verifies proper implementation of policy and
+standards by
+ conducting NIST 800-26 reviews of security controls in accordance
+with Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-03-19. These reviews
+are ongoing.
+
+ Question: b. Who sets cybersecurity requirements for the Department
+and how are they communicated to the technology developer or purveyor?
+ DHS follows cybersecurity standards requirements established by the
+Committee for National Security Systems for its classified systems, and
+the Office of Management and Budget, and National Institute of
+Standards and Technology guidance for it unclassified systems.
+Additionally, mission specific requirements are promulgated through the
+internal Management Directives, as well as through the Technical
+Reference Model of the Department's Enterprise Architecture. These have
+been provided to industry in general, and are also specifically called
+out when appropriate in contracting vehicles.
+
+ Question: c. How are cybersecurity standards requirements being
+incorporated in calls for proposals, grants or other contracting
+mechanisms?
+ The DHS Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate is in the process
+of establishing a DHS-internal Cyber Security Standards Working Group.
+Within the S&T Directorate, the working group will include
+representatives from the Standards and Cyber Security R&D portfolios,
+as well as representatives from S&T's Chief Information Officer (CIO)
+group. Outside of S&T, invitations to serve on the working group have
+been extended to the DHS Office of the CIO, the National Cyber Security
+Division and the National Communications System in the Information
+Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, and the United
+States Secret Service. This group will collectively identify what cyber
+security standards requirements should be incorporated into S&T's R&D
+portfolio investment plans.
+
+ Question: d. In what areas of cybersecurity do you see a need for
+new or better standards, benchmarks, and other elements of a
+cybersecurity framework, and what can DHS do to help implement such a
+framework?
+ With new areas of technology emerging every day as well as new
+applications of existing technology, there is always a need to refine
+existing standards and promote new ones. The emergence of MPLS has
+opened many new questions and the means to securely implement reliable,
+secure wireless networks continues to be a challenge, as does the
+management of geospatial data and Law Enforcement Information. DHS
+works closely with the Federal cooperative process through bodies such
+as the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the Committee
+for National Security Systems to ensure the success of these efforts.
+
+ Question: e. Does the office of the Chief Information Officer (CIO)
+use any cybersecurity standards and processes recommended by the
+National Cybersecurity Division (NCSD), National Institute of Standards
+and Technology (NIST), and National Security Agency (NSA) to secure the
+DHS enterprise architecture?
+ To the best of our ability, all relevant standards from national
+bodies such as NIST, NSA and NCSD are applied throughout DHS. This
+includes relevant FIPS and similar standards for procurement and
+internal processes such as self assessments and Certification and
+Accreditation are explicitly standards based.
+
+ Question: f. How does NCSD provide actionable cybersecurity
+information to the CIO to consider in its enterprise architecture
+implementation?
+ DHS participates in the interagency US CERT process. As a member of
+USCIRC, DHS like all participating agencies, gets alerts, warning and
+mitigation tools in a timely manner. In addition, there is a constant
+and constructive exchange of information between the National Cyber
+Security Division and the Office of the CIO for timely notifications of
+relevant issues. Actionable items--such as those that may significantly
+compromise confidentiality or availability are given the highest
+priority for incorporation into the Department's security architecture
+which is integral to the Department's Enterprise Architecture.
+
+2. Purchasing Power
+ Question: a. What specific actions has DHS taken to improve its
+FISMA report card in order to become government model for secure
+information systems?
+ DHS has implemented a COTS enterprise product to provide automated
+support for 800-26 assessments, manage FISMA metric reporting, as well
+as Department-wide Plans of Actions and Milestones (POA&M). This
+product is being used to generate a Digital Dashboard showing
+Organization Element performance metrics and overall DHS performance
+metrics, and access to this system has been made available to the OIG
+to ensure veracity of FISMA data reported by Organizational Elements.
+Access to the Digital Dashboard will be made available to senior
+management in the near future to ensure that senior managers are
+directly involved with the Department's Information Security Program.
+In the past few moths we have implemented several enhancements made to
+FISMA reporting product for improving reporting of 800-26 and C&A
+metrics. This enhancements include a) 800-26 integrity checking; 2)
+computed metrics for 800-26 assessments and C&A; capability to upload
+assessment and C&A artifacts; 4) better tracking of C&A deliverables.
+We have purchased an Enterprise license for a C&A tool (SecureInfo
+RMS). This tool has been installed on an Enterprise server and all OEs
+are currently using the tools with DHS ramping up to full mandatory
+use. The DHS baseline policy has been mapped to this tool and use of
+the tool will ensure that the C&A SRTM is mapped to DHS policy. We have
+prepared and submitted a POA&M to OMB to achieve full ATO on all
+currently reported systems by the end of July, 2005. To ensure
+continued progress we have formed a DHS security working group to focus
+on FISMA reporting and FISMA issues.
+
+ Question: b. Many witnesses before the Subcommittee have suggested
+that a powerful tool the federal government possesses in cybersecurity
+is its buying power. Has DHS used this power to induce hardware or
+software manufacturers to provide more secure systems?
+ Every new information technology contracting vehicle put into place
+by the Department includes robust security standards. Additionally, the
+Department regularly engages information technology vendors to ensure
+that strong security is integral to product development and
+implementation. Sec.
+
+3. Wireless Funding
+ Question: a. The office of the CIO includes funding for wireless
+activities at $100M. The National Communications System (NCS) program
+budget for Wireless Priority Service is $78M. How are your office, the
+NCS, and the Science and Technology Directorate working together on
+developing these programs?
+ The Wireless Management Office (WMO), within the DHS Office of the
+Chief Information Officer, is mandated to lead and coordinate the
+Department's programs, projects, and initiatives that involve the
+wireless transport of information, including voice, data, and
+multimedia. The WMO's mission, ``To be the model program office,
+providing state-of-the art wireless capabilities to preserve our
+freedoms and protect America,'' serves to focus and provide direction
+for the program's activities and services to ensure the effective use
+of wireless technologies across the Department's organizational
+elements. As part of its mission, the WMO integrates its activities
+with the National Communications System (NCS) and the wireless
+initiatives of S&T to meet evolving homeland security requirements. The
+WMO is primarily focused on wireless communications to support internal
+DHS missions. The NCS is responsible for directing the Wireless
+Priority Service program which supports commercial, private sector
+wireless capabilities.
+ The WMO is working with NCS and the DHS S&T Directorate in
+implementing program activities through groups such as the Wireless
+Working Group (WWG). The WWG is a coordination body established to
+ensure DHS-wide approaches to wireless communications are developed and
+implemented in an integrated manner. The WMO chairs the WWG, which is
+composed of 80 representatives from all of the DHS organizational
+elements with wireless communications as part of their mission. The
+majority of the WMO's coordination with the NCS and DHS S&T occurs
+through its participation on the WWG to collect DHS organizational
+elements wireless requirements, coordinate resource utilization, and
+ensure organizational elements play an integrated roll in centralized
+DHS wireless concepts (e.g., system designs, user requirements,
+operational concepts, procurement contracts). This collaborative
+approach is consistent with the Department's customer service strategy
+and allows for on-going feedback and confirmation that the WMO is
+adequately addressing the needs of its customers and stakeholders.
+ Question: b. Describe how First Responders will be able to benefit
+from the results of these efforts.
+ The activities of the WMO, in partnership with DHS S&T and the NCS,
+directly benefits first responders at all levels of the government by
+equipping them with the wireless capabilities to fulfill their missions
+of protecting the homeland. By building strong relationships that
+foster increased coordination among first responders, enabling and
+enhancing their wireless capabilities, the DHS WMO--in coordination
+with DHS S&T and NCS--are achieving several objectives to the benefit
+of first responders, including--
+ - Implementing integrated, nationwide tactical communications
+ capabilities for DHS organizational elements and other public
+ safety first responders
+ - Providing technical assistance and implementation of wireless
+ enhancements
+ - Advancing the use of emerging wireless technologies among
+ first responders
+ These objectives are being met through several major initiatives
+supported by the WMO and coordinated with DHS S&T and the NCS.
+ Integrated Wireless Network (IWN): The mission of the Integrated
+Wireless Network (IWN) project is to provide a consolidated, nationwide
+approach to reliable, seamless, interoperable wireless communications
+to support federal agencies and officers engaged in the conduct of law
+enforcement, protective services, homeland defense, and disaster
+response within the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, and
+Treasury. The IWN will serve as the day-to-day tactical communications
+network for the DHS, Justice, and Treasury user community, as well as
+for those within DHS and Treasury, replacing outdated and antiquated
+legacy communications systems. As a result, the IWN, in every sense,
+will serve as the lifeline that directly supports the wireless
+communications capabilities of first responders.
+ The IWN represents an investment in voice and data communications
+technologies, the completed system will establish a 24 x 7
+communications network, complete with support services that will
+include major disaster recovery and contingency capabilities (e.g.
+system back-up). A centrally managed and coordinated approach to this
+initiative ensures that common, standards-compliant technologies are
+procured, thereby fostering interoperability between and among federal
+agencies for more effective and efficient enforcement activities, as
+well as provisioning communications interoperability with our state and
+local partners for event management and crisis response.
+ G4High Risk Metropolitan Areas Interoperability Project: With the
+demand for improved intergovernmental communications necessitated by
+homeland security concerns, federal agents must increasingly
+interoperate with other federal, state, and local public safety
+entities. The project was initiated to improve federal interoperability
+with local first responders in the highest threat areas across the
+country. The project is being implemented in coordination with the
+interoperability efforts of the WMO, SAFECOM, and the Office of
+Domestic Preparedness (ODP).
+ WMO Sponsored Projects: The WMO is supporting several projects that
+are improving the wireless communications capabilities of agencies at
+all levels of the government.
+ DC Broadband Project: The District of Columbia is currently
+implementing a cost-effective, high-speed, wide area, wireless data
+network that will permit the use of interoperable, broadband, wireless
+data applications for public safety communications. This network will
+allow first responders in the NCS to use full-motion, high-resolution
+video monitoring and other bandwidth-intensive monitoring tools to
+immediately share time-critical incident and emergency event
+information.
+ This will enhance regional and federal first responder
+capabilities. It will also provide accurate interoperability usage
+profiles and results, collect data on network performance (data
+throughput, coverage, latency, and effective of spread spectrum
+technologies), and implement public safety application requirements and
+operations improvements.
+ Phoenix Mesa Interoperability Project: This project provides an
+opportunity for the WMO to partner with state and local agencies and
+build upon existing communications system infrastructure. The WMO plans
+to leverage this existing system by installing federal very high
+frequency (VHF) trunked repeaters at select locally-owned radio
+frequency (RF) sites. The project should result in several key
+benefits, including the demonstration of an innovative application that
+can be replicated across the country, providing potential long-term
+cost savings for IWN implementation, and serving as a model for
+coordination and partnerships among federal, state, and local agencies
+and first responders.
+ The primary goal of the project is to demonstrate the feasibility
+of local and federal agencies utilizing common infrastructure while
+operating within different frequency bands. To accomplish this goal,
+the WMO partnered with the cities of Phoenix and Mesa, Arizona, who
+were two of the first cities in the country to implement a regional
+TIA/EIA-102 Project 25 800-megahertz trunked system. The installation
+of these repeaters will enable the WMO to use existing system assets
+such as shelters, towers, connectivity, and network management
+infrastructure.
+ SAFECOM: Linking federal tactical communications to local, state,
+and tribal public safety first responders is critical to ensuring
+seamless, wireless communications at the scene of the incident and
+improving officer safety. In 2002, as part of the President's
+Management Agenda, the White House established SAFECOM as the umbrella
+program within the Federal Government to oversee all communication
+interoperability initiatives and projects. Through SAFECOM, the Federal
+Government is addressing public safety communications issues in a more
+coordinated, comprehensive, and effective way.
+ The WMO is working with SAFECOM to improve wireless communications
+interoperability among federal, state, and local public safety first
+responders. The WMO does so by recognizing and supporting the crucial
+role of SAFECOM to the benefit of first responders to include--
+ Creating and adopting standards
+ Recognizing interoperability and communications issues
+ Identifying current initiatives that address
+ interoperable communications issues, and
+ Developing coordinated strategies to leverage work,
+ while decreasing the unnecessary duplication of efforts.
+ Collectively, the programs are providing the vital link to improve
+vertical interoperability among over 100 federal agencies with public
+safety response to over 44,000 local and state first responders.
+ Federal Partnership for Interoperable Communications (FPIC): The
+FPIC works to advance federal wireless communications interoperability
+across federal first responders by fostering intergovernmental
+cooperation. The FPIC pursues this mission by advancing the following
+goals to the benefit of the federal wireless community: providing
+technical and operational advice to SAFECOM and federal departments and
+agencies; educating federal users about wireless communications
+equipment, security, and operations standards and best practices; and
+coordinating wireless communications interoperability efforts within
+the Federal Government.
+ As members of FPIC, the WMO and SAFECOM work to improve federal
+wireless communications first responders through standing committees
+and working groups. Standing committees--such as the Standards,
+Security, and Spectrum Standing Committees--coordinate ongoing FPIC
+activities. Working groups are established to consider, investigate,
+and/or act on a specific activity or subject area of interest to
+members. The FPIC may establish partnerships with state/local
+organizations, associations, departments, bureaus, agencies, or
+individuals as appropriate. In this way, projects of mutual concern to
+all of the wireless public safety community can be addressed in a
+cooperative manner.
+ Question: 4. To what degree do the DHS enterprise architecture
+plans integrate with the federal enterprise architecture effort? How is
+DHS working with other departments to establish cybersecurity
+standards?
+
+Support for Federal Initiatives
+ EA is one of the means by which visibility into IT assets can
+enable the federal government to find business and financial
+efficiencies. Our alignment to the Office of Management and Budget
+(OMB) Federal Enterprise Architecture (FEA) continues throughout all of
+our Enterprise Architecture (EA) efforts. Our FEA and e-government
+initiatives are discussed below.
+
+Support for the Federal Enterprise Architecture
+ Our EA planning project was driven by the concepts and products of
+the OMB FEA Reference Models. We have aligned the various EA artifacts
+with the five FEA Reference Models: the Business Reference Model, the
+Data and Information Reference Model, the Service/Component Reference
+Model, the Technical Reference Model, and the Performance Reference
+Model. And, more importantly, we have embraced the two FEA foundation
+concepts: Line of Sight for program effectiveness and Component and
+Service Based Architectures for effective reuse and repeatability.
+ Business Reference Model. The FEA Business Reference Model drove
+the development of our business model. Several of the Business
+Reference Model Lines of Business are directly applicable to DHS (in
+particular, Homeland Security and Disaster Management). For all other
+business activities within the DHS business value chain level, there is
+a one-to-one link to the Business Reference Model Lines of Business.
+The EA Business Model includes a matrix that shows the relationship
+between our business activities and the Business Reference Model
+Subfunctions. It is important to note that every business activity in
+the EA Business Model is mapped to a Business Reference Model Sub-
+function. As a result of this alignment, OMB should be able to readily
+identify functional commonality of DHS with other federal agencies.
+ Data and Information Reference Model. The Data Reference Model
+consists of a layered model for decomposing collections of information,
+from Subject Areas down to Data Objects and their properties. We
+adopted this approach and classified the information required to
+support the homeland security business activities at the Subject Area
+and Data Object levels. Further decomposition and description of the
+data objects will be performed in the next phase of the EA process. Our
+Data Architecture aligns with the Data Reference Model concepts by
+providing a common, consistent way of categorizing and describing data
+to facilitate data sharing and integration.
+ Service Component Reference Model. The DHS EA project has fully
+embraced the FEA Service/Component Reference Model's component-based
+approach to the reuse of applications, application capabilities,
+components, and business services across the federal government. OMB
+created the Service/Component Reference Model specifically to identify
+service components and their relationship to the technology
+architectures of federal agencies. We leveraged the Service/Component
+Reference Model in two important manners: (1) the structure of our
+Application Architecture is a set of interworking components that has
+direct ties to the Service/Component Reference Model, and (2) our
+Technology Architecture applies a set of technology patterns that is
+derived directly from the technology aspects of the reference model.
+ The Application Architecture has been constructed to leverage
+reusable components that can be acquired once and used to provide
+services to many applications. It shows the structure of this component
+reuse. From the set of component architecture diagrams, it can be seen
+that there is a significant opportunity to apply this reuse concept
+throughout DHS (and across other government agencies). The result
+should be considerable cost savings, as well as greatly improved
+interoperability and flexibility of applications.
+ The Technology Patterns of our EA are repeatable solutions to
+recurring technical challenges. These patterns employ technologies
+described in the DHS Technical Reference Model (discussed below) and
+provide capabilities as described in the FEA Service/Component
+Reference Model. For example, the Business Intelligence/Data Warehouse
+technology pattern of our EA aligns with the Business Intelligence
+Service Type of the FEA reference model.
+ Technical Reference Model. The initial formulation of the DHS
+Technical Reference Model began with the taxonomy as well as the
+technical services, protocols, and interfaces specified in the FEA
+Technical Reference Model. The DHS model extends and refines the FEA
+model where necessary to reflect the additional functional and
+technology requirements of DHS. In deriving the DHS model from the FEA
+model, we have also made adjustments to better align the technology
+categories with the physical layering of services that exist in vendor
+and open source products. The Domain level (Tier 3) categories of the
+DHS model have all been mapped to the FEA model, so that comparisons
+can be directly made with the technical reference models from other
+agencies.
+ Performance Reference Model. Although this FEA reference model was
+still under development during our EA planning project, an initial
+attempt was made to align our Business Model with the intent of the
+Performance Reference Model, based on draft materials provided by OMB.
+Specifically, the Business Model includes a table that defines the
+outcomes or measurement categories and corresponding indicators
+(metrics) for each cross-cutting, corporate activity defined in the
+Homeland Security Value Chain. Measurement categories are defined for
+each activity in six areas: Mission and Business Results, Customer
+Results, and Process and Activities, People, Technology, and Other
+Fixed Assets. This guidance within the DHS EA will provide specific DHS
+IT programs with a starting point for applying the Performance
+Reference Model within their Exhibit 300 submissions to OMB.
+
+Support of E-Government Initiatives
+ The Target EA and Transition Strategy identified several
+opportunities to leverage on-going e-Government initiatives. As you may
+be aware, the Department is currently the managing partner for the
+Disaster Management and Safecom e-Gov initiatives. The Department is
+also actively participating in six additional e-gov initiatives. For
+example, there are three major organizations within the department that
+provide grants to state, local, private industry, academia, and
+individuals for a variety of reasons that participate in the e-Grants
+effort. We will be looking more closely at this mode of delivery and
+how it may leveraged into the EA program.
+ Finally, the target EA identifies a concept for homeland security
+information sharing and knowledge flow--the Homeland Security
+Information Sharing Architecture--based on a concept of Communities of
+Interest adopted from the intelligence community. Information sharing
+with state, local, tribal, and other federal government entities is a
+critical function of DHS, both as a source of information and as the
+``first responders'' to an incident. Implementation of this information
+sharing architecture will provide value to homeland security community
+by driving results and productivity through effective information
+sharing.
+ In addition to the initiatives for which DHS has the lead
+responsibility, we expect to be a major contributing player or user of
+several others. We are committed to transitioning to projects such as
+e-Authentication, e-Clearance, e-Payroll, e-Travel, and HR Integration.
+We are actively gaining more knowledge about these initiatives so that
+our role in supporting them and their particular timelines and
+capabilities can be integrated seamlessly into our target and
+transition strategy.
+
+
+
+