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+
+ - THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S PROGRESS IN ENHANCING HOMELAND SECURITY
+
+[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
+[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
+
+
+
+ THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
+ ADMINISTRATION'S PROGRESS IN
+ ENHANCING HOMELAND SECURITY
+
+=======================================================================
+
+ HEARING
+
+ before the
+
+ SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFRASTRUCTURE
+ AND BORDER SECURITY
+
+ of the
+
+ SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
+ HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
+
+ ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
+
+ SECOND SESSION
+
+ __________
+
+ MAY 12, 2004
+
+ __________
+
+ Serial No. 108-49
+
+ __________
+
+ Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security
+
+
+ Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
+ index.html
+
+ __________
+
+ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
+23-890 WASHINGTON : 2005
+_____________________________________________________________________________
+For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
+Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
+Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�0900012005
+
+
+ SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
+
+
+
+ Christopher Cox, California, Chairman
+
+Jennifer Dunn, Washington Jim Turner, Texas, Ranking Member
+C.W. Bill Young, Florida Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
+Don Young, Alaska Loretta Sanchez, California
+F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
+Wisconsin Norman D. Dicks, Washington
+W.J. (Billy) Tauzin, Louisiana Barney Frank, Massachusetts
+David Dreier, California Jane Harman, California
+Duncan Hunter, California Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland
+Harold Rogers, Kentucky Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New
+Sherwood Boehlert, New York York
+Lamar S. Smith, Texas Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
+Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Nita M. Lowey, New York
+Christopher Shays, Connecticut Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey
+Porter J. Goss, Florida Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
+Dave Camp, Michigan Columbia
+Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida Zoe Lofgren, California
+Bob Goodlatte, Virginia Karen McCarthy, Missouri
+Ernest J. Istook, Jr., Oklahoma Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
+Peter T. King, New York Bill Pascrell, Jr., North Carolina
+John Linder, Georgia Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
+John B. Shadegg, Arizona Islands
+Mark E. Souder, Indiana Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
+Mac Thornberry, Texas Ken Lucas, Kentucky
+Jim Gibbons, Nevada James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
+Kay Granger, Texas Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
+Pete Sessions, Texas
+John E. Sweeney, New York
+
+ John Gannon, Chief of Staff
+
+ Stephen DeVine, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel
+
+ Thomas Dilenge, Chief Counsel and Policy Director
+
+ David H. Schanzer, Democrat Staff Director
+
+ Mark T. Magee, Democrat Deputy Staff Director
+
+ Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
+
+ ______
+
+ Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security
+
+ Dave Camp, Michigan, Chairman
+
+Kay Granger, Texas, Vice Chairwoman Loretta Sanchez, California,
+Jennifer Dunn, Washington Ranking Member
+Don Young, Alaska Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
+Duncan Hunter, California Norman D. Dicks, Washington
+Lamar Smith, Texas Barney Frank, Massachusetts
+Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland
+Robert W. Goodlatte, Virginia Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New
+Ernest Istook, Oklahoma York
+John Shadegg, Arizona Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
+Mark Souder, Indiana Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
+John Sweeney, New York Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
+Christopher Cox, California, Ex Jim Turner, Texas, Ex Officio
+Officio
+
+ (II)
+
+
+ C O N T E N T S
+
+ ----------
+ Page
+
+ STATEMENTS
+
+The Honorable Dave Camp, a Representative in Congress From the
+ State of Michigan, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Infrastructure
+ and Border Security............................................ 1
+The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of California, and Chairman, Select Committee on
+ Homeland Security.............................................. 31
+The Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in Congress From the
+ State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Select Committee on
+ Homeland Security.............................................. 2
+The Honorable Donna Christensen, a Representative in Congress
+ From the U.S. Virgin Islands................................... 39
+The Honorable Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of Oregon............................................ 32
+The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of Washington........................................ 9
+The Honorable Jennifer Dunn, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of Washington........................................ 35
+The Honorable Kay Granger, a Representative in Congress From the
+ State of Texas................................................. 26
+The Honorable Shiela Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress
+ From the State of Texas, Prepared Statement.................... 9
+The Honorable Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of Massachusetts..................................... 1
+The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress
+ From the State of North Carolina............................... 22
+
+ WITNESS
+
+Mr. Steven J. McHale, Deputy Administrator, Transportation
+ Security Administration, Department of Homeland Security
+ Oral Statement................................................. 11
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 14
+
+ APPENDIX
+
+Questions Submitted for the Record
+Responses from Mr. Steven J. McHale:
+Questions Submitted from the Honorable Dave Camp................. 43
+Questions Submitted from the Honorable Christopher Cox........... 45
+Questions Submitted from the Honorable Lamar Smith............... 50
+Questions Submitted from the Honorable Jim Turner................ 51
+
+
+ THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
+ ADMINISTRATION'S PROGRESS IN ENHANCING HOMELAND SECURITY
+
+ ----------
+
+
+ Wednesday, May 12, 2004
+
+ House of Representatives,
+ Subcommittee on Infrastructure
+ and Border Security,
+ Select Committee on Homeland Security,
+ Washington, DC.
+ The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:38 a.m., in
+Room 1334, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Dave Camp
+[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
+ Present: Representatives Camp, Granger, Cox, Dunn, DeFazio,
+Markey, Dicks, Turner, Pascrell and Christensen.
+ Mr. Camp. [Presiding.] Good morning. The Subcommittee on
+Infrastructure and Border Security hearing will come to order.
+Today's hearing is on the Transportation Security
+Administration's progress in enhancing homeland security.
+ The subcommittee will hear from Mr. Stephen McHale, the
+deputy administrator for Transportation Security
+Administration. Mr. McHale, we appreciate you being here in
+place of the TSA Administrator Stone, who is waiting
+confirmation by the Senate and therefore, unable to testify.
+ The chair would ask members to either waive opening
+statements or to give short statements and to submit their full
+opening statements for the record. The record will remain open
+for 10 days after the close of the hearing.
+ Members are advised they will receive an additional three
+minutes during the question time if they waive their opening
+statement.
+ At this time, I will simply submit my statement for the
+record. And I would ask Mr. Markey, as Ms. Sanchez not is here
+today, if he has an opening statement that he would like to
+give.
+ Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. Today, we
+focus on TSA's role in enhancing homeland security. I am going
+to focus my statement on three major flaws in the
+transportation sector's security posture.
+ First, cargo security. While old ladies are still being
+forced to take their shoes off and infants have to be taken out
+of baby carriers for screening prior to boarding flights, the
+Bush Administration continues to oppose efforts to screen all
+cargo being placed on passenger aircraft, even though
+technology to do so exists.
+ This is an unacceptable loophole that gives Americans a
+completely false sense of security. I have introduced
+comprehensive aviation security legislation to remedy this
+problem.
+ Second, rail shipments of hazardous materials. Each day,
+hundreds of thousands of shipments of hazardous materials,
+including materials like chlorine that kill thousands of people
+in a few short minutes, travel through densely populated areas
+and near critical infrastructure. Take, for example, this tank
+car full of chlorine, passing within view of this building and
+the Capitol Building.
+ The U.S. Naval Research Lab had said that a successful
+attack on just one such tank car could cause 100,000 deaths in
+one half hour. An Ohio-based Al-Qa`ida operative was even
+arrested for plotting to collapse a bridge in New York City or
+derail a train in D.C.
+ And last month, just north of downtown Boston, a railroad
+tank car carrying 20,000 gallons of hydrochloric acid started
+to leak close to the Sullivan Station Rapid Transit and just
+yards away from Route I-93, causing major chaos to the morning
+commute; and thankfully, no casualties.
+ Yet, there has been no national planning to reroute and
+better secure this dangerous shipment that could be used as
+weapons of mass destruction against us. I plan to introduce
+legislation to address this problem next week.
+ And third, passenger rail security. Although we have seen
+an attack in Madrid, we still have deployed only a fraction of
+what we can in order to ensure that we protect against a
+successful attack.
+ I thank the chairman.
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you. Does the ranking member of the full
+committee wish to make an opening statement?
+ Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Deputy Administrator
+McHale, welcome to the Homeland Security Committee. I regret
+the acting administrator, Admiral Stone, was unable to be here
+with us. But we appreciate your presence.
+ We know that in the months after September 11 of 2001, we
+have taken many important steps to improve our aviation
+security and our transportation security. In fact, I believe it
+has been said that 80 percent of the new dollars that we have
+invested in homeland security has been spent in the aviation
+sector.
+ We know that in short order, you hired screeners and
+deployed them to our airports. And the American public has
+noticed the difference. I think they feel comfortable with the
+fact that these screeners are there doing the job that we all
+know needed to be done in light of the serious failures that
+occurred on September 11.
+ Last week, Mr. Markey and many others on the Democratic
+side of this committee introduced the Safe PLANES Act to better
+secure our aviation system. It is well documented that airport
+screening, while much improved, is still not as effective as
+anyone would like it.
+ The Sunday New Jersey Star Ledger had a headline on May 9
+about Newark Airport, that I am sure you are familiar with,
+entitled, ``Security Fears at Newark Airport.'' This article
+depicts serious security gaps that still remain in aviation
+security at the Newark Liberty Airport.
+ Apparently, according to this report, they do not screen
+100 percent of the baggage, as is required. I was reading the
+comments of one of the screeners who said, ``It is all smoke
+and mirrors.''
+ Now there may be some answers to this. But I noticed even
+the chief TSA person at the airport acknowledged that they are
+understaffed at that airport. So any comments that you would
+have about that; it is certainly disturbing to know, at this
+late date, we still do not have 100 percent even of the carry-
+on luggage and the checked luggage screened.
+ As you know, Mr. Markey has been quite outspoken on
+pointing out that we still have yet to implement a full
+screening process for cargo.
+ We are also concerned about the cap of 45,000 employees and
+the problem this has created for TSA. This cap obviously was
+set by the Congress. But we believe it is important, if this
+cap is too low, that the department speak out and let us know
+of this inadequacy.
+ We also are concerned about the known shipper companies.
+Few of those companies apparently have ever been checked to see
+if they are who they say they are or if they are following
+security regulations. So that is certainly a concern that I
+think this committee has.
+ The legislation that we have introduced, the Safe PLANES
+Act, closes many of these security gaps. I hope you will take a
+look at that legislation and what we have put in it. I would
+appreciate your comments regarding the merits--or lack
+thereof--that you may see in those proposals.
+ I know you have a difficult task. We have security gaps not
+only in aviation security, but also in rail security, as Mr.
+Markey pointed out.
+ We will be introducing a bill in a few days to close some
+of the security gaps that we believe still exist in rail and
+other public transportation. Any input that you could give us
+with regard to those ideas, we would very much appreciate it.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ [Submitted for the Record.]
+
+Security fears at Newark Airport
+
+Screeners say too many bags elude adequate scrutiny on route to planes
+
+Sunday, May 9, 2004
+BY RON MARSICO
+Star-Ledger Staff
+ Two and a half years after 9/11, thousands of checked bags are
+loaded onto planes at Newark Liberty International Airport each day
+without being scanned for explosives, and security checkpoints remain
+seriously understaffed, according to current and former screeners as
+well as internal e-mail.
+ The concerns come from six current U.S. Transportation Security
+Administration employees at the airport and eight former employees.
+Five former screeners spoke on the record, while the others--including
+supervisory level personnel--requested anonymity. The e-mail messages
+obtained by The Star-Ledger, discussing security problems, were sent by
+the airport's ranking TSA officials to supervisors and other agency
+employees.
+ The interviews and the e-mail portray an airport security system in
+which short staffing and the pressure to keep lines moving result in
+corners being cut as screeners handle up to 40,000 checked bags and at
+least 40,000 carry-on bags each day.
+ ``It's all smoke and mirrors,'' said Dan Sabella, 40, a screener at
+Terminal C until he quit in February. ``I didn't sleep very well when I
+had that job. It became so routine to just have that uneasy feeling. .
+. . Stuff was getting through every day.''
+ Top-level TSA officials sharply disagree with screeners' assertions
+that security is being compromised at Newark Airport, one of the three
+airports used by terrorists on Sept. 11, 2001. They do concede,
+however, that the airport is understaffed. They say they are in the
+process of hiring hundreds of new workers.
+ ``We've gone through our growing pains, and we have what I consider
+a stable work force and a growing one,'' said Marcus Arroyo, the TSA's
+federal security director at Newark Airport.
+ ``We all take this job seriously. We're not going to sleep at night
+if there's a problem,'' said Arroyo. ``I'll come back if there's a
+problem. So will any member of my staff. So yes, I do feel Newark is
+safe.''
+
+MISSED DEADLINES
+ The TSA was created two months after the hijacking of four planes,
+including a United Airlines flight out of Newark that crashed in a
+Pennsylvania field after the passengers resisted.
+ The agency was given a daunting mission: Replace poorly trained,
+ineffective screeners who worked for private security firms with full-
+time, well-trained employees who worked for the federal government.
+ Some airports have made the transition faster than others. Newark
+Airport has not been one of the success stories.
+ Of the nation's 429 commercial airports, only five missed the
+extended congressional deadline for having all checked bags either pass
+through bomb-detection machines or be manually testing for explosive
+residue. Newark was one.
+ Newark missed the original deadline, at the end of 2002, while it
+was installing about 50 of the SUV-size machines required to the scan
+checked bags. A one-year extension of deadline expired this past Dec.
+31 with the machines in place but not all checked luggage going through
+them. Arroyo says manpower shortages were a factor. To this day, the
+airport does not have the staff it needs to fully operate all of the
+bomb detection machines during peak hours.
+ Before the deadlines expired, Congress allowed airports to meet
+security requirements by alternate means: by having specially trained
+dogs sniff bags for explosives, by hand-searching luggage or, as a last
+resort, by using a system called Positive Passenger Bag Match.
+ Under the bag match option, airlines use computer records to ensure
+no checked bag remains on an about-to-depart plane if its owner has not
+boarded. This measure has been widely criticized because it would not
+deter a suicide bomber whose bag was in the luggage hold below him, set
+on a timer to explode.
+ Current and former TSA screeners and supervisors say that, while
+there is not enough staff to electronically scan every bag for
+explosives, they do not often see manual searches or dogs used as an
+alternative. They could not say whether the airlines are using the bag
+match technique.
+ John Brennan, 33, of Piermont, N.Y., who spent nearly a year as a
+screener of checked baggage in Terminal A before he resigned in
+October, says continuing staffing shortages make it impossible to scan
+every bag for explosives.
+ ``If we physically did every bag, a lot of those planes would be
+delayed,'' said Brennan. ``We didn't do every single bag. We did a
+percentage.'' He said he had no idea what that percentage was, but ``it
+was ridiculous. Just too few bags were being done, in my opinion.''
+ Since Brennan's departure, Terminal A has met the mandate, with all
+bags there either going through the bomb-detection machines or being
+swiped with a sterile cloth for signs of explosive residue, according
+to senior TSA officials.
+ For example, on Nov. 26, the hectic travel day before Thanksgiving,
+TSA records show Terminal A handled 9,897 checked bags and all were
+electronically scanned for explosives.
+ But Terminal B and Terminal C are still unable to electronically
+screen or swipe 100 percent of checked bags. Terminal C is the
+airport's busiest; Continental Airlines, which uses Newark as a hub,
+operates most of its flights there from that terminal.
+ Arroyo disputed the screeners' assertion that the lapses involve
+thousands of bags daily. He said alternate means of review, including
+the bag match technique, continue to be used for some bags.
+ ``It's not by anybody's choice that we didn't get there on Dec.
+31,'' Arroyo said, referring to the extended deadline. ``I'm able to
+assure that every bag that gets on an airplane has been under some
+level of scrutiny.''
+ He said all checked bags would be scanned for explosives in ``the
+very foreseeable future.''
+ A TSA spokesman said he believes Newark Airport will meet the
+requirement when the new employees are hired within a few months.
+ 'MITIGATING' LUGGAGE
+ An internal e-mail message indicates that as recently as Jan. 22,
+one ranking airport official worried about the number of bags not being
+scanned.
+ On that day, three weeks after the airport missed the extended
+deadline, Lou Illiano, at the time Terminal C's screening manager, sent
+an e-mail to several other high-ranking TSA officials at the airport,
+warning that far too many bags were going onto planes unscanned.
+ Illiano wrote: ``I have begun to analyze the bag data. So far I've
+only look (sic) at one day, Jan. 19. It looks like we did about 67
+percent of domestic bags.''
+ Given that some 18,000 or more bags are checked onto domestic
+Continental Airlines planes at Terminal C most days, some 6,000 bags
+would not have been screened as required.
+ Asked whether only two-thirds of Terminal C's domestic bags were
+being properly scanned for explosives, Arroyo said, ``I'm not going to
+respond to that.''
+ Illiano wrote that the goal of screening 100 percent of bags was
+hampered by ``insufficient EWR screeners'' and difficulty in keeping
+``a consistent watch on this operation.'' (EWR are Newark's
+international air-transportation code letters.)
+ Illiano added he was ``not sure all the duty managers have grasped
+the importance of this operation.''
+ Continental Airlines employees also bore blame, he said, because
+they would send bags directly onto the planes if they determined the
+TSA could not screen every bag for explosives without causing delays.
+In airport parlance, the practice is called ``mitigating'' luggage.
+ ``I also think Continental is too quick to decide that we can't
+handle 100 percent, and begin mitigating. As it stands, we cannot keep
+track of the bags they are mitigating,'' Illiano wrote.
+ Illiano declined a request from comment.
+ Airline officials said in a statement: ``Continental's highest
+priority is the safety and the security of our customers and employees,
+and the assertion that Continental is interested in anything else is
+baseless, ridiculous and without merit.''
+ ``The airline fully supports the TSA's multiple efforts, many of
+which are not visible to the traveler, to comply with all federal
+security standards while offering customer-friendly service,'' the
+statement concluded.
+ Arroyo denied that TSA loses track of any checked bags. He said the
+agency works in concert with the airlines.
+ ``We know what we're doing in terms of bag match, in terms of
+processing, in terms of alternative measures,'' said Arroyo. ``They
+don't call the shots. We call the shots.''
+ Mark Hatfield, a TSA spokesman in Washington, D.C., stressed that
+even if other luggage is subjected to Positive Passenger Bag Match, the
+bags of anyone deemed a potential security threat are scanned for
+explosives.
+ ``We have several alternative screening measures available that
+allow us to meet the 100 percent checked bag screening requirement. We
+utilize them in random fashion and always ensure that risk-associated
+bags are electronically cleared,'' Hatfield said late last week.
+
+UNHAPPY CONGRESSMAN
+ Rep. Robert Menendez (D-13th Dist.), a member of the House aviation
+subcommittee that monitors TSA effectiveness, said relying on Positive
+Passenger Bag Match at this late date does not meet ``the spirit or
+intent'' of the congressional mandate that 100 percent of checked bags
+be screened for explosives.
+ Referring to the missed deadline, Menendez said: ``It's just
+unacceptable, especially when one of the flights of Sept. 11 came out
+of here. Technically, I would say they are in violation of the law.''
+ Last May, Menendez sent a letter to TSA seeking answers about
+various problems at Newark Airport.
+ ``Almost a year later, little has been done to address those
+concerns that I outlined in the letter,'' said Menendez. ``Clearly,
+they have not been responsive, and we're looking for a variety of ways
+to (get them to) be responsive.''
+ U.S. Sen. Jon Corzine (D-N.J.) also has asked questions about
+airport security.
+ On Feb. 25, following a budget hearing with Department of Homeland
+Security Secretary Tom Ridge, Corzine submitted a written question to
+Ridge asking what Homeland Security--which oversees TSA--was ``doing to
+expedite the 100 percent electronic screening of checked baggage'' at
+Newark. More than two months later, Corzine said, he has yet to hear
+back from Ridge or his staff.
+ ``I think it's outrageous, and the fact that Secretary Ridge is
+just ignoring a request is just wrong,'' said Corzine. ``It (the
+airport) is vulnerable until we at least deal with the issue of
+screening luggage that goes onto airplanes.''
+ But careful checking of baggage comes at a price for which the
+public has limited tolerance--delays.
+ One TSA supervisor cited the case last year of a threat directed
+toward an Air India 747, carrying 400 people, before departure.
+Officials responded by using the most stringent inspection procedures,
+and the flight was delayed four hours.
+ Similarly, threats made over the holidays to some Air France and
+Virgin Atlantic flights led to hours worth of delays, said the
+supervisor.
+
+CHECKPOINT WOES
+ Newark Airport is one of the nation's busiest airports, handling
+29.4 million arriving and departing passengers in 2003.
+ Some 20,000 fliers depart on average each day through Terminal C.
+Terminal A or B each has about 10,000 passengers departing on average
+daily. Checkpoint lanes--where passengers walk through metal detectors,
+take off their shoes and put carry-on bags and personal items on belts
+that carry them through X-ray machines--are the places most passengers
+encounter TSA screeners. The TSA's goal is to keep waits to 10 minutes
+or less and to treat fliers in a professional, courteous manner while
+not compromising security.
+ But that mission is an elusive one at Newark Airport's checkpoints,
+say TSA screeners and supervisors.
+ Screeners operating X-ray machines are faced with a dilemma: If
+they follow the TSA's standard operating procedure and stop the X-ray
+belt for every carry-on bag to better examine the contents over the
+machine's computer monitor, the line of waiting passengers quickly
+backs up dramatically.
+ Supervisors sometimes remind them of the requirement but too often
+demand they work quickly to keep the lines short, screeners say.
+ ``The onus was put on us to increase the speed we were screening
+these people,'' said Mick O'Donnell, 36, who worked as a Terminal A
+checkpoint screener from August 2002 until October 2003. ``And I'll
+tell you, it was a little too quick.''
+ O'Donnell, who is now an airline mechanic supervisor in Georgia,
+said screeners often had no choice but to violate standard operating
+procedure. The X-ray operator would give cursory looks at each bag's
+contents on the monitor as the parade of luggage streamed through the
+machine.
+ ``We wouldn't stop every bag. We would just let them go through--
+boom, boom, boom,'' said O'Donnell. ``There just wasn't time to do
+that. . . You would get spoken to if you were running slow.''
+ Several current TSA employees in supervisory positions also said X-
+ray operators still routinely flout the requirement because of pressure
+from top officials to move passengers quickly.
+ Arroyo said the problem of screeners not stopping carry-on bags on
+X-ray machines had not been brought to his attention.
+ ``They're not supposed to do that,'' said Arroyo. ``If that's
+somebody's edict, it's not coming from me. If we find out about it, we
+put a stop to it. But I've not had that reported to me.''
+ But in an e-mail on Feb. 26, a copy of which was sent to Arroyo, a
+top TSA official called the speedy movement of carry-on bags on X-ray
+machines at Newark Airport a ``serious matter'' that must be
+``quickly'' corrected.
+ ``Apparently, it has become common practice for our X-ray operators
+to allow the belts to run continuously and not stop the belt on each
+image,'' Jeffrey Candino, the airport's deputy assistant federal
+security director, wrote to supervisors. ``Anyone who is not doing that
+is in direct violation of the SCP SOP''--screening checkpoint standard
+operating procedure--``and can be disciplined.''
+ TSA officials said Candino would not comment on his e-mail message.
+ ``Our people can't talk about any screening standard operating
+procedures due to the sensitivity of the material,'' said Ann Davis, a
+TSA spokeswoman.
+
+UNGLAMOROUS WORK
+ Ultimately, many of Newark Airport's security woes stem from the
+severe staffing shortages, say screeners and TSA managers.
+ Screeners say there is a constant scramble to man checkpoint lanes
+and bomb-detection machines. At times the airport will use only three
+screeners on a checkpoint lane and two on a bomb-detection machine, the
+screeners say.
+ Originally, the TSA wanted seven screeners on each checkpoint lane
+and five screeners manning the bomb-detection machines. It lowered the
+recommended minimums to four on checkpoint lanes and three on bomb-
+detection machines.
+ Screeners at Newark Airport generally earn slightly more than
+$30,000 a year.
+ ``It's a brutal job, screening. It's deadly boring and it's deadly
+serious,'' said Robert Monetti, president of Victims of Pan Am Flight
+103 Inc., who lost his son in the 1988 terrorist bombing over Scotland
+and has lobbied since for improved aviation security. ``And that's a
+deadly combination.''
+ Deliberate interruptions in routine, such as switching jobs on the
+checkpoint lane, are intended to keep screeners sharp-minded. But
+Sabella, the former screener who spent 1 1/2 years with the TSA, said
+shorthanded lanes can leave screeners unable to properly break the
+monotony of the assignments--such as staring at X-ray machine monitors
+to find contraband--during eight-hour shifts.
+ ``You can't take a break. You can't be efficient,'' said Sabella.
+``You can't rotate every 30 minutes and be refreshed.''
+ TSA officials say they are working hard to hire more screeners at
+Newark after an unsuccessful effort to attract enough part-time
+employees. The agency plans to hire as many as 400 more full-time
+screeners in the next two or three months, bringing the total security
+force to about 1,600. That number should be sufficient to meet the
+congressional requirement for electronic screening, Arroyo said.
+ Werner Ledwon of Staten Island, who works as a screener at a
+Terminal A checkpoint, said the TSA is trying hard to achieve its
+mission and grapple with the staffing shortages.
+ ``Like any new company, you're going to have some rocky roads. . .
+. I think we're doing everything we can possibly do,'' said Ledwon, 55,
+an Air Force veteran. ``I'm from the old school. You make it work, even
+if you were down to one guy. . . . I'm proud of what I'm doing.''
+ Most of those interviewed, however, contend the problems are too
+severe to overcome without increased manpower.
+ Menendez called for the TSA to find ways to increase staffing
+during peak travel periods. ``The bottom line is there's a very
+significant employee pool that is available in this area,'' said
+Menendez, whose congressional district skirts the airport. ``They
+simply say they cannot find people--which is unacceptable.''
+ Hatfield, the TSA spokesman, said the attrition rate at Newark
+Airport was 16 percent over the past year. Current and former TSA
+personnel counter that figure seems low.
+
+THE TESTS
+ TSA officials acknowledged that security at the checkpoints is not
+foolproof, but they said that is why layered levels of security have
+been incorporated into the system. Examples of the extra safeguards are
+reinforced cockpit doors in the aircraft and air marshals aboard many
+flights, they said. The agency's leadership maintains that security at
+the nation's airports is significantly better than it was on 9/11 and
+continues to improve. The TSA stopped 576,925 prohibited items at the
+nation's airports in March alone, according to Hatfield.
+ But screeners' concerns about the chance for a weapon to bypass
+security echo a recent U.S. General Accounting Office report, which
+revealed that federal investigators conducted covert tests and
+identified weaknesses at more than 100 airports in the screeners'
+ability to detect dangerous objects. While the GAO declined to make the
+details public, those who saw them were troubled.
+ During a House aviation subcommittee hearing in Washington April
+22, Inspector General Clark Kent Ervin said the nation's aviation
+security screeners--both the federal employees and a handful of private
+contractors--``performed about the same, which is to say, equally
+poorly,'' according to an Associated Press report.
+ At Newark Airport, various tests of screeners' ability to detect
+dangerous objects have been conducted since last fall.
+ In October, Lockheed Martin tested screeners on such skills as how
+they hand-wand the passengers who set off the walk-through metal
+detectors. In November, TSA agents covertly conducted tests for the
+GAO, returning for another round of undercover drills in March.
+ Screeners and supervisors say Newark screeners did not fare well.
+ Arroyo confirmed that some 80 percent of the screeners in half of
+one terminal failed Lockheed Martin's first tests. But he said there
+were initial problems with the testing procedures. Within two weeks, he
+said, some 90 percent of screeners were passing.
+ Screeners and their supervisors say a different battery of tests
+was conducted covertly by TSA investigators last November and more than
+half of those who were tested failed.
+ While Arroyo would not provide specifics, he acknowledged that the
+November TSA test marks were poor, but he said the March drills
+produced ``significantly better'' results.
+ ``Knowing how difficult the tests are, I was very pleased with our
+results,'' said Arroyo. ``Had we gotten the results that we had gotten
+back in November, I would have been very upset.''
+ Arroyo added that test results can be misleading. The tests are
+supposed to be difficult to pass, he said, because they are seen by the
+TSA as teaching tool.
+ ``So the testing is, I hate to say it, designed to create
+failure,'' said Arroyo.
+ Screeners and supervisors, however, also point to specific examples
+of repeated checkpoint failures and worry about what else they might be
+missing.
+ In October, several walk-through metal detectors missed a steak
+knife nearly 8 inches long, according to a screening manager's e-mail.
+ Following months of complaints by screeners about a blurry X-ray
+monitor at a Terminal A checkpoint, the unit was finally replaced in
+January, after a United Airlines passenger discovered he had
+inadvertently passed through security with a box-cutter.
+ In February, 78 passengers aboard a Continental flight had to be
+rescreened, and part of Terminal A closed, when a passenger slipped
+past security with a carry-on bag containing an object that resembled a
+gun.
+ After investigating that incident, Arroyo said, he concluded the
+screener who said he saw a possible gun was mistaken.
+ In the case of the blurry monitor, Arroyo conceded there was a
+problem with the monitor in January, though he said it had passed
+calibration tests.
+ ``It wasn't a defective machine,'' said Arroyo. ``Was it as good as
+other machines? Probably not.''
+ Arroyo said he did not recall the incident of the steak knife.
+ The security director said he is always aware of Newark Airport's
+9/11 legacy and is committed to continued security improvements.
+ ``We know that UAL 93 left from this airport and it perished in
+Pennsylvania,'' said Arroyo. ``If any of us could do more than what
+we're doing, we would do it.''
+
+ Ron Marsico covers Newark Liberty International Airport. He may be
+reached at [email protected] or (973) 392-7860.
+Copyright 2004 NJ.com. All Rights
+Reserved.
+
+Security net at Newark Airport
+
+Sunday, May 9, 2004
+
+Here's a breakdown of TSA screening measures used at Newark
+LibertyInternational Airport:
+
+CHECKED BAGS
+ The preferred method involves sending checked luggage
+ through aSUV-sized bomb-detection machine that checks the
+ molecular content ofitems for explosives.
+ Alternatively, screeners swipe bags with a sterile
+ cloth, which is thenput into a computer to check for explosive
+ residue.
+ If neither of those methods can be used, screeners
+ conduct hand searchesof bags or use bomb-sniffing dogs to check
+ for explosives.
+ As a last resort, each bag is matched to a boarding
+ list of passengerswho are on the airplane. The system is called
+ Positive Passenger Bag Match.
+
+ 0CARRY-ON BAGS.
+ All carry-on bags are sent through an X-ray machine at
+ concoursecheckpoints.
+
+PASSENGERS
+ All departing passengers are required to pass through a walk-
+throughmetal detector. Passengers who set off the metal detector alarm
+are thensubjected to a secondary screening with a hand-held metal
+detector. Insome cases, pat-down searches can be required before the
+passenger canboard a plane. Some passengers may be advised to remove
+their shoes,which are also sent through the X-ray machines.
+
+ADDITIONAL MEASURES *
+ TSA officials say checkpoint and baggage screeners are just one
+layer ina multi-tiered security system that also includes:
+ A computerized profiling system that flags passengers
+ who might pose arisk. Criteria may include passengers who fly
+ one way, pay for ticketswith cash or travel with little or no
+ baggage.
+ Reinforced cockpit doors aboard planes.
+ Thousands of air marshals on U.S. flights daily.
+ Pilots allowed to carry guns.
+
+Copyright 2004 NJ.com. All Rights
+Reserved.
+
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you very much.
+ Mr. Dicks, would you wish to make an opening statement?
+ Mr. Dicks. Yes.
+ Mr. Camp. So the gentleman is recognized.
+ Mr. Dicks. Thank you. First of all, I want to associate
+myself with the remarks of Congressman Markey. The idea that we
+are not inspecting cargo, I think, is something that the
+administration has to address.
+ We need to understand why that is and what the plan is to
+take care of that. Secondly, I am worried about port security
+and the lack of funding in the budget for port security.
+ It has been the Congress that has had to add the money each
+year for this endeavor. And I do not get it.
+ We should remember what happened with just a brief lockout
+on the West Coast when we could not get containers into the
+West Coast because of this lockout. And it all of a sudden had
+an immediate economic impact, not only on Los Angeles and the
+West Coast cities, but also other cities that get these
+containers from the West Coast by rail or truck.
+ And we have a lot of lean production and other things that
+are done with components and parts coming in from offshore.
+ Now protecting and securing these ports; yes, I know we,
+under the Maritime Security Act, had to come in with a report.
+But there is still a major question about who is going to fund
+security at these major ports.
+ And Operation Safe Commerce, yes, that gives us a picture
+of what we need to do at three or four of the major ports in
+the country. But that certainly is not a comprehensive
+approach.
+ So again, I really worry that we are not putting the
+resources into this that is necessary to secure an important
+part of the economy. And I worry about the dirty bomb scenario
+or something of that nature coming in via a container, being
+shipped to Chicago. And you have an event that then could put
+us in a situation where we cannot bring containers in on the
+West Coast, with an enormous potential economic disaster for
+the country, if that should ever occur.
+ So again, we are not getting that part of the job done as
+well. That is why a lot of us up here are frustrated about
+this.
+ And I have been a supporter of homeland security. I want to
+see us do the right job. And I am pleased that our chairman has
+had these hearings, so that we can at least have a chance to
+discuss this with the administration in public, so that the
+American people know that there are still major gaps in our
+transportation security.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you.
+ Thank you, Mr. McHale, for being here. We have received
+your written statement in advance. And we ask you to summarize
+it in five minutes.
+ Thank you.
+
+ Prepared Statement of the Honorable Shiela Jackson-Lee
+
+ I thank Chairman Cox and Ranking Member Turner for holding today's
+hearing and Deputy TSA Administrator Mr. McHale for taking time out of
+his schedule to deliver testimony to this body. It is very important
+that we have an opportunity to analyze the performance of the
+Transportation Security Administration in light of the urgent needs
+that have arisen and that have existed in the areas of aviation
+screening and infrastructure, air cargo security, airport perimeter and
+site access, land security, and personnel.
+ Air Cargo security will be a topic that deserves special attention
+from Mr. McHale because we have severe constraints before us with
+respect to the need to balance the integration, introduction, and
+training required for new screening technologies with our ability to
+provide a sufficient number of personnel to operate such technology.
+Without carefully balancing these issues, we will be faced with yet
+another vulnerability .
+ As an attempt to address some of these problems, or at least to
+give our TSA some legislative tools with which to address these
+problems, I supported our Ranking Member Mr. Turner, Edward Markey,
+senior member of the Committee, and Steve Israel, member of the House
+Armed Services Committee in introducing the Safe Passengers and Lading
+in Aviation for National Enhancement of Security Act, or the ``Safe
+PLANES Act''--important legislation on behalf of House Democrats to
+improve aviation security throughout the United States of which I am an
+original co-sponsor.
+ The bill is comprised of 15 provisions that cover areas such as:
+ --strengthening the screener workforce at the Transportation
+ Security Administration (TSA), installing explosive detection
+ equipment and other technologies across the nation where
+ needed, and
+
+ --the implementation of a plan to fully inspect all cargo on
+ passenger aircraft, among others.
+ This legislation seeks to address the serious gaps that we
+recognize in our current aviation security plan that is currently being
+administered by TSA. The nature of the vulnerabilities require
+immediate changes and the implementation of improved plans to fully
+screen all cargo, even-handedly install equipment and technology in all
+airports, and increase the number of trained personnel where needed.
+ I contributed to this effort by drafting:
+ --paragraph (a)(5) of Section 6 entitled `Aviation Security
+ Technologies' and
+ --paragraph (b) of Section 7 entitled 'Inspection of Cargo
+ Carried Aboard Passenger Aircraft.'
+ --Paragraph (a)(5) of the first section calls for, in
+ connection with a report requirement made to accompany the
+ Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) fiscal year 2006
+ budget request, the gathering of information that reveals the
+ Federal and airport security personnel's capability of
+ operating screening equipment and technology-speaking to the
+ question of equipment interoperability and staff competency to
+ operate equipment.
+ --Paragraph (b) of the second section requires the Secretary of
+ DHS to transmit to Congress a summary of the system implemented
+ to screen and inspect air cargo in the same manner and degree
+ as that employed to screen and inspect passenger baggage
+ pursuant to Section 404 of this provision.
+
+ The language that I proposed seeks to
+ --uncover weaknesses in our airport security personnel as well
+ as
+ --to give Congress a blue print with which it can better
+ exercise its oversight duties with respect to the screening and
+ inspection of air cargo.
+ Among other issues, I will approach Deputy Administrator McHale to
+seek an answer to one of the questions that relates to the problems
+that plague Houston's Airport System--namely, whether the security
+screener hiring cap will be lifted in the near future to accommodate
+the recent growth of airline travel in Houston's three busy airports.
+ Additionally, I would like to inquire as to how TSA plans to
+address a problem that was expressed to me by local administrators in
+my District of Houston. I had the opportunity to obtain information
+from personnel of the City of Houston's Homeland Security Division. An
+issue was expressed that relates to the Urban Area Security Initiative
+grant that includes three phases of funding to local areas. In 2003,
+two of the three phases were paid in installments of $8.634 million and
+$23.7 million, and in 2004, the third phase was paid in an installment
+of $19 million.
+ Under DHS' funding mechanism, monies were allocated to Harris,
+Montgomery, and Ft Bend counties plus the City of Houston. County
+government executives--elected officials--were given complete
+discretion as to how to spend these monies by virtue of a mandate of
+channeling all grants through the state. Because all counties in the
+state had to agree on how to allocate and spend the monies, there was a
+tremendous functional problem.
+ In a recent grant allocation, the City of Houston demonstrated
+needs that exceeded $30 million; however, the county government
+executives, who have veto power as to how best to spend the grant
+monies, voted not to allocate sufficient funds to Houston. Houston's
+three busy airports, its port, its new public transportation system,
+high density problems, and shopping centers have infrastructure and
+vulnerabilities that other counties don't have; therefore, there needs
+to be a system of providing guidance as to appropriate ways to allocate
+the money where it really needs to go and in what quantities. A problem
+that exists is when several elected officials have veto power over the
+spending of grant funds, you run the risk of creating a political
+nightmare because every elected official can provide a justification
+for the allocation of certain amounts of funds to any project or
+initiative.
+ In addition, with respect to Houston's airports, there is a major
+concern that they aren't receiving adequate funding from TSA (or from
+FAA). Particularly, as to the need to secure the airport perimeters,
+Airport System administrators have had to use some of the Urban Area
+Security Initiative (UAS) monies.
+ Limitations have been placed on the spending of UAS monies such
+that construction costs cannot be paid; however, the construction
+projects are crucial to the securing of Houston's airports. For
+example, there is a need for vehicle inspection stations, a secure and
+safe water treatment plant railcar (that contains chlorine) equipped
+with security features must be funded.
+ Similarly, the Houston Police Department requires boats to patrol
+the lakes and dams that feed from Lake Houston. However, under the
+funding scheme of UAS, only boats that can be used at ports can be
+purchased.
+ Moreover, relative to the baggage screening process, the Houston
+airports were promised to be among the first to be funded for the
+installation of the new Explosive Detection system (In line Explosive
+Detection System). According to Houston Airport Systems, TSA ran out of
+funds before Houston could receive its allocation. This system will
+significantly reduce staffing needs for TSA and produce more efficient
+operation.
+ I hope that these issues, in addition to others brought up on a
+national scale, can be adequately addressed by Mr. McHale. Thank you.
+
+ STATEMENT OF MR. STEPHEN McHALE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR,
+ TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
+
+ Mr. McHale. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. And good
+morning, Congressman Turner and members of the subcommittee.
+ I am proud to testify before you today on the significant
+progress that DHS and the Transportation Security
+Administration have made to secure our nation's transportation
+systems since our agency was founded a little over 2 years ago.
+But before I talk about the specific actions that TSA and the
+administration have taken, let me first acknowledge the role of
+our partners.
+ The nation's transportation system, as you know, is vast
+and complex. Very few of its assets are owned or controlled by
+the federal government.
+ The railroad and pipeline networks are largely private. So
+too are the intercity bus companies and the thousands of truck
+operators.
+ Airlines are privately owned. And most commercial airports
+are run by local or regional authorities.
+ Mass transit is owned or operated by the cities or by
+regional or state authorities. Highways are owned by the states
+and local governments.
+ Most maritime assets, including most major port facilities,
+are in private hands. And on the inland waterways, the federal
+government often shares jurisdiction with the states and with
+regional and local authorities.
+ Only in air is the federal jurisdiction truly exclusive.
+And for that reason, right from the very start, TSA and its
+parent department, DHS, have worked with our state, local,
+regional and private partners to help secure our transportation
+system. And our partners have risen to the challenge
+magnificently.
+ The railroads overcame a 100-year old rivalry to form one
+of the first--and still one of the best--information sharing
+and analysis centers. The mass transit authorities quickly
+stepped up their spending on security after 9/11, with help for
+the Federal Transit Administration and the states.
+ Trucking and pilot associations came forward with
+innovative programs to harness the observations of thousands of
+their members to report suspicious activity. Every part of the
+transportation sector recognized that the nation's
+transportation system was itself a victim of the 9/11 attacks
+and has risen to do its part to secure the transportation
+network.
+ We could not have achieved a fraction of what we have
+achieved without the help of our partners.
+ That said, Mr. Chairman, I am immensely proud of what the
+men and women of TSA have achieved in such a short time. With
+the help of our many partners, TSA has created a new aviation
+security system that is dramatically different from the system
+in place on September 11, 2001.
+ TSA's fundamental strategy is to establish a system of
+rings of security. Each ring contributes to our overall
+aviation security system. But we do not rely exclusively on any
+one component.
+ We have greatly enhanced domain awareness, gathering as
+much information as possible about the threats,
+vulnerabilities, trends and conditions of the aviation system
+and its environment. With the Department of Transportation and
+the Department of Homeland Security, we have strengthened the
+perimeter security at airports and we have conducted background
+checks on more than one million air carrier and airport
+employees.
+ At airport checkpoints, highly trained and qualified TSA
+personnel screen passengers and carry-on items, using state-of-
+the-art equipment. And checked baggage is screened using
+explosive detection equipment.
+ And Mr. Chairman, let me take a moment to come to the
+defense of our people on the front lines of our nation's
+airports. A recent Washington Post editorial asserted that our
+screeners are no better today than before 9/11.
+ That is nonsense, arising from a misunderstanding of covert
+test results and a misreading of recent testimony by the
+Department of Homeland Security inspector general. In fact, the
+IG has assured us that he believes that the differences between
+pre-9/11 screeners' performance and the performance of our
+screeners today is like the difference between night and day.
+ The basic training our screeners receive is far longer than
+that of the pre-9/11 screeners. Continuous reinforcement
+training is also part of our screeners' daily routine. And they
+are required by law to recertify their skills every year.
+ And there is no comparison between the pre-9/11 testing and
+the testing today. Pre-9/11 screeners were tested using large
+knives, guns and assembled bombs, placed obviously in bags and
+on the person.
+ Today's testers use the latest intelligence to do
+everything they can do to conceal weapons and bomb parts and to
+slip them past our screeners. Comparing pre-9/11 testing
+results to test results today is like comparing testing in
+elementary school to college-level testing. Our people are that
+much better.
+ Just since the beginning of this fiscal year, TSA screeners
+have intercepted more than 300 guns at airports around the
+country. We have increased the number of explosive detection
+canine teams working throughout the airports to screen checked
+baggage and cargo, search unattended bags and vehicles and
+respond to bomb threats.
+ The number of federal air marshals have increased from just
+a handful on 9/11 to thousands today on high-risk domestic and
+international flights. Cockpit doors have been hardened. And we
+have trained thousands of volunteer pilots to serve as armed,
+federal flight deck officers.
+ On Saturday, May 1, as directed by the Congress, our first
+prototype class of cargo pilot FFDOs graduated.
+ We are implementing our air cargo strategic plan that
+employs the tools, resources and infrastructure that are
+available today, as well as creating a foundation for future
+improvements as new technology becomes available. And the
+result of all this activity is a restoration of public
+confidence in the security of air travel.
+ We also continue to look at the transportation sector as a
+whole. With the Department of Homeland Security, we are
+developing a national critical infrastructure protection plan.
+TSA has been delegated the responsibility to develop a sector
+specific plan for transportation.
+ We are continuing to work with our federal, state, local
+and private partners on the development of security plans for
+each mode of transportation, with such innovations as the
+Transportation Worker Identification Credential, and are
+working with the surface and transportation modes to
+coordination information and threat sharing.
+ Last year, Mr. Chairman, we activated our Transportation
+Security Operations Center in Herndon to serve as a single
+point of contact for security-related operations, incidents and
+crises in aviation and all land modes of transportation. And
+Mr. Chairman, I would be glad to invite you to come out and to
+visit that facility--you or any members of the subcommittee.
+ We understand, Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, that as we go
+forward, our strategy will continue to be to do well those
+things that the federal government does best and, when we can
+help our partners discharge their responsibilities, to help
+them do so.
+ Aviation, where federal jurisdiction is paramount, must
+continue to be a primary focus of TSA activity. In those
+sectors where regional, state and local, and private
+jurisdictions prevail, TSA must ensure that intelligence and
+best practices are shared widely, that standards of security
+are set and respected, and that federal financial resources are
+used to even out inequalities of security across the sector.
+ Mr. Chairman, much has been accomplished. Much remains to
+be done. And we continue to look forward to that challenge.
+ That concludes my testimony, Mr. Chairman. And I will be
+happy to answer any questions the subcommittee may have.
+ [The statement of Mr. McHale follows:]
+
+ Prepared Statement of Stephen J. McHale
+
+ Good morning Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Sanchez, and Members of
+the Subcommittee. I am pleased to testify before the Subcommittee on
+the progress of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in
+fulfilling its critical responsibilities to protect the Nation's
+transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and
+commerce. I look forward to highlighting many of the significant
+advances TSA has made in the two years since the agency was established
+and since joining the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
+ At TSA, we are designing a security strategy for a broader spectrum
+of responsibilities than we considered in the pre-9/11 world, ranging
+from enhanced awareness and information sharing, through prevention,
+protection, response, consequence management, and recovery. DHS was
+created to lead the unified national effort to secure America. The
+creation of DHS has produced a force multiplier and a vast network for
+awareness and information sharing to protect our Nation. Working under
+the guidance of the Border and Transportation Security Directorate
+(BTS), TSA's mission is completely aligned with the mission and goals
+of BTS and DHS. TSA collaborates extensively with other BTS agencies
+and with DHS components, such as the Science and Technology Directorate
+(S&T), the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
+Directorate (IAIP), and the U.S. Coast Guard (CG), identifying
+opportunities to share information, resources, and expertise. We also
+continue to work closely with the Department of Transportation (DOT)
+and the modal administrations. They provide another vital link with
+transportation providers, and we communicate daily to share expertise
+and to ensure that we make the best use of each organization's
+resources and opportunities.
+ TSA continues to work to improve coordination with our sister
+agencies within DHS, as well as with our other Federal partners. In
+this regard, President Bush issued Home]and Security Presidential
+Directive 7 (HSPD-7) on December 17, 2003, which directs the
+establishment of ``a national policy for Federal departments and
+agencies to identify and prioritize United States critical
+infrastructure and key resources and to protect them from terrorist
+attacks.'' HSPD 7 sets the framework for DHS to develop a National
+Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan, and TSA has been specifically
+delegated the responsibility to develop the Sector Specific Plan (SSP)
+for Transportation under the National plan. The development of this
+plan will involve intensive interaction with other DHS directorates and
+agencies, such as IAIP and CG, in addition to DOT. The plan, which will
+be developed over the next several months will: (I) identify
+participants in the sector, their roles and relationships, and their
+means of communication; (2) identify assets in the sector; (3) assess
+vulnerabilities and prioritize assets in the sector; (4) identify
+protective programs; (5) measure performance; and (6) prioritize
+research and development.
+ To ensure security in each mode of transportation at an operational
+level, TSA is also working with our federal and other partners on the
+development of Modal Security Plans for each mode of transportation. We
+will expand the Transportation SSP to include modally-specific annexes
+that provide security planning guidance to modal security plan writers
+and industry stakeholders, and explicit links to the other National
+plans such as the National Response Plan (NRP) and the National
+Incident Management System (NIMS). On behalf of DHS and in conjunction
+with other federal agencies, the completed Transportation SSP will
+guide and integrate a family of transportation modal security plans to
+prevent, mitigate, and respond to intentional disruption of the
+Nation's transportation systems while ensuring freedom of movement for
+people and commerce.
+ The tragic bombings that occurred in Madrid on March 11 and in
+Moscow on February 6 were terrible reminders of the risk of terrorism
+to rail transportation. To that end, DHS, in conjunction with DOT,
+continually ascertains the threats, probabilities, and consequences of
+potential attacks on rail and other transportation systems using a risk
+management approach. Effective strategic threat-based planning results
+from an evaluation of all available intelligence and an assessment of
+criticality and vulnerability information to determine the overall risk
+environment.
+ Domain awareness is the essential starting point of our overall
+transportation security strategy. TSA receives intelligence information
+from many sources, from the intelligence community (IC) and law
+enforcement and from IAIP, which as a member of the IC, routinely
+receives information from intelligence and law enforcement partners.
+IAIP has the overall responsibility at DHS for receipt and analysis of
+information related to threats to the homeland. TSA activated the
+Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC) in 2003 to serve as a
+single point of contact for security-related operations, incidents, or
+crises in aviation and all land modes of transportation. The National
+Capital Region Command Center is co-located with the TSOC and provides
+seamless integration in protecting the National Capital Region. TSA's
+24-hour watch routinely communicates with industry representatives
+about security events or information of potential security interest.
+ TSA also has electronic connectivity to intelligence community
+databases and participates in daily intelligence teleconferences with
+other Federal agencies to discuss threat and incident reports. To
+ensure that all information pertinent to transportation security is
+identified and provided to TSA on a timely basis, TSA has assigned
+liaison officers to major intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
+TSA also receives reporting through its field personnel on security
+incidents that occur at airports and aboard aircraft and from local law
+enforcement. This information is transmitted to TSA headquarters for
+evaluation and appropriate dissemination to intelligence and law
+enforcement agencies. TSA coordinates with IAIP to disseminate specific
+warnings, advisory information, or countermeasures, where appropriate,
+to local law enforcement and the transportation industry. All threat
+information received by the TSA, including information not specifically
+mentioning transportation, is carefully reviewed for its potential
+impact on any U.S. transportation asset at home or overseas. TSA
+consults with other security and technical experts within DHS and in
+other agencies to achieve a comprehensive threat and vulnerability
+assessment. If we conclude that warnings to industry and field
+operators or operational adjustments are warranted, our response can
+take a variety of forms. Top government decision makers are alerted
+immediately, as well as industry stakeholders.
+ The next step in our threat-based, risk-managed approach is to
+assess the criticality of the Nation's transportation infrastructure
+assets. Leveraging processes developed by IAIP, TSA developed a
+criticality model and is now deploying this model to determine
+criticality scores for facilities and assets. The vulnerability
+assessment process examines the overall security posture of a
+transportation asset as well as the security posture of the asset in
+response to identified threat scenarios. TSA has developed
+vulnerability assessment tools in concert with DOT modal
+administrations and industry stakeholders. For assets determined to be
+critical, the Transportation Risk Assessment and Vulnerability Tool
+(TRAVEL) will assess an asset's baseline security system and that
+system's effectiveness in detecting, deterring, and/or preventing
+potential threats. For assets determined to be less critical, TSA
+recommends the use of self-assessment tools. To date, one self-
+assessment module has been developed, in conjunction with CG, for use
+in the maritime transportation mode. Additional modules will be created
+for the other transportation modes. For the aviation mode, a third
+tool, the Joint Vulnerability Assessment (JVA) will also be utilized in
+conjunction with the FBI at critical commercial airports. Using the
+results of the vulnerability assessments, we can collectively develop
+targeted, layered security measures tied to DHS threat levels, or
+specific intelligence, with maximum flexibility to allow for normal
+transportation activity even during periods of elevated threat.
+
+Securing Surface Transportation
+ DHS, in close coordination with our partners at DOT, state and
+local governments, and transit and rail operators, has taken a number
+of steps to address vulnerabilities in the rail and transit systems and
+improve our security posture against attacks. These efforts span the
+spectrum of security, from information sharing and awareness through
+prevention, response and recovery to a potential terrorist attack in
+the United States.
+ The Department, working with the Federal Transit Administration
+(FTA), coordinates information and threat sharing for rail and transit
+through the FT A-funded Surface Transportation Information Sharing and
+Analysis Center (ST-ISAC) in partnership with the Association of
+American Railroads (AAR) and the American Public Transportation
+Association. As part of the significant partnership that has developed,
+TSA hosts ST-SAC representatives at the TSOC. When appropriate, DHS
+disseminates Information Bulletins describing specific threats and
+providing suggested protective measures. In addition, DHS hosts
+conference calls with our Federal, state, local, and industry partners
+to communicate current information, obtain an assessment of the level
+of related preparedness, and determine additional short-term measures
+to be taken. For example. in the immediate aftermath of the Madrid
+attacks, the Department released two Information Bulletins and hosted
+National Conference Calls with federal, state and local public safety
+communities, all State and Territorial Homeland Security Advisors,
+officials from 50 major urban areas, and industry stakeholders.
+ Prior to the Madrid and Moscow events, criticality assessments of
+rail and transit networks operating in high-density urban areas were
+performed by TSA and FTA. and as a result of these assessments, these
+systems have produced robust security and emergency preparedness plans.
+Between FY 2003 and this year, DHS has used information from these
+assessments to allocate $115 million to high-risk transit systems
+through the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) in the Office for
+Domestic Preparedness. Sixty-five million dollars ($65 million) was
+allocated in fiscal year 2003 and $50 million was allocated in fiscal
+year 2004. Grantees may use these funds for such expenses as the
+installation of physical barricades, video surveillance systems, motion
+detectors, thermal/IR imagery and chemical/radiological material
+detection systems, integrated communications systems, and for
+prevention planning, training and exercises, among other things.
+ TSA has partnered with the FTA on its ``Transit Watch'' Program,
+and is coordinating with the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to
+develop a rail system inspection guide for use by rail law enforcement
+and security personnel to inspect trains for explosives and other
+threats. The Department's Federal Law Enforcement Training Center has
+provided security training to rail and transit operators, and TSA has
+distributed educational information to transit system employees on how
+to recognize and respond to potential terrorist attacks.
+ TSA has also hosted security exercises to bring together rail
+carriers, federal and local first responders, and security experts, to
+address potential gaps in antiterrorism training among rail personnel.
+One such security exercise occurred at Union Station in Washington, DC,
+in July 2003, and involved stakeholders, emergency responders and
+enforcement agencies all working to implement the station's Emergency
+Response Plan. In another security exercise, DHS, through TSA,
+partnered with the Naval War College Gaming Department to conduct an
+operation designed to evaluate security awareness, prevention, response
+and recovery of the national transportation system to a security
+incident. The lessons learned from these exercises are being used to
+enhance rail security for the entire Northeast corridor.
+ The mass transit and rail industries, and State and local
+governments, have been very proactive in addressing homeland security
+issues. Most recently, transit and rail system operators enhanced their
+existing security plans by taking additional preventive measures in
+cooperation with the Department, including more canine and uniformed
+patrols. increased surveillance, and reporting and awareness campaigns
+in the passenger environment. Rail cargo companies are continuing their
+Alert Level 2, which includes increased security at designated
+facilities, security plan review, and increased spot identification
+checks.
+ On March 22, Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge announced
+additional measures to strengthen our rail and transit systems.
+Building on many of the security measures recommended for mass transit
+and passenger rail authorities, the Department is engaging our Federal
+partners at DOT, the industry, and state and local authorities to
+establish base-line security measures based on current industry best
+practices. These include existing security measures currently being
+implemented consistently in the mass transit systems and the commuter
+rail environment and could be adjusted in consultation with transit and
+rail system owners and operators in response to higher threat levels or
+specific threats in the future. DHS will ensure compliance with
+security standards for commuter and rail lines.
+ TSA is implementing a pilot program in New Carrollton, Maryland, to
+test the feasibility of using emerging technologies for screening
+passengers and carry-on items for explosives at rail stations and
+aboard trains. This pilot, the Transit and Rail Inspection Pilot
+(TRIP), is being conducted in partnership with AMTRAK, MARC, WMATA, and
+DOT for a 30-day period. Additional phases of the pilot program are
+under consideration. The pilot program does not resemble an aviation-
+type solution to transit and rail security challenges, but rather
+provides a venue to test new technologies and screening concepts. Rail
+stations are not self-contained, and passengers have the freedom to
+board and disembark trains throughout their routes. The lessons learned
+from the pilot could allow transit operators to deploy targeted
+screening in high threat areas or in response to specific intelligence.
+ Using existing Homeland Security explosive detecting canine
+resources, the Department is developing a rapid deployment Mass Transit
+canine program. These mobile response teams will be prepared to assist
+local law enforcement teams. The Federal Protective Service will lead
+an effort to ensure canine teams from various DHS agencies are
+crosstrained for the rail and transit environment and available for
+augmentation of local capabilities when needed. DHS will partner with
+local authorities to provide additional training and assistance for
+local canine teams. The mobile program would be used predominantly in
+special threat environments and provide additional federal resources to
+augment state and local transit and rail authorities' security
+measures.
+ The Department also plans to leverage existing efforts to generate
+additional public awareness by integrating existing passenger and rail
+education materials and awareness programs developed by industry, TSA,
+and FTA. The Department's Federal Law Enforcement Training Center will
+also accelerate current security training programs for transit law
+enforcement personnel.
+ DHS's Advanced Research Project Agency is developing a program that
+will focus on research and development of next generation technology
+for High Explosives Countermeasures. The goal of the program is to
+develop and test field equipment, technologies and procedures to
+interdict suicide bombers and car and truck bombs before they can reach
+their intended targets while minimizing the impact on the freedom of
+movement. Research and development efforts such as this will be closely
+coordinated with TSA to ensure that research and development activities
+lead to deployable solutions.
+ For highway security, TSA entered into a $19.3 million cooperative
+agreement with the American Trucking Associations (ATA) to expand the
+Highway Watch program. The program trains highway professionals to
+identify and report safety and security situations on our Nation's
+roads. The expanded program will provide training and communications
+infrastructure to prepare 400,000 transportation professionals to
+respond in the event they or their cargo are the target of a terrorist
+attack and to share valuable intelligence with TSA if they witness
+potential threats.
+ Under the USA PATRIOT Act, TSA is also required to conduct security
+threat assessments on drivers holding a hazardous materials (HAZMAT)
+endorsement on a commercial driver's license. This effort is being
+pursued in two phases: name-based, terrorist-focused checks will be
+conducted on all 3.5 million HAZMAT drivers by June 2004; and
+fingerprint-based criminal history records checks will begin by January
+31, 2005. TSA is working closely with the States and the private sector
+to develop the necessary infrastructure to establish this program. TSA
+also plans to leverage existing capabilities and infrastructure when
+possible to institute the security threat assessment.
+ DHS has a substantial effort under way to strengthen security
+credential programs across the Department. For our part, TSA is testing
+alternatives for a Transportation Worker Identification Credential
+(TWIC) to mitigate potential threats posed by workers and those with
+fraudulent identification. During the current prototype stage,
+beginning this summer, this credential will test the feasibility of
+bringing uniformity and consistency to the process of granting access
+to transportation workers entrusted to work in the most sensitive and
+secure areas of our national transportation system.
+ With our Federal government's security capabilities now under one
+roof, in one department, the level of communication and cooperation in
+enhancing intermodal cargo supply chain security among the CG and BTS
+agencies, including ICE, CBP, and TSA, is stronger than ever. BTS is
+leading the effort, with TSA, CBP, and the CG, to develop a more
+comprehensive framework for securing the intermodal cargo supply chain.
+This initiative wil1 also assist in meeting Maritime Transportation
+Security Act requirements for Secure Systems of Transportation by
+incorporating a point of origin to point of destination approach to
+cargo transportation. Agencies are reviewing cargo program, analytic
+tools, and other relevant resources within the Department to identify
+remaining supply chain vulnerabilities.
+ TSA is providing CG with technical assistance in the development of
+methods for local operator inspection of passengers and vehicles using
+established ferry transportation systems. TSA is implementing the
+``Synergy Project'' designed to test the long-term feasibility of
+screening and transferring passenger baggage from seaport to airport,
+reducing the congestion at airport security checkpoints caused by the
+influx of large number of passengers disembarking from cruise ships.
+This program is currently underway at the ports of Miami and Vancouver.
+
+Securing the Civil Aviation System
+ When it was created, TSA inherited a 30-year-old aviation security
+system. With the help of its many partners, TSA has created a new
+system that is dramatically different from that which was in place on
+September 11, 2001. TSA's fundamental strategy in operating this system
+includes establishing a system of rings of security whereby each
+security ring contributes to our overall aviation security system, but
+we do not rely exclusively on any one component.
+ As in other transportation modes, we begin aviation security with
+domain awareness. TSA continuously gathers as much information as
+possible about the threats, vulnerabilities, trends, and conditions of
+the aviation system and its environment. This first ring in our system-
+of-systems enables TSA to prioritize, direct resources, and take
+protective action.
+ TSA and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have helped fund
+many local airport projects to improve perimeter security, such as
+construction of perimeter access roads, installation of access control
+systems, electronic surveillance and intrusion detection systems, and
+security fencing. TSA has required background checks to be performed on
+more than a million air carrier and airport employees with unescorted
+access to airport secured and sterile areas. Across the country] 58
+Federal Security Directors (FSDs) lead and coordinate all TSA security
+activities at airports, including tactical planning, execution, and
+operating management. At checkpoints, highly trained, qualified
+personnel screen passengers and carry-on items using state-of-the-art
+metal detectors. All checked baggage is screened using a combination of
+explosives detection systems (EDS), explosives trace detection machines
+(ETD), and where necessary, other congressionally approved methods of
+screening.
+ Each day, TSA intercepts more than] 5,000 prohibited items at
+airports around the country. Each month more than 40 firearms are
+intercepted at airport checkpoints by TSA screeners. This tells us
+first, that we must continue to be diligent in our screening efforts,
+and second, that many passengers are not voluntarily complying with the
+ban on bringing prohibited items onto aircraft. While the majority of
+cases are not intentional violations, too frequently individuals are
+deliberately attempting to circumvent security or test the security
+system. We have intercepted a knife concealed inside a soda can, a
+sword hidden inside a cane, and a knife hidden within a prosthetic leg,
+just to name a few examples. TSA has held press conferences at many
+airports around the country to educate passengers about prohibited
+items. We prominently post signs in airports to help passengers
+understand which items are prohibited, and we provide detailed
+information on our public website.
+ TSA uses its Special Operations Program to provide ongoing and
+immediate feedback to screeners, their supervisors, and TSA leadership
+on screener performance. The Special Operations Program's overall
+objectives are to test the security systems at the airports and to
+introduce difficult, real-life threat items to the screener workforce.
+Once covert testing is completed at a checkpoint, Special Operations
+teams conduct post-test reviews with available screeners to reenact the
+test and provide training. These tests are based on the latest
+intelligence and are far more rigorous than any security testing
+conducted prior to 9/11. Despite continually raising the bar on these
+tests, TSA's screeners and security systems continue to improve over
+time. However, the primary goal of these tests is not to show
+improvement. We make our system testing hard, harder, and harder still.
+to uncover vulnerabilities and to address them.
+ To maintain high levels of screener proficiency, TSA's Screening
+Improvement Plan places a strong emphasis on recurrent screener
+training and supervisory training. Over 700 inert Modular Bomb Set (MBS
+II) and weapons training kits have been deployed to every airport in
+the country as an integral part of TSA's recurrent training for
+screeners, enabling them to see and touch the components of improvised
+explosive devices and weapons. TSA is also developing protocols to help
+FSDs conduct their own airport level screening testing. To blend
+nationally and locally developed training, TSA has established the
+``Excellence in Screener Performance'' video training series. The third
+part of our recurrent training program is a series of web-based and
+computer-based screener training programs. Recognizing the need to
+provide our front line supervisors with the tools they need to manage
+the screener workforce effectively, TSA has sent more than 3500
+supervisors to introductory leadership training at the Graduate School,
+United States Department of Agriculture.
+ TSA's Threat Image Projection (TIP) program is an essential element
+of TSA's screening improvement plan. All checkpoint security lanes now
+are equipped with TRXs with the 2400-image TIP library, providing real-
+time data on screener performance. Data is available quickly at the
+local level and reported to headquarters for aggregated analysis and
+monitoring. Through deployment of TRX machines and activation of the
+expanded TIP image library, TSA is able to collect and analyze
+significant amounts of performance data that has not been previously
+available. TIP is an excellent tool for evaluating the skills of each
+individual screener so that we can focus directly on areas needing
+skill improvement. By regularly exposing screeners to a variety of
+threat object images, TIP provides continuous on-the-job training and
+immediate feedback.
+ Today TSA is right-sizing and stabilizing screening operations
+based on security requirements and opportunities for increasing
+efficiencies in business processes. As part of our workforce planning,
+we are evolving to a business model that vests more hiring authority at
+the local level with our FSDs to address airport staffing needs. The
+original methods we used in centralizing recruitment, assessment,
+hiring, and training of screeners were necessary in the fast-paced
+environment to meet the original statutory deadlines. However, this
+highly centralized model is not the right fit for sustaining an
+existing workforce.
+ Although the Aviation and Transportation Security Act mandated the
+federalization of airport security screening, it held open the
+possibility that airports could return to contract screening, provided
+the high standards required by law and instituted by TSA are met. TSA
+is currently operating a pilot program at five airports using private
+screeners that, by law, must meet TSA eligibility, training, and
+performance requirements and receive pay and other benefits not less
+than those of TSA screeners. Beginning on November 19, 2004, any
+airport operator may apply to have screening performed by a contract
+screening company under contract with TSA. A recent evaluation by
+Bearing point will assist us in assessing if and how to expand contract
+screening. The report found that the private screening pilot airports
+performed at essentially the same level as federally screened airports.
+Overall, we believe the report confirms that TSA has been successful in
+ensuring equal security at the five participating airports. We look
+forward to applying the insights detailed within the report and the
+lessons learned from the pilot program as we consider guidance and
+procedures for airports to opt out of Federal screening.
+ EDS/ETD equipment purchase and installation is the key to
+compliance with statutory requirements for full electronic screening of
+checked baggage. TSA purchases and installs this equipment through a
+variety of mechanisms, including congressionally authorized Letters of
+intent (LOIs), which provide a partial reimbursement to airports for
+facility modifications required to install in-line EDS solutions. TSA
+has issued eight airport LOIs, covering nine airports. TSA is also
+using resources to purchase and install EDS and ETD machines at
+airports outside the LOI process.
+ Our National Explosives Detection Canine Team program performs a
+critical role in aviation security, performing multiple tasks
+throughout the entire airport environment, such as screening checked
+baggage, searching unattended bags, searching vehicles approaching
+terminals during increased threat levels, screening cargo on a limited
+basis, screening mail at certain pilot project locations, and
+responding to bomb threats. TSA helps local law enforcement agencies by
+procuring and training selected canines, training selected law
+enforcement officers, and by partially reimbursing agencies for costs.
+ The number of Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) was increased from just a
+few on 9/11 to thousands today, and they are now deployed on high-risk
+domestic and international flights. With the transfer of the FAM
+Service from TSA to ICE, BTS has the flexibility to deploy additional
+ICE agents as a surge force to temporarily increase the number of FAMs
+on high-risk flights when threat conditions warrant.
+ In light of security concerns, TSA is performing security checks on
+flight crew on domestic and international passenger and cargo flights
+bound for the U.S. TSA will also assume responsibility this summer for
+conducting background checks on aliens who wish to undergo flight
+training in the United States. Vision 100 transferred this requirement
+from the Department of Justice to TSA.
+ In addition, commercial aircraft serving the U.S. are equipped with
+new, hardened cockpit doors. TSA, working with its U.S. government
+partners through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
+is seeking to encourage compliance of foreign carriers with the
+international requirement for hardened cockpit doors, which went into
+effect November 2003.
+ Training of pilots who volunteer for TSA's Federal Flight Deck
+Officer (FFDO) program will continue at a strong pace with requested
+funding of $25 million in FY 2005. On May 1, the first prototype FFDO
+class of cargo pilots graduated. TSA initiated the on-line application
+process for cargo and other flight deck crew members in February 2004.
+In January 2004, TSA began doubling the number of FFDO classes, and we
+plan to provide initial training and qualification for thousands of
+FFDOs by the end of this fiscal year. TSA has streamlined the process
+for pilots to become FFDOs, and candidate assessments are administered
+at 52 locations throughout the United States, with more being added.
+Pilots also must attend re-qualification sessions twice a year to
+ensure that they maintain a high level of proficiency and familiarity
+with program requirements. Ten private, state, and local government
+sites are available for self-scheduling of requalification training. As
+the number of FFDOs grows, TSA will consider expanding the number of
+recurrent training sites to meet their needs.
+ Ensuring that flight and cabin crew members receive self-defense
+training will add another layer of security for in-flight aircraft.
+Each of these security enhancements is an additional obstacle that a
+terrorist would have to overcome in order to accomplish his objective.
+Each has been carefully developed with attention to security, customer
+service, and a minimum impact on the flow of commerce.
+ TSA plans to institute a Registered Traveler (RT) Pilot Program in
+the summer of 2004 at a limited number of airports. RT pilots will last
+approximately 90 days. TSA anticipates that an RT program could provide
+both security and customer service benefits. TSA envisions that an RT
+Program would be voluntary and may offer those qualified an expedited
+travel experience as they go through the screening checkpoint. A
+security assessment will be conducted on each RT applicant to determine
+eligibility for the program. Upon conclusion of the Pilots, results
+will be analyzed to determine the best program approach for proceeding
+on a larger scale program.
+ A total of $60 million is requested for FY 2005 for the second
+generation Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-screening System (CAPPS II).
+CAPPS II is a limited, automated prescreening system authorized by
+Congress. Developed with the utmost concern for individual privacy
+rights, CAPPS II would modernize the prescreening system currently
+implemented by the airlines. CAPPS II is expected to employ technology
+and data analysis techniques to conduct an information-based identity
+authentication for each passenger using commercial information along
+with data each passenger provides to the airline upon making a
+reservation. CAPPS II will combine the results (scores) from the
+identity authentication with a risk assessment. The overall process
+will yield a recommended screening level, based on the degree of risk
+assessed, or specific identifiable terrorist threat. The commercially
+available data will not be viewed by government employees, and
+intelligence information will remain behind the government firewall.
+The entire prescreening process is expected to take only a few seconds
+to complete.
+ In its recent report on CAPPS II, the GAO concluded that in most
+areas that Congress asked them to review, our work on CAPPS II is not
+yet complete. DHS has generally concurred in GAO's findings, which in
+our view validates the fact that CAPPS II is a program still under
+development. As we resolve issues of access to data needed, for testing
+CAPPS II, and the testing phase moves forward and results in a more
+mature system, we are confident of our ability to satisfy all of the
+questions that Congress posed.
+ Each year, U.S. air carriers transport approximately 12.5 million
+tons of cargo. To deny terrorists the opportunity to exploit our
+thriving air cargo system, TSA has developed an Air Cargo Strategic
+Plan that calls for the focused deployment of tools, resources. and
+infrastructure that are available today, as well as creating a
+foundation for future improvements as technology and resources become
+available. TSA has prohibited all ``unknown shipper'' cargo from flying
+aboard passenger carriers since September 11. 2001, thereby limiting
+cargo to packages from identifiable shippers under the TSA Known
+Shipper program. TSA has enhanced the criteria for participation in the
+Known Shipper program and is rolling out an automated Known Shipper
+database that will allow air carriers and indirect air carriers to
+verify immediately the status of a specific shipper. TSA has also
+mandated inspections of a certain amount of cargo transported aboard
+both passenger and all cargo aircraft.
+ Under the Air Cargo Strategic Plan, TSA will work closely with CBP
+to establish a Cargo Pre-Screening system that identifies which cargo
+should be considered ``high-risk'' and work with industry and other
+federal agencies and the airline and shipping industries to ensure that
+100 percent of high-risk cargo is inspected. We are also partnering
+with stakeholders to implement enhanced background checks on persons
+with access to cargo and new procedures for securing aircraft while
+they are on the ground. TSA and CBP are working together on air cargo
+initiatives through four established work groups, making plans for
+future collaboration, leveraging of existing programs, and sharing
+resources and technologies.
+ TSA is requesting $55 million in FY 2005 for the continuation of an
+aggressive R&D program to investigate technologies that will improve
+our ability to screen high-risk cargo. TSA will look at new
+technologies for screening large cargo, including pallets and
+containerized cargo. In January 2004, TSA issued a market survey
+requesting submissions and participation of vendors of commercial off-
+the-shelf explosives detection technology to support cargo inspection.
+A number of vendors have been tentatively selected for laboratory
+evaluation of their products against the current EDS certification
+criteria. TSA has issued a request for proposals (RFP) for potential
+inventors of explosives detection technology for the screening of
+containerized cargo and U.S. mail to be transported on passenger
+aircraft. This RFP, which resulted in 74 responses, will lead to the
+award of R&D grants to assist in the development of promising
+technologies. At TSA's state-of-the-art research laboratory, the
+Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL), we are conducting a cargo
+characterization study to determine the feasibility of using currently
+deployed explosives detection technology (EDS and ETD) to screen cargo
+while new systems are under development.
+ We need to stay at least one step ahead at all times in the
+development of new security technology. The President's FY 2005 Budget
+request includes $49 million for applied research and development and
+$50 million for next-generation EDS. TSA has a robust research and
+development program and works closely with DHS S&T to develop and
+deploy technology that will help make operations more effective, more
+efficient, less time consuming, and less costly. I would like to invite
+the Subcommittee to visit our TSL to see the full scope of efforts
+underway. Several screening and other security technologies are under
+development, including an explosives detection portal for passengers to
+determine if explosives are being carried on an individual's person,
+document scanners to detect trace amounts of explosive materials on
+items such as boarding passes, and scanners for better screening of
+casts and prosthetic devices.
+ DHS, in partnership with other federal agencies, is taking an
+aggressive approach to counter the threat of Man Portable Air Defense
+Systems (MANPADS) to civilian commercial aircraft. The strategy
+includes proliferation control, tactical measures and recovery, and
+technical countermeasures. In January, DHS S&T announced the selection
+of teams to develop plans and test prototypes to help determine whether
+a viable technology exists that could be deployed to address the
+potential threat of MANPADS. In addition, as part of the overall
+MANPADS strategy, TSA is performing airport vulnerability assessments
+to identify and map the areas around an airport from which a MANPADS
+attack could be initiated and working with surrounding communities to
+coordinate the efforts of agencies responsible for responding to this
+type of threat.
+ I appreciate this opportunity to highlight just a portion of TSA's
+efforts and progress in improving transportation security. There is no
+doubt that securing our nation's transportation system will be both
+costly and time consuming. Distributing these costs fairly and
+equitably is a constant challenge--and a constant goal. Looking ahead
+to Fiscal Year (FY) 2005, TSA and our many partners at the Federal,
+state, and local levels, and in the private sector, will continue to
+reinforce transportation security through innovation, technology and
+enhanced performance. In the two years since its creation, TSA has
+developed a culture of immediacy and a strong commitment to continual
+improvement. The increased variety and sophistication of weapons and
+communication tools available to modern terrorists presents a
+significant challenge. With preventive measures in place, the risk of
+terrorism is reduced, albeit not eliminated. TSA will continue to
+identify and re-evaluate threats and vulnerabilities and make decisions
+that both facilitate transportation and improve its security.
+ I will be pleased to answer your questions.
+
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you, Mr. McHale. The chair asks unanimous
+consent that the delegate from the Virgin Islands be allowed to
+question the witness when recognized and to remain on the dais
+when doing so.
+ Hearing no objection, so ordered.
+ Mr. McHale, there is an upcoming deadline for an opt-out
+process for airports to use private screeners. I realize that
+they would have to have in place a fairly strict security
+standard in order for that opt-out process to occur.
+ Can you tell me what action TSA has taken to develop an
+application review process for that? And where in the fiscal
+year 2005 budget is this represented?
+ Mr. McHale. As you know, Mr. Chairman, we have run a pilot
+really right from the beginning--a two-year pilot--on
+reprivatization of the airports. And we have had private
+contractors provide security at five airports around the
+country, ranging from San Francisco to Tupelo, Mississippi.
+ That pilot was a great success. It showed that the private
+screening companies, with federal supervision provided by the
+Federal Security Directors, could maintain security at the same
+levels and at about the same cost as federal screening.
+ We are now in the process of looking at what guidance to
+give airports and contractors who might want to apply to
+provide private screening in the future. The Aviation
+Transportation Security Act provides that, beginning on
+November 19 of this year, airport operators may apply to the
+Administrator to ask for private screening in lieu of federal
+screening.
+ So we are getting that guidance out. We expect to get it
+out in the next month or so to the airports so that they can
+begin to make that decision and we can evaluate their
+applications.
+ In terms of the budget, there is, I believe, in the
+President's request $130 million to continue screening at the
+five airports where we are doing that today privately. That is
+really a placeholder, since we do not know how many airports
+will apply to go private.
+ The best way to look at that budget item is to aggregate it
+with the $2.4 billion that is set aside for federal screening
+at the other airports. That combined pot of money will be used
+to support either federal or private screening, however the
+airports choose to apply.
+ Mr. Camp. I am also interested in a little further comment
+on the issue of air cargo security and particularly the known
+shipper program, which is a program to assist in shipments
+transported on passenger planes. I believe we need a strategy
+of analysis and risk management here. But I think this program
+could be expanded to do more in terms of comprehensive
+background checks and other things.
+ Mr. McHale. Right.
+ Mr. Camp. I am a little concerned about the lack of
+progress at TSA on this program. And I wondered if you could
+tell me how that is going specifically, if you could update us
+on that?
+ Mr. McHale. I am glad to do that, Mr. Chairman. Actually,
+we have made quite a bit of progress. We have operational today
+a known shipper database.
+ It contains what we believe today is, I was just told,
+about one-third of the known shippers that are known to
+carriers around the country. And we are continuing to populate
+that database.
+ Right now, it is still a voluntary database. We are engaged
+in rulemaking to make that mandatory. We expect to get that
+rule out shortly.
+ In addition, as we build that database, we are now running
+background checks on the known shippers. We are going to
+continue to make those background checks more rigorous as we
+get more information and are able to hook in with additional
+intelligence systems.
+ It is a little different here because we are not so much
+running background checks on people as often as we are on
+concerns. That makes the interface a little bit more difficult.
+But we are working through that.
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you very much.
+ Mr. Pascrell may inquire.
+ Mr. Pascrell. Let's see. Mr. McHale, I have some questions
+to ask you, specifically about Newark Airport and then the
+whole question of port security. You have seen the newspapers.
+ Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
+ Mr. Pascrell. You have read the stories. There are going to
+be more stories. The governor yesterday made a statement about
+security at Newark Airport. And in good faith, we will proceed.
+ One-third of the bags at Newark Airport go on planes
+without screening. That is a pretty remarkable number.
+ One former screener there said that this is all smoke and
+mirrors. I want to know what your plans are and what timetable
+you have for checking all the baggage with electronic detection
+systems. What plans do you have for Newark?
+ Mr. McHale. As the Federal Security Director at Newark,
+Marcus Arroyo, who is one of our best, has said, we are in
+compliance with the law at Newark and we do screen all the
+bags, either electronically or using alternate means. That
+said, while we do not talk about specific proportions of bags
+that are screened at any given airport, I can tell you that we
+have significantly increased the staffing at Newark in the last
+few weeks and that I believe that the statements in that
+article are grossly out of date.
+ Mr. Pascrell. You are not going to answer the question as
+to when, what is your timetable for putting into effect? I
+mean, I know Director Marcus Aroyo. I think he happens to be
+doing a great job.
+ Mr. McHale. I think he is too.
+ Mr. Pascrell. I say that to his face and behind his back.
+You are not answering my question, though.
+ Mr. McHale. Congressman, let me suggest this. I would be
+happy, in a non-public setting, to discuss baggage screening at
+any individual airport around the country. I cannot discuss
+with you alternate measures and other actions that are being
+taken at particular airports. That cannot be done in a public
+setting.
+ Mr. Pascrell. Well, let me say this. I have a lot of
+questions here. Let me say this: I do not understand, Mr.
+Chairman, the rationale behind not providing the public--the
+public has a right to know, let alone the Congress.
+ We do have oversight. This is the homeland security. There
+are certain things that are very private. There are certain
+things that are very secret.
+ Why is the number, when we said that we would have specific
+dates as to when luggage that was carried on and when luggage
+was put into the belly of an airplane would all be checked, why
+are you afraid? Or let me rephrase. Why are you reluctant to
+tell the public what percentage even of baggage is not checked
+at Newark Airport? The public uses that airport every day?
+ Mr. McHale. Congressman, we screen over three million bags
+a day at 448 airports around the country. On any given day,
+there will be machines that are down. There will be staffing
+issues.
+ There will be other issues at airports around the country.
+We provide a classified report to the Congress every month on
+the status of baggage screening at individual airports around
+the country.
+ I cannot, in a public session, discuss that kind of
+classified information. I am perfectly happy to provide it
+either in closed session or to provide you with a briefing.
+ Mr. Pascrell. So you do not--.
+ Mr. McHale. I think you will be pleased with where Newark
+is and the progress we are making. But I cannot discuss that in
+detail here.
+ Mr. Pascrell. But you do know the answer to the question.
+ Mr. McHale. Yes, congressman, I do.
+ Mr. Pascrell. So you know the answer to the question, but
+you do not want to tell the public what the answer to the
+question is? Correct?
+ Mr. McHale. Congressman--.
+ Mr. Pascrell. Am I putting words in your mouth?
+ Mr. McHale. As I said, we do not discuss specific steps--.
+ Mr. Pascrell. Look, look, wait a minute. Mr. Chairman, I
+have asked it three times. You know, I asked it in good faith.
+I praise the director before this meeting, after this meeting.
+ I mean, what the heck more can I do? I think the public has
+a right to know--has a right to know--whether the baggage at
+Newark Airport is being checked. I think this is preposterous.
+ Let me ask you this question--.
+ Mr. McHale. Congressman, the baggage at Newark Airport is
+being checked.
+ Mr. Pascrell. I am talking about how much is not being
+checked. How much is going on an airplane that is not being
+checked?
+ If you are not going to answer the question, let me go to
+the second point. Are you testifying today that there are a
+sufficient amount of screeners at Newark Airport? Is that what
+you are testifying today?
+ Mr. McHale. We are bringing out screeners as we speak. I
+would say that today there probably is not a sufficient number
+of screeners at Newark Airport. I expect that there will be
+within about the next 10 days to 2 weeks.
+ Mr. Pascrell. So that if we check back in 10 days or 2
+weeks, that there would be adequate screening? And you admit
+that there are not, there were not a month ago? There were not
+2 months ago?
+ Mr. McHale. We have been having--.
+ Mr. Pascrell. And perhaps the 45,000 arbitrary cap that we
+placed on it was a wrong number, that we should have had more
+people or a pool of more people? The suggestion that we use
+former police officers, former law enforcement officers has
+still not been used? But you tell me that in 10 days, you will
+have an answer to that question or we will have it resolved.
+ Mr. McHale. Within 10 days, we will have the screening at
+Newark at the level that they are authorized to have. We have
+been using a lot of overtime at Newark. We want to cut down on
+that so that our staff is not stressed.
+ We have a lot of former law enforcement officers in our
+screening workforce, a lot of ex-military personnel in our
+screening workforce. In fact, we were required to give
+preference to them. So we have them out there.
+ Mr. Pascrell. Two other questions.
+ Mr. Camp. The gentleman's time has expired.
+ Mr. Pascrell. I have not given an opening statement. Can I
+continue to ask some questions?
+ Mr. Camp. I will give the gentleman an additional minute.
+However, the additional three minutes comes for those who
+attend within five minutes of the gavel going down. And the
+gentleman was outside of that window.
+ But I will extend him some more time. I do want to say--and
+this will not come out of your time--that I understand your
+reluctance to go into this confidential airport-specific
+information in this committee hearing.
+ However, I have never seen this monthly confidential report
+that you refer to that would give us the individual status of
+airports. I would like to arrange an opportunity for that
+information to come to the subcommittee and we will have a
+classified session on that individual information.
+ Mr. McHale. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you.
+ Mr. McHale. I will make sure that happens.
+ Mr. Camp. And I will give the gentleman an additional
+minute.
+ Mr. Pascrell. Thank you. And Mr. Chairman, that is very
+important. I would have asked--continued to ask--if the
+committee would get those, all the members get a copy of that
+report. I think it is important that we know that, Mr.
+Chairman.
+ Mr. Camp. We will have an opportunity for all of us to get
+that information.
+ Mr. Pascrell. We have no other way to measure whether we
+are going in the right direction or not.
+ Now let me ask you this question: who is responsible for
+airport perimeter security?
+ Mr. McHale. It is the combined responsibility of the
+Transportation Security Administration and the airport
+operator.
+ Mr. Pascrell. If there is a decision to have people
+patrolling the perimeter, as an example, or surveillance
+equipment deployed or new physical barriers, whose
+responsibility is that?
+ Mr. McHale. The airport operator has developed a security
+plan that includes that kind of information. And that plan has
+to meet certain standards that we set and be approved by TSA.
+ Mr. Pascrell. Does every one of the major airports in this
+country have such a plan?
+ Mr. McHale. Yes.
+ Mr. Pascrell. Perimeter. Is it being implemented?
+ Mr. McHale. Yes.
+ Mr. Pascrell. You are stating for the record that every one
+of these major airports have a perimeter security plan and it
+is being implemented.
+ Mr. McHale. They have an airport operator plan that covers
+perimeter security. Obviously, there are violations of those
+plans. And our job is to enforce them.
+ Mr. Pascrell. My final point is this: why do we not ask
+employees working within the airport to go through screening
+like you do and like I have?
+ Mr. McHale. We do screen a lot of the vendor employees. We
+are working with the airports to improve that within the
+sterile area.
+ All of the employees who work in the sterile area and the
+secured area of the airport have extensive background checks.
+One of the reasons we have looked at that as a solution is, if
+you think about the kinds of things that workers have access to
+on the ramp--the kinds of tools, the kinds of chemicals and the
+other sorts of things that they have access on the ramp--they
+really do not have to carry very much into the airport area to
+do harm. We need to know who they are and be assured about
+their backgrounds.
+ Mr. Pascrell. So you think we can see the day that they
+will be screened?
+ Mr. McHale. There will be screening of the workers going
+into the sterile area, we expect. Yes.
+ Mr. Pascrell. Not the vendors?
+ Mr. McHale. The vendor workers who are in the sterile area,
+but not at this point, except in certain airports, on workers
+going onto the secured area.
+ Mr. Camp. The gentleman's time has expired. Thank you.
+ The gentlewoman from Texas may inquire.
+ Ms. Granger. Thank you.
+ I am going to continue on the question about the screeners
+because Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport has
+now waits of 90 minutes with lines half a mile long. And they
+are saying it is a lack of screeners on hand. And you are
+saying that perhaps they are going to staff up.
+ But at my airport, DFW International Airport, TSA has
+informed the airport it will be reducing the screener workforce
+by 179 positions. This future staffing level is well below the
+staffing level that TSA's own federal security director at DFW
+believes is necessary to man the checkpoints effectively.
+ DFW already has four separate security checkpoints where
+the waits extend 30 minutes during peak hours. And that is not
+during the summer travel time that we are getting ready to
+enter.
+ So I want to know what rationale exists for reducing the
+screener workforce levels at DFW airport in particular or other
+large airports?
+ Mr. McHale. I think actually DFW will probably stay at
+about the level it is today. The levels that a lot of airports
+are looking at are levels that were set when we had 49,600
+screeners at the beginning of this fiscal year.
+ So we are really now, we have actually been operating at
+about 45,000 screeners, give or take a few, since right about
+Thanksgiving of last year, or a little after that, in the
+middle of the holiday season.
+ Congresswoman, as you know, we did handle the holiday
+season, I think, very well. We are developing plans and working
+closely with the airports, the airlines, and our Federal
+Security Directors to deal with the summer season effectively.
+ Also at DFW, thanks to your help, we are moving forward
+with the inline baggage system, which will be more efficient
+and more effective and will help us bring some of the screeners
+who are now working on baggage up to the passenger checkpoints.
+ Ms. Granger. So you are saying you are not going to reduce
+it by 179 positions?
+ Mr. McHale. I have to check the exact numbers for that
+airport. But my understanding is, what they have on board today
+is about what they are going to have into the future. It may be
+a few more, but I would have to double check that. I will get
+back to you on that.
+ Ms. Granger. I think you should because that is certainly
+not the information they are giving me. And as I said, their
+own federal security director is saying that would be
+inadequate.
+ Mr. McHale. I think it is a reduction from the 49,600
+figure earlier this year. But I will get back to your office on
+that.
+ Ms. Granger. Are you reducing though, intentionally
+reducing, the screener workforce levels at large airports?
+ Mr. McHale. Not at most of the large airports, as far as I
+know. There may be some adjustments at a few of them. But
+generally, I think the large airports are either growing or
+staying about the same.
+ Ms. Granger. Okay. What are you doing to address the
+concerns? How are you getting the information out? In other
+words, if the airport is telling me one thing, my airport that
+I work with very directly, and you are telling me something
+else, then where is the breakdown in this communication?
+ Mr. McHale. We have not yet finalized or issued final
+staffing allocations for the 45,000 level. Frankly, we are
+going to be adjusting that and reshaping that and re-
+rightsizing that every day, every week, as we go on, around the
+country.
+ I would say the breakdown that is we have not gone back to
+the airports and said, ``You know, that figure you got last
+year based on 49,600, well, Congress has said we should be
+operating at 45,000, so that earlier figure obviously is not
+the right one.''
+ We need to communicate better on that.
+ Ms. Granger. I know that Secretary Mineta stated 2 years
+ago that wait times of more than 10 minutes would be
+unacceptable.
+ Mr. McHale. Right.
+ Ms. Granger. With the federal screeners. And now we are
+looking at wait times of 30 minutes or more. Are we saying that
+is acceptable then?
+ Mr. McHale. No, we would like to keep the wait times as far
+down as we can. We work with the airports and the airlines to
+reduce the overall hassle-factor in moving through an airport--
+whether it is ticket check-in or wherever it might be.
+ We have actually done pretty well, if you take an average
+across the country, of peak time wait times. They average about
+11 minutes.
+ But in almost every major airport, there is at least one
+peak during the day, when many flights leave within a very
+short period, and that peak is not always related to screeners.
+Even in Atlanta as you mentioned, there is a throat where there
+are only 18 lanes. Those 18 lanes can be working flat, out and
+you will still have a long line early in the morning.
+ They are adding four more lanes there. We are going to
+staff them. Hopefully, that will help to ease the problem
+there. We are looking at that kind of solution, where we can,
+around the country.
+ A lot of it is physical. Some of it is staffing.
+ Ms. Granger. And last, what are you doing? What is the most
+immediate thing that TSA is doing to improve security on rail
+transportation?
+ Mr. McHale. We have a lot of different programs we are
+doing there, where DHS and TSA are providing additional canine
+teams to mass transit. We have a pilot program we are running
+at New Carrollton right now called TRIP, which is primarily
+looking for explosives. We are trying to see how you could
+screen passengers for explosives. This is much more difficult
+in the rail environment than in the aviation environment
+because it is such an open system.
+ We are working on additional transit inspection programs.
+We have targeted inspections going on; we are working with the
+transit authorities, looking at their security arrangements to
+try to improve them. We have vulnerability assessments of
+critical infrastructure for transit authorities that we are
+working on, and, we are helping them also with tools to do
+their own criticality assessments. And of course, there is
+grant funding that is going to the states and the cities to
+help them with transit security.
+ Ms. Granger. Thank you.
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you.
+ Mr. Markey may inquire.
+ Mr. Markey. Thank you.
+ It is my understanding that in the next couple of weeks,
+TSA will be issuing a hazmat transportation security plan for
+the District of Columbia region, where we are right now, and
+that it will become a model for national hazmat transportation
+security. Will this plan include rerouting shipments of
+hazardous materials where possible so that they do not go
+through densely populated areas?
+ Mr. McHale. Well, there actually may be some rerouting. But
+it will be fairly limited.
+ One of the problems we have, particularly on the East
+Coast, is that all of our major rail systems typically run
+through city centers and it is not easy to go around them.
+There are really very few additional rail lines. So we have to
+work with what we have then.
+ Mr. Markey. Let me be more specific then. Will tanker cars,
+full of hydrochloric acid, be allowed to pass as close to the
+Capitol as they are allowed today to pass in this recently
+taken picture?
+ Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
+ Mr. Markey. They will still be allowed to pass that close?
+ Mr. McHale. There is no way to route them differently; no
+effective way to route them differently.
+ Mr. Markey. Is there no other route to get that
+hydrochloric acid to its destination other than allowing it to
+travel right past the Capitol, with no additional security
+placed around it?
+ Mr. McHale. There is a rail line in West Virginia that is
+narrower, much more curvy and raises safety concerns. And then
+the next route is west of the Appalachians.
+ Mr. Markey. Do you support the rights of states or cities
+to protect their most vulnerable areas by rerouting such
+shipments? Or do you retain, to yourself, the federal
+government, the ability to decide what is safe enough for an
+individual city?
+ Mr. McHale. I think that is part of our federal system. We
+need to look at what restrictions cities and states can put in
+place that may or may not shut down interstate commerce. So if
+we can work with the states--.
+ Mr. Markey. In other words, would you support the city of
+Washington saying, ``That is too dangerous to be allowed that
+close to the critical infrastructure of the city?'' Or would
+you retain to yourself the right to override the city?
+ Mr. McHale. We are working very closely with the city.
+ Mr. Markey. Would you retain the right to override the
+city?
+ Mr. McHale. Actually, I do not know that TSA has the
+authority to override the city. I would argue that the federal
+government probably does.
+ Mr. Markey. The federal government would have the right to
+override. All right. What additional security measures is the
+department planning to require for shipments of hazardous
+materials?
+ Mr. McHale. We are looking at notice. We are looking at
+additional security. We are looking at timing. We are looking
+at flow.
+ It is going to be quite a well developed plan that
+cities--.
+ Mr. Markey. What is the additional security?
+ Mr. McHale. There will be inspections of the track and the
+routing before hazardous materials move through. That is why we
+need the notice. There will be a number of steps that will go
+into that plan.
+ The city is actually working very closely with us on it and
+very effectively.
+ Mr. Markey. How many technologies have been certified by
+TSA for inspecting cargo going onto passenger planes?
+ Mr. McHale. We use both ETD and EDS technologies, as well
+as, of course, our canines, to do some inspections.
+ Mr. Markey. Have you certified technologies to screen cargo
+going onto passenger planes?
+ Mr. McHale. We certified those technologies for baggage. We
+can use them for cargo. The certification would be the same.
+ Mr. Markey. Now last year, the Bush Administration opposed
+my amendment, which called for the full screening of cargo
+which goes onto passenger planes. Has the Bush Administration
+yet revisited and reversed its position?
+ Or does it still maintain that, while we screen the bags of
+passengers which go on planes, every one of the bags, that we
+are not going to screen all of the cargo which goes on
+passenger planes? Have you reversed that position yet? Or do
+you still maintain that it is not necessary to screen the cargo
+which goes on passenger planes?
+ Mr. McHale. No, we have not reversed that position. The
+technology that we have out there today is useful to screen
+some of the cargo. And it is used to screen some of the cargo.
+ But we do not yet have technology--.
+ Mr. Markey. I understand. In other words, back a year ago,
+you said you did not support my amendment because the
+technology did not exist.
+ Mr. McHale. That is correct.
+ Mr. Markey. Now you are saying that the technology does
+exist and that you have certified that it exists. So will you
+remove your opposition to my amendment so that we now mandate
+that the technology be used to screen all the cargo in the same
+way that we screen all of the bags of passengers?
+ Mr. McHale. With all due respect, Congressman, that was not
+my testimony. We have technology that we can use to screen some
+of the cargo. And we do screen some of the cargo. And in fact,
+we encourage--.
+ Mr. Markey. Let me ask you this: will you mandate that the
+technology that you have certified be used to screen all of the
+cargo that can be screened by that technology?
+ Mr. McHale. Right now, they are screening quite a lot of
+it.
+ Mr. Markey. I want to know if you support using the
+technology which you have already certified to then screen all
+of the cargo which can be screened by that technology. Do you
+support that?
+ Mr. McHale. We do not believe that that is necessary at
+this time.
+ Mr. Markey. You see, that is the disagreement that we have.
+ Mr. McHale. That is correct.
+ Mr. Markey. You keep arguing that the baggage of innocent
+passengers should be screened, that their shoes should be taken
+off, that their wristwatches should go through the screening,
+and yet cargo should be placed on the very same plane without
+the same level of screening, even though for most of this
+cargo, the technology already exists to screen it.
+ And the Bush Administration continued to represent a
+position of the cargo industry and the airline industry, in
+opposition to the passengers on these planes who are placed at
+unnecessary risk, even though the technology exists to screen
+the vast bulk of the cargo which is going on next to their bags
+in the cargo hold of passenger planes all across America. It is
+unfair to passengers to put them at that risk, knowing that Al-
+Qa`ida could exploit that weakness in our system because you do
+not screen cargo that you could screen with existing
+technology.
+ Mr. Camp. The gentleman's time has expired. But I would
+like the witness to take a moment and answer, please.
+ Mr. McHale. Thank you. Congressman, as you know, we have
+what we believe is a comprehensive approach to this. It does
+include the known shipper database. I know that you do not
+support that particularly.
+ Mr. Markey. Well, I am a known tripper. And I have my
+ticket. But they still, even though I am a known tripper, make
+me take off my shoes and make me put my bag through.
+ A known shipper, who is no more trustworthy than me, is
+allowed to put their cargo on without going through screening
+and put it right next to my bags that have been screened. And I
+do not think it is fair to American passengers to put them
+through that kind of a dual system.
+ Mr. McHale. Well, we believe our strategy--using the known
+shipper program, enhancing that program with background checks,
+doing random screening using technology, using dogs, keeping
+quite a lot of cargo off passenger planes--together forms a
+comprehensive approach that balances the need for security
+against the tremendous contribution to the economy that air
+cargo makes on passenger planes.
+ Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you.
+ Mr. Markey. I apologize. One-third--.
+ Mr. Camp. The gentleman has run over 2.5 minutes from his
+time, an ample amount of time.
+ Mr. Markey. Can you give me 10 seconds?
+ Mr. Camp. Ten seconds, and then the chairman of the
+committee will be recognized.
+ Mr. Markey. You have earlier testified that only one-third
+of all known shippers are in your database, which means that
+two-thirds of the shippers are unknown shippers. And yet, they
+get to put their cargo onto passenger planes, the same way that
+known shippers do.
+ It is a very dangerous program that could come back to
+haunt our country and the passengers on the plane, where an
+explosion could occur.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Camp. All right. The chair recognizes the chairman of
+the full committee, the gentleman from California.
+ Mr. Cox. An important part of our current examination of
+the department, for purposes of drafting an authorization bill,
+is looking at the organizational structure of DHS. Of course,
+when the Transportation Security Administration was created by
+Congress, there was no Department of Homeland Security. That
+has now been moved wholly into DHS.
+ And the question that I would ask you to address--I am
+going to give you just a couple and this is the first of them--
+is whether TSA, in your view, should operate as a distinct
+entity within DHS. Or are we on a road to further
+organizational progress and integration?
+ The second, to what degree should TSA exercise authority
+beyond aviation security? At least on paper, the mandate
+extends to transportation, not just to aviation.
+ But I note that the 2005 budget request of $5.3 billion
+includes just two percent for anything besides aviation. Of
+$5.3 billion, only $146 million is for some other purpose.
+ Third, what is the goal, in your view, of IAIP? And to what
+extent should the infrastructure protection mission of homeland
+security be coordinated with TSA and its responsibilities,
+particularly in other areas of transportation?
+ Because we know, for example, IP is working with rail. We
+know that IP is working with other forms of transportation. And
+so how should be integrate all of that?
+ And then, as a somewhat unrelated question, but a question
+in which I am equally interested, the Bearing Report--and Mr.
+Chairman, you will have to tell me whether this question has
+been asked and answered--concluded that, based on quantitative
+evidence, the Kansas City Airport outperformed its federal
+counterparts in Category One. And I wanted to get your thoughts
+on why that might be.
+ Mr. McHale. Okay, Congressman. TSA as a separate entity--
+let me address that within the context of the discussion of
+IAIP as well. When Congress enacted the Homeland Security Act
+and created the Department, it very much encouraged the
+Department to look for synergies and integration and how to do
+the job better.
+ The thinking on that is evolving all the time, and we have
+a lot of discussions around that.
+ I am, however, aware of no plans to change TSA's status as
+a separate entity. How we go about our job may evolve over
+time.
+ I am not saying that such plans may not develop. But as far
+as I know, at this point, there are no plans.
+ The Homeland Security Act kept TSA as a separate entity
+until November of this year. The Department could not change
+it. After that, the Secretary is free to do so.
+ I think we probably will be waiting until that timeframe to
+look at that and into the years ahead. There is no deadline for
+doing anything like that.
+ I think there is a lot of work still to be done within TSA,
+both in the aviation and in the non-aviation arena. I think
+that what we will be looking at, in considering TSA's
+continuing existence, is how best to get that work done.
+ As a separate entity, TSA brings a lot of focus to the
+issues. But more integrated, maybe we can bring to bear in a
+more effective way a lot of the other resources of the
+Department. So those are the kinds of things we will be
+thinking about as we go forward.
+ Very similarly, IAIPs' mission and role within the
+Department and its role with regard to infrastructure
+protection is still evolving. Within the government, there are
+many entities that have a role in infrastructure protection,
+and IAIP clearly oversees that. The Department of Energy, the
+Department of Agriculture, all have roles in infrastructure
+protection. IAIP sets the overall structure for that.
+ Right now, TSA has been given the lead to develop the
+sector specific plan for transportation, in recognition of its
+important intermodal responsibilities.
+ Briefly, on the maritime and land issue, the budget of TSA
+outside of aviation is small. It is a recognition that TSA only
+has one part of the mission to protection maritime and land.
+ We focus particularly on maritime integration in
+transportation for the intermodal connections. We are trying to
+make sure that we identify any cracks or gaps.
+ When you look at the overall budget, including a vast
+budget for the Coast Guard--perhaps not vast, the Coast Guard
+would probably say it was not vast, but from my perspective, it
+is vast--more of the budget calls for the Coast Guard to
+protect maritime.
+ A lot of other agencies are involved in providing funding
+and other things. I think you need to look at the federal
+government budget as a whole in the maritime and land area, not
+just at the TSA budget.
+ And briefly, lastly, at Kansas City, it is true that the
+study found that the screeners at Kansas City were better at
+providing security than federal counterparts at the few other
+airports they were compared to. However, they did not compare
+them to all Category One airports. They compared them to a
+sample.
+ They found that the TSA and federal and private screeners
+are pretty much the same at other airports. Those of you who
+have been to Kansas City know it is a very different airport.
+It has a very unusual layout.
+ We are very proud of the work that the screeners there did
+to get that result. But I think we probably need to drill down
+to a little bit more detail as to why we got that result there.
+ It could be layout. It might be training. It might be
+motivation. There are a lot of things we need to look at.
+ Mr. Camp. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentleman
+from Oregon is recognized for five minutes.
+ Mr. DeFazio. I thank the chairman. Thank you for being here
+today.
+ I am going to be meeting with a group of flight attendants
+shortly. And one of their concerns is that there are not
+uniform guidelines regarding mandatory security training for
+flight attendants.
+ As they observed, in some airlines, they are shown a 20-
+minute video. Other airlines take this much more seriously,
+realizing the vulnerability and essentially that they are the
+first line of defense or first responders. And they have two
+days of hands-on and intensive training.
+ Do you have any intention--or does the agency have any
+intention--of issuing guidelines that would set standards, as
+opposed to leaving it to the discretion of the airlines?
+ Mr. McHale. Actually, this was one of the first regulatory
+packages that TSA issued in early 2002 to set some basic
+standards for that training. You are correct, however, to say
+that today, while those are minimum standards, the airlines do
+vary quite a bit as to how they provide that training.
+ Mr. DeFazio. Right. So what I would suggest is: are you
+looking at a higher floor?
+ Mr. McHale. Right.
+ Mr. DeFazio. If your base standards are met by a 20-minute
+video, which really I do not think anybody would think was
+adequate, are you looking at something that would require a
+higher base? Because what you get is the cheapo, cut-rate
+people say, ``Oh, we will just show them a 20-minute video.''
+And the mainline airlines and the good operators take it
+seriously and say, ``Well, this is going to cost us a lot of
+money, but we will do it.''
+ But then they say, ``I have to compete. How are we going to
+compete with someone who shows a 20-minute video and those
+flight attendants do not have all that down time? I guess we
+had better move from two days of training to 20-minute
+videos.'' We are going to drag down the whole industry.
+ Mr. McHale. Right. As you know, in the Vision 100 Act that
+Congress passed last year--.
+ Mr. DeFazio. May.
+ Mr. McHale. No, where we are. We are going to develop
+training for the flight attendants. We are going to have that
+hopefully piloted later this fiscal year and be ready to
+deliver it next year.
+ Mr. DeFazio. And that would be--.
+ Mr. McHale. In that process, we are actually looking at
+what is the base level, and what would that advanced level
+course do, and how the two would fit together. So we are taking
+another look at it.
+ Mr. DeFazio. Okay. On the allocation of screeners, I am
+concerned that not only are we going to see a lot of
+inconvenience because of the number or lack of screeners this
+summer, but as with the article that Mr. Pascrell referred to,
+there are screeners who say, because of the load that they are
+put through, that they are basically doing things that they do
+not think are safe.
+ I mean, they are moving bags through too quickly. They are
+ignoring some things. They are not giving everything the
+scrutiny they should.
+ Where are we in moving toward this cap, which was
+arbitrarily created out of thin air and imposed by Congress and
+agreed to by the administration, of 45,000? And where are we in
+reallocating to the airports, from that 45,000? And do you
+honestly believe that, at the level of 45,000, we can not only
+prevent long lines, but we can provide the best possible
+security?
+ Mr. McHale. We have actually been right around about 45,000
+since late last calendar year. So we were there through the
+Christmas holiday, pretty much, at airports around the country.
+We managed to get through that period.
+ We recognize that that was a short period, so we were able
+to focus a lot of effort there. We have developed a plan to
+deal with the summer. The increases we are seeing--and I am
+proud of this--we are seeing quite a resurgence in air travel.
+I think people are getting back into the air, and that is a
+great thing. That is also something that is obviously of
+concern to us as we go forward.
+ We think we can handle the loads generally that we are
+seeing today with the 45,000 level. As strain builds up on
+that, we would come back to the Congress and point out where we
+have issues and problems.
+ We are redistributing the workforce. We have not yet gone
+back out to all the airports with their reallocations at the
+45,000 level. We need to do that. Congresswoman Granger raised
+that with me, and we certainly need to do that shortly.
+ We are redistributing the workforce to address precisely
+the kinds of security issues that you raise to make sure that
+we can deliver security. Security is the number one mission.
+ Mr. DeFazio. I understand. On the bag match, I have asked
+this question before, but in the modern day world where we have
+suicide bombers, it seems to me that bag match is not a
+substitute for and should not be used as one of the criteria
+for saying we have screened baggage for explosives.
+ In fact, if I were a suicidal terrorist, I would be
+thrilled to know that my bag was on board the plane and not
+some other plane or sitting in the airport and exploding
+harmlessly or only killing a few people. So why do we think
+there is any utility in this anymore?
+ I guess maybe there might be a few non-suicidal terrorists
+out there. But it really just does not seem to me to be a
+substitute for some harder form of screening of baggage
+anymore. It just really does not make a lot of sense.
+ Mr. McHale. We are moving away from using bag match. We
+have been moving away for some time. We do not use it very
+much. We are trying to phase it down.
+ Although I think it always should be a tool in the quiver.
+Even if it is not a substitute, it is probably something we are
+always going to be requiring at som some level.
+ Of course, it is currently an alternate measure recognized
+by law. But it is one that we are moving away from.
+ Mr. DeFazio. I just question the wisdom of that. And I
+would assume that you, as the security experts, would be--and
+it sounds like you are moving away from it, which I am happy to
+hear.
+ Mr. McHale. Right.
+ Mr. DeFazio. Then the last question would be on the air
+side. I understand I am going to get a briefing tomorrow on
+vendor employees and their access to the secure areas in the
+terminal. And I will be pleased to have that finally and
+understand where we are moving, because I think that is an
+extraordinary loophole, with those tens of thousands of people
+per day going into secure areas with no screening whatsoever.
+ But beyond that, what about the air side? Are we moving
+beyond the cursory background checks?
+ The last testimony we had a couple of months ago, we were
+not even requiring enhanced background checks of people who
+have access on the air side--caterers, cleaners, mechanics,
+others on that side.
+ Mr. McHale. Well, we are moving forward with our plan for
+enhanced background checks and we will be doing that. We have
+done some, and we will continue. We will get them all through.
+ Mr. DeFazio. When do you think we will have them all done?
+ Mr. McHale. Congressman, actually I do not know that figure
+off the top of my head. But I will be happy to get it for you.
+I do not think it is all that long, but I will be happy to get
+it back to you.
+ We are not at this time planning to significantly increase
+the amount of physical screening done for people entering the
+site. We will be obviously screening them as they pass into the
+sterile area, through the checkpoints. That will be the
+briefing you will have tomorrow; you will have some information
+about that.
+ Again, this is really something of a philosophical issue.
+The people who work on the site have access to such tools,
+weapons, chemicals, things that can be used as weapons, and
+other things, that screening them is almost pointless.
+ Mr. DeFazio. With all due respect, my time is going to
+expire, I have heard that argument before. I do not think that
+a primitive weapon fashioned from fuel or other things that are
+available, I would hope that we do not have blocks of C-4 or
+sheets of C-4 laying around the airport--I do not know what
+purpose it would serve--or sophisticated detonators laying
+around the airport that are based on altimeters.
+ I have heard the argument before that, boy, there are a lot
+of dangerous things there. But those go more to the idea of
+someone trying to take over a plane fashioning some sort of
+weapon or that, but not to the catastrophic loss of a plane
+with an explosive device. And that is really where I am focused
+here.
+ We all have different opinions. But I think that when we
+look at a repeat of opinions, the most likely thing is they are
+just going to take them down.
+ They do not need to take them over and use them as weapons.
+They can just totally disrupt air travel by just taking them
+down. They tried that before over the Pacific, Ramzi Jusef.
+ They repeat patterns. They came back to the World Trade
+Center. I think they will come back.
+ Is it suicidal belts that people wear on the planes? Is it
+checked bags? Is it cargo, as Mr. Markey talked about? We do
+not know. But we need to be defending against all those things.
+ And I am not really that worried about people fashioning
+bombs using fuel at the airport. I just do not agree with that
+argument, that they have access to the same things that the
+terrorists have access to.
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you.
+ The gentlewoman from Washington State may inquire.
+ Ms. Dunn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. McHale, we are delighted that you can be here today. We
+just had some recent activity, as you well know, at Seatac
+Airport. And I simply want to thank you for keeping such close
+watch over the management problems there in that airport.
+ And I know that today you cannot talk about the details of
+that whole situation. But we were informed well ahead of time
+by Admiral Stone. We appreciated that kind of communication
+because that positioned us well to discuss the topic when it
+did come up, which it always does. And we always get the press
+calls.
+ But I think also what you have done in replacing the top
+four managers will do a lot toward heightening the morale among
+the workers who are there. So I wanted to let you know that.
+ Mr. McHale. Thank you.
+ Ms. Dunn. This committee has focused a significant amount
+of time and energy to make sure that department-wide we are
+breaking down the legacy agency mentality and moving toward a
+forward-thinking department with a new mission. We are
+committed to supporting the department as it fills the
+communication gaps that led to the tragedy on 9/11.
+ When it comes to communicating with the private sector
+about specific threats on transportation security, what
+responsibility does TSA have compared to the IAIP wing of the
+Department of Homeland Security or compared to any other
+federal agencies?
+ Mr. McHale. TSA works very closely with our stakeholders.
+In the aviation area, we have principal security inspectors
+assigned to every carrier.
+ At almost every major carrier, they have a corporate
+security officer who has a security clearance, with whom our
+transportation security intelligence service can share
+classified information. We talk back and forth with them all
+the time.
+ In the other modes, we work very closely with the
+information sharing and analysis centers, some of the trade
+associations in the railroads, the railroad industry, the
+companies themselves and others, to get out threat information
+that is tailored to their threats.
+ IAIP tends to look at the national level. And it gives
+national level threat guidance.
+ I think one of the innovations they have developed is
+getting out some very practical kinds of things that industry
+or people should do to respond to the threat. We take that kind
+of guidance and try to tailor it to the specific industry or
+the specific transportation mode that we are dealing with, to
+give some practical guidance.
+ Sometimes, it is pretty hard to give practical guidance to
+deal with a threat, but that is what we look to do.
+ Ms. Dunn. What about, who would Sound Transit call on the
+phone if they heard of a vulnerability or a threat? Whom would
+they specifically--this is our local authority there in the
+Puget Sound area that deals with transit?
+ Mr. McHale. Last year we started up the Transportation
+Security Operations Center, TSOC, out in Herndon. That is a
+one-stop shop basically, to get any information out, and we
+take it upon ourselves to get it around to the rest of the
+government.
+ Sometimes though, the transit authorities in particular are
+very used to dealing with the Federal Transit Administration.
+The DOT has its own crisis response center that we are actually
+hooked into as well.
+ We recognize that news--bad news--can come in to a lot of
+different places. What we are trying to do today, throughout
+the government, is make sure that whoever gets information
+spreads it around very quickly and gets it to everybody.
+ Ms. Dunn. I understand that TSA is currently developing a
+registered traveler pilot program.
+ Mr. McHale. Right.
+ Ms. Dunn. And you are going to be testing it out this
+summer. Can you give us an update on that program? And if
+somebody is enlisted in that program, do they still have to be
+evaluated by CAPPS 2?
+ Mr. McHale. No, they will not go through the CAPPS system.
+They will not be a selectee under the CAPPS system.
+ It will be piloted later this summer. We expect it to run
+about 90 days at a few airports around the country, probably
+with most of the carriers in those airports; maybe not all the
+carriers, depending on how it works out.
+ We hope to learn a lot from that plot. The idea of that
+program is to gather enough information about someone so that
+we do not need to use the CAPPS system to make a determination
+on them. Then they would not be a CAPPS selectee.
+ They would have to go through the basic security, and if
+they alarmed, then they would be subject to secondary security.
+ Ms. Dunn. Thank you.
+ As you know, Seatac is currently undergoing an extensive
+expansion. They started this expansion before 9/11. The airport
+is continuing the efforts.
+ While reaching compliance with TSA regulations, I have
+heard concern about whether there is inadequate space for the
+exit kiosks in certain terminals at Seatac and at other
+airports that we visited as a committee on our forays out into
+the country.
+ What sort of coordination is going on between your agency
+and the U.S. visit program?
+ Mr. Camp. Time has expired. Please answer, Mr. McHale.
+ Mr. McHale. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Quite a lot of work
+has been done.
+ In fact, U.S. VISIT has been riding on several of our
+contracts. We provide contracts that support the U.S. VISIT.
+And we have been looking at the exit side of it.
+ We do not do too much on the entrance side of it. But on
+the exit side of it, we have been working very closely with
+U.S. VISIT.
+ Some of the plans for the exit side involve TSA directly,
+and some of them will involve us indirectly.
+ But we are pretty well integrated. We are on their advisory
+committee, and we meet with them frequently.
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you. The ranking member of the full
+committee, the gentleman from Texas, is recognized for five
+minutes.
+ Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have three
+questions.
+ One: why have we not required the planes that overfly the
+United States to also harden their cockpit doors, as we have
+other planes?
+ Mr. McHale. There is an ICAO requirement that kicks in
+fairly shortly, if it has not already. For all aircraft flying
+in international space, the International Civil Aviation
+Organization has a requirement to do that. I will be happy to
+let you know exactly when that is going to be in place.
+ Mr. Turner. Okay, thank you. You mentioned to Congressman
+Markey that quite a lot of cargo that travels on passenger
+planes is being screened. Does this mean, when you say ``quite
+a lot'' that is being screened, does that mean that there is
+some that you are physically inspecting with the x-ray and
+following up with the swab for explosives if something is
+revealed? There is quite a lot of that going on?
+ Mr. McHale. We are using dogs. We are using ETD when it is
+available. We do trace detection when it is available.
+ We sometimes run some of the packages through the bigger
+explosives detection machines. And there is some physical
+inspection.
+ Mr. Turner. Can you clarify what ``quite a lot'' means?
+Does that mean five percent or 95 percent?
+ Mr. McHale. There is a percentage that is a random
+requirement. That percentage is sensitive security information.
+I would be happy to provide that to you off the record.
+ Mr. Turner. What would it take to screen 100 percent?
+ Mr. McHale. It would take new technology. It would take
+machines with bigger throats to be able to take odd shaped
+packages, long packages, large packages, large containers, to
+move it through.
+ The technology that we have today would be very, very slow,
+and ineffective and inefficient in doing that. In fact, for
+some kinds of packages, the technology just does not exist. You
+would have to literally unpack and pack the cargo to do it.
+ Mr. Turner. And how long will it be before that technology
+is available?
+ Mr. McHale. We are making progress. The department's
+Science and Technology Directorate has some ongoing basic
+research on that. We have some ideas about how to do that.
+ I do not know when we will get to 100 percent. We will get
+to technology that increases the percentage we can do as we go
+forward. It will depend on some developments.
+ Mr. Turner. So would you say to this committee that you are
+screening every piece of cargo that travels on passenger planes
+that technologically can be screened today?
+ Mr. McHale. No, I would not say that. We use the known
+shipper program. We do not screen every single piece of cargo
+that could be screened today by technology.
+ Mr. Turner. So you really rely a lot on this known shipper
+program?
+ Mr. McHale. Yes, we do. That is why we are working so hard
+to improve it.
+ Mr. Turner. And that is the program that does not verified
+that known shippers are actually doing anything to carry out
+the regulations that are supposed to be carried out if you are
+designated as a known shipper?
+ Mr. McHale. Well, we do audit them. We do not audit a very
+large number of them. That is why we are hiring a bunch more
+cargo inspectors this year, to get out there and do better
+audits.
+ Mr. Turner. Do cargo inspectors have to come under this
+45,000 cap?
+ Mr. McHale. No.
+ Mr. Turner. Okay. One final question, if my time has not
+expired. I notice there are no funds requested in your budget
+request for grants to rail or other transit authorities for
+security. And we all know, particularly in light of the Madrid
+bombing, that rail is a significant vulnerability.
+ Why is it that the department did not request in your
+budget any funds for these types of grants?
+ Mr. McHale. Almost all of the grant programs are being
+consolidated within the Office of Domestic Programs for next
+fiscal year, which is part of the Department. They are being
+moved out of TSA. Some of the maritime grants will be moved out
+of Coast Guard.
+ There are grants in programs like the Urban Area Security
+Initiative and other programs that are available to be used to
+states and locals. They will be available to use for transit
+security and other kinds of developments.
+ Mr. Turner. You know the estimates range as high as $2.5
+billion in terms of the needs of rail and transit for security
+measures?
+ Mr. McHale. Yes.
+ Mr. Turner. And even though you are consolidating and this
+committee--in fact, has recommended some consolidation--it
+seems that in this year's budget, you should have made some
+request to acknowledge the need that is there. And to be
+totally silent while we are asking for funds for a whole lot of
+other things and to not mention rail seems to have been a
+serious oversight.
+ Mr. McHale. I think if you look at the budget as a whole,
+there will be funding. The rail industry particularly on the
+freight rail groups, has really done a tremendous amount, even
+starting right at 9/11. They are very advanced in their
+thinking on this.
+ Amtrak has received funding over the past few years and
+continues to get funding separately. If you look at all the
+different pieces, there is funding out there. But there is no
+funding in the TSA budget.
+ Mr. Turner. Thank you.
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you.
+ The gentlewoman from the Virgin Islands, Ms. Christensen,
+may inquire for five minutes.
+ Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you
+for allowing me to sit in on the subcommittee.
+ Welcome. You have a great group of workers in the Virgin
+Islands.
+ Mr. McHale. Thank you.
+ Mrs. Christensen. I cannot speak for every other airport.
+But I know ours are really--.
+ Mr. McHale. I have not gone down there to see them yet. I
+should.
+ Mrs. Christensen. Very good. But sometimes, they are really
+stressed when we have a large number of passengers coming
+through, especially on the island of St. Croix, where we have
+no machine.
+ Now I understand we are supposed to have 100 percent of
+luggage screened electronically hopefully by the end of the
+year. We may be a little delayed on that.
+ So even though my airport in St. Croix is a small airport,
+can I anticipate that I am going to have one of those machines
+that would screen electronically in my airport?
+ Mr. McHale. I will have to look at the specific situation
+in St. Croix. There are two types of machines that we use. One
+is a trace detection machine. The other are the much larger EDS
+machines. And it sounds like you are referring to one of the
+EDS machines.
+ Mrs. Christensen. EDS machine.
+ Mr. McHale. I will have to look at St. Croix.
+ Mrs. Christensen. It is really hard on them when you have
+long lines. People actually miss flights. And they have to go
+through the luggage by hand. And there are long lines of people
+waiting.
+ And they really do a good job. And they do a thorough job.
+But it is very, very difficult.
+ So I am hoping that--.
+ Mr. McHale. We are making some progress. As we are getting
+more and more of the larger, inline systems at the larger
+airports, we are able actually to roll down some of the
+machines that are then made redundant at those airports and
+move them into smaller airports.
+ Unfortunately, I do not know the situation in St. Croix.
+But I will be happy to take a look at it.
+ Mrs. Christensen. Right, right. Because you know, the
+chances of missing something becomes much greater. And I do not
+want that to happen at my airport.
+ When you are doing the studies between the private
+contractors and the TSA federal employees, are you comparing
+alternate methods, as well as the electronic? Is it structured
+so that you are comparing the checking by alternate method by
+alternate method?
+ Mr. McHale. Between the private contractors and the federal
+contractors?
+ Mrs. Christensen. Yeah.
+ Mr. McHale. We are comparing the overall security. We are
+comparing all their operations as screeners, whether it is the
+baggage or the passenger checkpoints. We are looking at each of
+the operations that they do as we compare them.
+ And as we said, we have basically found them to be
+comparable. We train them to the same standards, and we
+supervise them very closely.
+ Mrs. Christensen. Right. We went through an awful lot of
+discussion. And after September 11, we felt that it was really
+important to make the screening a federal responsibility.
+ Can you help me to understand the thinking--and I realize
+we left it open, that we could come back and look at private
+screeners. A lot of people in my district and I am sure across
+the country were displaced and could not be rehired by TSA.
+ Now we are going to go back. Could you give me some of the
+thinking that went on to now? I mean, the system is working
+just as well.
+ Mr. McHale. The pilot program that we just completed is one
+that was mandated by Congress to do. We had to do the five
+airports in five different categories, but the screeners were
+required to meet exactly the same standards.
+ They too had to be U.S. citizens, English speakers, able to
+pass the observation and discernment test, communications
+skills, and all those sorts of things. They also had to meet
+the same training standards. They had to get the same pay and
+benefits or equivalent pay and benefits, I think is the
+language in the statute.
+ So there were a variety of things that really, within the
+statute, said that we were going after essentially the same
+population of people, whether they were federal or private. In
+fact, the private screeners, screening companies, ended up
+hiring about the same relatively small percentage of pre-9/11
+screeners as we did in the federal workforce because they had
+the same requirements for the same standards.
+ Mrs. Christensen. Do I understand that under the LOIs that
+the match is changing from 90 to 75? If so, is that to try to
+reach more airports?
+ And do you think that there are airports that, if you
+change the match--somewhere I read that--and if that match is
+being changed, do you think the airports are going to be able
+to meet the requirements under this new match that we require
+them to contribute more?
+ Mr. McHale. The program, when it started, was at a 75
+percent match. And then in the Vision 100 Act, passed last year
+by the Congress, there was language which authorized the
+creation of a fund. And part of that language changed the match
+to 90 percent.
+ To the extent we have issued LOIs so far, they have been
+issued at the 75 percent level. We are concerned that it will
+strain the the available funding at the 90 percent level.
+ The administration has proposed in its budget to roll that
+back to 75 percent.
+ As to whether airports will be able to make it, to meet it,
+I think the answer is: some will. Some have already. There will
+be difficulties at other airports.
+ At smaller airports and small to medium-sized airports
+typically we are not looking at LOIs. We fund those a little
+differently through programs that we can give direct funding
+to.
+ Mr. Camp. All right.
+ Thank you. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
+ I want to thank you for your testimony here today, Mr.
+McHale. I also want to acknowledge and welcome to the committee
+room your new director of legislative affairs, who many of us
+know very well. And glad he could be here as well.
+ Thank you for your testimony. This hearing is now
+adjourned.
+ [Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
+
+
+ A P P E N D I X
+
+ ----------
+
+
+ Questions and Responses for the Record
+
+ Questions Submitted by the Honorable Dave Camp
+
+ 1. Recently, several reports from the DHS/OIG, GAO, and
+BearingPoint (under contract to TSA) identified a number of compelling
+challenges facing TSA's screener program, including ongoing performance
+problems. What are the root causes of screener performance deficiencies
+noted by these groups? How much is attributable to technology, how much
+is attributable to training, and bow [sic] much is attributable to
+other human factors causes (e.g. supervision, fatigue)? What does TSA
+plan to do in response to these reports' findings? Please explain TSA's
+response plan, with implementation timelines.
+ Answer: The GAO and OIG reports both indicate that TSA has made
+significant progress in providing enhanced training tools to the
+screener workforce in order to improve threat object detection
+performance. In July 2003, TSA completed a comprehensive Passenger
+Screening Performance Improvement Study using the tools, strategies and
+techniques associated with performance analysis. The study team
+validated desired screener performance, examined screening practices,
+and determined factors that influence the gap between these two states.
+Using this systemic process, TSA evaluated the nature of the screening
+work tasks, the screening workplace environment in which the tasks are
+performed, and the screeners'--performance. The outcome of this
+performance analysis included a list of systemic root causes and a set
+of recommended solutions linked to those causes. Although the solutions
+encompass the areas of technology, training, and human factors, TSA did
+not quantify the percentage of overall performance gap attributable to
+these areas but instead determined which among all the categories
+needed priority attention.
+ In October 2003, to address passenger screening performance
+deficiencies identified in the Screening Performance Improvement Study,
+TSA developed a ``Short-Term Screening Performance Improvement Plan.''
+This plan included eight broad initiatives and 62 specific actions that
+TSA planned to pursue to provide tangible improvements in screening
+performance and security. On June 7, 2004, TSA reported to the
+Chairman, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on
+Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, the completion of 57 of
+these actions. One action, is still in progress and is expected to be
+completed in the first quarter of fiscal year 2005. The remaining two
+actions have been deferred pending identification of appropriate
+resources.
+
+ 2. Given the upcoming deadline to provide an ``opt out'' process
+for airports to use private screeners, what action has TSA taken to
+develop an application and review process? Where is this process
+represented in the FY05 budget?
+ Answer: ATSA provides that airport operators may submit
+applications on or after November 19, 2004 to TSA to have the screening
+of passengers and property be carried out by qualified private
+screening companies. On June 23, 2004, TSA released its guidance
+setting forth the general parameters of the Screening Partnership
+Program (SPP) under which TSA will receive and review applications from
+airports to opt out of Federal screening and select contractors to
+provide contract screening services in opt out airports. While the
+guidance does not address every question relating to the Screening
+Partnership Program, TSA is continuing to define the program. For
+example, TSA is crafting an application template for distribution at
+the appropriate time.
+ In terms of funding for the SPP, TSA's approach is to fund Opt Out
+screening operations from the same budget line item as screening
+operations performed by TSA screeners. In this manner, Federal
+screeners and private screeners will be funded from the same pool of
+money. Costs for contracts with companies providing screening services
+in SPP airports will be funded by the cost of the Federal operations
+that are being displaced. Funding SPP in this manner is necessary
+because providing a specific program budget for SPP airports, which
+necessarily depends on the number and size of airports that will be
+approved to opt out, is not possible at this time.
+
+ 3. What cooperation did you receive from the aviation and travel
+industry in developing the Registered Traveler Program? How is or can
+this program be coordinated with expedited pre-clearance programs run
+by CBP, such as Air Nexus?
+ Answer: Cooperation with the aviation and travel industry in the
+development of the Registered Traveler program has been extensive.
+During the concept development phase, TSA adopted an aggressive
+outreach program with both industries to ensure key stakeholder input
+was available. TSA met with representatives of major airlines and
+travel associations to exchange ideas on the operational aspects of the
+program and to identify the potential benefits. Key partnerships were
+established with the 5 airports participating in the pilots
+(Minneapolis-Saint Paul, Los Angeles, Houston Bush, Boston Logan and
+Reagan National), as well as the participating airlines (Northwest,
+United, Continental, and American) to ensure effective coordination and
+service to passengers volunteering to participate in the Registered
+Traveler pilots. TSA also met with the National Business Travel
+Association and the Association of Corporate Travel Executives. We
+anticipate that additional meetings and briefings will continue with
+stakeholders and associations within the aviation and travel industries
+while the pilots are operating.
+ TSA continues to communicate and coordinate with other expedited
+pre-clearance programs, such as Air Nexus. TSA has met with the Air
+Nexus staff to share ideas and lessons learned and to examine potential
+synergies. TSA arranged for Air Nexus staff to visit and observe the
+pilot currently being conducted at Minneapolis-Saint Paul. We
+anticipate this communication and cooperation will continue into the
+future.
+
+ 4. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Undersecretary for Border
+and Transportation Security Asa Hutchinson said (in a Senate Committee
+on Commerce, Science, and Transportation hearing on March 23, 2004), in
+response to a question about signing Memoranda of Understanding with
+DOT outlining responsibilities for transportation security, that such
+agreements were unnecessary in light of Presidential Decision Directive
+#7 (signed on December 17, 2003) on critical infrastructure protection.
+However, this directive does not delineate responsibilities between the
+TSA and DOT; it says that DOT and DHS `gill collaborate on all matters
+relating to transportation security and transportation infrastructure
+protection''
+ The GAO argues that without a clear division of responsibilities
+between TSA and the DOT modal administrations, there can be
+``duplication, confusion, and gaps in preparedness.'' Moreover, an
+agreement delineating responsibilities would make each organization
+accountable for its responsibilities, and would make the separate roles
+and responsibilities of each organization clear to transportation
+security stakeholders.
+ Why has TSA chosen not to sign Memoranda of Understanding with the
+Federal Transportation Administration (FTA), which is within DOT, as it
+did with the FAA to delineate areas of responsibility and
+accountability? How would clarifying the relationship be helpful for
+coordinating transportation security?
+ Answer: Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)--7, sets
+forth the establishment of ``a national policy for Federal departments
+and agencies to identify and prioritize United States critical
+infrastructure and key resources and to protect them from terrorist
+attack.'' The directive instructs DHS and DOT to collaborate on
+transportation security and transportation infrastructure protection,
+and it directs DHS to take the lead role in coordinating protection
+activities for transportation systems, including mass transit,
+aviation, maritime, ground/surface, rail, and pipeline systems.
+ Additionally, DHS and DOT have finalized a Memorandum of
+Understanding (MOU). Through the procedures agreed upon in the MOU, DHS
+and DOT will work together to achieve effective public transportation
+strategies and initiatives and develop appropriate funding plans.
+ DHS has assigned TSA primary Sector Specific Responsibility for the
+Transportation Sector in implementing HSPD-7. In accordance with DHS's
+implementation plan and in partnership with other federal stakeholders,
+TSA is coordinating the development of the Transportation Sector
+Specific Plan (TSSP) and is working under DHS guidance and with
+partners in the U.S. Coast Guard and the DOT. The TSSP will discuss how
+Federal and private-sector stakeholders will communicate and work
+together; how critical assets in the transportation sector will be
+identified, assessed, and prioritized; how protective programs will be
+developed; how progress in reducing risk will be measured; and how R&D
+will be prioritized in the sector. In the Transportation Sector, the
+SSP will help ensure that efforts are systematic, complete, and
+consistent with the efforts in the other 16 critical infrastructure and
+key resources sectors. DHS will build on the foundation of the SSP to
+develop the Transportation Security Operational Plan (TSOP) that will
+provide overall operational planning guidance on rail and other modal
+security. The TSOP will ensure that modal security plans are integrated
+into an effective concept of operations for management of security of
+that sector of transportation.
+ DHS and DOT's Modal Administrations are currently meeting to
+discuss roles and responsibilities and are cooperating on many issues
+of mutual interest, especially on the development of the Transportation
+SSP and modal security plans under the guidance of HSPD-7. We believe
+this ``family of plans'' will provide clarity to all parties on roles
+and responsibilities in transportation security.
+
+ Questions by the Honorable Christopher Cox
+
+ 1. At a March 2004 appropriations subcommittee hearing, you
+testified that TSA was employing a ``system of systems'' approach to
+enhance aviation security, including improving screener performance,
+deploying technology, and strengthening oversight and accountability.
+Please explain the specific steps being taken in implementing this
+systems approach, including timelines for completion and provisions for
+review/evaluation and improvement. This is especially important because
+TSA appears to have a large portfolio of issues to address and is
+taking a number of actions without an apparent proactive overall plan.
+ Answer: TSA's security strategy uses a ``system of systems?''
+approach whereby each security ring contributes to TSA's overall
+security system but the overall system does not rely exclusively on any
+one component. These systems includes screening of passengers and their
+checked and carry-on baggage, the display of valid, government-issued
+photo identification, Federal Air Marshals, Federal Flight Deck
+Officers, hardened cockpit doors, and other enhanced security
+practices. Each security measure is designed to complement the
+efficiency and effectiveness of the others. The result is a system of
+enhanced security systems designed to provide a layered security that
+addresses a continuum of security threats with minimal impact on
+airline customers and operations, and on the free flow of commerce
+through the nation's commercial aviation infrastructure.
+ TSA has established four strategic goals aligned with DHS goals:
+domain awareness; prevention/protection; response/restoration; and
+organizational effectiveness. TSA continuously gathers as much
+knowledge as possible about the threats, vulnerabilities, capabilities,
+status, trends, unusual circumstances, and other conditions of the
+transportation system and its environment. We use this knowledge to
+direct resources and protective action most effectively.
+ We continue to meet the challenge of preventing terrorist attacks
+through a multilayered detection, deterrence and response system. We
+work collaboratively with intelligence and law enforcement agencies to
+monitor, disrupt and pre-empt emerging terrorist threats, and through
+our layered security systems, prevent terrorist attacks and incidents.
+We have developed plans to coordinate a rapid and effective response to
+any attack on, or disruption to, the air transportation system. We also
+provide expertise to assist in the development of plans for incident
+management, contingencies, and organizational continuity, such as the
+National Response Plan (NRP) and the National Incident Management
+System (NIMS).
+ To ensure and improve our organizational effectiveness across the
+board, we have established performance planning and reporting
+mechanisms, and we continue to use these systems to collect data to
+monitor our progress toward achieving our goals. Our Performance
+Measurement Information System (PMIS) was developed to capture basic
+performance measures at U.S. airports on a daily basis and is
+continually being upgraded to support new capabilities. We capture and
+analyze data on our security operations and adjust operations to
+achieve desired performance goals. Random and routine inspections, plus
+program evaluations, are also conducted to supplement the information
+captured in PMIS.
+ To measure effectiveness, TSA's Office of Internal Affairs and
+Program Review (OIAPR) has been conducting covert testing continuously
+since September 2002 to identify vulnerabilities in airport security
+systems. OIAPR has conducted thousands of checkpoint, checked baggage,
+access control and other tests of airport security systems. OIAPR
+conducts post test reviews with the screeners, screener supervisors,
+and Federal Security Directors (FSD) to re-enact the test and to
+identify opportunities for improvement. The information OIAPR provides
+to TSA management is used to focus attention on critical areas needing
+performance enhancements.
+ FSDs and their staff routinely monitor passenger and baggage
+screening activities to ensure that the screener workforce is complying
+with TSA standard operating procedures and policy directives at U.S.
+airports. Regulated parties are also monitored and inspected for
+compliance with pertinent security regulations and measures. Similar
+monitoring takes place overseas to ensure that airlines and host
+government authorities also maintain a high level of effectiveness in
+their screening operations and application of security controls for
+flights to the United States.
+ Terrorism is thwarted by efforts to raise or adjust the security
+threshold and create uncertainties in terrorists' planning efforts.
+Accordingly, TSA takes a risk-based approach to provide effective
+aviation security. This is accomplished by analyzing the threats along
+various pathways of attack and vulnerabilities to those methods of
+attack, as revealed by comprehensive and continuous threat and
+vulnerability analyses of security systems.
+
+ By necessity, upon its creation, TSA focused its security efforts
+almost exclusively on the commercial aviation sector. Since then, it
+has been criticized for not paying sufficient attention to other modes
+of transport, such as rail, maritime, and surface, especially in light
+of recent attacks on such modes (e.g., Madrid). What steps is TSA
+taking to protect other modes of transport, especially in terms of the
+aforementioned ``systems'' approach?
+ Answer: In partnership with other DHS component agencies and the
+Department of Transportation (DOT) modal administrations, TSA is
+identifying security vulnerabilities in the non-aviation modes of
+transportation. This security information will be used in developing
+and implementing, as appropriate, national performance-based security
+standards to improve the security of passengers, cargo, conveyances,
+transportation facilities and infrastructure. TSA is also working
+closely with federal, state, local, and industry partners to ensure
+compliance with established regulations and policies.
+ Specific projects TSA is undertaking or that are under discussion
+include:
+ Partnering with Information Analysis & Infrastructure
+ Protection directorate (IAIP) and industry stakeholders to
+ leverage Information Sharing Analysis Centers effectively;
+ Assessing hazardous materials (HAZMAT) transport
+ security threats and identifying best practices and mitigation
+ strategies to secure HAZMAT transport through High Threat Urban
+ Areas (HTUA). Specifically, DHS and DOT joined in a
+ collaborative effort to address security issues surrounding the
+ movement of bulk HAZMAT by rail through the National Capital
+ Region (NCR). TSA, designated as the lead Federal agency in
+ these efforts by DHS, developed a pilot project centered in
+ Washington, D.C.--known as the D.C. Rail Corridor Project. TSA
+ performed a fact-based, risk-analysis approach to understand
+ vulnerabilities, hazards, and the ``as is conditions'', and--
+ based on the facts and analysis--IAIP developed mitigation
+ strategies to identify threats associated with the movement of
+ bulk HAZMAT that occur within the physical boundaries of the
+ beltway--about 42 miles of railroad track and related assets.
+ Some of those enhancements were implemented immediately, and
+ others will be implemented overtime. The willingness of the
+ diverse parties involved to come together for the D.C. Rail
+ Corridor Project has been extraordinary. In a multi-
+ disciplinary, multi-agency approach, our partners in this
+ effort reflect the complex relationships, roles, and
+ responsibilities that exist within the NCR.
+ Working with the Science and Technology directorate to
+ develop chemical, biological, and radiological countermeasures
+ for identifying, isolating, and defeating attacks in mass
+ transit settings;
+ Assessing the operational feasibility and
+ appropriateness of applying tailored screening standards to
+ passengers in non-aviation environments;
+ Working under the guidance of the Border and
+ Transportation Security Directorate, and with U.S. Customs and
+ Border Protection (CBP) and the USCG to develop the appropriate
+ framework for securing the intermodal transport of
+ containerized cargo in the domestic United States.
+ Working with DOT, USCG and public/private
+ transportation owners and operators on transportation security
+ planning efforts that are an important part of DHS's overall
+ Critical Infrastructure Protection program.
+ DHS announced the following initiatives for rail and mass transit:
+ Continued engagement with industry and State and local
+ authorities to establish base-line security measures based on
+ current industry best practices;
+ Transit and Rail Inspection Pilot (TRIP) to test the
+ feasibility of screening luggage and carry-on bags for
+ explosives at rail stations and aboard trains;
+ The integration of existing public and employee
+ awareness programs and the creation of new programs where
+ necessary;
+ Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7)
+ directed DHS to develop a comprehensive National Infrastructure
+ Protection Plan (NIPP) covering 17 sectors of the U.S.
+ economy's Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources, a process
+ that is being managed by DHS IAIP. For each sector, there is a
+ federal agency taking the lead in developing a Sector Specific
+ Plan (SSP) that will feed into the comprehensive National Plan.
+ In the Transportation Sector, TSA has worked closely with IAIP
+ to develop the Transportation Sector Specific Plan (TSSP). The
+ TSSP is a process-oriented document and provides a high-level
+ map for security in the Sector. TSA is now developing the
+ Transportation Security Operational Plan (T-SOP). The TSOP is
+ an operational-level extension of the TSSP, which will provide
+ much greater detail on Transportation Sector initiatives and
+ accompanying roles and responsibilities. The TSOP will consist
+ of two parts: a baseline plan that details all common elements
+ among the modes followed by mode-specific annexes, one of which
+ will include the rail sector.
+ Investment in the research and development of
+ technological innovations for biological, chemical and high
+ explosives countermeasures.
+
+ 2. Passenger and baggage screening is generally said, even by TSA,
+to be impractical for passenger rail systems, due to the openness of
+the system and the nature of their operations. Yet, TSA has undertaken
+test screening procedures in two rail stations, through a Transit and
+Rail Inspection Pilot program. Even if screening procedures that are
+devised for the pilot yield positive results, is it likely that such
+procedures would be transferable to stations where the rail systems
+vary significantly in design and passenger volume is much greater?
+ Answer: TSA's goal in the Transit and Rail Inspection Pilot (TRIP)
+pilot has been to introduce emerging technologies to the rail
+environment, to evaluate their effectiveness at detecting explosive
+material, and to assess the impact that deployment of such technologies
+have on passenger travel. Unlike aviation facilities, rail stations are
+not self-contained and passengers have a great deal of freedom to board
+and disembark the train throughout its route. Because screening
+passengers in the open rail environment is very different from the
+controlled-environment of the aviation sector, the pilot focuses on
+testing the best means to adapt screening techniques for this
+environment. TSA and its partners recognize the distinct challenges
+presented by the rail environment and are conducting this pilot to
+identify the best methods to address them.
+ On May 30, TSA completed Phase I of this pilot program in New
+Carrollton, Maryland. The purpose of this phase was to test equipment
+in the open environment of a rail station and see if it is feasible as
+a response option for mitigating a high threat situation.
+ Between June 7 and July 5, Amtrak passengers boarding long-distance
+trains at Washington, D.C.'s Union Station had their checked luggage
+screened for explosives, as part of Phase II of the TRIP program. The
+goal of Phase II was to evaluate emerging technologies in a rail
+environment to screen for explosives in checked and unclaimed baggage,
+as well as temporarily stored personal items and cargo.
+ The Phase III pilot was designed to determine the operational
+suitability of installing screening technology in passenger rail cars
+to screen passengers and/or their carry-on baggage. Phase III began on
+July 19, 2004 and ran until August 20, 2004 and examined potential
+issues surrounding the development of a screening model for Amtrak and/
+or a commuter rail systems. Phase III was conducted in conjunction with
+Connecticut's Shoreline East commuter rail system. Screening was
+conducted in a specialized railcar equipped with on-board screening
+technology as the train was in motion. TSA tested technologies to
+screen passengers and their baggage for explosives while the train car
+is in motion.
+ All three phases of the pilot have been completed. Results are
+being assessed and will be presented to the Department when ready.
+
+ 3. In recent testimony, TSA officials have indicated that the
+agency is ``right-sizing'' screening operations to a mix of no more
+than 45,000 full-time and part-time FTEs. How was this number
+developed, especially in light of the findings in the recent reports on
+screener performance that concluded that such performance was impacted
+in part because of staff shortages at certain airports? Does the right-
+sizing drill-down to the airport level, where the level of screening
+personnel is a function of, among other things, the airport's risk, its
+workload, and infrastructure configuration?
+ Answer: TSA is developing a detailed bottom-up staffing model that
+takes into account several factors to determine an adequate level of
+screening personnel necessary to meet our mission. This model uses
+airport flight information, airport hours of operation, baggage
+screening areas, checkpoint lanes, types of screener equipment,
+screener Standard Operating Procedures, passenger load factors and
+arrival curves, projected administrative time, and other operating
+criteria.
+ TSA reviews the workforce requirements for each airport on a
+periodic basis. The model, once operational, will be an important asset
+in TSA's efforts to ensure that our screeners are deployed effectively
+to maximize the safety and security of the traveling public. This
+analysis will also allow us to engage in further discussions with the
+relevant Committees of Congress.
+ TSA is also creating additional capacity through achieving greater
+efficiencies in the scheduling of screeners. Federal Security Directors
+at each airport now have access to scheduling tools that provide real-
+time information enabling them to forecast periods of peak demand for
+screening. TSA uses mores split shifts and has restructured the
+workforce to reach a higher ratio of part-time screeners to maximize
+operational flexibility. As a result of this restructuring, TSA can
+more efficiently schedule screeners to match capacity with the level of
+demand.
+
+ 4. How does TSA propose to gather and analyze relevant data to
+calculate its performance indicators? For example, what processes and
+controls will be put in place that will allow TSA to gather the data,
+ensure its relevance and quality, and ``crunched?'' How will these
+indicators collectively present TSA with a picture of its performance
+and trends in this performance?
+ Answer: TSA has been collecting and analyzing performance data for
+over two years from a variety of sources. The backbone of the TSA
+performance measurement and indicators structure is the Performance
+Measurement Information System (PMIS), which collects data from all
+federalized commercial airports as well as from the five airports that
+are under private screening contracts. Source data include screener
+employee census data, payroll, passenger throughput, passenger wait
+times by screening checkpoint, items confiscated, and machine
+performance, among other data. Additionally, PMIS contains sizing
+information on airports, checkpoints, lanes, and machines that produce
+a number of standard and ad hoc reports. In August 2004, TSA deployed
+the Performance Information Management System (PIMS), a business
+intelligence tool that allows greater ad hoc reporting using multiple
+TSA data collection systems, including PMIS and the Performance and
+Results Information System (PARIS), used to collect data on incidents,
+inspections and investigations at the Nation's ports.
+ The Threat Image Projection (TIP) systems embedded in x-ray
+machines at use in airports superimposes randomly selected threat
+images on x-ray screens during actual operations and records whether or
+not screeners identify the threat object. TSA combines the live covert
+testing results with the results from TIP automated testing for a more
+complete picture of TSA's effectiveness in aviation security screening
+operations. The results of these assessment processes are analyzed for
+trends and emerging vulnerabilities in order focus training plans on
+areas needing strengthening.
+ TSA also uses surveys, listening sessions, and other mechanisms to
+receive quantitative and qualitative information from passengers and
+other customers, industry stakeholders, and employees. This outreach
+ensures that the performance measurements encompass all aspects of our
+business, including efficiency and customer satisfaction.
+
+ 5. At what percentage of airports are airport workers permitted to
+bypass screening checkpoints, relying upon identification cards for
+security checks? Are strategies being evaluated to increase the
+screening of airport workers?
+ Answer: The Airport Security Plan (ASP) at each airport governs
+procedures for airport employees that require access to sterile and
+SIDA areas, including whether they are authorized to access the sterile
+and SIDA areas respectively upon presenting their SIDA or sterile area
+badges. Federal Security Directors must approve the ASPs for the
+airports that they oversee.
+ TSA is actively strengthening safeguards regarding access to
+Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) and sterile areas of our
+Nation's airports. The sheer quantity of airport workers with SIDA
+credentials and the fact that they would have access to a wide variety
+of tools and equipment within the SIDA area preclude any simplistic
+solutions. TSA's security strategy uses a ``system of systems''
+approach whereby each security ring contributes to TSA's overall
+security system but the overall system does not rely exclusively on any
+one component. In other words, the different security components
+complement and reinforce each other.
+ TSA recently completed a review of the access for airport and
+airline workers to SIDA and sterile areas of airports and has
+significantly strengthened security policies. Details of the policies
+contain sensitive security information and can be shared in the
+appropriate manner.
+ An extensive background investigation is necessary for one to be
+issued either a SIDA or Sterile Area badge. The background
+investigation consists of 3 parts: (1) an FBI fingerprint based
+criminal history records check (CHRC) with specific outstanding arrests
+or convictions resulting in disqualification, (2) a name-based check
+against the TSA No Fly and Selectee lists which provide links to
+potential terrorists, and (3) a name-based security threat assessment
+on all SIDA and Sterile area workers. The latter component is a new
+requirement recently enacted by TSA.
+ TSA will continue to review security processes relating to access
+to sensitive areas of airports and identify further enhancements where
+appropriate. While no single measure will provide a 100% security
+guarantee, TSA's current procedures represent a significant set of
+mutually reinforcing safeguards when taken as a whole and are
+consistent with our layered security approach.
+
+ 6. Air cargo security has received increasing scrutiny as a
+potential ``soft'' target vulnerable to some sort of terrorist action,
+yet thus matter has not received sustained attention. TSA essentially
+relies on the Known Shipper Program to ensure the security of air cargo
+shipments-tender this program, cargo from unknown shippers is declined
+loading aboard aircraft. However, a number of terrorism experts and
+others note that such programs could be compromised by terrorists who
+might pose as legitimate businesses for a period of time, establish
+credibility, and then strike.
+ What steps is TSA taking to secure air cargo, especially cargo that
+originates overseas; and what is the level of cooperation and
+coordination with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)?
+ Answer: TSA, in coordination with CBP and the Border and
+Transportation Security Directorate, has taken numerous steps to
+strengthen air cargo security. In November, 2003, TSA issued revised
+security mandates requiring random inspection of air cargo transported
+on both all-cargo and passenger aircraft. In December, TSA adopted a
+comprehensive Air Cargo Security Strategic Plan (ACSSP), based on
+recommendations from the ASAC Air Cargo working group.\1\ Additionally,
+earlier this year, TSA deployed our Known Shipper Database which has
+centralized the collection of data on about 450,000 known shippers and
+enabled vetting against government databases. TSA's Known Shipper
+Database will be just one element of our planned Freight Assessment
+program which will be designed to identify high risk cargo that will be
+subjected to further inspection prior to transport by passenger
+aircraft.
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ \1\ The Air Cargo Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), which
+includes the ACSSP, was published in the Federal Register in November
+2004 and is one in a series of steps of steps toward codifying air
+cargo security measures first introduced to industry in the form of
+security directives and emergency amendments after the 9/11 attacks.
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ CBP is an integral partner to TSA in the development and
+implementation of several important air cargo programs, including
+freight assessment. Currently TSA and CBP have four distinct working
+groups dedicated to the advancement of freight assessment components.
+
+ 7. CAPPS II has generated considerable controversy and, as detailed
+by a recent GAO report, faces a number of technical and operational
+challenges. What specific steps is TSA taking to respond to the
+challenges that GAO identified-TSA had not fully addressed seven of
+eight key issues, including accuracy of data, prevention of
+unauthorized access, and privacy concerns; and implement the
+recommendations it made?
+ Answer: TSA concurred with the findings of the GAO report on CAPPS
+II when it was released. One of the primary reasons for the
+``weaknesses'' cited by GAO was the fact that, thus far, the Department
+has not been able to conduct any testing. DHS believes that once a
+reasonable amount of testing has been conducted, it will be in a far
+better position to address and resolve the concerns raised by the GAO
+report.
+ After a review of airline passenger prescreening programs, and
+bearing in mind GAO's findings, the Transportation Security
+Administration (TSA) has developed a new program for screening domestic
+airline passengers in order to enhance the security and safety of
+domestic airline travel called Secure Flight.
+ The Department has learned valuable lessons regarding passenger
+pre-screening and will be incorporating these lessons into Secure
+Flight. During the Secure Flight testing phase, TSA will:
+ Compare historic passenger name record (PNR)
+ information against expanded and consolidated watch lists held
+ in the Terrorist Screening Center database to identify known or
+ suspected terrorists.
+ TSA will also apply, within the Secure Flights system,
+ a streamlined version of the existing CAPPS rule set related to
+ suspicious indicators associated with travel behavior as
+ identified in passengers' itinerary-specific PNR.
+ Additionally, on a very limited basis, TSA will also test the use
+of commercial data to determine if this approach is effective in
+identifying passenger information that is incorrect or inaccurate.
+ Secure Flight will be continuously monitored to identify and delete
+factors that do not contribute to the effective and efficient
+assessment of terrorist risk. Additionally, the TSA Civil Rights and
+Privacy Offices, and when appropriate the DHS Office for Civil Rights
+and Civil Liberties and the DHS Privacy Office, will be involved in
+redress process for the new program. The full protection of privacy and
+civil liberties remains a core principle for any passenger pre-
+screening system.
+
+ Questions Submitted by the Honorable Lamar Smith
+
+ My question pertains to the Transportation Worker Identification
+Program (TWIC):
+ As you know, Congress overwhelmingly approved and appropriated the
+funds necessary to study, develop, test and deploy a credentialing
+program that contained biometric identification procedures to require
+that transportation workers be authenticated before gaming access to
+secure areas, facilities and networks. While Congress has been patient
+through the transition of the TSA from the Department of Transportation
+to the Department of Homeland Severity [sic] and the subsequent change
+of its leadership, the TWIC program has unfortunately floundered and
+has been unnecessarily delayed.
+
+ Would you please update the Members of this Committee on the status
+of TWIC and the Department's plans and timeline to fully deploy this
+biometric identification card program to all transportation workers?
+ Answer: In May 2002, DOT transitioned the lead for the TWIC project
+to TSA. In August 2002, additional Congressional guidance resulted in
+modification of the TWIC implementation planning and program timeline.
+An extensive Technology Phase was inserted into the plan prior to
+conducting an operational prototype. The Technology Phase evaluated the
+full range of credential-based technologies. The Technology Phase
+contract was released in April 2003, and the phase was completed in
+October 2003. The results of the Technology Phase confirmed that the
+most appropriate technology for the core TWIC requirements was the
+integrated circuit chip (ICC) smart card. Concurrent with Technology
+Evaluation, planning for the Prototype Phase occurred.
+ At the completion of the Technology Phase, a review of the TWIC
+program occurred prior to commencement of the Prototype Phase. Based
+upon this review, the Request for Proposal for the TWIC Prototype Phase
+was approved for release in June 2004, and the contract was awarded in
+August 2004. The Prototype Phase is being conducted over a seven-month
+period. Upon its completion, the results will be reviewed, and a final
+decision is expected to be made in the 2nd quarter of FY05 with regards
+to national implementation.
+
+ Please share with us the Department's plans to address the National
+policy issues surrounding the deployment of these cards including:
+which transportation workers will be issued a card and what is the plan
+for financing of the necessary infrastructure.
+ Answer: TSA has announced plans in the Federal Register to commence
+the development of a rule making process that will provide more
+explicit guidance for specific populations that will use the TWIC to
+gain access to secure areas. Additionally, TSA is conducting the
+required planning and stakeholder outreach, including a detailed
+Privacy Impact Assessment.
+ In accordance with Congressional guidance, TSA is developing a user
+fee-based funding strategy, and plans to transition to fully fee-based
+funding for TWIC in FY06.
+
+ Questions Submitted by the Honorable Jim Turner
+
+ Responses to the following questions have not been recieved.
+ 1. You testified that ``[a]t airport checkpoints, highly trained
+and qualified TSA personnel screen passengers and carry-on items, using
+state-of-the-art equipment.'' However, at a previous hearing before the
+House Government Reform Committee (November 20, 2003), you stated ``I
+agree with you completely that the technology we'e using is somewhat
+better than 9/11 but not a lot. It is the same type of technology.
+We've replaced all the metal detectors with the latest generation, but
+it is still the pre-9/11 x-ray and metal detection technology.'' Please
+provide the Committee with a description of the types of equipment
+needed and timeline for expected deployment of new products under
+Projects Phoenix and Manhattan II.
+
+ 2. Does DHS still intend to conduct a risk assessment for all cargo
+by the end of fiscal year 2005? If so, who will conduct the risk
+assessment, what information will that be based on, how and when will
+that information by provided to DHS, what will constitute a
+sufficiently high level of risk to trigger action, and what will that
+action be?
+
+ 3. You stated that one third of the known shippers are currently in
+TSA's database. How many companies do you ultimately expect to be in
+the database? What is TSA's policy for verifying that known shipper
+companies are complying with security regulations, both in terms of
+written and physical inspections?
+
+ 4. Please provide details on the background checks that are
+conducted for known shipper companies, airport workers in sterile and
+secure areas, and screeners. For each, please provide the number of
+checks that have been conducted, who conducts the checks, and what
+types and sources of information are included in the checks.
+
+ 5. You testified that TSA will minimum security training for flight
+attendants will be ``piloted later this fiscal year and be ready to
+deliver it next year.'' Can you provide a timeline and description of
+the training?
+ 6. How many airports currently rely on positive passenger--bag
+match as the only security measure on checked baggage? When will no
+baggage rely solely on the passenger--bag match as a security measure?
+
+ 7. You mentioned the exemplary work of the rail information sharing
+and analysis center (ISAC). Does TSA intend to create and use a similar
+structure for the aviation sector? Will there be a sector coordinator?
+Has there been interest from the aviation community in establishing an
+ISAC?
+
+ 8. You testified that the Transportation Security Operations Center
+is the point of contact for local transit authorities with security
+issues, but that the Federal Transit Administration also plays a role.
+Please clarify the responsibilities of the TSOC and the FTA, and
+indicate any operations that are conducted solely at the TSOC.
+
+ 9. TSA officials have testified that many airports--far beyond the
+current set of eight--have a legitimate need for letters of intent
+(LOIs) to better deploy EDS machines. The President's fiscal year 2005
+budget request include no funds to sign new LOIs. What is TSA's long
+term budget plan for LOIs?
+
+ 10. The GAO report on CAPPS II in February, 2004, said that only
+one of the eight criteria that TSA and DHS need to meet before
+implementing the system had been met. Since then, has GAO told
+determined that any of the remaining seven criteria have been met? When
+does TSA expect to be ready to deploy CAPPS II?
+
+ 11. I understand that TSA's pilot program on the registered
+traveler program may include using dedicating checkpoint screener lanes
+for registered travelers. Screening resources, in terms of TSA
+personnel, equipment, and physical airport space, are already stretched
+thin and can't be increased in the short term. Won't this proposal to
+dedicate screeners and detection equipment to a small percentage of the
+passengers mean that the overwhelming majority of travelers will face
+even longer lines, and that it will be even more difficult than it is
+now to fully screen all passengers and baggage? Can you explain how
+this system will run without compounding the screening problems we
+already have?
+
+ 12. The Committee has heard from armed federal law enforcement
+officers traveling on commercial flights that their status is revealed
+at several points in the airport, including in conversations with
+airline personnel at check-in, in noticeable bypassing of checkpoint
+screening, and in pre-boarding. What steps, if any, are being used to
+help law enforcement officers avoid being revealed as such? Are any
+additional authorities needed to help in this regard, either for the
+security of the federal law enforcement personnel or for aviation
+security? Regarding TSA's pilot program for federal law enforcement
+officers traveling with firearms to use the National Law Enforcement
+Telecommunications System (NLETS) to pre-notify airport personnel: What
+airports are involved in this study? What are the results of the pilot
+program in terms of security at the participating airports and the
+advisability of using NLETS for this purpose?
+
+ 13. When will TSA complete any steps necessary to determine the
+appropriate size of the screening workforce, especially in light of
+increasing air travel?
+
+ 14. Does TSA have a risk-based plan for securing rail and mass
+transit? If so, please provide the Committee with a copy. If not, when
+will such a plan be in place?
+
+ 15. The American Public Transportation Association has estimated
+that public transportation authorities throughout the country would
+need to spend $6 billion to be reasonably secure. Does TSA agree with
+that figure? If not, what is TSA's estimate of the cost for adequate
+transit security? What is TSA's responsibility for helping transit
+authorities reach that security level?
+
+ 16. What is TSA's timeline for completing the requirements in
+Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7 to create an intermodal
+transportation security strategy? What are the timelines for finishing
+all the sector specific plans?
+
+ 17. In light of the TSA publication ``Security Guidelines for
+General Aviation Airports'' released this month:
+ Will TSA monitor, on an ongoing basis, the progress
+ made by general aviation airports in reaching the recommended
+ levels of security?
+ What TSA or FAA funds are available for general
+ aviation airports to make security improvements? Has TSA
+ coordinated with FAA to provide financial assistance to help
+ airports implement the guidelines?
+
+
+
+