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+ - NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES
+
+[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
+[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
+
+
+
+
+ NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST
+ ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES
+
+=======================================================================
+
+ HEARING
+
+
+ before the
+
+ SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
+ HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
+
+ ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
+
+ SECOND SESSION
+
+ __________
+
+ AUGUST 17, 2004
+
+ __________
+
+ Serial No. 108-55
+
+ __________
+
+ Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security
+
+
+ Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
+ index.html
+
+ __________
+
+
+
+ _____
+
+ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
+
+25-324 WASHINGTON : 2006
+_________________________________________________________________
+For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
+Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free
+(866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail:
+Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
+
+
+
+ Christopher Cox, California, Chairman
+
+Jennifer Dunn, Washington Jim Turner, Texas, Ranking Member
+C.W. Bill Young, Florida Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
+Don Young, Alaska Loretta Sanchez, California
+F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
+Wisconsin Norman D. Dicks, Washington
+David Dreier, California Barney Frank, Massachusetts
+Duncan Hunter, California Jane Harman, California
+Harold Rogers, Kentucky Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland
+Sherwood Boehlert, New York Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New
+Joe Barton, Texas York
+Lamar S. Smith, Texas Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
+Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Nita M. Lowey, New York
+Christopher Shays, Connecticut Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey
+Porter J. Goss, Florida Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
+Dave Camp, Michigan Columbia
+Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida Zoe Lofgren, California
+Bob Goodlatte, Virginia Karen McCarthy, Missouri
+Ernest J. Istook, Jr., Oklahoma Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
+Peter T. King, New York Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
+John Linder, Georgia Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
+John B. Shadegg, Arizona Islands
+Mark E. Souder, Indiana Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
+Mac Thornberry, Texas Ken Lucas, Kentucky
+Jim Gibbons, Nevada James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
+Kay Granger, Texas Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
+Pete Sessions, Texas Ben Chandler, Kentucky
+John E. Sweeney, New York
+
+ John Gannon, Chief of Staff
+ Stephen DeVine, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel
+ Thomas Dilenge, Chief Counsel and Policy Director
+ David H. Schanzer, Democrat Staff Director
+ Mark T. Magee, Democrat Deputy Staff Director
+ Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
+
+ (II)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ C O N T E N T S
+
+ ----------
+ Page
+
+ STATEMENTS
+
+The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of California, and Chairman, Select Committee on
+ Homeland Security.............................................. 1
+The Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in Congress From the
+ State of Texas, Ranking Member, Select Committee on Homeland
+ Security....................................................... 3
+The Honorable Robert E. Andrews, a Representative in Congress
+ From the State of New Jersey................................... 64
+The Honorable Dave Camp, a Representative in Congress From the
+ State of Michigan.............................................. 39
+The Honorable Lincoln Diaz-Balart, a Representative in Congress
+ From the State of Florida...................................... 85
+The Honorable Benjamin L. Cardin, a Representative in Congress
+ From the State of Maryland..................................... 50
+The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Delegate in Congress From
+ the U.S. Virgin Islands: Prepared Statement.................... 7
+The Honorable Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of Oregon............................................ 36
+The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of Washington........................................ 37
+The Honorable Jennifer Dunn, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of Washington........................................ 6
+The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of North Carolina.................................... 100
+The Honorable Barney Frank, a Representative in Congress From the
+ State of Massachusetts......................................... 40
+The Honorable Jim Gibbons, a Representative in Congress From the
+ State of Nevada................................................ 62
+The Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of Virginia.......................................... 45
+The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress From the
+ State of California............................................ 47
+The Honorable Ernest J. Istook, Jr., a Representative in Congress
+ From the State of Oklahoma..................................... 93
+The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of New York.......................................... 49
+The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
+ From the States of Rhode Island................................ 105
+The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress
+ From the State of Texas........................................ 66
+The Honorable John Linder, a Representative in Congress From the
+ State of Georgia............................................... 52
+The Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Representative in Congress From the
+ State of California............................................ 86
+The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of New York
+ Oral Statement................................................. 60
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 8
+The Honorable Karen McCarthy, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of Missouri: Prepared Statement...................... 9
+The Honorable Kendrick Meek, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of Florida........................................... 108
+The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, a Delegate in Congress From
+ the of District of Columbia.................................... 136
+The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress
+ From the State of New Jersey................................... 33
+The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of California........................................ 119
+The Honorable John B. Shadegg, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of Arizona........................................... 55
+The Honorable Christopher Shays, a Representative in Congress
+ From the State of Connecticut.................................. 35
+The Honorable Louise McIntosh Slaughter, a Representative in
+ Congress From the State of New York:
+ Oral Statement................................................. 53
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 10
+The Honorable Lamar S. Smith, a Representative in Congress From
+ the State of Texas............................................. 31
+The Honorable Mark Souder, a Representative in Congress From the
+ State of Indiana............................................... 58
+The Honorable John E. Sweeney, a Representative From the State of
+ New York....................................................... 87
+The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
+ From the State of Mississippi.................................. 30
+
+ WITNESSES
+ Panel I
+
+The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton, Vice Chair, National Commission on
+ Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States:
+ Oral Statement................................................. 15
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 19
+The Honorable Thomas H. Kean, Chair, National Commission on
+ Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States:
+ Oral Statement................................................. 11
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 19
+
+ Panel II
+
+The Honorable J. Cofer Black, Coordinator, Office of the
+ Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State:
+ Oral Statement................................................. 67
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 68
+Ms. Maureen Baginski, Executive Assistant Director for
+ Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation:
+ Oral Statement................................................. 77
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 79
+Mr. John Brennan, Director, Terrorist Threat Integration Center:
+ Oral Statement................................................. 74
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 75
+General Patrick Hughes, Assistant Secretary for Information
+ Analysis, Department of Homeland Security:
+ Oral Statement................................................. 70
+ Prepared Statement............................................. 70
+
+ For the Record
+
+Responses from Ms. Maureen Baginski:
+ Quesitons submitted by the Honorable Edward J. Markey.......... 139
+ Questions submitted by the Honorable John Sweeney.............. 139
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES
+
+ ----------
+
+
+ Tuesday, August 17, 2004
+
+ House of Representatives,
+ Select Committee on Homeland Security,
+ Washington, DC.
+ The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:40 a.m., in room
+345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Cox
+[chairman of the committee] presiding.
+ Present: Representatives Cox, Dunn, Smith, Shays, Camp,
+Diaz-Balart, Goodlatte, Istook, King, Linder, Shadegg, Souder,
+Gibbons, Granger, Sessions, Sweeney, Turner, Thompson, Sanchez,
+Markey, Dicks, Frank, Harman, Cardin, Slaughter, DeFazio,
+Lowey, Andrews, Norton, Lofgren, McCarthy, Jackson-Lee,
+Pascrell, Christensen, Etheridge, Langevin, Meek, and Chandler.
+ Chairman Cox. Good morning. The Select Committee on
+Homeland Security will come to order.
+ The prior business of the committee will stand adjourned,
+and the committee will proceed to hear testimony pursuant to
+notice on the 9/11 Commission recommendations concerning
+homeland security information sharing. Let me welcome the
+distinguished chairman and vice chairman of the Commission, Tom
+Kean and Lee Hamilton.
+ We appreciate your appearance before us today. This
+committee, Republicans and Democrats alike, commend you for
+your work and for your significant contribution to our national
+effort to apply the lessons learned from the tragedies of
+September 11th.
+ This committee and the 9/11 Commission both have a common
+origin. We were formed because of and in the wake of the
+catastrophic terrorist attacks against America. Both Congress
+and the President swiftly recognized that neither the executive
+nor the legislative branch of our government was organized to
+deal with this terrorist assault. This committee, as you know,
+represents the only structural change thus far in Congress,
+since September 11th, which was undertaken specifically to deal
+with the threat of international terrorism to the United
+States. As such, you can understand why we are here to conduct
+this hearing into your findings and your recommendations.
+ As chairman, I can report that this committee has
+consistently pursued a legislative and policy agenda to focus
+congressional attention on preventing and preparing for acts of
+terrorism targeting the United States. This has been a
+bipartisan effort owing in part to the strong and able
+leadership of our ranking member, Jim Turner, and also to the
+recognition by all our members that the security of the
+American people must transcend politics, even in an election
+year. Partisanship will surely cause us to fail.
+ The theme of today's hearing is information sharing, which
+was a primary focus of the Commission, as it has been of
+numerous hearings of our committee. In the fight against
+international terrorism there can be no higher priority.
+ Nor do we treat this subject narrowly. It encompasses
+fundamental issues of structure, systems, policy, and
+leadership. It is about getting vital information to those who
+need it in time to prevent harm to Americans.
+ The 9/11 Commission has done a superb job in investigating
+and recounting for the American people the details of the Al-
+Qa'ida attacks on our Nation nearly 3 years ago. In 77 minutes
+on that fateful day, terrorism on U.S. soil took over 3,000
+innocent American lives.
+ The report shows in graphic detail how the terrorists
+exploited systemic weaknesses to defeat one U.S. Government
+agency after another. These were agencies that we reasonably
+could have expected to stop the terrorists--the Intelligence
+Community, law enforcement, the Federal Aviation
+Administration, the State Department, and the Department of
+Defense.
+ Nor does the report spare the Congress. The Commission
+concludes that the Congress had failed to organize itself to
+deal effectively with post-Cold War national security threats
+in general and international terrorism in particular.
+ Your indictment, therefore, is not just of our Intelligence
+Community, but of the way the entire U.S. Government was
+organized with respect to counterterrorism.
+ The Intelligence Community does not exist in a vacuum. Its
+priorities and performances are clearly influenced both by
+executive branch structures and by the authorization and
+appropriations committees in the Congress.
+ Reforms will not succeed, the report concludes, unless the
+priorities of the President, the Federal Government, and the
+Congress are brought into alignment for the future. And this
+means each branch must be properly organized to do this, which
+is still not the case today.
+ President Bush has gotten ahead of this issue by accepting
+two principal recommendations from the Commission. First, with
+regard to establishing the National Counterterrorism Center,
+and second, by proposing a National Intelligence Director.
+These swift and bold decisions are consistent with his repeated
+statements that whatever we have achieved over the past 3
+years, we have much more work to do to protect the American
+people. The President clearly sees the 9/11 Commission report
+as helping toward this end, and so should we here.
+ I know the Commission will stay engaged with us as we
+grapple with these active issues in the months ahead. You have
+not just delivered a carefully prepared historical analysis,
+but you have also significantly advanced the long-term
+prospects for fundamental reform.
+ Finally, let me turn to the Commission's look at the
+performance of Congress over the past several years. The report
+found Congress wanting in several key areas. Congress, the
+report says, is too much oriented toward domestic rather than
+foreign affairs. Congress has resisted reorganizing itself to
+deal with the post-Cold War threat environment, including
+international terrorism. Congress has focused on selective
+investigations over comprehensive and thorough oversight. And
+Congress has allowed rigid and unchanging committee
+jurisdiction to skew priorities, often against heightened
+security concerns in a changing world.
+ That is an unflinching diagnosis. All of us, Republicans
+and Democrats alike, would have preferred a different one. But
+we do hear you, and we must now do something about it.
+ The Commission follows this provocative analysis with a
+recommendation that permanent standing committees on homeland
+security be established in both the Senate and the House. These
+far-reaching recommendations I know will be delved into even
+more deeply this morning.
+ Let me thank you both once again for coming before our
+committee this morning. I am eager to hear your testimony and
+to remain engaged with you in the challenging year ahead.
+ Let me now turn to our distinguished ranking member, Jim
+Turner, for his opening remarks.
+ Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling
+this very important hearing.
+ I want to acknowledge the presence of all of our colleagues
+here today to deal with this very critical issue. And I have
+been a part of several other hearings where many of the family
+members of the families of the 9/11 victims have been with us.
+I want to acknowledge their steadfastness in following this
+issue and working together with the 9/11 Commission to bring us
+to the point where we can make America safe.
+ Governor Kean and Congressman Hamilton, we are very pleased
+to have you before us. I know you have had a rigorous schedule
+of testifying. I know, Governor, you are probably tired of
+hearing all of Lee Hamilton's former colleagues brag on him,
+but we want to do that once again here today. I was listening
+to Congressman Hamilton's successor, Baron Hill; in talking
+about him the other day in the Armed Services Committee, he
+pointed out that following Lee Hamilton in office was kind of
+like following Abraham Lincoln in office. Lee Hamilton did such
+an outstanding job for many years leading us, particularly in
+the area of foreign policy.
+ So we are very honored by your presence and we thank you
+for being with us. Most importantly, thank you for your
+leadership of a bipartisan commission. Your unanimous report
+creates, I think, the political conditions that are necessary
+to advance meaningful reform. You have invited all to embrace
+your report and its recommendations. And in the partisan world
+of Washington, D.C., you have produced a truly bipartisan
+product. We commend you in that effort. You have not dealt with
+the blame game, wisely recognizing that prior to 9/11 failing
+to take Al-Qa'ida seriously was a pervasive fault.
+ Now, here we are almost 3 years after 9/11, and frankly we
+have no excuse. We have heard repeatedly from numerous
+scholarly reports, recommendations for action. Today, we are
+confronted with the clear threat of another major attack on our
+country. The reality of these continued threats should be a
+stark reminder to us that we have much more to do to make
+America safe.
+ You have been very clear in your recommendations that just
+moving a few positions around on the organizational chart as
+the proposed National Director of Intelligence will not get the
+job done. You have said we need a grand strategy, a
+comprehensive, long-term approach to address a new enemy,
+militant Islamic jihadism.
+ Defeating this enemy, you say, requires a three-pronged
+approach: one, attacking the terrorists more aggressively; two,
+securing our homeland better; and three, pursuing policies and
+initiatives to prevent the rise of future terrorists.
+ Only one of your recommendations, I note, deals with the
+role of the military; 21 of your recommendations deal with
+strengthening homeland security, 10 of your recommendations
+deal with preventing the rise of future terrorists. Clearly we
+must transform the military to defeat this new enemy.
+ Condoleezza Rice testified to your commission that in June
+of 2001 when she was tasked with drawing up plans to attack Al-
+Qa'ida and the Taliban, in her words, quote, ``The military
+didn't particularly want this mission.'' We are trained and
+equipped to fight nations and armies, but the new enemy
+requires new training, new capabilities, and new missions.
+ We defeated communism in the last century by maintaining
+superior military capabilities and by projecting our values and
+our ideals as a nation to the rest of the world. When the
+Berlin Wall fell, not one shot was fired. Radical Islamic
+fundamentalism must be defeated by the same force of our ideals
+and our values. Secretary Rumsfeld, in his now famous memo,
+asked this: He said, ``Are we capturing, killing or deterring
+and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrasas and
+the radical clerics are recruiting, training, and deploying
+against us? The United States is putting relatively little
+effort into a long-range plan, but we are putting a great deal
+of effort into trying to stop terrorists.'' That is from the
+Secretary of Defense.
+ The 9/11 Commission gives us a long-range plan to stem the
+rise of future terrorists, and it begins with supporting the
+voices of moderation in the Islamic world. The Commission
+recommends investment in education and economic partnership in
+the Muslim and Arab world with America offering, in your words,
+an example of moral leadership in the world committed to treat
+people humanely, abiding by the rule of law and being generous
+and caring to our neighbors.
+ This clearly will require American leadership in building
+strong alliances and coalitions around the world. If our
+government continues to ignore the 10 recommendations of the
+Commission to prevent the rise of future terrorists, we have no
+strategy for victory over terrorism. We will be left to decades
+of fighting the terrorists both abroad and here at home. And
+until we achieve this ultimate victory over terrorism, we have
+no option but to implement vigorously the 21 recommendations of
+your report dealing with securing the homeland.
+ I am pleased that we can report to you that our committee
+has already taken action on your recommendation to distribute
+homeland security funds based solely on the assessment of
+threats and vulnerabilities. We acted on this in a unanimous
+and bipartisan way last February. Now this legislation should
+be set for debate on the House floor.
+ For over 2 years we have called on the administration to
+close the security gaps facing America as outlined in many of
+your recommendations. The 9/11 Commission has stated that
+unscreened air cargo is a threat to our security. Congressman
+Markey and Congressman Shays have called for action on this for
+over 2 years, yet little has been done to close that security
+gap, and the vulnerability remains.
+ The 9/11 Commission has stated that we need a biometric
+interoperable border screening security system. Members of
+Congress on both sides of the aisle have been advocating for
+such a system for many years. Yet the 9/11 Commission has
+concluded that the US VISIT system, initiated by the Department
+of Homeland Security, is built on, and I quote, ``antiquated
+computer environment.'' That will have to be replaced.
+ Almost 3 years after 9/11 we still do not have an
+interoperable border security system. We still have not
+achieved integrated information sharing among intelligence
+agencies.
+ The 9/11 Commission has noted that even after the deadly
+rail attacks in Madrid, the Department of Homeland Security has
+failed to develop an integrated strategic plan for the
+transportation sector. My colleague, Congresswoman Holmes
+Norton, called for this action months ago in our legislation to
+better secure our rail and public transportation sector, but
+there has been no action. The list could go on.
+ The 9/11 Commission report is a wake-up call for our
+government. We need to regain the sense of urgency that we all
+had after September 11th. With 21 recommendations on homeland
+security, we should, Mr. Chairman, schedule hearings on each of
+these recommendations jointly with other committees when
+appropriate to be ready to act on comprehensive legislation
+that addresses each of the Commission's 41 recommendations.
+ We also should be proceeding with the suspended markup of
+our Homeland Security Authorization Act. Many of the amendments
+that my colleagues and I would offer to that bill relate
+directly to the recommendations of the Commission.
+ Democrats met last week with Governor Kean and Lee Hamilton
+to talk about the report and to let it be known that we are
+ready to get to work. I hope that this committee can provide
+and will provide the leadership necessary over the next few
+weeks to move forward on this important task.
+ Governor Kean, Mr. Hamilton, thank you again for your
+leadership in helping make America safe. America is grateful
+for what you and your colleagues have done, and for your
+dedication and your commitment we will be eternally grateful.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Cox. I thank the gentleman.
+ I would advise members of the outset that both Chairman
+Kean and Vice Chairman Hamilton have been generous with their
+time today. They are available to be with us all morning, and
+they have requested that they be dismissed at 12:15. In order
+to provide sufficient time for questioning by all members, I
+would ask members to consider waiving or limiting the durations
+of opening statements. If members have written statements, they
+may as always be included in the hearing record.
+ The vice chairman of the full committee, the gentlelady
+from Washington State, Ms. Dunn, is recognized for her opening
+statement.
+ Ms. Dunn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too thank the
+witnesses for coming yet another time to testify before our
+committee--a very important committee, though, I believe, of
+people who are representative of districts all over the Nation.
+And we have flown in today to make sure that we hear from you
+firsthand. It is a credit to you that you have got so many
+members here today, because we believe that you have done a
+very thoughtful job and have brought sensitivity and attention
+to an issue that we have been dealing with now for almost 2
+years. So thank you for being here.
+ The terrorist attacks on September 11th forced all of us to
+think differently about life in America. We realize we faced a
+new enemy, one that is not easily contained or eliminated. That
+day we shifted our focus and our resources. The terrorists
+didn't make us fearful as they had hoped they would do. They
+strengthened our resolve. They have not made us cower. We have
+confronted them with international might. Most of all, the
+terrorists have reminded us of what is great about America:
+freedom, democracy, justice, values that we will always fight
+for.
+ These radical groups are creative and enduring in their
+effort to bring down the values of the Western civilization. We
+must be just as unwavering and innovative in our effort to
+prevent them from doing so. The 9/11 Commission's report has
+provided an insightful road map for our continuing effort to
+reform systems and processes that were not designed to confront
+the present enemy.
+ Today, we will hear firsthand from Commission leaders as
+well as Federal officials of counterterrorism responsibilities.
+House and Senate leadership are committed to swift action on
+the Commission's report. In the following weeks, the American
+people will see a careful and thoughtful process that takes
+into account the progress that already has been made by the
+administration and the Congress as well as the equally
+thoughtful calls for action in the Commission's report.
+ We have a lot of work to do. The President has already
+proposed creating a National Intelligence Director as well as a
+National Counterterrorism Center, two changes suggested in your
+report. It is also important to note that of the 19
+recommendations for intelligence reform issued by the joint
+Senate-House inquiry last year, which are consistent with the
+9/11 Commission's recommendations, Congress and the
+administration already have implemented or addressed all but
+three of those.
+ As we take action on the 9/11 Commission's ideas, we will
+also consider the Commission's recommendation to focus
+congressional oversight. Successful reform of Federal
+Government agencies will absolutely depend on effective
+oversight. And the current system which requires Homeland
+Security Secretary Tom Ridge and his chief deputies to report
+to an estimated 88 committees and subcommittees reinforces the
+status quo and is unacceptable. We will continue to seize this
+opportunity for reform. And during our consideration of bold
+proposals, we will not discount the reform that has already
+taken place--the consolidation of 22 Federal agencies within
+the Department of Homeland Security; the establishment of the
+Terrorist Threat Integration Center, centralizing information
+and manpower from several intelligence agencies; the passage of
+Project BioShield--all bold steps that have made us safer than
+we were on 9/11.
+ In a Presidential election year, it is especially tempting
+to focus on what has been done wrong and not what has been done
+right.
+ As we focus on the Commission's recommendations, I am
+confident that all of us will put politics aside. It would be a
+mistake and a disservice to our constituents to ignore the
+progress we have made since 9/11. Today we welcome ideas for
+continued process.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Cox. I thank the gentlelady. Does the gentleman
+from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, have an opening statement?
+ Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of getting to
+the substance of why we are here, I will reserve the time
+allotted to me.
+ Mr. Frank. Mr. Chairman, as greatly as I respect my
+colleagues, I would not have interrupted my vacation to come
+listen to us all make speeches. I ask unanimous consent that we
+waive opening statements and get right to the witnesses.
+
+ Prepared Statement of the Honorable Donna M. Christensen
+
+ Thank you Mr. Chairman. I want to, at the outset, commend you Mr.
+Chairman for scheduling a hearing before this committee on the
+recommendations of the September 11th Commission.
+ Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to discuss the Commission's
+findings and recommendations with the Commission's distinguished
+Chairman and Vice-Chairman. They are to be commend for the remarkable
+job they have done, not only in spearheading the drafting of the report
+but also for the generous way that they have given of their time in
+appearing before a number of other committees to press for the
+enactment of their recommendations in their entirety. I also appreciate
+that we will hear from the Mr. Brennan of the TTIC again, as well as a
+comprehensive list of witnesses who will allow us to fully explore the
+need for a better homeland security information sharing system between
+agencies and state and local governments.
+ Coming close to the end of the committee listing, I am sure that
+most of the broader questions will have been asked. My interest then is
+in border security, the treatment of the territories and Indian
+reservations, funding and preparedness of first responders, and how we
+regain our position of moral leadership in the world.
+ Over the past two weeks, in response to the 9/11 commission report
+and in preparation for this hearing, I convened Town Meetings across my
+Congressional District to gage my constituent's reaction to the
+commission's recommendations. These meetings were hugely successful in
+demonstrating the importance the people of the Virgin Islands place on
+the protection of the community and the United States as a whole.
+ Overall we endorse the findings and recommendations of the
+Commission, but stress the need for a planned approach developed on the
+basis of study and research. To the extent we are still not as well
+prepared as we should be and limited in our capacity to adequately
+respond, I believe it is because all along we have ``reacted'' instead
+of ``responded.''
+ I daresay, if lack of imagination was a fault before 9/11, it
+continues to be so today, closely followed by being entrenched in the
+old ways things were always done. This and the other legislative body
+bear much of the responsibility for the latter, and I see little signs
+of willingness to change.
+ Change was and is needed to meet new threats and new methods of
+attack that are only limited by the imagination, will and ingenuity of
+those who would do us harm.
+ If we fail to imagine and change, our constituents will always
+remain at great risk.
+ Political posturing which is dominating much of our reaction has no
+place. To eliminate it requires presidential leadership of a kind we
+have not seen in the life of this Committee.
+ More specifically, where you address the need for a comprehensive
+border strategy, the 175 miles of unsecured border in the U.S. Virgin
+Islands, my district--a cross over point for illegal entrants from
+distant places remains unsecured. We fully support that all borders
+must be secured.
+ We support an all hazard approach that protects our communities'
+safety at all times, for we cannot know where the terrorists will next
+strike or how. This includes a fully prepared and intact public and
+private health system with emphasis on poor and minority communities
+where it is weakest--including Indian reservations, with clear lines of
+authority and accountability.
+ One area not specifically iterated in the report, but very relevant
+to improved intelligence, is the need to diversify our intelligence
+workforce if we are ever to penetrate the enemy cells.
+ Realizing that this is a report on 9/11, I would nevertheless add
+that the focus of our terrorist identification and eradication cannot
+be focused on Islamic believers only. Continuing to do so leaves every
+other flank open.
+ Lastly, and this is my greatest concern--as you have so accurately
+said, we have done nothing to reduce the growth of the numbers of those
+dedicated to doing harm to our citizens and our country.
+ We have failed to look within, to go beyond getting back to
+``normal''. It--normal--was and remains not a nice place to be for many
+of us, and the world can see that. Our failure to deal fairly with
+those who are ``different'' right here in the US portends the
+impossible for our dealings with those in foreign lands.
+ To gain respect we not only have to reach out with educational,
+political and economic opportunity elsewhere, we must begin that
+process here at home. We have yet failed to do so, and any outreach
+across the seas will be seen for the empty, false gesture that it is.
+ So we have a lot of work to do. We are grateful for your service,
+and the blueprint you have so ably provided.
+ It remains for the president and us to respond appropriately. The
+only hope I hold out that we will do so is your promise to follow
+through on the recommendations to the end, and the commitment of the
+families of those who were so brutally assassinated on September 11,
+2004, whose efforts made the commission possible.
+ Thank you once again Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to give these
+brief opening remarks. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
+
+ Prepared Statement of the Honorable Nita M. Lowey
+
+ I want to welcome Commission Chairman Kean and Vice Chairman
+Hamilton to the Committee. I commend you for the thorough and dedicated
+way in which you have carried out your work on behalf of our country.
+It is clear that this Committee, and this Congress, has a great deal of
+work to do.
+ I share your commitment to act expeditiously to implement the
+recommended reforms, some of which can be put in place without major
+structural changes and without enacting legislation. It is on these
+recommendations I would like to focus today.
+ This Committee has an awesome responsibility as the first oversight
+panel of the Department of Homeland Security. But despite the best
+intentions of many of my colleagues, the Select Committee has not
+become the perfect solution to the question of how to oversee this new
+Department. Instead, this arrangement has turned out to be the perfect
+storm.
+ We have been hamstrung by jurisdictional disputes that the
+leadership has been unwilling to resolve. We passed a First Responder
+bill out of Committee five months ago that would have ensured that our
+formula for disbursing homeland security dollars was based on threat,
+population, and vulnerability, just as the Commission has recommended.
+But it has been stalled on its way to the floor by Members who disagree
+with the Commission's recommendation that ``Congress should not use
+this money as a pork barrel.'' We could act on this recommendation
+right now, but we have not.
+ Since the summer of 2003, the Department of Homeland Security has
+cited consistent intelligence reports that terrorists remain interested
+in using aircraft as weapons against the United States. A GAO report
+released in June concluded our airports and aircraft are still
+vulnerable--passengers are not checked adequately for explosives, and
+more than 1 million airport workers, many of whom have antiquated
+background checks, enter secured areas each day without being
+physically screened. The Commission recommended that we give priority
+attention to improving screening of passengers and more closely oversee
+screener performance. We could act on this recommendation right now,
+but we have not.
+ Our communication systems failed our first responders on September
+11th, leading to many deaths that could have been prevented. In May, I
+introduced the CONNECT First Responders Act, a bill that would fund the
+creation of a nationwide interoperable communications infrastructure.
+The Commission recommended that Congress support efforts to improve
+communications connectivity. We could act on this recommendation right
+now, but we have not.
+ The Commission has also made recommendations that are more long-
+term, recognizing that homeland security is not only a matter of
+practice; it's a matter of policy. I appreciate the Commission's focus
+on the importance of providing a quality education in the Muslim world
+that teaches tolerance, the dignity and value of each individual, and a
+respect for different beliefs. As Ranking Member of the House
+Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, I have worked to
+quadruple U.S. spending on basic education abroad, from $98 million in
+FY 2000 to a total of $400 million for FY 2005. I have always
+maintained that support for this objective is a matter of national
+security--not just a nice thing to do--and I am pleased to have the
+unanimous support of the Commission in this endeavor.
+ The Commission's report has provided Congress with a road map. The
+speed and resolve with which we follow this road map will have serious
+consequences for the security of the American people. I urge this
+Committee and this Congress to listen carefully to our witnesses today,
+and to act quickly to make our country more safe.
+
+ Prepared Statement of the Honorable Karen McCarthy
+
+ Thank you Chairman Cox and Ranking Member Turner for convening this
+important hearing.
+ On September 11, 2001 the world watched in horror as terrorists
+attacked our country. They were able to invade our country and commit
+these terrible acts of violence.
+ The release of the bipartisan 9/11 Commission Report has told us
+what went wrong but most importantly provides us a roadmap to prevent
+this from happening in the future. Their recommendations are the
+actions that we in Congress must take to prepare and prevent another
+attack.
+ The Commission found that lack of intelligence information sharing
+between the CIA, FBI and other government agencies was the greatest
+weakness leading to the 9/11 attacks. They found that even when
+intelligence was shared there still was an inability to make sense of
+this information and take immediate action. I strongly agree with the
+Commission's recommendation that the President should lead a government
+wide effort to help fix these critical problems within our intelligence
+gathering organizations. If this had happened before the 9/11 attacks
+many lives may have been saved. These institutions must be able to
+collect, analyze and share intelligence expeditiously and have the
+means to pass on and collect intelligence to and from our state and
+local officials who serve on the front lines.
+ The Commission recommends the establishment of a National
+Counterterrorism Center, built upon the foundation of the existing
+Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). They also recommend the
+consolidation of budgetary and operational oversight of all fifteen
+intelligence agencies and the naming of a new National Intelligence
+Director to unify the intelligence community. As the Ranking Member on
+the Intelligence and Counterterrorism Subcommittee of the Select
+Committee on Homeland Security, I whole heartedly support these
+recommendations.
+ The international collection and sharing of information is
+extremely important to stopping terrorists. The Commission recommends a
+global strategy for the United States to ``. . .reach out, listen to,
+and work with other countries. . .'' Congress must embrace this
+strategy. During the first part of August, I joined with my Homeland
+Security Committee colleagues on an intelligence gathering trip to the
+UK and Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. We learned about
+the existence of foreign terrorist cells from their intelligence
+agencies and had a very frank exchange about how we can help each other
+in the fight against terrorism. I was very pleased to see that the 9/11
+Commission Report recommends that United States ``. . .should reach
+out, listen to, and work with other countries. . .'' as a means of
+gathering intelligence.
+ Now that the 9/11 Commission has done its job, we need to do ours.
+Today's hearing puts us a step closer to preventing another terrorist
+attack. I urge the leadership of Congress to follow the lead of this
+Committee.
+ I want thank the 9/11 Commissioners and the staff for their hard
+work and dedication. This report should become our bible in winning the
+war on terrorism.
+ I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on how we can
+quickly move forward to create a new National Counterterrorism Center,
+name a National Intelligence Director, develop a global strategy for
+working with our allies and implement all of the Commission's
+recommendations. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
+
+ Prepared Statement of the Honorable Louise M. Slaughter
+
+ Thank you, Chairman Cox and Ranking Member Turner for holding this
+timely and important hearing, and thank you Governor Kean and
+Representative Hamilton for joining us.
+ I would like to start by giving special recognition to the two fine
+men before us today for their yeoman's work.
+ The fortitude and great character that Governor Kean and
+Representative Hamilton exhibited at every point in the process is
+truly remarkable. From the very beginning, we could see that these two
+men took their responsibilities to the 9-11 families and the American
+people very seriously.
+ As we are all aware, the process for investigating the attacks was
+not always smooth. In some corners, there were those who tried to
+denigrate the effort to secure key testimony and access to records.
+There were even some who chose to characterize the effort to secure
+this information as partisan. Those critics were blind to what was
+really behind this effort.
+ On 9/11, I stood on the steps of the Capitol building, arm-in-arm
+with my colleagues in Congress to sing God Bless America. On that day,
+there was no such thing as Democrat or Republican. We were all just
+Americans. It is that sense of unity and patriotic spirit that guided
+this Commission's work.
+ Governor Kean, the other Commissioners, and the Commission staff
+were executing their solemn oath to the 9/11 families and the nation.
+ They did not execute their responsibilities to serve the interests
+of any one political party. No, they were on a mission to get to the
+truth to make America safer.
+ The 9/11 Commission was not focused on pointing fingers or laying
+blame. Rather, it was focused on providing the truth about what
+happened on that terrible, terrible day to the families of those lost
+in the September 11th attacks and all Americans.
+ The 9/11 Commission was also focused on providing us with a plan to
+ensure that our country is never as vulnerable as it was on September
+11, 2001.
+ They could not have provided a higher service to this country.
+ I am pleased that the reaction to the 9/11 Commission report
+recommendations has been overwhelmingly positive. However, the
+Commissioners are right to be concerned that this report, like so many
+well-regarded reports before it, will be relegated to sitting on a
+shelf in all our offices, and see no action.
+ We cannot not--we must not--let that happen.
+ My constituents, the 9/11 families, and all Americans expect more
+than cosmetic changes from our government.
+ We must act on all 41 recommendations outlined by the 9/11
+Commission--not merely the provisions that the President supports.
+ The focus of today's hearing is on information sharing--an area
+that has received significant attention by this panel since the
+Committee's inception in January 2003. The 9/11 Commission's findings
+seem to support what I have come to believe.
+ Despite the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in
+March 2003, our information sharing system is weak and the problems of
+interagency coordination that existed on September 11th persist.
+ The people I represent in Western New York are the kind of people
+who ``call it like they see it''. When it comes to current state of
+homeland security, they don't know what to think.
+ In the wake of the September 11th attacks, they stood ready to
+sacrifice; many going down to Ground Zero to help in the search and
+recovery. They still stand ready to withstand delay and discomfort, if
+it means our country will be safer.
+ But today, nearly three years later, they ask me how duct tape will
+make their families safer. They ask me why there are chronic delays at
+the U.S.-Canadian border, even when we're not at a heightened Orange
+Alert. They ask me how confiscating a key-chain pocketknife from an
+elderly man at the airport will make them safer.
+ As the Ranking Member of this panel's Rules Subcommittee, I am
+keenly interested in the Commission's views on the weaknesses in the
+current congressional oversight model.
+ Today, DHS officials must come before 88 congressional committees
+and subcommittees. How does that impact the Department's ability to
+execute its mission and Congress' ability to conduct oversight?
+ When it came to creating DHS, Congress accepted, on a bipartisan
+basis, that the merger of 22 Executive agencies would be required to
+ensure greater coordination and accountability.
+ Congress must now put aside its petty jurisdictional fights and
+enhance accountability by adopting a centralized model of oversight.
+ This is not just my opinion, it's what the 9/11 Commission
+recommends.
+ In fact, the Commission calls on Congress to ``create a single,
+principal point of oversight and review for homeland security.'' By the
+Commission's own admission, ``[o]f all our recommendations,
+strengthening congressional oversight may be among the most difficult
+and important.''
+ As someone who has served in this body for 18 years, I must commend
+the Commission for its accurate assessment of the challenges ahead.
+ I am interested in hearing from Representative Hamilton, a 34-year
+veteran of the House, on how to overcome the jurisdictional hurdles and
+develop a centralized approach to oversight.
+ I am also interested to hear the panelists' views on making this
+Committee permanent--as the primary House Committee in charge of
+overseeing the Department of Homeland Security.
+ After months of study, I strongly believe that this Committee is
+uniquely situated to undertake the challenges of enhanced congressional
+oversight. Congress should make this Committee permanent to do just
+that.
+ I also must reiterate that Congress must act on all forty-one
+recommendations. For this to be accomplished, Congress will not only
+have to put partisanship aside but also abandon jurisdictional
+wrangling. Such action is essential to giving the American people the
+homeland security they deserve.
+ Thank you Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Turner for holding this
+important hearing.
+ Chairman Cox. Is there objection?
+ Hearing none, we will move immediately to the testimony of our
+distinguished witnesses, the chairman and vice chairman of the National
+Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.
+
+ Chairman Cox. Governor Kean, we will begin with you.
+
+ STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE THOMAS H. KEAN, CHAIR, NATIONAL
+ COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES
+
+ Mr. Kean. Chairman Cox, Ranking Member Turner,
+distinguished members of the House Select Committee on Homeland
+Security, I want to thank you, the ranking member and the
+chairman for their statements. We appreciate that it is a
+wonderful summary of our recommendations and your statements of
+support. I thank you on behalf of the Commission and the
+American people very much.
+ We are honored to appear before you today. We want to thank
+you and the leadership of the House of Representatives for your
+very prompt attention to our recommendations. We are very
+grateful to you and the leadership for that attention.
+ The Commission's findings and recommendations, as you know,
+were strongly endorsed by all commissioners, five Democrats,
+and five Republicans. We share a unity of purpose and we call
+upon Congress and the administration to display that same
+bipartisanship and that same unity of purpose as we all strive
+to make our country and all Americans safer and more secure.
+How information is shared in our government, and not just at
+the Federal level, but with State and local agencies, is a
+matter of critical importance to homeland security and to
+national security.
+ As we looked at the 9/11 story, we found that the failure
+to share information cost us very dearly. All agencies,
+Federal, State, and local, need to have information available
+in a timely manner because they all have responsibilities to
+protect Americans. We need to get this right.
+ What we learned in our 9/11 story is that the U.S.
+Government has access to a vast amount of information. We have
+Customs and immigration information, FBI and police reports,
+and so much more. The storehouse of information is immense. But
+the government has very weak systems for processing and using
+that information it possesses, especially when that information
+has to be used across agency lines.
+ Our report details many unexploited opportunities to
+disrupt the 9/11 plot, failures to watchlists, failures to
+share information, failures to, as we say, ``connect the
+dots.''
+ The story of Hamzi and Mihdhar in Kuala Lumpur in January
+of 2000 is just one of a number of examples. We caught a
+glimpse, we found those future hijackers, but we lost their
+trail somehow in Bangkok. And because information wasn't shared
+when these people came to the United States and were living
+openly on the West Coast, Los Angeles and San Diego, the FBI
+didn't know about it. And the FBI didn't learn until August of
+2001 that Hazmi and Mihdhar were in the United States. And so
+they suddenly started pursuing leads, but that was too late,
+and time on that fateful day just simply ran out.
+ Agencies live by the need-to-know rule. They limit the
+sharing of information. Each agency has its own computer
+system, its own security practices, and these are outgrowths of
+the Cold War. Implicit in their practices is the assumption
+that the risk of inadvertent disclosure outweighs the benefits
+of larger sharing among agencies. And we believe, as a
+commission, that that is a Cold War assumption and it is no
+longer appropriate.
+ In the 9/11 story we came to understand the huge cost of
+failing to share information across agency boundaries. Yet the
+current practices of government, security practices encourage
+overclassification.
+ Now, we understand the critical importance of protecting
+sources and methods. We believe it is also important to share
+information. There are plenty of penalties for unauthorized
+disclosure, but you know there isn't one single penalty for not
+sharing information.
+ We believe that information procedures across the
+government need to be changed, that there should be incentives
+provided for sharing information. Intelligence gathered about
+transnational terrorism should be processed, turned into
+reports, and distributed according to the same quality
+standards whether it is collected in Indonesia or Minnesota.
+ We believe the President needs to lead a government-wide
+effort to bring the major national security institutions into
+the information revolution. The President needs to lead the way
+and coordinate the resolutions of the legal, policy, and
+technical issues across agency lines so that we can make sure
+in the future that this important information is shared.
+ The model is a decentralized network. Agencies would still
+have their own databases, but those databases would be
+searchable across agency lines. In the system, in this system,
+secrets are protected. They are protected, though, through the
+design of the network that controls access to the data. They
+don't prevent people from having access to the network.
+ An outstanding conceptual framework for this kind of
+trusted information network has been developed by a task force
+of leading professionals in national security, information
+technology and laws as they are all assembled by the Markle
+Foundation. Its report has been widely discussed throughout the
+U.S. Government, but so far it has just been discussed; it
+hasn't been converted into action.
+ The point here is that no single agency can do this alone.
+One agency can modernize its stovepipe, but cannot develop a
+system to replace that stovepipe. Only Presidential leadership
+can develop the necessary government-wide concepts and
+standards.
+ In a hearing that Lee Hamilton and I testified at last
+week, a Member of Congress asked us what information about
+terrorism did the pilot of American 11 have available to him on
+the morning of September 11th? And the answer is very simple:
+He had none. Despite his professional training and military
+experience, he was given no useful information to help him or
+the crew to protect the passengers of that plane. In fact, his
+training told him that if there was a hijacking, you submit to
+it, protect the passengers, and eventually perhaps you would
+land in Havana and then go home.
+ Now, contrast this with the situation on United 93 when the
+passengers and crew learned from phone conversations with their
+loved ones about the attacks on the World Trade Center. They
+took action as citizens. They saved the Capitol, or the White
+House, we don't know which, from probable destruction. An
+informed citizenry, a citizenry that knows the facts, is this
+Nation's best defense.
+ For the same reason, we believe it is imperative that as
+much information as possible be shared with State and local
+authorities. There are a lot more of them than there are
+Federal authorities, and they too can take action to protect
+the homes of their fellow citizens.
+ There are some 18,000 State and local law enforcement
+agencies in the United States. If we can harness the awareness
+and experience of these dedicated professionals, as a Nation we
+will greatly enhance our security. Reforms of the kind we
+recommend will push more important information out to State and
+local agencies. The more everyone charged with our security
+knows, the more information they have, and the safer we all
+will be.
+ Let me turn for a moment to some of our findings and
+recommendations. As our report makes clear, the decade before
+9/11 border security was simply not seen as a national security
+matter. From a strategic perspective, border policy focused on
+counternarcotics efforts, illegal immigration, and more
+recently perhaps, the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction.
+ Our government simply did not exhibit a comparable level of
+concern about terrorists' ability to enter and stay in the
+United States. During that same period, Al-Qa'ida was working
+very hard. They were studying all our systems. They were
+learning how to exploit gaps and weaknesses in our passport
+system and our visa system, our entry systems of the United
+States and other countries. Al-Qa'ida actually set up its own
+passport office in Kandahar and developed working relationships
+with travel facilities, travel agents, some of them witting,
+some of them unwitting, document forgers, corrupt government
+officials to move their people around.
+ More robust enforcement of routine immigration laws,
+supported by better information, might have made a real
+difference in stopping these hijackers. Had information been
+shared and these terrorists watchlisted, border authorities
+could have intercepted up to three of those hijackers. Two
+hijackers made patently false statements on their visa
+applications. They could have been shown to be false by U.S.
+Government records, and those records were available to
+consular officials. Many of the hijackers lied about their
+employment or lied about their educational status. Two
+hijackers could have been denied admission to ports of entry
+based on violations of immigration rules themselves governing
+the terms of admission. Three hijackers violated the
+immigration laws after entry. One who said he was going to
+enroll in school and then never did, two by overstays of their
+terms of admission.
+ Although the intelligence as to their tactics was not known
+at the time, examining their passports could have allowed
+authorities to detect at least four and possibly up to 15
+hijackers.
+ Neither the Intelligence Community, nor the border security
+agencies or the FBI, had programs in place to analyze and act
+upon intelligence about terrorists' travel tactics--how they
+obtained their passports, how they made travel arrangements and
+subverted national laws and processes governing entry and stays
+in foreign countries.
+ Now, Congress during the 1990's took some steps to provide
+better information to immigration officials by legislating
+requirements for a foreign student information system and
+entry-exit system. As we know, these programs had not yet
+successfully been completed by 9/11.
+ Since 9/11, some important steps have been taken to
+strengthen our border security. The Department of Homeland
+Security has been established, combining the resources of the
+former Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Customs
+Bureau into new agencies to protect our borders and to enforce
+the immigration laws within the United States. The visa process
+and the terrorist watchlist system have been strengthened. DHS
+has begun to implement, through the US VISIT program, a
+biometric screening system for use at the borders.
+ Now, we believe, as a commission, there is no question that
+these efforts have made us safer, but they have not made us
+safe. As a nation, we have not yet fully absorbed the lessons
+that we should have learned from 9/11 with respect to border
+security. When they travel, that is the time that terrorists
+are at their most vulnerable. You see, they have to leave safer
+havens where they have been. They have to travel secretly. They
+have to use evasive techniques, from altered travel documents
+to lies or cover stories. Terrorist entry can often be
+prevented and terrorist travel can be constrained by acting on
+this knowledge and understanding it. Targeting terrorist travel
+is at least as powerful a weapon against terrorists as
+targeting their finances. The Commission therefore has
+recommended that we combine terrorist travel intelligence,
+operations, and law enforcement in a strategy to intercept
+terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain
+terrorist mobility.
+ Frontline border agencies must not only obtain from the
+Intelligence Community, on a real-time basis, information on
+terrorists, they must also assist in collecting it. Consular
+officers and immigration inspectors, after all, are the people
+who encounter these terrorists. They encounter travelers, they
+encounter their documents.
+ Specialists must be developed and deployed in consulates
+and at the border to detect terrorists in their travel
+practices, including looking very carefully at their documents.
+Technology has a vital role to play. Three years after 9/11 it
+is more than time for border officials to integrate into their
+operations terrorist travel indicators that have been developed
+by our Intelligence Community. The Intelligence Community and
+the border security community, they really haven't been close
+partners in the past. This simply must change.
+ We also need an operational program to target terrorist
+travel facilitators--forgers, human smugglers, travel agencies
+and corrupt border officials. Some may be found in this
+country. Most will be found abroad. Disrupting them will
+seriously hurt the terrorists. While there have been some
+successes in this area, intelligence far outstrips action. This
+should be rectified by providing the interagency mandate and
+the necessary resources to Homeland Security's enforcement arm,
+immigration and customs enforcement, and other relevant
+agencies, including, by the way, the FBI.
+ This problem illustrates the need for a National
+Counterterrorism Center. Investigations of travel facilitators
+invariably raise complicated questions. For instance, should a
+particular travel facilitator be arrested or should he be the
+subject of continued intelligence operations? If he is going to
+be arrested, in which country do you do it? A National
+Counterterrorism Center is needed to bring the numerous
+agencies to the table so that they can talk together in a
+unified way, decide in each case what is the best course of
+action.
+ And I now turn to my partner and friend and teacher, Lee
+Hamilton.
+
+ STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LEE H. HAMILTON, VICE CHAIR,
+NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES
+
+ Mr. Hamilton. Thank you very much, Governor. Let me join
+you in thanking you Chairman Cox, Ranking Member Turner,
+Congresswoman Dunn, for your really superb statements. It was
+very pleasing to us to hear the manner in which you summarized
+our report.
+ I want to say just a word, that it has been a high personal
+privilege for me to work with Tom Kean. He is a consensus
+builder, a talent I think that is rare even among politicians
+today. And it has been one of the great privileges of my public
+career to work with Tom.
+ And I also want to express a word of personal appreciation
+to each of the members for returning for this hearing in
+August. That is really unprecedented. And Tom and I and the
+Commission are very grateful to you for your interest in our
+report.
+ I will begin on screening systems. To provide better
+information to our consular officers and immigration
+inspectors, the government must accelerate its efforts to build
+a biometric entry and exit screening system. This is an area in
+which Congress has been active since the mid-1990's, and it has
+been a frustrating journey.
+ Congress first legislated an entry-exit system in 1996 to
+increase compliance with our immigration laws. It was not
+associated with counterterrorism nor with biometric
+identification. As a practical matter, the entry-exit effort
+was not seriously funded until the end of 2002. By that time,
+aspects of the system were directed by four separate laws. The
+establishment of the Department of Homeland Security then
+changed the organizational context for implementing those laws.
+ The new department is emerging from its difficult start-up
+period and is, we believe, poised to move forward to implement
+Congress' mandates in this area. We stress four principles that
+we believe must guide our efforts:
+ First, the U.S. border security system is effectively a
+part of a larger network of screening points that includes our
+transportation system and access to vital facilities such as
+nuclear reactors. The Department of Homeland Security should
+lead an effort to design a comprehensive screening system,
+addressing common problems and setting common standards with
+system-wide goals in mind.
+ Second, a biometric entry and exit screening system is
+fundamental to intercepting terrorists, and its development
+should be accelerated. Each element of the system is important.
+The biometric identifier makes it difficult to defeat a
+watchlist by slight alteration in the spelling of a name, a
+technique relied upon by the terrorists. The screening system
+enables border officials' access to all relevant information
+about a traveler in order to assess the risk they may pose.
+Exit information allows authorities to know if a suspect
+individual has left the country and to establish compliance
+with immigration laws.
+ Third, United States citizens should not be exempt from
+carrying biometric passports or otherwise enabling their
+identities to be securely verified, nor should Canadians or
+Mexicans.
+ Fourth, there should be a program to speed known travelers
+so inspectors can focus on those travelers who might present
+greater risks. This is especially important for border
+communities.
+ We believe that the schedule for completion of this
+biometric entry-exit screening system should be accelerated to
+the extent feasible. This will require additional annual
+funding and a mandate to a central organizational authority
+such as the US VISIT office to manage the effort. We need much
+greater collaboration with foreign governments on border
+security. This means more exchange of information about
+terrorists and passports and improved global passport design
+standards. Implicit in this recommendation is continued close
+cooperation with Mexico and Canada.
+ It is especially important to improve screening efforts
+prior to departure from foreign airports, especially in
+countries participating in the visa waiver program. We must be
+able to monitor and respond to entries along our long borders
+with Canada and Mexico, working with those countries as much as
+possible.
+ Our law enforcement system ought to send a message of
+welcome, tolerance, and justice to members of the immigrant
+communities in the United States. Good immigration services are
+one way to reach out that is valuable, including for
+intelligence. State and local law enforcement agencies need
+more training and partnerships with Federal agencies so they
+can cooperate more effectively with those Federal authorities
+in identifying terrorist suspects.
+ Finally, secure identification should begin in the United
+States. We believe the Federal Government should set standards
+for the issuance of birth certificates and sources of
+identification such as driver's licenses.
+ The agenda on immigration and border control, then, is
+multifaceted and vital to our national security. The bottom
+line is that our visa and border control systems must become an
+integral part of our counterterrorism intelligence system. We
+must steer a course that remains true to our commitment to an
+open society and that welcomes legitimate immigrants and
+refugees, while concentrating our resources on identification
+of potential terrorists and prevention of their entry into the
+United States.
+ We recommend that homeland security assistance should be
+based strictly on an assessment of risks and vulnerabilities.
+Now, in 2004, Washington, D.C., and New York City are certainly
+at the top of any such list.
+ We understand the contention that every State and city
+needs to have some minimum infrastructure for emergency
+response. But Federal homeland security assistance should not
+remain a program for general revenue sharing. It should
+supplement State and local resources based on the risks or
+vulnerabilities that merit additional support. Congress should
+not use this money as a pork barrel.
+ The 9/11 attacks showed that even the most vigorous
+emergency response capabilities can be overwhelmed if an attack
+is large enough. We recommend that emergency response agencies
+nationwide should adopt the incident command system. When
+multiple agencies or multiple jurisdictions are involved, they
+should adopt a unified command. Both are proven frameworks for
+emergency response.
+ We strongly support the decision that Federal homeland
+security funding will be contingent, as of October 1, 2004,
+upon the adoption and regular use of ICS and unified command
+procedures. In the future, the Department of Homeland Security
+should consider making funding contingent on aggressive and
+realistic training in accordance with ICS and unified command
+procedures.
+ The inability to communicate was a critical element at the
+World Trade Center, Pentagon, and Pennsylvania crash sites
+where multiple agencies and multiple jurisdictions responded.
+The occurrence of this problem at three very different sites is
+strong evidence that compatible and adequate communications
+among public safety organizations at the local, State, and
+Federal levels remains an important problem.
+ Congress should support pending legislation which provides
+for the expedited and increased assignment of radio spectrum
+for public safety purposes. Furthermore, high-risk urban areas
+such as New York City and Washington, D.C., should establish
+signal corps units to ensure communications connectivity
+between and among civilian authorities, local first responders,
+and the National Guard. Federal funding for such units should
+be given a high priority by Congress.
+ The private sector controls 85 percent of the critical
+infrastructure of the United States. The Department of Homeland
+Security's mandate includes working with the private sector to
+ensure preparedness. Preparedness in the private sector and
+public sector for rescue, restart, and recovery of operations
+should include a plan for evacuation, adequate communications
+capabilities, and a plan for continuity of operations.
+ As we examined the emergency response to 9/11, witness
+after witness told us that despite 9/11, the private sector
+remains largely unprepared for a terrorist attack. We were also
+advised that the lack of a widely embraced private-sector
+preparedness standard was a principal contributing factor in
+this lack of preparedness. The Commission, therefore, endorses
+the American National Standard Institute's recommended standard
+for private preparedness, and we thank them for developing
+that. We were encouraged by Secretary Tom Ridge's praise of the
+standard and urged the Department of Homeland Security to
+promote its adoption.
+ We also encouraged the insurance and credit rating
+industries to look closely at a company's compliance with the
+ANSI standard in assessing its insurability and
+creditworthiness. We believe that compliance with the standard
+should define the standard of care owed by a company to its
+employees and the public for legal purposes.
+ Private-sector preparedness is not a luxury, it is a cost
+of doing business in the post-9/11 world. If we ignore it, the
+potential costs in lives, money and national security will be
+inestimable.
+ Mr. Chairman, we believe the recommendations we have
+presented this morning, as well as the many other
+recommendations we have made on foreign policy, public
+diplomacy, and transportation security, can make a significant
+difference in making America safer and more secure.
+ We also recommend reforms in the structure of the executive
+branch and the Congress. We believe that organizational reforms
+in the absence of implementing the other reforms and
+recommendations in our report will have significantly less
+value than the value of these reforms as a complete package.
+ In short, while we welcome each step toward implementation
+of our recommendations, no one should be mistaken in believing
+that organizational reforms alone can address the current
+terrorist threat we face. We are very gratified by the rapid
+response of the President and the White House to our
+recommendations. We welcome the President's support for a
+National Intelligence Director and National Counterterrorism
+Center. We welcome the support of Senator Kerry.
+ We look forward to working with you on our recommendations.
+ We should seize this historic opportunity and move
+expeditiously. With your counsel and direction, we believe the
+Nation can and will make wise choices.
+ And we are pleased now to respond to your questions.
+ [The statement of Messrs. Kean and Hamilton follows:]
+
+ Prepared Statement of Chairman Thomas Kean and Vice Chair Lee Hamilton
+
+ The 9/11 Commission's Findings and Recommendations
+
+ Chairman Cox, Ranking Member Turner, distinguished members of the
+House Select Committee on Homeland Security. We are honored to appear
+before you today. We want to thank you and the leadership of the House
+of Representatives for your prompt attention to the recommendations of
+the Commission. We are grateful to you, and to the leadership of the
+House.
+ The Commission's findings and recommendations were strongly
+endorsed by all Commissioners--five Democrats and five Republicans. We
+share a unity of purpose. We call upon Congress and the Administration
+to display the same spirit of bipartisanship as we collectively seek to
+make our country and all Americans safer and more secure.
+ How information is shared in our government--not just at the
+federal level, but with state and local agencies--is a matter of
+critical importance to homeland security, and to national security. As
+we looked into the 9/11 story, we found that the failure to share
+information cost us dearly. All agencies--federal, state, and local--
+need to have information available in a timely manner to protect
+Americans. We need to get this right.
+
+Unity of Effort in Sharing Information
+ What we learned in the 9/11 story is that the U.S. government has
+access to a vast amount of information. We have customs and immigration
+information, FBI and police reports, and much more. The storehouse of
+information is immense. But the government has weak systems for
+processing and using the information it possesses, especially across
+agency lines.
+ Our report details many unexploited opportunities to disrupt the 9/
+11 plot: failures to watchlist, failures to share information, failure
+to connect the dots. The story of Hazmi and Mihdhar in Kuala Lumpur in
+January 2000 is a telling example. We caught a glimpse of the future
+hijackers, but we lost their trail in Bangkok. Agencies did not share
+information. The FBI did not learn until August, 2001 that Hazmi and
+Mihdhar had entered the United States. Late leads were pursued, but
+time ran out.
+ Agencies live by the ``need to know'' rule. They limit the sharing
+of information. Each agency has its own computer system and its own
+security practices, outgrowths of the Cold War. Implicit in their
+practices is the assumption that the risk of inadvertent disclosure
+outweighs the benefits of wider sharing. We think this Cold War
+assumption is no longer appropriate. In the 9/11 story we came to
+understand the huge costs of failing to share information across agency
+boundaries. Yet, in the current practices of government, security
+practices encourage overclassification.
+ We understand the critical importance of protecting sources and
+methods. We believe it is also important to share information. There
+are plenty of penalties for unauthorized disclosure; there are no
+punishments for not sharing information.
+ We believe that information procedures across the government need
+to be changed, to provide incentives for sharing. Intelligence gathered
+about transnational terrorism should be processed, turned into reports,
+and distributed according to the same quality standards, whether it is
+collected in Indonesia, or in Minnesota.
+ We believe the president needs to lead a government-wide effort to
+bring the major national security institutions into the information
+revolution. The president needs to lead the way and coordinate the
+resolution of the legal, policy, and technical issues across agency
+lines so that information can be shared.
+ The model is a decentralized network. Agencies would still have
+their own databases, but those databases would be searchable across
+agency lines. In this system, secrets are protected through the design
+of the network that controls access to the data, not access to the
+network.
+ An outstanding conceptual framework for this kind of ``trusted
+information network'' has been developed by a task force of leading
+professionals in national security, information technology, and law
+assembled by the Markle Foundation. Its report has been widely
+discussed throughout the U.S. government, but has not yet been
+converted into action. The point here is that no single agency can do
+this alone. One agency can modernize its stovepipe, but cannot design a
+system to replace it. Only presidential leadership can develop the
+necessary government-wide concepts and standards.
+
+Sharing Information with State and Local Authorities
+ In a hearing last week, a Member of Congress asked us: what
+information about terrorism did the pilot of American 11 have available
+to him on the morning of September 11? He had none. Despite his
+professional training and military experience, he had no useful
+information to help him or the crew protect the passengers or plane.
+ We contrast this with the situation on United 93. When the
+passengers and crew learned from phone conversations about the attacks
+on the World Trade Center, they took action. They saved the Capitol or
+White House from destruction. An informed citizenry is the nation's
+best defense. For the same reason, we believe it is imperative that as
+much information as possible be shared with state and local
+authorities. They, too, can then take action to protect their homes and
+fellow citizens.
+ There are some 18,000 state and local law enforcement agencies in
+the United States. Harnessing the awareness and experience of these
+dedicated professionals can greatly enhance our security. Reforms of
+the kind we recommend will push more important information out to state
+and local agencies. The more everyone charged with our security knows,
+the more information they have, the safer we will all be.
+ We will turn to some of our other findings and recommendations.
+
+Border Control
+ As our Report makes clear, in the decade before 9/11, border
+security was not seen as a national security matter. From a strategic
+perspective, border policy focused on counternarcotics efforts, illegal
+immigration, and, more recently, the smuggling of weapons of mass
+destruction. Our government simply did not exhibit a comparable level
+of concern about terrorists' ability to enter and stay in the United
+States.
+ During that same period, however, Al-Qa'ida studied how to exploit
+gaps and weaknesses in the passport, visa, and entry systems of the
+United States and other countries. Al-Qa'ida actually set up its own
+passport office in Kandahar and developed working relationships with
+travel facilitators--travel agents (witting or unwitting), document
+forgers, and corrupt government officials.
+ More robust enforcement of routine immigration laws, supported by
+better information, might have made a difference in stopping the
+hijackers.
+ Had information been shared and the terrorists been
+watchlisted, border authorities could have intercepted up to three of
+the hijackers.
+ Two hijackers made statements on their visa applications that
+could have been shown to be false by U.S. government records available
+to consular officers.
+ Many of the hijackers lied about their employment or
+educational status.
+ Two hijackers could have been denied admission at the port of
+entry based on violations of immigration rules governing terms of
+admission.
+ Three hijackers violated the immigration laws after entry, one
+by failing to enroll in school as declared, and two by overstays of
+their terms of admission.
+ Although the intelligence as to their tactics was not
+developed at the time, examining their passports could have allowed
+authorities to detect from four to 15 hijackers
+ Neither the intelligence community, nor the border security
+agencies or the FBI, had programs in place to analyze and act upon
+intelligence about terrorist travel tactics--how they obtained
+passports, made travel arrangements, and subverted national laws and
+processes governing entry and stays in foreign countries.
+ Congress during the 1990s took some steps to provide better
+information to immigration officials by legislating requirements for a
+foreign student information system and an entry-exit system. As we
+know, these programs were not successfully completed before 9/11.
+ Since 9/11, some important steps have been taken to strengthen our
+border security. The Department of Homeland Security has been
+established, combining the resources of the former Immigration and
+Naturalization Service and the Customs Bureau into new agencies to
+protect our borders and to enforce the immigration laws within the
+United States. The visa process and the terrorist watchlist system have
+been strengthened. DHS has begun to implement, through the US VISIT
+program, a biometric screening system for use at the border.
+
+Targeting Terrorist Travel
+ These efforts have made us safer, but not safe enough. As a nation
+we have not yet fully absorbed the lessons of 9/11 with respect to
+border security. The need to travel makes terrorists vulnerable. They
+must leave safe havens, travel clandestinely, and use evasive
+techniques, from altered travel documents to lies and cover stories.
+Terrorist entry often can be prevented and terrorist travel can be
+constrained by acting on this knowledge. Targeting terrorist travel is
+at least as powerful a weapon against terrorists as targeting their
+finances.
+ The Commission therefore has recommended that we combine terrorist
+travel intelligence, operations, and law enforcement in a strategy to
+intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain
+terrorist mobility.
+ Front line border agencies must not only obtain from the
+Intelligence Community, on a real-time basis, information on
+terrorists, they must also assist in collecting it. Consular officers
+and immigration inspectors, after all, are the people who encounter
+travelers and their documents.
+ Specialists must be developed and deployed in consulates and at the
+border to detect terrorists through their travel practices, including
+their documents. Technology has a vital role to play. Three years after
+9/11 it is more than time for border officials to integrate into their
+operations terrorist travel indicators that have been developed by the
+intelligence community. The intelligence community and the border
+security community have not been close partners in the past. This must
+change.
+ We also need an operational program to target terrorist travel
+facilitators--forgers, human smugglers, travel agencies, and corrupt
+border officials. Some may be found here, but most will be found
+abroad. Disrupting them would seriously constrain terrorist mobility.
+While there have been some successes in this area, intelligence far
+outstrips action. This should be rectified by providing the interagency
+mandate and the necessary resources to Homeland Security's enforcement
+arm, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and other relevant
+agencies, including the FBI.
+ This problem illustrates the need for a National Counterterrorism
+Center. Investigations of travel facilitators invariably raise
+complicated questions: Should a particular travel facilitator be
+arrested or should he be the subject of continued intelligence
+operations? In which country should he be arrested? A National
+Counterterrorism Center is needed to bring the numerous agencies to the
+table to decide on the right course of action.
+
+Screening Systems
+ To provide better information to our consular officers and
+immigration inspectors, the government must accelerate its efforts to
+build a biometric entry and exit screening system. This is an area in
+which Congress has been active since the mid-1990's. It has been a
+frustrating journey.
+ Congress first legislated an entry-exit system in 1996, to increase
+compliance with our immigration laws. It was not associated with
+counterterrorism, nor with biometric identification. As a practical
+matter, the entry-exit effort was not seriously funded until the end of
+2002. By that time, aspects of a system were directed by four separate
+laws. The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security then
+changed the organizational context for implementing those laws.
+ The new Department is emerging from its difficult start-up period
+and is, we believe, poised to move forward to implement Congress's
+mandates in this area. We would like to stress four principles that we
+believe must guide our efforts in this arena.
+ First, the U.S. border security system is effectively a part of a
+larger network of screening points that includes our transportation
+system and access to vital facilities, such as nuclear reactors. The
+Department of Homeland Security should lead an effort to design a
+comprehensive screening system, addressing common problems and setting
+common standards with system-wide goals in mind.
+ Second, a biometric entry and exit screening system is fundamental
+to intercepting terrorists and its development should be accelerated.
+Each element of the system is important. The biometric identifier makes
+it difficult to defeat a watchlist by a slight alteration in spelling
+of a name, a technique relied upon by terrorists. The screening system
+enables border officials access to all relevant information about a
+traveler, in order to assess the risk they may pose. Exit information
+allows authorities to know if a suspect individual has left the country
+and to establish compliance with immigration laws.
+ Third, United States citizens should not be exempt from carrying
+biometric passports or otherwise enabling their identities to be
+securely verified. Nor should Canadians or Mexicans.
+ Fourth, there should be a program to speed known travelers, so
+inspectors can focus on those travelers who might present greater
+risks. This is especially important for border communities.
+ We believe that the schedule for completion of this biometric
+entry-exit screening system should be accelerated to the extent
+feasible. This will require additional annual funding, and a mandate to
+a central organizational authority, such as the US VISIT office, to
+manage the effort.
+
+International Collaboration
+ We need much greater collaboration with foreign governments on
+border security. This means more exchange of information about
+terrorists and passports, and improved global passport design
+standards. Implicit in this recommendation is continued close
+cooperation with Mexico and Canada. It is particularly important to
+improve screening efforts prior to departure from foreign airports,
+especially in countries participating in the visa waiver program.
+
+Immigration Law and Enforcement
+ We must be able to monitor and respond to entries along our long
+borders with Canada and Mexico, working with those countries as much as
+possible. Our law enforcement system ought to send a message of
+welcome, tolerance, and justice to members of the immigrant communities
+in the United States. Good immigration services are one way to reach
+out that is valuable, including for intelligence. State and local law
+enforcement agencies need more training and partnerships with federal
+agencies so they can cooperate more effectively with those federal
+authorities in identifying terrorist suspects.
+ Finally, secure identification should begin in the United States.
+We believe that the federal government should set standards for the
+issuance of birth certificates and sources of identification such as
+drivers' licenses.
+ The agenda on immigration and border control, then, is multi-
+faceted and vital to our national security. The bottom line is that our
+visa and border control systems must become an integral part of our
+counterterrorism intelligence system. We must steer a course that
+remains true to our commitment to an open society and that welcomes
+legitimate immigrants and refugees, while concentrating our resources
+on identification of potential terrorists and prevention of their entry
+into the United States.
+
+Setting Priorities
+ We recommend that homeland security assistance should be based
+strictly on an assessment of risks and vulnerabilities. Now, in 2004,
+Washington, D.C., and New York City are certainly at the top of any
+such list.
+ We understand the contention that every state and city needs to
+have some minimum infrastructure for emergency response. But federal
+homeland security assistance should not remain a program for general
+revenue sharing. It should supplement state and local resources based
+on the risks or vulnerabilities that merit additional support. Congress
+should not use this money as a pork barrel.
+
+Command, Control, and Communications
+ The 9/11 attacks showed that even the most vigorous emergency
+response capabilities can be overwhelmed if an attack is large enough.
+We recommend that emergency response agencies nationwide should adopt
+the Incident Command System (ICS). When multiple agencies or multiple
+jurisdictions are involved, they should adopt a unified command. Both
+are proven frameworks for emergency response.
+ We strongly support the decision that federal homeland security
+funding will be contingent, as of October 1, 2004, upon the adoption
+and regular use of ICS and unified command procedures. In the future,
+the Department of Homeland Security should consider making funding
+contingent on aggressive and realistic training in accordance with ICS
+and unified command procedures.
+ The inability to communicate was a critical element at the World
+Trade Center, Pentagon, and Pennsylvania crash sites, where multiple
+agencies and multiple jurisdictions responded. The occurrence of this
+problem at three very different sites is strong evidence that
+compatible and adequate communications among public safety
+organizations at the local, state, and federal levels remains an
+important problem.
+ Congress should support pending legislation which provides for the
+expedited and increased assignment of radio spectrum for public safety
+purposes. Furthermore, high-risk urban areas such as New York City and
+Washington, D.C., should establish signal corps units to ensure
+communications connectivity between and among civilian authorities,
+local first responders, and the National Guard. Federal funding of such
+units should be given high priority by Congress.
+
+Private-Sector Preparedness
+ The private sector controls 85 percent of the critical
+infrastructure of the United States. The Department of Homeland
+Security's mandate includes working with the private sector to ensure
+preparedness.
+ Preparedness in the private sector and public sector for rescue,
+restart, and recovery of operations should include (1) a plan for
+evacuation, (2) adequate communications capabilities, and (3) a plan
+for continuity of operations. As we examined the emergency response to
+9/11, witness after witness told us that, despite 9/11, the private
+sector remains largely unprepared for a terrorist attack. We were also
+advised that the lack of a widely embraced private-sector preparedness
+standard was a principal contributing factor to this lack of
+preparedness.
+ The Commission therefore endorses the American National Standard
+Institute's recommended standard for private preparedness. We were
+encouraged by Secretary Tom Ridge's praise of the standard, and urge
+the Department of Homeland Security to promote its adoption.
+ We also encourage the insurance and credit-rating industries to
+look closely at a company's compliance with the ANSI standard in
+assessing its insurability and creditworthiness. We believe that
+compliance with the standard should define the standard of care owed by
+a company to its employees and the public for legal purposes.
+ Private-sector preparedness, we believe, is not a luxury; it is a
+cost of doing business in the post-9/11 world. If we ignore it, the
+potential costs in lives, money, and national security will be
+inestimable.
+
+Closing Comments
+ Mr. Chairman, we believe the recommendations we have presented this
+morning--as well as the many other recommendations we have made on
+foreign policy, public diplomacy, and transportation security--can make
+a significant difference in making America safer and more secure.
+ We also recommend reforms in the structure of the Executive branch
+and the Congress. We believe that organizational reforms, in the
+absence of implementing the other reforms and recommendations in our
+report, will have significantly less value than the value of these
+reforms as a complete package.
+ In short, while we welcome each step toward implementation of our
+recommendations, no one should be mistaken in believing that
+organizational reforms alone can address the current terrorist threat
+we face.
+ We are gratified by the rapid response of the White House to our
+recommendations. We welcome the President's support for a National
+Intelligence Director, and a National Counterterrorism Center. We
+welcome the support of Senator Kerry.
+ We look forward to working with you on our recommendations.
+ We should seize this historic opportunity and move expeditiously.
+With your counsel and direction, we believe that the nation can, and
+will, make wise choices.
+ We would be pleased to respond to your questions.
+
+ Chairman Cox. I thank you both for your excellent
+statements.
+ I would like to begin with the point that Lee Hamilton has
+just made, that organizational changes will not be enough--your
+report makes this very, very clear--unless we also address the
+deep-rooted cultural resistance to sharing that is shot through
+the executive branch. Your report states that, quote, ``The
+biggest impediment to all-source analysis is the human or
+systemic resistance to sharing information.''
+ I want to ask you whether or not one of the highest
+purposes, therefore, to which a National Intelligence Director
+might be addressed is enforced sharing. Might we not consider
+that the National Intelligence Director have as his or her
+highest order of business the enforced sharing of information
+across jurisdictional lines?
+ You mentioned, Governor Kean, the Markle report, which you
+have also drawn attention to in your Commission report. It is
+something that we have focused on in this committee. We must
+move, in my view, I agree completely, to a trusted information
+network along the lines of the Markle commission has proposed
+because agency-owned databases have to be made accessible
+across agency lines.
+ That is a step beyond the TTIC concepts. Might this not be
+something that the National Intelligence Director would be
+tasked with enforcing?
+ On the other side of this coin, I would like you to address
+concerns that a National Intelligence Director, to the extent
+he or she has programmatic responsibility, might homogenize the
+requirements that are currently in place across the
+Intelligence Community.
+ As you know, we employ enough people in the Intelligence
+Community to populate a midsize U.S. city. There are 15
+separate intelligence agencies, each with their own unique
+capabilities and missions, each of those critical to our
+national security. Currently, our chief national security
+priority is fighting terrorism, but if history is any guide, we
+will in the future at some point in the indefinite future face
+a war between nations. And one of the highest purposes of
+intelligence is to forestall conflict between nations.
+ What can we do to make sure that we don't dilute the
+positions on the field played by each of these intelligence
+agencies, to make sure that by funneling everything through a
+single National Intelligence Director we don't--to make sure
+that we maintain the distinct purposes of each of these 15
+agencies in our Intelligence Community.
+ Separately, from NID, I would like you to address the
+question of the National Counterterrorism Center, in specifics,
+its relationship to the Department of Homeland Security. As you
+know, Congress created within the Department of Homeland
+Security the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
+directorate with the purpose of fusing both domestic and
+foreign intelligence and then disseminating that to State and
+local government and the private sector. One of the reasons,
+one of the several reasons that CIA was not given this function
+is that there is significant reach into our local communities,
+into the domestic United States, into the private sector beyond
+anything that we have asked CIA to do in the past; and we have
+abiding civil liberties concerns with breaching those walls
+that have been erected in the past for a very good purpose.
+ The Department of Homeland Security now having been created
+for that purpose, TTIC now having been created separately from
+it outside the department, we are now faced with a proposal for
+a National Counterterrorism Center. Will it subsume TTIC? Will
+it subsume IAIP? Will it move its analysis directly to State,
+local, and private-sector entities?
+ So if you would please address both the National
+Intelligence Director and the National Counterterrorism Center
+proposals and recommendations with those questions in mind, I
+would appreciate it.
+ Mr. Hamilton. That is a very formidable list you have us,
+Mr. Chairman. On the first point, you are absolutely right. We
+think that someone has to enforce sharing and that is a
+principal role of the national intelligence director. You have
+a lot of marvelous groups out here in the intelligence
+community who do very good work. The intelligence community is
+organized basically on the method of collection. And they do an
+excellent job in developing information through their
+particular means of collection. What does not happen is that
+intelligence community agencies share that information and our
+analysis of 9/11 was that a principal cause of 9/11 was because
+the intelligence agencies did not share. You have to find some
+way to smash the stovepipes.
+ And I think that can be done--has to be done by someone
+above them and therefore, the national intelligence director
+would have that role and it is a critically important role as
+we understand it. You simply got to get a better flow of
+intelligence information across all of the intelligence
+agencies and make that information available, more available
+than it is--has been in the past. I think some progress has
+been made here since 9/11. I know a lot of dedicated patriotic
+officials are trying to do a better job of it, but the
+organization is standing in the way of the sharing.
+ Now the second point you raised with regard to homogeneity
+of intelligence is likewise an enormously significant question
+and one that we wrestle with a great deal. We do not believe
+that combining the intelligence agencies under one official
+undermines competitive analysis. Indeed, we want to encourage
+competitive analysis, and I think everybody does. It is a
+question of how best to put the structure together. I don't
+think anyone can claim that the current structure fosters tears
+competitive analysis. We just had the Senate report come out
+the other day on group think. And the whole idea there is that
+everybody is thinking the same way with regard to Iraq and you
+did not have competitive analysis. So it seems to me the status
+quo is not satisfactory with regard to the competitive
+analysis. Under our system, I want to emphasize that we have
+recommended not all of the analysis would fall under the
+director. The State Department would still have the INR. The
+Treasury would still have their intelligence. The Energy
+Department would still have their intelligence. The Army, the
+Air Force, the Navy, the Marine Corps would all have their
+intelligence units.
+ So the competitive analysis situation is very lively and
+viable. And the other point I would want to make here is that
+the focus we put on open source information, indeed we make it
+a special part of the national counterterrorism center, calls
+for the development of a new office or agency to collect and
+analyze intelligence that is available on the open source. I
+know that kind of runs counter to what you think with regard to
+intelligence agencies, but if you look back on 9/11, the fact
+of the matter is that almost all of the information that was
+available was available to all of us. All you had to do was
+read the newspaper. The problem was we just didn't put it
+together, none of us put it together, or at least very, very
+few of us put it together. So open source analysis is important
+and will help competition.
+ So we don't see any reduction of competitive analysis under
+our plan. We think even more. And we also would mention that
+very same objection was made to Goldwater-Nichols prior to that
+being brought into effect. We think our military is the best in
+the world today. We think it performs far better than ever
+because of the joint command system, and we believe that the
+intelligence community will perform better with joint mission
+centers.
+ The final point you made with regard to the NCTC, its
+relationship to the DHS, let me just say that the there are two
+parts of our organizational chart. I don't know if you have
+that in front of you. It perhaps would be helpful if we did
+have it, the DHS, the Department of Homeland Security, is very
+much a part of the national intelligence centers. And they sit
+on the agency or the board where you have the deputy national
+intelligence director, who oversees homeland security. There
+are three deputies to the national intelligence director. One
+relates to the foreign field. That is CIA clandestine services.
+The other relates to defense. That is NSA, NGA, NRO. And the
+third relates to homeland security or homeland intelligence and
+that is where the tie would be to DHS. We think that TTIC is
+the right concept, but it needs to be strengthened.
+ Mr. Kean. I would add just very little to that except that
+we believe our proposal will strengthen analysis and enhance
+competitive analysis, right now viewed as marginalized from
+some of the agencies. And it can have dire consequences. An
+example, easy example of not sharing information is when we
+found Moussaoui. The FBI identified him as the guy trying to
+learn how to fly jumbo jets and not much else. That information
+was gathered by the FBI. It got to the CIA. It went right up to
+the director of the CIA. The director of the CIA said that is
+an FBI matter, and so he ignored it. It never got to the FBI.
+If there was at that point a counterterrorism center, that kind
+of information would have surfaced and people would have shared
+information and we believe there would have been fairly prompt
+action. And of course, there was no action on this before 9/11.
+ Mr. Hamilton. You mentioned, Mr. Chairman you mentioned
+specifically and I neglected to respond to it, what happens to
+IAIP, the information analysis and infrastructure protection
+agency within the Department within the homeland security, the
+answer is under our proposal, the locus of analysis moves to
+the national counterterrorism center, but IAIP continues to
+exist and continues to support the Department requirements,
+infrastructure protection, support to State and local
+authorities, but the overall analysis moves to the national
+center.
+ Chairman Cox. I thank you. We have a great deal more to
+delve into on these subjects, but my time has expired and I
+want to move this along, we are going to be operating on a
+strict five-minute rule to give members who travelled great
+distances to be here, the opportunity to ask their questions.
+And I now recognize Mr. Turner for his questions.
+ Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Governor Kean, in your
+statement, you say, and I am looking at it here, we believe the
+President needs to lead a government-wide effort to bring the
+major national security institutions into the information
+revolution. And you also say further down in your statement,
+only presidential leadership can develop the necessary
+government-wide concepts and standards. And I hope we don't
+miss that message, because as I have reviewed the efforts to
+bring about an integrated information sharing system, it is
+clear to me that the Congress has made repeated efforts to
+accomplish that. We have passed, as Lee Hamilton said, four
+separate laws mandating an interoperable border security
+system. Back in 2000, Congress created an independent
+commission appointed by the Attorney General to report on how
+border agencies could efficiently and effectively carry out the
+mission of creating an integrated collection and data sharing
+system, including an integrated entry and exit system which was
+mandated by the Congress in 1996. It seems that this law
+creating this independent commission followed 4 years of costly
+delays at the former INS when they failed to develop such an
+integrated entry exit system. Congress authorized the task
+force that was created. It authorized funding for fiscal years
+2001 through 2008. In the first report of that Commission
+issued in December, 2002, the task force included an entire
+chapter on subjects that the task force would continue to
+research through 2003 and 2004, which included the development
+of an interoperable entry exit border system.
+ In December of 2002, Attorney General Ashcroft renewed the
+task force charge to study this issue, provided $5.6 million to
+do it and assigned seven new staff divisions to accomplish it.
+And among the most significant efforts of this task force was
+to employ a group of eight scientists from the Los Alamos labs
+to study the 50 major border IT systems that are used in our
+government and to make recommendations. And when they issued
+their report in December of 2003, which, by the way, was on the
+eve of the implementation of this new U.S. VISIT program, these
+Los Alamos scientists stated that most of the existing border
+security systems could be readily integrated into an
+interoperable network so that one query could search numerous
+data bases simultaneously. They cautioned that the underlying
+technical infrastructure at the borders needed to be replaced
+with a more modern foundation in order to achieve
+interoperability.
+ It seems clear to me--oh, by the way, this task force was
+dismissed by the Department of Homeland Security after the task
+force warned, in its December 2003 report, that entry-exit U.S.
+VISIT is a critical component of the broader DHS strategy and
+any system that is designed or perceived as a stand alone
+system simply would not fit into a post-September 2001 world.
+The report went on to recommend an independent evaluation of
+U.S. VISIT. It seems very clear that this task force suspected
+that we were once again building another stovepipe. And it
+comes back down to your initial statement that I read when I
+began my question and that is, it takes presidential leadership
+to develop the necessary government-wide concepts and standards
+to have an interoperable system.
+ So I ask each of you if you were advising the President
+this morning and he were to say, yes, I will call in all the
+relevant players, the Cabinet secretaries and I will try to
+find out why after 3 years, we haven't created this
+interoperability that is so critical to preventing another 9/
+11, I would like you, based on your experience, to tell me what
+kind of excuses would we get from the relevant players for not
+moving forward more expeditiously to solve this problem? Where
+is the problem? You say it is presidential leadership. But even
+if the President were to lead, what kind of excuses would he
+get for this problem not being solved today?
+ Mr. Hamilton. Well, first excuse would be need to know, I
+believe, because that is so embedded in our intelligence
+community today and we don't mean to dismiss that. That can be
+very important in protecting sources and methods. So you have
+to get a balance here. You have to get a balance on need to
+know on the one hand and need to share on the other. But the
+way we produce our intelligence in each of these areas, HUMINT
+over here, satellites over here, interceptions over here and
+other means, they all kind of hanging on to that information.
+And because the need to know philosophy is so deeply embedded
+in the intelligence community, they hang onto it. And they say,
+we are the only ones that really have to know this information.
+Now that is understandable and it probably historically has
+validity to it, but we are in a different world now with
+terrorism. And we think that you have to elevate the need to
+share up to the need to know and maybe the balance has to tip a
+little towards need to share because it was precisely the lack
+of sharing of information that Tom has cited just a moment ago
+that created the circumstances that permitted 9/11 to occur. In
+addition to this, as we say in our report, there is this very
+strong urge, which every one of you has countered to
+overclassify. Look, a document becomes secret before a person
+has the authority to classify or not classify. He or she looks
+at that document. There is no incentive for that person to make
+it public. The incentive is to classify it and protect himself
+from the possibility of the information getting out and causing
+a problem, so they stamp it secret. And we pile up enormous
+amounts of information, warehouses of information that are
+secret because of the incentives are all on the side of
+classification.
+ Now this is a problem we think that no agency can deal
+with, no agency can solve this problem. It has to be done above
+an agency. And it has some very tough problems in it. There are
+technical problems, there are legal problems, there are
+political problems. And I think only the President can resolve
+those matters and has to resolve them, I believe, or you will
+not get the kind of information rights management that we think
+is necessary to protect ourselves.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentlelady from Washington is recognized
+for her questions.
+ Ms. Dunn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congressman Hamilton, 12
+years ago, as you may recall, you and I served together on the
+joint committee for the organization of Congress. Our report
+included specific recommendations on consolidation within the
+committee structure. You devote some of your report to this
+subject, specifically noting that congressional oversight for
+intelligence and counterterrorism is dysfunctional. My question
+to you and certainly Governor Kean, please jump in because you
+have been through this thing for the past many months, and we
+are very intrigued to hear the results of your experience on
+this, if you were in charge of organizing Congress to provide
+particular focus to this new threat of terrorism, where would
+you start?
+ Would you, for example, divide the responsibilities for
+oversight and authorization in appropriations? What would you
+do with the terrorist watchlist, which is not currently under
+the aegis of our Select Committee on Homeland Security? What
+kind of a committee would you see happening? Would it be a
+joint committee between the House and the Senate? And I would
+suggest to you that just as you see what we are going through
+today with such a massive committee, it is hard for us to bore
+in and spend the time we need to spend to get precise answers
+and to follow up. It is very challenging. But the goal of all
+of us is to provide focus. I think, for example, that if
+something else does happen here in the United States, people
+will turn to Congress and say they had the chance to do the
+best job they could ever do to put such an oversight committee
+together. And so I am asking for your experience and for your
+thoughts as you have heard from other groups you have testified
+before and from the people who testified before your committee
+in the many, many hearings you have held, what is your
+suggestion to do with Congress?
+ Mr. Kean. Well, we have general, what we have said has got
+to be consolidated. The importance came to me and I got this
+from the outside in that in this whole area, normally in areas
+other than intelligence, there is a lot of oversight from the
+press and from the public. People press in. People want
+questions answered. When you get into the counterterrorism
+area, so much of it is secret that that whole area doesn't
+exist. So you depend much more heavily on the Congress to do
+the oversight than you do than in almost any other area of
+government. And if the Congress can't get it done, nobody gets
+it done. If these agencies are allowed to go their own way or
+make use of multiple jurisdictions or not answer the questions
+properly from the Congress, then there is no oversight at all.
+ And we suggest in the report that--particularly homeland
+security where there is mention, they are responsible to 88
+different committees. That doesn't mean oversight at all. What
+it does mean is that people who should be spending their time
+protecting us all are spending an enormous amount of time of
+time testifying before a whole vast majority of committees. We
+suggest consolidating homeland security into a committee in the
+House and committee in the Senate. We suggested intelligence
+doing something radical and that is taking the authorization
+and budget functions and combining them into one committee
+because we sense the intelligence committee without any budget
+authority doesn't really have the clout with the intelligence
+community that they need to do their job.
+ So it is moving in those directions so there is more
+concentrated oversight that can really understand these
+organizations, which are very complicated. Lee Hamilton knows
+more about this than I will ever learn in a lifetime, but he
+tells me that in the intelligence area, it is 4 years, 6 years
+before you really understand these agencies and are really able
+to ask the intelligent questions. So it is a question of
+consolidation. More authority for the committees.
+ Mr. Hamilton. I think Tom has made the essential points. I
+must say, I have considerable sympathy for the Congress in
+putting this together, because Congresswoman Dunn, you and I
+served on the Joint Reform Committee and I might say that when
+the Democrats controlled the Congress, we weren't all that
+successful in making these reforms. It is very tough to do. I
+appreciate that. Very difficult to do, because when you are
+talking about reform of committee jurisdiction, you are talking
+about allocation of power, and power is the name of the game.
+Now what we are saying to you here is that this threat of
+terrorism is so urgent, so long-term, so difficult that not
+only must we do some reorganization of the executive branch, we
+also have to reorganize the Congress as well. And I will be
+quick to admit that it is a lot easier to say this from outside
+the body than from inside the body.
+ But I think you folks are at a crunch point. And I think
+you are exactly right when you say that if another incident
+were to happen and the Congress had done nothing to put its own
+house in order, I think the institution, and maybe some of you
+individually would be heavily criticized for not acting. In
+other words, I think there is a political risk here. I may be
+wrong about that. I don't think so. I certainly don't think
+that the particular suggestions we made are carved in granite.
+You have to analyze the situation, understand the internal
+dynamics better than I do and you have to figure it out, but
+you have to get your house in order so you can have robust
+oversight of the Department of Homeland Security.
+ The Department of Homeland Security needs your advice and
+counsel. And they want to be able to come--as Secretary Ridge
+said to us, I want to be able to come to one body of expert
+members of the Congress and lay out my problems to them and
+tell them what we have done and tell them what we haven't done
+and get their advice and counsel, rather than going to 88
+subcommittees, which Tom mentioned, 88 subcommittees. That
+really is absurd. And it is not fair, it simply is not fair to
+the executive branch to make them do that, I don't believe.
+ So we say OK, we have to have robust reform. Let me tell
+you what I did in the Senate. I was making a presentation on
+this for the Senate not long ago, and I asked them how long did
+you spend in the appropriations committee on review of the
+intelligence budget? And one Senator spoke up and said 10
+minutes. The defense subcommittee appropriations in the United
+States Senate spent 10 minutes reviewing what we all know to be
+a $40 billion budget. I used that illustration in another group
+of senators a day or two later. And one Senator got up and say
+Hamilton, you are all wrong, you greatly exaggerated it. It was
+5 minutes. Now nobody can say that is robust oversight. And it
+is a very, very serious matter. So you work it out. We have
+made our suggestions on it. You know this place better than I
+know it, now.
+ But I think it is important for the Congress to get itself
+in shape so that it can perform one of its constitutional
+duties, which is oversight.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson.
+ Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me welcome
+the two gentlemen here this morning. Let me join my colleague,
+Ms. Dunn, in saying that the notion that we have all these
+jurisdictional issues before us is a real problem and it is
+both--it is a bipartisan problem. Mr. Hamilton, you are
+absolutely correct. This institution loves power, individuals
+love power and the homeland security issue is really one that
+should not be about power, but one about the people and how we
+can secure the homeland.
+ So I will join you and other colleagues who testified
+before this committee that we ought to have a standing
+committee with all the jurisdictional authorities right within
+the committee. So I appreciate your comments on that respect.
+But there are some other issues associated with your report.
+One, it has to do with transportation. Many individuals in the
+public would like for people to try to prioritize
+transportation problems. Did you all look at transportation and
+try to give it a pecking order in terms of security or what did
+you do?
+ Mr. Kean. I don't think we gave it a pecking order, but
+what we did was identify the various problems that had to be
+addressed in the transportation and security areas. And we are
+spending most of the money now on air safety, but we recognize
+that the transportation of containers, transportation of people
+via rail or subway, there are a number of other areas we have
+got to give if not equal attention to at least more attention
+to than we are giving them right now.
+ Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Thompson, I think we look quite a bit at
+the transportation sector and there are so many possible
+recommendations that you could make there. We did not try to do
+that. But what we did say is that you have to plan. We have
+been doing is planning on planning for the last 3 years. We
+have got to put into place plans and it has to be done
+urgently. A comprehensive plan for the entire transportation
+system that Tom mentioned, aviation, rail, all the rest of it,
+and likewise, sector plans so that you have some way of
+measuring what you have done, you know what your goals are, you
+establish your priorities, you do your budgeting and all the
+things that are necessary in good planning, we are not there
+yet.
+ We heard yesterday from the assistant secretary, Asa
+Hutchinson. We are moving forward on this. And I think some of
+these plans will be ready by the end of the year. We think it
+is terribly important to have integrated security plans for all
+of these modes of transportation. And the other things we
+mentioned were with regard to aviation security was to make
+sure you had layers of security, not just one checkpoint. What
+happened with the 9/11 terrorists was there was no layered
+security.
+ They had to get by one principal problem and that was the
+check-in. And incidentally, a number of them were screened
+twice, but we didn't stop them. But I think everybody
+acknowledges that in order to have an effective security
+system, you have to have layers of checks and so we emphasized
+that. We put a lot of emphasis on explosives, because we think
+that is a very major problem in transportation security today
+and recommended among other things, for example, that every
+airplane have an explosive proof container on it and very few
+airplanes have that today.
+ So those are some of the comments we made with regard to
+aviation security and rail security. But we didn't try to deal
+with it comprehensively but picked out two, three things that
+we thought were especially important.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Smith. If the
+gentleman would suspend in order to permit time for all
+members' questions, I would ask that both members and our
+witnesses observe the green, amber and red lights that are
+there for your convenience. The gentleman from Texas.
+ Mr. Smith. Chairman Kean, my first question is addressed to
+you and this goes to the statement on page 1 of your testimony
+today where you say the failure to share information cost us
+dearly. Today as we sit here, does ICE within the Homeland
+Security Department, the FBI and the CIA have the computer
+interface capability to exchange information, not whether they
+should exchange any and all information, but do they have the
+ability to exchange information?
+ Mr. Kean. No.
+ Mr. Smith. Do you have any idea when they will have that
+ability?
+ Mr. Kean. No. We don't know what the timetable is. We know
+they are working on it, but we have not been given a timetable.
+ Mr. Smith. Mr. Hamilton, page 3 of your testimony suggests
+pretty strongly that if a previous administration had enforced
+the immigration laws then in effect, we might have stopped the
+terrorist attack from occurring. You specifically refer to a
+number of laws, including laws--one law passed in 1996,
+Immigration Reform Act, which called for a entry-exit system,
+called for standardized birth certificates, called for better
+scrutiny of student visas.
+ And you give examples, in fact, there on page 3 of your
+testimony that pretty clearly implied that a majority of the
+terrorists might have been apprehended or at least not admitted
+had those and other laws been enforced. You then say that
+eventually in 2002, they were implemented or beginning to be
+implemented or enforced then. But we did have a terrorist
+attack in 1993. The basement of the World Trade Center was
+attacked. You are suggesting something pretty seriously.
+ If the Clinton administration had enforced the 1996 law
+which was passed by the House by a 3-to-1 margin, and in the
+Senate by a 9-to-1 margin, we might have avoided the terrorist
+attack; is that right?
+ Mr. Hamilton. We certainly say that more robust enforcement
+of routine immigration laws supported by better information
+might have made the difference. Tom and I have been very, very
+careful not to say that if this step or that step had been
+taken, it would have prevented 9/11. Causation is much too
+complex to draw that conclusion.
+ Mr. Smith. You said might have stopped. That is a very
+astounding statement. And is there any good explanation as to
+why the previous administration didn't enforce a lot of these
+laws considering the overwhelming support in Congress and
+considering the wake-up call we had in 1993?
+ Mr. Hamilton. Two administrations have not enforced the
+1996 law with regard to entry and exit systems.
+ Mr. Smith. The current administration is enforcing that.
+ Mr. Hamilton. I think our enforcement is better, and I
+agree with that, because we have learned a lot. Why didn't we
+enforce it back then, the reason is that none of us thought
+that this could happen. We just didn't expect it. And I think
+that made us all kind of lax probably in enforcement. What we
+are saying today--
+ Mr. Smith. Let me interrupt you quickly. The 1996 bill was
+passed just a couple of years after the 1993 World Trade Center
+bombing. It seems to me that we were pretty much on notice that
+we should start enforcing immigration laws especially those
+that were passed by Congress. Is there any good explanation as
+to why we did not?
+ Mr. Hamilton. I thought I just answered that. Any reason we
+why we did not enforce?
+ Mr. Smith. 1993. We passed major legislation in 1996. It
+was ignored. I know we are talking in retrospect, but it seems
+to me that was a dangerous position.
+ Mr. Hamilton. I think in retrospect, it is easy to see
+there should have been a much more robust enforcement of our
+immigration laws.
+ Mr. Smith. Let me squeeze in one more question. The
+Commission relied upon an individual foreign national security
+advisor to provide the Commission with information as to
+whether the previous administration had--how they had handled
+the Al-Qa'ida terrorist threat. Don't you think there was some
+conflict of interest on relying upon a national security
+advisor with a previous administration to tell the committee
+whether or not the previous administration had, in fact,
+handled the Al-Qa'ida threat well or no? Wasn't there some
+conflict of interest relying on a biased source there?
+ Mr. Hamilton. We took the testimony of hundreds of people
+and I don't think we relied on anyone. We tried to sort through
+all of it. And we certainly gave the national security advisors
+of both administrations ample opportunity to defend their
+administrations and they both did a very good job of it.
+ Mr. Smith. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Chairman, point of inquiry?
+ Chairman Cox. Gentleman of New Jersey.
+ Mr. Pascrell. I must say after that line of questioning--
+ Chairman Cox. If the gentleman is not stating a procedural
+inquiry, the gentleman is going to recognize the gentlelady
+from California.
+ Mr. Pascrell. We have not had time for questions at our end
+many, many times on both sides. And I think that the line of
+questioning is improper and does not sit well--with the
+findings of this--
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman will suspend. The gentleman
+will suspend.
+ Mr. Pascrell. You can suspend all you want.
+ Chairman Cox. The Chair will take this opportunity to
+announce that in order to permit time for all members to ask
+questions, we are going to proceed in the order of questioning
+for this panel that we have been following until 12:15 when our
+panel members must leave, and then the testimony of the second
+panel. We will continue in that order without interruption. So
+we will not resume with questions from the chairman and ranking
+member until every member has had an opportunity to ask
+questions. The gentlelady from California is recognized for her
+questions.
+ Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you again,
+gentlemen. I had the pleasure of questioning you last week in
+the defense committee. I have two questions, one for Governor
+Kean and one for my former colleague and let me say them both.
+The first one would be to Governor Kean. It is about the whole
+issue that you wrote about with respect to the relationship of
+strengthening and in some cases repairing our relationships
+with other countries. In your report, you recommend the
+formation of a flexible contact group of leading coalition
+governments. Can you elaborate more on what you meant by this;
+how do you see this contact group functioning; what would be
+its relationship to other multinational groups, like NATO, for
+example?
+ And then to my former colleague, great again to see you. If
+you take a look over there on the majority side right after Ms.
+Dunn, you will see a lot of empty seats. Those are all chairmen
+of other committees. I also sit on the subcommittee of this
+group, which is the rules subcommittee, the one tasked with
+trying to figure out how we make this or if we make this a real
+standing committee with real jurisdictional power. When we had
+testimony before that rules subcommittee, most of those
+chairmen said make this go away. Comes back to that power
+struggle that you were talking about.
+ So I would like to ask you, after all of the experience
+that you have had and the changes that you were able to
+construct within the Congress, how do we get these gentlemen to
+sit here and have a real discussion about not having 88
+subcommittees for the homeland security agency to report before
+the Congress?
+ Mr. Kean. I guess I will start. Our recommendation was that
+there should be some sort of a forum. We have no forum now for
+talking with the countries of the Arab world. We meet a number
+of times a year with the European union and we have an
+organization to discuss with them. The Asian countries and we
+have a forum to discuss things with them. If you take the
+countries of the Muslim world, there is no forum of that kind
+and there is no occasion to get together with them to share our
+thoughts and share our differences and get to know each other
+in that kind of a relationship. And so the point of that
+recommendation is just to suggest that such a forum be created.
+And that we as a country, therefore, would have the ability to
+have the same kind of conversations with that part of the world
+as we do with other parts of the world.
+ Mr. Hamilton. I am not sure I can be helpful to you in
+trying to figure out the best way to deal with your very real
+problems of jurisdiction, except I would recommend to you the
+Tom Kean approach. Tom deserves much of the credit for the fact
+that we had a consensus report. And it is worth looking at why
+we were able to reach it and I think it may have some lessons
+for the Congress. The first rule was that we are going to agree
+on the facts. It is amazing how often we disagree on facts. And
+the Commission again and again--somebody would say, what is the
+fact, what is the fact here? And we would kind of suspend
+everything in the work of the Commission until we agreed upon
+the fact.
+ So you have to figure out what the problems are and what
+the facts are. And then if you can get an agreement on the
+facts, it becomes not a cinch, but it becomes easier to get
+agreement on recommendations. But it can only be done with
+extended dialogue and deliberation. One of the things that
+really boaters me about the Congress today, looking at it from
+my posture is how difficult it is for you to deliberate, and
+that really is what the body is all about or should be,
+deliberation. But your schedules are so hectic and the time
+that you have to sit down with your colleagues and work through
+difficult problems is limited. I think one of the things you
+really have to do is to figure out how to engage in dialog with
+one another. And so much of the activity on the floor of the
+House, you are just kind of reading speeches and making
+speeches past one another. That is not deliberation. That is
+not dialog. That is not the way the body is supposed to work.
+And so I have that advice for you. And it all came about
+because of the remarkable leadership that Tom Kean showed in
+bringing a very disparate group of commissioners together. It
+is a hard business and it is tough to do and takes a lot of
+time.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Shays.
+ Mr. Shays. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I just want
+to say to both of you as the chairman and vice-chairman, I am
+in awe of the work you did on the 9/11 Commission. I am
+absolutely in awe of it. I am grateful that you made it
+unanimous and you didn't have to work hard to do that part. I
+mean, you had to work hard to make sure it didn't become
+partisan. And it is very clear that you put criticism on
+previous administrations, the present, Congress, our oversight
+and yet, you did it in a way that I thought was helpful in our
+getting and moving forward.
+ I believe some of this can be done in executive order,
+regulation, law and House and Senate rules. And I just want to
+say publicly that I will not, and if I am reelected and in a
+position to vote on the rules, I am not going to vote for any
+House rule that doesn't include a permanent committee on
+Department of Homeland Security, for instance. I just simply
+will vote against any rule. I will not vote for a rule that
+places our country in jeopardy because we don't have the good
+sense to make this a permanent committee.
+ And I think my colleague is correct that when she points
+out that the people who aren't here today are the Chairmen of
+the other committees. It is outrageous. We have to put this
+aside and do what is right and have a permanent committee. Lots
+of things to talk about with the limited time I have, I would
+like you both to address the whole issue of overclassification.
+And I would like you to just tell me when you see what is the
+incentive for change? I mean, we all know that we have too much
+classification. We read documents. And I think, Governor Kean,
+you told me that you just were amazed at the fairly average
+stuff you read that was classified.
+ So what is the incentive, though, that we put in to change
+that? We are going to have a hearing, my subcommittee is going
+to have a hearing on this next week, called too many secrets,
+overclassification, it is a barrier to information sharing. But
+I don't know what the incentive is. Tell me what the incentive
+is so we don't have so much overclassification?
+ Mr. Kean. It is hard. I will tell you, Congressman, you are
+absolutely right, coming from the outside, it just absolutely
+amazed and appalled me the amount of information I read that
+was stamped, classified, top secret, all these stamps on it and
+then you would read it and it wasn't anything you hadn't read
+in the newspapers. And I was asking one of my watches that we
+used to call them and I said, why would 300 pages of it--why is
+it classified? And he said because he didn't know it was true
+when he read it before.
+ That is no answer. That is no answer. I think this
+overclassification is hurting us terribly right now. The public
+is not an enemy, it is an ally in this war against terrorism.
+The more they know, the more they can help us. The more local
+law enforcement knows, the more they can help us. I don't know
+whether you have somebody with all the incentives to declassify
+that you now have to classify. What Congressman Hamilton said
+before was absolutely right. If you have a document, you get in
+no trouble for classifying it secret. You might get in trouble
+if you don't. So everything is stamped secret. You have to
+somehow put the motivation on somebody to look at all this
+stuff and say why shouldn't the American people have this
+information? Why shouldn't it be in the paper? Wouldn't it help
+if it was? Knowledge is power.
+ Mr. Shays. It would strike me that if you didn't classify
+as much, you would then know what are those classified pieces
+of information that have to be shared from one agency to
+another. So it seems to me like a huge issue. I have been
+wrestling with what the incentives are.
+ Mr. Hamilton.
+ Mr. Hamilton. Congressman Shays, I am immensely pleased to
+learn that you are having a hearing in this area because it
+really does need to be explored and we need to get some more
+ideas into it. And what I am going to suggest may not be too
+palatable to this group. But my experience is the Congress has
+just defaulted on the question of classification, just been too
+timid and has said in effect, Mr. President, you deal with it.
+The President today--and look, presidents have many things on
+their plate. Presidents of the United States do not sit around
+stamping documents secret. They have the authority, but they
+delegate that authority all over the place so that every
+department of government you go into, they have classifiers
+whose job it is to stamp documents secret. And believe you me,
+they have got a good stamp.
+ I think the Congress has to assert itself and begin to find
+ways and means of setting standards, for example, for when a
+document should be classified and when it should not be
+classified. Now I don't suggest that is easy. It will be a
+tough task. It hadn't been done before. But I think the
+tumidity of the Congress, the willingness just to defer to the
+President, whoever the President is, the authority to stamp--to
+delegate this authority without any real review by the Congress
+is a major default of responsibility.
+ So I will be following your hearings. I would like to
+hear--we did not have time, I guess, maybe that is not a very
+good excuse--we did not get into the question of what
+incentives, the one you are raising--it is a hard one to
+answer--I would like to see what you come up with.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman's time has expired. I will
+interject at this point that the comments that have been made
+about chairmen of other committees should be clarified by
+observing that the questioner himself is the vice chairman of
+the Full Committee on Government Reform and Oversight and top
+representative of that committee on the select panel. He is, of
+course, here today and has endorsed the concept of creating a
+permanent homeland security committee. Likewise, the chairman
+of the Committee on Intelligence who, with his ranking member,
+has strongly endorsed a permanent--
+ Mr. DeFazio. Mr. Chairman, we are running out of time. You
+said there would be no extraneous statements. Could we move on?
+We are not going to have a chance to ask questions.
+ Chairman Cox. I appreciate the gentleman. I think we wish
+to point out that the chairman of the Intelligence Committee
+has recused himself from today's hearing because he has been
+nominated as Director of Central Intelligence, and likewise,
+the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services strongly
+supports the recommendations of this commission. The gentleman
+from the State of Washington, Mr. Dicks is recognized.
+ Mr. Dicks. I, too, want to thank the chairman and vice-
+chairman for their great work for the country--
+ Chairman Cox. Would the gentleman yield for just a moment?
+I failed to recognize that Mr. Goodlatte, the chairman of the
+Committee on Agriculture is present.
+ Mr. Dicks. I want to thank you for your great service and I
+know particularly Lee Hamilton chaired the intelligence
+committee. I served for 8 years on the Intelligence Committee.
+One of the things that Secretary Kissinger reminded us of
+yesterday was that one of the biggest breakdowns is not
+necessarily in the collection of the information, but in the
+assessment of that information and it in almost every one of
+these intelligence failures we have had, we have had the
+information.
+ Either we have collected it through our national, technical
+means or we had information like that from the FBI field
+offices, but it was the failure of higher-ups who got that
+information to act upon it. When we think about this whole
+issue, we need to remember that. In many of these cases, we had
+the information. It is tragic, but we had it and we just didn't
+act on it. The group think, you know, like that which occurred
+going into the Egyptian-Israeli of 1973.
+ Another classic example was right before Desert Storm and
+Desert Shield. The information was there. We saw the tanks
+being fueled, but the President was talking to leaders in the
+region and they said Saddam won't do it and he did it. And to
+President Bush's great commendation, he came out and said this
+wasn't an intelligence failure but a failure to act on the
+intelligence.
+ But I think that is one thing we need to consider here. I
+think John Hamre has made an important point in his statement.
+Remember, this is the start of the debate. This is far too
+important a point on whether we create a national intelligence
+director and how that is done because you have the classic
+problem here. 80 percent of the intelligence budget is in the
+Defense Department. 20 percent is over at CIA. So how do you
+work out an arrangement so the Director of the Central
+Intelligence Agency, who has community-wide responsibility, can
+actually have authority over this budget? Hamre puts out a
+pretty good point.
+ You could put the NRO, the NSA, NEMA and the interspacial
+group all together and put the intelligence director over that
+so you would have diversity and you would have the CIA and
+director of CIA. You would have the DIA over in the Defense
+Department and their services.
+ So I think that deserves some consideration. Another idea
+here that we need to think about in trying to figure out a
+solution is there is a model where the head of the NRO, Peter
+Teets, is also the assistant secretary of the Air Force for
+science and space. You could have a model where the director of
+the Central Intelligence Agency would also be the deputy
+Secretary of Defense for intelligence. He would still have to
+work out his arrangement with the Secretary of Defense, but you
+could have then one person in charge of the entire intelligence
+community in terms of formulating the budget and the policy,
+but also he would have to coordinate with the Secretary of
+Defense, which is the situation that we have today.
+ So there is some concern, I think, about if we create a new
+national intelligence director, then we are going to have to
+create a new bureaucracy and all the staff to support that
+person. And what does the Director of the Central Intelligence
+Agency do besides run the CIA as part of this operation? I like
+the idea of the center. I think it is good. But I make the
+point. All this discussion about information sharing and
+tearing down the stovepipes, we have done a lot of that work. A
+lot of these interagency centers can get the work done. But
+don't forget, it is the failure of assessment. That is where
+the real failures have occurred in our history. I just would
+make that point.
+ Mr. Hamilton. Well, Congressman Dicks, the two articles
+that you referred to by former Secretary Kissinger and John
+Hamre, need to be looked and studied carefully because both are
+highly respected figures who have had a lot of experience in
+this field. Secretary Kissinger obviously is correct when he
+says we have got to get the assessments right. The question I
+raise about that is how can you possibly get the assessment
+right if you don't have accurate sharing? You have to have the
+sharing of the information so that the analyst is able to see
+what these various agencies of intelligence have done. You have
+to pool that information. You have to bring it together
+somewhere or you cannot get an accurate assessment.
+ And that is what we are saying. We are saying we have to
+share that information and only then can the analysts have a
+chance of getting an accurate assessment. There is no quarrel
+with the idea that you have to put emphasis on assessment. I
+think he is exactly right in many respects. We have put most of
+our resources in intelligence on collection. And we collect so
+much data that we can't process it all.
+ Mr. Dicks. That is true. As you well know, there is only a
+fraction of this information that is analyzed in real-time, and
+that is a major problem. The assessment thing has to be
+considered. I agree completely with you on the information
+sharing, and I think that is a great concept. But it is the
+assessment phase, getting the equipment and getting the
+information so you can analyze this information as much as
+possible in real-time and then having people who are smart
+enough to be able to conclude that something is happening and
+convince their superiors to act upon it. Don't forget that
+part.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman from--
+ Mr. Kean. May I say one comment? You are absolutely right
+on the assessment side. And we think the director of the CIA is
+going to have a full-time job rebuilding the CIA. It will take
+5 years to do that. We hope he can do it faster, but that is
+going to be a full-time job, getting diversity, language skills
+and getting the right people on board. So we think that is
+very, very important. And looking at the assessment, I will
+tell you, having read, I guess, the highest level briefings
+that were given to two presidents, I will say only as a citizen
+coming from the outside, I think our intelligence agencies
+failed two presidents.
+ Neither president had the information that he needed to
+assess the situation properly and make correct decisions. So I
+think the one thing we cannot do is allow a lot of status quo
+to exist.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Camp.
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your
+service in making our country safer. My question is this, you
+both referred to our porous borders and some of the things we
+have done to address that issue. Certainly creating the
+Department of Homeland Security is one of those things to
+secure our borders. There is this U.S. VISIT program. The
+administration is ahead of the congressionally-mandated
+schedule. But my question is this recent change. As you know,
+border protection could deport at airports and seaports people
+found illegally. Now that has been extended to those found
+within 100 miles of our border. It is a new responsibility of
+our border protection. Is that something you would agree with?
+Is that moving in the right direction in terms of trying to
+address our border issue?
+ Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Camp, I am not clear on what change you
+are talking about.
+ Mr. Camp. The law was that if someone was found within 100
+miles of our border, border patrol did not have the authority
+to deport people. However, if they were at a airport or seaport
+they were immediately deported to another country. There has
+been an administrative change allowing now inspectors at our
+borders to deport people who are found in this country
+illegally. Is that the sort of thing that would fit in with
+attempts to address our porous border?
+ Mr. Hamilton. That is the so-called expedited removal
+program that was announced this week. That was announced after
+the Commission had completed its work. We do want to emphasize
+the need for terrorists' travel intelligence and operational
+strategy in this. And that step when I read it, I thought my
+reaction was positive to it. Of course it is implemented and
+makes all the difference, but it is a means of making a
+decision on site as I understand it, is that correct, to act?
+ Mr. Camp. Yes, it is.
+ Mr. Kean. It does give us an opportunity. Everybody who we
+catch who crosses the border on phony documents we shouldn't
+just send them back. We should get those documents, find out
+where those documents came from. Because if we can crack these
+illegal terrorist facilitators who are doing this work, we will
+go a long way to stopping the problem.
+ So I think we should look at any of these people we catch
+as not just somebody but as an opportunity to learn more.
+ Mr. Camp. My second question is on the issue of airline
+security and particularly the No-Fly Lists and attempting to
+compare every passenger list with comprehensive lists or
+terrorist lists. This has been done primarily by the airlines.
+Recently, there is a suggestion to move that to TSA. And I
+would like to get your comments. It would seem to me that if
+the more everyone knows, the safer we are, I don't see why the
+airlines should not have a role in that as well. But I would be
+interested in both of your comments in that area.
+ Mr. Hamilton. One of the recommendations we made was that
+you have to have an improved No-Fly List and you have to have
+an improved automatic selectee list and that we ought not to
+delay the development of those while the argument goes on about
+the successor to the CAPS program.
+ We believe the screening function should be performed by
+the TSA, not by the air carriers. It certainly has to utilize
+the set of terrorist watchlists, all of them, that we have that
+are maintained by the Federal Government; and air carriers
+should be required to supply information that is needed for the
+system.
+ Mr. Camp. Thank you very much.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Frank.
+ Mr. Frank. In your report you have a great deal about the
+FBI and quite thoughtfully note that there were past problems
+with the FBI in terms of getting into impingement on political
+freedom. And I was struck by the thoughtfulness with which you
+said that your recommendations--essentially, you rejected the
+notion that there should be a new agency that would take a big
+chunk out of the FBI but did say quite thoughtfully that you
+are expressing the hope that the FBI will be able to reform. We
+all share that hope.
+ I must say that my hope in that regard was given a little
+bit of a jolt yesterday when I read the New York Times article
+by Eric Lichtblau headed ``FBI goes knocking for political
+troublemakers.'' FBI officials, it says, are urging agents to
+canvas their communities for information about planned
+disruptions aimed at the convention and other coming political
+events.
+ Essentially what it says is that a significant number of
+FBI agents are questioning people about whether or not they
+know whether or not somebody is going to do something violent
+at the Republican convention. They had apparently done it with
+regard to the Democratic convention. The New York Times in
+today's editorial says, quite accurately, I believe, these
+heavy-handed inquiries are intimidating and they threaten to
+chill freedom of expression. They also appear to be a
+spectacularly poor use of limited law enforcement resources.
+ You pay some attention, I was pleased to see, about privacy
+and civil liberties. I wonder if you have any reaction to this.
+I mean, the notion the FBI is out there asking people if they
+plan to do things, there is a troubling tendency here to take
+the doctrine of preemption, which seems to me controversial
+enough in the international area, and apply it domestically. It
+is none of the business of law enforcement in the United States
+to preempt people of what some might think are whacky political
+views and I might think because they might be about to do
+something.
+ We have this new notion of free speech zones. Many of us
+had always thought that the free speech zone was called the
+United States of America, and efforts to kind of make it
+anything less than that were grave error.
+ In your judgment--you spent a great deal of time on this--
+is there any reason why we should be having the FBI going
+around anticipatorily asking people if they know anybody who
+plans to divert attention? Is the FBI that deep in extra agents
+that they got people with nothing else to do for the summer to
+go out and do this? I wonder if this in your mind raises the
+concern that it raises in mine.
+ Let me read, in your report, on page 75, you note Attorney
+General Levi, who did great work when he was under Gerald Ford
+in this regard, tried to clean it up and then talked about
+Attorney General Smith's revision. But this is the key point:
+Smith's guidelines, like Levi's, took account of the reality
+that suspicion of, quote, terrorism like suspicion of, quote,
+subversion could lead to making individuals targets for
+investigation more because of their beliefs than because of
+their acts. I am wondering if you think have we gotten that out
+of our system? Is it coming back?
+ Mr. Kean. I don't know the facts other than what you have
+read behind this particular case. What we do believe is that,
+as we try to protect ourselves, there is always the danger as
+we get into these new methods of protection that our civil
+liberties will be jeopardized; and we have recommended creating
+something that does not exist right now, which is a board
+within the executive branch to examine these various things
+where in cases like this are raised to actually look and see is
+this getting unnecessarily into the jeopardies of our--
+ Mr. Frank. Thank you, Chairman Kean. I would hope very
+strongly that we would make that part of any report. I hope it
+will get the attention.
+ Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to put into the
+record the New York Times article and the editorial.
+ Chairman Cox. Without objection.
+ [The information follows:]
+
+ Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company
+
+ The New York Times
+
+ August 16, 2004 Monday
+
+ Correction Appended
+
+ Late Edition--Final
+
+SECTION: Section A; Column 2; National Desk; Pg. 1
+
+LENGTH: 1605 words
+
+HEADLINE: F.B.I. Goes Knocking for Political Troublemakers
+
+BYLINE: By ERIC LICHTBLAU
+
+DATELINE: WASHINGTON, Aug. 15
+
+BODY:
+
+ The Federal Bureau of Investigation has been questioning political
+demonstrators across the country, and in rare cases even subpoenaing
+them, in an aggressive effort to forestall what officials say could be
+violent and disruptive protests at the Republican National Convention
+in New York.
+ F.B.I. officials are urging agents to canvass their communities for
+information about planned disruptions aimed at the convention and other
+coming political events, and they say they have developed a list of
+people who they think may have information about possible violence.
+They say the inquiries, which began last month before the Democratic
+convention in Boston, are focused solely on possible crimes, not on
+dissent, at major political events.
+ But some people contacted by the F.B.I. say they are mystified by
+the bureau's interest and felt harassed by questions about their
+political plans.
+ ``The message I took from it,'' said Sarah Bardwell, 21, an intern
+at a Denver antiwar group who was visited by six investigators a few
+weeks ago, ``was that they were trying to intimidate us into not going
+to any protests and to let us know that, `hey, we're watching you.' ''
+ The unusual initiative comes after the Justice Department, in a
+previously undisclosed legal opinion, gave its blessing to
+controversial tactics used last year by the F.B.I in urging local
+police departments to report suspicious activity at political and
+antiwar demonstrations to counterterrorism squads. The F.B.I. bulletins
+that relayed the request for help detailed tactics used by
+demonstrators--everything from violent resistance to Internet fund-
+raising and recruitment.
+ In an internal complaint, an F.B.I. employee charged that the
+bulletins improperly blurred the line between lawfully protected speech
+and illegal activity. But the Justice Department's Office of Legal
+Policy, in a five-page internal analysis obtained by The New York
+Times, disagreed.
+ The office, which also made headlines in June in an opinion--since
+disavowed--that authorized the use of torture against terrorism
+suspects in some circumstances, said any First Amendment impact posed
+by the F.B.I.'s monitoring of the political protests was negligible and
+constitutional.
+ The opinion said: ``Given the limited nature of such public
+monitoring, any possible 'chilling' effect caused by the bulletins
+would be quite minimal and substantially outweighed by the public
+interest in maintaining safety and order during large-scale
+demonstrations.''
+ Those same concerns are now central to the vigorous efforts by the
+F.B.I. to identify possible disruptions by anarchists, violent
+demonstrators and others at the Republican National Convention, which
+begins Aug. 30 and is expected to draw hundreds of thousands of
+protesters.
+ In the last few weeks, beginning before the Democratic convention,
+F.B.I. counterterrorism agents and other federal and local officers
+have sought to interview dozens of people in at least six states,
+including past protesters and their friends and family members, about
+possible violence at the two conventions. In addition, three young men
+in Missouri said they were trailed by federal agents for several days
+and subpoenaed to testify before a federal grand jury last month,
+forcing them to cancel their trip to Boston to take part in a protest
+there that same day.
+ Interrogations have generally covered the same three questions,
+according to some of those questioned and their lawyers: were
+demonstrators planning violence or other disruptions, did they know
+anyone who was, and did they realize it was a crime to withhold such
+information.
+ A handful of protesters at the Boston convention were arrested but
+there were no major disruptions. Concerns have risen for the Republican
+convention, however, because of antiwar demonstrations directed at
+President Bush and because of New York City's global prominence.
+ With the F.B.I. given more authority after the Sept. 11 attacks to
+monitor public events, the tensions over the convention protests,
+coupled with the Justice Department's own legal analysis of such
+monitoring, reflect the fine line between protecting national security
+in an age of terrorism and discouraging political expression.
+ F.B.I. officials, mindful of the bureau's abuses in the 1960's and
+1970's monitoring political dissidents like the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther
+King Jr., say they are confident their agents have not crossed that
+line in the lead-up to the conventions.
+ ``The F.B.I. isn't in the business of chilling anyone's First
+Amendment rights,'' said Joe Parris, a bureau spokesman in Washington.
+``But criminal behavior isn't covered by the First Amendment. What
+we're concerned about are injuries to convention participants, injuries
+to citizens, injuries to police and first responders.''
+ F.B.I. officials would not say how many people had been interviewed
+in recent weeks, how they were identified or what spurred the bureau's
+interest.
+ They said the initiative was part of a broader, nationwide effort
+to follow any leads pointing to possible violence or illegal
+disruptions in connection with the political conventions, presidential
+debates or the November election, which come at a time of heightened
+concern about a possible terrorist attack.
+ F.B.I. officials in Washington have urged field offices around the
+country in recent weeks to redouble their efforts to interview sources
+and gather information that might help to detect criminal plots. The
+only lead to emerge publicly resulted in a warning to authorities
+before the Boston convention that anarchists or other domestic groups
+might bomb news vans there. It is not clear whether there was an actual
+plot.
+ The individuals visited in recent weeks ``are people that we
+identified that could reasonably be expected to have knowledge of such
+plans and plots if they existed,'' Mr. Parris said.
+ ``We vetted down a list and went out and knocked on doors and had a
+laundry list of questions to ask about possible criminal behavior,'' he
+added. ``No one was dragged from their homes and put under bright
+lights. The interviewees were free to talk to us or close the door in
+our faces.''
+ But civil rights advocates argued that the visits amounted to
+harassment. They said they saw the interrogations as part of a pattern
+of increasingly aggressive tactics by federal investigators in
+combating domestic terrorism. In an episode in February in Iowa,
+federal prosecutors subpoenaed Drake University for records on the
+sponsor of a campus antiwar forum. The demand was dropped after a
+community outcry.
+ Protest leaders and civil rights advocates who have monitored the
+recent interrogations said they believed at least 40 or 50 people, and
+perhaps many more, had been contacted by federal agents about
+demonstration plans and possible violence surrounding the conventions
+and other political events.
+ ``This kind of pressure has a real chilling effect on perfectly
+legitimate political activity,'' said Mark Silverstein, legal director
+for the American Civil Liberties Union of Colorado, where two groups of
+political activists in Denver and a third in Fort Collins were visited
+by the F.B.I. ``People are going to be afraid to go to a demonstration
+or even sign a petition if they justifiably believe that will result in
+your having an F.B.I. file opened on you.''
+ The issue is a particularly sensitive one in Denver, where the
+police agreed last year to restrictions on local intelligence-gathering
+operations after it was disclosed that the police had kept files on
+some 3,000 people and 200 groups involved in protests.
+ But the inquiries have stirred opposition elsewhere as well.
+ In New York, federal agents recently questioned a man whose
+neighbor reported he had made threatening comments against the
+president. He and a lawyer, Jeffrey Fogel, agreed to talk to the Secret
+Service, denying the accusation and blaming it on a feud with the
+neighbor. But when agents started to question the man about his
+political affiliations and whether he planned to attend convention
+protests, ``that's when I said no, no, no, we're not going to answer
+those kinds of questions,'' said Mr. Fogel, who is legal director for
+the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York.
+ In the case of the three young men subpoenaed in Missouri, Denise
+Lieberman, legal director for the American Civil Liberties Union in St.
+Louis, which is representing them, said they scrapped plans to attend
+both the Boston and the New York conventions after they were questioned
+about possible violence.
+ The men are all in their early 20's, Ms. Lieberman said, but she
+would not identify them.
+ All three have taken part in past protests over American foreign
+policy and in planning meetings for convention demonstrations. She said
+two of them were arrested before on misdemeanor charges for what she
+described as minor civil disobedience at protests.
+ Prosecutors have now informed the men that they are targets of a
+domestic terrorism investigation, Ms. Lieberman said, but have not
+disclosed the basis for their suspicions. ``They won't tell me,'' she
+said.
+ Federal officials in St. Louis and Washington declined to comment
+on the case. Ms. Lieberman insisted that the men ``didn't have any
+plans to participate in the violence, but what's so disturbing about
+all this is the pre-emptive nature--stopping them from participating in
+a protest before anything even happened.''
+ The three men ``were really shaken and frightened by all this,''
+she said, ``and they got the message loud and clear that if you make
+plans to go to a protest, you could be subject to arrest or a visit
+from the F.B.I.''
+
+URL: http://www.nytimes.com
+
+CORRECTION-DATE: August 17, 2004
+
+CORRECTION:
+
+ A front-page article yesterday about efforts by the F.B.I. to
+interview prospective political demonstrators in advance of the
+Republican National Convention in New York misidentified the Justice
+Department office that found the bureau's monitoring of previous
+protests to be constitutional. It is the Office of Legal Counsel, not
+of Legal Policy. A caption with a picture of four Denver residents who
+were questioned in the effort referred incorrectly to two of them in
+some copies. Sarah Graves, not Christopher Riederer, is the housemate
+of Sarah Bardwell.
+
+GRAPHIC: Photo: F.B.I. agents and Denver police officers visited Sarah
+Bardwell, right, and a housemate, Sarah Graves, and two neighbors,
+Christopher Riederer, second from right, and Blake, who would not give
+his last name, at their homes to ask them about political and antiwar
+protest activities. (Photo by Carmel Zucker for The New York Times)(pg.
+A11)
+
+LOAD-DATE: August 16, 2004
+
+ Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company
+
+ The New York Times
+
+ August 17, 2004 Tuesday
+
+ Late Edition - Final
+
+SECTION: Section A; Column 1; Editorial Desk; Pg. 20
+
+LENGTH: 542 words
+
+HEADLINE: Interrogating the Protesters
+
+BODY:
+
+ For several weeks, starting before the Democratic convention,
+F.B.I. officers have been questioning potential political
+demonstrators, and their friends and families, about their plans to
+protest at the two national conventions. These heavy-handed inquiries
+are intimidating, and they threaten to chill freedom of expression.
+They also appear to be a spectacularly poor use of limited law-
+enforcement resources. The F.B.I. should redirect its efforts to focus
+more directly on real threats.
+ Six investigators recently descended on Sarah Bardwell, a 21-year-
+old intern with a Denver antiwar group, who quite reasonably took away
+the message that the government was watching her closely. In Missouri,
+three men in their early 20's said they had been followed by federal
+investigators for days, then subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury.
+They ended up canceling their plans to show up for the Democratic and
+Republican conventions.
+ The F.B.I. is going forward with the blessing of the Justice
+Department's Office of Legal Counsel--the same outfit that recently
+approved the use of torture against terrorism suspects. In the Justice
+Department's opinion, the chilling effect of the investigations is
+``quite minimal,'' and ``substantially outweighed by the public
+interest in maintaining safety and order.'' But this analysis gets the
+balance wrong. When protesters are made to feel like criminal suspects,
+the chilling effect is potentially quite serious. And the chances of
+gaining any information that would be useful in stopping violence are
+quite small.
+ The knock on the door from government investigators asking about
+political activities is the stuff of totalitarian regimes. It is
+intimidating to be visited by the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
+particularly by investigators who warn that withholding information
+about anyone with plans to create a disruption is a crime.
+ And few people would want the F.B.I. to cross-examine their friends
+and family about them. If engaging in constitutionally protected speech
+means subjecting yourself to this kind of government monitoring, many
+Americans may decide--as the men from Missouri did--that the cost is
+too high.
+ Meanwhile, history suggests that the way to find out what
+potentially violent protesters are planning is not to send F.B.I.
+officers bearing questionnaires to the doorsteps of potential
+demonstrators. As became clear in the 1960's, F.B.I. monitoring of
+youthful dissenters is notoriously unreliable. The files that were
+created in the past often proved to be laughably inaccurate.
+ The F.B.I.'s questioning of protesters is part of a larger campaign
+against political dissent that has increased sharply since the start of
+the war on terror.
+ At the Democratic convention, protesters were sent to a depressing
+barbed-wire camp under the subway tracks. And at a recent Bush-Cheney
+campaign event, audience members were required to sign a pledge to
+support President Bush before they were admitted.
+ F.B.I. officials insist that the people they interview are free to
+``close the door in our faces,'' but by then the damage may already
+have been done. The government must not be allowed to turn a war
+against foreign enemies into a campaign against critics at home.
+
+URL: http://www.nytimes.com
+
+LOAD-DATE: August 17, 2004
+
+ Mr. Frank. One last question. I was struck when you talked
+about the failure of immigration enforcement to exclude some of
+the people who came in. I was involved to state my role during
+the 1980's and 1990's trying to change the rules. I thought
+they were unduly restrictive on political grounds of people
+coming in. I take it from reading your report that you don't
+find that the problem is in the definition statutory of who can
+be excluded but rather in the failure to use that definition
+appropriately. Am I reading that accurately?
+ Mr. Kean. I think you are reading that accurately. We had a
+wonderful example of an immigration official in Orlando,
+Florida, who simply asked a couple of questions. A lot of these
+people just automatically granted access even to those that
+made false statements.
+ Mr. Frank. Can I just say that the key point is that under
+the statutes as they now exist those people were excludable if
+the right procedures had been followed. It is not that the
+statute allows--
+ Mr. Kean. No, they were excludable, and they were not. I am
+saying there was at least one case of a very alert Customs
+agent who simply started asking questions, and that was
+probably the 20th hijacker who was excluded because of a good
+civil servant doing his job.
+ Mr. Frank. We have FBI agents asking too many questions and
+immigration officials not asking enough. Maybe they can trade
+off.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Virginia, the
+distinguished chairman of the Committee on Agriculture, Mr.
+Goodlatte.
+ Mr. Goodlatte. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for
+holding this very important hearing. Thank you for the
+excellent work that both of you and your colleagues have done
+in preparing this report and providing us with many thought-
+provoking ideas that the Congress and the executive branch need
+to act upon and act upon aggressively.
+ I would like to follow up on two areas that have been
+talked about thus far. Governor Kean, you mentioned in your
+opening comments and in the report your note that in the past
+the wall that we have built between intelligence-gathering
+agencies like the CIA and law enforcement agencies like the FBI
+was due to the risk of inadvertent disclosure that outweighs
+the benefit of sharing information with other agencies.
+ That certainly is one of the concerns, certainly, on the
+part of intelligence agencies why we had that wall, but it was
+not by any means the only reason. Another reason that the wall
+was built up was to address the concern about the use of
+intelligence gathering which is done with regard to foreign
+nationals but necessarily involves also gathering information
+about U.S. citizens when those foreign nationals have
+communications with them and so on. Even when done properly,
+information is gathered, and the concern was then that law
+enforcement agencies which could abuse that information would
+not have access to it.
+ Obviously, there is a big flaw in that; and September 11th
+is the greatest proof of that flaw. But, nonetheless, while we
+did in the PATRIOT Act, I would note, partially tear down that
+wall to enable the sharing of that information, we have also
+been careful to make sure that we not have the kind of abuses
+that some have suggested could occur.
+ I wonder if you have additional comments that you might
+make or recommendations that you might make to how the Congress
+can assure the public that the action taken as a part of the
+PATRIOT Act was a sound one for the reasons of September 11th
+but not one that should cause them concern that their civil
+liberties are going to be abused.
+ Mr. Kean. You know, in that regard I would say there is
+probably no substitute for the oversight of the committees. I
+mean, that is another argument for really having very, very
+vigorous oversight on the part of the Congress, to make sure
+that the public can be assured that it is being done properly.
+ Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you.
+ Congressman Hamilton.
+ Mr. Hamilton. Well, we think the provisions of the PATRIOT
+Act that facilitate the sharing of information between the law
+enforcement people on the one side and the intelligence on the
+other are very beneficial and very important in terms of a
+counterterrorism strategy overall. We are not experts on the
+PATRIOT Act, and there are many provisions of the PATRIOT Act,
+but this provision we think is very, very important.
+ Mr. Goodlatte. Let me follow up also on the questions
+related to immigration. I was pleased to hear you both say that
+more robust enforcement of routine immigration laws--and the
+example you just cited is clearly one of those--is very
+important. I wonder how serious you are about that. This is, as
+you probably know, a major political issue here in the
+Congress. There are very widely differing opinions about what
+types of overall reforms, some related to national security,
+some related to a whole host of other interests, should take
+place. But we have been unable to reach conclusions about that
+except the law that we passed in 1996 that did provide for
+greater crackdown on illegal immigration.
+ Nonetheless, since that time I would argue, in part because
+of lack of enforcement of our current immigration laws, we have
+seen the number of illegal immigrants in the country rise.
+Obviously, not all of those are threats to our national
+security, but it is very difficult when have you a lack of
+information because people are operating below the radar screen
+which ones are and which ones are not of concern to the country
+because of national security. How aggressively should we be
+enforcing our immigration laws overall to avoid that very type
+of problem when that individual presented himself to that
+particular immigration officer in Florida, that officer had no
+reason before asking the questions whether that particular
+person was a threat.
+ We also have millions of people who never check in with an
+immigration officer to go through that kind of questioning who
+are here in this country, some of which have malicious intent;
+and I wish you would comment on the need to enforce our
+immigration laws overall and address this problem.
+ Mr. Hamilton. I want to say, first of all, in responding to
+your question, that we were given a mandate and we did not
+construe that mandate to mean that we should review all of
+these immigration questions that you have presented.
+ Mr. Goodlatte. I understand. I am talking about enforcement
+of current law.
+ Mr. Hamilton. I think the enforcement has to be very
+robust. Let me say that we believe that border security is a
+part of national security and that we have to have an
+integrated, modern border and immigration system. You can't
+look at them as two separate things. You have got to have a
+border and immigration system that meshes. We make three
+specific recommendations, and they are fairly broad, but there
+is where we focused our interest.
+ Number one, we said you must move towards a biometric entry
+and exit system as soon as you possibly can. We think that is
+absolutely essential to getting control of the border and to
+providing an integrated border immigration system. So number
+one is the adoption of a biometric entry exit system.
+ Number two is to have accessible files on visitors and
+immigrants so that officials at all points who deal with people
+coming into this country--Customs, Border Patrol, immigration,
+visas, passports, whatever--you have to have an accessible file
+that people can tap into to learn about that person. Is that
+person who he says he is or she is? And we have got to be able
+to put that all together and integrate it.
+ And the third thing we say is you have to use intelligence
+on indicators of the terrorist travel tactics. Terrorists are
+great travelers. They have all kinds of tactics which we have
+already referred to earlier in our report, and you have got to
+get intelligence on those tactics so that you can effectively
+defend your borders.
+ We do not, Mr. Goodlatte, get into more detail on
+immigration than that. What we have suggested is--calls for
+major change, and I must say it is not inexpensive. It is going
+to cost a lot of money.
+ Mr. Kean. It is probably the largest expense of all of our
+recommendations.
+ We also believe, by the way, as we move in this direction
+if possible it be coordinated with other countries,
+particularly like the European Union who have the same interest
+we do. And because the terrorists are so vulnerable when they
+are traveling, if we could have a biometric system as
+integrated with as many countries as possible, it is going to
+make the terrorist's job a lot tougher.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Harman.
+ Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ I would first like to observe that many members of this
+committee in the lower rows here have traveled across the
+country today to participate, and I would urge you to gavel
+each person's questions closed at 5 minutes sharp, including
+the answers, because it is really unfair to other members that
+they will have so little time.
+ Chairman Cox. I appreciate the gentlelady's comments.
+ Ms. Harman. And please gavel me closed. I don't plan to
+exceed the 5 minutes.
+ I would like to welcome our witnesses. I have had a lot of
+time to talk to them, to read their report carefully. I think
+it is an exceptionally good report. I think we will be
+measured, all of us in this committee, all of us in Congress,
+and the President, by whether we step up and act on the
+recommendations, not just talk about them but act on the
+recommendations.
+ If there are representatives of the 9/11 families in the
+audience today, as there have been in so many hearings, I would
+like to welcome you and tell you that, certainly speaking just
+for me, I will do everything I can to make sure that these
+recommendations are acted on in a timely way in this term of
+Congress.
+ I just want to mention several things. I was one who
+testified before the Rules Committee as a ranking member of the
+Intelligence Committee. I testified in favor of making this
+committee permanent, making it have real jurisdiction so that
+it could truly authorize a real homeland security budget. That
+will mean other committees giving up jurisdiction. I think we
+should be for that.
+ Similarly, I feel that the Intelligence Committee--realize
+I have an interest in it, but even if I were not a member--
+should have real jurisdiction and should have, as both
+witnesses have testified, control over both the authorization
+and appropriations of a standalone intelligence budget. We do
+not have that. In fact, the defense appropriations budget is
+already law. It appropriates funds for intelligence programs
+that have not yet been authorized. I think that that is a sad
+commentary on the state of power of the Intelligence Committees
+in the Congress.
+ At any rate, I want to focus today on one of what I think
+are two glaring gaps. One glaring gap is information sharing.
+We have had lots of conversation about the need--and I share
+this--for a national intelligence, a national counterterrorism
+director, technology reforms and so forth. These are great
+ideas.
+ I want to talk about the other glaring gap, and that is
+interoperable communications. Congressman Hamilton mentioned it
+this morning. Congressman Kean testified about it yesterday.
+There is a recommendation in your report that specifically says
+Congress should support legislation to expedite the assignment
+of radio spectrum. Legislation introduced in the House 17
+months ago by Congressman Curt Weldon and me has been
+languishing because of jurisdictional disputes in various
+committees. It would close the gap and make certain that
+adequate spectrum is available by the end of 2002 which was the
+promise--2006, excuse me, a promise Congress made in 1997.
+ My question to you is, when you say we should expedite the
+assignment of radio spectrum, are you talking about closing the
+loopholes and making certain that that spectrum is available by
+2006 or are you trying to argue that we should transfer that
+spectrum even sooner?
+ Mr. Kean. As soon as possible.
+ Let me tell you what she is talking about. We have been
+told by respondents--firemen, policemen, first aid people--who
+respond to the scene that they do not now have the ability to
+communicate with one another and therefore save lives together.
+It puts their lives in jeopardy, and it puts people's lives in
+jeopardy. They can't do it because they don't have enough
+spectrum for their radios. This is a plea that came to us
+particularly from the New York Police Department and Fire
+Department but a number of others, also.
+ I recognize this is a tougher one because I guess you would
+be taking on the National Association of Broadcasters. They win
+most of their fights. But it is absolutely essential for the
+protection of the American people.
+ I can't tell you how important that is. Talk at home, talk
+to your responders, talk to your fire and police, talk to the
+people in your districts, because this has to be done. This is
+something which will not only in case of a terrorist attack but
+in case of the kind of terrible tragedy we had in Florida with
+the hurricane, in case of any other emergencies like that,
+giving spectrum to our public safety officials is just going to
+make your constituents and our countrymen and women a lot
+safer.
+ Ms. Harman. Governor, I thank you.
+ I would like to quote Senator McCain from yesterday. He
+said, ``I have been on this committee''--that is the Commerce
+Committee--``for 18 years and they''--that is the
+broadcasters--'' won every time. Maybe we will have a victory
+on behalf of the American people. I surely hope so.''
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Cox. I agree.
+ The gentleman from New York, Mr. King.
+ Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ First of all, I want to thank Governor Kean and Congressman
+Hamilton for the great job they have done. The country owes you
+a tremendous debt.
+ Also, as someone who lost well over 100 friends, neighbors,
+and constituents on September 11th, I want to thank
+Congresswoman Sanchez and Congressman Shays for the remarks
+they made about the importance that Congress has to give to
+this committee and to this entire issue of homeland security. I
+think it is really unfortunate that too many Members of
+Congress are still living back on September 10th, 2001. If
+another attack does come, we haven't done our job. There will
+be no forgiving any of us for not having moving forward when we
+should have.
+ Congressman Hamilton, I think my main question is to you.
+You touched on this before, but it is often the whole issue of
+TTIC and the National Counterterrorism Threat Center. I would
+ask you--first of all, I read the report. I am not certain
+exactly what you mean by saying that you would build on TTIC.
+In other words, will it still be there? Will it continue to
+function?
+ Second, if you could give us your analysis of the job that
+TTIC has done and is doing and how you expect that to be
+improved by the National Counterterrorism Threat Center. How
+and why will there be a better job done in the future than
+there will be now under TTIC?
+ Mr. Hamilton. I think TTIC is a valuable concept. It is
+working reasonably well. We are concerned that the people that
+are assigned to TTIC are not at the highest level. In other
+words, it tends to be junior level people; and it doesn't quite
+have the overall clout that you want.
+ What you have today is a lot of different fusion centers
+around the government, and TTIC is one among several fusion
+centers, maybe even one among many. What we are suggesting here
+is a National Counterterrorism Center which would take the lead
+on strategic analysis and develop net assessments, and it would
+really have--it would not--it would replace all of the other
+fusion centers. This would be the center that you would look to
+for your strategic analysis, the President and Members of
+Congress, and to make assessments and to provide warnings of
+possible terrorist attacks. It would have the responsibility of
+tasking collection requirements.
+ In other words--and that is a terribly important role in
+the Intelligence Community--to say, OK, you are going to go
+after this, you are going to use these assets to go after this
+kind of intelligence. And it would be--it would have that
+responsibility both inside and outside the United States. It
+would be a very--it would absorb and we think strengthen the
+analytic talent that exists today in TTIC and not just TTIC but
+the Counterterrorism Center, the DIA's Joint Intelligence Task
+Force combating terrorism. So it is a newer and much more
+powerful fusion center.
+ In addition to what I have said, it would have not just
+responsibilities in intelligence but it would have
+responsibilities in operational planning as well. And this is
+an important concept that we borrow completely from the
+military. It is not just an intelligence entity, it is a place
+where you pool and collect and analyze all of the intelligence
+from the various intelligence agencies of the United States,
+but, beyond that, it is an operational center in the sense that
+it plans operations.
+ The Governor mentioned early on in his testimony the case
+of these two muscular hijackers in San Diego. We had bits and
+information--bits and pieces of information about them. Nowhere
+did it all come together. Nobody was in charge in the sense of
+managing the case. And that is what you need. You need someone
+to step forward and say we are going to manage the case.
+ George Tenet was informed in August of 2001 about Moussaoui
+in Minneapolis. We asked him about it; and he said, first of
+all, he assigned some of his people to work with the FBI on it.
+Then we said, did you talk to the President about it? And he
+said, no, and said this was the FBI's case.
+ I don't think that answer was wrong. It was the FBI's case,
+but clearly insufficient. What was the problem? The problem was
+nobody was managing the case. Nobody was saying to themselves,
+I know about these two fellows out on the West Coast. I know
+this about them. I know that about them. It raises red flags.
+And somebody has got to take hold of that and management case,
+plan it operationally. And that is what this counterterrorism
+would do.
+ They are appointed by the President. It reports to the
+National Intelligence Director. It is a very, very important
+center. May I say that it is not just a center that deals with
+counterterrorism--excuse me, beyond that, we create centers for
+other threats. Because the same thing is needed with regard to
+other threats. WMD or maybe you put China or maybe you put the
+international crime and narcotics on the list. Whatever you
+think the major threats to the national security are, we create
+a center, if you would, to deal with it. Those would change
+from time to time, and the responsibility would be not just to
+pool all of the intelligence you have got but to operationally
+plan it and to see that the policy decisions of the President
+and the National Security Council are in fact carried out.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Cardin.
+ Mr. Hamilton. It is a very new concept, and it is not easy
+to get hold of.
+ Mr. Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Let me also offer my congratulations to Governor Kean and
+to Congressman Hamilton for their extraordinary service to our
+country. I also want to compliment the other members of your
+Commission for the extraordinary work that you were able to do.
+It is a very professional document.
+ I hope the fact that we are holding these August hearings,
+which are extraordinary for Congress to do, means that we will
+have action in September establishing a single point, single
+person for the collection and analysis of intelligence
+information and strengthening the entire process for dealing
+with intelligence information and protecting us.
+ I also cannot help but look at a comparison to the Cold
+War. Growing up in the Cold War, the fear of communism and the
+Soviet Union really prevailed throughout our community, similar
+to how the fear of terrorism is today. We developed a strategy
+in the Cold War to develop a very strong national defense, and
+we did that in the United States. But we also recognized we
+couldn't win the war on terrorism alone and the war against the
+communists alone, that we needed to develop international
+support. We worked with our friends in Europe, and we developed
+NATO, which was a way of shoring up our defense in Europe, and
+we shared a lot of information with the Europeans. And we won.
+ We developed a war of ideas, and we used new technology at
+that time to get information behind the Iron Curtain that there
+was a better way of life, with democratic principles and
+respect for human rights that led to economic advancements. And
+more and more people, more and more nations agreed with us; and
+we won the Cold War.
+ So I guess my point is, I looked at your report, and I am
+impressed by your commitment to expand our efforts
+internationally. Yes, we need to develop our capacities here
+for sharing information, but we also need to work with our
+friends around the world to share information. The people who
+travel to the United States, the terrorists go through other
+countries; and we need to share that information.
+ In 1975, we developed the Helsinki Accord, the organization
+for security and cooperation in Europe to develop an
+international regional forum to share a commitment towards
+democratic principles and respect for human rights. It helped
+us during the Cold War with a forum that we could go to
+challenge the actions of other countries and to help people who
+in their own countries were fighting a battle of ideas.
+ There is interest in the Middle East to do that, to develop
+forums where we can show hope to people and look at longer-
+range solutions to this battle.
+ So I just really wanted to give you an opportunity to
+underscore the importance not just for us to look inward at our
+own Nation to improve the collection of intelligence
+information and to deal with a better sharing of information,
+but this battle, if we are going to win it, also has to be
+engaged internationally with the U.S. leadership working with
+our friends around the world, particularly in the Middle East.
+ Mr. Kean. Congressman, thank you very much for making that
+point. Because that is a very strong and important area of our
+recommendations and hasn't received the focus, frankly, that
+some the rest of it has. We have got to have a consistent
+message going out to that part of the world. And it is a
+message of hope. You are absolutely right. Bin Laden's message
+is one of despair that leads eventually to death. That is what
+he is talking about. If we don't have a message to these people
+to show there is a better life, that we can actually provide a
+path to that better life, that we are on their side, not
+somebody else's side, we are not going to win this.
+ Because, as Secretary Rumsfeld said to us once, you know we
+can kill these terrorists, but if they are being created faster
+than we kill them, we are not going to win this one. That is
+one thing, the message of hope, certainly working with our
+friends and allies who have some of the same interests we do
+and share the same hopes and dreams and way of life and ideals,
+getting those across. We have specific recommendations, as you
+know, for some of the most important countries, we believe--
+Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan. The emphasis on those
+three countries in our report is very, very important.
+ We believe the whole way in which we do business in that
+part of the world, once we get a consistent message, has got to
+change--if we are, for instance, upset, as we should be, that
+these madrasas that kids are going to in that part of the world
+are teaching hate and teaching hate of the West and all of
+that, well, there has got to be some alternative. A lot of the
+young children are going to those madrasas because there is no
+other school. There is other opportunity for parents to send
+them anywhere except the madrasas. All right, let's help these
+countries to build alternatives.
+ There are a number of recommendations along this area in
+our report. We believe, frankly, they are among the most
+important recommendations.
+ Thank you very much for bringing them to our attention.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Linder.
+ Mr. Linder. I want to thank you both for being here and for
+your service to our country. We appreciate it.
+ Lee, you mentioned something about biometrics early on. It
+strikes me that the terrorists need access to our traveling
+systems, our airplanes, our trains, and if we could get to
+biometric identifiers on people who are not risks quickly,
+could we spend more of our time on those who might be risks and
+cannot be identified with the biometrics? Would you expand on
+that?
+ Mr. Hamilton. You always have a tension here. Most of the
+people that come into this country are peaceful and have good
+intent. The overwhelming number that come into the country do.
+You have a lot of people who come into the country every day to
+work and go back and you have to develop systems that sort
+these people out very quickly. That is one of the goals, I
+think, of the biometric entry exit system.
+ We have to develop the technology and the skill to let the
+peaceful people, if you will, through quickly and the person
+who is a regular commuter across the international boundary, to
+let him go through quickly; and we think the biometric system
+integrated with both border security and immigration is the way
+to do that. It is the quickest way to do it.
+ To pick up on the previous question, you have to have
+international cooperation on that. We want to develop a
+biometric system that is internationally recognized. Now, that
+is not going to be done in the next year or two, but it ought
+to be the goal in the long term, and it is the way to assure
+fluid commerce.
+ We are very concerned about the anecdotal, I guess,
+information we were getting about the number of scholars who
+are not coming into the country and the number of students who
+are not coming into the country. This is a serious matter for
+us in the long term, and we have to figure out a system. Now,
+we have talked to all of the top officials about this. They are
+very alert to it. They know the importance of it. So I think
+the system will move forward. But we have got to accelerate it.
+If we don't, we are going to be denying ourselves and this
+country a lot of talent that we need.
+ Mr. Linder. Governor, you think alluded twice to are we
+staying ahead, are we killing more terrorists than we are
+creating or than are being created? You referred to the
+madrasas. I would like to ask you very bluntly, can we deal
+with this without dealing directly and frontally and bluntly
+with Saudi Arabia?
+ Mr. Kean. No. And the relationship with Saudi Arabia has
+got to change. Our relationship in the past with Saudi Arabia,
+to be very blunt, is, as I understand it, has been oil. That
+has been the relationship with Saudi Arabia. Allies to the
+royal family, they ensure us enough oil, and that has sort of
+been the relationship.
+ That can't be the relationship anymore. We have got to
+continue to work with the royal family. There is no question
+about it. But we got to work with the royal family to bring
+some changes in that country.
+ It seems they are now recognizing that their way of life,
+the royal family's leaders of Saudi Arabia, is under attack;
+and these Islamic militants would like to overthrow them just
+as much as they would like to injure us at the moment. So they
+are, of necessity, our allies; and they also realize the need
+for change within their own borders. We have got to work with
+them on that. We have got to help them on that. We have got to
+work with them instituting the changes that are possible and
+then try to push and shove a little bit and get a few more
+changes to the system.
+ Because if Saudi Arabia--I mean, we identified those three
+countries--Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan--because if any
+one of them went the wrong direction, we would have a world of
+trouble on the international stage and in the terrorist
+problem. So, yes, the relationship with Saudi Arabia has to
+change, must change.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentlelady from New York, Mrs. Slaughter.
+ Ms. Slaughter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am so happy to
+see both of you here this morning.
+ I think the whole world owes you thanks for what you have
+done. I want to express my thanks to your amazing staff as
+well. The report that they have produced is unequal to any
+report I have seen in three legislatures, and I am very
+grateful for that.
+ Personally. I lost any confidence I might have had that our
+intelligence agencies were any good when the CIA let Aldrich
+Ames sit with them for 8 years as a Russian spy and the FBI let
+Robert Hanssen do the same thing here in the shadow of the
+Capitol. It certainly was not lost on me that if they couldn't
+even find spies in their midst that worked with them on a daily
+basis that they probably weren't doing a great deal to protect
+us. So I was not surprised at that.
+ I agree with you absolutely about congressional oversight.
+We have got to get some control in this House and make this a
+strong committee that really has the jurisdiction it needs to
+see to give the American people and the rest of the world
+confidence that we are doing our part to keep America secure.
+ In that regard, I have only got one complaint. I represent
+Niagara Falls, New York; and you have recommended that DHS lead
+the effort for the comprehensive integrated system. I would
+like to ask you to reconsider that. After 3 years, DHS has
+still not given us a threat assessment. At this point, Wyoming
+is getting the same amount of aid from our national security as
+New Yorkers on a per capita basis. This makes no sence since
+all of us are aware that if terrorists strike, two things they
+are going to want to do is, one, kill as many people as
+possible and, two, cause as much economic damage as possible.
+And while I don't mean to denigrate Wyoming, that is not likely
+to happen there.
+ On our border, since 9/11 there has been a complete backup
+of both commerce and people at our border crossing. It it takes
+about five hours to get across. At the same time, you can still
+come across in a rowboat from Canada to the United States at
+many, many points; and people do that. DHS' plan for security
+on the Great Lakes was to set up something that would require
+every boat on the lake to report to a video phone somewhere,
+many, many of them 60, 70 miles apart, which are continuously
+out of order.
+ Now what people tell me is that fewer than 5 percent even
+attempt to use those video phones. The only thing that people
+who do not do so have to worry about, in some of our rural
+counties, is that the sheriff might somehow pluck them up from
+all of the hundreds of boaters who are there.
+ It simply does not work; and, beyond that, it doesn't make
+any sense.
+ At the same time, we have tightened up so much on our
+border on our side you cannot come in from Canada literally for
+hours. I am meeting tomorrow with my Canadian counterparts to
+see what we can do. DHS has come up with a Nexus card, which I
+think Congressman Hamilton referred to, which would work except
+it costs $80 for 5 years and nobody will pay. In addition, in
+my area, you can only buy it in Canada.
+ So these are some of the things that we should be able to
+deal with, but at this point I would like to see if you would
+re-consider your border recommendation and see if one of the
+national laboratories or NIST or GAO or somebody could develop
+a better border plan do that in a hurry. Because we can't wait
+3 more years for something like that.
+ So that is my major concern at this point having--
+representing one of those border States, I need to tell you
+that what DHS is doing there simply does not work.
+ Citizens tell me that in these rural towns, they see boats
+come in, cars drive on the bridge, pick up somebody or
+something from that boat and go away all night long. By the
+time they call the sheriff, they are long gone.
+ So this is a wide-open area which is of some concern. What
+the answer is eludes me, but I am very much concerned that
+after 3 years I think that all that we have accomplished there
+basically is to aggravate almost everybody who lives in that
+area. Most of these people cross this bridge almost on a daily
+basis; and if they try to get to the Nexus lane, they can't.
+They are tied up so much in traffic.
+ So these are some of the things on a local basis that we
+are trying to deal with. My sense about DHS is 170,000 people
+trying to learn how to get along. I am not sure they are
+anywhere near close to that at this point.
+ So I just throw that out for your recommendation. But,
+beyond that, I cannot tell you how impressed I am on the work
+that you have done. Like Congressman Shays, I will certainly
+pledge to you my strong support that we will get your
+recommendations enacted into law. Thank you very much for what
+you have done and I appreciate, despite all that other work you
+have done, that you continue to make all these rounds and talk
+to all of us. Thank you both very much.
+ Mr. Kean. Thank you very much.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Shadegg.
+ Mr. Shadegg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and, gentlemen, I
+would like to echo the appreciation of the others on the panel.
+I greatly appreciate the work you have done. I think it is a
+great contribution to our efforts here in the Congress to move
+forward and to improve homeland security.
+ I want to begin with a question that goes to kind of one of
+the thrusts of the report. A great deal of your recommendations
+go to restructuring, restructuring particularly of the
+Intelligence Community, and not substantive recommendations.
+Some have criticized that. One prominent individual within the
+CIA has criticized that rather strongly. Others have said that
+at least a flaw they see in your overall report is its failure
+to emphasize revitalizing the clandestine service to infiltrate
+and destroy terrorist organizations, as opposed to making
+structural or restructuring recommendations.
+ I would like to give you a chance to respond to that and
+tell us why you think focusing on restructuring is important
+and, second, how important you personally believe it is to
+increase our efforts through the clandestine service to
+infiltrate and destroy terrorist organizations.
+ Mr. Hamilton. We put a lot of emphasis on strengthening
+human intelligence, and I think that is part of the
+conventional wisdom today. Everybody agrees with it. I don't
+know anybody that disagrees with it.
+ Now, there are two problems with it. One is that it is
+very, very tough to penetrate these cells; and that is why you
+have to have a lot more diversity into the CIA. But these cells
+are very small. I suspect they are the most difficult
+intelligence targets there to penetrate. We must not have
+exaggerated expectations about our ability to do it.
+ I am all for doing it, I am all for strengthening the human
+intelligence, and it clearly needs to be done. But may I cite
+to you when I was chairman of the Intelligence Committee back
+in the late 1980's and the early 1990's that we were talking
+about strengthening human intelligence. This is not a new idea.
+It is just very hard to do. And Tenet testified before us that
+it will take him at least 5 years from now to get intelligence
+clandestine service where he wants it to be.
+ The second problem that I think we often overlook with
+regard to intelligence HUMINT, human intelligence, is you are
+asking a person to live a very dangerous life for a very long
+period of time, away from family, away from country, and it is
+not the easiest thing to recruit those kind of people. They
+have to be absolutely fluent in the language. They have to be
+able to be absorbed into the culture so that nobody would
+recognize them.
+ So I am all for human intelligence. I think it needs to be
+strengthened, but I also think we have to have some reasonable
+expectation of its limitations.
+ The second point about why did we put so much emphasis on
+the structure, I would only say to the person that made that
+criticism they haven't read the report. Look, we talk in here
+about the military actions that are necessary, attacking the
+Usama bin Ladens of the world, of not providing any
+sanctuaries. We have a whole chapter devoted to American
+foreign policy and how you prevent the growth of terrorism, how
+you have got to engage with ideas, how our policies have to
+understand the--we have to understand the consequences of our
+policies. We talk about the elements of a coalition strategy,
+public diplomacy, scholarship exchanges, agenda of opportunity,
+a better vision. We talk about how to stop terrorist financing
+or use terrorist financing to your advantage; and we have a
+whole list of recommendations, many of which we have been
+talking about today, about how to protect ourselves better.
+ So I understand that a lot of the discussion in the public
+press and in the media has been on institutional reform, and
+that is understandable because--but--
+ Mr. Shadegg. I have just a little bit of time. Let me get
+in one other question.
+ Under the structure you envision there will be--several
+agencies will be able to search the database--we are talking
+about intelligence-gathering agencies--the database of other
+agencies. I think that is clearly necessary. But my question
+is, is not that or did you give thought to the fact that might,
+in fact, be a disincentive for the agencies to put information
+into their database and--since human nature being what it is--
+and are there recommendations you think within your report that
+go to that particular point?
+ Mr. Hamilton. It is a good point, and what it means is you
+have to have someone above the agency who has the power to
+impose rules and regulations to force that sharing. I think you
+put your finger on a very good point. It is not automatic that
+you get the sharing, and the tendency of keeping the
+information you have got from everybody else is a very human
+one and a very strong one. The only way I know you can deal
+with it is through superior authority.
+ Mr. Shadegg. I thank you for your report.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Oregon, Mr. DeFazio.
+ Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, thanks
+for convening the committee during the August recess.
+ I have several questions. Stansfield Turner and others have
+postulated that a number of the more urgent reforms and
+requirements that you are putting forward in terms of a
+National Intelligence Director, budgetary control, basically
+putting someone in charge and making the agency share could be
+done by executive order or modification of Ronald Reagan's
+executive order regarding the intelligence services. So that
+would be one question, to comment on whether or not, given the
+fact Congress won't act at least until September, very likely
+may be not even until later than that, shouldn't the President
+look at implementing some of these changes more quickly by
+executive order?
+ The second would be, you commented on interoperability and
+the focus was on spectrum, but I would like you to focus, if
+you could, on cost of interoperability. Because that seems to
+me to be the major barrier to all of the first responders I
+talked to. In fact, the President's budget this year zeroed out
+interoperability funds from the Federal Government. What
+priority would you put on that since you have talked about the
+fact that the funds are spread widely, but would you put a
+priority on a national interoperable communications system for
+all level of government since you rightly pointed out that
+Federal, State, and local are the eyes and ears and first
+responders are the State and local and they need to be there.
+ So, first, the executive order; second, interoperability;
+and then, third, if you could just come back to--I continue to
+be frustrated. I thought I was told at an aviation hearing that
+we now had an integrated watchlist or it was announced actually
+at a hearing by Admiral Stone, as I recall, that by the end of
+that month--and I believe that was the month of June--that
+there would be an integrated watchlist available so that the
+agencies and the TSA could access that.
+ If you could comment on those three things.
+ Mr. Kean. I guess I will start.
+ While some of it could be done by executive order, we felt
+very strongly--we talked about this and talked about this on
+the Commission--that the Congress really ought to--is it ought
+to be law and Congress ought to have the input and Congress
+ought to be the designer and it ought to be permanent. And that
+things done by executive order are not permanent and sometimes
+they are not agreed to by the Congress and that creates all
+sorts of problems. So we felt very strongly in the Commission
+as we talked about it that this really should be
+congressionally inputted.
+ Mr. DeFazio. Quickly, because I hope you can cover the
+other two points, but I mean is it urgent that we begin to
+force the coordination more quickly and that perhaps at least
+as an interim step the President could appoint somebody or
+could force that change in terms of authority to the CID?
+ Mr. Kean. He could do anything, I guess, in consultation
+with the Congress. My worry is if you start to put a new system
+in place or a new individual in place or what have you and then
+the Congress comes along behind that--for instance, a person
+who we would recommend should be Senate confirmed because it is
+such an important position. So you put somebody in, it is
+just--it raises problems that we would much rather have the
+Congress to obviously act with due deliberation but act as
+hastily as possible because we believe that until this
+information is shared the American people are not going to be
+as safe as they should be.
+ As far as the cost of trying to make a communication
+system, we leave it--we believe it is a national priority.
+These first responders and people who are going to come to
+national emergencies need help and everything we can do to help
+them I think we ought to do.
+ And the third point.
+ Mr. DeFazio. Watchlist. We have been told it was going to
+be up and running.
+ Mr. Hamilton. Our impression is we do not have a totally
+integrated watchlist, and there is still a number of different
+watchlists, and we are urge, of course, that it be integrated.
+ Mr. DeFazio. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Souder.
+ Mr. Souder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to pursue a
+little bit the biometric indicators on the licenses. We have
+had a little bit of discussion about this, mostly as it relates
+to borders.
+ A couple of premises. One is that not every terrorist is
+going to cross the border. Some may already be here. second,
+they may even in fact, since they don't seem in a rush, get
+themselves into regular crossings and get into the fast pass
+lanes, get secured. It seems to me, in addition to kind of the
+way we are doing it now, the random or unexpected or occasional
+terrorist, we also have to have a system that has biometric
+indicators or other things more than just that.
+ Could you elaborate a little bit more on whether you see
+this as a watermark, whether you see this as indicators, what
+type of things, whether you see this for all citizens, for
+people who have Green Cards? And also address the question, as
+many cities in Indiana and other places are starting to accept
+non-American identification, which would include setting up a
+bank account which would make it very difficult for us to track
+financial funding, be able to go to a store to pick up
+precursor chemicals for bombs using a non-American ID, could
+you elaborate more in detail and specific how we should start
+to address this question?
+ Mr. Hamilton. I don't think, Mr. Souder, that we consider
+ourselves any kind of experts on what kind of a biometric
+screening system you have. It is a complicated, technical
+question; and you do want to try to begin to implement the
+system as soon as you can and not wait for the perfect system
+to come along.
+ What we say is that the goal is an effective biometric
+entry/exit screening system, that it needs to be compatible
+with other countries to the extent possible so that we can
+exchange information about these people that cross
+international boundaries. We need to have border officials who
+have access to interoperable--access I guess to all of the
+information about an individual traveler; and we think it is
+just common sense to have a modern, integrated border
+immigration system.
+ Now, all of that, of what I have said to you, are kind of
+general principles and statements. That is as far as the
+Commission went in addition to saying that you have got to have
+all of the intelligence you can about individual travelers.
+When you get into the questions you are raising about the kinds
+of biometric systems and all, we did not address those.
+ Mr. Souder. Don't you agree it isn't just a matter of
+travelers? They may already be here. People can move and get
+work permits and say something more than a passport. Don't we
+need a system internally as well? Can you comment on how can
+you track intelligence if you can't track the individuals? What
+good will a national intelligence center do if people can start
+bank accounts and pick up bomb supplies and we don't know who
+they are?
+ Mr. Hamilton. Well, it is a very important point because
+what we know is that the terrorists are very good at exploiting
+the gaps. And if we have a marvelous system that works at the
+borders but it doesn't catch the illegals and it doesn't catch
+other people who come in different ways, it is not going to
+work. And that is really what we mean by the word integrated.
+It has to include all of the ways that we check on people
+coming into this country.
+ Mr. Souder. Mr. Hamilton, I have a question. As a fellow
+Hoosier, one of the difficult things we have, and you have this
+in your report, that we have to put the money to targeted
+higher-risk areas. Bottom line what that means is moving money
+from Indiana to the East Coast and hardening targets in the
+East Coast, which potentially leaves us more vulnerable in
+Indiana. We saw the incident in Ohio, that it can move to other
+places.
+ How do you advise those of us who are in those places to
+deal with this difficult political question? It is fine to say
+that is the case, but the terrorists may move around. They are
+going to go to softer targets. You may get copycats. What do
+you recommend we say, those of us who already see a lot of our
+dollars go to the East and West Coast?
+ Mr. Hamilton. There are limited resources, and you have to
+make some tough judgments. I think it is likely that every
+State could make a claim for some of these funds. But to
+suggest that you are going to predict a rural county in
+southern Indiana--I will say southern rather than northern
+Indiana--to the extent that you protect New York City or
+Washington, D.C., just doesn't stack up with the intelligence
+information.
+ So you have a limited number of dollars. You can't protect
+against every threat, you cannot protect against every tactic
+that a terrorist will use, and you have to make some very tough
+judgments as to where you put those dollars. I know that those
+are very difficult judgments to make because you are dealing
+with a question of priorities, and priorities is always the
+toughest question in government. Where do you put limited
+resources?
+ The intelligence chatter is very clear. The intelligence
+chatter is that New York and Washington, D.C., are the primary
+targets and, therefore, the bulk of your resources have to go
+there. I know that may not be an easy message for somebody from
+Indiana because they see it, but I also think that there are
+many facilities--I mentioned in the testimony 85 percent of the
+facilities that need protection are in the private sector. You
+folks know better than anybody what facilities in your district
+need protecting, and I suspect some Federal funds should be
+made available for these most vulnerable facilities. You have
+to also take into account not just the vulnerability of the
+facility but how much damage would be done if the facility, in
+fact, were attacked.
+ Mr. Hamilton. How many lives would be lost, what are the
+risks, all of those things have to be sorted through, and so we
+say money should be distributed largely on a risk assessment
+basis.
+ Mr. Kean. There are two targets that come over and over and
+over again. These people want to kill as many of us as
+possible, so they are going to pick targets where the most
+people are. And second, they talk about the symbols of America.
+And so where those symbols are located are where the targets
+will be. We have to direct our resources to the places where
+those large numbers of people congregate and where the symbols
+exist.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentlelady from New York, Ms. Lowey.
+ Mrs. Lowey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to join my
+colleagues in welcoming you, Chairman Kean and my good
+colleague, Lee Hamilton. I really appreciate your last
+comments, because it is an excellent segue way to several of
+the issues that many of us have been working on as New Yorkers.
+First of all, I would like to generally ask you to continue
+your involvement, to continue using your clout and influence in
+implementing the recommendations that don't require overall
+structure change. I support the structure change, but for those
+of us who have been trying to move some of these issues
+forward, we share the frustration of many here in this Congress
+that we can't get it done.
+ First of all, John Sweeney and I and others have been
+working on formula change. We have not been able to get that
+done. I won't repeat the statistics. You know, and Louise
+Slaughter mentioned it as well, when you compare the per capita
+of New York to the other areas, it should be an embarrassment
+to all of us: $10.12 compared to the $38 to other parts of the
+country. So please continue your advocacy. Whether it is done
+through the Congress or executive order, it must be done and it
+must be done as soon as possible, and I know you agree.
+ second, many of us have been talking about airport
+security. In your report, you say, quote, ``It must take into
+consideration the full array of possible enemy tactics, such as
+the use of insiders.'' Did the Commission intend for airport
+workers, cabin cleaners, maintenance crews, caterers who are
+currently permitted to bypass metal detectors, or should
+everyone have to go through metal detectors? And I have been
+repeatedly told by TSA it is too inconvenient and costly to
+screen airport workers despite the fact that 100 percent of
+workers are physically screened at airports like Heathrow,
+almost 100 percent at Charles de Gaulle. This doesn't make
+sense to me. If you could, continue to weigh in on that issue,
+because I am sure you agree that everyone should be going
+through metal detectors. And I--as a New Yorker, it disturbs me
+that currently, we are so worried about security in the New
+York area, yet thousands of people are going through airports
+every day with antiquated identification badges.
+ I also would like to comment on your eloquent statements
+about education. You are very well aware that the whole budget
+for the foreign aid appropriations bill is $19.3 billion--I
+happen to be the ranking member--and the budget for the
+military is upwards of $416 billion.
+ We managed to get education dollars from $100 million to
+$400 million. I would be interested to know whether you think
+the current estimate of $10 billion or more should be validated
+by this committee and this Congress by adding dollars to our
+overall allocation for education. The $19.3 billion goes, as
+you know, to HIV-AIDS, goes to all the work of US-AID, goes to
+education. I would like to hear your recommendations.
+ And since my time is running out, if you could comment on
+the formula change, if you could comment on airport security in
+particular, the fact that thousands of people are not going
+through the metal detectors with their badges; and third with
+regard to our foreign aid budget.
+ Thank you very much.
+ Mr. Kean. Everybody should go through metal detectors, my
+belief, without exception.
+ Mrs. Lowey. Do we have to wait for structural change or do
+you think it can be implemented now, or can it be implemented
+by executive order? We can't seem to move the FAA or TSA, and
+business keeps talking about an inconvenience. How can we get
+that done now?
+ Mr. Kean. You probably could answer it better than I could.
+I don't know how you can do these things by executive order, or
+whether you can, or whether you have to have something through
+the United States Congress. I don't have the expertise to
+answer that, but it should be done. No question about it.
+ I believe that if we are going to create fewer terrorists,
+change minds in the Arab world, we have got to change--we just
+can't be viewed as a military power. We have to get back to
+some of the things we used to do in the Cold War, to try to win
+that Cold War and change minds, and that involves not only
+education expenses, but cultural exchanges, ways in which there
+are student exchanges, ways in which we allowed these people to
+get to know us and we get a better understanding of them. We
+have to get into those soft areas.
+ We have got to get into them. We have to let these people
+know who we are, and we have to understand in a much better way
+who they are. And I am not talking about the small percentage
+who want to kill us, but I am talking about the much larger
+percentage that don't really like us at all because of what
+they know of us right now, but if we are able to send a
+different message, might like us a bit better.
+ And the third question--
+ Mrs. Lowey. The formula.
+ Mr. Kean. My view and the Commission's view: You have to
+put the money where the greatest danger is, and that is
+measurable due to the chatter we hear and the estimates from
+the intelligence agencies. We know where the greatest danger is
+and that is where the money ought to go.
+ Mr. Hamilton. Let me add to what Tom has said. What you are
+really wrestling with here is, what should the elements be of a
+counterterrorism policy. And the answer to that is that it
+takes a lot of elements. And if you think only in terms of one
+or two of those elements, you are not going to get it together.
+ You have to have military force. You have to have covert
+actions and the right kind of diplomacy, the right kind of
+public diplomacy, the right kind of law enforcement. You have
+to have the right kind of action in the Treasury Department to
+trace the flow of monies.
+ And I think the risk that you face in thinking about
+counterterrorism policy is that you grab on to one or two of
+those and say you are going to solve counterterrorism with
+covert action or with military action or with educational
+reform.
+ You are not going to do it. You have to get the whole thing
+in balance and integrate it, and that is the big challenge of
+counterterrorism policy.
+ With regard to the education matter, we think that is a
+very, very important part of it. I want to pick up on what Tom
+has said. The challenge to American foreign policy is not the
+Osama bin Ladens. We know what we have to do with them. We have
+to remove them. We have to kill them. We think and we believe
+that is a very small portion of the Muslim world.
+ The challenge to American foreign policy is the great vast
+number of Muslims who are sympathetic to Osama bin Laden, who
+may admire him, but do not support the idea of violence. And
+that is--if you are going to win the war on terrorism, you have
+got to prevail, you have got to persuade those people that we
+offer a better vision and an agenda and an opportunity for
+them.
+ Now, you work all the time with the foreign aid budget and
+you know the limitations of that budget, but you also know the
+importance of it. You cannot solve the problem of these schools
+in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in the United States--can't do it.
+You have money in the foreign aid budget today for Pakistani
+schools. What is it, 100 million or so?
+ Mrs. Lowey. Out of the 600 million about 30 million is
+going to education.
+ Mr. Hamilton. It is a drop in the bucket, isn't it? But it
+does say to these people who are seeking a better life, who
+want some of the same things you and I seek, that we are on
+their side and we are trying to help them with their problem;
+and that is a very important message to convey.
+ Fundamentally, Pakistan has to solve its own education
+program and so does Saudi Arabia. As Tom said a moment ago, you
+have to push and prod them in that direction. And we certainly
+do, and we could maybe encourage them a little bit with a few
+million dollars here and there, but we cannot solve their
+problem. But we want to let them know that it is not only in
+the American national interest that they reform their school
+systems; it is in their national interest that they do it, and
+if they don't do it with all of the technology available today
+to let these people know that their life is pretty miserable,
+if they don't begin to deal with those problems, they are not
+going to be in charge.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Nevada, Mr. Gibbons.
+ Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much. And gentlemen, thank you
+very much for your patience with us here today. Your dedication
+to helping us better understand these issues is greatly
+appreciated. Thank you for your assistance in helping make
+America safer. We appreciate that as well.
+ Let me say that over the last 3 weeks as I sat here
+listening to each of you, I know we have talked about
+information sharing, the need for information sharing, the
+management and direction that information sharing should take.
+ We have talked about the overclassification of information,
+but you do not make a recommendation; in fact, you oppose a
+recommendation for an internal MI5-style intelligence agency
+which would look at domestic or U.S. citizens' intelligence. I
+want to build on that concept, because I think the confluence
+of understanding your recommendations and our taking action has
+to understand a better--little bit better, this idea. Because
+what I see is an agency, the FBI, as needing some reform
+itself, because we have a construct in the FBI today which says
+that when we gather intelligence information in FBI, we are
+focused on prosecution and criminal action cases, rather than
+on anti terrorism intelligence.
+ Now, the focus on prosecution is highly appropriate for a
+law enforcement agency, but it is not appropriate for
+intelligence gathering in a counterterrorism, antiterrorism
+type environment. Should we, and here is my question and I will
+leave it to one question--should we divide the FBI into two
+intelligence-type agencies leaving to it law enforcement for
+the conviction and prosecution and that construct, and giving
+it an additional role, a different agency, which is
+intelligence gathering for antiterrorism?
+ What are your thoughts on that?
+ Mr. Kean. Under the reforms that the director is trying to
+implement in the FBI, that would in a sense be a division in
+the FBI, an important division of the FBI, and that would be
+their job. Their job would be to collect information against
+terrorist efforts.
+ We on the Commission wrestled with this FBI problem,
+because the history of the FBI and the culture of FBI is as you
+so correctly stated. As you know, you break down the door, you
+make the case and you take somebody to trial and convict them.
+That is not gathering information for counterterrorism
+purposes.
+ There is now a large part of the FBI that is starting to be
+devoted to collecting information for counterterrorism
+purposes. But it is being done from a very top-down reform by
+Director Mueller. Our concern on the Commission was that this--
+these reforms were based on the work of two or three people at
+the very top, and if they were to retire, to leave or die or
+whatever, that the FBI culture would go right back to the way
+it was.
+ So we think it is very important and this again comes to
+oversight. I don't think you have to create something
+different, but you have to systematize these reforms. You have
+to make sure that the FBI doesn't slide back. The people that
+go into the intelligence gathering side have to have the same
+chances at promotion, same chances of salary increases, same
+chances to get to the top of the FBI as the people under the
+old J. Edgar Hoover side. If that doesn't happen, then it is
+not going to work.
+ So we endorsed the director's reforms with the proviso that
+the Congress in particular look and make sure that these
+reforms are implemented not only under this director, but with
+future directors. Because without it, it doesn't work. That was
+basically the view we came to.
+ Mr. Hamilton. I think the Commission believed that there is
+a very important synergy between intelligence gathering on the
+one hand and law enforcement on the other, and you ought not to
+put a wall between them. The guy out here who is trying to
+prosecute somebody collects a lot of information. The fellow
+out here who is doing some surveillance on a prospective
+terrorist is also collecting a lot of information. And you want
+to make sure that they are talking to one another and that
+there is interaction between them and that you not build that
+wall too solidly. So that is what we are really driving at.
+ Now, when you talked about the FBI collecting all
+antiterrorist intelligence, you are not talking about the
+foreign side?
+ Mr. Gibbons. No.
+ Mr. Hamilton. I may have misunderstood. We do think this
+synergy is very, very important and each benefits from the
+other in effect.
+ Mr. Gibbons. Thank you.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Andrews.
+ Mr. Andrews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to express to
+Mr. Hamilton the honor of having served with him in this
+institution, and on behalf of our fellow New Jerseyans, express
+our pride to Governor Kean and the work you have done here. We
+are proud of you.
+ One of the most compelling parts of your report is the
+riveting discussion of those moments on the morning of
+September 11th when there were still two planes in the sky and
+there was a muddled and dysfunctional series of communications
+among decision makers as to what to do about those two planes.
+And in your report you address that, I think, in two places.
+One is in Recommendation 26 about incident command systems and
+the other is in Recommendation 40 about the role of the
+Northern Command.
+ I want to ask you this question based upon this chilling
+hypothetical. If we knew right now that someone had hijacked a
+tanker truck on the New Jersey Turnpike filled with chlorine
+gas and that the person was headed toward Washington, D.C., on
+I-95 and that their intention was to blow up that chlorine
+tanker truck and in fact create a chemical weapon on the
+Capitol Mall, and we had to make a decision about what to do
+about that truck right now, who should be in charge of making
+that decision and what should the chain of command be?
+ Mr. Kean. Under the present system or under the system we--
+ Mr. Andrews. What does the Commission believe it ought to
+be?
+ Mr. Hamilton. The question of who is responsible for
+defending us at home?
+ Mr. Andrews. During an imminent ongoing emergency.
+ Mr. Hamilton. Very tough question. We think there are two
+answers. One is the Department of Defense, the Northern
+Command, and the second is the Department of Homeland Security.
+They both have the responsibility and the authority for
+defending the country. Now they have to work that out, how that
+authority is split.
+ I don't know the answer to your question specifically.
+ Mr. Andrews. As my colleague knows, one of the vexing
+questions here is the doctrine of posse comitatus and how it
+would play into the answer of this question.
+ I don't want in any way to erode our important tradition of
+separating the military from the control of civilian life. I
+think that is one of the key precepts of the country. On the
+other hand, just because something is taking place on or above
+our soil does not mean it is a domestic matter. And I think
+that is one of the key issues we have to grapple with.
+ My own suggestion is that we have to revisit the doctrine
+of posse comitatus in this terrible new world. We need to do so
+in a way that doesn't undermine civil liberties, but sorts this
+question out.
+ To answer my own hypothetical, if a decision were made to
+take paramilitary action to stop that truck, scramble a
+helicopter and shoot the driver of the truck, that is a
+function that I want the Department of Defense to lead and be
+responsible for. On the other hand, I think it has to be under
+extremely egregious and emergent circumstances like those on
+the morning of 9/11.
+ I think one of the most chilling things I read in your
+report is that the order that was given by President Bush to
+Vice President Cheney and then passed down the command to--as I
+understand it, to intercept and shoot planes that were hijacked
+was not communicated to the pilots in the cockpit; that they
+received an order that they should identify tail and type of
+the airplanes, but that is it.
+ That could have been--and I ascribe no fault here, but I
+blame all of us--that could have been a terrible
+miscommunication. I am interested in the Commission's thoughts
+on how to fix it.
+ Mr. Kean. I had exactly the same reaction you did.
+ And there is another part to that story, that the Secret
+Service had some control of National Guard planes that they
+sent up, and they had the order to shoot. So the National Guard
+planes, without getting an order from the President, might have
+shot these planes that were supposed to have orders from the
+President to shoot, wouldn't have shot.
+ So we are told in questioning that that command and control
+problem has been straightened out. We hope it is true, but that
+was a moment for me, too, when I heard that information.
+ Mr. Andrews. This fall, the GAO will be issuing a report
+that examines in the war game context whether the problems have
+been straightened out, and we are anxiously awaiting that
+report and we would be interested in the Commission's review of
+it.
+ Mr. Kean. Command and control, that whole day in the fog of
+war, as the President told us, Air Force One didn't work
+properly. The President was not--did not have the communicative
+skills above Air Force One as commander in chief. Now he told
+us as a commission when we met him that that has been
+straightened out.
+ We have to be sure of these things. It is too important for
+the defense of this country that these things cannot occur that
+way again.
+ Mr. Hamilton. I want to amend. I think I said there are two
+people who had the responsibility to defend, the Department of
+Defense and Department of Homeland Security.
+ The Department of Defense would only defend in the event of
+a military attack, I think. And what you described, the example
+you gave about the truck on the turnpike, I think probably
+would not qualify as a military threat.
+ As a practical matter, if something like that happened, we
+would put every resource we had into it to try to stop it. That
+would include local sheriffs, National Guard and probably some
+military components as well.
+ Mr. Andrews. The question is not how we categorize it, but
+how we stop it.
+ Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Chairman, we are hitting 1:00 and I had
+kind of planned finishing at 12:15 or 12:30.
+ Chairman Cox. I understand and I want to at this point
+recognize that we have members on both sides of the aisle who
+have not yet had the opportunity to put questions, but out of
+courtesy to both of you, we will adjourn this panel at this
+time. And we want to thank you very much for the extended
+period of time that you have spent with us this morning. I know
+that when Congress reconvenes in 2 weeks that you will be
+available to continue to work with us on the implementation and
+further consideration of your recommendations.
+ At this time--
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. Mr. Chairman, I have an inquiry, please.
+This is such a moment in history and time for this committee,
+and I respect the gentlemen's time and I am always grateful for
+their work.
+ My request to the chairman, because other members have not
+had a chance to inquire and other members may have been on
+other committees, that the gentlemen be asked to come back.
+This is crucial. We are not acting, we are only hearing and
+listening. This committee is burdened with the responsibility
+of doing something. And I would ask respectfully if we could
+inquire of the gentlemen through the committee and have them
+come back to the Homeland Security Committee, the very
+committee you have asked to take up the responsibility
+singularly of oversight of the Homeland Security Department.
+ And I ask the chairman for a response, and I know the
+gentlemen may not have their schedules, but looking at the
+smiling face of the Governor, it looks as if we can work that
+out. You are cutting us off from doing the questions with
+respect to the gentlemen's time, and I do respect their time.
+Mr. Chairman. I yield back to the chairman.
+ Chairman Cox. I know that both the chairman and vice
+chairman have committed to continue to work with this
+committee, both formally through the hearing process and
+informally. As part of the latter, I hope that members who have
+additional questions will feel free even before Congress
+reconvenes. And the hearing record will be held open for that
+purpose.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. Will the gentleman extend an invitation to
+the Chair and Cochair? That is my inquiry and my question, and
+I think they would be receptive to that invitation. This is a
+work in progress and it is not complete.
+ Mr. Shays. Would the gentleman yield? It may be if these
+gentlemen cannot attend that--we had Mr. Lehman and Senator
+Kerrey come before us and they likewise did an excellent job
+and I think that is the strength of this Commission. There are
+other members who could come before us as well.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. I would welcome that. I welcome any
+opportunity for us to pursue the work of the Commission. I
+think the two Chairs, Cochairs have done an excellent job. I
+think we should do that.
+ Chairman Cox. Well, I don't wish to speak for our
+witnesses, but I know that they have on multiple occasions
+extended their full cooperation to this committee, and I expect
+they and their staff and other commissioners will continue to
+do so.
+ We will be seeking that cooperation. It is a vital concern
+to our Nation. It is a point that I know we are in complete
+accord on.
+ There being no further questions at this time, I thank you,
+Mr. Kean and Mr. Hamilton, for your testimony. And at this time
+you are excused, and I call up our second panel. Members should
+be advised as we call up the second panel, following the
+testimony of this panel, questioning will resume with Ms.
+Granger and Ms. Holmes Norton; and we will proceed, continuing
+in the order that we have already adopted.
+ Our witnesses on this second panel will include Hon. J.
+Cofer Black, Counterterrorism Coordinator for the Department of
+State; Patrick Hughes, Assistant Secretary For Information
+Analysis for the Department of Homeland Security; John Brennan,
+Director of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center; and
+Maureen Baginski, the Executive Assistant Director for
+Intelligence for the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
+ Some of our witnesses are involved in White House
+discussions today on the very proposals for restructuring the
+Intelligence Community that are the subject of this hearing.
+ Members are informed that Mr. Hughes must depart no later
+than 2:45 p.m. today. Mr. Brennan will be with us until 3:45
+p.m. We will do our best to get as much questioning done as we
+can today before those deadlines.
+ As the witnesses take their seats, I ask members to take
+their seats. The chairman will recognize first Mr. Black and
+Mr. Hughes, Mr. Brennan and Ms. Baginski. I think our panel is
+now all seated.
+ Chairman Cox. Welcome, Ms. Baginski, Mr. Brennan, General
+Hughes, Mr. Black. Thank you very much for being with us. We
+look forward to an opportunity to have significant discussion
+with you.
+ I know that you have offered to forgo your opening
+statements and go directly into questions. We would like,
+nonetheless, to have you put a summary of your statement on the
+record; members, I think, will benefit from that. And we will
+begin with the Counterterrorism Coordinator for the Department
+of State, Cofer Black.
+ Mr. Black, your statement, please.
+
+STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE J. COFER BLACK, COORDINATOR, OFFICE
+ OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
+ STATE
+
+ Mr. Black. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, distinguished
+members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to
+testify on the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. I will
+attempt to summarize my formal, written statement and ask that
+you include my full testimony in the record.
+ Today's hearing offers a timely opportunity to examine
+broad recommendations to reorganize the national security
+institutions of the U.S. Government in order to combat
+terrorism. I welcome the invitation to contribute to this
+important debate on how to protect American citizens at home
+and abroad.
+ Following the September 11 attacks, the administration
+developed the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, which
+outlines the broad policy framework for coordinated actions to
+prevent terrorist attacks against the United States, its
+citizens, its interests and its friends around the world. The
+national strategy is premised on the systematic application of
+the key elements of national security, diplomacy, financial,
+law enforcement, military and intelligence and information
+sharing. Today I would like to address the process in place at
+the Department of State.
+ The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, or INR, is the
+Department's liaison to the Intelligence Community at large. My
+office works closely with INR, with the Bureau of Diplomatic
+Security's Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis, to
+assess the current intelligence information related to
+terrorist threats overseas and at home. Through these
+relationships, the State Department has ample opportunities to
+provide input to the U.S. Government's process for collecting
+and analyzing intelligence for counterterrorism purposes.
+ Finally, as a participant in the National Security
+Council's Counterterrorism Security Group, I have frequent
+interactions with other interagency officials who shape and
+direct the counterterrorism policies of the U.S. Government.
+ The State Department will play a crucial role in the
+President's strategy to implement reforms that will make
+Americans safer at home and abroad. I look forward to the role
+that the Department and my office will play in this process
+through the intra--and interdepartmental relationships briefly
+outlined in my testimony today.
+ Mr. Chairman, with this background and experience in mind,
+I will conclude my formal testimony. Thank you again for the
+opportunity to appear before your committee. I will be happy to
+take questions.
+ Chairman Cox. Thank you.
+ [The statement of Mr. Black follows:]
+
+ Prepared Statement of the Honorable Cofer Black
+
+ Chairman Cox, Distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for
+the opportunity to testify today on the recommendations of the 9-11
+Commission to reorganize the national security institutions of the U.S.
+Government to better combat terrorism. In light of the testimony you
+will hear from my co-panelists and other witnesses, I will keep my
+remarks brief.
+ Following the September 11 attacks, the Administration developed
+the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, which outlined the
+policy framework for coordinated actions to prevent terrorist attacks
+against the United States, its citizens, its interests, and its friends
+around the world. Our work to implement the National Strategy will
+ultimately create an international environment inhospitable to
+terrorists and all those who support them. We have implemented this
+strategy to act simultaneously on four fronts:
+ Defeat terrorist organizations of global reach by
+ attacking their sanctuaries, leadership, finances, and command,
+ control and communications;
+ Deny further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to
+ terrorists by cooperating with other states to take action
+ against these international threats;
+ Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists
+ seek to exploit by enlisting the international community to
+ focus its efforts and resources on the areas most at risk; and
+ Defend the United States, its citizens, and interests
+ at home and abroad.
+ Today's hearing offers an opportunity to examine the 9-11
+Commission's recommendations on information and intelligence sharing. I
+welcome the invitation to contribute to this important national debate
+on how better to protect American citizens at home and abroad. The
+National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is premised on five key
+elements of national security--diplomatic, financial, law enforcement,
+military, and, as we will discuss today, intelligence and information
+sharing.
+
+Intelligence Analysis and Information Sharing
+ When discussing ways to improve information and intelligence
+sharing for counterterrorism, it is important to consider the
+foundation upon which we must build, in this case, the elements of
+intelligence analysis in place at the Department of State. The
+Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) is one of the 15
+members of the U.S. Intelligence Community. My colleagues in INR share
+my opinion that we need to do much more to make it easy, not just
+possible, to share information across agencies, with state and local
+officials and with our foreign allies. This is especially important to
+the State Department because widespread, timely, and routine
+information sharing facilitates decentralized and competitive
+intelligence analysis crucial to our mission. My office also works
+closely with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security Office of Intelligence
+and Threat Analysis (DS/ITA), which focuses specifically on threats
+against U.S. interests, to assess the current intelligence information
+on terrorist threats overseas and at home.
+ We also agree with the 9-11 Commission's recommendation to move
+from a system based on ``need-to-know'' to one based ``need-to-share,''
+consistent, of course, with the 9-11 Commission's recommendation to
+``safeguard the privacy of individuals about whom information is
+shared.'' Mechanisms for separating content from source information
+could help with classification levels. This is already accomplished to
+a certain extent with tear lines. Web-based systems will undeniably be
+part of the solution, given the ubiquitous nature of this technology.
+By following the progression of technology advances in the open market,
+information sharing can be made technologically easier and less
+cumbersome.
+
+The Counterterrorism Security Group
+ Intelligence sharing within the Department and with other agencies
+was a reality before September 11, but it has since improved. Deepening
+our intelligence sharing through personnel liaison, we have provided
+the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), among others, with
+State Department detailees, and we host detailees from the CIA and
+other agencies as well. In addition to the intelligence analysis work
+of INR and DS/ITA, S/CT and the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of
+Diplomatic Security participate in the Counterterrorism Security Group
+(CSG). The CSG is chaired by the National Security Council and serves
+to share information and coordinate the response to terrorist threats
+against U.S. interests domestically and abroad. Each morning we join
+the NSC-chaired meeting of high-level representatives from the Homeland
+Security Council, the Departments of Defense, Justice, Treasury, and
+Homeland Security, the CIA, FBI, and TTIC. A staff-level meeting of CSG
+participants is conducted every afternoon.
+ Within the CSG structure, the Department has frequent and direct
+interactions with the other senior interagency officials who shape and
+direct the counterterrorism policies of the U.S. Government. Through
+these relationships, we have ample opportunity to provide input to the
+U.S. Government process for collecting and analyzing intelligence for
+counterterrorism purposes. The quality of information exchange and
+effectiveness has improved significantly since 9/11 partly because the
+CSG mechanism promotes proper coordination among agencies regarding
+terrorist threats globally on a daily basis.
+
+Other Department Contributions to Information Sharing
+ Since 9/11, the Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs
+has worked with other agencies to make significant improvements to our
+ability to share information. Thanks to this new level of
+collaboration, the data holdings in the Department's consular lookout
+system now total almost 18 million records on people potentially
+ineligible to receive visas, nearly triple what we had prior to
+September 11. We now have more than eight million records from the FBI
+alone in our system. In fact, the majority of the data in the consular
+lookout system now derives from other agencies, especially those in the
+law enforcement and intelligence communities. Information sharing, of
+course, must be mutual.
+ The Department now provides access to 75 million visa records in
+our consular database so that Department of Homeland Security officers
+at ports of entry can view the electronic files of every passenger with
+a visa entering the United States. This database permits detailed
+examination of the information in near-real time for all visas issued,
+including the photographs of nonimmigrant visa applicants. We are also
+sharing our consular database with the National Targeting Center, a 24/
+7 operation of Customs and Border Protection in DHS.
+ The Department of State joined in the establishment of the
+Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), which integrates terrorist watchlists
+and serves as the centralized point of contact for everyone from the
+U.S. police officer on the beat to the consular officer in the farthest
+reaches of the globe. Together with TTIC, which maintains the principal
+database on known and suspected international terrorists in a highly
+classified form, we rely on the TSC to ensure that consular officers
+have access to the information they need to scrutinize applications and
+deny visas to those who would do us harm. These institutions rest on a
+foundation that the Department laid in the form of TIPOFF, a pioneering
+system in the use of classified information for screening purposes.
+Much of the cost of developing and operating TIPOFF was funded through
+the Border Security Program, which the Bureau of Consular Affairs
+manages for the Department. The TIPOFF database with its approximately
+120,000 records, more than double the amount since September 11, is now
+housed at TTIC. TTIC and TSC together eliminate the stovepiping of
+terrorist data and provide a more systematic approach to posting
+lookouts on potential and known terrorists.
+
+Conclusion
+ The President indicated in his speech on August 2nd support for the
+key recommendations of the 9-11 Commission, including the establishment
+of a National Intelligence Director and a National Counterterrorism
+Center. The Department of State will play a crucial role in the
+President's plan to implement reforms that will make Americans safer at
+home and abroad. I personally look forward to the role that the
+Department and my office will play in this process, through the intra-
+and interdepartmental relationships briefly outlined in my testimony
+today.
+ With this background and experience in mind, I will conclude my
+formal testimony. Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before
+the Committee. I would be happy to take your questions.
+
+ Chairman Cox. General Hughes.
+
+ STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL PATRICK M. HUGHES, USA, RET.,
+ ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INFORMATION ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
+ OF HOMELAND SECURITY
+
+ Mr. Hughes. Good day, Mr. Chairman and members of the
+committee. It is a privilege to appear before you today as I
+have in the past. And today, I would like to just give you a
+short version of my views.
+ We are very supportive of efforts to improve and enhance
+the Intelligence Community that are ongoing in the aftermath of
+the 9/11 Commission's report and recommendations. Today's
+hearing, I think, is in the context of information sharing and
+improvements; and in that category, the glue that links and
+holds our national intelligence and counterterrorist activities
+together is indeed the professional exchange of information
+that empowers knowledge and action, often referred to as
+``information sharing,'' but we would like to include the idea
+of ``collaboration'' in the construct.
+ We are supporting making information readily available
+rapidly to all who need it to accomplish their mission, while
+at the same time facilitating interaction to better understand
+and use the knowledge that collaboration produces while always
+protecting sources and methods.
+ It is a very simple philosophical underpinning; and I think
+I will give the rest of my time back to you, sir, and say I am
+willing to answer any questions you have today.
+ Chairman Cox. Thank you.
+ [The statement of General Hughes follows:]
+
+ Prepared Statement of Patrick M. Hughes
+
+ Good morning Chairman Cox and distinguished members of the
+Committee. I am privileged to appear before you today to discuss the
+role of the Office of Information Analysis (IA), within the Information
+Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP) of the
+Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as well as IA's intelligence,
+coordination, and information sharing efforts to date.
+ September 11, 2001 forever transformed our nation. In one moment,
+we came face to face with a known enemy. . .on American soil. . .and a
+changed condition threatening to our way of life. This day seared
+images of devastating loss and destruction into our national
+consciousness, images that we--I--will never forget. I was present at
+the Pentagon minutes after the plane struck and I saw once again
+something I have become all too familiar with over the years. . .the
+violent outcome of a terrorist attack against unwarned unprotected
+people. The anguish and fear of the moment was written on the faces of
+many of my colleagues who never dreamed that their place of work in a
+bastion of Democracy would be struck. Our co-workers, soldiers all, lay
+in the wreckage. The damage was done.
+ However, on that day, something far greater than fear and something
+much stronger than despair took root. An unshakeable faith in our
+fellow citizens, in our ideals, in our nation and an unwavering
+determination to protect and preserve what we stand for as a country
+emerged from the destruction, to guide our efforts in the fight against
+terrorism and the quest to preserve liberty. I am at my place of work
+at the Department of Homeland Security because of that motivating set
+of beliefs.
+ In the aftermath of 9/11, the Department of Homeland Security was
+envisioned, formed, and is now in operation. Standing up the
+Department, the largest reorganization of government in fifty years,
+has been a great undertaking. Many employees of DHS have assumed new
+responsibilities, and all have put in long hours to ensure that while
+our strategies may change to meet the terrorist threat, our course as a
+nation will remain constant. President Bush's decision to establish the
+Department has enabled us to unify our resources into one team, to
+ready ourselves against our enemy, and to ensure the highest level of
+protection for our country and the citizens we serve.
+ I became a direct part of this Department's effort when I became
+the Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis, part of the
+Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, on 17
+November 2003. Through the Homeland Security Act of 2002, IAIP is
+charged with integrating relevant information, intelligence analyses,
+and vulnerability assessments (whether such information, analyses, or
+assessments are provided or produced by the Department or others) to
+identify protective priorities and support protective measures by the
+Department, by other executive agencies, by State and local government
+personnel, agencies, and authorities, by the private sector, and by
+other entities.
+ The philosophical underpinning of IA as an integral part of the
+IAIP Under-Secretariat of DHS is to provide the connectivity, the
+integration, the communication, the coordination, the collaboration,
+and the professional intelligence work necessary to accomplish the
+missions of, and the products and capability necessary for the
+customers and the leadership of DHS. Simply put, we perform the
+intelligence and threat analysis of Department of Homeland Security.
+ IAIP is moving forward in carrying out our statutory
+responsibilities which include:
+ Providing the full range of intelligence support to
+ senior DHS leadership and component organizations and to state
+ and local and private sector respondents
+ Mapping terrorist threats to the homeland against
+ assessed vulnerabilities to drive our efforts to protect
+ against terrorist attacks
+ Conducting independent analysis and assessments of
+ terrorist threats through competitive analysis, tailored
+ analysis, and an analytical red cell
+ Assessing the vulnerabilities of key resources and
+ critical infrastructure of the United States
+ Merging the relevant analyses and vulnerability
+ assessments to identify priorities for protective and support
+ measures by the Department, other government agencies, and the
+ private sector
+ Partnering with the intelligence community, TTIC, TSC,
+ law enforcement agencies, state and local partners, and the
+ private sector, as well as DHS' components to manage the
+ collection and processing of information within DHS involving
+ threats to the Homeland into usable, comprehensive, and
+ actionable information
+ Disseminating time sensitive warnings, alerts and
+ advisories to federal, state, local governments and private
+ sector infrastructure owners and operators
+ It is the mandate to independently analyze, coordinate, and
+disseminate information affecting the homeland that makes IA unique
+among its Intelligence Community partners. The analysts within
+Information Analysis are talented individuals who draw on intelligence
+from other components within DHS, IA's fellow Intelligence Community
+members, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), and federal,
+state and local law enforcement and private sector entities. The
+analysis produced is coordinated with the vulnerability assessment and
+consequence predictions identified by the Infrastructure Protection
+half of the IAIP Directorate.
+ The Office of Information Analysis communicates timely and valuable
+threat products to state and local officials, federal sector specific
+agencies (as indicated in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7,
+``Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and
+Protection''), and the private sector as is appropriate. The
+relationship IA and indeed the entire Department of Homeland Security
+has with these contacts results in the IAIP Directorate being in the
+position to effectively manage information requirements from the state
+and local governments and private sector entities that are vital to
+protecting the homeland. DHS will continue to work in close
+communication with these officials, as well as with the other
+organizations it receives inputs from, to maintain the effective
+relationships that have been established.
+ IA is the heart of the intelligence effort at DHS. It is
+responsible for accessing and analyzing the entire array of
+intelligence relating to threats against the homeland, and making that
+information useful to first responders, state and local governments,
+and private sector officials. As such, IA provides the full-range of
+intelligence support to the Secretary, DHS leadership, the
+Undersecretary for IAIP, and DHS components. Additionally, IA ensures
+that the best intelligence information informs the administration of
+the Homeland Security Advisory System.
+ Central to the success of the DHS mission is the close working
+relationship among components, the Office of Information Analysis and
+the Office of Infrastructure Protection (``IP''), and the Homeland
+Security Operations Center (HSOC), to ensure that threat information
+and situational awareness are correlated with critical infrastructure
+vulnerabilities and protective programs. Together, the three offices
+provide real time monitoring of threat information and critical
+infrastructure to support the Department of Homeland Security's overall
+mission. This permits us to immediately respond to and monitor emerging
+potential threat information and events, and to take issues or
+information for more detailed analysis and recommendations for
+preventive and protective measures. The integration of information
+access and analysis on the one hand, and vulnerabilities analysis and
+protective measures on the other, is the fundamental mission of the
+IAIP Directorate.
+
+IA and TTIC
+ The close professional associations that have been forged between
+the two offices will allow both organizations to work on complimenting
+each other in the best interest of the nation's security. For example,
+IA is responsible for translating the analysis done at the TTIC into
+actionable data for State, territorial, tribal, local, and private
+sector officials responsible for homeland security. From a personal
+standpoint, I believe both organizations are fulfilling their missions
+and enriching both each other and the wider Intelligence Community. My
+relationship with TTIC Director John Brennan could not be better. At
+present, we talk at least daily and as specific threats pertinent to
+the homeland arise. This opinion is backed by the tremendous track
+record of success TTIC has in supporting the Department of Homeland
+Security and its needs. As partners, IA and TTIC spend much time
+communicating, both through the DHS representatives located at TTIC and
+through direct communication of leadership.
+
+IA and TSC
+ The Office of Information Analysis has a similarly productive
+relationship with the Terrorist Screening Center. While both perform
+duties that result in information being passed to local first
+responders and State, territorial, tribal, and local officials, both
+entities have separate missions. IA provides the full spectrum of
+information support necessary for the operation of the Department of
+Homeland Security and for the benefit of Federal, State, territorial,
+tribal, local, and private sector officials throughout the United
+States, to secure the homeland, defend the citizenry and protect our
+critical infrastructure. In contrast, the TSC is in the process of
+developing a fully interoperable watch list database which will provide
+immediate responses to border-screening and law-enforcement authorities
+to identify suspected terrorists trying to enter or operate within the
+United States.
+ Just as TTIC plays a vital role in supplying its federal partners
+with the broad threat picture, the TSC has quickly become an essential
+resource for local law enforcement, its federal government
+contributors, and other users. Through the matching and cross-
+referencing of lists, the TSC is allowing those personnel on the front
+lines of the fight against terrorism to access the information they
+need to identify and detain suspicious individuals.
+ DHS, IAIP, and especially IA will continue to work with the TSC to
+coordinate information sharing efforts and to establish requirements
+for accessing information. IA and the TSC will grow together in their
+effort to serve the people and guardians of this nation.
+
+Improving Information Sharing and Collaboration
+ While existing relationships are gaining momentum every day, we
+must assure that we formalize a process which will improve information
+sharing and collaboration. The Department is charged with this
+responsibility by law and by Executive Order.
+ Our goal is to effectively, efficiently, and synergistically pass
+and receive information in all of its forms for the benefit of the
+United States Government, our State, tribal, territorial, local, and
+private sector partners, and other DHS entities. In order to achieve
+this goal we must develop technical and procedural transparency and
+interoperability in mind to the greatest extent possible. However, the
+most significant impediments to information sharing are not
+technological, they are legal and cultural. We needed to start with the
+``business case'' and work toward a common, integrated, and rational
+vision for the Department. That is precisely what we are doing.
+ Information sharing involves working with the Department of Justice
+(DOJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Department of Defense
+(DOD), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the State Department and
+others. For instance, as part of this effort, the DOJ and DHS
+information sharing staffs are working hard to bring the Homeland
+Security Information Network (HSIN), Law Enforcement Online (LEO), and
+the Regional Information Sharing System (RISSNET) together with the
+goal of making the systems more compatible as quickly as possible. As
+we rely on existing systems, we recognize the significant work needed
+ahead to achieve compatibility and interoperability to meet the
+challenges faced by DHS.
+
+In Conclusion
+ The Office of Information Analysis' unique position, roles and
+efforts have lead to many challenges. However, the work is not done.
+These challenges now lead us to the next logical step in protecting the
+nation, its people, and its infrastructure. Following careful review of
+the 9/11 Commission report, President Bush announced his support for
+the creation of National Intelligence Director (NID) and the
+establishment of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). We at the
+Department of Homeland Security look forward to continuing to work with
+the Congress to take these important steps in preventing terrorist
+attacks against the United States.
+ The Department of Homeland Security is a prime example of how
+changes have already been made to the Intelligence Community and the
+counterterrorism community as they existed before September 11th, 2001.
+The creation of the NID and NCTC will enhance DHS' ability to better
+identify threats and map those threats against vulnerabilities.
+However, these are not the only recommendations the Commission made.
+The Commission also recommended continued improvements in information
+sharing among agencies involved in national security. DHS, especially
+the IAIP Directorate, plays a central role in this effort as we
+continue the work of communicating both with our partners in the
+federal government as well as with the State, territorial, tribal,
+local, and private sector officials charged with protecting the people
+and infrastructure of this country.
+ Building up the IA office, increasing our information capabilities,
+and coordinating information sharing across the entire federal
+government are monumental tasks. And, while we have accomplished much
+in a short period of time, we continue to press forward to strengthen
+this vital office and our ability to support the overall DHS mission of
+securing our homeland. In order for the Office of Information Analysis
+to accomplish its unique mission, we need the right organizational
+structure, qualified and cleared personnel, resources, and technical
+capabilities.
+ We are working hard to coordinate and integrate the intelligence
+and information necessary to protect our people and our critical
+infrastructure. Yet, we still have much work to do. We have made
+tremendous progress and the dedication and devotion to duty of those
+who do the work of intelligence at DHS is unparalleled.
+ We are meeting threats to the homeland with determination and
+dedication to lead this nation to a higher level of protection every
+single day. The sheer depth and breadth of our country means that one
+slip, one gap, one vengeful person, can threaten the lives of our
+citizens at any time, in any number of ways. There are no guarantees,
+but I firmly believe the American people are more secure and better
+prepared than before September 11th 2001, directly because of the
+Department of Homeland Security.
+ A brief note about the threat: it is real. Terrorists are at work
+around the world and when they succeed it seems our best efforts in
+intelligence, security, defense and protective measures have somehow
+failed, despite the many successes we have against terrorists. We
+continue to receive substantial information concerning terrorist intent
+to strike us again in our homeland. As we approach the period of our
+national political process and the many associated events, it is my
+view that we are entering a period of significant risk, perceived by
+those who would strike us as an opportunity to tear our societal and
+cultural fabric. We cannot relax, we cannot falter, we cannot live in
+fear. Instead, we who do the work of intelligence and law enforcement
+must persevere and provide insight and knowledge to those who lead and
+decide.
+ We have accomplished much in IA since our inception and we are on
+course with our partners and colleagues to continue to achieve. We are
+fully connected to the U.S. Intelligence Community and well informed.
+We are integrated into the workings of the domestic security structure.
+We are connected with law enforcement. We have working analysts poring
+over the detail of intelligence and law enforcement reporting to
+discover the hidden patterns and concealed threads of terrorist
+activity and the manifestation of other threats to America from crime
+with national security implications and from other disasters and
+threatening conditions that come our way. We have a sense of purpose
+and we have embarked on what has likely never been done before with
+regard to information fusion. . .to fully understand the threat and the
+conditions extant in the ``new normal'' United States context that we
+see now and in the future. The 9-11 attacks, the December 2003--
+February 2004 period of heightened concern, the recent attack in Madrid
+and potential but largely interdicted attacks elsewhere, and the fact
+of anthrax and ricin attacks here in the United States, combine to form
+this ``new normal'' condition of constant possibility that we cannot
+ignore.
+ At the same time we are--I am--most mindful of the need to protect
+the civil liberties and personal privacy of our citizens and to
+preserve and defend our Constitution and our way of life. In the end,
+we are--I am--focused on defeating the terrorists before they can
+strike. That is why we exist.
+ Chairman Cox and Members of the Committee, this concludes my
+prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may
+have at this time.
+
+ Chairman Cox. Mr. Brennan.
+
+ STATEMENT OF JOHN O. BRENNAN, DIRECTOR, TERRORIST THREAT
+ INTEGRATION CENTER
+
+ Mr. Brennan. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of
+the committee. It is a pleasure to appear before you today to
+talk about information sharing and homeland security. And I
+would like to offer just a few brief ideas, as well as lessons
+learned from the TTIC experience on information sharing.
+ In order to minimize the potential for dangerous seams and
+coverage as well as to optimize the use of finite resources, we
+must continue building and implementing a national framework
+for the origination, analysis and dissemination of terrorism
+information by the U.S. Government. The delineation of such
+responsibilities must be as unambiguous and as straightforward
+as possible to ensure we continue building an agreed-upon
+information sharing architecture, both horizontal and vertical,
+that is based on a clear understanding of who is responsible
+for what.
+ Such an architecture must include an overall Intelligence
+Community business model framework to ensure comprehensive,
+robust and as appropriate, alternative terrorism capability; a
+national information sharing framework based on increased
+clarity of mission roles and responsibilities, including an
+understanding of the information needs of the Federal
+Government, State and local officials and law enforcement and
+the private sector; an overall blueprint for information
+technology systems, including strategic prioritization,
+implementation schedules and sunset requirements for legacy
+systems that impede interoperability; community-wide standards
+for reporting formats, dissemination requirements,
+interoperable hardware and software; and role-based data
+access.
+ There are important lessons in the establishment of TTIC.
+Assignees to TTIC retain authorities to home organizations,
+which allows TTIC to access more information than in any single
+government department or agency.
+ Now, a key TTIC objective has been to develop an integrated
+information technology architecture so its sophisticated
+analytic tools and search capabilities can be applied against
+the many terabytes of data available to the Federal Government.
+We must be able to cross-check these different data sets which
+are collected by departments and agencies statutorily
+authorized to do so. Our approach for this is called the
+Sanctum architecture, which will allow analysts to conduct
+simultaneous and federated searches against data sets resident
+on separate networks. By the end of this month, we will be able
+to conduct federated simultaneous searches against the data
+contained in six separate networks, and other networks will be
+added throughout the year.
+ An additional challenge is dealing with disparate
+information technology systems and nonstandardized information
+technology practices, processes and procedures, including a
+plethora of legacy information systems and networks that impede
+interoperability. This is not to say that there should be a
+single integrated database of all terrorism information in the
+U.S. Government. However, overall guidelines for U.S.
+Government information technology systems and enforced
+community-wide standards regarding metadata tagging, security
+practices and procedures would go a long way toward
+implementing an overall national framework that promotes
+interoperability and information sharing.
+ And I look forward to taking your questions.
+ [The statement of Mr. Brennan follows:]
+
+ Prepared Statement John O. Brennan
+
+ Good afternoon, Chairman Cox, Ranking Member Turner, and the
+Members of the House Select Committee on Homeland Security.
+ I appreciate the opportunity to join my colleagues from the
+Departments of State and Homeland Security, and the Federal Bureau of
+Investigation, to discuss progress made, lessons learned, and areas
+that might be strengthened regarding information sharing and associated
+activities to protect U.S. interests at home and abroad from the
+terrorist threat.
+ Significant progress has been made on information sharing
+throughout the Federal government and beyond since the tragic events of
+September 11, 2001. The implementation of streamlined processes and
+procedures, enhanced partnerships bridging organizational boundaries,
+and the deployment of new technologies have enabled the integration and
+dissemination of information on terrorist threats to U.S. interests at
+home and abroad in a more timely and comprehensive manner than ever
+before. Likewise, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the
+Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are expediting the provision of
+terrorist threat-related and associated information to state and local
+government officials, the private sector, and law enforcement entities.
+ As we collectively continue efforts to improve information sharing,
+as well as move toward implementing recommendations made by the 9/11
+Commission, I offer some core concepts as well as lessons learned based
+on the experience establishing the multi-agency joint venture known as
+the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC).
+ It is my personal opinion that in order to minimize the potential
+for dangerous seams in coverage as well as to optimize the use of
+finite analytic resources, we must continue building and implementing a
+national framework for terrorism analytic responsibility in the U.S.
+Government. The delineation of substantive responsibilities for
+terrorism analysis among the various members of the Intelligence
+Community must be as unambiguous and as straightforward as possible,
+while still allowing alternative views to be heard. An unambiguous
+delineation of roles and responsibilities is critical to ensure that we
+continue building an information-sharing architecture--both horizontal
+and vertical--that is based on a clear understanding of who has
+responsibility for analytic ``output.'' With well-defined
+responsibilities, we will have a system that identifies ``who'' is
+responsible for providing ``what'' to ``whom.'' We must continue
+progress already made in clarifying roles and responsibilities and the
+building of an information-sharing architecture, with particular
+emphasis on establishing:
+ An overall Intelligence Community business model
+ framework to ensure comprehensive, robust, and, as appropriate,
+ redundant terrorism analysis capability.
+ A national information-sharing framework based on
+ increased clarity of mission roles and responsibilities, with a
+ common understanding of the information requirements of
+ individual U.S. Government components and beyond. This
+ information-sharing framework should extend beyond the
+ Intelligence Community and where appropriate, include linkages
+ to state and local officials and law enforcement; commercial
+ industry; foreign entities; and other non-traditional partners.
+ An overall blueprint for information technology
+ systems, including strategic prioritization, implementation
+ schedules, as well as establishment of a ``sunset'' list for
+ legacy systems that impede interoperability.
+ Community-wide standards for reporting formats,
+ dissemination requirements, and interoperable hardware and
+ software, with an information technology architecture for role-
+ based data access.
+ There are some relevant lessons from the establishment of TTIC.
+Assignees to TTIC carry the authorities of their home organizations
+with them, such that in TTIC there is the ability to access more
+information than in any single independent agency or department. In
+fact, TTIC has direct access connectivity with 26 separate U.S.
+Government networks, enabling access to terrorism-related information
+systems and databases spanning the intelligence, law enforcement,
+homeland security, diplomatic, and military communities. This
+unprecedented information access allows for a more comprehensive
+understanding of terrorist threats to U.S. interests at home and abroad
+and, most importantly, enables the provision of this information and
+related analysis to those responsible for detecting, disrupting,
+deterring, and defending against terrorist attacks.
+ A key TTIC objective is to develop an integrated information
+technology architecture so that sophisticated analytic tools and
+federated search capabilities can be applied to the many terabytes of
+data available to the Federal Government. We must be able to cross
+check these different data sets, which are collected by departments and
+agencies statutorily authorized to do so, in a manner that allows us to
+identify terrorists and their supporters before they reach our shores
+or when they emerge within our midst. Simply put, we need to create new
+knowledge from existing information currently resident in a distributed
+architecture. We must also implement the appropriate controls to ensure
+security and privacy of information. Progress has been made toward this
+end. Our approach, called the ``Sanctum Architecture,'' is expected to
+reach initial operating capability later this month, allowing analysts
+to search against data sets resident on 6 separate networks. Over time,
+the goal for the Sanctum architecture is to expand this capability to
+enable federated searches across multiple data sets--in other words,
+one query against the holdings of multiple systems and databases on
+multiple networks.
+ An additional challenge is that of disparate information technology
+systems and non-standardized information technology practices,
+processes, and procedures, including a plethora of legacy information
+systems and networks that impede interoperability. This is not to say
+that there should be a single, integrated database of all terrorism
+information in the U.S. Government. However, overall guidelines for
+U.S. Government information technology systems and enforced community-
+wide standards (metadata tagging, security practices and procedures,
+etc) would go a long way toward implementing an overall national
+framework that promotes interoperability and information sharing.
+ In conclusion, as we move forward with information sharing
+initiatives as well as address the broader issues associated with
+intelligence reform, integration of effort should serve as an important
+organizing principle. In particular, we need to enhance orchestration
+of the broad array of counterterrorism activities across the U.S.
+Government and beyond. In this regard, I support the concept of
+establishing a National Counterterrorism Center to orchestrate and
+integrate, as appropriate, the myriad of activities working to protect
+U.S. interests at home and abroad from the scourge of international
+terrorism. We all have a shared responsibility to continue implementing
+a new information sharing paradigm and an overall national
+counterterrorism system that maximizes the security and safety of all
+Americans, wherever they live or work. I look forward to continue
+working with my colleagues here today and with the Members of this
+committee toward this end.
+
+ Chairman Cox. Ms. Baginski, I should note for members, the
+title Executive Assistant Director refers to the Bureau and you
+are in fact the Director of the Office of Intelligence.
+
+STATEMENT OF MAUREEN BAGINSKI, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR
+ INTELLIGENCE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+
+ Ms. Baginski. Thank you very much. It is a pleasure to
+appear before you and I will make my remarks brief.
+ We applaud--at the FBI we applaud the work of the 9/11
+Commission. We are grateful for their fine work. We are pleased
+they have embraced our reforms to date, and we agree with them
+wholeheartedly that we have additional work to do.
+ The adversary we face today is networked and enabled by
+information technology that allows it to have a shared view of
+the objective, a clear understanding of roles and
+responsibilities in carrying out the objective and very tight
+decision loops in taking action. To defeat this adversary, we,
+the intelligence and homeland security communities, have to
+look just like it. Each of us sitting here at this table
+represents a node on the Federal network. Our job is to
+interoperate with each other, but also ensure that we can
+interoperate with other information networks, particularly
+those at the State and local and tribal level, who will be the
+first to encounter threats and the first called upon to defend
+against them.
+ At the FBI, we define intelligence very simply. We call
+intelligence vital information about those who would do us
+harm; and we see the only true measure of intelligence, good
+intelligence, is whether or not it helps someone make a better
+decision. The decision makers who have to defend our Nation are
+varied indeed, and they range from the President to the
+patrolman. So our first commitment on the intelligence side is
+to invest very substantial resources in understanding the
+decisions that have to be made and ensuring that we provide the
+proper information to do that.
+ Over 2 years ago, Director Mueller recognized this and
+appointed an Assistant Director of the FBI for Law Enforcement
+Coordination. That Assistant Director is sitting behind me, Mr.
+Louis Quijas, who comes to us from High Point, North Carolina,
+where he was a police chief, and before that, the Kansas City
+chief.
+ Everything we have done since 9/11 in the FBI and across
+the Federal, State, local and tribal governments has been
+designed to create this information network, and it has been an
+evolutionary process. We began, I think, immediately after 9/11
+with bringing foreign and domestic intelligence about the
+terrorist threat together in the Oval Office in the President's
+briefings. That evolved into the creation of a TTIC where we
+institutionalized the bringing together of information around
+the threat.
+ And we brought together intelligence and operations in the
+counterterrorism strategy security group headed by the National
+Security Council. We stood up the Department of Homeland
+Security designed to really overlay those threats, over our
+critical infrastructure, and to ensure that we were protected.
+And the reforms that the President has announced, the ones he
+has accepted from the creation of the National Counterterrorism
+Center and the creation of a National Intelligence Director are
+embraced as logical next steps.
+ There is great parallel to that progression in the course
+we have taken with intelligence at the FBI, a very evolutionary
+path, beginning immediately after the events of 9/11 and
+standing up a very robust intelligence capability within our
+counterterrorism directorate focused basically on raw
+intelligence production and finished analysis; and then
+gradually, over a 3-year period, migrating to the creation of
+an enterprise-wide intelligence program led by an Executive
+Assistant Director. And I was pleased and honored to join the
+FBI in that position in May of 2003.
+ Our intelligence program is actually built on four key
+principles. We want an independent collection and requirements
+management system. What we can do and what we can collect
+should not be driving what we collect. What we must collect
+should be driving what we need to know and have to know to
+defend the country has to be defining it. So that process is
+managed in my office.
+ Another core principle is centralized management of
+intelligence. The power of the FBI intelligence process is in
+its distribution geographically in its 56 field offices, 400
+resident agencies and worldwide legal attache offices. My trick
+is to ensure that that process is managed against common
+threats, but not micromanaged from headquarters so we unleash
+the power that is out in the field.
+ The third principle is focused strategic analysis. If all
+of our attention is on current reporting, then we are failing
+to devote the resources we need to step back from the threat so
+that we understand what we don't know and need to know, to put
+all of that information so we can make better decisions.
+ And finally: the core principle of integration of
+intelligence with law enforcement operations.
+ Those are our four principles.
+ I am the FBI official responsible for information sharing.
+So if there are problems with information sharing and
+information policy, you are looking at the person who has to
+put in place the proper policies to do that.
+ I come before you today to tell you we have made a very
+good step and we have more work to do. So that there is no
+confusion for you, it is my responsibility both within the FBI
+and outside of the FBI to ensure that the proper information is
+delivered to key decision makers, and with the timeliness they
+need it and at the classification level that they need it.
+ In the interest of brevity, I want to share with you some
+of the key accomplishments we have made, because they are
+substantial and they are a good start, but they are not yet
+enough.
+ First, we have issued our first-ever FBI intelligence
+requirements and collection tasking documents. These
+requirements are completely lined up with the national
+intelligence priorities framework and emanate from it. We have,
+in addition, issued an unclassified version for our partners in
+State, local and tribal law enforcement who continue to ask me,
+we will give you whatever it is you want: just tell us what it
+is you need from us.
+ We have become full members of the DCI's National
+Intelligence Collection Board and National Intelligence
+Analysis and Production Board, and we are participating in the
+drafting of national intelligence estimates.
+ We have created a collection capabilities database that
+tells us what sources we have and could bring to bear on all
+threats facing the Nation. Most importantly, this database
+allows us to identify where we have critical gaps and need to
+develop new sources.
+ I chair a daily intelligence board every day to ensure that
+critical decisions are made about information sharing and that
+cross-programmatic analysis is done so all information is
+brought to bear on threats.
+ We completed our first-ever FBI dissemination manual. It is
+based on the principle ``right to release'' and requires a new
+classification requirement, ``required to release.'' We write
+to the lowest classification. We separate sources from methods.
+And we have just developed a Web-based intelligence authoring
+tool that requires the author to write their first version at
+the lowest classification level.
+ We have set unified standards and policies for training
+intelligence analysts. We are in the process of changing the
+critical performance criteria for agents to include emphasis on
+source development and production of intelligence.
+ We have tripled our raw intelligence production this year
+and doubled our production of Presidential assessments--of
+intelligence assessments.
+ I want to tell you the final thing we have done is to
+develop metrics to tell you, ourselves and others whether these
+changes are making any difference. And with that, I will be
+happy to take any of your questions.
+ [The statement of Ms. Baginski follows:]
+
+ Prepared Statement of Maureen A. Baginski
+
+Introduction
+ Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. It is my
+pleasure to come before you today to discuss the recommendations of the
+9-11 Commission, specifically information sharing issues that face the
+Federal Bureau of Investigation and other members of the Intelligence
+and Law Enforcement communities. As Director Mueller has said, the FBI
+has worked closely with the Commission and their staff throughout their
+tenure and we commend them for an extraordinary effort. Throughout this
+process, we have approached the Commission's inquiry as an opportunity
+to gain further input from outside experts. We took their critiques
+seriously, adapted our ongoing reform efforts, and have already taken
+substantial steps to address their remaining concerns. We are gratified
+and encouraged that the Commission has embraced our vision for change
+and has recognized the progress that the men and women of the FBI have
+made to implement that vision. Our work to date has been on
+strengthening FBI capabilities so that we can be a strong node on the
+information network of those who defend the nation. Vital information
+about those who would do us harm is not produced by the federal
+government alone. We are proud to also be part of an 800,000 strong
+state, local, and tribal law enforcement community who are the first to
+encounter and defend against threats.
+ On August 2nd, the President announced his intention to establish a
+National Intelligence Director (NID) and a National Counter Terrorism
+Center (NCTC). We look forward to working with you on these vital
+reforms.
+ Our core guiding principle at the FBI is that intelligence and law
+enforcement operations must be integrated. Under the direction of
+Director Mueller, the FBI has moved aggressively forward in this regard
+by implementing a comprehensive plan that has fundamentally transformed
+the FBI. Director Mueller has overhauled our counterterrorism
+operations, expanded our intelligence capabilities, modernized our
+business practices and technology, and improved coordination with our
+partners.
+ A prerequisite for any operational coordination is the full and
+free exchange of information. Without procedures and mechanisms that
+allow information sharing on a regular and timely basis, we and our
+partners cannot expect to align our operational efforts to best
+accomplish our shared mission. Accordingly, we have taken steps to
+establish unified FBI-wide policies for sharing information and
+intelligence both within the FBI and outside it. This has occurred
+under the umbrella of the FBI's Intelligence Program, and is my
+personal responsibility as the FBI executive for information sharing.
+We have made great progress and we have much work ahead of us.
+
+Intelligence Program
+ The mission of the FBI's Intelligence Program is to optimally
+position the FBI to meet current and emerging national security and
+criminal threats by (1) aiming core investigative work proactively
+against threats to US interests, (2) building and sustaining
+enterprise-wide intelligence policies and human and technical
+capabilities, and (3) providing useful, appropriate, and timely
+information and analysis to the national security, homeland security,
+and law enforcement communities. Building on already strong FBI
+intelligence capabilities, Director Mueller created in January 2003 the
+position of Executive Assistant Director (EAD) of Intelligence and an
+Office of Intelligence. I was honored to join the FBI in May 2003 as
+the first EAD Intelligence.
+
+Core Principles
+ We built the FBI Intelligence Program on the following core
+ principles:
+ Independent Requirements and Collection
+ Management: While intelligence collection, operations,
+ analysis, and reporting are integrated at headquarters
+ divisions and in the field, the Office of Intelligence
+ manages the requirements and collection management
+ process. This ensures that we focus intelligence
+ collection and production on priority intelligence
+ requirements and on filling key gaps in our knowledge.
+ Centralized Management and Distributed
+ Execution: The power of the FBI intelligence capability
+ is in its 56 field offices, 400 resident agencies and
+ 56 legal attache offices around the world. The Office
+ of Intelligence must provide those entities with
+ sufficient guidance to drive intelligence production
+ effectively and efficiently, but not micro-manage field
+ intelligence operations.
+ Focused Strategic Analysis: The Office of
+ Intelligence sets strategic analysis priorities and
+ ensures they are carried out both at headquarters and
+ in the field. This is accomplished through a daily
+ production meeting that I chair.
+ Integration of Analysis with Operations:
+ Intelligence analysis is best when collectors and
+ analysts work side-by-side in integrated operations.
+
+Concept of Operations
+ Concepts of Operations (CONOPs) guide FBI intelligence processes
+and detailed implementation plans drive specific actions to implement
+them. Our CONOPs cover the following core functions: Intelligence
+Requirements and Collection Management; Intelligence Assessment
+Process; Human Talent for Intelligence Production; Field Office
+Intelligence Operation; Intelligence Production and Use; Information
+Sharing; Community Support; Threat Forecasting and Operational
+Requirements; and Budget Formulation for Intelligence.
+
+Accomplishments
+ What follows are some of our key accomplishments:
+ We have issued the first-ever FBI requirements and
+ collection tasking documents. These documents are fully aligned
+ with the DCI's National Intelligence Priorities Framework and
+ we have published unclassified versions for our partners in
+ state, local, and tribal law enforcement.
+ We are full members of the National Intelligence
+ Collection Board and the National Intelligence Analysis and
+ Production Board, and soon will be participating in the
+ drafting of National Intelligence Estimates and the National
+ Foreign Intelligence Board.
+ We have created a collection capabilities database
+ that tells us what sources we can bring to bear on intelligence
+ issues across the FBI.
+ We have created FBI homepages on INTELINK, SIPRNET,
+ and Law Enforcement Online (LEO) for dissemination and
+ evaluation of our intelligence product.
+ We have established a daily Intelligence Production
+ Board to ensure that timely decisions are made regarding the
+ production and dissemination of all analytical products. The
+ Board reviews the significant threats, developments, and issues
+ emerging in each investigative priority area, and identifies
+ topics for intelligence products.
+ We have completed the first-ever FBI intelligence
+ dissemination manual.
+ We have proposed and are building an Intelligence
+ Officer certification program for Agents, Analysts,
+ Surveillance Specialists and Language Analysts. Once
+ established this certification will be a pre-requisite for
+ advancement to Section Chief or Assistant Special Agent in
+ Charge, thus ensuring that all FBI senior managers will be
+ fully trained and experienced intelligence officers.
+ We have completed and begun to implement the CONOPs
+ for Intelligence Analysts. We have set unified standards,
+ policies, and training for intelligence analysts. In a new
+ recruiting program veteran analysts are attending events at
+ colleges and universities throughout the country and we are
+ offering hiring bonuses to analysts for the first time in FBI
+ history.
+ We are in the process of changing the criteria on
+ which Agents are evaluated to place more emphasis on
+ intelligence-related function.
+ We are on course to triple our intelligence production
+ this year.
+ We have placed reports officers in our Joint Terrorism
+ Task Forces (JTTFs) to ensure vital information is flowing to
+ those who need it.
+ We have developed detailed metrics to judge the
+ results of our intelligence initiatives and are prepared to
+ regularly report performance and progress to Congress and other
+ stakeholders, partners, and customers.
+ We have established Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs)
+ to integrate analysts, Agents, linguists, and surveillance
+ personnel in the field to bring a dedicated team focus to
+ intelligence operations. As of June 2004, there are 1,450 FIG
+ personnel, including 382 Special Agents and 160 employees from
+ other Government agencies. Each FIG is under the direct
+ supervision of an Assistant Special Agent in Charge.
+ From October 2003 to April 2004, the FBI participated
+ in more than 10 recruitment events and plans to add at least
+ five additional events through September 2004. A marketing plan
+ also was implemented to attract potential candidates. In
+ February 2004, an advertisement specific to the Intelligence
+ Analyst position at the FBI was placed in The Washington Post,
+ The Washington Times, and the New York Times, and has since
+ been run several more times. Our National Press Office issued a
+ press release that kicked off an aggressive hiring campaign.
+ The College of Analytic Studies (CAS), established in
+ October 2001, is based at the FBI Academy in Quantico,
+ Virginia. Since FY 2002, 264 analysts have graduated from the
+ College's six-week Basic Intelligence Analyst Course. 655 field
+ and headquarters analysts have attended specialty courses on a
+ variety of analytical topics. 1,389 field and headquarters
+ employees have attended specialized counterterrorism courses
+ offered in conjunction with CIA University, and 1,010 New Agent
+ Trainees have received a two-hour instructional block on
+ intelligence.
+ The Basic Intelligence Course currently offered by the
+ CAS is being revised and updated to incorporate key elements of
+ our intelligence program. Upon completion of this effort, the
+ course will be retitled: Analytical Cadre Education Strategy I
+ (ACES I) as outlined in the Human Talent CONOPS. An
+ intermediate course entitled ACES II is anticipated in the
+ future that would target more experienced analysts. Practical
+ exercises and advanced writing skills will be emphasized, as
+ well as advanced analytical techniques.
+ The ACES I course will incorporate seven core elements
+ of intelligence relevant for new agents and new analysts.
+ Additionally ACES I will focus on assimilation, analytic
+ tradecraft and practice, thinking and writing skills,
+ resources, and field skills.
+ Complementing ACES I and ACES II, the Office of
+ Intelligence, in coordination with the FBI Training and
+ Development Division, will identify, facilitate, and exploit
+ training partnerships with other government agencies, academia,
+ and the private sector to fully develop the career choices of
+ FBI analysts. Whether an analyst chooses the specialized,
+ interdisciplinary, or managerial career path, s/he will have
+ the opportunity to attend courses offered through the Joint
+ Military Intelligence Training Center, other government
+ training centers, and private companies.
+ The Office of Intelligence is also establishing
+ education cooperative programs where college students will be
+ able to work at the FBI while earning a four-year degree.
+ Students may alternate semesters of work with full-time study
+ or may work in the summers in exchange for tuition assistance.
+ In addition to financial assistance, students would benefit by
+ obtaining significant work experience, and the FBI would
+ benefit through an agreement requiring the student to continue
+ working for the FBI for a specific period of time after
+ graduation. This program will be implemented in FY 2005.
+ An Analyst Advisory Group has also been created
+ specifically to address analytical concerns. I established and
+ chair the advisory group--composed of Headquarters and field
+ analysts. The group affords analysts the opportunity to provide
+ a working-level view of analytic issues and to participate in
+ policy and procedure formation. They are involved in developing
+ promotional criteria, providing input for training initiatives,
+ and establishing the mentoring program for new FBI analysts.
+ The Career Mentoring Working Group of the Analyst
+ Advisory Group is creating a career mentoring program to
+ provide guidance and advice to new analysts. Once implemented,
+ all new Intelligence Analysts will have a mentor to assist
+ them. The career mentor will have scheduled contact with the
+ new analyst on a monthly basis throughout the analyst's first
+ year of employment.
+ As of this year, the Director's Awards will feature a
+ new category: the Director's Award for Excellence in
+ Intelligence Analysis. Nominees for this award must display a
+ unique ability to apply skills in intelligence analysis in
+ furtherance of the FBI's mission, resulting in significant
+ improvements or innovations in methods of analysis that
+ contribute to many investigations or activities, and/or
+ overcoming serious obstacles through exceptional perseverance
+ or dedication leading to an extraordinary contribution to a
+ significant case, program, threat, or issue.
+ Turning to intelligence training for our agents, we
+ are now working to incorporate elements of our basic
+ intelligence training course into the New Agents Class
+ curriculum. We expect that work to be completed by September. A
+ key element of this concept is that agents in New Agents
+ Training and analysts in the College of Analytic Studies will
+ conduct joint training exercises in intelligence tradecraft.
+ The first offerings to contain these joint exercises are
+ expected in December of this year. In addition to this, we are
+ in the process of changing the criteria on which agents are
+ evaluated to place more emphasis on intelligence-related
+ functions and information sharing.
+ On March 22, 2004, Director Mueller also adopted a
+ proposal to establish a career path in which new Special Agents
+ are initially assigned to a small field office and exposed to a
+ wide range of field experiences. After approximately three
+ years, agents will be transferred to a large field office where
+ they will specialize in one of four program areas:
+ Intelligence, Counterterrorism/ Counterintelligence, Cyber, or
+ Criminal, and will receive advanced training tailored to their
+ area of specialization. In our Special Agent hiring, we have
+ changed the list of ``critical skills'' we are seeking in
+ candidates to include intelligence experience and expertise,
+ foreign languages, and technology.
+ Our language specialists are critical to our
+ intelligence cadre as well. The FBI's approximately 1,200
+ language specialists are stationed across 52 field offices and
+ headquarters, and are now connected via secure networks that
+ allow language specialists in one FBI office to work on
+ projects for any other office. Since the beginning of FY 2001,
+ the FBI has recruited and processed more than 30,000 linguist
+ applicants. These efforts have resulted in the addition of
+ nearly 700 new linguists with a Top Secret security clearance.
+ In addition, the FBI formed a Language Services Translation
+ Center to act as a command and control center to coordinate
+ translator assignments and maximize its capacity to render
+ immediate translation assistance.
+
+Information Sharing--Our Relationship with the Intelligence and Law
+Enforcement Communities
+ The FBI shares intelligence with other members of the Intelligence
+Community, to include the intelligence components of the Department of
+Homeland Security (DHS), through direct classified and unclassified
+dissemination and through websites on classified Intelligence Community
+networks. The FBI also shares intelligence with representatives of
+other elements of the Intelligence Community who participate in Joint
+Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) in the United States or with whom the FBI
+collaborates in activities abroad. FBI intelligence products shared
+with the Intelligence Community include both raw and finished
+intelligence reports. FBI intelligence products shared with the
+Intelligence Community include Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs),
+Intelligence Assessments, and Intelligence Bulletins. To support
+information sharing, there is now a Special Agent or Intelligence
+Analyst in the JTTFs dedicated to producing ``raw'' intelligence
+reports for the entire national security community, including state,
+municipal, and tribal law enforcement partners and other JTTF members.
+These reports officers are trained to produce intelligence reports that
+both protect sources and methods and maximize the amount of information
+that can be shared. It is the responsibility of the FIGs to manage,
+execute and maintain the FBI's intelligence functions within the FBI
+field office. FIG personnel have access to TS and SCI information so
+they will be able to receive, analyze, review and recommend sharing
+this information with entities within the FBI as well as our customers
+and partners within the Intelligence and law enforcement communities.
+ In addition, classified intelligence and other sensitive FBI data
+are shared with cleared federal, state, and local law enforcement
+officials who participate in the JTTFs. The JTTFs partner FBI personnel
+with hundreds of investigators from various federal, state, and local
+agencies, and are important force multipliers in the fight against
+terrorism. Since September 11, 2001, the FBI has increased the number
+of JTTFs from 34 to 100 nationwide. We also established the National
+Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) at FBI Headquarters, staffed by
+representatives from 38 federal, state, and local agencies. The mission
+of the NJTTF is to enhance communication, coordination, and cooperation
+by acting as the hub of support for the JTTFs throughout the United
+States, providing a point of fusion for intelligence acquired in
+support of counterterrorism operations. The FBI will continue to create
+new avenues of communication between law enforcement agencies to better
+fight the terrorist threat.
+ The FBI has also established a robust channel for sharing
+information with the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) by
+providing direct electronic access to classified and unclassified
+internal FBI investigative and operational databases, with narrow
+exceptions for certain types of sensitive domestic criminal cases
+unrelated to terrorism. TTIC also has direct electronic access to
+internal FBI headquarters division websites and e-mail capabilities on
+the FBI's classified intranet system. Both FBI and non-FBI personnel
+assigned to TTIC have access to this information.
+ The FBI has agreed to provide a substantial permanent staff to
+TTIC. TTIC's mission is to enable full integration of terrorist threat-
+related information and analysis. It creates a structure to
+institutionalize sharing across appropriate federal agency lines of
+terrorist threat-related information in order to form the most
+comprehensive threat picture.
+ Although the FBI retains authority to approve dissemination of raw
+FBI information by TTIC to other agencies, the FBI authorizes the TTIC
+to share FBI intelligence products by posting them on the TTIC Online
+website on Intelink-TS. The TTIC Online website provides additional
+security safeguards, and access is granted to Intelligence Community
+users who have a need-to-know for more sensitive classified
+intelligence on international terrorism from the FBI and other
+agencies. The FBI also authorizes the National Counterintelligence
+Executive (NCIX) to share FBI counterintelligence products on the
+Intelink-CI(iCI) website with similar safeguards and access by users
+who have a need-to-know for more sensitive classified
+counterintelligence products.
+ In addition to this, the Bureau also fully contributes intelligence
+analysis to the President's Terrorist Threat Report (PTTR). These
+products are coordinated with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
+DHS, and other federal agencies. In addition to the PTTR, the FBI
+provides Presidential Intelligence Assessments directly to the
+President and the White House Executive Staff.
+ The FBI is also committed to providing those tools which assist law
+enforcement in intelligence-led policing--from the National Crime
+Information Center, the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification
+System, and the Interstate Identification Index, to Law Enforcement
+Online (LEO), a virtual private network that reaches federal, state,
+and law enforcement agencies at the Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU)
+level. LEO user's total nearly 30,000 and that number is increasing.
+That total includes more than 14,000 state and local law enforcement
+members. LEO makes finished FBI intelligence products available,
+including Intelligence Assessments resulting from analysis of criminal,
+cyber, and terrorism intelligence. Our LEO Intelligence Bulletins are
+used to disseminate finished intelligence on significant developments
+or trends. Intelligence Information Reports also are available on LEO
+at the Law Enforcement Sensitive classification level. The FBI also
+recently posted the requirements document on LEO, which provided state
+and local law enforcement a shared view of the terrorist threat and the
+information needed in every priority area.
+ LEO also has secure connectivity to the Regional Information
+Sharing Systems network (riss.net). The FBI Intelligence products are
+disseminated weekly via LEO to over 17,000 law enforcement agencies and
+to 60 federal agencies, providing information about terrorism,
+criminal, and cyber threats to patrol officers and other local law
+enforcement personnel who have direct daily contacts with the general
+public. The FBI will use an enhanced LEO as the primary channel for
+sensitive but unclassified communications with other federal, state and
+local agencies. LEO and the DHS Joint Regional Information Exchange
+System (JRIES) will also be interoperable.
+ In the spring of 2002, the International Association of Chiefs of
+Police (IACP) met and agreed that a collaborative intelligence sharing
+plan must be created to address the inadequacies of the intelligence
+process that, in part, led to the failure to prevent the events of
+September 11. In response, the Global Justice Information Sharing
+Initiative (Global), which is a Federal Advisory Committee to the U.S.
+Attorney General, formed the Global Intelligence Working Group (GIWG).
+The GIWG is comprised of experts and leaders from local, state, and
+federal law enforcement, including members from the FBI. Their efforts
+resulted in the creation of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing
+Plan (NCISP).
+ On February 11, 2004 the Attorney General announced the creation of
+the Justice Intelligence Coordinating Council (JICC). I currently chair
+this Council, which is comprised of the heads of Department of Justice
+(DOJ) agencies with intelligence responsibilities. The Council works to
+improve information sharing within DOJ, and ensures that DOJ meets the
+intelligence needs of outside customers and acts in accordance with
+intelligence priorities. The Council will also identify common
+challenges (such as electronic connectivity, collaborative analytic
+tools, and intelligence skills training) and establish policies and
+programs to address them.
+ On February 20, 2004 the FBI formed the Information Sharing Policy
+Group, comprised of Executive Assistant Directors, Assistant Directors,
+and other senior executive managers. I serve as the co-chair. This
+group is establishing the FBI's information and intelligence sharing
+policies.
+ At the same time, we have intelligence analysts from other agencies
+working in key positions throughout the Bureau. The Associate Deputy
+Assistant Director for Operations in the Counterterrorism Division is a
+CIA detailee. This exchange of personnel is taking place in our field
+offices as well.
+ We have also worked closely with DHS to ensure that we have the
+integration and comprehensive information sharing between our agencies
+that are vital to the success of our missions. The FBI and DHS share
+database access at TTIC, in the National JTTF at FBI Headquarters, in
+the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) and the Terrorist
+Screening Center (TSC), and in local JTTFs in our field offices around
+the country. We worked closely together to get the new Terrorist
+Screening Center up and running. We hold weekly briefings in which our
+Counterterrorism analysts brief their DHS counterparts on current
+terrorism developments. The FBI and DHS now coordinate joint warning
+products to address our customers' concerns about multiple and
+duplicative warnings. We designated an experienced executive from the
+Transportation Security Administration to run the TSC, a DHS executive
+to serve as Deputy Director of the TSC, and a senior DHS executive was
+detailed to the FBI to ensure coordination and transparency between the
+agencies.
+ In order to improve the compatibility of information technology
+systems throughout the Intelligence Community and increase the speed
+and ease of information sharing and collaboration, the FBI's
+information technology team has worked closely with the Chief
+Information Officers of DHS and other Intelligence Community agencies,
+to develop our recent and ongoing technology upgrades to ensure the
+interoperability of the various information systems. To facilitate
+further coordination, the FBI Chief Information Officer (CIO) sits on
+the Intelligence Community CIO Executive Council. The Council develops
+and recommends technical requirements, policies and procedures, and
+coordinates initiatives to improve the interoperability of information
+technology systems within the Intelligence Community.
+ The CIO is also working with DOJ on interfaces between the
+Intelligence Community System for Information Sharing (ICSIS) and the
+Law Enforcement Information Sharing (LEIS) initiative, with the FBI's
+Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division, to increase the
+sharing of intelligence-related information to and from state and local
+officials.
+ In conclusion, the FBI has a responsibility to the nation,
+Intelligence Community, and federal, state, and local law enforcement
+to disseminate information, and to do so is an inherent part of our
+mission. Sharing FBI information will be the rule, unless sharing is
+legally or procedurally unacceptable.
+
+Next Steps
+ We have made great progress, but we have much work to do. Our plan
+is solid and we believe we are heading in the right direction. We have
+enjoyed much support from your committee and we are very appreciative
+of the time your staff has spent in learning about our initiatives and
+giving us advice. What we need more than anything else is your
+continued support and understanding that a change of this magnitude
+will require time to implement. With your help, we will have that.
+Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify before you today
+and I will be happy to entertain any questions you may have.
+
+ Ms. Dunn. Thank you, each of you, for your statements. We
+will begin the questioning with the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
+Diaz-Balart.
+ Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ I would like to thank you for testifying before us today.
+The first question I would like to address is to Mr. Brennan.
+ The 9/11 Commission report recommended expanding TTIC,
+enabling it to share foreign and domestic intelligence and
+conduct joint operational planning. So what I would like to ask
+you about is, in your opinion, what legal changes would be
+needed to accomplish that?
+ Mr. Brennan. Congressman, I think there is still a lot of
+discussion going on right now to determine exactly what the
+NCTC should do. The President has announced support for it and
+there have been important meetings over the past several weeks
+to look at the details on that. And depending on the extent of
+the change and the NCTC's responsibilities, I think there would
+have to be a careful look at whatever types of legislative
+action or executive order language that would need to be put
+forward. I think that is open to discussion; and as you point
+out rightly, it is talking about a new dimension to provide to
+TTIC in terms of this joint operational planning. And I think
+the 9/11 Commission report says that decisions would have to be
+made about how much authority should, in fact, be vested in the
+NCTC on that score.
+ Mr. Diaz-Balart. Ms. Baginski, I appreciated very much your
+testimony, and as an admirer of the FBI, as I am--and you have
+a very solid team in south Florida dealing with multiple
+challenges on a daily basis--the community is very proud of the
+FBI.
+ The criticism in the Commission's report of the FBI was
+perhaps stinging, not only of the FBI, but as an admirer of the
+FBI, I noted it with much interest. You explained in some
+detail, and I appreciate you having done so, steps that the FBI
+has taken since September 11 with regard to the very specific
+criticisms by the Commission. And so I don't want you to expand
+more on those steps. But what I would ask you is to facilitate
+the steps you are taking, because some of them are continuing
+obviously. Especially with regard to information sharing, how
+can we in Congress be of help to you, to the FBI in the efforts
+being taken to improve information sharing?.
+ Ms. Baginski. The first dimension is the recognition that
+it is going to take some time. There are dimensions in this
+that are information technology, that are people, that are
+training issues. So that would be helpful to recognize. It is a
+combination of things.
+ And then, from our perspective, our biggest needs are for
+secure communications to our field offices and for secure
+compartmented information facilities. And these are not small
+requests. In order to join this large Intelligence Community
+and to be a healthy node on this network, we have to be able to
+operate in their information environment.
+ So those are the two areas. And I think third is to foster
+the debate that is necessary on important issues that people
+are raising about civil liberties as this work is done.
+ Mr. Diaz-Balart. Look forward to continuing to work with
+you.
+ Ms. Dunn. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Lofgren.
+ Ms. Lofgren. Thank you and thanks for your service to our
+country.
+ You know, as I have been listening both to the Chair and to
+the Vice Chair of the Commission before you and the questions
+of my colleagues, my thoughts have really turned to a broad
+question, which is the deployment of technology in the Federal
+Government. And we have talked about information sharing, but
+it is not just information sharing, it is the deployment of
+technology generally.
+ Listening to one of my colleagues talk about enforcement of
+the immigration laws, I was mindful of Commissioner Ziglar
+telling us that they didn't catch the terrorist who applied for
+a student visa because the application was on a piece of
+microfiche in a bucket in Florida and you couldn't do a data
+search of the microfiche in the bucket.
+ Listening to Mr. Andrews' hypothetical about a hazardous
+material truck on its way to blow up the Capitol, there is
+technology that Lawrence Livermore Labs has today that could be
+inserted on HAZMAT trucks that would allow those trucks to be
+stopped remotely, and yet we don't deploy that technology. Why
+not?
+ I am interested, obviously--have been on the Judiciary
+Committee since I became a Member of the House in January of
+1995, and I have complained for nearly 10 years now about the
+lack of technology in the immigration function. And when our
+markup was interrupted before we recessed, I had several
+amendments that I had planned to offer and I shared with the
+majority to automate the I-94 entry-exit form, which is
+something that Director Mueller told me was a high priority for
+him and yet has not occurred, to require a study on digitizing
+all immigration applications and petitions with a mind towards
+cataloging all immigration applications by a unique biometric
+identifier such as a fingerprint and have the NIST biometric
+study go forward.
+ I understand since that time, US VISIT has ditched the idea
+of a broad biometric that would be cross-platformed and cross-
+agencied and instead is proposing to use the IDENT system,
+which uses a nonstandard fingerprint format. And maybe we need
+to do that because we need something in place. I voted to
+continue that, as a matter of fact, for that very reason, but
+it looks like we have now stopped the deployment of the broader
+effort.
+ So I guess my question to all of you is, in the Homeland
+Security--in the 9/11 Commission report, there is a
+recommendation that DHS take on the lead for integrating the
+larger network in terms of entry-exit. And the question I have
+is, is DHS capable of actually getting the technology deployed?
+If so, how are they going to do it? They haven't shown any
+capacity to do it yet. If not, how do we get technology
+identified and deployed on a Federal Government-wide basis to
+keep our country safe here?
+ Any of you who can answer.
+ General Hughes. I am the representative from the Department
+of Homeland Security. I think the answer is that we can and are
+deploying technology across the board for many biometric and
+sensory missions to include on the borders and to include in
+ports of entry.
+ Ms. Lofgren. Can I interrupt? I recently did some study on
+what technology is actually along the borders and interviewed a
+team that had been out from the national labs, had gone out to
+the borders. And this is 2 weeks ago. Basically, no technology
+has been deployed. They are short of gasoline for the trucks.
+They don't have any of the cutting-edge technology that America
+owns through our very excellent science centers. Why is that?
+ General Hughes. May I ask which part of the border?
+ Ms. Lofgren. They went to the southern border with the
+Lawrence Livermore National Lab. It has a whole unit to
+establish this technology.
+ General Hughes. I am not familiar with which border site
+they went to, but if they covered the entire southwest border,
+they talked to the wrong people.
+ There are, of course, some problems. I am not sure what--
+some border areas being not directly covered by technology, but
+much of it is covered. We are flying unmanned aerial vehicles
+over the southwest border. We have placed sensors at border
+control points. We have a variety of checks against the
+immigration documents, persons coming across the border--there
+are a large number of illegal immigrants coming across the
+border every single day.
+ Ms. Lofgren. I see that my time has run out, but we are
+still issuing paper on I-94s.
+ General Hughes. That is true. We have not yet digitized the
+entire system. We are in the process, however, of trying to
+upgrade to a digital environment.
+ Ms. Dunn. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Sweeney.
+ Mr. Sweeney. I thank the Chair. We have limited time and I
+want to thank our witnesses. I have about eight questions, two
+for each of you, so I am going to try to give them to you in
+``machine gun'' fashion. Before I do that, I want to look back
+to the last panel and correct the record if I could regarding
+the contention by some that the Administration's proposal for
+funding on interoperability zeroed out the budget, as I am on
+the Appropriations Committee.
+ That didn't happen. There was a different set of priorities
+established and, in fact, $2.5 billion first responder grant
+monies was put in the budget for those communications, and $20
+million specifically for DHS. I wanted the record to reflect
+that because I think it is important we have the facts.
+ The 9/11 Commission report says a lot of things. One of the
+things I think it says is that there is a general sense, an
+overwhelming sense, that we still don't have it right and what
+we effectively need, as Vice Chairman Hamilton said, is some
+superior authority over the information sharing part of this
+process. And, that is the reason why there is the call for the
+National Intelligence Director.
+ I have a real concern about it all, because as we all know,
+the IAIP directorate was set by Congress and the Executive
+branch to address the information sharing issues. What I have
+seen is that in a year and one half, we are at the point where
+it is all starting to come together. The right people have been
+hired, and we are beginning to set up protocols and standards
+that are beginning to be used. And I am worried about starting
+over, and I am worried about layering bureaucracies on top of
+each other.
+ General Hughes and Mr. Brennan, you two are going to be the
+ones who are going to probably most directly be impacted. I
+know the President has said he supports the idea of the
+national director. I don't expect you are going to be able to
+tell me as definitively or not whether you are, as well,
+concerned, but it is a concern I have in the creation of that
+position or any others. And I just don't know how it is going
+to work. I think it is important that we deliberate this in the
+next couple of weeks.
+ Mr. Black, can you guarantee that relevant information we
+receive from foreign partners gets to the FBI?
+ Mr. Black. The systems are in place. As an example, we have
+communications connectivity where the FBI has access to the
+traffic that we produce. We spent a lot of our time supporting
+the various elements, the practitioners of counterterrorism,
+whether it be intelligence, FBI and the rest. So we have an FBI
+officer in my office whose sole job is to facilitate this
+process.
+ Mr. Sweeney. Ms. Baginski, that is happening? You are
+getting it into the threat integration center networks and it
+is getting out there?
+ Ms. Baginski. Yes, sir. But I wouldn't be passing it to
+threat integration. That actually happens from Cofer's
+organization itself.
+ Mr. Sweeney. So that is happening?
+ Mr. Black. Sure.
+ Mr. Sweeney. One hundred percent capacity? How much
+improvement? How do we measure that?
+ Mr. Black. In terms of all of our cable traffic, it has
+full connectivity with the screening elements. So that, as an
+example, everything that we have, Visa Viper mechanism, which
+is a retrievable terrorist information system, is made
+available, 100 percent of it, to the Terrorist Threat
+Integration Center and the Terrorist Screening Center. And we
+have plugged in the system that we started off and
+contributed--TIC, the tip-off program, has been moved, so I
+think we are well ahead of the curve in making the information
+collected by the Department of State--
+ Mr. Sweeney. Are we fully exchanging information with
+India, who has had hundreds of years of fighting Islamic
+extremists? Are we fully engaged in the exchange of
+information?
+ Mr. Black. We are fully engaged. I am always queasy when we
+use figures like 100 percent. There is not much in life that I
+would raise my hand to 100 percent on. But I could tell you--
+ Mr. Sweeney. That is why you want us to quantify things?
+ Mr. Black. In all professional candor, this process has
+gone forward tremendously and that the impetus is on making all
+of the information that we have available to the practitioners
+of counterterrorism.
+ Mr.Sweeney. Okay, Mr. Brennan, do all the analysts at TTIC
+receive full access to databases which TTIC has access to, or
+do providing agencies limit distribution of that information?
+ Mr. Brennan. As I mentioned, we have over 22 networks that
+come into TTIC. Access within TTIC is based on what the role
+and the function of the analysts are, and so many analysts have
+access to many--most all of the information streams. All of
+them don't need all of the access.
+ Mr. Sweeney. Could I follow up and have a real sense of the
+protocols that are in place there?
+ Mr. Brennan. Sure.
+ Mr. Sweeney. Last question to you--have a couple more I am
+going to ask others for the record--but do you believe that
+some terrorist organizations have the intention, organizational
+capabilities, or technical acumen to produce and deliver a
+nuclear weapon to U.S. cities?
+ Mr. Brennan. I do not believe at the current moment that
+any terrorist organization has the capability to do that. I
+believe that terrorist organizations are pursuing a nuclear
+capability to include radiological devices, nuclear devices and
+other types of materiel. But I don't believe they have the
+capability right now to do that right now. No.
+ Mr. Sweeney. Thank you. I thank the Chair.
+ Chairman Cox. [Presiding.] The gentlelady from Texas, Ms.
+Jackson-Lee.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. I thank the Chair very much and the
+Ranking Member for both convening this meeting, and I thank him
+for allowing me to pursue the line of questioning relating to
+the importance of the work of this body and the need to
+reconvene with the two members of the 9/11 Commission. I must
+say, Mr. Chairman, that in conversations with both the Governor
+and the Co-Chair Hamilton both agreed to welcome both an
+invitation and to return before this committee.
+ Because, as I said in the open session and as I have said
+in this direct conversation with them, this is ours, and our
+work is securing the homeland. Abbreviated hearings, mixed with
+no congressional and executive action, giving no legislative
+direction to the securing of the homeland is playing with fire.
+It almost reminds me of Rome burning while music plays. So I
+would just start out by saying then that I call upon the
+Speaker of the House to convene a session in Congress so that
+the legislative matters that need to be acted upon the 9/11
+Commission Report can be done now and can be done immediately.
+ Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to submit into the
+record the first page of the legislation that I have offered
+giving Cabinet status to the National Intelligence Director--
+ Chairman Cox. Without objection, so ordered.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. --which would oversee budget operations
+and personnel of the entire Intelligence Community.
+ [The information follows:]
+
+
+
+ [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
+
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. Let me qualify it is Cabinet status
+without the responsibilities of policy. It will be operational,
+but that individual will have budgetary responsibility and
+control. It is crucial that these legislative initiatives be
+able to be filed and that we act upon them immediately.
+ Let me thank the panel, and I realize that we may be at a
+disadvantage for some of the concerns that I have, because, as
+I indicated, I frankly believe that Rome is burning and that we
+are literally playing with fire.
+ In conversations that have gone on that have evidenced
+themselves in the press, it is well-known that some terrorist
+act is expected before the elections. It is also well-known
+that we as Americans will not be intimidated, but certainly
+Congress has a crucial responsibility to be able to be part of
+the firewall, if you will, in protecting the American people.
+We cannot do that in an abbreviated framework, albeit with
+respect to our committee leadership, and with a Congress that
+is not in session.
+ So, first of all, I think that we must frame this in a way
+that Co-Chair Hamilton said, and that is to smash the stovepipe
+on intelligence. Because the very core of the disaster of 9/11
+was the lack of transferring intelligence as it was needed.
+ So I would clearly like to hear from this group your sense
+of smashing the stovepipe and whether or not you believe it
+will interfere with competitive analysis. I say that
+straightforwardly, because I believe that our previous
+director, certainly a distinguished public servant, failed us
+in the inability to see the big picture, as did our other
+agencies pre-9/11.
+ Likewise, there was a failure in oversight in the
+intelligence disseminated on Iraq, and there was no objectivity
+as I perceived it in our Intelligence Community. It was only a
+``yes, sir, yes, boss'' attitude in terms of taking America to
+war.
+ That is my first question.
+ The second is, any impressions, Mr. Brennan or General
+Hughes on a national I.D. card? My understanding is the
+Commission, has not, has not, has not confirmed or recommended
+such. Your view of that.
+ Civil liberties, I would like your view on the
+implementation of a board inside of the intelligence center
+that will be created that will oversee the protection of civil
+liberties.
+ And I would appreciate, Ms. Baginski, your comment on the
+FBI's seeming siege on peace activists in the United States and
+whether that has anything to do with protecting the homeland.
+ And lastly, the need for border security to be combined
+with intelligence, meaning to enhance the capabilities of
+border personnel in securing intelligence.
+ If I could get an answer to at least one of those questions
+since the Nation is at crisis.
+ Mr. Brennan.
+ Mr. Brennan. I will start. First of all, smashing the
+stovepipes and competitive analysis, I think we are all
+committed to smashing any stovepipes that remain. It is not
+sufficient though just to share hard copy information. It is
+important to have an information technology architecture that
+allows institutions to share information with institutions so
+that in fact you can search, retrieve that information in a
+systemic manner, as opposed to having a lot of different hard
+copy files. That is not what we need, because there are so many
+different elements of the U.S. government that need that
+information. We need to put in place that architecture.
+ Competitive analysis, I am fully supportive of competitive
+analysis but done thoughtfully, as opposed to unnecessary
+redundancy that wastes resources. And, as I said in my
+statement, what we need to do is have a framework that allows
+for allocation of roles and responsibilities to include the
+assignment of competitive or alternative analysis.
+ Regarding national ID cards, I would refer to DHS on that,
+but what I would do is say the administration is looking at
+different standards and biometrics that in fact makes sense to
+apply at borders in other orders.
+ Civil liberties, since TTIC has access to so much data, we
+take very seriously the protection of U.S. citizens' rights and
+privacy obligations and we are committed to working with the
+rest of the government as far as having some type of board that
+in fact look at those issues very seriously.
+ General Hughes. And I will have my views that we definitely
+believe in breaking or ending any barriers that exist. The term
+stovepipe is a little bit emotional, as far as I am concerned.
+We are in favor of horizontal and vertical integration at every
+part of the government, if we can get it. We are in favor of
+protecting civil liberties at every opportunity. I personally
+am and so is the Department. We are in favor of a board to
+oversee if this is a necessary development.
+ We are also working on the national I.D. card issue. It is
+more complex than simply saying, yes, we are in favor of it or,
+no, we are not. It has great implications for the United
+States, and one of the implications is the civil liberties of
+individuals. We have to deal with that, and so we are
+considering the issue.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. Well, obviously, General Hughes, you will
+do that with the consent of Congress, because there are those
+of us who are not conceding a national I.D. card and
+particularly I do not sense and did not read that the
+Commission recommended a national I.D. card, and that is
+correct?
+ General Hughes. That is correct.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. Thank you, sir.
+ Ms. Baginski. Yes, ma'am, on two issues. Stovepipes are not
+necessarily all bad. A stovepipe around an area of expertise,
+an analytical area of expertise, a center, if you will, is not
+something that necessarily would be negative.
+ But what I would say is we have done a remarkable job
+unifying our disparate collection resources against threats,
+and I think that is the core of the progress that we have made
+over time.
+ In response to your question about the articles that
+appeared in the New York Times, the--both the Democratic
+National Convention and the Republican National Convention have
+been designated national security special events. In accordance
+with that, every effort is made to insure that any threat to
+the security of that event is taken care of within the confines
+of the Constitution and the law as we always do. There is
+absolutely no truth to the allegation that any of these things
+were undertaken outside of predication and outside the bounds
+of the Constitution.
+ I understand the press article. I did read it. I understand
+the concerns of citizens. But I also know the organization that
+I work in, and these were all done with regard for specific
+intelligence that caused us to have concerns about attempts to
+disrupt this event, and we had a similar series of events for
+the Democratic National Convention.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. Well, I would ask that any peace activist
+that believes that they have been intimidated just for their
+opposition and first amendment rights need to be contacting
+both Members of Congress who are concerned, and I hope that you
+will be responsive to our calls regarding this intimidation.
+ Ms. Baginski. Yes, ma'am.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. Security is one thing, but intimidation
+and oppression is another thing.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentlelady's time has expired.
+ Ms. Baginski. We would be very anxious, ma'am, to have
+those reports and deal with that.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. I thank you very much, thank you.
+ I thank the gentleman.
+ Chairman Cox. Are there other members of the panel that
+would like to address any of the questions that have been put?
+ Mr. Black. I would just add one concluding remark. I think
+the stovepipe issue is very important. We are trying to
+institutionalize this. I think, Congresswoman, it is not only
+institutional but employees and individuals involved in this
+process don't have to put in Herculean efforts all the time.
+ I think in the past we have been relying on the work ethic
+of people working around the clock in defense of this country.
+What we are trying to do is put in a system that lends itself
+to people routinely doing their job in a more productive way.
+We no longer the have the luxury to rely upon people working
+around the clock with no sleep, and I think we are heading in
+that direction.
+ I would also underscore that my exposure to this issue in
+terms of civil liberties is that we are very and profoundly
+interested in this. We are in the business of defending
+America, and America is based upon civil liberties. They go
+together. You can't have one without the other.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Istook.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. Thank you.
+ Mr. Istook. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ I would like to address to the panel the issue of blind
+spots. We are all concerned, of course, realizing that
+terrorists want to attack us where we are not expecting it. We
+recognize the great symbolic value of attacks upon icons such
+as the World Trade Center, the U.S. Capitol or the Pentagon.
+Yet, being from Oklahoma City, I am certainly aware that
+terrorism can strike in the heartland.
+ It can strike where it is unexpected. In fact, that is the
+goal of terrorists is to do so. I am also aware that terrorism
+does not necessarily come totally from foreign nationals.
+Again, I cite the Oklahoma City example, although it was for
+different motives than Al-Qa'ida is pursuing.
+ But I would like the members of the panel to address these
+aspects. For example, in the testimony this morning, when we
+are talking about the great desire of people to blend into the
+landscape and to acquire documentation that will help them to
+escape detection--Mr. Kean certainly testified that terrorists
+are most vulnerable when they are traveling. So we have
+established networks, and we are trying to make them more
+robust, with the entry and exit programs focused mostly again
+on foreign nationals. Yet we have not only a great number of
+people who are in the country illegally, but we also have
+people who are American citizens that are involved in things,
+not just a Tim McVeigh. We have the American Taliban we have
+arrested that have been made up of American citizens in
+connection with foreign activities.
+ One thing that I did not see, and perhaps I overlooked it,
+but did not see among the Commission's recommendations was
+focusing on better screening in the naturalization process
+where someone wishes to become an American citizen, wishes to
+acquire a U.S. passport, to enable them to escape some levels
+of scrutiny.
+ We had several years ago a situation where some people said
+it was 50,000, some will say it was 100,000, people who applied
+to become American citizens were not put through the routine
+criminal background screenings. I do not know, and you perhaps
+can tell me, of any access to these information systems that is
+part of the naturalization process currently to make sure that
+the same level of screening that we are applying to people that
+want to come in and out of the country freely applies to people
+who want that great credential of U.S. citizenship and thus
+access to U.S. passports.
+ So I would appreciate the panel addressing how much of a
+potential blind spot we have when we either do not put enough
+focus on the soft targets or fail to recognize that some of the
+targets may have American citizenship or may be pursuing
+American citizenship.
+ General Hughes. Perhaps I will start, since primary
+responsibilities lies with the Department of Homeland Security
+for these issues. I think I have got two questions here.
+ Mr. Istook. Yes.
+ General Hughes. The question of blind spots, especially
+dealing with documentation of proof of who you are and what you
+are doing, there are a variety of issues at work here, but the
+primary one is to focus on those persons that either have
+documentation that is questionable or illicit more--or on those
+persons who have a history or record we have now recorded in
+databases and in other ways that tells us that there are
+terrorists or terrorist-connected persons.
+ That testimony is not perfect, sir--and I would be the
+first one to admit that--but working; and it is being improved
+all the time.
+ The good news is that once again I think something that
+began before the Commission and the 9/11 report is--continues
+until this day is attempting to coordinate, collate and
+interact with all of the databases and all of the repositories
+of information.
+ Mr. Istook. Is that being done in the naturalization
+screening processes?
+ General Hughes. Yes, it is. Yes, it is. Our Office of
+Citizenship and Immigration Services is the office that
+undertakes that. They are not as fully integrated yet into the
+system as they will be in the future because when we absorbed
+them they were an analog organization largely. They are making
+rapid process to bring themselves into the digital environment,
+as Ms. Lofgren and others have remarked on here earlier, and
+that is an ongoing process.
+ I would like to just mention that the idea of blind spots
+is of great importance certainly to all of us here, I think,
+and we have detected instances where American citizens, where
+people with very, very good documentation who were indeed
+terrorists or terrorist connected have been able to travel or
+transit in some way across our borders. We regret that. We are
+trying hard to figure out how to solve it.
+ I think in the case of the American citizens who do want to
+do ill to the United States, we are not dealing there with
+identity, mirror identity. We are dealing also with their
+belief system, their values and their actions, and that is a
+more difficult kind of thing to reduce to a data entry that
+will show that in every case.
+ So we are trying to come to grips with that, but it is at
+that time primarily an interface process where we come to those
+persons, understand their actions or their professions, the
+views and ideas that they give, and then we deal with them on
+that basis. But their documentation or their previous identity
+may not show anything else at all that is wrong.
+ Mr. Istook. Other panelists.
+ Mr. Brennan. The issue of blank spots is a very important
+one, and that is why I am a strong advocate of making sure that
+there is an allocation of responsibilities. Because there is a
+vast horizon of issues that need coverage from an analytic as
+well as a collection perspective, and the more that we can
+identify that universe and that horizon and assign
+responsibilities the better chance we are going to be able to
+cover that horizon.
+ On the issue of individuals here in the States who may in
+fact be part of transnational terrorist groups, the Homeland
+Security Presidential Directive 6, HSPD-6, that was promulgated
+last September streamlined the whole watchlisting and database
+process. It is still in the process of being streamlined and
+overhauled, but in the past when there were 12 different
+databases and nine different departments and agencies, that no
+longer is the case.
+ There is the terrorist screening center. That falls on the
+FBI that has responsibilities for and in fact providing the
+support to those screeners and watchlisters. TTIC now has the
+national responsibility to maintain the national database on
+known and suspected transnational terrorists to include U.S.
+citizens who are here in the United States. So we have absorbed
+from the State Department the tip-off program that has been in
+existence for close to 20 years. We are putting into that the
+names of U.S. citizens who are known or purported to be part of
+transnational terrorist groups, and we work very closely with
+the FBI on domestic terrorism responsibilities.
+ Mr. Istook. And would that show up on a background check
+for someone seeking U.S. Citizenship?
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman's time has expired.
+ Mr. Istook. Thank you.
+ Chairman Cox. But the panel may address the question
+further if you choose to do so.
+ If not, the gentlelady from the Virgin Islands.
+ Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to go
+right into my questions.
+ Welcome, panelists. I wanted to follow up on the question
+on the board to protect civil rights and liberties, because my
+understanding is that the recommendation is that the board
+would insure that the government is adhering to guidelines and
+protocols for protecting civil rights and civil liberties. Can
+one person answer for me? Are there guidelines and protocols in
+place at this time for the government to adhere to?
+ Ms. Baginski. Speaking from the FBI perspective, there
+clearly are those guidelines. We conduct all of our
+intelligence activities and all of our investigative activity
+under the attorney general guidelines that were just recently
+updated; and they give us those guidelines, clear guidelines,
+for predication for when one can collect information on U.S.
+citizens and under what circumstances. So those guidelines are
+in place and have been in place for many years, yes.
+ Mrs. Christensen. OK. Unless we get good-quality
+intelligence, the best organization and collaboration won't
+help to give the people of this country the kind of protection
+they deserve.
+ I wanted to raise an issue that I wanted to ask the last
+panel about, which is diversity within the Intelligence
+Community, and it also speaks to how the data will be analyzed.
+We are dealing with people from a faraway country, different
+cultures, different ways of approaching things. What is the
+level of diversity, for example, within the FBI, TTIC? My
+experience in speaking with people within the Intelligence
+Community, from the African American point of view, is that
+they are few and far between and even rarer at the top of the
+spectrum. So what is it and to what extent are you seeking
+actively to bring diversity into the Intelligence Community?
+ Ms. Baginski. I think the DCI--former DCI Tenet in fact led
+a very, very focused study of this issue; and I know that I in
+fact testified in front of this group on behalf of the FBI.
+Within the FBI, there is very great diversity among our
+intelligence analyst program. So I will just speak for that
+portion, not for the law enforcement portion.
+ What I would say is that your observation is correct in
+terms of African Americans and leadership positions, but we
+have a very healthy diversity, both in terms of gender--what
+Director Mueller's guidance to me is is to bring in people who
+understand the cultures, that we are actually--that we are
+actually analyzing that and that we are actually studying, as
+that is part of a very focused recruiting process, 33
+recruiters focused on universities to be able to bring that
+kind of diversity thinking.
+ Mrs. Christensen. So that focused somewhat also on HPCUs
+and Hispanic surveys of Americans?
+ Ms. Baginski. Yes, ma'am.
+ Mrs. Christensen. Anyone else? TTIC want to answer?
+ Mr. Brennan. TTIC doesn't have direct hiring authority. We
+rely on the different agencies and the departments. But
+integration by definition is diversity, and so what we are
+trying to do is make sure we have that diversity perspective
+which includes diversity in terms of background.
+ Mrs. Christensen. OK. One of the other recommendations is
+on incentive for information sharing. Personally, I don't see
+incentives as being the answer, because I believe that we
+should have a centralized system and one director. But if there
+were incentives for information sharing, what would you
+envision them to be?
+ Mr. Brennan. I agree with you completely that the reference
+in the 9/11 Commission to creating incentives to better balance
+security with information sharing, I believe it should be
+institutionalized, not incentivized. You want to make sure that
+you are able to facilitate that flow of information and require
+and mandate, in fact, that information be shared and so not
+leave it discretionary. What you need to do is put together a
+framework, though, that is sensible, that you can protect
+information as well as get it out.
+ Mrs. Christensen. Can I just follow up with you?
+ Mr. Brennan, because you talk about--you said--talked
+several times about the architecture that needs to be in place
+to facilitate this, to what extent is any of it in place at
+this point? Where are we in having the kind of infrastructure
+to facilitate the collaboration and the sharing of information?
+ Mr. Brennan. I think there are many pieces of an
+architecture in place. But when we talk about a national
+architecture, you are talking about a very complicated
+multidimensional architectural system that in fact is trying to
+take shape right now. The FBI and DHS and other departments and
+agencies have their systems and networks that they are trying
+to interact with.
+ Mrs. Christensen. But some of them don't talk to each
+other. Some of them are not able to talk to each other.
+ Mr. Brennan. That is a question in terms of
+interoperability. That is why we have to look from a
+government-wide perspective across all the departments and
+agencies. But then it is complicated by the fact you are
+bringing in State and local entities and local law enforcement
+that have their own systems, and so this is a challenge of, you
+know, enormous magnitude, and I think--
+ Mrs. Christensen. So are we at the beginning of that
+process? Are we just at zero?
+ Ms. Baginski. No, actually, ma'am, I don't think that we
+are at zero at all. In fact, in terms of the Intelligence
+Community classified architecture, that is very well
+established and we have been joining it.
+ I think in terms of the secret level and then in the
+sensitive but unclassified level there have been enormously
+positive efforts between DHS and the FBI to take the existing
+sensitive but unclassified infrastructure and join it with the
+DHS architecture so that they interoperate and so that
+information appears seamlessly to the users so that they don't
+have to actually worry about whose network that was actually
+carrying on. So I think there is very positive work going on
+there.
+ And in terms of incentives for information sharing, I
+happen to agree with John. I don't think he can do this through
+incentives, so we have actually done it through rules, which is
+essentially--we have created a category of information that is
+required to share, and our authoring tool for reports requires
+the first version to be written at a low classification.
+ General Hughes. Would you mind if I gave a brief follow-on?
+ Chairman Cox. Please do.
+ General Hughes. I would like to tell you last week we
+convened 324 persons from States, the territories and
+possessions, from a few localities here in D.C. and began in
+the process of training them in the handling of U.S. Federal
+Government information up to the Secret level. The system that
+will provide that information to them is also being fielded
+now. It is almost complete, called the Homeland Security
+Information Network, which was complementary and parallel with
+the JTTF structure from the FBI and other systems that are in
+use throughout the country. So we are definitely more than
+talking about or thinking about this. We are doing it, and we
+are some distance into it.
+ Chairman Cox. The Chairman will recognize himself for 5
+minutes.
+ Ms. Baginski, as the person responsible within the FBI for
+information sharing and also as part of a bureau that has
+nearly 100 JTTFs operating, not to mention the field offices
+and so on, do you see it as the role of the FBI to take the
+lead on information sharing with State and local governments?
+ Ms. Baginski. We actually see it as the responsibilities of
+DHS and the FBI to speak from the Federal level to the various
+components of State and local government. In our case, we are
+focused on the law enforcement community. In DHS's case, they
+are focused on the municipal and the private sector.
+ Chairman Cox. I am not quite sure I understand how that
+works. What you are saying is that information that is finished
+intelligence, analytical product, is in some cases shared by
+DHS with State and local government and some cases shared by
+FBI, but there isn't anyone with a lead on it?
+ Mrs. Baginski. Actually, what General Hughes and I have
+done--and I think we are both enormously proud of it--when
+those communications occur, we have been doing them in the form
+of bulletins. I think you probably recognize those. Before, we
+were in a position where the FBI was issuing its own to the
+local law enforcement community and the DHS was issuing its own
+to the municipal and government and private sector.
+ What we have done is we issue now one bulletin, one set of
+information with both seals, so that the Federal voice to the
+local community is a single voice, and I think that is a very
+positive step forward that we have worked as a personal
+partnership and that our folks have executed very, very well
+over the past couple of months.
+ Chairman Cox. So there isn't a customer that is getting
+information from FBI that is not under the aegis of DHS?
+ Ms. Baginski. Yes, there is.
+ Chairman Cox. There is. What customers are those?
+ Ms. Baginski. The Intelligence Community is one of those
+customers. We, I think, as you know--
+ Chairman Cox. I am sorry, talking within the realm of State
+and local governments in the private sector?
+ Ms. Baginski. Uh-huh.
+ Chairman Cox. Any customers within that realm?
+ Ms. Baginski. Yes, I think it is fair to say in the State
+and local law enforcement community, we are, in fact, producing
+a number of intelligence assessments to include the raw
+intelligence that we produce that the Director of the FBI is
+actually responsible for producing; and through a number of
+mechanisms, to include our law enforcement online sensitive but
+unclassified Web-based network, we are posting intelligence
+assessments and raw intelligence for passage for our State and
+local partners at the same time that we are passing it to our
+partners at the Department of Homeland Security.
+ Chairman Cox. We have simultaneously the bulletins going
+out which are jointly produced by DHS and FBI and we have
+things going directly from FBI that don't go through DHS? Same
+customers?
+ Ms. Baginski. That is correct. And I think it is important
+to note here that you might be thinking about just terrorism,
+but you understand that we have three other missions as well,
+and there is the traditional criminal mission, where we produce
+a lot of intelligence that is of direct use to State and local
+law enforcement.
+ Chairman Cox. Could be, but I am not addressing my question
+to that.
+ Ms. Baginski. I am sorry.
+ Chairman Cox. I am addressing my question entirely to the--
+ Ms. Baginski. Counterterrorism.
+ Chairman Cox. --issue that we have been focused on this in
+this hearing.
+ Ms. Baginski. I am sorry, this is actual information that
+goes to State and local law enforcement and, of course, our
+JTTF constructs which is, of course, our operational arm.
+Information is in fact going in there to the JTTFs to take
+action on as well as the DHS, and the elements of DHS are
+partners in that.
+ But when you ask me the information--is there specific
+information, State and local, not going to DHS, our answer is
+yes. Our bulletins are putting threat information in
+perspective and giving State and local authorities a sense of
+what countermeasures they can take and be on the lookout for.
+ Chairman Cox. I am sorry. My time is just about running
+out. I want to get to one other aspect here.
+ My question is that I don't think we have yet licked the
+problem of complete coordination between the Federal
+Government, certainly not through DHS and the State and local
+governments and the private sector customers for finished
+intelligence products. That raises then the question about the
+National Counterterrorist Center and the degree to which it
+might be viewed by some people, now that it is in the planning
+stages, as acquiring the responsibility that I think by statute
+now in section 201 under the Homeland Security Act is given to
+DHS.
+ General Hughes, since my time has expired, let me leave
+that question in your lap. What do you think we are headed for
+in terms of the executive branch's points of view on this? Is
+the National Counterterrorism Center going to be in the role of
+distributing information to State and local governments? Is DHS
+going to want to continue to do this, FBI or TTIC, or is TTIC
+going to be subsumed in this? We don't know any more than what
+we read in the newspapers about this right now. While you are
+at it, what do you think will happen to IA in all of this
+process?
+ General Hughes. I think the process and the point we were
+discussing, these issues, I don't think decisions have been
+made. If they are, I am not aware of them.
+ With regard to the idea that supposed that information will
+flow from the National Counterterrorism Center out to the
+States and localities, there is some discussion about that, how
+it will go, whether it goes through DHS or through law
+enforcement channels or through a direct channel. Because we
+certainly could do it directly. And, by the way, probably
+concurrently to not only the respondents of the State and local
+but also to Federal partners, much as Ms. Baginski just
+described, that has yet to be determined.
+ That is one of the many--I would say many thousands of
+details we have to work through here. But certainly it is
+intended for the National Counterterrorism Center to be the
+focal point for threat assessments regarding terrorism for the
+United States. So I can assume from that title, that idea, that
+concept, that if the NCTC embraces that mission, they will be
+issuing products that one way or another through a variety of
+conduits will go to the State and local level in our country.
+ Chairman Cox. Mr. Etheridge.
+ Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Folks, we are here today because of this report. We would
+not have a meeting in August if it weren't for this 9/11
+Commission, a Commission that many people in this body opposed
+and people in high office didn't want to happen. But because
+the families pushed hard and some Members did, we are here, and
+I want to thank them and the families, because they more than
+anyone else bear a lot of the burden of 9/11, and we want to
+fix that problem.
+ The previous testimony from two speakers talked about a
+problem that we face, one of many. I am going to ask my
+question, and I want each of you to comment on it, because they
+discussed the inordinate amount of classification of
+intelligence data, data and information that no one has any
+doubt about what it is, not really sure that it is secret,
+classified, et cetera, and that information is then out of the
+public domain.
+ Over the last couple of weeks I have had the opportunity to
+visit with a lot of police officers, police departments, fire
+departments, rescue squads and people that we say we really
+want to be in touch with, that we really need their help and
+their input. We are now just talking about the information that
+we are going to get to them. The problem is we don't get them
+the information quickly and we classify stuff that shouldn't be
+classified that would help.
+ I remember in the last several weeks--whether it comes to
+anything or not--a police officer just doing his duty saw
+someone in Charlotte filming buildings, may not mean anything.
+But that is how we get the job done. But if we classify
+everything that crosses our desk, they won't get the
+information.
+ So my question is this--and I don't think there is an
+adequate flow of information getting to locals, either that or
+the people I am talking with are not being honest with me, and
+I think they are being honest with me. I just think they are
+not getting the information. I would like for each of you to
+discuss any attempt that your organizations are making to
+coordinate and revise the classification strategies that would
+make the accuracy, the collection and the effective information
+available to the first responders across this country and what
+is being done to put the stamps of classification to the side
+when it doesn't have to be put there. I think this is a huge
+problem that no one is doing any talking about yet. Because if
+we move all the blocks and the chairs we want to on the decks
+of the Titanic, if we keep doing that, we never get the
+information out in time no matter how many people we move and
+change.
+ Whoever would like to go first.
+ Mr. Black. I guess I have been elected to start.
+ I think you have asked one of the most profound questions
+for the future of this issue. I think it is important to note
+that essentially we are in a different environment than we were
+in the past. This is not the Cold War. The Cold War was slow
+and ponderous. It rewarded attention to detail. It rewarded
+secrecy. It rewarded keeping secrets from as many as possible
+to protect the source.
+ Immediate response to the high-velocity threat of terrorism
+requires accurate information, yet it requires speed. So I
+think the correct solution is to move away from where we were
+in the past. Speed counts, information has to be disseminated
+quickly so that people can take action to protect, especially
+since we are not interested in writing a intelligence report
+for its own sake. We are interested in using this information
+so it can protect people.
+ In the overall context, this is where we are going. This is
+the future. There is the caveat that has to be the preserve of
+the Intelligence Community and the FBI, and that is to protect
+those sources that do need protection.
+ Sometimes sources that are highly significant are rare.
+They need to be protected. But I think the community is working
+on that, and I would have to defer to Mr. Hughes and Mr.
+Brennan. But there is an effort in this direction.
+ So I think the answer--the response to your question would
+be, in the past everything was classified because it was slow
+and ponderous. Now you require speed for action purposes, yet
+at the same time we have to increasingly identify those several
+sources of those limited numbers of sources that need to be
+protected, because they are so hard to replace.
+ Ms. Baginski. Yes, sir. I would like to comment on that. I
+think you have asked a very, very important question.
+ Our initiatives are twofold. The first is to separate the
+information from the source; and we think that can, in fact, be
+done. As long as you try to merge those two things, you are
+often dealing in a very difficult classification situation.
+ At the same time, when you separate those two things, we do
+require from the FBI analyst a source commentary that attests
+to the pedigree of the information, which generally can be
+described as the degree of separation of the source from the
+actual information itself and some characterization about its
+reliability. So there are two things, separation that allows us
+to write it to release it at the lowest classification in
+accordance with a DCI directive, I might add, a DCI directive
+that has been on the books since 1989 or before, requiring us
+to alternate at the lowest possible classification level.
+ Mr. Brennan. It is not just an issue regarding
+classification. It is the entire way that data is originated
+within the U.S. government. We need to reengineer that
+origination process.
+ And, as Maureen said, right to release, so that the
+technology exists right now that the thread of information that
+is required overseas can move at the speed of light all the way
+down to the police chief in a local jurisdiction where the
+thread of information focuses on.
+ But the policies and practices and procedures have to be
+put in place to reduce the number of human interventions that
+are required as the case exists right now. So what we need to
+do is--the natural default over the years in the intelligence
+business has been to declassify something. It is changing that
+mindset to make sure that the first piece out of the box in
+fact goes to the classified level that can go to the first
+responder or somebody else. Then you can follow with the more
+detailed, sensitive information.
+ General Hughes. I will just give three short bursts here.
+ We are routinely producing in this community highly-
+classified information with tearlines or excerpts out of the
+information that are either at a reduced classification level
+or at unclassified level, sensitive but unclassified or law
+enforcement sensitive, that can be sent out to the field. That
+is an ongoing mechanism, and it seems to be working very well.
+It may not be yet where we would like it to be, but it is
+certainly a big improvement over the past.
+ Second, we have direct automated communications that are or
+were at the unclassified level every day going to all of the
+States. Many of the localities in this country are also
+receiving that information. It is not all-inclusive. We are
+Federal officers. We are bound to protect according to the law,
+the information we invest so much in and worked so hard to get.
+So we are doing the best we can right now with this effort.
+ I would also mention telephone calls, sir. Many of us make
+telephone calls. I personally make them to persons who are
+not--who do not have available to them some other kind of
+communication system that works. Sometimes those calls are
+secure, over classified telephone systems. Sometimes they are
+unclassified over the regular telephone system. Depends on the
+information. But that is happening now.
+ And the last point I would like to make to you is
+classification is really not a barrier to the communication of
+information if indeed the information indicates an impending
+act or a crisis or some kind of a problem that needs to be
+acted upon immediately. I can look you and any Member here in
+the eye and tell you that we will get that information out of
+its classified restricted environment and give it to the people
+who need it as rapidly as possible.
+ Chairman Cox. Thank you.
+ The gentlelady from Washington.
+ Ms. Dunn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Welcome to our panel today. It is very helpful, your
+testimony. We have appreciated it.
+ I have a couple of questions. I was very happy to hear Ms.
+Baginski talk about metrics being involved. Now measurements of
+success, those are vitally important, and we take them
+seriously, but we also all know that structural change such as
+the sort of change we have gone through with the Department of
+Homeland Security can be as rational as possible and yet not
+really work because of cultural problems.
+ I am interested in asking you, first of all, what sort of
+challenges have you run into in terms of the culture of the
+organizations that you lead. In two of the cases, General
+Hughes, Mr. Brennan, you are leading new agencies since 9/11.
+You are dealing with details from legacies, responsibilities.
+Some of you are having problems attracting talent to come to
+work in your departments. What have you done within your
+departments since 9/11 to make sure that we can meet some of
+the--that we already have some of the shortcomings that were
+listed in the 9/11 Commission's report, and what do you have
+left to do?
+ Mr. Brennan. First of all, as far as we in TTIC have
+different representatives, there are assignees in the different
+organizations, people have asked how do you bring those
+different cultures? Quite frankly, we haven't had to work at
+it. Because if you give people an important mission like
+terrorism, you give them access to information across the U.S.
+Government. You find that they will work together seamlessly
+and collaboratively in a way that they haven't done before. So
+we feel as though there is a real benefit of the integration
+and colocation of these individuals with information systems.
+ This has been working in concert with FBI, DHS, CIA and
+others to bring together this--what I refer to as an
+architecture that is not just information technology
+architecture, it is also the business practices and
+interactions.
+ So I think one of the things that we represent up here is
+that we have regular interaction. And if we have the
+interaction at senior levels, the individuals who are working
+on the challenges really feel at liberty to be sharing this
+information among themselves to find the ways that they can in
+fact facilitate that sharing of information.
+ General Hughes. I would like to give you just two quick
+answers here.
+ First is what we have done since 9/11, and in my case we
+are a couple of months beyond a year old, in organizational
+terms. Our mere--the mere fact that we have come into being is
+a response to the need for some organizational entity to
+provide an umbrella for many disparate organizations to work
+under the Department of Homeland Security and then to use the
+power of those organizational elements that were legacy
+organizations to feed information into a central repository, a
+central location and interact in the Federal and the State and
+local environment to make sure that information has utility.
+That is the single biggest thing I can think of.
+ We have many other issues, but I think that is enough on
+that topic.
+ I would like to say that the idea that it was hard to get
+legacy organization personnel to work together, in my case, is
+the same as John Brennan has characterized it. If you give them
+a mission and if you give them an identity, especially that
+goes with that mission, an organizational identity or even
+perhaps a philosophical identity, they will do the job very
+well. They are, in fact, patriots as much as they are any other
+members of an organization.
+ So on behalf of the country, I haven't encountered any
+problems with people working together. Once they come into the
+Department of Homeland Security, they do very, very well
+together.
+ Mr. Black. I would just say that personally the threat of
+terrorism is not foreign to the State Department. We all know
+we have had our embassies overseas and Foreign Service
+personnel being blown up and dying in large numbers over the
+years. So this is not anything new to us under the leadership
+of Secretary of State Powell. He has reinforced in the minds of
+our employees but also the mission.
+ When we talk about counterterrorism, things come to mind
+like the FBI, CIA and the rest. The reality is that the
+Department of State has the privacy to be able to enable these
+other agencies, these practitioners of counterterrorism, to be
+able to do their work overseas and to prepare for that. To
+facilitate it, we have changed completely how we do our
+business. New officers coming in receive training in
+counterterrorism. Our consular programs receive pro forma
+counterterrorism training, how to contribute to the system. New
+ambassadors coming in, whether they are career with years of
+experience or new political appointees, get training programs.
+They are provided education in counterterrorism and the like.
+ We also have diplomatic security that does for us our
+threat assessments globablly around the world. We also, through
+diplomatic security, have programs that reach out to the
+business and private sector around the world. We have 81
+different offices overseas.
+ So--I mean, I have only been in the State Department a
+couple of years, having come from intelligence. The great thing
+about the State Department in the past was to protect U.S.
+persons overseas, to conduct diplomacy and to facilitate the
+process of containing the Soviet Union under the Cold War.
+Secretary Powell has completely changed that. Counterterrorism
+is one of our primary missions, and our success is important to
+the country, and we are determined to be successful in that
+regard.
+ Ms. Baginski. Ma'am, if I might, I think what is more
+interesting to me is I haven't found the challenge--I think
+what I hear is what you have probably all heard, that there is
+something that is inherently incongruous between law
+enforcement operations and intelligence operations, and I can
+honestly say from the day I arrived there, I found just the
+opposite to be true. Just like my time working in DOD where we
+had fully integrated military operations and intelligence, what
+I have seen is fully integrated law enforcement operations and
+intelligence.
+ I have also seen two very strong strengths that actually
+come from intelligence being in the law enforcement community,
+and they are very important, the first being that there is
+enormous attention paid to the pedigree of the source. That
+comes from the heritage of the law enforcement culture that
+says that they would have to appear in court, therefore, they
+must be credible, and we must check them out. It is incredibly
+important to our intelligence capability. That kind of
+attention to pedigree of sourcing is critical to a good
+intelligence capability.
+ And the second I would say there is an enormous rigor and
+discipline in intelligence analysis that I find very
+comfortable for me, coming from the second world, which is that
+facts are facts and conjecture is marked as conjecture, and
+that also comes from the law enforcement community.
+ My challenges, though, have to do with an organization that
+has long been optimized for one of its missions, its law
+enforcement mission, and not as optimized for its overall
+intelligence mission. So in terms of infrastructure, hiring,
+training, recruiting, those kinds of issues, those are where I
+have had to spend the majority of my time.
+ Chairman Cox. Mr. Langevin, the gentleman from Rhode
+Island.
+ Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ I want to thank the panel for being here today and for your
+testimony. I could probably follow up on Ms. Dunn's question in
+the area of organizational culture, start with that.
+ It is clear from the findings of the 9/11 Commission report
+and subsequent things that we have heard in testimony, both on
+my work in Armed Services and also here at Homeland Security,
+that the way that we were fighting the war on terrorism, both
+before 9/11 and in many ways after 9/11, was according to the
+way we fought the Cold War, using the Cold War battle plan, if
+you will. And clearly that plan may have been successful in
+winning the Cold War, but it is not going to work in fighting
+this war on terrorism.
+ Now, Public Administration 101 will teach you that
+bureaucracies by their very nature are intransigent and that
+one of the most difficult things in changing the mission of an
+organization is changing its organizational culture. People
+basically keep doing things the way they have always done them
+because that is the way they have always done them.
+ I really do want to hear more about and I want to focus on
+the issue of incentives and what is being done to encourage
+information sharing. Mr. Brennan, you said that you want to
+institutionalize this effort to information share. Ms.
+Baginski, you said you have done it basically through
+rulemaking.
+ I have found in my experience that it doesn't work that
+way. You have got to have incentives to get people to buy into
+this. You either have to terminate people that are there--
+bviously, you are not going to do that across all lines and
+terms of the various agencies that deal with this--or you have
+to incentivise people to buy into changing the mission.
+ Clearly, patriotism is a major incentive. I will concede
+that. But there are also going to have to be additional things
+done to change the mission. So we need to focus on that, and I
+would like to hear more about that.
+ The other thing I wanted to ask, my second question, is
+that the Commission's recommendations for a National
+Intelligence Director have received a great deal of attention.
+In particular, I would like to ask about the recommendation
+that there be a Deputy of Homeland Intelligence, one of three
+deputies who would serve under the DNI. Basically, the
+Commission suggests that this role should be filled by either
+the Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence at FBI or the
+DHS Undersecretary of Information Analysis and Infrastructure
+Protection.
+ I would like to hear your thoughts on which of these two
+would be the best option and how we can insure cooperation
+between the FBI and IAIP, if only one of the two were directly
+represented in the Office of the National Intelligence Director
+as a deputy.
+ A related question, is it even necessary or advisable to
+create these dual roles for certain intelligence officials?
+ Ms. Baginski. I will go to your first question and then the
+second one. I think the notion of incentives is very powerful,
+and I hope I didn't misspeak. Rulemaking actually is a very
+strong incentive in the FBI through an inspections process, and
+what people get measured on is what they get evaluated on.
+ So when you create those rules that say you must do the
+following and you follow that up by inspecting them and
+ensuring that they are doing it, that actually becomes my
+incentive. So I didn't mean to suggest I was just writing
+manuals and hoping that they would--
+ Mr. Langevin. So pay measurements are in some way
+associated with--
+ Ms. Baginski. Yes. Yes. And then I think the other big
+incentive for us is to actually change the critical elements on
+which agents are judged to include performance in source
+development and intelligence production, and those are going to
+be very, very strong incentives in our culture.
+ So I think you and I are in violate agreement on what needs
+to be done, and we are searching for those things that actually
+work within a very proud and wonderful culture, actually, that
+the FBI has.
+ To your second issue of the deputies, I think as you know,
+nothing is off the table in the discussions. There are very
+high-level discussions occurring now. The three of us have been
+involved in them, and there is a lot of discussion about what
+is--what are the details surrounding the implementation of this
+particular model and the President's support for the NID, the
+national intelligence director.
+ The more important question is, organization or not, how do
+the two of us ensure that we are actually sharing the
+information so that--in coordinating, so that we are providing
+the information. And I think that General Hughes and I did have
+an agreement--and I know that he will tell me if we do not. I
+have a responsibility to produce raw information on all kinds
+of threats.
+ So there are many missions where my path is very, very
+focused on the terrorism mission, and my job is to get him the
+dots and to get John Brennan the dots, frankly, so that they
+can produce the all-source analytic work and path in
+particular. General Hughes can then overlay them on the
+territory of the United States so that he can do the very hard
+analysis he has, which is to do vulnerability assessments and
+to provide countermeasures.
+ So a good deal of our interaction is getting those
+relationships right. I have to serve John Brennan, and I have
+to serve Pat Hughes in order for both of them to be successful.
+So our 12,000 collectors of information out there are passing
+that information in such a way that it reaches all who have to
+act on it. Pat acts in a certain domain. John Brennan acts in a
+certain domain, and Cofer Black acts in a certain domain, as
+well as do our State and local and tribal partners. I hope that
+made some sense.
+ Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
+ Mr. Brennan. Maybe it is a difference in terms of our
+interpretation of the world scene, but I will stick with my
+earlier position that I don't think settlements work. I believe
+enforcement and compliance of standards, rules, regulations and
+the law--and if you look at the memorandum of information
+signing that was signed by Attorney General Ashcroft, Secretary
+Ridge and DCI Tenet in March of 2003, it lays out very clearly
+what the obligations are, the very positive obligations on the
+part of the law enforcement and the intelligence community, and
+those obligations need to be enforced and complied with; and so
+therefore--whether it is not--you know, an evaluation of
+somebody's performance, again, I don't see incentives, because
+I see that as more discretionary. I want to have compliance
+enforcement and make sure that the obligations--the positive
+obligations on individuals are being fulfilled.
+ As far as the deputy's issues, I will defer to FBI and DHS
+on this, but I just don't think that the model that is proposed
+by the 9/11 Commission is workable.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Shays.
+ Mr. Shays. Thank you. All of you obviously are intricately
+involved in homeland security. I would like to know what you
+agreed with most with the 9/11, the recommendation that you
+thought was the soundest, the one you supported the most and
+the one you had the greatest reservation about. Why not the
+gentleman from Stamford, Connecticut answer first.
+ Mr. Black. I think that is a good choice. I think in
+reading the report, the recommendation that jumps to mind is
+what I recall would have been the advantage of centralization
+in terms of leadership and resources. In this and other
+hearings, oftentimes you hear a lot of emphasis on an
+organizational chart, how essentially units would be integrated
+among themselves.
+ I think in the past, we had very good people working very
+hard. I think it was over time from the 1990's underresourced.
+So I personally have put the greatest weight on the
+centralization of having a director of national intelligence. I
+think that is a very good idea.
+ I also like the idea of a director of national
+counterterrorism. As a customer now being at the State
+Department, because I think there is great advantage to have
+essentially one-stop shopping. Otherwise, it invariably puts me
+as the customer and the State Department into the business of
+having to evaluate competing analyses. Competition is good. I
+think competition is good among the collectors and those that
+analyze information. It is not necessarily good in terms of the
+customers.
+ The recommendation--maybe a little outside of the reserve
+of this--that I am a bit apprehensive about is that the idea of
+having the Department of Defense assume complete responsibility
+for paramilitary affairs. On the one hand, I like this very
+much, the greatest fighting force known to man. These are the
+people to go to, but I also at the same time think the Central
+Intelligence Agency is very adept at the use of clandestinity
+and that type of activity. So what I would encourage would be a
+solidification, a merger, not necessarily one subsuming the
+other.
+ Mr. Shays. Thank you.
+ Mr. Hughes. In my case, I agree with the recommendations on
+information sharing. I support everything they advocate. I
+think actually I would like to go further perhaps in achieving
+information transparency inside this community so that the
+professional persons who work in this community under a common
+security standard know everything that they ought to know in
+order to accomplish their mission.
+ The thing that I like the least--there are two or three
+things I don't agree with, but I think the one that I will
+mention here is the organizational chart for the national
+intelligence director on page 413.
+ I don't believe that they got that right in several ways,
+and I believe that the administration and leadership here in
+Congress should carefully review the ideas regarding that
+structure and the missions and functions that a national
+intelligence director would have. That is my view.
+ Mr. Shays. Thank you.
+ Mr. Brennan. I agree with what my colleagues have talked
+about as far as conceptually I agree with a national
+intelligence director and a national counterterrorism center.
+There is so much engineering that needs to go on in order to
+make both of those very successful, and I think that is what we
+are seeing right now.
+ Quite frankly, the recommendation about having more
+streamlined congressional oversight I think is a good one. I
+think that is the way the executive branch needs to reshape
+itself so it does the legislative oversight function.
+ The reference here that the President should lead a
+governmentwide effort to bring the major national security
+institutions into the information revolution, it is
+tremendously important that if we are going to achieve a
+national framework of sharing of information, that there needs
+to be this overarching effort on the part of the nation, not
+just the Federal Government, to ensure that we are moving
+together in concert as opposed to separate initiatives that are
+not in fact finding a way to meld together.
+ Ms. Baginski. From our perspective, we were pleased with
+the FBI recommendations, I am sure as would surprise you. We
+were. But for us, the key recommendation is the director of the
+national intelligence director to allow the fusion of domestic
+and foreign intelligence. We are very excited about that.
+ Like Cofer, my personal reservations are with the
+recommendation to transfer all paramilitary activity to DOD. I
+think there is some complexity there that probably needs study.
+ Mr. Shays. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Cox. Mr. Meek.
+ Mr. Meek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our
+panelists that are here today. I just have an observation. I
+know we had the last panel with 9/11 Chairman and Vice Chairman
+Mr. Kean and Mr. Hamilton, and I just couldn't help but think
+about their experience in this area. I mean, you have a past
+governor, past speaker of the New Jersey House, and majority
+and minority leader Mr. Kean and Mr. Hamilton spent 34 years in
+this body, several of those years on the Intelligence Committee
+serving, doing this kind of work.
+ You had 78 staff members on this 9/11 Commission that
+worked very hard over a period of 18 months, took a lot of
+testimony from everyday individuals, victims, families, also
+those that were injured in 9/11, professional staff, even in
+some of your own offices. Probably some of you came before the
+Commission.
+ And, you know, I couldn't help but take an opportunity to
+look at and go through the 9/11 book and really read some of
+the--I just wanted to just talk about chapter 8, where it says
+the system was blinking red, and then you go on to page 254,
+and it said, the summer of threat. And then you can go to
+chapter 13 and it says, how do you do it? A different way of
+organizing the government. You know, that is the most, I think,
+interesting chapter in the whole book when you start talking
+about how do you reorganize a government. That is just
+something that doesn't happen overnight.
+ General Hughes, I know you know that we had an opportunity
+and you were before our subcommittee, and it was maybe about 4
+months you were on the job, and there is a lot of positive--and
+I want to commend you for your honesty, because a lot of the
+members on the Homeland Select Committee was, like, oh my God,
+we are in real trouble here, because this man doesn't have what
+he needs. You know, we talked about your clearance versus your
+No. 2 persons--or person clearance. If you caught a cold, he
+wouldn't have the clearance to be able to hear what you could
+hear, and you are the guy, you are the gate to getting
+information out.
+ We have this commission that is saying that we have a
+problem, and I will tell you many Members of Congress, I was a
+Member of Congress when they passed the PATRIOT Act. They
+couldn't tell you what was in the PATRIOT Act. They just voted
+for it, and that is dangerous. And I feel--and I agree with
+you, Director, when you said we need enforcement and we need
+oversight.
+ Well, you are testifying in front of a committee that is
+not even a committee. We are a Select Committee. We are
+temporary. We are like a syndication pilot that is out there
+right now, and we are here to hear you, but we don't even know
+if we are going to exist in the 109th Congress.
+ So we can, you know, go through and talk about what we
+agree and what we don't agree with, but the bottom line and the
+final analysis, it is people like yourselves that are sitting
+on this panel, the panel before you, the Commission and vice
+chairman and the commissioners don't demand a professional
+committee in this Congress to be able to become professionals
+in what we are talking about here, then we are just spinning
+our wheels.
+ And as far as I am concerned, with all due respect to my
+colleagues, to be able to pass something without a standing
+committee to say report to 88 committees so when something
+happens, the Congress can just do this, you know, is really
+inadequate and a disservice to those that have lost their lives
+and all this time that we are spending.
+ So I hope as we start to bubble things up to the director's
+office and to other folks that are making major decisions, even
+to the White House as they start talking about who is going to
+have power and who doesn't have power, that there is some
+discussion about sharing some of the decision making and also
+some of the thought as it relates to protecting the homeland
+with the Congress. And some folks are going to have to give up
+power in this Congress, and for folks to start doing the
+Potomac two-step saying we have done something when we really
+haven't in the final analysis, it is really a disservice.
+ So I would hope--I am not asking you to make a career
+decision, but I am making a statement here today. But what I am
+saying is that we have to man-up, woman-up and leader-up to be
+able to let folks know that it is imperative that we have this
+kind of oversight, because if we don't have it, you can go
+before 100 committees before you circle back around to this
+one, but we can say can we pick up where we left off. And we
+have this 9/11 report out, and we are not the only ones reading
+it. I guarantee you that it is in the hands of terrorists
+abroad and domestic looking at where they can see through our
+lines of what we feel the defense that they know is not defense
+and take advantage of it.
+ So to move fast and quick is important, but to also have
+what we need is also important. I share that. I am on the Armed
+Services Committee that meets in this room. I shared that with
+the panel that came before us. I am sharing it with you,
+because I think it is the most important thing that we can do
+in correcting the oversight and making this Congress aware of
+what is going on and paying a service to those of you that are
+working professionally in this area to have members that
+understand the issues and are able to get you what you need as
+it relates to oversight and authority and all of those things
+what comes along with it.
+ So I just want to--Mr. Chairman, I am sorry for going over
+the time, but I just want to share with the panel if they can
+please pass that on to their superiors and colleagues.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman's time has expired.
+ The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Goodlatte.
+ Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Brennan,
+currently the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, TTIC, does
+not collect intelligence. That function remains among the
+various other agencies within the intelligence community. TTIC
+analyzes the information provided by the community. How can a
+TTIC analyst trust raw data when he or she is not provided with
+some analysis on the background of the information, and how
+would the National Counterterrorism Center that is been
+proposed avoid this stovepiping that the report describes is a
+problem?
+ Mr. Brennan. Well, first of all, TTIC has access not just
+to the raw data, but the information that sort of underlies
+that in terms of information on sources. We have real-time
+access to the FBI's information system so that when an
+electronic communication comes in from New York into FBI
+headquarters, we see it at the same time the FBI headquarters
+sees it. When an operational cable comes in from the CIA, from
+overseas into CIA headquarters, we see it at the same exact
+time. So we have full insight, full transparency into that,
+which really helps to educate the analysts and inform them
+about the nature of the information that they are seeing so
+they can, in fact, tell us where it came from, how it was
+acquired, and as Ms. Baginski said, the pedigree of the
+information and the sourcing.
+ The national counterterrorism--
+ Mr. Goodlatte. Let me ask you, with regard to that, do you
+feel that then that TTIC is already serving some of the
+functions of this suggested National Counterterrorism Center,
+then, if you are already--
+ Mr. Brennan. By all means. In fact, the Commission says
+that the National Counterterrorism Center shall be built upon
+the foundation of TTIC, because TTIC right now has been charged
+with the responsibility to access the information and provide
+all-source analysis that will integrate the information that is
+collected domestically as well as from abroad; so yes, we are
+far down this road to the National Counterterrorism Center
+analytic responsibilities.
+ Mr. Goodlatte. Will the Center add another layer of
+bureaucracy, or will it enhance the process? In other words, in
+other words, we don't want information--the problem we had in
+the past is information would be gathered and it would lie on
+somebody' desk in somebody's computer and not get in the hands
+of people who can act upon it. The more people who can lay
+their hands on the information it could mean more people are
+aware of the problem and get to address it, or it could mean it
+has got to go through one more channel before it actually
+arrives where it is needed.
+ Mr. Brennan. Our obligation is to make sure we leverage
+that information to make it available to the different
+departments and agencies, and I talk about the architecture
+that is required in order to allow different departments and
+agencies to search against the largest volume of information so
+they can bring up the information that they need in order to
+fulfill their missions.
+ So what we are trying to do right now and the
+administration is to determine exactly what this National
+Counterterrorism Center should, in fact, include and involved.
+The 9/11 Commission talks about basically two distinct
+functions that TTIC does not do right now. One is joint
+operational planning and the second is doing net assessments,
+which is, you take the threat and the capabilities of the
+terrorist organizations and you apply it against the
+vulnerabilities and the infrastructure that is going against.
+We don't do that kind of assessment now.
+ Mr. Goodlatte. As I understand it, TTIC is overseen by the
+CIA; is that correct?
+ Mr. Brennan. No, it is not. It is a direct report to the
+Director of Central Intelligence. So I don't have anybody in
+the CIA to go through, directly report to the DCI. Now, the DCI
+is dual-hatted as well as the director of CIA as well.
+ Mr. Goodlatte. And how will this new--in your view. I don't
+know if it is specified in any of the discussions you have had
+already, but how will the new National Counterterrorism Center
+fit into that framework? Is it going to be overarching above
+all of the different intelligence agencies, or will it also be
+under the direction of the director of the CIA?
+ Mr. Brennan. Since it doesn't exist yet, I can talk about
+what the 9/11 Commission recommends, which is that the National
+Counterterrorism Center would be a direct report to the
+national intelligence director, so that it would not, in fact,
+go through any individual department or agency, but those digs
+are yet to be made about that--
+ Mr. Goodlatte. Would that alter--in your view, would that
+or should that alter who you report to and where your
+organization lies in that framework?
+ Mr. Brennan. I think the reporting chain right now from
+TTIC to the Director of Central Intelligence is the appropriate
+reporting chain of command, and if, in fact, a national
+intelligence director position is established, I believe that
+the director of the National Counterterrorism Center should
+report to the national intelligence director.
+ Mr. Goodlatte. So you think it should or should not be
+changed if that entity were created?
+ Mr. Brennan. I don't think that the--well, you will have a
+different person at top if the national intelligence director
+position is, in fact, legislated.
+ Mr. Goodlatte. And you would report directly to them or
+continue to report to the director of Central Intelligence, in
+your opinion?
+ Mr. Brennan. Well, the national intelligence director would
+take the place of the director of Central Intelligence, and so
+in the future, if what they are proposing here, the director of
+CIA would be separate from the national intelligence director,
+so you would have two people there. Right now you just have
+one.
+ Mr. Goodlatte. I understand, but which of those do you
+think you should be reporting to?
+ Mr. Brennan. The national intelligence director. We should
+not be embedded in one single department or agency since that
+transcends those individual mission responsibilities of
+individual departments and agencies.
+ Mr. Goodlatte. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Cox. Mr. Turner.
+ Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Brennan, you have
+been a very active proponent of an integrated information-
+sharing architecture, and you have talked a lot about your
+efforts to get us there.
+ You mentioned in your statement that as of the end of this
+month, you will have six separate networks that will be
+integrated in such a way that searches can be done on all six
+separately accessing those networks as you do now at TTIC.
+ What networks are those going to be that are now going to
+be integrated?
+ Mr. Brennan. Believe it or not, it is different and
+distinct CIA networks. There is the CIA classification--
+classified system. There is the unclassified system. There is
+the open-source information system, the FBIS. And I will get
+back to you with precisely which of those networks, in fact,
+will be ready by the end of this month.
+ Mr. Turner. When you make the effort to get integration,
+who leads in that? Who provides the necessary leadership, as
+you have said, to basically say this has got to be done, we
+have got to integrate these databases? Who does that?
+ Mr. Brennan. Right now there is an information program
+sharing office that TTIC chairs that includes the Department of
+Homeland Security and the FBI. It is to fulfill obligations
+that are contained in the MOU and information sharing in March
+of last year, and so there are a number of individuals who are
+a part of this information-sharing program office and a number
+of groups that have been established to address issues such as
+third-party rule, originated control, tear line standards and
+other types of things. So it runs across the different agencies
+and departments, these there is nobody at the top.
+ Mr. Turner. Governor Kean this morning, in his oral
+statement, as well as his written statement, said, ``Only
+presidential leadership can develop the necessary
+governmentwide concepts and standards,'' referring to
+information sharing.
+ Do you agree with that?
+ Mr. Brennan. I think looking across the different
+departments and agencies and based on the statutory
+authorities, vested in those departments and agencies, it would
+then go to presidential leadership to initiate an effort on the
+part of the executive branch to work with the Congress, to be
+able to transcend those different bureaucratic boundaries.
+ Mr. Turner. Do we have any timetable that has been set
+forth by the President for integrating these databases?
+ Mr. Brennan. There is a timetable that we are operating
+within in the intelligence community structure to try to bring
+those different elements of the intelligence community
+architecture together, and I believe that the administration
+said that every one of the commission's recommendations are
+being followed up on and acted upon, and I know that there are
+efforts underway to try to address that specific recommendation
+here.
+ Mr. Turner. But do we have timetables? Do we have
+benchmarks, goals that we are trying to integrate a certain
+number of databases by a certain date? Do we have an overall
+objective that is expressed as a time frame within--
+ Mr. Brennan. Across the U.S. Government?
+ Mr. Turner. Yes.
+ Mr. Brennan. I don't believe. I would defer to the Office
+of Management and Budget on this issue since it, again, goes
+across them. We have one for TTIC internally.
+ Mr. Turner. All right. When I look at the changes that are
+recommended by the 9/11 Commission in the area of the
+counterterrorism center, it seems that TTIC would be absorbed
+into that new organization and that this new responsibility of
+planning, joint planning, as they refer to it, would be an
+additional responsibility.
+ Is it your view that this new counterterrorism center is
+the best entity for carrying out that kind of joint operational
+planning?
+ Mr. Brennan. There is a lot that is to be defined by the
+term ``joint operational planning'' and what would actually be
+done within the center and what would be done outside in those
+individual agencies, departments that actually carry out those
+operations, and that is what the discussions have been taking
+place over the past two or three weeks have been, to try to
+define that appropriately to make sure that we continue to have
+chains of command between cabinet officers and the President,
+the White House and the Security Council.
+ So I am a strong opponent of a National Counterterrorism
+Center, but, again, like other things, the devil is in the
+details here, and you have to make sure that you understand
+what you want to invest in that entity and what you want to
+leave outside.
+ Mr. Turner. One of the comments that was made, I believe by
+General Hughes, expressing some concern about the proposed
+structure of the National Counterterrorism Center, am I correct
+to assume, General Hughes, that your concern relates to that
+portion of the proposed counterterrorism center that requires a
+deputy national intelligence director to oversee the operations
+of DHS and specifically the operations of your particular
+directorate?
+ General Hughes. Sir, I believe that I don't think they have
+got the organization for the national intelligence director
+right, not the National Counterterrorism Center.
+ Mr. Turner. Oh, all right. I am sorry.
+ General Hughes. Sure.
+ Mr. Turner. You agree with the proposed organizational
+chart on page 413 that you refer to?
+ General Hughes. I do not think it is what we ought to do.
+ Mr. Turner. Well, so specifically, what on that chart on
+page 413 do you disagree with?
+ General Hughes. As a personal view, not representative of
+the DHS consolidated view, my personal view is that there
+should be three principal deputies, one for foreign
+intelligence, one for domestic intelligence and one for
+community management; and beneath those three principal
+deputies--and there could be other principal deputies, too,
+though. I am not sure, but I think the division of labor
+between foreign and domestic is an important issue to keep in
+mind in a bureaucratic sense.
+ Beneath those principal deputies, I personally think that
+there are to be an array of organizations and entities. Some of
+them would be the departments and their intelligence
+organizations that currently exist. Some of them would be
+offices and functional areas of the intelligence community that
+currently exists or may need to exist in the future, and of
+course there would be centers like the National
+Counterterrorism Center reporting directly to the national
+intelligence director. So it is kind of a mixture of issues
+here, and I personally do not think the three-deputy mechanism
+that is portrayed on this chart is the right approach. It
+doesn't incorporate all of the issues that the national
+intelligence director is going to be faced with. So I have a
+different hierarchical, organizational view than that portrayed
+by this chart.
+ Mr. Turner. All right. Thank you, sir. Is my time up?
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman's time has expired.
+ The gentleman from New York, Mr. King.
+ Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank, again,
+all of the members of the panel for their appearance here
+today, and I would like to direct my question to Ms. Baginski.
+ On the question of sharing intelligence and sharing
+information, I would like to focus on the issue of sleeper
+cells in this country. For instance, if you could give any
+detail on the extent of cooperation that you are receiving from
+the Muslim community, and when you do get information, how
+quickly would you share raw data, for instance, with the local
+police? I am thinking of the NYPD, for instance, where they
+have a number of mosques, where they received information that
+maybe isn't actionable but may be of some means to the NYPD who
+has its own operations going. How quickly in real-time would
+that type of information be made available to the NYPD, and how
+closely is the level of cooperation at that level?
+ Ms. Baginski. I would characterize the level of cooperation
+maybe three months ago and the level of cooperation today, and
+I personally have been involved in a lot of very hard work to
+close some of those seams.
+ What we did for the Republican National Convention was
+actually to accomplish an information architecture that made us
+actually write down the protocols for passing this information
+quickly, beginning with what it was the NYPD wanted from us,
+and this is just a first step, but we have, I think, very, very
+good working relationships when we are in a crisis situation
+and when it is identified as such.
+ I think we have work to do to make that the way we do
+business every day, and in a ready sense, we pass information
+to them, but also my talks with Dave Cohen have been about them
+passing that information to us and through the JTTF construct.
+I am very encouraged. With the working with a foundation who is
+actually helping us pull this together and engineering what the
+information sharing should be, and I have this responsibility
+myself given to me by the Director to make sure that we smooth
+this out in concert with Pat D'Amuro and Chuck Frahm, who is
+now up there, and I think we are making enormous strides, but
+we still have much work to do.
+ Mr. King. Now, David Cohen, the one you deal with from--
+ Ms. Baginski. Yes. David is the one I will deal with. We
+are going to do intel to intel so that we have the strength in
+that relationship that we have always had ops to ops.
+ Mr. King. How concerned are you with the issue of sleeper
+cells, and I am concerned particularly with the city of New
+York, but nationwide.
+ Ms. Baginski. I think we are always concerned about what we
+don't know. What I am encouraged by is that we have begun to
+attack that issue as an analytic problem, which is to say if
+there were, how would you find out, and then finding clues from
+intelligence reports that tell us they will use these kind of
+operatives, they want to come in from this kind of area and
+actually begin a full-court intelligence press to try to locate
+such cells. So I am encouraged with our methodology, and I am
+encouraged--I am concerned just as any citizen is with what we
+don't know.
+ Mr. King. Do you believe you are making progress in
+developing sources in the community?
+ Ms. Baginski. I do indeed.
+ Mr. King. And without going into much detail, is much of
+the information you are getting overseas from overseas relating
+to operations here in the United States?
+ Ms. Baginski. I think that is fair to say, sir.
+ Mr. King. Thank you very much.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson.
+ Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Based on the 9/11
+report and everything you have learned to date--and I am
+speaking specifically about Iraq--what additional steps can we
+take to ensure that the mistakes of the past won't be repeated?
+And it is based on this issue of faulty intelligence and the
+notion of weapons of mass destruction and a lot of other
+things. What have we done since the invasion of Iraq from an
+intelligence standpoint to get better intelligence from the
+field?
+ Ms. Baginski. I can take a stab at it, and this would apply
+to, I think, all threats, not just Iraq.
+ There may be a difference between faulty intelligence and
+faulty intelligence analysis or insufficient intelligence
+analysis, but for us it is actually the core approach that we
+are taking to the whole business of intelligence, which is to
+understand at the base what information is necessary to make
+decisions but also accurately report what we know and what we
+don't know in terms of doing the analysis and then dedicating
+resources that specifically have the full-time job of positing
+hypotheses and then interacting with the data to prove or
+disprove certain theories.
+ So we have issues of analytic bias. We have issues of
+reporting only that which we have information on but not
+necessarily stepping back and saying, well, these are pieces of
+information that we have, but what are the pieces we don't have
+that would be necessary to actually help us make those
+decisions.
+ So mine are less about Iraq than analytic methodology is
+what I am actually responding to.
+ Mr. Thompson. Well, I guess in layman's terms, help me out.
+Who would make the call in terms of the intelligence that was
+being reviewed? Are the agencies now talking to each other so
+it would be a joint decision as to what this intelligence
+really means, or are we still separate and apart?
+ Ms. Baginski. No, sir. I do not think we are separate and
+apart. I think that under the existing DCI, there have been
+processes and procedures that begin with national intelligence
+requirements and joint community assessments on issues that are
+actually performed, and all of us are, I think, very keen to
+improve the analytic methodology, the analytic discipline and
+the analytic trade craft that goes into providing those
+assessments to include competitive analysis and what others
+might call contrarian analysis.
+ Mr. Brennan. The whole concept of TTIC is to bring together
+those different agencies that have a shared responsibility to
+make sure they are sharing information, that they understand
+each other's assumptions, to make sure that there is a full
+transparency into sources and methods and so that there is no
+mistakes made or to minimize the chance of mistakes.
+ You want to put a rigor in analytic effort, an think that
+is what we have done in the terrorism environment, and so TTIC,
+which is very innovative within the U.S. Government, is
+basically the embodiment of FBI and Department of Homeland
+Security, State Department, CIA working collaboratively
+together to share that information and provide integrated
+assessments, working with them to identify if there are
+differences of view, you don't want to have just group think.
+You want to make sure that you are able to present different
+hypotheses and different perspectives, so this, in fact, is
+giving birth to trying to do this in other areas as well such
+proliferation, and so there are initiatives underway to try to
+have a proliferation, in fact, integration center.
+ So I think the lessons of 9/11, the lessons of Iraq have
+really propelled the government as a whole to try to find ways
+that you can share this information and have the best darn
+analysis and output possible, and that has to be fueled then by
+enhanced complex and TTIC doesn't do collection, but, you know,
+the FBI and CIA and others are, in fact, trying to improve
+their entire collection effort as well. So it is a cycle of
+collection, analysis, dissemination, the entire system.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Istook.
+ Mr. Istook. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Before I ask another question, I would like to go back to
+what was hanging out there when my time expired earlier. I
+would like to make sure that I understand clearly, against what
+lists or databases currently are people checks when they are
+either, one, seeking to become a citizen, or they are seeking
+an adjustment in immigration status, whether it be permanent
+residency, entry-exit visas? What are those lists against which
+they are currently checked? Is there a difference between the
+lists against which they are checked depending upon whether it
+is naturalization status and so forth? And the last part of
+that is when will any differences be resolved? When are other
+cross-checks supposed to be coming online?
+ General Hughes. If you don't mind, I would like to get you
+a written answer to that question. I think it is a very good
+question, and we ought to give you the right information. It is
+a little too complex for me to relay all of the databases or
+lists that are now used and whether or not there are some
+problems with one check being made with one group of knowledge
+bases and another check being made with another group of
+knowledge bases.
+ So I would like to reserve an answer to writing, and we
+will provide it to you as soon as we possibly can.
+ Mr. Istook. I would appreciate that definitive answer,
+because obviously what I am concerned with, as I expressed
+earlier, is potential blind spots, and we know that this is
+part of the overall data integration that we are seeking to
+resolve.
+ Let me go on to the second topic. There was a lot of
+discussion about culture changes when you have the different
+information agencies, the consolidation of the homeland
+security, the potential further consolidations or revisions.
+According to the 9/11 Commission. And we have had discussion
+about culture changes among the Federal agencies, but culture
+changes are not confined to those agencies. You have a huge
+country, and if we want to take advantage of the citizenry, of
+the private sector, of the local and State, the law enforcement
+officials and take their knowledge of and put this to work,
+then we have to understand the culture of the country.
+ I think Governor Kean certainly made that point this
+morning, when he said that if we have everybody focused upon
+homeland security and we are able to use their input, then we
+are going to achieve the results that we want. We have more
+people helping.
+ But when there is constant change in the lines of
+authority, in the organizational structure, you confuse those
+potential people. A private citizen, if they see some sort of
+suspicious activity, typically will think of calling one of two
+law enforcement agencies, I believe. They will contact their
+local police, or if in their mind they say, well, this is
+something bigger, they are going to think of the FBI. They are
+not going to think of any of the alphabet soup of other
+agencies which we are discussing about the reorganization.
+ I am concerned that further reorganization may create
+problems with culture change that requires a culture change of
+the entire Nation if we do not give easy-to-understand lines of
+authority that the private citizens can understand so that they
+can therefore be active helpers in our war against terrorism.
+ I would appreciate your comments and feedback on that
+concern.
+ Ms. Baginski. Yes, sir. I would actually like to start with
+that. I take your point, and I think it is a very, very
+important point about passage of information to State and
+locals.
+ What I would like to highlight here is our agreement with
+you that this is terribly complex, and what we actually think
+is the solution, which is the Joint Terrorism Task Forces that
+we have had for many years, but I think as we have said earlier
+today, we are up to almost a hundred of them, which are
+literally that, joint task forces, State, local, tribal, DHS,
+intelligence community personnel, all in one area so that when
+that information is received that you are talking about, there
+is one place to go, into that task force, information is
+received, and there is the network that can pass it on to all
+of the people who need to know and to the appropriate people to
+act.
+ So I think in the operational construct what we have hit
+upon is a JTTF, and I think those things are some of the best
+operational paradigm I have ever seen. Whichever--
+ Mr. Istook. A private citizen is not going to think of a
+joint task force.
+ Ms. Baginski. But that is the FBI is the point I am saying,
+they would call the FBI, and that is done under their--
+ Mr. Istook. They are the clearinghouse.
+ Ms. Baginski. Yeah. And so General Hughes and I, our work
+is about ensuring that 99 know what the 100th is doing and
+getting that information passed between them for analysis, and
+that is what we are working on.
+ General Hughes. Well, I think, first, I agree with your
+sentiments, and I think it is a concern. It is something we are
+going to have to work on. I am not sure if a single agency or a
+single organizational element can do the complete job. I am not
+positive of that, because there are differences between
+providing information to a law enforcement organization,
+providing information to a homeland security organization,
+providing information to an intelligence organization,
+specifically, and then providing information to other
+organizational entities that respond to the people of the
+United States.
+ Those differences have to be accounted for. I, indeed,
+think they are a part of our culture. We haven't got it right
+yet, but I think we have a lot of ideas and possibilities, and
+out of the 9/11 Commission report, this issue is being
+discussed and considered. As I think Chairman Cox asked me a
+question earlier about how the possible changes would affect
+the Department of Homeland Security, and I think there will be
+some changes coming to our Department out of the 9/11
+Commission recommendations, as there probably should. We need
+to adapt and find the right pathway toward the future. Just
+what those are, it is premature to say, but if you could just
+accept the idea of that I personally agree with your concerns.
+I think the Department of Homeland Security has your concerns
+in mind, and we are going to try to achieve the right answer
+for our country and our culture.
+ Mr. Istook. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Sanchez.
+ Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for
+being before us today.
+ I have three quick questions. The first one is to Mr.
+Brennan. When my colleague, Mr. Meek, was questioning you, you
+said TTIC has been charged to analyze what has been collected.
+Who gave you that charge?
+ Mr. Brennan. I am sorry. Could you repeat that question?
+ Ms. Sanchez. You said that you had been charged to analyze
+the information that had been collected who gave you your
+charge? Who gave you your charter? Who put you up? How did we
+create you? Where did you get that charge from?
+ Mr. Brennan. First of all, the President announced in
+January of 2003 in the State of the Union address that was
+directing the director of Central Intelligence and the director
+of the FBI to form an integration center to deal with the
+terrorist threat. I was appointed in March of 2003. In May 1st
+we stood up. The Director of Central Intelligence issued a
+Director of Central Intelligence directive in May of 2003 that
+laid out under the DCI's authorities what the responsibilities
+would be of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center and what my
+charge and the charge of the TTIC would be.
+ Ms. Sanchez. What would you say to some of my colleagues
+here in the Congress who believe that as a joint sort of
+situation, really not under the jurisdiction of any particular
+statute or place in the Congress to have set you up, that, you
+know, they are not very happy, they don't feel that they have
+much oversight, much control or much ability to bring you
+forward and sort of figure out what you all are doing? What
+would you say to that comment?
+ Mr. Brennan. I would say it would be incorrect, because I
+have appeared in many different committees and subcommittees
+over the past year and a half. I think this is the third or
+fourth time I have appeared here. I also hope your colleagues
+would say that it is very good that the executive branch has
+found a way to bring together those different systems and
+agencies with shared statutory authorities and work together
+collaboratively in an integrated environment. I hope that is
+what they would say.
+ Ms. Sanchez. And then I have two other questions that I
+would ask of any of you or all of you. The first is what do you
+say to--you know, we are not the only ones who hopefully are
+reading this report, but there are a lot of Americans out
+there, and one of the things I am struck by when people ask me
+this, you know, we want to create this big position of a guy or
+gal overlooking intelligence. They are going to be in charge of
+these 15 agencies or departments or pieces or there might even
+be more, as some of us know. What would you say to the question
+about don't you think a lot of these agencies are duplicating
+effort or have the same information or why didn't the
+Commission address getting rid of some of these or really
+rearranging things? What would you say, you know, to those
+people who say we just don't need to put somebody at the top
+and then put everybody underneath? Why don't we really make a
+reorganization?
+ That would be that question, and then the next question
+would be what role did each of your agencies play in the
+analysis of the information that Al-Qa'ida was trying to target
+the financial buildings in DC, New Jersey and New York City?
+And do you agree that Secretary Ridge should have issued that
+warning?
+ Mr. Brennan. On reorganization issues, I think it is a very
+worthwhile question to take look at all of those different
+intelligence agencies and what the responses are, and the ones
+that have been in fact set up by individual statutes. So I
+think that is an appropriate question for a review to take a
+look at ultimately.
+ Regarding the role of TTIC in this analysis, we, in fact,
+were working very closely with the Department of Homeland
+Security, FBI and others, as that information was coming in,
+and we had to integrate the information and put it in a context
+for the Department of Homeland Security. And we worked very
+closely with Secretary Ridge as he moved forward with his
+announcements and decisions.
+ General Hughes. And I will chime in now and say I agree
+with the idea that these are very good questions to ask, and we
+should consider them in the future. With regard to the
+duplication of effort, the plethora of organizational entities
+and functions, we ought to try to more carefully consolidate
+and focus our efforts in some way.
+ With regard to the role that DHS played, we were the
+recipient of information from others. We examined that
+information in the cold light of day. We determined that we had
+a duty, and in fact, a promise to the American people to warn
+them about information that rose to the level of detail and
+importance that would generate an action on our part. The
+Secretary made a final decision in consultation with the other
+secretaries of the government and the leaders of the executive
+branch and went forth with the more precise raising of the
+alert level, focused on specific facilities that you know
+occurred. Not a generalized alert, not a broad warning but a
+very specific kind of function based upon the information.
+ I, as his intelligence officer, advised him on that,
+supported him on that. I believe that it was the right
+decision, and we did the right thing in this case with regard
+to our duties to the American people.
+ Ms. Baginski. We received and reviewed a lot of the raw
+intelligence, shared it immediately with both of these
+gentleman and with Cofer as well and are fully supportive of
+the action that the Secretary of Homeland Security took in
+issuing the warning.
+ In terms of a duplication of effort, I think you are
+absolutely right to raise this issue, that it is a very fair
+thing to do, and I think as the President has made very clear,
+nothing is off the table as we look at intelligence reform.
+ Mr. Black. Lastly, I would just add having a strong
+national director of intelligence would allow this man or woman
+to rationalize the intelligence system so there would be some
+economies. One would hope along those lines. I think the
+warning was appropriate. The Department of State was a
+recipient of this information, and our function was to
+communicate it overseas to our embassies and see if there is
+anything that is applicable to U.S. interests overseas.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Souder.
+ Mr. Souder. Thanks. I first want to say to Mr. Brennan, I
+agree with you. I am glad the President didn't sit around
+waiting for Congress to act. He needed to act far faster than
+we are going to get legislation done, and I appreciate that he
+attempted at least to bring as much fusion as possible.
+ I also want to thank all the men and women in your
+agencies, because, in fact, we have intercepted at least many
+potential incidents, and that is because of our increased
+efforts. It is not perfect. We clearly are moving far ahead,
+but we should thank the patriots on the line who have risked
+their lives and who have, in fact, averted continual incidents.
+ But one thing that really troubles me about today's
+hearing. I raised it in the first panel. We go there this big
+report and we talk about new information systems. I spent 3
+years doing hearings on our borders and sitting in the booths
+with our people, but, you know, if they don't have an accurate
+ID, we put them into a system, and we don't know whether it is
+the same person.
+ So it isn't going to pop up if they are a terrorist that
+they have a fake ID. I have been at the State Department desks
+and other places. If the ID changes, they get false ones, they
+use different names, hey, our whole system, the idea of
+intelligence is that you are pooling, having a whole bunch of
+meetings about people who may have 16 different names in common
+with a hundred or thousands of other people in the United
+States. We have already had cases of identity theft where
+people have stolen people's IDs, and then one of the most
+common questions I get from Republicans, Democrats, all kinds
+of people in my district, is how do I get off a watchlist?
+ Well, if we had a biometric indicator, whether it is an eye
+or a fingerprint or a watermark so that you can't be
+duplicated, then we wouldn't have this problem. How in the
+world do we justify to the taxpayers not doing this type of
+thing and investing millions of dollars in new border
+equipment, millions of dollars at the airport? Every airport
+screener I talked to says it is so hard to match any kind of ID
+with the ticket. People's pictures don't look the same. You are
+guessing. These people have multiple names. How can we even be
+discussing all of this investment, billions of dollars, if
+everybody is afraid to go on record and say, look, this whole
+system isn't going to work unless we know the person we are
+dealing with is the person we are looking for? Any comments on
+this?
+ General Hughes. Well, first, I think your characterization
+of this is right. It is a very difficult job, and we are not
+doing it perfectly in all cases. That is for sure.
+ I will have to tell you, sir, that there are others who
+have a differing view. They view a biometric identification as
+a controlled by the government as a potential for misuse.
+ There are other issues involved here, collecting the
+biometric, placing it in an identification medium that could be
+relied upon, suffering the cost of doing this across the
+country. That sort of thing is all the problems that we are
+trying to come to grips with. On the face of it, emotionally, I
+agree that we ought to have a reliable form of identification
+for persons who come into the United States and those who
+reside here, but for the reasons that I mentioned and many
+others, it is proving harder than mere sentiment.
+ Mr. Souder. Let me follow up on that. Let me ask for the
+record--and you can just say yes or no--do you all agree,
+because certainly in material that has been released, that
+American citizens are included among the terrorist risks. It
+isn't just people who are foreigners. Let the record show do
+you agree with that, Mr.Black, that there are American citizens
+who are on terrorist watchlists as well?
+ Mr. Black. I think it would be prudent to assume that, yes,
+sir.
+ Mr. Souder. And do you agree that we have had some reports
+now of people being contracted as mules like in narcotics where
+people could bring money in for terrorists, people could bring
+other things in who are American citizens, who get contracted
+like they do in narcotics. They might not even realize they are
+part of a bigger plot but can do that.
+ In other words, this just isn't about foreigners, and
+furthermore, it isn't just about American citizens who go
+across the borders. It is about--and even for those foreigners,
+they can get false U.S. IDs. I have been against the national
+ID card. I am one of the conservatives who had a fear about
+this, but I don't hear anything that you are telling me today
+that gives me any comfort if you don't know who the individual
+is, and that the civil rights question, it can be done with a
+watermark.
+ There are other ways to do it other than something
+completely invasive, and besides that, if you are following the
+law and you have an eyeball scanner or a fingerprint, what is
+invasive about it if you are following the law? You have a
+social security number already, or you are supposed to in the
+United States. We have driver's licenses. What is the
+difference between a number with a picture--and a picture on
+your driver's license and a picture that actually is proven to
+be yourself as opposed to a phony picture?
+ I don't understand why a picture on a driver's license--I
+have a lot of Amish in my district. They are objecting to the
+pictures religiously, because they don't believe in a
+photograph, a graven image. OK, that is a problem on a
+spiritual way, so then they should have a fingerprint, but we
+actually require a picture of people, a number of people. I
+don't understand what exactly the civil liberty question here
+is and what is evasive--invasive about a fingerprint or an eye
+print as opposed to a picture and a number. That is the part I
+don't understand, and it is important, I believe, for the
+people who are doing this to let the American people know that
+we are dependent on the stupidity of the terrorists to use
+their real name. That is basically what we are right now. That
+is what we are dependent on, to use the same ID with the real
+name.
+ We just took down two fake IDs places in one of my mid-
+sized counties that were producing fake IDs. We are completely
+vulnerable unless we address this question.
+ General Hughes. Would you mind if I just gave a very brief
+reply to the last issue?
+ Chairman Cox. Please do.
+ General Hughes. We do use fingerprints very successfully,
+sir, to identify persons. We do it at the borders, and we do it
+internal to the country.
+ Mr. Souder. Thank you.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Frank.
+ Mr. Frank. Ms.Baginski, I apologize. I took about 20
+minutes off to do business, and I missed your colloquy with Ms.
+Jackson-Lee, and I apologize for that and I want to go back to
+it.
+ I will tell you why I am disturbed. I was at the Democratic
+Convention, and the way the protesters were treated there was
+simply wrong. We had a case, for example, in South Carolina of
+a man who is now being prosecuted federally because he was
+carrying the wrong sign in a free speech zone, not that he was
+carrying a sign but it was the wrong sign. And I understand the
+need for security.
+ I also think too much attention is being given to our
+desire not to have our feelings hurt and that it isn't always
+easy for you to sort out, but I am troubled by this, and I am
+troubled again by the preemption doctrine. I don't want people
+to commit violent acts, but I don't think law enforcement
+should be spending a great deal of time--preventing violent
+acts, yes.
+ If you have got intelligence, fine, but questioning people,
+questioning people about what they know, asking them what their
+plans are and then getting into their politics, which I am told
+sometimes happens, seems to me entirely inappropriate. And the
+opinion or quote in The New York Times dismissing the chilling
+effect as being outweighed as the potential for cutting out
+grounds, yeah, you have a right to cut out grounds, but I think
+the chilling effect ought to be a fairly high barrier.
+ I am told you said there were legitimate needs. I would
+like to ask this and get it back in writing. How many inquiries
+did the FBI make with regard to the two conventions? How many
+different individuals were questioned? And I would like--and I
+appreciate what you said about getting out information and
+sources. So forget the sources and methods. What kind of crimes
+were you trying to forestall? You mentioned a couple, but what
+were the leads, and so I would like to know how many people
+were questioned, how many leads were there, and of what sort of
+crimes? Because I really am troubled.
+ Now, you tell me that nobody was questioned unless there
+was a reason to think that he or she--let me ask this, that
+they were going to engage or violence or they knew someone who
+would? Which is it?
+ Ms. Baginski. I think it is both, but I would be loath to
+comment. I think your solution is the right one. This is a very
+reasonable request.
+ Mr. Frank. I will tell you in the interim one of the things
+I did when I went off was to write to the Director to tell him
+that I was troubled by the New York Times article; if it was
+accurate, it seemed to be an overreach. So I would really like
+to know how many people were questioned? And it is hard--I know
+the people in charge don't--we don't like to be yelled at, some
+of us. Some of us don't mind. I find if you don't like being
+yell at, then you lose your right to yell. I would rather
+preserve both.
+ But the other point we have is this: I know it has sort of
+been ramped up since September 11, but they are unrelated.
+September 11, the terrible tragedy of September 11, the
+murdered innocent people, it is no reason to interfere with
+what people say, and I am troubled by what seems to me to be a
+crossing of that line.
+ Ms. Baginski. We appreciate your concern. We do not
+consider that article to be accurate, but we will provide the
+information.
+ [The information follows:]
+
+
+ [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
+
+ Mr. Frank. Let me ask you while I have a couple of minutes
+left, you heard Mr. Kean and Mr. Hamilton talk about this
+proposal for a board that would look into privacy and civil
+liberties. Do you all endorse that? Are you familiar with that
+recommendation? It would be particularly relevant to General
+Hughes and Ms. Baginski, but to everybody, do you endorse that,
+and what kind of powers would that board have? Would you agree
+that such a board ought to be able to commandeer any
+information from you it would want, the government officials?
+ I would hope that if we had such a board, they would have a
+pretty firm right to go to any of your agencies and get the
+information with appropriate secrecy that they had. Would you
+be supportive of such a concept? We will start with Ms.
+Baginski.
+ Ms. Baginski. I am sorry. Yes. I think that that kind of
+concentrated look and responsibility at the whole civil
+liberties issue as we--
+ Mr. Frank. I am talking specifically about their right to
+go to you and say we--you know, really full investigative
+powers, almost like an inspector general across the board with
+a civil liberties mandate.
+ Ms. Baginski. There are many bodies that have that
+responsibility now.
+ Mr. Frank. I am asking about this one.
+ Ms. Baginski. I wouldn't hesitate to give that kind of
+information to any of the investigative bodies. If such a body
+were created, we would certainly do the same.
+ Mr. Frank. General, you would be relevant as well.
+ General Hughes. I think the answer is, as I tried to
+express earlier, if such a board is needed--
+ Mr. Frank. Is such a board needed, General? Let me ask you
+a question. You have had a lot of opinions. I have been
+impressed by a lot of them. It is a little late for ``if.'' Do
+you think such a board is needed?
+ General Hughes. Yes, I believe it is.
+ Mr. Frank. Thank you. And you think it should have then the
+full powers?
+ General Hughes. I think it should have full powers, but it
+should follow the same rules as the government officials whom
+they are asking information from with regard to the
+safeguarding of the--
+ Mr. Frank. Absolutely. Thank you.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentlewoman from California Ms. Harman.
+ Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Cox. I am sorry, Ms. Harman. I did not see that
+Mr. Shadegg was here. So we are going back and forth. The
+gentleman from Arizona Mr. Shadegg.
+ Mr. Shadegg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ I appreciate all of your being here, and I appreciate your
+testimony. I think you have given thoughtful input to us on
+which of the recommendations are most valuable and which you
+have concerns about.
+ I have some concerns about some of them. I particularly
+have concerns about the issue of whether or not a clandestine
+military effort should be, in fact, handed over to the
+Department of Defense. I am not certain that it isn't important
+to preserve that capability within the CIA.
+ But the issue I want to focus you on is one that orients
+itself towards human nature. The 9/11 Commission has
+recommended that the current spoke-and-wheel structure of our
+intelligence network where each agency cannot look at the
+other's database needs to be replaced with one where each
+agency can look at the other's database. While I see an
+advantage to that in terms of making sure that the information
+is out there for everyone to see, I am worried that human
+nature will cause that to cause perhaps a diminution in the
+value of the information that is put into the database.
+ It seems to me that human nature might cause an agency to
+put on the database--I don't want to be harsh about this, but
+there might be a tendency to put on there only things that were
+not particularly valuable, only things that they knew everybody
+else already knew, or only things that they were willing to let
+others know, and if it was this key bit of information that
+they wanted to take advantage of, it might not be put on the
+database. Short of--when I asked the Commissioners, the two
+vice chairs, cochairs, who were here earlier this question,
+their response was, well, that is why we have a singular czar
+overhead--I guess ``czar'' is a word not to be used--a singular
+person in charge over top to lay down edicts to force that data
+to be placed into the information network so that it can be
+accessed by everybody.
+ I am interested in, since you deal with this kind of data
+all the time and these kinds of incentives, your thoughts on
+how we approach that problem, or perhaps it is not a legitimate
+concern. We can start with whoever has strong feelings on it.
+ Mr. Brennan. The term ``database'' is used in different
+ways by different people. You can be talking about one set of
+data that is all together, that is just melded together, and
+everybody has access to that big soup, or you can talk about a
+database in terms of the distributed architecture where you
+have connectivity between the different data holdings that
+reside in different networks. And I think what the Commission
+is looking for is to have some type of overall architecture
+where there are connections between those different data
+holdings and data networks so you can pulse them to bring up
+the information.
+ That doesn't mean that everybody has access to everything,
+because I think that would be just a disaster. You want to make
+sure you maintain compartmentation for those things that need
+to be compartmented, but you want to make sure you make
+available to those individuals who need the information
+everything that should be made available to them. So I think it
+is more of an architecture as opposed to a single database.
+ General Hughes. I will just add that some elements of the
+information should not be visible to everybody, but the essence
+of the information between databases I believe should be
+available generally. We should figure out a technical way to
+compartment sensitive sources, methods, and other identifying
+data that would give too much information to the broad user;
+but the essence of the data can be somehow provided to the
+larger audience. And I think that is a direction we ought to go
+in.
+ Mr. Shadegg. Ms. Baginski, did you have--
+ Ms. Baginski. Very similar to my colleagues, I think the
+truth of the matter is that when we each built our individual
+databases, there was never any thought about their utility
+outside of us. So what has happened is we have mixed things
+that are legal and things that are source and method, and so
+sometimes it looks to you like we are always saying no, but
+really you either have an all yes or all no answer. I mean, we
+haven't set these up to be flexible.
+ So my view is the solution is what you want to be able to
+do is essentially what you do in your living room, right, or
+wherever you might do your own Internet work, which is to do
+federated queries across disparate databases that are
+structured similarly so that they provide you results and
+answer questions that you may have. And what that is going to
+require is for each of us to agree to different standards, data
+standards, flagging, tagging, and the separation of the source
+and method so that we can provide that access, and I think--
+that is where I think we are moving.
+ Mr. Shadegg. If you move in that direction, will there then
+not be a problem with agencies withholding data from that
+database which is accessible to other agencies?
+ Ms. Baginski. There will be less of a problem. I guess we
+learn to never say never, right? But there will be less of a
+problem if the sourcing material is not automatically linked to
+the data. I think there will be less of a problem.
+ Mr. Shadegg. So one agency would be able to get the data,
+but not necessarily the source of that information?
+ Ms. Baginski. Exactly. I mean one example is to look at
+what State and local law enforcement have done for years with
+things like NCIC. There is a price of admission. It is called
+flagging and tagging data in certain ways, and you are able to
+ask questions of it and get answers back. And I think there is
+actually a lot the Intelligence Community could learn from the
+law enforcement community on this one.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentlelady from California Ms. Harman.
+ Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was happy to defer
+my time to a USC parent.
+ Chairman Cox. That makes at least three of us up here on
+the panel.
+ Ms. Harman. I would like to welcome our panel and make a
+couple of comments about several of them, whom I have known for
+some years. Ambassador Black's last incarnation was as head of
+the CTC at the CIA. He was there after 9/11 and before 9/11.
+His response to 9/11 is, I think, an example of the response of
+the hard-working men and women of the Intelligence Community,
+and his response was basically to camp out in his office for
+some weeks or months to make absolutely certain that he let
+nothing slip. And many of us worried about his health. He knows
+this. And all of us are very grateful for his dedication. And
+on behalf of those in Congress who knew you then and have
+watched you since, thank you very much personally for your
+service, and thank you to all of the men and women of the CTC
+for everything they have done and are doing.
+ Mr. Black. Thank you very much. You are awfully gracious. I
+appreciate it.
+ Ms. Harman. There are others on this panel, too, Mr.
+Chairman, who have done a great deal. Mr. Brennan runs a very
+interesting operation. I have been there. I don't know whether
+one can describe where it was or is, so I won't. But I have
+been to someplace called TTIC, and one of the interesting
+metaphors is that under the desks of the people that work there
+are all these hard drives lined up next to each other. Those
+are the stovepipes. I mean, you can visually see the fact that
+we don't have an integrated database. We have had a lot of
+conversation about this, and I guess we are getting there, but
+it has been a very hard slog. I think everything would agree.
+ And to Ms. Baginski, who worked at the NSA before this,
+that agency and her present agency, the FBI, have made enormous
+progress. I like to say that the FBI has transitioned from the
+abacus and the smoke signal in the 14th century to the late
+20th century. You have only got about 5 years to go and you
+will be up to date, but it has been a huge transition. So many
+of us appreciate what you do.
+ Having said that, Mr. Chairman, we are the Homeland
+Security Committee. It may be that we don't have all the
+jurisdiction we need, but we are the Homeland Security
+Committee. So my one question to all these witnesses is what in
+your personal view is the likelihood that we will be attacked
+again? What is the time frame? And if you could just tell us on
+the public record to the extent you can what is the basis for
+your view?
+ Mr. Brennan. There will be inevitable attempts, I believe,
+including this year that try to carry out an attack by Al-
+Qa'ida. Since we are talking about anytime, anyplace, anywhere
+by Al-Qa'ida, I think Al-Qa'ida will succeed in penetrating
+certain security defenses whether it be overseas, potentially
+here in North America and the United States. I think that the
+Bureau, the Agency, Department of Homeland Security, have done
+a tremendous job as far as making this a very inhospitable
+environment.
+ Ms. Harman. I appreciate, that Mr. Brennan, but I asked you
+what the likelihood is that we will be attacked, and I mean in
+the homeland, again; not what you have done to protect it--
+ Mr. Brennan. Ever by any transnational group, I think it is
+probably inevitable that at some point in the future there will
+be a transnational terrorist attack here in the United States.
+ Ms. Harman. Others?
+ Mr. Black. I think the use of the word ``inevitable'' is
+good. I think from a standpoint of counterterrorism, we must
+consider it to be probable unless we work against in that
+process--we reduce the threat as much as possible to defeat
+them and, should they become successful, minimize the damage as
+much as possible.
+ General Hughes. I don't think it is inevitable at all. I
+personally believe that we can succeed against the terrorists,
+and we are so far doing that.
+ Ms. Harman. Ms. Baginski.
+ Ms. Baginski. I think Cofer said it the best. I think it is
+probable, and we are doing the best we can to make it
+inhospitable, but I do think it is likely.
+ Ms. Harman. I agree. I think it is likely, and I think the
+time frame is short, and I think the need to act is urgent, and
+I certainly hope that this committee gets real jurisdiction and
+that this Congress gets it and we move ahead on very careful
+recommendations to provide us the kind of interoperable
+communications and information sharing that are absolutely
+critical to making us aware of a threat in advance and
+hopefully preventing the next attack.
+ Thank you all. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Maryland Mr. Cardin.
+ Mr. Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Let me ask also thank our witnesses not only for their
+testimony today--this has been a long hearing--but for your
+service to our country. And what Ms. Harman said I would just
+like to underscore, particularly to the men and women who work
+in your agencies day in and day out at a great personal
+sacrifice under very difficult circumstances. If you would
+express our appreciation to the type of work they are doing for
+our country, I think every member of the committee would
+appreciate that.
+ Many of the areas that I was interested in inquiring have
+been asked, so I want to spend my time on one area that has
+been continuously brought to my attention by local law
+enforcement. I hear over and over again that, yes, things are
+much better than they were before September 11; however, it is
+still not where it should be. And part of it, they believe, is
+the culture of a resistance to consider local law enforcement
+full partners in the war against terrorism, and that there is
+not a view that there is really a willingness to totally share
+information, although they know under the current scrutinies
+that they will get access to some information.
+ So I really want you to go through for me where we are in
+this. If I am a detective in a Palmer City Police Department,
+and I am working on an investigation perhaps unrelated to
+terrorism, but I have reason to believe that there may be some
+connection to terrorist organizations, what do I have to go
+through in order to complete my investigation to make sure that
+there is not a terrorist contact here? Can I get the type of
+access to all the information I need, or do I have to send this
+to a third party, go through my Joint Terrorism Task Force?
+What have I got to do in order to be able to fully access in a
+realistic time frame to complete my investigation?
+ Ms. Baginski. I think you have raised a very, very
+important point, so let me be the first to say I think we have
+a lot of work to do. I think there are three dimensions, but
+the most inhibiting is the technology dimension, and that is
+the actual connection of our various systems, the State and
+local systems, the systems at the JTTFs. They are, in fact,
+different, and we do have plans to actually work on that.
+ I think there is a cultural issue. My personal belief is
+that initiatives like the global--the criminal intelligence
+information-sharing plan that I am sure you have heard of is
+the notion that in terms of State and local, we have to allow
+State and local to lead and to dictate State and local needs as
+opposed to sort of coming in there like Big Brother and saying,
+we will tell you when you need to know something. So there is
+an interaction that needs to occur that has our State and local
+and tribal partners sitting at the table as a full partner
+expressing their needs from the Federal family. That is
+actually--I am watching that develop in certain areas, and I am
+actually fairly encouraged by that. And the day-to-day
+operational level, what would have to happen for us to resolve
+the issue I think you laid out is if there were some suspicion,
+it would be into the JTTF, and the answer to the question would
+come from the JTTF, and I think what you are suggesting is that
+might not be the most efficient way to get the information.
+ Mr. Cardin. Exactly. I understand that. And our Joint
+Terrorism Task Force is working, I think, very effectively, and
+I am very pleased by the way it is working. But to expect that
+a first responder needs to go through another layer of
+bureaucracy when they already are pressed for time and time
+might be of the essence, and then they have to fight with the
+priorities within the Joint Terrorism Task Force, I am not sure
+that is the most efficient or the best way for that information
+to be handled. Again, I think there is a view among the first
+responders that there is not really a trust in letting them
+have access to the type of information they need.
+ Ms. Baginski. I can honestly tell you it is not a trust. It
+is not malice. It is incompetence perhaps sometimes or
+ineffective execution, and it definitely is not helped by a
+very difficult information technology issue.
+ Mr. Cardin. On the technology point, let me point out that
+under our current system, of course, almost all of the funding
+has to go through the State. Now, our State, again, is working
+very carefully with local governments, but there are many local
+governments, and we don't always get the same degree of
+attention to the technology compatibilities for local law
+enforcement dealing directly with Federal agencies because it
+needs to go through the State as far as approval process is
+concerned. One of the issues came out again with the 9/11
+Commission's recommendations on the funding issues, I think,
+also may play into making it a more cost-effective way for
+local law enforcement to access this information.
+ Ms. Baginski. From our perspective, getting the Federal
+family sort of information act in order is job one so that we
+can interoperate with the State and local and tribal families
+systems, which they actually must have a voice in and lead in.
+We cannot be dictating hardware and software and business
+process to them. It is not effective.
+ Mr. Cardin. Thank you very.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Cox. I thank the gentleman.
+ We have two Members who have not yet had the opportunity to
+question the panel, and with the indulgence of the panel, I
+know we are keeping you here an awfully long time, but if you
+will bear with us, I will give every Member here the
+opportunity to put questions.
+ The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from New York, Mrs.
+Lowey.
+ Mrs. Lowey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to add my
+appreciation to the panel for spending so much time with us
+here today.
+ Mr. Brennan, I wanted to follow up on a couple of things
+that were said. Lee Hamilton was here earlier, as you know, and
+he said TTIC is the right concept, but needs to be
+strengthened. And then in your presentation you said the model
+of the 9/11 Commission is not workable. You also referenced the
+memo of 2003 where you said there was an encouragement of
+cooperation and sharing of information, and in further remarks
+you said that that is improving. Then there was some discussion
+about upgrading computer technology and how it is so very
+essential.
+ What I am trying to understand is can TTIC and all the
+other agencies which you coordinate do the job that is
+recommended by the 9/11 Commission? What will be different by
+the institution of the NCTC if all the agencies are already
+willing to share and there isn't some embedded, shall we say,
+determination not to share? Why couldn't it be done right now
+with TTIC?
+ Along with that, I am concerned, and I would appreciate it
+if Mr. Brennan or each of you could answer, are there enough
+good intelligence people around? How do we encourage more
+people to enter the field? Should we be doing more training? I
+believe it is estimated that the new recommended agency will
+require over 100 new personnel.
+ So back perhaps to Mr. Brennan, given the fact that Lee
+Hamilton and the Governor both said that the concept is based
+on TTIC, from your perspective why can't you accomplish the
+goals of the new recommended agency? Is it that there isn't an
+adequate directive from on high? Is it that you haven't been
+given the authority on high? Is it that the President, as the
+Markle Foundation has stated, has to have a direct connection
+to this agency in order to make it succeed?
+ So perhaps I am throwing several questions, but after
+listening here all day, I am trying to understand whether it is
+structure or personnel, whether it is practice or it is policy,
+or whether it is inadequate directives? Why can't you do the
+job? I mean that seriously, obviously.
+ Mr. Brennan. First of all, when I made reference before to
+the model of the 9/11 Commission not being workable, that was
+the reference to the overall reform of the Intelligence
+Community, the National Intelligence Director, and the diagram
+that is on page 14 of their Commission report. That is what I
+said is not workable, and General Hughes did a good job of
+explaining some of the concerns that we have with that.
+ As far as the National Counterterrorism Center itself, the
+concept that is put forward by the 9/11 Commission, again, it
+calls for two things differently--two things that the NCTC
+would do that TTIC does not necessarily do. First is the joint
+operational planning, and second is net assessments, taking the
+threat and basing it against the vulnerabilities of a target.
+ Mrs. Lowey. Why don't you do that, and could you do it?
+ Mr. Brennan. We can do anything that we are directed to do
+and we get the appropriate resources to do. Right now what the
+arrangement is within the Federal Government is that in the
+Department of Homeland Security there is the Information
+Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate that this
+committee was instrumental in setting up. The infrastructure
+protection element has the responsibility for assessing the
+vulnerabilities of U.S. critical infrastructure--
+ Mrs. Lowey. Should it be there, or should it be in TTIC?
+ Mr. Brennan. Right now it is there by statute, and what we
+do is we work very closely with the Department of Homeland
+Security so that the information is shared back and forth.
+ There is a lot of work that needs to be done on the
+information protection side in terms of identifying those
+targets, assessing what the potential vulnerabilities are and
+what weaknesses that the terrorists could exploit. So what we
+are trying to do, I think, with this National Counterterrorism
+Center is try to identify all the responsibilities that need to
+be carried out and then have the right framework that can
+fulfill them.
+ Mrs. Lowey. I don't mean to cut you off, but I see the
+yellow on. I just want to say I am a New Yorker. I lost
+hundreds of constituents on 9/11. It is 3 years later that we
+are still getting organized and the Department of Homeland
+Security is still getting organized. Although I believe we have
+to act expeditiously to implement the recommendations, I wonder
+if some of these recommendations couldn't be implemented by
+personnel or different personnel or additional personnel at the
+current structures. And I think this is a very important
+discussion, and it is unfortunate that my red light is on.
+ The Chairman is not paying attention, so you can respond.
+ Mr. Brennan. Just a quick comment on that. I think the
+secret is that a lot of the recommendations included in here
+are already being implemented. A lot of work has gone on as far
+as information sharing and making structural change. So there
+is still more work to be done, but a lot of things that are
+entrained already will, in fact, give us a lot of things that
+are called for in here.
+ I am not opposing the idea of intelligence transformation.
+I am one of the biggest advocates of it, in fact a maverick
+within my own home organization, but I think there have been a
+number of things that have been done. We represent here on the
+panel TTIC, the Office of Intelligence, and the IAIP, a clear
+manifestation of all the changes that have taken place. So what
+they are calling for here is a continued sort of strategic path
+that we need to be on, but a lot of things that are called for
+here are already done.
+ Mrs. Lowey. Mr. Brennan, just in conclusion, with the
+indulgence of the Chair, I read it a little differently, and as
+a New Yorker, when I hear from several people on this panel
+that another attack is imminent, we don't have the luxury, and
+I keep asking why the current structure can't move more
+quickly, and why we keep creating bigger structures, and where
+are we going to get all those people to fill those positions?
+And this is probably another hour conversation. So I just wish
+you good luck, and I hope that you move to implement these
+plans, frankly, before another attack, and I hope that you take
+an aggressive role in reporting to somebody that they had
+better take action on recommendations that don't need structure
+changes, such as having airport workers, all of them who are
+going into a sterile secure area, go through a metal detector.
+ There are things that have to be done now, and I, frankly,
+representing my constituents, am quite worried that we are not
+doing the obvious. So at the same time I want to thank you, but
+I hope that will speed up the normal pace of the bureaucracy
+and make us all safer now, and, as Mr. Hughes said, hopefully
+avoid another attack. Thank you very much.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentlelady from the District of Columbia.
+ Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I apologize to the
+witnesses. Just as it came my time to speak, I was called away
+on a matter that I will take as a kind of case in point. I am
+working with security officials of the Capitol and of the
+District of Columbia concerning the present orange alert and
+its effects around this Capitol and on this city. And I take it
+as a case in point, and my question is really based on what
+amounts to a case study on how much integration is occurring
+and how it is implemented in the field. In a real sense it may
+be the best evidence.
+ I have now had two meetings with security officials in the
+Senate, the House, the District of Columbia. One of the first
+agreements we reached, I think, would astound the public. We
+reached agreement that the executive branch, the congressional
+branch, and District of Columbia security officials would
+develop a citywide plan for protecting the Nation's Capital.
+That means there was none, gentlemen. What we had and what we
+have had and what was all too clear following this orange alert
+is that the executive moved to do what it believed was
+appropriate, the congressional officials moved quickly and with
+astounding reaction, and the city believes overreaction, and
+they moved in very different ways.
+ And this is why I want to put the question to you, for
+example, Mr. Hughes, is the information analysis and
+infrastructure protection at the Department of Homeland
+Security, they moved in very different ways. This is right here
+in the Nation's Capital where I would think that attention and
+planning and integration of threats and how to respond would be
+at their best. They moved in very different ways. The executive
+along 15th Street where the Treasury Department is, a few
+blocks from the IMF and the World Bank, moved obviously with--
+first of all, there was some consultation with the District of
+Columbia. There was almost none on the congressional side--with
+some calculation of risk in deciding what to do. Already trucks
+don't go up 17th Street, so virtually nothing was done on 17th
+Street. 15th Street is where the Treasury Department is. What
+they did on 15th Street was to decide to close the sidewalk on
+the Treasury Department side of 15th Street. It makes good
+sense to us; some inconvenience to walk on the other side of
+the street, but be my guest. They may be doing what they have
+been doing all along, some randomizing of trucks and larger
+vehicles, but they calculated that you had to continue to have
+traffic up 15th Street unless the risk was so great that you
+wanted to take more severe actions. It is the kind of sensible,
+but we think assessment--somebody was doing some analysis.
+Somebody was thinking through all of the factors that had to be
+considered.
+ Go to the other side of town, further away from at least
+the targeted threat, but certainly a place where you would
+better take some action. One of the reasons why you would
+better take some action is that terrorists know enough how to
+play chess rather than checkers and how to move around what
+they are going to do. So if there is a threat on one side of
+town, they will ride on this side of town to begin to take
+action.
+ But the action was very different from the action taken
+closer to the threat. The Treasury Department is closer to the
+IMF, is closer to the World Bank and is arguably more related
+to those institutions than we are, at least as related. No
+check points on that side of town. The only reason this city
+isn't closed down is because it is August, and nobody is here
+but you all and the few of us who are left. No closing of
+streets.
+ This is anathema to any big city, absolutely anathema, and
+the one thing the city will not tolerate is the last-resort
+measure that you would expect on a red alert, a closing down of
+a street leading to the major transportation hub of the
+District of Columbia, Union Station, rail, Metro, light rail,
+the whole kit and caboodle. You can't get there from there; the
+streets to that hub already closed down, the next street down,
+which is the Senate street, closed down. You have got to go all
+the way back up and get down. This is not a matter of
+convenience. We had to even have consultation on making sure
+emergency vehicles, fire, police, EMS, could get through.
+ I mean, this is a case study, gentlemen, it seems to me, in
+whether or not there is any integration of terrorist threat
+going on and any analysis of response is occurring from the
+absence of a plan to what appeared to be kind of seat-of-your-
+pants reactions.
+ I have to ask you what is your role here? Do you have any
+relationship to the people on the ground? Is your threat
+analysis conveyed in such a way that Federal officials on the
+ground have some basis to take reasonable and coordinative
+action related to the threat that has been identified? And I
+would like to know the role of your agency in that regard,
+particularly here in the Nation's Capital where it seems to me
+it would be paramount.
+ General Hughes. I will start by saying that the Department
+of Homeland Security gives advice and assistance in these
+matters. We also provide threat information, and in this case
+we did provide threat information directly to the many
+officials involved. There are quite a few.
+ As you know, this is a somewhat complex jurisdictional
+issue here in the District of Columbia and the two States that
+encompass it, Maryland and Virginia. We try to inform everyone
+involved, and in this case it may not have been a perfect job,
+but we did the best we could at the time. I have to say that
+the actions, the decisions and actions, are left to local
+authorities. In this case that would be both--
+ Ms. Norton. I am quite aware of that. That is not my
+question. I know who did it. I am not accusing you of doing it.
+I am trying to find out whether or not the nature of the
+analysis of the threat as conveyed to the people on the ground
+is such that they are doing anything but acting in an ad hoc
+and uncoordinated manner. And my question really isn't meant to
+be recriminatory to you. I am just trying to make a link here
+to an actual case in point because I think we might learn from
+it.
+ And by the way, if I may say so, we are the one
+jurisdiction that does have a coordinator. It is in the
+statute. So if anything, it is easier here than it would be
+elsewhere because there is a paid coordinator who is in the
+Office of the Secretary himself precisely because this is the
+Nation's Capital, and yet this is what has happened here only
+within the last 2 weeks.
+ General Hughes. The answer in this case is that the threat
+information regarding the International Monetary Fund and the
+World Bank buildings were communicated directly to appropriate
+authorities here in Washington, DC.
+ Ms. Norton. Does anybody else have anything to say about
+the relationship between the analysis and how those on the
+ground who are not experts at analysis and therefore have to
+depend upon the analysts, about that link which is the link I
+am trying to get at?
+ Ms. Baginski. Yes, ma'am. General Hughes and my
+organization have, in fact, done a series of joint advisories
+and bulletins for State and local authorities to share as much
+specificity as we can about the nature of this particular
+threat that would allow them to take countermeasures. So in
+this case we have a unique situation in that we have detail. I
+think the frustration in other cases is there is that lack of
+specificity to begin with, there isn't a lot of detail, and so
+the analysis that you can do on an isolated threat is--
+ Ms. Norton. But I congratulate you that for the first time
+you really did have, and we are all grateful for the fact that
+you had, the most specific information we have had since 9/11,
+and yet we see this seat of your pants all over the city, do as
+you care to do without much guidance in the analysis of the
+threat from somebody who knew more than they knew. That is my--
+that is what I am focusing on.
+ Ms. Baginski. We actually think that we did provide this
+analysis, but I think it is worth our going back and taking a
+look at it for you.
+ Ms. Norton. I would appreciate it.
+ Chairman Cox. The gentlelady's time has expired. Each
+member of the committee having had the opportunity to ask
+questions of this panel, I want to at last excuse you long
+after our intended departure time. I know that several of you
+had to in real time change your schedules today. I know what is
+going down at the White House concurrently, and we very much
+appreciate your being with us here for such a long period of
+time here today.
+ At this point I would yield to the Ranking Member.
+ Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to thank
+the witnesses for your patience and indulgence today. We had
+obviously such a broad scope of issues to delve into, I am sure
+we could spend many more hours on these subjects, and I hope we
+will, in fact. And I want to thank each of you for your
+dedication, for your service and your commitment to making
+America safe.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. Will Mr. Turner yield for a question,
+please?
+ Mr. Turner. Yes, I will yield.
+ Ms. Jackson-Lee. I heard Mr. Frank's questioning regarding
+the peace activists and others. I would appreciate it if the
+same responses or written answers that you might give to him
+that you would forward to me as well.
+ And also I wanted to make sure that the questions dealing
+with the power of the board governing civil liberties, if you
+were going to give written answers, if you will include me as
+well. I know you might be giving them to the committee. I
+wasn't sure, and I wanted to make sure that those questions
+came in. Thank you.
+ Ms. Baginski. Yes, ma'am.
+ Mr. Turner. It would be helpful if you would just send that
+to all members of the committee.
+ Ms. Baginski. We will.
+ Chairman Cox. I thank the gentleman.
+ Again, I thank each of our witnesses for your valuable
+testimony. The members of the committee may have some
+additional questions, as Ms. Jackson-Lee indicated. We would
+ask you to respond to these in writing. The hearing record will
+be held open for this purpose for 10 days.
+ [The information follows:]
+
+ FOR THE RECORD
+
+ Questions and Responses for the Record
+
+ Questions from the Honorable John Sweeney for Ms. Maureen Baginski
+
+1. Does the FBI have real time secure digital communication networks
+capable of handling Top Secret SCI level information connected to all
+84 JTTFs?
+Response: The FBI is connected to the rest of the United States
+Intelligence Community (USIC) at the Top Secret Sensitive Compartmented
+Information (SCI) level via the new SCI Operational Network (SCION).
+SCION is currently available to over 1,000 users at FBI Headquarters
+(FBIHQ). The FBI has initiated a pilot project whereby SCION will be
+deployed to the FBI's Field Offices in New York, Boston, and Kansas
+City, with plans to deliver SCION to all FBI Field Offices as funding
+becomes available. While in most Field Offices there are two
+Intelligence Information System Network (IISNET) workstations, which
+permit communications to the USIC's Intelink system, these are
+difficult to use and are housed in small SCI Facilities (SCIFs) that
+are not located near the IISNET users. An impediment to field expansion
+of SCION is the current lack of SCIF space for Field Intelligence Group
+and Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) personnel, who are the most
+likely users. Currently, SCION is available to six of the 100 JTTFs.
+
+2. Will the Integrated Data Warehouse be fully functional and available
+to state and local analysts by the end of December as Director Mueller
+promised?
+Response: Yes. The Integrated Data Warehouse (IDW) is currently fully
+functional with approximately 6,000 users, including approximately
+2,500 users in state and local law enforcement and numerous federal
+government agencies. Although IDW can only be accessed from the FBI's
+internal network, it is available to users in all Field Intelligence
+Groups (FIGs) and all JTTFs and, through these users, IDW is available
+to the thousands of federal, state, and local officials assigned to
+these entities. IDW contains more than 30 million FBI terrorism-related
+documents and bi11ions of database records relevant to counterterrorism
+and intelligence.
+
+ Questions from the Honorable Edward J. Markey
+
+3. On page 380 of the Commission's report, the Commission recommended
+that ``The United States should engage its friends to develop a common
+coalition approach toward the detention and humane treatment of
+captured terrorists.'' (emphasis added) The Commission further
+recommends that these ``new principles might draw upon Article 3 of the
+Geneva Conventions on the law of armed conflict'' which notes ``was
+specifically designed for those cases in which the usual laws of war
+did not apply'' and is generall accepted throughout the world as
+customary international law.
+ As you know, Article 3 deals with conflicts that are not of an
+international character, such as civil wars, and it includes a specific
+prohibition on ``violence to life and person, in particular murder of
+all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture'' and ``outrages
+upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading
+treatment.''
+
+ Can I conclude, based on these passages in its report, that the
+Commission is recommending that captured terrorists should be afforded
+these types of protections--protections against murder, mutilation,
+torture and degrading treatment?
+Response: The FBI respectfully defers to the 9/11 Commission regarding
+the recommendations contained in the Commission's report. With regard
+to the FBI's participation in the interrogation of terrorists outside
+the United States, FBI agents deployed outside the United States in
+connection with the war on terrorism have been directed not to
+participate in the use of interrogation techniques that would not be
+permissible if used within the United States.
+
+4. There is another Convention that the Commission did not specifically
+mention in its report--the UN Convention Against Torture. The U.S. is a
+signatory to that Convention. Article 3 of the Torture Convention
+provides that ``no state party shall expel, return, or extradite a
+person to another State where there are substantial grounds for
+believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.''
+ Do you also believe that the U.S. should follow this prohibition in
+dealing with captured terrorist suspects?
+Response: It is my understanding that it is the policy of the United
+States to comply with the United States' obligations under the
+Convention Against Torture.
+
+5. The Bush Administration unfortunately appears to be pursuing
+policies that are inconsistent with the Commission's recommendation.
+Specifically, instead of ensuring that the prisoners captured are
+treated humanely, the Administration continues to practice a process
+called ``rendition,'' in which it sends suspected terrorists to be
+interrogated in third countries. such as Syria or Saudi Arabia. that
+our government has determined, within the context of the State
+Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. are known to
+practice torture. This practice is very difficult to reconcile with
+President Bush's own declaration, following the exposure of abuse at
+the Abu Ghraib prison, that: ``We do not condone torture. I have never
+ordered torture. I will never order torture. The values of this country
+are such that torture is not a part of our soul and our being.''
+ Perhaps there are some who would argue that as long as we ask
+others to do the torturing for us, the U.S. is not, strictly speaking,
+doing the torturing.
+
+ Do you agree that if we are to realize the Commission's goal of
+having the U.S. serve as an example of moral leadership in the world,
+we should renounce the policy of rendition, which amounts to
+``outsourcing torture''?
+Response: Your question assumes a number of facts that do not involve
+the FBI. The FBI respectfully defers to entities in the Executive
+Branch in a better position to respond.
+
+6. If we are to ``develop a common coalition approach toward the
+detention and humane treatment of captured terrorists''--as the
+Commission has recommended, do you agree that the U.S. should comply
+with Article 3 of the Torture Convention and train our service men and
+women so they understand what is required to comply with Article 3?
+Response: It is my understanding that it is the policy of the United
+States to comply with the United States' obligations under the
+Convention Against Torture.
+
+7. I have recently introduced H.R. 4674, a bill to stop the rendition
+to countries that torture prisoners. My bill has been endorsed by
+Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the World Organization for
+Human Rights, USA, and the New York Bar Association.
+Do you think it would be consistent with the Commission's
+recommendations regarding torture for the Congress to enact this type
+of bill into law?
+Response: The FBI defers to other, more directly concerned parties
+regarding this question.
+
+ Chairman Cox. I would like to thank all the members of this
+committee as well as the witnesses on the first panel, the
+Chairman and Vice Chairman of the 9/11 Commission for an
+extraordinary piece of business today which required Members to
+travel from all over the country to be here, and in some cases
+from other countries.
+ There being no further business before the committee today,
+committee stands adjourned.
+ [Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
+
+
+
+