[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
UNPACKING THE WHITE HOUSE
NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY STRATEGY
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY, AND GOVERNMENT INNOVATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND ACCOUNTABILITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 23, 2023
__________
Serial No. 118-12
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Accountability
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available on: govinfo.gov
oversight.house.gov or
docs.house.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
51-668 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY
JAMES COMER, Kentucky, Chairman
Jim Jordan, Ohio Jamie Raskin, Maryland, Ranking
Mike Turner, Ohio Minority Member
Paul Gosar, Arizona Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Virginia Foxx, North Carolina Columbia
Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts
Gary Palmer, Alabama Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois
Pete Sessions, Texas Ro Khanna, California
Andy Biggs, Arizona Kweisi Mfume, Maryland
Nancy Mace, South Carolina Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, New York
Jake LaTurner, Kansas Katie Porter, California
Pat Fallon, Texas Cori Bush, Missouri
Byron Donalds, Florida Shontel Brown, Ohio
Kelly Armstrong, North Dakota Jimmy Gomez, California
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Melanie Stansbury, New Mexico
William Timmons, South Carolina Robert Garcia, California
Tim Burchett, Tennessee Maxwell Frost, Florida
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Becca Balint, Vermont
Lisa McClain, Michigan Summer Lee, Pennsylvania
Lauren Boebert, Colorado Greg Casar, Texas
Russell Fry, South Carolina Jasmine Crockett, Texas
Anna Paulina Luna, Florida Dan Goldman, New York
Chuck Edwards, North Carolina Jared Moskowitz, Florida
Nick Langworthy, New York
Eric Burlison, Missouri
Mark Marin, Staff Director
Jessica Donlon, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel
Raj Bharwani, Senior Professional Staff Member
Lauren Lombardo, Senior Policy Analyst
Peter Warren, Senior Advisor
Mallory Cogar, Deputy Director of Operations and Chief Clerk
Contact Number: 202-225-5074
Julie Tagen, Minority Staff Director
Contact Number: 202-225-5051
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Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Information Technology, and Government
Innovation
Nancy Mace, South Carolina, Chairwoman
William Timmons, South Carolina Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia
Tim Burchett, Tennessee Ranking Minority Member
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Ro Khanna, California
Anna Paulina Luna, Florida Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts
Chuck Edwards, North Carolina Kweisi Mfume, Maryland
Nick Langworthy, New York Jimmy Gomez, California
Eric Burlison, Missouri Jared Moskowitz, Florida
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on March 23, 2023................................... 1
Witnesses
Ms. Kemba Walden, Acting National Cyber Director, Office of the
National Cyber Director
Oral Statement................................................... 5
Opening statements and the prepared statement for the witness
are available in the U.S. House of Representatives Repository
at: docs.house.gov.
Index of Documents
----------
* Article, Wall Street Journal, ``Wave of Stealthy China
Cyberattacks Hits U.S., Private Networks, Google Says'';
submitted by Rep. Lynch.
* Questions for the Record: to Ms. Walden; submitted by Rep.
Mace.
* Questions for the Record: to Ms. Walden; submitted by Rep.
Langworthy.
* Questions for the Record: to Ms. Walden; submitted by Rep.
Connolly.
Documents are available at: docs.house.gov.
UNPACKING THE WHITE HOUSE
NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY STRATEGY
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Thursday, March 23, 2023
House of Representatives
Committee on Oversight and Accountability
and Government Innovation
Washington, D.C.
The Subcomittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:09 p.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Nancy Mace
[Chairwoman of the Subcomittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Mace, Timmons, Burchett, Edwards,
Langworthy, Connolly, and Lynch.
Ms. Mace. The Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Information
Technology, and Government Innovation will now come to order.
Welcome everyone, and good afternoon.
Without objection, the Chair may declare a recess at any
time.
I recognize myself for the purpose of making an opening
statement.
Good afternoon, and welcome to this hearing, the
Subcommittee on Cyber, Information Technology, and Government
Innovation. Today, we are going to discuss the White House
National Cybersecurity Strategy, which was issued three weeks
ago today. The strategy in this Administration's proposal for
fighting a battle that, as a Nation, we must win. Key aspects
of our everyday life now rely on the safe flow of data,
computerized systems, and even AI. That includes the delivery
of medical care, the conduct of law enforcement activity, the
operation of utilities, and the smooth flow of ground and air
transportation, and even critical infrastructure.
We must be able to trust the integrity of these systems,
their ability to keep functioning, and to preserve and protect
the data they use. When these systems fall victim to malicious
hackers, the costs are enormous. And I don't have to remind our
witness today, but in December 2020, with SolarWinds, we had 11
Federal agencies hacked by adversaries aligned with China and
Russia. In my home state of South Carolina, a few summers ago,
we saw the Colonial Pipeline hacked, and that is when we saw
gas prices started to go up, and they really have never come
back down since then. And so, this is an issue that is--affects
everybody, whether in the public or the private sector.
Aside for the enormous costs, these breaches also erode
trust in key institutions. So, for instance, the Federal
Government computer systems, holding confidential data of
millions of Americans, has been compromised by malicious actors
too many times. As I cited before, and most recently, D.C.
Health Link, where we have been advised that over 50,000 people
who use D.C. Health Link in the Federal Government work force,
had been affected by that particular hack.
So, this is truly a national security issue. Many of the
most sophisticated attacks come from abroad and target our
critical infrastructure. In recent years, foreign hackers from
China, Russia, and Iran have sought to disrupt our economy and
society by infiltrating U.S. critical infrastructure systems,
including airports, telecommunications networks, along with
Federal and state government systems. I don't think I can open
up my computer today and look at a news story and not hear
about another cyberattack on one of our systems or one of our
government, Federal, or state, or local agencies, that is
everywhere. It is pervasive, and it is every day. We must have
reliable safeguards against criminal and unauthorized use of
data to ensure economic security, our homeland security, and
our national security. This is going to require intelligent,
coordinated action at the Federal level.
To help the executive branch rise to that challenge, two
years ago, Congress created a new White House office to provide
coherent direction and coordination to agency-level
cybersecurity efforts across the Federal Government. That is a
lot. You have a big shoes to fill, including by spearheading a
National Cybersecurity Strategy. Prior administrations have
released similar cybersecurity strategies, but this is really
the first time it is to be issued since the Office of National
Cyber Director was created into law.
We are pleased to have here today the acting head of the
Office of National Cyber, Director, as our witness today. There
are many burning questions that I have about implementation of
the national cybersecurity strategy, so we all look forward to
hearing from you this afternoon about the strategy document
itself. I have it right here and discussing, you know, how and
when the rubber meets the road, on how rhetoric can be
translated into action either now or hopefully soon and in the
future. But before I formally introduce our witness, I will
yield to the Ranking Member Connolly to provide his opening
remarks, and I yield back.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Thank you for
having the hearing, and welcome, Ms. Walden, this afternoon.
Cybersecurity is a defining political, economic, and
national security challenge for our time. From malicious
foreign actors' online destabilization and espionage campaigns
to ransomware incidents that compromise government and private
sector information technology networks, these attacks have cost
the United States billions of dollars and countless critical
strategic disadvantages. In Fiscal Year 2021 alone, U.S.
Federal agencies, which depend on IT systems to carry out
operations and protect the essential information, were the
target of more than 32,500 cybersecurity incidents. In the last
half of 2022, cyberattacks targeting governments jumped 95
percent worldwide and cost an average of $2.07 million per
incident, a 7.25 percent increase from the previous year alone.
Data breaches also affect the private sector, including
educational institutions and healthcare centers. In 2022, the
FBI received almost 801,000 phishing, personal data breach, and
other complaints representing estimated losses of more than
$10.2 billion dollars. According to a 2021 survey by research
firm, AdvisorSmith, 42 percent of small-and medium-sized U.S.
businesses had experienced a recent data breach--42 percent.
The estimated average cost totals almost $9.5 million per
breach, higher than any other country in the world, and 60
percent of organizations have raised prices on consumers to
cover those costs. Experts now predict that the annual cost of
cybercrime will climb to over $10 trillion in the next number
of years.
Cyberattacks will eventually hit close to home for
everybody. For Congress, it was most recently the hack of the
D.C. Health Link, which operates the healthcare system used by
most Members of Congress and our staff. Before that, it was the
2015 OPM data breach that exposed the private information of
nearly 22 million individuals, including my own personal
information. Cyber threats are not new, as information security
has been on the Government Accountability Office's high-risk
list since 1997.
For those who are concerned, you are right to be concerned,
but we cannot just throw up our hands. We must act quickly and
decisively to secure digital infrastructure, protect the
integrity and confidentiality of data, and preserve public
trust in government institutions. I am proud that Democrats in
this Committee did just that and helped to lead the bipartisan
fight to establish the Office of the National Cyber Director,
the ONCD, in FY 2021. The ONCD is required to coordinate the
whole of government effort to elevate American safety in the
digital world, including through the development and
implementation of the National Cybersecurity Strategy. I
applaud this and look forward to hearing more from our witness
today.
Drawing on bipartisan ideas, including those vested in the
recommendations of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission, the
Biden-Harris strategy, as presented, is a bold, comprehensive
plan for government and industry to create a safer digital
ecosystem for all Americans. Recognizing that cyber threats cut
through all industries and ignore geographic borders, the plan
will examine the regulatory landscape to harmonize
cybersecurity standards across different sectors and around the
globe. With so much at stake, it is critical that our
regulatory landscape allow industry to focus on security
outcomes, not duplicative or nonsensical compliance burdens. We
also know that if hackers fail to break into one agency system,
they will seek out vulnerable entry points elsewhere, and they
do.
We must address the current patchwork of cyber regulations
to ensure that cybersecurity protections flow seamlessly and
efficiently across industries and government. The strategy
realigns incentives to ensure that Federal Government's
investments enhance the long-term strength of a cybersecurity
posture. For example, it harnesses the Federal Government's
purchasing power to shape market demand for safe and secure
technologies. Through programs such as the Federal Risk and
Authorization Management Program, FedRAMP, which this committee
passed legislation forward that became law, we can bake into a
product rather than an additional expensive feature.
Additionally, the strategy redistributes the responsibility
so that those best positioned to protect the cybersecurity of
our citizens, schools, hospitals, and small businesses are
required to take reasonable steps to do so. For example, it
embraces liability for software companies that fail to use best
practices or take reasonable precautions to secure their own
products. If we do not hold bad actors or actors more focused
on sales than security accountable, we disadvantage responsible
companies that take time to follow these best practices, and we
increase systematic risk for our constituents.
As the Administration works to implement this strategy,
Congress must provide the funding and clarify the authorities
needed to ensure its success. As former chair of Government
Operations Subcommittee and a current Member of this
Subcomittee, I know it is essential that we invest in
modernizing our legacy ID systems and recruit and maintain a
Federal cyber work force for the future.
The Federal Government must improve its internal practices.
It must reap the benefits of the latest cybersecurity
technologies and increase cooperation with the private sector.
I look forward to understanding how the ONCD will leverage this
plan and collaborate with other congressionally empowered IT
and cyber related leaders to promote the kind of accountability
our critical Federal systems need. With that, I yield back.
Ms. Mace. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. I am pleased today to
introduce our witness for the hearing. Ms. Kemba Walden is the
acting director of the White House Office of National Cyber
Director. Ms. Walden came to the ONCD from Microsoft, where she
was the assistant general counsel in the company's Digital
Crimes Unit. Prior to that experience, Ms. Walden spent a
decade at the Department of Homeland Security, holding several
counsel positions, including the Cyber and Infrastructure
Security Agency. Welcome, Ms. Walden. We are pleased to have
you this afternoon.
Pursuant to Committee Rule 9(g), the witness, if you will
please stand and raise your right hand.
Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony that you
are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
Ms. Walden. Aye.
Ms. Mace. Let the record show the witness answered in the
affirmative.
We appreciate you being here today and look forward to your
testimony and answering some of our questions. Let me remind
the witness that we have read your written statement, and it
will be here in full in the hearing record. Please limit your
oral statement to five minutes today. As a reminder, press the
button on the microphone in front of you so that it is on, and
all Members up here can hear you. When you begin to speak, the
light in front of you will turn green. After four minutes, the
light will turn yellow. When the red light comes on, your five
minutes has expired, and we would ask that you try to wrap it
up at that juncture.
I recognize Ms. Walden to please begin her opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF KEMBA E. WALDEN, ACTING NATIONAL CYBER DIRECTOR,
THE WHITE HOUSE
Ms. Walden. Thank you. Thank you, Chairwoman Mace, Ranking
Member Connolly, distinguished Members of the Subcomittee.
Thank you for the privilege to appear before you today to
discuss the Biden-Harris Administration's National
Cybersecurity Strategy. I am eager to share with you how the
President's strategy will make our digital ecosystem more
secure and resilient. It builds on two years of the President's
unprecedented attention on cyber issues as well as the
resources and valuable leadership provided by Congress and this
Committee. While my written testimony goes into more detail
discussing each of the five pillars that make up the document,
I would like to highlight the framing of the strategy and the
two fundamental shifts in policy that are woven throughout it.
As you know well, the magnitude of the threat we face in
cyberspace is real, but it is important to remember that we
defend cyberspace not because it is some distant terrain where
we battle our adversaries. We defend cyberspace because it is
intertwined into nearly every aspect of our lives. We live in a
world that is increasingly digitally dependent. Too often we
are layering new technology onto old systems at the expense of
security and resilience, and, unfortunately, today, an attack
on one organization, industry, or state can rapidly spill over
to other sectors and regions.
We all remember how the Colonial Pipeline ransomware
attack, an incident affecting one company, resulted in a gas
shortage impacting the entire East Coast. It is within these
circumstances in mind that we crafted the President's National
Cybersecurity Strategy--strategies or tools. At their most
basic level, they match our goals where we are trying to go
with the vision we need to get there.
In this strategy, our ultimate goal is a digital ecosystem
that is more defensible, resilient, and aligned with our
values. ``Defensible'' means we have tipped the advantage from
attackers to defenders by designing systems where security is
baked in, not bolted on. ``Resilient'' means that when defenses
fail, which they sometimes will, the consequences are not
catastrophic, and recovery is seamless and swift. Cyber
incidents shouldn't have systemic real-world impacts, and in
creating these conditions, we can and must seize the
opportunity to instill America's values.
The strategy calls for two fundamental shifts in how the
United States allocates roles, responsibilities, and resources.
First, we need to rebalance the responsibility for managing
cyber risk. Today, we tend to devolve responsibility for cyber
risk downwards. We ask individuals, small businesses, and local
governments to shoulder a significant burden for defending us
all. We ask our parents and our kids to be vigilant against
clicking suspicious links, and we expect school districts to go
toe-to-toe with transnational criminal organizations, largely
by themselves. This isn't just unfair, it is ineffective.
Instead, the biggest, most capable, and best positioned
actors in our digital ecosystem can and should shoulder a
greater share of the burden for managing cyber risk and keeping
us all safe, and that includes the Federal Government. We must
do a better job of leading by example and defending our own
systems, something I know is a key priority for this
Subcommittee, but we expect similar leadership from industry,
too. Our mantra is every American should be able to benefit
from cyberspace, but every American should not have the same
responsibility to keep it secure. Second, our economy and
society must incentivize investments that make cyberspace more
resilient and defensible over the long term. Doing that
requires creating conditions so an entity is faced with
tradeoffs between easy, but temporary fixes and harder, but
lasting solutions. They are motivated to choose the latter.
We need the free market and public programs, alike,
rewarding security and resilience. That means building a robust
cyber work force that draws from all parts of society and
embracing security and resilience by design. A cybersecurity
job should be in reach for anyone who wants one. These efforts
also require thoughtful research and development, investments
in cybersecurity to prepare for revolutionary changes in our
technology landscape brought by artificial intelligence and
quantum computing, and working with our allies and partners to
promote the collaborative stewardship of our digital ecosystem.
A strategy is only as good as its implementation, and in
implementing this strategy, the Federal Government will take a
data-driven approach and will measure investments made,
progress, and the outcomes and effectiveness of these efforts.
Closely working with Congress, interagency partners, civil
society, and the broader cybersecurity community will be key to
getting this right and ensuring accountability. Work is already
under way putting this strategy into action.
In conclusion, the President's strategy lays out how the
United States will meet these challenges in cyberspace from a
position of strength, leading in lockstep with our allies, and
working with partners everywhere who share our vision for a
brighter digital future. Thank you for the opportunity to
testify, and I look forward to your questions.
Ms. Mace. Thank you, Ms. Walden, and we are asking about
your mics, and I know you have been moving around. We apologize
for that. I will now recognize myself for five minutes.
The National Cybersecurity Strategy, it really reads like a
vision for the Federal Government, but real results, as you
know, in your work in the private and public sector really
depend on implementation of a vision or of a strategy. So, will
you and your office be leading the implementation of the
strategy, and if not, then who would be doing that? Where do we
start with the strategy to do the implementation side of it?
Ms. Walden. Well, thank you, Chairwoman, for that question.
One of the most exciting parts of the strategy for me is the
last page where we articulate precisely that ONCD, in
collaboration with OMB, are going to lead the development of
this implementation plan. In fact, we have already started that
work. ONCD was built to do that work. This is a plan that, as
we articulate in the strategy, will be public, it will be
developed, it is being developed, in full collaboration with
all the departments and agencies who are going to be charged
with certain action items, and with the private sector, and
with civil society, and with Congress to make sure that the
strategy realizes the vision that we have laid out. This
strategy is new and novel in my mind, because we have attempted
to, where appropriate, place departments and agencies
responsible for certain action items, and we will build that
out in the implementation plan.
Ms. Mace. What do you think, the timeline? I mean, this is
a big plan, a big strategy, but how long will it take to
finally get there from point A to point B?
Ms. Walden. So, we have already started the work. We have
created an implementation plan working group that we have
convened other departments and agencies. We have started the
actual implementation. So, for example, we have started
crafting our work force awareness and education strategy. That
is one of the implementation pieces. We have been implementing
Executive Order 14028, which is that cybersecurity executive
order putting actual action into place alongside of that or as
part of that. We have been implementing our Zero Trust
Architecture Strategy for the Federal enterprise to be more
secure, layer by layer, piece-application by application. So,
we have already started the work. We are moving full speed
ahead. This will be an ever-evolving dynamic process because
cybersecurity and cyberspace is ever evolving and dynamic, but
we have already started the work.
Ms. Mace. And then, on the topic of work force, obviously
we all agree here we want to build a robust cyber work force
drawing from all parts of our society. I think everybody up
here would agree with that. I am working on legislation to try
to accelerate the hiring of Federal employees in the
cybersecurity space, and I would look forward to working with
you and your office on some of the ideas that we have from, you
know, education to--in the way that we hire as well. But even
under existing law, the executive branch has tools at its
disposal it is not necessarily fully utilizing.
A report based on the findings of Solarium Commission cited
specific actions the Administration could take now, should take
now, and it calls for the office to help coordinate some of
those actions. Your thoughts on that, and is that possible?
Your thoughts on getting more employees. You know, as we have
discussed before, we have an ageing work force. We have got
four times as many people over the age of 60 in a lot of these
jobs versus under the age of 30, and so at some point those
individuals will retire. So, just sort of your thoughts. Will
your office take the wheel and steer the effort to this more
robust cyber work force?
Ms. Walden. So, yes, and in partnership with OPM. So, yes,
we have similar concerns about access to good-paying cyber jobs
for anybody that wants one, right? We need to be able to
rethink the barriers that we might have imposed for those entry
level jobs. We need to broaden the scope for how we bring in
new employees, and perhaps we don't need people with four-year
college degrees for----
Ms. Mace. Hundred percent, yes.
Ms. Walden. Maybe we look at community colleges. Maybe you
just look at the digital skills. I have friends who are
executives in the outside world there who are great at
researching when they were younger. They have the right digital
skills in order to be able to enter this work force.
In terms of the Federal cyber work force, I share a similar
concern. And so, we are working with OPM to shore up and
harmonize the differing Federal authorities across departments
and agencies for hiring and retaining talent in this space. We
are working with OPM to develop a legislative proposal, so, I
would love the opportunity to work with you on those
initiatives. But the idea is to make sure that we are not
putting up or imposing barriers to recruitment and that we are
also putting in incentives for retention.
Ms. Mace. Thank you, and I wish you the best of luck with
the Director of OPM. We had her here two weeks ago. She was the
worst witness our Committee has ever had in the two-plus years
that I have been here. And so, I have much greater confidence
in you and your leadership and hope like hell that you can pull
that off with--because she really couldn't answer any of our
questions about even workforce issues. So, I really hope and
pray that you will be able to work with her, and she will be
able to work with you, and us, too, to expedite getting Federal
employees into our cyber workforce. So, thank you, and I yield
back.
I will now recognize the Ranking Member Connolly for five
minutes.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Ms. Walden, if I
could pick up a little bit on where Ms. Mace was, OK? We are
looking at tens of thousands of positions in IT in the Federal
Government and cyber as a subset of that, for sure. Given the
age cohort of the Federal Government, right, we are looking at
serious numbers of retirements over the next five years. So,
how proactively--I mean you talked about removing barriers and
working with OPM, but how do we proactively persuade, you know,
the millennial generation `you want to come work for the
Federal Government, and we see a 30-year career in your
future.' How do you do that? Do you go to college campuses, and
how do we make Federal services attractive in the sphere when
the private sector alternative is glaringly seductive in terms
of compensation and benefits and everything else?
Ms. Walden. Well, thank you for that question,
Representative Connolly. I personally do go to college
campuses. I go to high schools. I even teach cybersecurity
badge in my daughter's Girl Scout's troop. The pipeline is a
serious part of our focus in the work force strategy. That is
why we call it the work force and education strategy. We really
need to not only focus on the core cyber and IT jobs and how we
fill that, but the pipeline. So, in my experience, you cannot
imagine yourself in a particular career unless you see yourself
in that career. So, it is important to me, for example, to make
sure that I am out there in front, motivating people to
consider this.
So, a couple of thoughts about this. One, the thing that
draws me in and out of the private sector and into the
government is mission. Private sector cannot compete with the
government on mission, and, quite frankly, the government
cannot compete with the private sector on pay. We can do
better, and that is one of the opportunities we are looking at
in this new legislative proposal, being flexible and how we do
pay. But what we really offer is mission as a sense of moral
enlightenment, in many ways. So, yes, reaching out, reaching to
rural areas of the United States, reaching into parents to have
parents understand the benefits of a career in cyber, and
parents are and should be one of the primary influencers of
their children. That is a constituency that I like to reach.
But it is really the mission that is the secret sauce here.
Mr. Connolly. Well, thank you. I will commend you. We have
seen, for example, the excitement generated in high schools
with robotics competition teams. The excitement is incredible,
and I remember that some of our intelligence agencies actually
sponsored cyber competitions. And so, we may want to think more
about expanding that kind of program to get into high schools
and get in people's heads this might be something you might
want to pursue, including in Federal service.
Let me talk about the National Strategy. I mean, candidly,
the National Strategy took a little while to get together. Now,
granted, we were in a pandemic, and we have lots of other
competing things, but cyber is not a new topic. The OPM breach
occurred two administrations ago, affecting 22 million current
and retired Federal employees, and so, it comes to us a little
bit late. And I guess I am worried about implementation because
we talk about a whole-of-government approach. Knowing the
Federal Government, this Subcomittee and its predecessor have
spent a lot of time looking at Federal agencies, the diversity
of capability, the diversity of expertise, the diversity of
proactive strategies to protect, you know, the jewels in a
given agency is very variable. So, how are you going to have a
whole-of-government approach that guarantees all Federal
agencies, whether you are in intelligence or you are in
education, are protected and that are proactively fending off
and maybe even proactively attacking the bad guys?
Ms. Walden. What I can guarantee is that we are, as a whole
of government, proactive in making sure that our systems are
resilient. I feel the same urgency. I feel that we are moving
like a bullet train in this space. There is a sense of urgency
here. We want to get it right, though, so we have all of the
departments and agencies working with us. We work by, with, and
through them. We need mostly consensus to make sure that this
moves forward in a deliberate, thoughtful, but expedient way,
so I share that. That is why we were designed the way that we
are as ONCD. So, we have been implementing, we have been
working for the last two years on shoring up our cybersecurity
resilience. I see my time is up.
Mr. Connolly. Let me just say, because I know the
Chairwoman shares my concern in this regard, I think you have
got your work cut out for you.
Ms. Walden. I do.
Mr. Connolly. And it is an across-the-board kind of thing.
It is the IT we possess, the legacy systems that need to be
retired. It is the encryption that hasn't happened or hasn't
been updated. It is the personnel as the Chair pointed out, I
mean, that the age gap between us and the private sector is
phenomenal. And so, you know, I just think you have got limited
resources, and your ability to try to have a cohesive strategy
that affects everybody and protects everybody is going to be,
well, I hope not a Sisyphean task. I am sorry, Madam
Chairwoman. Thank you.
Ms. Mace. You are good. And it will be some of the Federal
employees that won't want to go along with the national
strategy that is, as you said, it is preeminent. It is deeply
important. I would now like to recognize Representative Timmons
for five minutes.
Mr. Timmons. Thank you, Madam Chair. The National Cyber
Strategy was expected to be released last fall. Was that delay
a reflection of how difficult it is to get the various
interested parties on the same page, or were there other
challenges?
Ms. Walden. You know, it was a bureaucratic process
intentionally so that we can make sure that everybody, every
department and agency, saw themselves in the strategy and are
ready to implement. So, that was just a necessary step that had
to take place in order to make sure that it is successful.
Mr. Timmons. Sure. So, next question. U.S. businesses, no
matter how hard they try to have the best cybersecurity
possible, can still fall victim to nation-state attacks, and
those attacks can often cost billions of dollars to publicly
traded companies.
Mr. Timmons. Do you think that the Federal Government has a
role in backstopping those businesses? Since, assuming they are
doing everything possible to avoid an attack, it is just not
possible to stand up to nation-state actors. What are your
thoughts on that?
Ms. Walden. So, I will start by saying that the cyberspace
is a global commons. It is a public good. So, the U.S.
Government has a responsibility and a duty to make sure that it
is safe, while the private sector pretty much owns and controls
most of the infrastructure that underlines cyberspace. So, we
have to work together.
So, my response to your specific question about small and
medium businesses, one of the core tenants of the cybersecurity
strategy is to make sure that those small and medium businesses
don't bear the significant brunt of cybersecurity risk all on
their own. So, all of the tools in the strategy are there to
lift and shift that risk, while also making the infrastructure
cyberspace more resilient. You talked about backstopping. That
is indeed one of the tools that we are considering, so cyber
insurance backstop. Think of flood insurance, for example, in
order to make sure that cybersecurity, small and medium
businesses, don't bear the full cost of a cybersecurity breach
while we are also working on making sure that the systems are
resilient.
Mr. Timmons. Sure. Thank you for that. So, let us talk
about ICANN. The original intent was to promote the stability
and security of the internet by creating a transparent multi-
stakeholder governance model for the management of domain name
system. So, in 2016, Department of Commerce, their role in
ICANN expired. Do you have concerns over that, in the U.S.'
leadership in maintaining a secure internet globally?
Ms. Walden. So, I think we need to consider how do we
harmonize standards. Digital ecosystem is--doesn't have
specific borders, so we need to make sure that we harmonize
standards in general, but let me just even take it a step
further back. Cyberspace is composed of three pieces. We have
touched a lot on personnel, people, which is arguably the most
important part of cyberspace, but it is also technology, the
gizmos, the microphone that has an echo, all of that, right?
But it is also governance, it is authorities and
responsibilities. If no one is guarding the gate, then the bad
guy can just walk through. It is that governance layer that you
are getting at.
So, yes, the cybersecurity strategy, generally, is intended
to articulate and find vulnerabilities in that governance
layer, in the roles and responsibilities, figure out who is
guarding the gates, figure out what the vulnerabilities are,
and then close those vulnerabilities. So, that is a symptom of
the challenge that we face.
Mr. Timmons. To that point, what tools does the
Administration plan to use to bolster the security of the
foundation itself?
Ms. Walden. So, there are a couple of tools as articulated
in the strategy. I think it is Pillar 4 we talk about the
technical opportunities in the foundations of the internet,
right, like a faster migration to IPv6 from IPv4. That is one
opportunity in terms of modernizing the backbone of the
internet. But then there are also opportunities for filling
those vulnerabilities, like I described, in the roles and
responsibilities. The implementation plan is going to help us
with that, at least in the departments and agencies. We are
also looking at the idea of harmonizing standards, harmonizing
regulations so that we know exactly what we are certifying to
when we have like IoT device labeling, for example, how that
works across borders, we collaborate with our allies. Pillar 5
talks about that. So, that is that roles and responsibilities
piece that relates to the backbone of the internet.
Mr. Timmons. Sure. Thank you for being here today. Madam
Chair, I yield back.
Mr. Connolly. Madam Chairwoman, I just want to welcome to
the Subcommittee the former Chairman of our full Committee and
my predecessor in this seat in the 11th District, Virginia, the
Honorable Thomas Davis. Welcome, Tom.
Ms. Mace. Thank you for joining us, sir. I would now like
to recognize Representative--I turned my mic off for you--
Burchett for five minutes.
Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Chairlady. You mentioned when we
first started this that she doubted that I could spell AI, but
I can assure you I can now. I have researched it. I Googled it.
Ma'am, Chinese-owned media application, TikTok, has over 150
million active users in the U.S. Do you feel like this is a
national security concern?
Ms. Walden. Yes.
Mr. Burchett. Another question. What countries do you think
are the biggest threats to national cybersecurity?
Ms. Walden. Well, as articulated in the worldwide threats
report that ODNI published, it is China, North Korea, Iran, and
Russia.
Mr. Burchett. All right. 1,600 offshore oil and gas
facilities faces significant risk of cyberattacks. What do you
think the potential impact of a successful cyberattack on these
facilities is, and what steps is your office taking to secure
this infrastructure?
Ms. Walden. Please excuse me, I did not hear the very
beginning of that question.
Mr. Burchett. I said six. OK. Yes, ma'am. I am sorry. I am
from East Tennessee. It is the only place in the country where
people do not speak with an accent.
Mr. Connolly.
[Laugh]
Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Connolly. I appreciate it. 1,600
offshore oil and gas facilities faces significant risk of
cyberattacks. What is the potential impact of a successful
cyberattack on these facilities, and what is your office doing
to secure this valuable infrastructure?
Ms. Walden. Well, let me start with Pillar 1 of our
National Cybersecurity Strategy, which is focused clearly on
critical infrastructure security. There are several tools that
we have identified in that pillar for making sure that we make
our critical infrastructure more defensible, while also making
investments in making sure that it is resilient regardless of
the attacker or the type of attack. One of those opportunities
is raising baseline cybersecurity requirements across all
critical infrastructure sectors. There are many ways to do it,
but as we do that, we need to make sure that no one, particular
sector is overregulated so that we encourage investment in
raising baseline cybersecurity requirements rather than
investing in compliance. Now, with respect to the offshore oil
rig, I would love to give you a reaction to that question, but
I would need to research what the exposure is and----
Mr. Burchett. Please do. It has been recently reported, and
I have been informed that that is a major issue, and I can
assure you that if our enemies can turn that spigot off, they
will.
Ms. Walden. Yes.
Mr. Burchett. And they will not do it in an environmentally
sound manner either. If somebody could get with me from your
office, that would be great.
Ms. Walden. Absolutely.
Mr. Burchett. From the cybersecurity perspective, ma'am,
how can we better secure our global financial institutions from
bad actors? I am always afraid they are going to turn the
switch. In early days of eBay, they always said make sure you
use PayPal. Everybody thought it was a racket, and it is a
racket, but it is their racket, so it is just the deal. But
then they would say, you know, you get wired money, and it was
always some kind of lame deal, and people were always getting
ripped off.
Ms. Walden. So, there are several opportunities. First, I
would like to say about the financial services sector that they
are quite mature in their cybersecurity practices. Of course,
more work can always be done. As cybersecurity threat actors
are always evolving and improving, so can our defenses, and so
can our resilience, so it is an evolution. We work closely with
the financial sector. We work closely with the Department of
Treasury. So, for example, we have recently done exercises with
the Department of Treasury for how do we make sure that our
financial services sector becomes more resilient?
Mr. Burchett. Let me get to one more because I am running
out of time.
Ms. Walden. OK.
Mr. Burchett. This is really important to me. Our senior
citizens, they seem like they are on the radar for a lot of
these dirtbags that prey upon them. And what steps can your
office do to work with us to ensure that these folks are
protected from these hostile foreign actors and groups?
Ms. Walden. My mom might hate me saying this on live C-
SPAN, but I have got a mom who might be classified as a senior
citizen, and it concerns me every time she does online banking.
Mr. Burchett. Mama had a Sunday school class and they
called them ``seasoned.''
Ms. Walden. I like it.
Mr. Burchett. Well, she said, I did not like that, honey.
It makes it sound like a bunch of cannibals, so my mama was a
pretty cool lady. But go ahead, I am sorry.
Ms. Walden. No, but we need to make sure that all of the
technology, all of the devices that we have, need security
built in, right? We need to make that commercial where there is
an easy button. That is what I envision when I am envisioning
security built in for senior citizens. They should be able to
turn on their computer, login is already enabled by default,
multi-factor authentication is already enabled by default. All
the different security options that you can take should be
enabled by default. Security has to be built in.
Mr. Burchett. And I know we are out of time, but a recent
former Director of the FBI got ripped off on one of these
deals. And they went after them and got his money back, and I
was glad they did that. But I was ticked off because I have had
people that the FBI just gives me lip service, and if they
could do it for one, they can do it for all of them, and
dadgummit, they need to start doing it. So, thank you, ma'am.
Ms. Mace. Thank you, Mr. Burchett.
Mr. Burchett. I am sorry. I went out of time.
Ms. Mace. Are you yielding back?
Mr. Burchett. Do what?
Ms. Mace. Are you yielding back?
Mr. Burchett. Yes, ma'am, I yield----
Ms. Mace. Yes, you are. Yes, you are.
Mr. Burchett [continuing]. None of my time back.
Ms. Mace. All right. I would now like to recognize
Representative Langworthy for five minutes.
Mr. Langworthy. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Ms. Walden, I
just want to thank you for being here today and providing this
Subcommittee with the invaluable insight on the path forward in
the cybersecurity sector.
So, I would like to start off by looking at cloud service
providers. And the strategy correctly notes that cloud-based
services enable better and more economical cybersecurity
practices at scale, and their security is crucial for critical
infrastructure in government systems. However, the strategy
also is looking to close gaps in regulatory authorities for
cloud services. Now, I am concerned that this categorical
effort to sweep in an all cloud-based services is inconsistent
with a risk-based approach. Can you explain the rationale for
the blanket approach that you plan to pursue?
Ms. Walden. So, cloud service providers provide some
cybersecurity risk protections, particularly for small and
medium businesses, and even for large enterprises, so let us
start there. The cloud service providers operate in a highly
regulated environment as it is. They are a participant in all
of the regulations that their customers bear. Wouldn't it be
fantastic if we had harmonized system regulations so that those
that are highly regulated and that cloud service providers
provide the compliance for, equal--and we reward that
investment and cause others to invest in cybersecurity best
practices by looking at how they are regulated. But cloud
services providers have publicly acknowledged--we have worked
with them directly in developing the strategy, but they have
publicly acknowledged the need for regulatory minimum
cybersecurity requirements baselines to be brought up and for
harmonization to take place.
So, cloud service providers, cloud environments are more
secure than on-prem, but there is some work still to be done.
And we are ready, willing, and able to work directly with cloud
service providers, not necessarily to kowtow to their demands,
but to make sure that we have effective harmonization across
all sectors for these purposes of making cloud services more
secure.
Mr. Langworthy. You spoke in an interview recently saying
that of cloud services, that if they were disrupted, they could
create large and potentially catastrophic disruptions to our
economy and to our government. Can you talk a little bit about
this? You had mentioned how cyber criminals in malign foreign
countries disrupt cloud services.
Ms. Walden. So, cyber criminals will typically spin up
infrastructure using cloud services to do so. I was part of a
team that would find that infrastructure and use all means
appropriate to tear it down. I think that we can do that at
scale. We need to be able to work with cloud service providers
to remove infrastructure, or at least to harden infrastructure,
so that cyber criminals cannot leverage it. Of course, there
are other opportunities for making sure that we reduce or we
increase the cost of cybercrime. We can arrest people. We can
lean into our authorities more. But we also need to work with
private sector, owners and operators of managed service
providers, and cloud service providers to tear down
infrastructure where infrastructure is being used by
cybercriminals.
Mr. Langworthy. OK. Now, the Stafford Act, generally
speaking, is an all-encompassing document for disasters in the
United States. A largescale cyberattack could plausibly be
considered a disaster. However, cyber-related disasters are not
mentioned in the Stafford Act. What would our strategy be in
case of a large-scale attack?
Ms. Walden. This is the reason why we have designed the
strategy the way that we have. We need to make sure that we
have our ducks in a row so that we make it more defensible. But
the focus really needs to be on what investments do we need to
make in order to make sure that cyberattacks are not
catastrophic and do not cause systemic failure or long-term
failure, that we have shorter downtimes. We have a seamless
response. So, that is the reason why we have the Cybersecurity
Strategy. On your specific questions about the Stafford Act, I
would be happy to come back to you with some thoughts about
that, but that is the reason why we have the strategy the way
it is.
Mr. Langworthy. Thank you very much.
Mr. Langworthy. And I yield back, Madam Chair.
Ms. Mace. Thank you. I would now like to recognize
Representative Edwards for your five minutes.
Mr. Edwards. Thank you, Madam Chair. Ms. Walden, thanks for
being with us. As I sit here and read your testimony and listen
to your responses, I cannot think of a less enviable position
than yours. We are certainly appreciative of you taking this
on. I served on a bank board for a number of years, and I knew
the thing that kept us awake most at night was the chance of a
cyber threat, and you have got a whole country to look out for.
Can you see any, at this time, I do not want to talk about the
plan so much, I want to talk about right now. Can you see any
coordinated efforts from foreign governments right now to hack
into systems in the United States, or are the threats out there
from universities or just ne'er-do-wells or that sort of thing?
Ms. Walden. Thank you for that question. What I can say is
that the Worldwide Threats Report that was published by ODNI is
the preeminent description of cyber threats and nation-state
actors. That is not classified. I would refer you to that, and
I agree with everything that is in that report. If you are
asking me about specifics, that might get into classified
nature of a conversation, and I am not prepared to do that
today.
Mr. Edwards. I respect that. Thanks. How do you coordinate
with the private sector? We have all seen examples of how they,
too, are under attack, and your responsibility is vast. How do
you include the private sector?
Ms. Walden. You know, you can always just pick up the phone
and call. So, there are opportunities, right? ONCD, my office,
collaborated with the private sector in a robust way in a
development of the strategy. We are not an operational office.
We are, by design, a strategic policymaking office, but
operationally, there are several different models. We need to
meet the private sector where they are. We have recognized that
we need proactive operational collaboration, and this is
different than information sharing when I left government the
last time. So, it is exciting for me to see how we are doing it
now.
So, for example, CISA runs the Joint Cyber Defense
Collaborative, known as the JCDC. It is a model where different
private sector entities are able to come together, exchange
ideas, exchange information with CISA, with each other. And
there are other models like the National Security Agency's
Cyber Collaboration Center, the CCC, which does cyber
information sharing with their defense industrial base, maybe
one-on-one, in a classified nature, however it is. But we need
to meet the private sector where they are. We need to find
opportunities to identify problems together, come up with
solutions and operational plans for mitigating that problem
together, and then executing and deploying that solution
together.
Good example, one that makes me really excited and I think
is a pivotal moment that really did inform the strategy, was
that on the eve of, or the weeks leading up to the Russian
invasion of Ukraine, we collectively, we the government,
collectively figured out that we had intelligence that the
private sector may not have. Understanding, particularly in the
financial sector, that if we sanction Russia, that there might
be some retaliatory effects on the financial sector here at
home, that there is more that could be done with the
intelligence that we had by those that actually operate and
control the infrastructure in the financial services sector. We
delivered that intelligence so that they can take action. We
worked the intelligence. We worked the action together. And I
would like to think that that is a success story. We did not
see any retaliatory effect on the financial services sector.
Mr. Edwards. I am running out of time, but a question that
has been burning on my mind for years, we have heard of this
threat that maybe computers, PCs that we buy through foreign
entities that may come from China, Korea, the chips may contain
in their bias, some sort of code that is sniffing out activity
here in the U.S. and just ready to be called whenever the
foreign entity decides. Are you aware of that? Is that actually
happening? Has it happened?
Ms. Walden. Well, I would like to point you to the
strategy, and perhaps you might understand why the strategy
talks about understanding the supply chain implications of
chips manufacturing. That is partly what the CHIPS and Science
Act is intended to mitigate, any opportunity like that,
hypothetically, could happen like that. Wouldn't it be nice if
we understood what was in our software, right, what code
libraries were in our software and how they were assembled?
Wouldn't it be nice if we could make sure that the final
assemblers, for example, of software, were held liable for what
is in it so that it is not buggy, or, and it does not have some
nefarious code written into it.
That is one of the most intriguing parts of the National
Cybersecurity Strategy, from my perspective, is how do we make
sure that software is built with security in mind. How do we
make sure that market focuses on securing the market rather
than first to market? What are the incentives that we need to
shift in order to make sure that that hypothetical situation
does not happen?
Mr. Edwards. Thank you. Madam Chair, I yield.
Ms. Mace. Thank you. I am going to do one more quick round
of questions. I may be the only one with questions, and then we
are going to close it out, if that would be OK to the Ranking
Member. I am going to recognize myself for five minutes and
hopefully less than that.
One of my burning questions is on legacy systems. So, Y2K,
I was learning COBOL, C++, we called it. COBOL was legacy back
then in the late 1990's and early 2000's, and it is sort of
shocking to me to see how many systems that we have that are
still legacy today. So, for example, there is a 46-year-old
Department of Education System handling 20 million student
financial aid applications annually, running on COBOL. There is
a 50-year-old HHS system supporting clinical and patient admin
activities coded in C++. I mean, so the list goes on and on of
all of these examples of these legacy systems. So you know,
your thoughts on--the Government Accountability Office has
pointed this out repeatedly--we need these upgrades. We have
needed it for decades. How does the strategy play into getting
this done across the board?
Ms. Walden. You know, IT modernization is part of the story
here. It has to happen. We cannot have 50-year-old systems.
Ms. Mace. It has to happen.
Ms. Walden. It has to happen.
Ms. Mace. I mean, there is--yes.
Ms. Walden. But it has to happen in a way that is smart and
thoughtful, but it has to happen. There is some urgency behind
it. We have already started working on that process.
Ms. Mace. What about the agencies and Federal employees
that are dragging their feet on some of this? I mean, we have
seen, like, at the VA right now, EHR, I mean, just taking over
a decade to do something that really should not take as long as
it is. How do we get them to come along with this?
Ms. Walden. Well, I would love to take that particular
question back about the VA and give you a detailed answer.
Ms. Mace. Yes.
Ms. Walden. But I share your urgency. I am 51.
Ms. Mace. And a lot of examples.
Ms. Walden. Yes.
Ms. Mace. I will not go into all of it. But the other quick
thing I wanted to ask about, and you have talked about this,
too. Our first hearing was on AI in this committee, and there
are things that we cannot even imagine how AI will be used. I
read a story the other day about ChatGPT getting through
CAPTCHA, like, with a TaskRabbit employee, and told them that
they were visually impaired, to break into that. We cannot even
imagine how it might be used for good and then also for bad,
which is one of my concerns. How are we going to use some of
these tools to ensure that we defend ourselves against breaches
that we cannot even be aware of right now? Where is AI? I know
it is mentioned in the plan, but where do you see AI in the
overall strategy?
Ms. Walden. So, it is mentioned in the strategy, but I
think our first conversation was around AI at some point, and
so, I have been giving this some thought. I think of AI and the
cybersecurity pieces of it in three buckets, right? Data that
fuels AI, the compute power for AI, and the algorithms. There
are cybersecurity components of each piece of that, that we can
use to not only shore it up so that it is not used for
nefarious purposes, or at least we reduce the chances of it
being used for nefarious purposes, but we can also use it for
the benefit of security, right?
So, I am thinking in terms of data. I am thinking through
data security measures, thinking through cryptography. How do
we do data analytics without decrypting? Thinking about compute
power and the work we are doing right now, as articulated in
the strategy, on quantum is all about compute power. The work
that we are doing on chip supply chain the gentleman here
raised, it is all about compute power. And then the algorithms,
how do we think about that? So, we are purposefully thinking
through how to make sure that AI, the cybersecurity elements of
AI, are used for good purposes, and that we are reducing the
likelihood of----
Ms. Mace. We do not want China to eat our lunch or Russia,
or Iran, or any of that.
Ms. Walden. Absolutely.
Ms. Mace. My last question is part of the strategy
contemplates more regulation, but from your lips, God's lips to
my ears, you said you did not want to overregulate. So, thank
you for making that statement, much appreciated because I think
that we could stifle innovation by overregulating. But in terms
of regulation, that framework, who is going to coordinate the
cybersecurity regulatory regime and then also de-conflict when
that is necessary?
Ms. Walden. Well, we do have language, and not in this
strategy, offering that ONCD in collaboration with OMB will
lead a regulatory harmonization taskforce, for example, where
we will think through precisely what are the gaps, what are the
regulations, what are the authorities that exists now that we
are underutilizing for regulatory purposes of cybersecurity.
How do we fill any gaps that might exist? But most importantly,
you and I agree, that we need to harmonize so that we make sure
that we incentivize investment in cybersecurity requirements
and not compliance, which some sectors are doing right now.
And so, that is an all-of-department and--agency effort. We
would love to have a task force that does that work. We are
already working on that. We work on that through the CIRC, the
Cyber Incident Response Council, and CIRCIA. We are working on
that with independent agencies in terms of thinking through how
do we harmonize the regulations that independent agencies are
imposing, but there is more work to be done.
Ms. Mace. Thank you. And I would now like to recognize
Representative Lynch for five minutes.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I thank the Ranking
Member for holding this hearing, and I want to welcome Ms.
Walden for giving her testimony and helping the committee with
this work.
Ms. Walden, the Administration's National Cybersecurity
Strategy represents, I think, an important step in our response
as a Nation in dealing with the cyber threat landscape. We know
that autocratic and oppressive governments like Russia and
China are not only operating full spectrum surveillance of
their own citizens, but we also know that they are taking
advantage of the freedoms that we have in our country by
surveilling our personnel, our citizens as well. And they are
leveraging espionage, influence campaigns, ransomware, critical
infrastructure attacks, and emerging technologies to pursue all
those goals.
Your strategy, as I read it, mentions ``the dark vision for
the future of the internet that the People's Republic of China
and other autocratic governments,'' I presume, Russia, what
``those regimes promote.'' Can you sort of flesh that out a
little bit and talk about what does that look like, the dark
vision that Russia and China present in terms of our future on
the internet?
Ms. Walden. So, the way I think about the internet, is that
it carries our values. It carries the values of those that
design and build it. We have democratic values here. We need to
lead and lean into that as we think about the future resilience
of internet. We cannot allow autocratic societies like China,
like Russia, to set our agenda to have internet, to have a
cyberspace that we envision in the document that we presented
here today. That is the idea. That is the big idea in this
strategy is that we need to set what we think the future of
cyberspace is. We need to invest in that future of cyberspace,
and that is the resilience piece of it, rebalancing the risk
piece of it. But we cannot let China, Russia, et cetera, et
cetera, set our agenda. We are getting really great at
defending against, but wouldn't it be great if we got in front
of? That is a better opportunity from my perspective.
Mr. Lynch. Absolutely.
Ms. Walden. That is what we mean.
Mr. Lynch. OK. In some ways, and in frightening ways, this
dark future that you identify in your National Cybersecurity
Strategy, that dark future seems more immediate, to be honest
with you. For example, The Wall Street Journal reported last
week, and I have an article here that I will ask for unanimous
consent. It talks about China's use of state-sponsored hackers,
teams of hackers, to employ novel hacking techniques.
Madam Chair, I ask unanimous consent to submit this Wall
Street Journal article entitled, ``Wave of Stealthy China
Cyberattacks Hits U.S. and Private Networks, Google Says.''
Ms. Mace. Without objection.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Madam Chair. These techniques have
allowed China to spy on governments and businesses for years
without detection. These activities are so stealthy that, ``The
scope of Chinese intrusion into U.S. and Western targets is
likely far broader than currently known.'' Ms. Walden, what
solutions do we have in terms of--does the strategy include
solutions to root out and combat these type of aggressive
attacks by autocratic state actors, and how successful have we
been thus far?
Ms. Walden. So, Pillar 2 of the strategy, in my mind, is
quite aggressive and forward leaning. It really projects the
concept that defense is the new offense in this space. But we
need to lean further into the authorities that we do have to
dismantle and disrupt while shoring up opportunities with the
private sector to remove infrastructure that we know that these
hackers are leveraging. So, there are opportunities for that,
but really, what is going to happen here is we are going to
have a cyberspace that is more resilient. There are going to
always be some sort of holding our infrastructure at risk. We
need to get in front of that. We cannot just keep playing
whack-a-mole, essentially. That is the general idea. But I
would direct your attention to Pillar 2 about our opportunities
to disrupt and dismantle.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Madam Chair. My time has expired, and
I yield back. Thank you.
Ms. Mace. And I will recognize the Ranking Member Connolly
for five minutes.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the Chair, and I will not take five
minutes. I do want to thank the Chair for holding this hearing,
which is one of a series of hearings planned on cybersecurity,
AI, IT management in general. And I just want to say thank you
to Ms. Walden, but I also want to urge, and I know you share
this view, Madam Chairwoman, we will have you back, and we are
going to talk about implementation of the strategy because we
are eager to see that happen.
And I do believe the task in front of you is herculean. A
whole-of-government approach to this subject, noble, worthy,
but very challenging, and we have been working a lot on those
issues for a long time on this Subcommittee as predecessors.
So, we certainly want to help, and we want to give you the
opportunity to share successes and frustrations as we move
forward.
I, also, Madam Chair, and then I will yield back. We talked
earlier about hiring, and I just wanted to commend the three
bills we are working on. One I have introduced, called the OPM
Reform Bill to improve our hiring practices. The second I am
working with Virginia Foxx, Congresswoman Foxx of North
Carolina, called the Chance to Compete Act, which addresses
what you were talking about earlier to Madam Chairwoman, to
increase hiring of people with non-traditional credentials. And
the third is the NextGen Fed Employee Act, a bill I have
introduced, which is to try to systematize and professionalize
the use of internships in the Federal Government. We are so far
behind the private sector in the use of internships to recruit
the talent we need for the future, and I am working with
Chairman Comer on that bill as well.
So anyway, we are working on trying to bolster how we hire,
who we hire, and not only recruit but retain that work force of
the future, and it is particularly acute and important in U.S.
sphere. With that I yield back, and I thank the Chair.
Ms. Mace. Thank you, and in closing, and I agree with the
Ranker, that this is a herculean effort, the tasks before you,
but know that we are here to assist and help you. We will have
you back. We are going to want to hear about implementation and
how that is progressing along as well. The importance, as
Representative Lynch said earlier, it seems like it is needed
faster and faster. In particular, I am going back to AI,
everything that I come back to, because it is advancing so
quickly.
We just do not know what we do not know, and we do not know
how it will impact us, the vulnerabilities that we have. And I
have great concern, but not just the public sector, but the
private sector, as well, on this issue, and so we want to offer
as much support as we can. We will be putting out a portfolio
of legislation to be helpful, and so in any way that any of us,
you need us, you call us, and we will be there to assist here.
So, in closing, I want to thank Ms. Walden for her
presence. Your testimony today was clearly knowledgeable. It
was fantastic, and we really appreciate it. We are very
interested to learn about how the Administration, as
Congressman Connolly said, will implement this strategy, and we
are going to want more details on that in our next
conversation, and we will invite you back.
So, with that and without objection, all Members will have
five legislative days within which to submit materials and to
submit additional written questions for the witness, which will
be forwarded to the witness for her response.
Ms. Mace. If there is no further business, and without
objection, the Subcomittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the Subcomittee was adjourned.]
[all]