[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HOMELAND SECURITY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
BUDGET HEARING FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005
=======================================================================
HEARING
of the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY,
SCIENCE, AND RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT
before the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 25, 2004
__________
Serial No. 108-37
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
house
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Christopher Cox, California, Chairman
Jennifer Dunn, Washington Jim Turner, Texas, Ranking Member
C.W. Bill Young, Florida Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Don Young, Alaska Loretta Sanchez, California
F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Wisconsin Norman D. Dicks, Washington
W.J. (Billy) Tauzin, Louisiana Barney Frank, Massachusetts
David Dreier, California Jane Harman, California
Duncan Hunter, California Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland
Harold Rogers, Kentucky Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New
Sherwood Boehlert, New York York
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Nita M. Lowey, New York
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey
Porter J. Goss, Florida Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Dave Camp, Michigan Columbia
Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida Zoe Lofgren, California
Bob Goodlatte, Virginia Karen McCarthy, Missouri
Ernest J. Istook, Jr., Oklahoma Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Peter T. King, New York Bill Pascrell, Jr., North Carolina
John Linder, Georgia Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
John B. Shadegg, Arizona Islands
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Mac Thornberry, Texas Ken Lucas, Kentucky
Jim Gibbons, Nevada James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Kay Granger, Texas Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Pete Sessions, Texas
John E. Sweeney, New York
John Gannon, Chief of Staff
Stephen DeVine, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel
Thomas Dilenge, Chief Counsel and Policy Director
David H. Schanzer, Democrat Staff Director
Mark T. Magee, Democrat Deputy Staff Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
______
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, and Research and Development
Mac Thornberry, Texas, Chairman
Pete Sessions, Texas, Vice Chairman Zoe Lofgren, California, Ranking
Sherwood Boehlert, New York Member
Lamar Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey
Dave Camp, Michigan Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Robert W. Goodlatte, Virginia Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Peter King, New York Islands
John Linder, Georgia Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Mark Souder, Indiana Charles Gonzalez, Texas
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Ken Lucas, Kentucky
Kay Granger, Texas James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Christopher Cox, California, Ex Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Officio Jim Turner, Texas, Ex Officio
(ii)
CONTENTS
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Mac Thornberry, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Science, and Research and Development........... 1
The Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Representative in Congress From the
State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Science, and Research and Development
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Chairman, Select Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 39
The Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas, Ranking Member, Select Committee on Homeland
Security
Oral Statement................................................. 40
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Robert E. Andrews, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey................................... 36
The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From
the State of North Carolina.................................... 43
The Honorable Kay Granger, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas................................................. 45
The Honorable Pete Sessions, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas............................................. 46
WITNESS
Dr. Charles E. McQueary, Under Secretary for Science and
Technology, Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
APPENDIX
Material Submitted for the Record
Questions for the Record From The Honorable Mac Thornberry....... 61
Questions for the Record From The Honorable Jim Turner........... 63
Questions for the Record From The Honorable Kendrick B. Meek..... 67
HOMELAND SECURITY SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY BUDGET HEARING FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2005
----------
Wednesday, February 25, 2004
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science,
and Research and Development,
Select Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:04 p.m., in
Room 2325 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mac
Thornberry [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives: Sessions, Camp, Granger, Cox,
Lofgren, Andrews, Christensen, Etheridge, Lucas, Langevin,
Meek, and Turner.
Mr. Thornberry. The Subcommittee will come to order. I want
to welcome the members, the witness, to our hearing today,
which is going to focus on the Department of Homeland
Security's budget for science and technology. Next Monday, the
Department will mark its one year birthday. It seems to me this
is an appropriate time to measure how much progress has been
made over the past year, and assess where we are now, and also
plan on where we--how we move ahead. And I am also cognizant of
the fact that as September 11 recedes further back into our
memory, it is a challenge to maintain the sense of urgency,
both in improving operations of the Department and also in the
day to day job of making our country safer.
I personally believe that there are five areas in which the
Department and Congress ought to focus in our second year
efforts. One is integrating the Department into that one
seamless unit that we intended it to be. Two is improving
coordination with the private sector, with other government
entities, and ultimately, also international entities. Three is
improving intelligence analysis and sharing. Four is developing
ways to measure whether we are really making the country safer.
And five is developing and fielding technology, which of
course, is the subject of our hearing today.
Most of us acknowledge that central to success in the war
on terrorism is fielding of technologies that can help prevent
attack, as well as those that help us to respond quickly and
effectively when something does occur; but deciding what to
buy, and in which technology--technologies to invest involves
setting priorities, and to a certain extent, in making educated
guesses. It also involves not buying everything that somebody
has for sale, and having the discipline to invest for longer
term solutions.
The first step was to get the building blocks in place, the
people, the organizations, the processes to make decisions; and
my view is that the S & T Directorate has done a good job so
far in setting those cornerstones. The next step is to begin
making decisions, whether it is identifying an existing
technology that you want to field quickly, or developing a
technology to a more useful application, or directing research
dollars into some area where you have vulnerabilities.
For Fiscal Year 2005, the Administration has requested just
a little over a billion dollars for the S & T Directorate,
about $126 million more than last year. The largest increase
over last year is for biosurveillance. Other parts of the
Department of Homeland Security, as well as other Cabinet
agencies, also have Homeland Security-related science and
technology funding, and one of the issues we will want to
explore is how that is coordinated. The bottom line, it seems
to me, is that we are safer than we were a year ago, but we are
not nearly as safe as we should be, or as safe as we will be.
Technology, in our ports, in our cities, or in our squad cars,
are going to help us all do a better job of protecting
Americans.
With that, I will yield to the distinguished Ranking
Member, the gentlelady from California, for any statements she
would like to make.
Mr. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I ask unanimous
consent to put my entire statement into the record.
Mr. Thornberry. Without objection.
[Statement of Ms. Lofgren follows:]
PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ZOE LOFGREN, RANKING MEMBER
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, SCIENCE, AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Today is the first hearing of the Homeland Security Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Science and Research and Development in 2004. This
subcommittee accomplished much in the past year since its initial
creation, and let me once again state how much I have enjoyed working
with our chairman, Congressman Mac Thornberry and his staff. I look
forward to working with you, and have high expectations for the coming
year.
Today we will hear from Under Secretary Charles E. McQueary of the
Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate.
Dr. McQueary was the first person to testify before this subcommittee
last year, and I want to thank you for appearing before us once again
today.
At the time of last year's hearing, Dr. McQueary was new to the
job, and he spoke about his priorities for the S & T Directorate, and
mentioned 7 specific areas of emphasis for the Directorate. These
included the following:
1. Develop and deploy state-of-the art, high-performance, low
operating-cost systems to prevent the illicit traffic of radiological/
nuclear materials and weapons into and within the United States.
2. Provide state-of-the art, high-performance, low operating-cost
systems to rapidly detect and mitigate the consequences of the release
of biological and chemical agents.
3. Provide state-of-the art, high-performance, low operating-cost
systems to detect and prevent illicit high explosives transit into and
within the United States
4. Enhance missions of all Department operational units through
targeted research, development, test and evaluation (RDT & E), and
systems engineering and development.
5. Develop and provide capabilities for protecting cyber and other
critical infrastructures.
6. Develop capabilities to prevent new-technology as a surprise
weapon by anticipating emerging threats.
7. Develop, coordinate and implement technical standards for
chemical, biological, radiological, arid nuclear (CBRN) non-medical
countermeasures.
Dr. McQueary proposed an ambitious agenda at that first hearing and
the Members of this subcommittee were willing to give the Directorate
some time to organize.
Dr. McQueary, you have been on the job at DHS for almost a year.
Now is an appropriate time for this subcommittee to get a report from
you on your progress. We want to learn about the status of your stated
priorities, and if they have changed as a result of your experiences
over the past year.
We also will spend a considerable amount of time today looking at
your fiscal year 2005 budget request. This year's request is $1.04
billion, which is an increase over last year's enacted budget of $912.9
million. As you know, this budget proposal invests heavily in
biological countermeasures (over a 40 percent increase over last year's
enacted budget). I want to hear how you came to decide that bio-defense
is the most important priority at this time. What about chemical,
nuclear, and high explosives countermeasures? Their budgets remained
almost flat over last year's enacted budget. Without releasing any
classified information, I hope you will take some time today to walk us
through your process for assessing threats, setting priorities and
investing resources.
Finally, at last year's hearing, you were questioned extensively
about the process that the department uses for reviewing ideas and
products from the private sector and individuals. As I am sure you
recall, several members asked you about this, including Congressman
Thornberry, Camp, Lucas, Congresswoman Dunn and myself. You told this
subcommittee that you personally reviewed each incoming proposal and
product that is sent to the directorate. Specifically, you said the
following. . .
``The first formal thing that we put in place was the e-mail
address because it was clear that we had a pent up emotional
demand from people that wanted to be able to tell us about
things that they're doing. . . .And what we do with those
[incoming e-mail proposals], I actually read every one of them
myself. I mean, and when I say read them, those that are many
pages long, I only read the executive summary to get a sense of
what's there.''\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ I Undersecretary of Homeland Security Charles McQueary in
testimony before the House Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, and
Research and Development; May 21, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The fact that you reviewed each and every proposal was a bit
shocking to me. I can only imagine how many incoming requests arrive at
the directorate and I suspect that if you are still reviewing each one,
you have very little time for anything else.
I continue to hear from people, both here in Washington and back in
Silicon Valley, who have ideas and products that they would like to
share with the Department. They are frustrated because they do not know
where to go or who to talk within DHS. I share their frustrations. It
is a major concern to me that I can't give them advice on how best to
approach the staff at DHS. Some individuals have excellent and
innovative ideas that merit consideration by DHS. Others may not have
the best ideas, but I am not in a position to judge their thoughts on
the merits. You are.
Earlier this week at a ceremony marking the first anniversary of
the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, Secretary Tom
Ridge outlined several goals for DHS in 2004. One of these goals was
the creation of a ``Private Sector One-Stop Shop.'' He described this
shop as a ``robust web and personal assistance service venue where all
elements of the business community can learn how to do business with
the department.''
I have many questions about this shop that I hope you will answer
today. How will this one-stop shop work? Where in the Department will
it be located? What is the difference between this and the ``technology
clearinghouse'' provided for in the Homeland Security Act, Sec. 313? Is
this just a way to send information to the department, or will it also
include an ability to interact directly with DHS officials? I hope you
are not still in the business of reviewing each incoming e-mail and
that this one-stop shop will be effective. I look forward to learning
more about it today.
Before I conclude, I want to thank the Democratic staff on the
Homeland Security Committee for their hard work. In particular, David
Grannis was particularly helpful in preparing for today' shearing.
Ms. Lofgren. First, this is our first hearing of the--of
this year, and I think when we look back over the last year, we
did accomplish a lot, but there is much, much more to do, as
you have just referenced, and thinking back to when we first
met with Dr. McQueary last year, he spoke about seven specific
areas that he wished to focus in on.
I am hoping today to get an update on all seven of those,
and where we stand with each of them. As you have mentioned, in
the budget, there is a strong emphasis on biodefense. I am
interested in how, to the extent you can discuss that in an
unclassified setting, we reached the conclusion that that was
our highest priority, as compared to other threats, chemical,
nuclear, high explosives, and the like.
The other thing I hope you can touch on, and I have
mentioned it to the Chairman, we may want to propose having
some further discussions, in--either in a workshop format or
the like, is to pursue further the interface between the
private sector and your shop.
I still hear concerns that people don't know who to talk
to, how to be heard. Clearly, I remember last time we met, you
mentioned, and it actually made me--it scared me here, that you
were reading all the emails. I am sure that that can no longer
be the case.
Mr. McQueary. That is correct.
Ms. Lofgren. And that is good news. But I want to know
about the processes in place, and I--without being unduly
negative, note that we need to do a better job here, because
I--the members of the Committee are constantly being approached
with--by private sector people with suggestions. We shouldn't
really be the entry point for the Department. We are not
skilled to do that, and so I am hopeful that we can come up
with--I mean there are so many great ideas out there, but some
of them are also vaporware, and so somebody needs to sort
through what is real, what isn't, what can be applied, and in a
way that is better than what we are doing now.
So, I am hopeful to hear about the private sector one stop
shop, where that is, and where it is going to be located, and
how we can deploy it. And with that, I would just like to
mention, again, what a pleasure it has been to work with the
Chairman, Mr. Thornberry, and I look forward to another good
year.
Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentlelady, and it is also my
pleasure in working with her. All members may, without
objection, have opening statements submitted for the record,
unless there is a member who would like to make an oral opening
statement, we will turn to our witness at this point.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JIM TURNER, RANKING MEMBER, SELECT
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Under Secretary McQueary, welcome back. We appreciate your
testimony today.
As you may know, the Democratic Members of this Committee issued a
report today entitled ``America at Risk: Closing the Security Gap.'' A
principle reason why we issued the report was to underscore that while
the nation is more secure one year after the creation of the
Department, it is not as secure as it needs to be. Additional measures,
supported by appropriate resources, need to be taken to ensure the
safety and security of our homeland. I hope that the Department will
take a close look at the report and that we can work together to
implement its recommendations.
Closing our existing security gaps will require the continued
efforts of the Department's Science and Technology Directorate. I
appreciate you being here to give us a better understanding of how the
budget request for the Science and Technology Directorate for Fiscal
Year 2005 will do this. The hearing will help us produce the first ever
Department of Homeland Security authorization bill.
Let me first say that this Directorate, under your leadership, has
made great strides to build an institution from scratch. And my staff
informs me that your staff has been very accessible and helpful
throughout the past year.
My two largest concerns today are whether the top line of your
Directorate's budget request is sufficient, given the importance of
your research and development work, and whether it will be spent in the
most effective way to improve homeland security.
The President's Fiscal Year 2005 budget request for the Directorate
is about $1 billion, representing a $127 million, or 14 percent,
increase above the current year levels. Outside of the portfolio for
biological research and development, the request is almost exactly the
same as what Congress appropriated for the current year.
I think it's important, however, to put the budget into greater
context. The DHS budget is only about one third of the Administration's
total request for homeland security research and development of $3.6
billion. It is less than two percent of what was requested for the
Department of Defense for research and development, and less than one
percent of the total President's total R & D budget.
In this context, I am concerned that we may not be devoting
sufficient resources to the science and technology programs within the
Department of Homeland Security. We could be moving faster and stronger
to protect the homeland.
For example, I mentioned that the Fiscal Year 2005 budget request
for radiological and nuclear countermeasures and for the chemical
countermeasures are flat. Even the Department's own strategic plan
released earlier this week underscores the need for better technologies
to detect nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.
There are Customs and Border Protection officials at the nation's
ports of entry that don't have the ability to detect nuclear materials
in containers and cargo. Our nation's first responders are frequently
called to investigate suspicious white powders, and are unable to tell
whether it is ricin, anthrax, or powdered donut. So I am concerned that
these research and development portfolios are not commensurate with the
security gaps that exist.
Secondly, I have concerns with the way funds are prioritized within
the Directorate's budget request. During a hearing of this
Subcommittee's late last fall, we heard about the Directorate's process
for allocating funds across research and development portfolios by
speculating on the sophistication and potential damage caused by
different terrorist attacks. But that process does not include
intelligence on the likelihood that terrorists will attempt a given
type of attack or information on what capabilities a terrorist group
has to carry out an attack.
Your Directorate should be getting this information as part of a
comprehensive threat and vulnerability assessment from the IAIP
Directorate. While this responsibility clearly falls outside of your
Directorate, I expect that future budget decisions will be made on the
basis of this information.
The Directorate has also decided to prioritize short-term
development at the expense of longer-term research. While the urge to
deploy important and nearly-mature products out into the field is
understandable, I believe the Directorate will need to begin shifting
additional resources towards developing the next-generation of homeland
security technologies.
Mr. Under Secretary, the Science and Technology Directorate has
made impressive strides since it was created in the Homeland Security
Act, and I commend you for your leadership. I urge you to work with
your colleagues to ensure that threats and vulnerabilities are fully
assessed when preparing your budget. And I hope this Committee can work
with you to ensure that you have all the resources that are necessary
to advance your important homeland security work.
Let me welcome back before the Subcommittee Dr. Charles E.
McQueary, Under Secretary for Science and Technology of the
Department of Homeland Security. And you are recognized, sir.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES McQUEARY, UNDER SECRETARY SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. McQueary. Thank you very much. I would like to say good
afternoon to you, Chairman Thornberry, Congresswoman Lofgren,
and the distinguished members of the panel, my good friend from
North Carolina, Congressman Etheridge. It is a pleasure to be
here with you today to discuss the research and development
activities of the Department of Homeland Security's Science and
Technology Directorate.
The Nation's advantage in science and technology is key to
securing the homeland. The most important mission for the
Science and Technology Directorate is to support the efforts of
the dedicated men and women who protect and secure our
homeland.
When I first reported to you about our activities last May,
we had just begun our work. The Directorate has accomplished
much since its inception last March 1, and I would like to give
you some of those highlights.
We have deployed monitoring systems that operate
continuously to detect biological pathogens in approximately 30
U.S. cities.
We have also set up test beds to provide accurate radiation
and nuclear warnings at air and marine cargo ports in
cooperation with the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.
We have established the first series of interoperability
guidelines for the Nation's wireless emergency communications
network.
In another effort, we have greatly reduced the time it
takes to develop national standards for technologies to protect
the homeland. Our new standards for radiation detection
equipment will help us put needed technologies into the hands
of responders
quickly.
And the Homeland Security Advanced Research Project Agency
has started extensive research for next generation biological
and chemical and radiological and nuclear detectors.
We have awarded the first round of 100 Homeland Security
Fellowships and Scholarships to build U.S. leadership in
science and technology.
We have also established the first university-based
Homeland Security Center of Excellence to address both the
targets and means of terrorism, and we have become active
contributors in numerous interagency working groups.
In accomplishing this, we have doubled the staff of this
Directorate with some of the country's brightest and most
dedicated people. We started this Directorate with 87 people,
53 of whom were transferred in from the Environmental
Measurements Laboratory in New York, and so we had a very small
staff to start. Today, we are at about 212 people.
However, the threats to our homeland remain diverse and
daunting. We must constantly monitor current and emerging
threats, and assess our vulnerabilities to them, and we must
develop new and improved capabilities to counter them and be
prepared to respond to and recover from a potential attack.
The Science and Technology Directorate has prioritized its
research and development efforts based upon the directives and
recommendations from many sources, and I will only mention a
few of those here, although the complete list is in my written
testimony: the Homeland Security Act of 2002, President Bush's
National Strategies and 9 Homeland Security Presidential
Directives, the report from the National Academies of Sciences
on ``Making the Nation Safer,'' and reports from the Gilmore,
Bremer, and Hart-Rudman Committees.
We have identified and integrated into the information in
these sources for review and evaluation by our scientific
staff, and it
provides the basis for determining the R & D needed to meet our
mission. We recognize that many organizations are contributing
to the homeland security science and technology base.
In the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Congress recognized
this as well, and directed the Under Secretary of Science and
Technology to coordinate the Federal Government's civilian
efforts to identify and develop countermeasures to current and
emerging threats, and I can assure you we take this
responsibility very seriously.
We began this coordination process by evaluating and
producing a report on Department of Homeland Security R & D
activities underway that were not under the direct cognizance
of the Science and Technology Directorate, and, where
appropriate, S & T will absorb these R & D functions. We are
now initiating the effort needed to coordinate homeland
security research and development across the entire United
States Government, and that is a large challenge, as you
obviously would know. Discussions are ongoing with Federal
departments and agencies, as well as the Office of Management
and Budget, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and
the Homeland Security Council to ensure the best possible
coordination.
In the area of the budget request, what I would like to do
is very briefly describe our Fiscal Year 2005 plans. We have an
overall budget request of $1.04 billion, which is an increase
of $126.5 million, or almost 14 percent over the Fiscal Year
2004 levels. With these funds, Science and Technology will
continue to make progress in securing the homeland.
For example, under President Bush's new biosurveillance
initiative, which accounts for most of the increase in funding,
additional capability will be implemented quickly in the top
threat urban areas to provide more than twice the current
capability. We will continue to provide the science and
technology capabilities and enduring partnerships needed to
develop methods and tools to test and assess threats and
vulnerabilities to protect our critical infrastructure and
enhance information exchange.
We will continue to work in cybersecurity, both through
partnerships and by creating low-cost, high-impact solutions to
identified cybersecurity challenges. We will ramp up our work
in counter MANPADS (man-portable air defense systems), to
improve technologies to protect the commercial aircraft from
this threat. We will award contracts in fiscal year 2005 for
integrating commercial prototype equipment on selected
commercial aircraft, and conduct tests and evaluate--and
conducting tests and evaluation, including live fire range
tests.
In less than a year, the science and the engineers of the
Science and Technology Directorate have accomplished more than
I could have expected. I am proud to have shared with--some of
these success stories with you here today. We have appended a
more comprehensive summary of accomplishments to date for the
record. As yet, we also recognize--and yet, we also recognize
there is much to do, which is the point you have made, and I
fully agree, and we will be working just as hard in 2005 to
make further progress.
I look forward to working with you and my colleagues in
other Federal agencies and with private industry and academia
to
continue this work and improve our ability to protect our
homeland. This concludes my prepared statement, and I would
welcome the opportunity to take questions, if I may, at this
time.
[The statement of Mr. McQueary follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. CHARLES E. McQUEARY, UNDER SECRETARY, SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Introduction
Good morning. Chairman Thornberry, Congresswoman Lofgren, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to be with
you today to discuss the research and development activities of the
Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate.
The Nation's advantage in science and technology is key to securing
the homeland. The most important mission for the Science and Technology
Directorate is to develop and deploy cutting-edge technologies and new
capabilities so that the dedicated men and women who serve to protect
and secure our homeland can perform their jobs more effectively and
efficiently--these men and women are my customers..
When I last reported to you about our activities, we had just started
our work. Since its inception less than a year ago, the Science and
Technology Directorate has:
(1) deployed continuously operating biological pathogen
detection systems to approximately 30 United States cities;
(2) set up testbeds for radiation and nuclear warnings at air
and marine cargo ports in cooperation with the Port Authority
of New York and New Jersey,
(3) established the first series of interoperability guidelines
for the Nation's wireless emergency communications network;
(4) established the first national standards guidelines for
radiation detection equipment;
(5) awarded the first Homeland Security Fellowships and
Scholarships;
(6) established the first Homeland Security University Center
of Excellence,
(7) transferred the Plum Island Animal Disease Center from the
Department of Agriculture to the Science and Technology
Directorate;
(8) engaged private industry in bringing innovative and
effective solutions to homeland security problems through the
interagency Technical Support Working Group and issuance of
HSARPA's first two Broad Agency Announcements and a Small
Business Innovative Research Program solicitation;
(9) initiated a development and demonstration program to assess
the technical and economic viability of adapting military
countermeasures to the threat of man portable anti-aircraft
missiles for commercial aircraft;
(10) collaborated with and assisted other components of the
Department to enhance their abilities to meet their missions
and become active contributors in interagency working groups--
all while staffing this Directorate with some of this country's
brightest and most dedicated people.
I continue to be energized by and proud of the scientists,
engineers, managers, and support staff in the Science and Technology
Directorate. We have accomplished a great deal in a short amount of
time and are positioning the Directorate to make continuing
contributions to the homeland security mission of the Department.
However, the threats to our homeland remain diverse and daunting.
We must constantly monitor current and emerging threats and assess our
vulnerabilities to them, develop new and improved capabilities to
counter them, and mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks should they
occur. The Science and Technology Directorate must also enhance the
conventional missions of the Department to protect and provide
assistance to civilians in response to natural disasters, law
enforcement needs, and other activities such as maritime search and
rescue.
Results from Current Research and Development (R & D) Spending and
Fiscal Year 2005 Plans: Portfolio Details
The Science and Technology Directorate has organized its efforts
into research and development portfolios that span the set of product
lines of the Directorate.
Four portfolios address specific terrorist threats:
Biological Countermeasures
Chemical Countermeasures
High Explosive Countermeasures
Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures.
Four portfolios crosscut these threats:
Threat and Vulnerability, Testing and Assessment--this
portfolio includes our support to the Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate, including our critical
infrastructure protection and cybersecurity activities.
Standards
Emerging Threats
Rapid Prototyping
We also have portfolios that support the operational units of the
Department (Border and Transportation Security; Emergency Preparedness
and Response, United States Coast Guard and United States Secret
Service) in both their homeland security and conventional missions.
Our University and Fellowship Programs portfolio addresses the need
to build an enduring science and technology capability and support
United States leadership in science and technology.
Our most recent program, Counter-MANPADS, is seeking to improve
technologies to protect commercial aircraft from the threat of MAN-
Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS).
In addition, the Science and Technology Directorate is responsible
for the management of one of the United States government's E-Gov
Initiatives, the SAFECOM Program. There are tens of thousands of state
and local public safety agencies, and 100 Federal law enforcement
agencies that depend on interoperable wireless communications. The
SAFECOM (Wireless Public SAFEty Interoperable COMmunications) program
is the umbrella initiative to coordinate all Federal, state, local, and
Tribal users to achieve national wireless communications
interoperability. The placement of SAFECOM in the Department of
Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate allows it full
access to the scientific expertise and resources needed to help our
nation achieve true public safety wireless communications
interoperability.
At this time I would like to briefly describe some of our
accomplishments to date and our fiscal year 2005 plans. As can be seen
in the following chart, we have an overall fiscal year 2005 budget
request of $1.039 billion, which is an increase of$126.5 million (13.9
percent) over the fiscal year 2004 levels. The request includes $35
million for construction of facilities. In addition, the increase
includes President Bush's request for an additional $65 million dollars
to enhance and expand the BioWatch Program.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2003 FY 2004 less Proposed FY Increases/Decreases from FY 2004
--------------------------------------------- rescission 2005 to 2005
-------------------------------------------------------------------
BUDGET ACTIVITY Amount Amount Amount Amount Percent
(millions) (millions) (millions) (millions) Increase
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Budget Activity M & A 0.0 44.2 52.6 8.4 19.1%
Salarv and expenses 0.0 44.2 52.6 8.4 19.1%
Budget Activitv R & D 553.5 868.7 986.7 118.0 13.6%
Bio Countermeasures 362.6 285.0 407.0 122.0 42.8%
(incl. NBACC)
High-Explosives 0.0 9.5 9.7 0.2 2.1%
Countermeasures
Chemical Countermeasures 7.0 52.0 53.0 1.0 1.9%
R/N Countermeasures 75.0 126.3 129.3 3.0 2.4%
TVTA (incl. CIP & Cyber) 36.1 100.1 101.9 1.8 1.8%
Standards 20.0 39.0 39.7 0.7 1.9%
Components 0.0 34.0 34.0 0.0 0.0%
University & Fellowship 3.0 68.8 30.0 -38.8 -56.4%
Programs
Emerging Threats 16.8 21.0 21.0 0.0 0.0%
Rapid Prototyping 33.0 73.0 76.0 3.0 4.1%
Counter MANPADS 0.0 60.0 61.0 1.0 1.7%
R & D Consolidation 0.0 0.0 24.1 24.1
transferred funds
Total enacted appropriations 553.5 912.8 1039.3 126.5 13.9%
and budget estimates
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Biological Countermeasures
Biological threats can take many forms and be distributed in many
ways. Aerosolized anthrax, smallpox, foot and mouth disease, and bulk
food contamination are among the threats that can have high
consequences for humans and agriculture. Our Biological Countermeasures
portfolio uses the nation's science base to prevent, protect, respond
to and recover from bioterrorism events. This portfolio provides the
science and technology needed to reduce the probability and potential
consequences of a biological attack on this nation's civilian
population, its infrastructure, and its agricultural system. Portfolio
managers and scientists are developing and implementing an integrated
systems approach with a wide range of activities, including
vulnerability and risk analyses to identify the need for vaccines,
therapeutics, and diagnostics; development and implementation of early
detection and warning systems to characterize an attack and permit
early prophylaxis and decontamination activities; and development of a
national bioforensics analysis capability to support attribution of
biological agent use.
In fiscal year 2003 and 2004, the Biological Countermeasures portfolio:
Deployed BioWatch to approximately 30 cities across
the nation. BioWatch consists of air samplers that detect the
release of biothreat pathogens, such as anthrax, in a manner
timely enough to allow for effective treatment of the exposed
population. In addition, with additional funds provided by
Congress in fiscal year 2004, we were able to integrate
environmental monitoring data with biosurveillance to provide
early attack alerts and assessments. The environmental
monitoring activities include not only Bio Watch, which
provides continuous monitoring of most of our major
metropolitan areas, but also targeted monitoring that is
temporarily deployed for special national needs, such as a
Homeland Security Elevated Threat Level. While serving the
primary function of mitigating attacks, both BioWatch and
environmental monitoring systems also play a significant
deterrent role, since terrorists are less likely to attack when
they know that defensive systems prevent them from attaining
their goals.
Established the National Biodefense Analysis and
Countermeasures Center, which provides scientific support for
intelligence activities, prioritizes biothreats, and conducts
bioforensic analyses for attribution and hence deterrence.
In fiscal year 2005, we will build upon our past work and continue to
deploy and improve wide area monitoring systems for urban areas. Under
President Bush's new Biosurveillance Initiative, which accounts for
most of the fiscal year 2005 increase in funding, additional capability
will be implemented quickly in the top threat urban areas to more than
twice the current capability. We will be working on decontamination
technologies and standards for facilities and outdoor areas, and a
National Academy of Science study characterizing contamination risks
will be completed in fiscal year 2005. At a smaller scale, we will
define requirements for expanded technology in detect-to-warn scenarios
relevant to facilities monitoring. At the same time, we will be
building our capabilities in the National Biodefense Analysis and
Counterterrorism Center (NBACC) and at Plum Island Animal Disease
Center (PIADC). At the NBACC, we are focusing first on bioforensics and
development of a biodefense knowledge center; for agro-bioterrorism, we
are prioritizing countermeasures to foreign animal diseases. We are
requesting additional funding in fiscal year 2005 for Plum Island to
improve the facilities and security of this important research and
development site.
Chemical Countermeasures
The National Research Council Report Making the Nation Safer points
out that ``chemicals continue to be the weapon of choice for terrorist
attacks.'' The large volumes of toxic industrial chemicals and
materials along with the potential for chemical warfare agents and
emerging threat agents constitute a broad range of threats that may be
applied to virtually any civilian target.
Our Chemical Countermeasures portfolio provides the science and
technology needed to reduce the probability and potential consequences
of a chemical attack on this nation's civilian population. The
portfolio places high priority on characterizing and reducing the
vulnerability posed by the large volumes of toxic industrial materials
in use, storage or transport within the nation. The research and
development activities include prioritization of efforts among the many
possible chemical threats and targets, and development of new detection
and forensic technologies and integrated protective systems for high-
value facilities such as airports and subways. These activities are
informed by end-user input and simulated exercises.
Over the past year, our Chemical portfolio completed Project
PROTECT--Program for Response Options and Technology Enhancements for
Chemical/Biological Terrorism--a program conducted in collaboration
with the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA).
PROTECT, an operational chemical agent detection and response
capability, significantly decreases response time, which in the event
of an attack will save human lives. PROTECT is deployed in Metro
stations and is operated by the WMATA.
In fiscal year 2005, our focus will be on protecting facilities
from chemical attacks and controlling the industrial chemicals that may
be used for such attacks. Our scientists, working with the Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP), will
complete a detailed end-to-end study of three reference scenarios, to
culminate in recommendations for top-level architectures,
identification of key gaps, and a ``report card'' showing present, mid-
term (three-year), and long-term (five-plus year) capabilities. We will
qualify candidate off-the-shelf sensors for demonstration in an
application to facilities protection. We will also address response and
recovery. Working with the user community, we will develop first-
generation playbooks for responding to the three reference scenarios
and develop technical requirements for personal protection equipment.
High Explosives Countermeasures
The High Explosives Countermeasures portfolio addresses the threat
that terrorists will use explosives in attacks on buildings, critical
infrastructure, and the civilian population of the United States. The
Science and Technology Directorate's portfolio is closely coordinated
with the activities ongoing in the Transportation Security
Administration to ensure that research and development (R & D)
activities are complementary, not duplicative. R & D priorities in this
portfolio have focused on the detection of vehicle bombs and suicide
bombers, and on providing the science and technology needed to
significantly increase the probability of preventing an explosives
attack on buildings, infrastructure and people.
This portfolio in fiscal year 2005 will develop and field
equipment, technologies and procedures to interdict suicide bombers and
car and truck bombs before they can reach their intended targets while
minimizing the impact on the American way of life. We will complete
testing and evaluation of known procedures and commercial off-the-shelf
devices applicable to indoor or outdoor interdiction of suicide
bombers, and develop a training package for local law enforcement,
including recommended equipment and procedures. In addition, we will
support the development of new devices to interdict suicide bombers and
study the feasibility of using existing detectors to identify
explosives in trucks. Finally, we will analyze the costs and benefits
of hardening aircraft cargo containers, cargo bays, and overhead bin
storage compartments to better withstand the effects of an explosion.
Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures
Potential radiological and nuclear threats range from the
deliberate dispersal of small amounts of radioactive material to the
detonation of an improvised or stolen nuclear weapon to an attack on
our nuclear power industry. Our Radiological and Nuclear
Countermeasures portfolio provides the science and technology needed to
reduce both the probability and the potential consequences of a
radiological or nuclear attack on this nation's civilian population or
our nuclear power facilities.
On August 19, 2003, our Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures
portfolio formally assumed management of the Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey radiation detection test bed. The test bed was
previously managed by the United States Department of Energy. Following
the transfer, we have broadened the project scope beyond testing and
evaluating individual pieces of technology to a systems approach,
including response protocols and operational concepts. As part of the
Science and Technology Directorate's effort, radiation detection
sensors will be deployed and operated by Federal, state, and local
inspectors and police at land, maritime and aviation venues. By judging
the efficacy of deployed systems over time, we will be able to inform
future decisions on detection technology R & D investment, deployment
of urban monitoring systems, configurations best able to enhance
security, and viable ways to defend against a radioactive dispersal
device or an improvised nuclear device.
For fiscal year 2005, we plan to leverage our previous technology
and capability successes and place a high priority on providing the
end-user community with the most appropriate and effective detection
and interdiction technologies available to prohibit the importation or
transportation and subsequent detonation of a radiological or nuclear
device within U.S. borders. Specifically, we will do the following:
Integrate at least five Federal, state, and local
sites into an operational detection system architecture to
detect radiological and nuclear threats;
Establish a test and evaluation capability, and test
and evaluate 90 percent of the fiscal year 2005 prototype
technologies developed in the portfolio's programs;
Demonstrate two advanced characterization technologies
for crisis response; and
Demonstrate a prototype for automatic radiological
imaging analysis that enhances current imaging systems at one
pilot site.
Threat and Vulnerability, Testing and Assessment
Our Threat and Vulnerability, Testing and Assessment (TVTA)
portfolio is one of our largest portfolios, and includes our scientific
and technical support to the Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection (IAIP) Directorate. TVTA includes our R & D activities in
Critical Infrastructure Protection and Cybersecurity. Activities in
this portfolio are designed to help evaluate extensive amounts of
diverse threat information; detect and document terrorist intent;
couple threat information with knowledge of complex, interdependent
critical infrastructure vulnerabilities; and enable analysts to draw
timely insights and distribute warnings from the information. This
portfolio provides the science and technology needed to develop methods
and tools to test and assess threats and vulnerabilities to protect
critical infrastructure and enhance information exchange; this
portfolio also includes a Biometrics Program and a Cybersecurity
Program.
In fiscal year 2004, TVTA:
Developed and installed an operational component, the
Threat-Vulnerability Mapper (TVM), as part of the Threat and
Vulnerability Integration System for the Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection Directorate. The TVM provides
counterterrorism analysts with a simple, straightforward way
not only to depict the geographic distribution of threats
across the United States, but also to search the underlying
databases for information on the possible actors, agents,
potential severity of attacks, and extent of the
vulnerabilities to and effects of such attacks.
Co-funded the Cyber Defense Technology Experimental
Research (``DETER'') Network with the National Science
Foundation, a $5.45 million, three-year research project to
create an experimental infrastructure network to support
development and demonstration of next-generation information
security technologies for cyber defense. This is a multi-
university project led by the University of California at
Berkeley.
Developed a Decision Support System focused on
prioritizing investment, protection, mitigation, response, and
recovery strategies related to Critical Infrastructure
Protection. The initial proof-of-concept began in August 2003
and a case study is being conducted in February 2004. The
prototype model will include representation of all 14 critical
infrastructure sectors/assets and their interdependencies.
Developed advanced algorithms for speeding the
creation of DNA signatures for biological pathogen detection
through the Advanced Scientific Computing Research and
Development program. These discoveries will result in cheaper,
faster and more reliable bio-detectors for homeland security.
In fiscal year 2005, TVTA will provide the science and technology
capabilities and enduring partnerships needed to develop methods and
tools to test and assess threats and vulnerabilities to protect
critical infrastructure and enhance information exchange. The Threat-
Vulnerability Mapper is only one component of a large Threat and
Vulnerability Information System that we will continue to build,
drawing upon advances in the information and computer sciences as well
as innovative analytic techniques. Our objective is to continually
improve an analyst's capability to answer threat-related questions. The
Science and Technology Directorate will contribute to the capability to
produce high-quality net assessments and assessments of weapons of mass
destruction. We will develop advanced computing algorithms in support
of improved aerosol dispersion models, blast effects calculations,
neutron interrogation models, bioinformatics, and scalable information
extraction; improved algorithms make more accurate information
available faster. We will continue to provide, in collaboration with
other relevant organizations, the science and technology and associated
standards needed in the development of biometrics for precise
identification of individuals and develop instrumentation to aid
authorized officials in detecting individuals with potentially hostile
intent. In the cybersecurity area, the DETER Network testbed will be up
and running, and we will competitively fund several low-cost, high-
impact solutions to specific cybersecurity problems.
Standards
Ensuring that standards are created and adopted is critically
important for homeland security. We need consistent and verifiable
measures of effectiveness in terms of basic functionality,
appropriateness and adequacy for the task, interoperability,
efficiency, and sustainability. Standards will improve the quality and
usefulness of homeland security systems and technologies. Our Standards
portfolio cuts across all aspects of the Science and Technology
Directorate's mission and all threats to improve effectiveness,
efficiency, and interoperability of the systems and technologies
developed, as envisioned in the Homeland Security Act.
Our Standards portfolio continues to actively engage the Federal,
state, and local first responders to ensure that developed standards
are effective in detection, prevention, response, management, and
attribution. This portfolio also conducts the essential activities in
order to meet the requirement of the SAFETY (Support Anti-Terrorism by
Fostering Effective Technologies) Act in developing certification
standards for technologies related to homeland security.
In fiscal year 2004, our Standards portfolio:
Created initial standards guidelines, with formal
standards nearing completion, for radiation pagers, hand-held
radiation dosimetry instruments, radioisotope identifiers and
radiation portal monitors. These standards were developed under
the auspices of the American National Standards Institute's
Accredited American Standards Committee on Radiation
Instrumentation.
Published guidelines for interoperable communications
gear. Common grant guidance has been developed and incorporated
in the public safety wireless interoperability grant programs
of both the Department of Justice and the Department of
Homeland Security;
Launched the SAFETY Act process for evaluating anti-
terrorism technologies for potential liability limits.
In fiscal year 2005, the Standards portfolio will continue to work
on many fronts and with many partners to establish needed standards for
technologies (including equipment), processes, and systems. We will
especially focus on two major milestones. First, we will establish
technical standards and test and evaluation protocols for
decontamination technologies and analysis across the ranges of weapons
of mass destruction. Second, we will publish a ``Consumer's Report'' on
radiation and bioagent detection devices for Federal, state, and local
users.
Emerging Threats
It is truly the threats we do not yet know that are often the most
terrifying. Our Emerging Threats portfolio addresses the dynamic nature
of terrorist threats, as science and technology advancements enable new
agents of harm and new ways to employ them. This portfolio places high
priority on developing the capability to use innovative, crosscutting,
out-of-the-box approaches for anticipating and responding to new and
emerging threats. Successful identification of emerging threats will
permit capabilities to be developed to thwart these emerging threats
before they are used.
Relevant R & D is underway at other agencies and organizations;
thus, partnerships in this area hold great potential for synergistic
focus on homeland security. Work is being done and will continue to be
pursued in partnership with the Departments of Energy, Defense,
Justice, and Agriculture, the intelligence community, and the National
Institutes of Health.
In fiscal year 2003 and 2004, our scientists in the Emerging
Threats portfolio established informal partnerships with the
intelligence community and with the United States Secret Service in
order to leverage ongoing activities in support of over-the-horizon
assessment.
In fiscal year 2005, we will leverage the activities started during
fiscal year 2004, and continue to focus on developing the capability to
use innovative, crosscutting, out-of-the-box approaches for
anticipating and responding to new and emerging threats and to develop
revolutionary technologies to combat them.
Rapid Prototyping
By accelerating the time needed to develop and commercialize
relevant technologies, the Science and Technology Directorate will
ensure that operational end-users will be better able to prevent
terrorist attacks, reduce the nation's vulnerability, and minimize the
damage and assist in recovery if attacks occur. Our Rapid Prototyping
portfolio advances the Directorate's mission to conduct, stimulate and
enable research, development, test, evaluation and timely transition of
homeland security capabilities to Federal, state and local operational
end-users.
In fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004, the Rapid Prototyping
portfolio provided funding of $30 million each year through our
Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) to the
interagency Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) to solicit ideas,
concepts and technologies for 50 requirement areas of interest to both
the Department and TWSG; initial contracts have been made and HSARPA
will provide the programmatic monitoring of those efforts for the
Science and Technology Directorate. This portfolio also provided
support through HSARPA for a joint port and coastal surveillance
prototype testbed designated ``HAWKEYE'' with the United States Coast
Guard. Funding has been made available to support the creation of a
Technology Clearinghouse as required in the Homeland Security Act of
2002.
In fiscal year 2005, this program will continue to provide a
mechanism for accelerated development of technologies relevant to
homeland security in a process driven by technology developers. Through
rapid prototyping and commercialization, these technologies will be
made available to operational end-users as quickly as possible, thus
increasing their capability to secure the homeland.
Support to Department of Homeland Security Components
As I have mentioned, the operational components of the Department
are my customers. The Department of Homeland Security's Science and
Technology Directorate supports the missions of the Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate, Border and
Transportation Security (BTS), Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP
& R), United States Coast Guard (USCG), and United States Secret
Service (USSS). Our TVTA portfolio supports the mission of the IAIP
Directorate as previously indicated. This portfolio places high
priorities on high-risk, high-reward research and development relevant
to homeland security that might not otherwise be conducted in support
of the missions of BTS, EP & R, USCG, and the USSS.
In fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004, we continued to support
the conventional missions of these operational components. Ongoing
activities within BTS, USCG and USSS focus on preventing terrorists and
terrorist weapons (particularly weapons of mass destruction) from
entering the United States, on detecting and preventing cyber attacks,
supporting maritime transportation, safety and economy (Port and
Channel navigation, Search and Rescue, and Aquatic Nuisance Species
Remediation), and on preventing attacks on United States Secret Service
protectees and highvisibility venues.
Support to Border and Transportation Security
The Science and Technology Directorate supports all elements of BTS
enforcement and facilitation processes through identifying operational
requirements, developing mission capabilities-based technological needs
and implementing a strategic plan. We are providing systems engineering
support to various BTS programs including US-VISIT and Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles.The Science and Technology Directorate's support to the BTS
Directorate is accomplished by implementing a capabilities-based
technology planning process. The capabilities-based approach
establishes the scope of effort and framework for a technology plan.
Through a series of user conferences and technology opportunity
conferences, requirements are developed and prioritized for new and
improved capabilities. Operational personnel identify capabilities and
technology personnel identify potential development opportunities.
Capability gaps and possible technology solutions are proposed, and a
budget is developed to distinguish between both funded and unfunded
needs.
The Science & Technology Directorate co-chairs with BTS, the
Department's Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Working Group, which is
currently focused on developing the Border and Transportation Security
operational requirements for UAVs and related technologies, e.g.,
aerostats, blimps, lighter than air (LTA) ships, and fixed and mobile
towers. The starting point for the requirements generation process is
six BTS capability objectives we have identified that could benefit by
the utilization of UAVs: surveillance and monitoring communications,
apprehension, targeting, intelligence, deterrence, and officer safety.
Functional capabilities that could be filled or improved through the
application of UAVs and other technologies have been identified. Based
on these high-level requirements, the Science and Technology
Directorate is developing concepts of operations and assumptions that
will be used in conducting an Analysis of Alternatives that will
include UAVs and other technologies.
In fiscal year 2005 we will be involved in a wide range of
activities supporting the components, based upon their needs. For BTS,
we will focus on discovering and implementing technologies that include
improved screening and inspection, access control, document
verification and validity, and data compression and analysis.
Support to Emergency Preparedness and Response
The nation has more than 750 regionally accredited community
colleges. Community colleges train more than 80 percent of our
country's first responders; these first responders are critical for
homeland security. The Science and Technology Directorate has a
responsibility to ensure that these first responders have the necessary
tools available to them to perform their jobs effectively and safely on
a daily basis. This portfolio has a key role in our meeting that
responsibility.
The scope of our EP & R portfolio includes research, development,
test and evaluation for state, local and Federal emergency responders
and emergency managers. Particular emphasis is placed on technology
integration at all levels of government, technology insertion for
weapons of mass destruction detection and monitoring systems, and long-
term sustained performance and interoperability to enhance state and
local preparedness.
Our work in the EP & R portfolio focuses on three major areas:
Technology development for first responders
Scientific and technical support to Federal response
Technology integration--Safe Cities
The Safe Cities Program, a new initiative in fiscal year 2004, is
focused on implementing technology and operational system solutions in
local communities/regions. This program is being piloted in a select
number of cities in fiscal year 2004 and will be conducted in close
cooperation with state and local emergency managers and city planners
to identify capability needs and gaps that advanced technologies being
developed by the Science and Technology Directorate can meet. The Safe
Cities Program seeks to provide technology and operational solutions
that are sustainable by the communities in which they are implemented.
The Safe Cities Program will enable us to better understand the
operational context into which new technologies will be inserted. The
Program will result in the creation of an infrastructure that
facilitates the evaluation of new technologies in real-world operating
environments as well as providing a venue for integrating these
technologies with existing state and local systems.
In fiscal year 2005 the EP & R portfolio will continue its focus on
technology development and technical guidance for first responders
(state and local), scientific and technical support to the EP & R
Directorate; and expansion of technology integration--Safe Cities.
Support to United States Coast Guard
The Science & Technology Directorate is integrating a major
research program into a United States Coast Guard operational testbed
in south Florida. The HAWKEYE program injects technologies (such as
Surveillance, Command & Control, Sensor Fusion, and Communications)
allowing simultaneous evaluation of technology performance as a direct
impact on mission execution.
Support to the United States Secret Service
We have coordinated with the United States Secret Service and
established its first direct-funded R & D program. Based upon
appropriated funding, four initiatives have been identified and
prioritized, and are underway in fiscal year 2004. In addition, there
will be joint activities in support of the assessment of emerging
threats.
Homeland Security University and Fellowship Programs
In this portfolio we seek to develop a broad research capability
within the nation's universities to address scientific and
technological issues related to homeland security. The portfolio places
high priorities on developing academic programs and supporting students
in order to build learning and research environments in key areas of
Departmental interest.
In fiscal year 2004, this portfolio established the Department of
Homeland Security's first University based Center of Excellence, for
Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events. The Center, based at
the University of Southern California, will assess the level of risk
associated with various terrorist scenarios, in particular the
potential economic consequences. A request for proposals has been
issued for the next two Centers of Excellence, which will focus on
Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease Defense and Post-Harvest Food
Protection and Defense.
Last fall, we awarded our 2003-2004 academic year DHS Scholarships
and Fellowships, and welcomed our new Scholars and Fellows with a
reception in Washington, DC. The solicitation for this program received
just under 2,500 applications for 100 Scholarships and Fellowships.
Besides making immediate contributions to homeland security-related R &
D, these students will be part of the development of a broad research
capability within the Nation's universities to address scientific and
technological issues related to homeland security.
During fiscal year 2005, another 100 Scholars and Fellows will be
supported for the academic year of 2004-2005, bringing the total of
supported students to 200. We will also continue to support the
Homeland Security University Centers of Excellence established in
fiscal year 2004, each with a different subject expertise focused on
reducing the terrorist threat on the United States. Each Center of
Excellence is awarded an initial three-year contract whose annual cost
we account for in our planning.
Counter-MANPADS
The Counter-MANPADS program is focused on identifying, developing,
and testing a cost effective capability to protect the Nation's
commercial aircraft against the threat of man-portable, anti-aircraft
missiles. This program also provides the science and technology base
needed to reduce the vulnerability of commercial aircraft to terrorist
attack using man-portable anti-aircraft missiles.
Over the past year, we have had a successful solicitation
announcing a program to address the potential threat of MANPADS to
commercial aircraft. White papers responding to the Counter-MANPADS
program solicitation were reviewed by technical experts from the
Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense, and other
government agencies; proposals were evaluated; and awards were made to
three contractor teams to perform the first of two program phases,
which began in January, 2004. The first phase will result in a
preliminary design and a test plan to demonstrate missile
countermeasure equipment on selected commercial aircraft.
The second program phase is an 18-month effort beginning in August
2004, with the one or two contractors that produced the most promising
results in Phase One. During this phase, the commercial prototype
countermeasure equipment will be integrated on selected commercial
aircraft, and live-fire range tests will be accomplished with extensive
data collection and analysis. Results of this second phase will be
presented to the Administration and Congress to aid in formulating an
informed decision on how best to address the protection of commercial
airlines from the MANPADS threat.
SAFECOM
The SAFECOM (Wireless Public SAFEty Interoperable COMmunications)
program is the umbrella initiative to coordinate all Federal, state,
local, and Tribal users to achieve national wireless communications
interoperability. The placement of SAFECOM in the Department of
Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate allows it full
access to the scientific expertise and resources needed to help our
nation achieve true public safety wireless communications
interoperability.
Since the Science and Technology Directorate formally assumed
responsibility for the management of the SAFECOM program barely seven
months ago:
SAFECOM has been established as the one umbrella group
in the Federal government for the management of public safety
wireless interoperability programs;
Common grant guidance has been developed and
incorporated in the public safety wireless interoperability
grant programs of both the Department of Justice and the
Department of Homeland Security;
A Federal coordinating structure has, for the first
time, been created to coordinate all Federal public safety
wireless interoperability programs;
The first catalog of national programs touching on
public safety wireless interoperability has been developed and
published; and
The ten major state and local organizations concerned
with public safety wireless interoperability--the Association
of Public-Safety Communications Officials (APCO), International
Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), International Association of
Chiefs of Police (IACP), Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCC),
National Sheriffs' Association (NSA), Major County Sheriffs'
Association (MCSA), National Association of Counties (NACO),
National League of Cities (NLC), National Public Safety
Telecommunications Council (NPSTC), and the United States
Conference of Mayors (USCM)--released a statement in support of
the SAFECOM program which declared that ``With the advent of
the SAFECOM Program. . . Public safety, state and local
government finally have both a voice in public safety
discussions at the Federal level and confidence that the
Federal government is coordinating its resources.''
Prioritization
The Science and Technology Directorate has prioritized its research
and development efforts based on the directives, recommendations and
suggestions from many sources, including:
Homeland Security Act of 2002;
The fiscal year 2004 Congressional Appropriations for
the Department of Homeland Security;
President Bush's National Strategy for Homeland
Security, the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of
Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, the National Strategy
to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, the National Strategy to
Secure Cyberspace, and the National Security Strategy;
President Bush's nine Homeland Security Presidential
Directives;
Office of Management and Budget's 2003 Report on
Combating Terrorism;
Current threat assessments as understood by the
Intelligence Community;
Requirements identified by other Department
components;
Expert understanding of enemy capabilities that exist
today or that can be expected to appear in the future; and
The report from the National Academy of Science on
``Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology
in Countering Terrorism,'' and the reports from the Gilmore,
Bremer and Hart-Rudman Committees.
Identifying and integrating the information contained in these
sources has not been a small task, but the result, coupled with expert
evaluation and judgment by our scientific staff, is the basis for
determining the research and development needed to meet our mission
requirements.
Division of Effort Among the DHS S & T Directorate and Research Efforts
at Other Government Agencies
One of the accomplishments of which I am personally most proud is
the emphasis our new Directorate has put on interacting with other
Federal departments and agencies. Knowledge of other science and
technology programs and their results, appropriate collaboration
between agencies, coordination of relevant programmatic activities, and
information sharing are essential for us to best meet our mission
requirements. Science and Technology Directorate cybersecurity
personnel and those at the National Science Foundation and the National
Institute of Standards and Technology have already established
collaborative and coordinated programs to ensure no duplication of
effort. Our biological and chemical countermeasures staff have
partnered with the Department of Defense's (DOD's) Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DTRA) to plan and execute the BioNet program and
roadmap the biological countermeasures R & D programs in both agencies
to understand capabilities and shortfalls. They work with the National
Science Foundation on pathogen sequencing. The BioWatch program,
although led by the Science and Technology Directorate, was
accomplished through collaboration with personnel from the Department
of Energy's National Laboratories, contractors, the Environmental
Protection Agency, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
We work with DOD's Office of Homeland Defense to ensure the effective
transfer to the Department of relevant DOD technologies.
Our high explosives scientists are working with the interagency
Technical Support Working Group, managed by the Department of State, to
evaluate commercial off-the-shelf systems with capabilities against
suicide bombers. The Director of the Homeland Security Advanced
Research Projects Agency is a member of the TSWG Executive Committee.
Our staff are in frequent contact with the Office of Science and
Technology Policy on a range of issues, and several are members and co-
chairs of the Office of Science and Technology Policy's National
Science and Technology Council. Our Office of Research and Development
works closely with the Department of Agriculture to ensure that the
Plum Island Animal Disease Center facility is operating smoothly and
fully meeting its mission. The Office of Research and Development also
interfaces with the Department of Energy to keep the Office of Science,
as well as the National Nuclear Security Administration, apprised of
our long-term homeland security requirements.
The Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology
Directorate recognizes that many organizations are contributing to the
science and technology base needed to enhance the nation's capabilities
to thwart terrorist acts and to fully support the conventional missions
of the operational components of the Department. Congress recognized
the importance of the research and development being conducted by
numerous Federal departments and agencies, and, in the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, directed the Under Secretary of Science and
Technology to coordinate the Federal government's civilian efforts to
identify and develop countermeasures to current and emerging threats.
We take this responsibility very seriously.
We are now initiating the effort needed to coordinate homeland
security research and development across the entire United States
Government. It will come as no surprise to the members of this
Subcommittee that good, solid, effective research and development
relevant to homeland security is being conducted by the Departments of
Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, Justice, Health and Human
Services, State, and Veteran's Affairs; within the National Science
Foundation, the Environmental Protection Agency and other Federal
agencies; and by members of the Intelligence Community.
Several interagency working groups already exist that are
addressing issues important to homeland security. The Science and
Technology Directorate has been, and continues to be, an active
participant in these working groups, and in most cases has taken a
leadership role. These fora foster an active exchange of information
and assist each participating agency in identifying related needs and
requirements, conducting research and development of mutual benefit,
and avoiding duplication of effort.
We also continue to have discussions at multiple levels of
management with Federal Departments and Agencies, as well as with the
Office of Management and Budget, the Office of Science and Technology
Policy, and the Homeland Security Council. These discussions ensure
that the strongest possible links are made and the best possible
coordination occurs between our Department and those who are conducting
sector-specific research. By the autumn of 2004, all Department of
Homeland Security research and development programs will be
consolidated and all United States Government research and development
relevant to fulfilling the Department's mission will have been
identified and coordinated as appropriate. It is important to note that
this identification and relevant coordination does not imply the
Department of Homeland Security should have the responsibility and
authority for these programs within other Federal agencies; it does
recognize that science and technology advances can have many
applications, including homeland security.
Outside Inputs to the S & T Budget
The Science and Technology Directorate's budget is built to meet
the Department's and our mission requirements. As previously discussed,
we identify and prioritize our efforts using multiple national sources
and the sharing of information relevant to homeland security among
government organizations. Our Homeland Security Science and Technology
Advisory Committee will hold its first meeting February 26-27, 2004,
and this group will also provide input to the scope, priority and level
of effort needed to meet our objectives.
Metrics Developed by the Science and Technology Directorate
The success of the Science and Technology Directorate depends on
its ability to identify, develop and transition capabilities to end-
users that enhance the Nation's ability to protect itself. Appropriate
goals and performance measures must be identified and used to measure
our progress. The following table identifies the programmatic metrics
developed by the Science and Technology Directorate's portfolio
managers; these metrics will be used to measure our performance.
ST0001 Biological Countermeasures
Long term performance goal
The United States will have a high-performance and well-
integrated biological threat agent warning and characterization
system that willinclude sustainable environmental monitoring
capability for metropolitan areas; a national special security
event system for the nation at large; and identification of
needs for vaccines and therapeutics for people and animals.
Longer term research will support the development of biological
threat warning and characterization systems that address both
current and future threats.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance Measures FY2005 Target
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Capability to detect and assess biological threats, measured by a FAR=10EE-4, Multiplex 10 assays
set of attributes: increase sensitivity by decreasing false alarm
rate (FAR), and increase multiplex samples.
FY2005 milestones: Decontamination technologies and standards for Milestone will be achieved
facilities and outdoor areas. National Milestones will be achieved
Academy of Science study characterizes contamination risks.
FY2005 milestones: Establishment of a national capability in Milestones will be achieved
biodefense analysis and agro-bioterrorism countermeasures. Research
operations begin; phased construction continues. BioForensics
Analysis Center Hub operational.
Improved capabilities to detect threats in urban areas (Urban Milestone will be achieved
Monitoring Program), measured by increased sampling coverage and
frequency, and capability to detect additional threats. FY2005
milestone: increase coverage in top threat cities.
Integrated field demonstrations of next-generation solutions 2 Demos operational
(Domestic Demonstrations and Applications Program).
Validated human and agricultural bioassays. 10
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST0002 Chemical Countermeasures
Long term performance goal
Develop and deploy a broad capability to prevent and rapidly
mitigate the consequences of chemical attacks.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance Measures FY2005 Target
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY2005 milestone: Development of protocols for the highest priority Milestone will be achieved
toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) and toxic industrial materials
(TIMs).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST0003 Chemical High Explosives
Long term performance goal
The Chemical High Explosives portfolio will improve explosives
detection equipment and procedures for all forms of
transportation as well as fixed facilities.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance Measures FY2005 Target
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY2005 milestone: Pilot tests of standoff detection technologies. Milestone will be achieved
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST0004 Radiological & Nuclear Countermeasures
Long term performance goal
By FY2009. an effective suite of countermeasures against
radiological and nuclear threats will be developed with
capabilities in detection, intelligence analysis, response, and
preparedness.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance Measures FY2005 Target
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal, state and local sites that are integrated into an 5
operational secondary reachback architecture to resolve
radiological and nuclear alarms.
Performance measures associated with Test and Evaluation (T and E) Milestone will be achieved
of developmental prototypes of Radiation Detectors. Establish a
long-range plan for T and E capability.
Progression on planned capability development for Nuclear Incident Milestone will be achieved
Management and Recovery. Demonstrate 2 advanced detection
technologies.
Progression on pre-planned product improvement of deployed Milestone will be achieved
technologies. Perform critical design reviews for Phase One
technology improvements for projects awarded in fiscal year 2004.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST0005 Threat and Vulnerability, Testing & Assessments
Long term performance goal
Provide measurable advancements in information assurance,
threat detection and discovery, linkages of threats to
vulnerabilities, and capability assessments and information
analysis required by Departmental missions to anticipate,
detect, deter, avoid, mitigate and respond to threats to our
homeland security.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance Measures FY2005 Target
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Improvement in the national capability to assess threats and Improvement in 7 categories
vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks: 10 categories to be assessed.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST0006 Standards
Long term performance goal
Establish an integrated infrastructure for determining and
developing standards, and test and evaluation protocols for
technology used for detecting, mitigating, and recovering from
terrorist attacks and also to support other Departmental
components' technologies. Provide consistent and verifiable
measures of effectiveness of homeland security-related
technologies, operators, and systems in terms of basic
functionality, interoperability, efficiency, and
sustainability. Facilitate the development of guidelines in
conjunction with both users and developers.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance Measures FY2005 Target
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Long-term implementation of SAFETY Act Certifications
FY2005 milestones: Technical standards and test/evaluation protocols Milestones will be achieved
will be established for WMD decontamination technologies and
analysis tools. ``Consumer's report'' on radiation and bioagent
detection devicesfor federal, state, and local users will be
published.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST0008 Homeland Security Fellowship Programs I University Programs
Long term performance goal
Significantly increase the number of U.S. students in fields
relevant to homeland security including the physical life and
social sciences; and engineering.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance Measures FY2005 Target
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
To increase the nation's science and technology workforce and 200 students
research 200 students capability on issues related to homeland 3 centers
security. Fiscal Year 2005: students supported/Centers of
Excellence established.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST0009 Emerging Threats
Long term performance goal
To develop effective capabilities to characterize, assess, and
counter performance goal new and emerging threats, and to
exploit technology development opportunities as they arise.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance Measures FY2005 Target
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Improved capability to prevent terrorist attacks through annual Baseline
emerging threat assessment report (% of responding recipients
indicating the report is valuable).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST0010 Rapid Prototyping
Long term performance goal
Support the development of innovative solutions to enhance
homeland security and work with federal, state, and local
governments; and the private sector to implement these
solutions. In partnership with the Technical Support Working
Group (TSWG), operate an effective and efficient clearinghouse
that will develop, prototype, and commercialize innovative
technologies to support the homeland security mission.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance Measures FY2005 Target
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Technologies prototyped or commercialized. 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST0011 SAFECOM
Long term performance goal
Provide public safety agencies with central coordination,
leadership and guidance to help them achieve short-term
interoperability and long-term compatibility of their radio
networks across jurisdictions and disciplines.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance Measures FY2005 Target
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Increased interoperability across local, tribal, state, and federal 3
public safety jurisdictions and disciplines. Fiscal Year 2005:
Based on fiscal year 2004 baseline, improvements in 3 categories.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST0012 Counter Man-Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS)
Long term performance goal
The Nation will have effective capabilities to defeat the
threat to commercial aircraft of man-portable anti-aircraft
missiles.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance Measures FY2005 Target
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Effective technology/technologies for commercial aircraft to defeat 2
manportable anti-aircraft missiles identified. Fiscal Year 2005:
Technologies identified, and prototypes developed and tested.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST007 Support to Department of Homeland Security Components
Long term performance goal
Increase the capabilities of mission-focused operational
components (BTS, EP & R, Coast Guard, and Secret Service) to
secure the homeland and enhance their ability to conduct their
missions.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance Measures FY2005 Target
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Improved capability of DHS Components to secure the homeland as Baseline
measured by assessment of customer organizations in accomplishing
agreed-upon areas of assistance.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Short-Term and Lone-Term Research.
In the 11 months that this Department has been in existence, the
Science and Technology Directorate has focused its initial efforts on
near-term development and deployment of technologies to improve our
nation's ability to detect and respond to potential terrorist acts.
However, we recognize that a sustained effort to continually add to our
knowledge base and our resource base is necessary for future
developments. Thus, we have invested a portion of our resources,
including our university programs, toward these objectives. The
following table indicates our expenditures in basic research, applied
research, and development to date, excluding construction funding.
Science and Technology Directorate R & D Investments (in millions of $)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2003(
Fiscal Year actual) FY 2004(estimated) FY 2005(proposed)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Basic 47 117 80
Applied 59 56 229
Developmenta398 608 643
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 504 781 952
------------------------------------------------------------------------
% basic 9.3% 15.0% 8.4%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our initial expenditures in basic research are heavily weighted by
our investments in university programs. These university programs will
not only provide new information relevant to homeland security, but
will also provide a workforce of people who are cognizant of the needs
of homeland security, especially in areas of risk analysis, animal-
related agro-terrorism, bioforensics, cybersecurity, disaster modeling,
and psychological and behavioral analysis.
We expect to gradually increase our total percentage of basic and
applied research to the level needed for sustaining our role as a
research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT & E) organization.
Rationale for Budget Increases: BioWatch and the National Biodefense
Analysis and Countermeasures Center
President Bush's Fiscal Year 2005 budget request includes a $274
million Bio-Surveillance Program Initiative to protect the nation
against bioterrorism and to strengthen the public health
infrastructure. Included in this request is an increase of $65 million
for the Science and Technology Directorate to enhance current
environmental monitoring activities. This requested increase is a
direct outgrowth of the recently completed joint Homeland Security
Council--National Security Council (HSC-NSC) Bio-Defense End-to-End
study which identified the need for an integrated, real-time, human-
animal-plant surveillance system as a top priority national need. The
DHS Bio Watch system, which currently provides a bio-aerosol warning
for most of this nation's large metropolitan areas, figures prominently
in the integrated Biosurveillance initiative. This initiative would
entail: (1) Expanding BioWatch coverage in the top ten threat cities;
and (2) Piloting of an integrated attack warning and assessment system
known as BWICS (BioWarning and Incident Characterization System).
Currently the ``average'' BioWatch city has about 10 collectors per
city. Systems studies and city feedback provide a more 'needs based'
guide to the optimal number of collectors in our large, high threat
cities. The systems studies show that about 40-60 collectors provide
optimal outdoor coverage for a city, while the cities themselves have
requested additional collectors for key facilities (transit systems,
airports, stadiums). Alternate labor contracting processes, simplified
sample handling techniques, and the introduction of additional
automation in analyses will allow us to do this expansion in a cost
effective manner.
The BWICS pilot will integrate real-time bio-surveillance and
environmental monitoring data with plume hazard predictions,
epidemiological forecasts, population and critical infrastructure
databases, and other available resources in two of the highest threat
cities.
We also will accelerate R & D on next generation environmental
monitoring systems. New classes of detectors, that can identify bio-
agents in two minutes or less with incredibly low false alarm rates
will make it possible to do 'detect-to-protect' for key facilities--
allowing one to reroute air flow or evacuate a facility so as to
minimize exposure and not simply begin the onset of early treatment.
And tailoring of existing and emerging detection systems to monitoring
key high volume nodes in our food processing will be critical to the
development of proposed `food shields.'
The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC)
provides scientific support for intelligence activities, prioritizes
biothreats, and also conducts bioforensic analyses contributing to
attribution and hence to deterrence. Specifically, the NBACC (both
facilities and programs) will support public and agricultural health,
law enforcement, and national and homeland security by providing hub
laboratory capabilities for:
Dedicated and accredited bio-forensic analysis
capabilities to support attribution of the use of bio-threat
agents (BTA) by criminals, non-state, and state-sponsored
actors
Laboratory-based, scientific data from the analysis
and assessment of biological threats to human health and
agriculture to support a national bio-defense net assessment
fundamental to development of national plans, risk assessment
evaluations and priorities to deter, detect, mitigate and
recover from BTA attack
Applied models, materials, and validation processes to
evaluate BTA countermeasures
Evidenced-based subject matter expertise to integrate,
analyze and distribute critical bio-defense and related
information assembled from multiple sources through a high
security and open clearinghouse.
Transfer of R & D Budgets and Activities from Other Directorates
The Science and Technology Directorate is both a generator and a
consumer of scientific and technological advances resulting from basic
and applied research and development. We also have a responsibility for
testing and evaluating capabilities to ensure that their deployment
results in improved operational systems. Standards are needed to assist
first responders and operational components of the Department in
evaluating, procuring, and deploying new capabilities. This is a broad
range of responsibility and one we take seriously. The Department has
defined R & D activities as follows:
Activities associated with R & D efforts include the
development of a new or improved capability to the point where
it is appropriate for operational use, including test and
evaluation. R & D activities include the analytic application
of scientific and engineering principles in support of
operational capabilities, concept exploration, systems
development, proof of principle demonstration and pilot
deployments, standards development, and product improvement
including application and integration of technologies. For
mission (non-management) systems, resources associated with
developing technology to provide new capabilities (including
systems engineering, research, development, testing and
prototyping) are covered under the R & D category.
This definition encompasses all of the research, development, test,
and evaluation (RDT & E) efforts of the Science and Technology
Directorate. It also encompasses RDT & E efforts currently existing in
other parts of the Department of Homeland Security. The Science and
Technology Directorate has been tasked to consolidate these activities
from elsewhere within the Department into our directorate.
We have begun this coordination process by evaluating and producing
a report on the research, development, testing, and evaluation work
that was being conducted within the Department of Homeland Security but
was not already under the direct cognizance of the Science and
Technology Directorate. Where it is appropriate, the Science and
Technology Directorate will absorb these R & D functions. In other
cases, the Science and Technology Directorate will provide appropriate
input, guidance, and oversight of these R & D programs.
Research and Development activities are ongoing in fiscal year 2004
within the following departmental elements: Border and Transportation
Security (BTS), Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR), United
States Coast Guard (USCG), and United States Secret Service (USSS). The
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate
reported no fiscal year 2004 R & D activities.
The Fiscal Year 2005 President's Budget contains three programs
that have been identified to transfer to the Science and Technology
Directorate. They are United States Coast Guard RDT & E activities
conducted at their Groton, CT laboratory ($13.5 million); Emergency
Preparedness and Response RDT & E activities supporting the U.S. Fire
Administration ($0.65 million); and ICE-Federal Air Marshall's RDT & E
activities supporting the development of their Air-to-Ground
Communication System ($10 million).
The transfer of these three RDT & E Programs is only the start and
not the complete identification of the potential programs to review for
consideration. S & T will be working throughout the year with the
Department and with Congress to identify other existing programs and
transfer them consistent with direction.
Budget and Activities Supporting Cybersecuritv R & D
The cybersecurity program within the Science and Technology
Directorate is conducted by the Threat and Vulnerability, Testing and
Assessment portfolio. The approach of this program includes addressing
areas not currently addressed elsewhere in the Federal government. An
example of this is developing tools and techniques for assessing and
detecting the insider threat. The cybersecurity budget request for
fiscal year 2005 is $18 million dollars.
An important component of the cybersecurity program is coordination
with others who are performing cyber research and who are responsible
for cybersecurity. For example, our staff have engaged in a series of
meetings with staff members from the Department's Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP), both the National
Cyber Security Division and National Communications System. These
meetings provide an venue for general exchanges of information about
each organizations' respective plans for cybersecurity, as well as
specific discussions focused on IAIP technical requirements to feed
into cybersecurity R & D programs funded by the Science and Technology
Directorate.
Further, we are coordinating with the National Institute for
Standards and Technology (NIST) and the National Science Foundation
(NSF) to plan our respective roles. We are funding two projects with
NIST, Secure Domain Name System and Secure Border Gateway Protocol,
which are protocols that the Internet relies on to function. We are co-
funding two projects with the NSF: a research project to create an
experimental infrastructure network to support development and
demonstration of next generation information security technologies for
cyber defense, called Cyber Defense Technology Experimental Research
(``DETER'') Network; and a project called Evaluation Methods in
Internet Security Technology (EMIST), a testing framework that will
include attack scenarios, attack simulators, generators for topology
and background traffic, data sets derived from live traffic, and tools
to monitor and summarize results.
Basis for Policy on the Use of the National Laboratories
The Science and Technology Directorate has identified separate
mechanisms to access the capability base at the DOE national
laboratories and sites to guard against organizational conflicts of
interest and inappropriate use of inside information in responding to
competitive private sector solicitations. Five national laboratories
(Livermore, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, Pacific Northwest, and Sandia) have
been identified as Intramural Laboratories. These labs will help S & T
set research goals and requirements and formulate R & D road maps. This
level of engagement would give the intramural labs unfair advantage if
they were permitted to compete for funding awarded through open
solicitations.
All other DOE laboratories and sites have been identified as
Extramural Laboratories. Because the Extramural Laboratories will not
be involved in internal DHS research planning, they are eligible to
compete in Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA)
and Systems Engineering and Development (SED) funding, such as the
Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) valued at $50 million for radiological/
nuclear technologies that was recently issued. The majority of the
Science and Technology Directorate's funding will be executed through
HSARPA and SED. These labs may also freely team with industrial
partners to seamlessly commercialize technologies they have developed.
Budget for University Centers of Excellence and Fellows Programs
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget request of $30 million will
sustain the current scholars and fellows program and a total of three
Homeland Security Centers of Excellence. Each additional Center of
Excellence would require a sustained investment of $5 million per year.
If more than a total of three Centers of Excellence are desired without
increasing the President's fiscal year 2005 budget request, a reduction
in the scholars and fellows program would be required.
Staffing
When the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) stood up on March 1,
2003, the Science and Technology Directorate had a total staff of about
87, including the 53 staff transferred from the Department of Energy's
Environmental Measurements Laboratory. The balance was comprised of
permanently assigned personnel, employees detailed from within and
without the Department, Intergovernmental Personnel Act assignments,
and personnel support from the National Laboratories.
By January 6, 2004, we more than doubled our staff. In January
2004, we had a total staff of 212, including 100 DHS employees, six
Public Health Service Officers, 21 Intergovernmental Personnel Act
employees, 26 individuals on assignment from other agencies, and 59
contractors.
We continue to be active in staffing our Directorate with well-
qualified individuals whose skills support the full breadth of our
responsibilities and RDT & E activities. We continue to actively seek
additional staff in accordance with our approved staffing plan.
Conclusion
With less than a full year under the Department's belt, the
scientists and engineers in the Science and Technology Directorate have
accomplished more than I could have expected. I am proud to have shared
with you today some of those success stories. We have appended a more
comprehensive summary of accomplishments to date for the record.
And yet, we also recognize that there is much to do, and we will be
working just as hard in fiscal year 2005.
I look forward to continuing to work with you on the Cybersecurity,
Science, and Research and Development Subcommittee; other Federal
departments and agencies; the academic community; and private industry
to continue the work begun and continually improve our ability to
protect our homeland and way of life.
Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Lofgren and Members of the
Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I thank you for the
opportunity to appear before this committee and will be happy to answer
any questions you may have.
Appendix
Accomplishments of the Science and Technology Directorate
Department of Homeland Security
March 2003 to February 2004
Biololgical and Chemical Countermeasures
Biowatch: National Urban Monitoring for Biological Pathogens
The Biowatch program has been established and deployed to cities
across the nation. The program--developed, funded, and managed by the
Science and Technology (S & T) Directorate--is executed in cooperation
with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). It employs environmental sampling
devices to quickly detect biological pathogens, such as anthrax, in
time to distribute life-saving pharmaceuticals to affected citizens.
The S & T Directorate is now focusing its efforts on piloting the next
generation of environmental samplers, which will reduce the amount of
labor required and the response time needed for detection while keeping
the detection probability high and false alarm rates low. These devices
will take advantage of the latest advances in micro-chemistry, commonly
referred to as ``chemistry on a chip.''
PROTECT (Program for Response Options and Technology Enhancement for
Chemical Terrorism): Chemical Defense and Response Capability for
Transportation Facility
The S & T Directorate, in collaboration with the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), completed PROTECT (Program
for Response Options and Technology Enhancements for Chemical/
Biological Terrorism). PROTECT, which is an operational chemical agent
detection and response capability, is deployed in Metro stations and
operated by the WMATA. PROTECT is a team effort that owes its success
to the scientific and engineering talent from Argonne, Sandia, and
Livermore National Laboratories and operational expertise from WMATA
and the First Responder community (the District of Columbia; Arlington,
VA; Montgomery County, MD; and others). Also contributing significantly
to the project are private industry partners, including LiveWave Inc.,
ManTech Security Technology, the detector manufacturer (name withheld
for security reasons); and Federal partners, including the Federal
Transit Administration (FTA), Department of Transportation (DOT),
National Institute of Justice (NIJ), and the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS's) Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP). The system
integrates chemical detector data and video feed and transmits the
integrated information to the Operation Control Center (OCC), where the
information is analyzed and an event confirmed. The information is then
transmitted to the first responders who access it in both their OCC and
through the use of wired jacks on the scene to facilitate response and
recovery. PROTECT also has application in other areas, including fire
and emergency response, security, and forensics. Upon completion, the
system will be totally owned and operated by WMATA and expanded to
approximately 20 stations. FTA is working with WMATA and Argonne
National Laboratory to transfer the technology nationally. The
information gleaned from PROTECT will have direct application to
facility protection and response. A related effort is being piloted in
the Boston subway system.
Joint Urban 2003: Experimental Atmospheric Transport and Modeling
In June 2003, the S & T Directorate, in coordination with the
Department of Defense's Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Department of
Energy, and University of Oklahoma sponsored a month-long atmospheric
dispersion study in Oklahoma City, OK. Nearly 150 scientists,
engineers, and student assistants were dedicated to this study, which
tracked the air movement of safe, non-toxic tracer gases in and around
city buildings. The resulting data is being used to enhance and develop
urban-specific atmospheric dispersion computer models that will allow
emergency management, law enforcement and other personnel to train for
and respond to potential chemical, biological, and radiological
terrorist attacks.
ProACT (Protective and Response Options for Airport Counter Terrorism):
Chemical and Biological Counterrorism Demonstration and Application
Program
The S & T Directorate and its partners at the San Francisco
International Airport are involved in a pilot program that couples
biological and chemical detection with vulnerability analysis,
response, and restoration. This program integrates networked sensors
with the operation of ventilation systems, allowing redirection of
contaminated air and effective evacuation should an event occur.
Guidance for the airport facility operators to manage biological and
chemical crises will be finalized soon for distribution throughout the
applicable community. Protocols and concepts of operation for
restoration also are under development. This program is designed to
serve as a template for deployment of these capabilities to other
similar facilities.
LINC (Local Integration of National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center
[NARAC] with Cities): Hazard Assessment Tool for Operational Event
Management
LINC demonstrates the capability for providing local government
agencies with advanced operational atmospheric plume prediction
capabilities that can be seamlessly integrated with appropriate federal
agency support for homeland security. LINC's approach is to integrate
NARAC capabilities with local emergency management and response
centers. In the event of a chemical or biological release, NARAC
predictions can be used by emergency managers and responders to map the
extent and effects of hazardous airborne material. Prompt predictions
are provided to guide front-line responders in determining protective
actions to be taken, critical facilities that may be at risk, and safe
locations for incident command posts. LINC provides response teams from
multiple jurisdictions with tools to effectively share information
regarding the areas and populations at risk. To date, several cities
have participated in the project. New York City used LINC to help
inform and manage an explosion and fire at a Staten Island refinery in
the Spring of 2003.
BioNet: Integrated Civilian and Military Consequence Management
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of
Defense's Defense Threat Reduction Agency have initiated the BioNet
program to address joint civilian-military consequence management
issues for localities near military bases. Upon completion of BioNet, a
seamless consequence management plan that incorporates concepts of
operation, information products, area monitoring, population health
monitoring, and sample analysis laboratory will be developed that can
be used nationally.
Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC)
The S & T Directorate assumed responsibility for the operations of
the ``facilities and liabilities'' of PIADC in June 2003. A 60-day
review of security and operations resulted in immediate improvements
and a plan for enhancements to security and operational maintenance.
Dr. Beth Lautner has become new Center Director for PIADC. Dr. Lautner
was with the National Pork Board for 13 years, most recently serving as
the vice-president of Science and Technology. Highly respected
throughout animal agriculture for her work on numerous issues, she
pioneered the establishment of the Pork Quality Assurance (PQA) Program
and has worked extensively with the USDA and other organizations on
national agricultural security issues. In 1994, she was awarded the
prestigious Howard Dunne Memorial A ward by the association. In
addition, DHS announced on December 9, 2003, the selection of Field
Support Services, Inc. (FSSI), as the new contractor for maintenance at
PIADC. FSSI is a subsidiary of Arctic Slope Regional Corporation, an
Alaskan Native corporation, headquartered in Barrow, Alaska.
TOPOFF2 Exercise
In May 2003, leadership and staff members of the Science and
Technology Directorate served as members of the Secretary's Crisis
Assessment Team (CAT) and the interagency Domestic Emergency Support
Team (DEST) and provided expert technical advice on understanding,
communicating and responding to the hypothetical radiological and
plague events during the TOPOFF2 exercise.
Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures Programs
Radiation Detection in Metropolitan Areas
The Science and Technology division formally assumed management of
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey's radiation detection
test bed on August 2003. The test bed was previously managed by the
U.S. Department of Energy. The transfer will broaden the project scope
beyond testing and evaluation of individual pieces of technology to a
systems approach including response protocols and operational concepts.
Radiation detection equipment will be installed at tunnels, bridges,
ports, and airports in the New York City metropolitan area, and all
functions associated with their operational use will be evaluated. By
judging the efficacy of fielded systems over time, the Science and
Technology division will be able to influence future decisions on
detection technology R & D investment, deployment of urban
monitoring systems, configurations best able to enhance security, and
viable solutions for protecting the nation from radiological and
nuclear threats.
Determined Promise Exercise
In August 2003, staff members of the S & T Directorate participated
in Determined Promise, a Department of Defense (DoD) exercise held in
Las Vegas, NV. The exercise demonstrated the military's capability to
assist in the response to a natural disaster, a bioterrorism event, and
a number of other emergency situations nationwide. The exercise also
provided a forum for initiating discussions that will foster
interagency cooperation between DHS and USNORTHCOM.
Nuclear Threat Assessments
The S & T Directorate has provided eight rapid nuclear threat
assessments for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and
approximately two dozen assessments on reports of illicit trafficking
in nuclear materials for the Department of State and other customers.
The Department of Homeland Security has been leading the interagency
Nuclear Trafficking Focus Group, which regularly brings together the
operational players of all agencies involved in response to and
understanding of nuclear smuggling events.
Secondary ``Reach Back''
In August 2003, the S & T Directorate's Nuclear Assessment Program
stood up a system to provide secondary ``reach back'' support to
operational DHS entities employing radiation detection systems in the
field. Secondary reach back provides inspectors with an additional
information resource to utilize for the resolution of radiation
detection alarms that draws upon experience in the analysis of nuclear
smuggling incidents and threat analysis.
Standards
Radiation Detection.
The S & T Directorate has developed a suite of four radiation
detector standards under the auspices of the American National
Standards Institute (ANSI)'s Accredited American Standards Committee on
Radiation Instrumentation. The four standards deal with radiation
pagers, handheld dosimetry instruments, radioisotope identifiers and
radiation portal monitors. The S & T Directorate has formed three
writing groups to prepare Test and Evaluation (T & E) protocols for
hand-held radiation detectors, radionuclide identifiers and radiation
portal monitors. The writing groups have met in working sessions in San
Diego, CA (July 2003) and Las Vegas, NV (September 2003) and have
prepared draft T & E protocols. Benchmark testing against these draft
protocols has been initiated at four National Laboratories.
Biopathogen Identification
The Science and Technology Directorate has partnered with the
Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense to fund a
contract with the Association of Analytical Communities International
to develop Reference Methods and Official Methods for bulk assay of
bacillus anthracis. This work will also permit the comparison of
commercially available rapid identification methods (hand-held assays)
for B. anthracis.
SAFETY Act
On October 10, 2003, Secretary Ridge signed an interim final rule
implementing the Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective
Technologies (SAFETY) Act which was a requirement of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002. The SAFETY Act is designed to encourage the
development and rapid deployment of life-saving, anti-terrorism
technologies by providing manufacturers and sellers with limited
liability risks. The Department is now accepting applications for
designation under the Act and evaluating the proposed technologies.
Interoperability of Communications
SAFECOM: E-Gov Initiative to Improve Interoperability of Wireless
Communications
The Department of Homeland Security is taking steps to boost the
ability of the approximately 44,000 local, tribal and State entities
and 100 federal agencies engaged in public safety to communicate
effectively with one another, particularly during an emergency. SAFECOM
is a Federal umbrella program under the S & T Directorate that is
dedicated to improving public safety response through enhanced
interoperable wireless communications. The goal is to enable public
safety agencies to talk across disciplines and jurisdictions via radio
communications systems, exchanging voice or data with one another on
demand and in real time. SAFECOM is providing seed money for the
Department of Justice's Integrated Wireless Network program, which will
create interoperability among local, state and federal public safety
agencies in 25 cities. In addition, technical guidance for
interoperable
communications that was developed under SAFECOM is included in this
year's Office of Domestic Preparedness grants.
Summit on Interoperable Communications for Public Safety
In June 2003, the S & T Directorate, Project SAFECOM, the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the National Institute
of Justice hosted a Summit on Interoperable Communications for Public
Safety. The event focused on familiarizing attendees with programs that
assist public safety practitioners, including first responders, and is
the first national effort ever undertaken to convene all the players.
In addition, it provided insight on federal resource needs, how
government can leverage existing program successes and resources in the
area of standards development, approaches, and products and services.
The Summit results provided help in formulating a coordinated approach
toward nationwide communications interoperability.
SAFECOM Vendor Demonstration Day
In August 2003, the Science and Technology Directorate held its
first SAFECOM Vendor Demonstration Day, with an overwhelmingly positive
response from technology providers. Due to the increasing number of
vendor requests to present their technologies to the SAFECOM Program,
the S & T Directorate is holding a vendor demonstration day on the last
Friday of every month. These Friday sessions will offer a chance for
SAFECOM to learn about new technologies for interoperability, provide a
clear process for managing vendor requests, and ensure that every
vendor has a fair opportunity to participate.
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Programs
Addressing Threats and Vulnerabilities in the Oil and Gas Industries
The S & T Directorate sponsored and delivered a prototype system to
the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP)
Directorate to perform Graphical Information System (GIS) based
computer assisted threat and vulnerability mapping of the oil and gas
infrastructure in the American Southwest. S & T is also in the process
of delivering to IAIP cutting edge visualization, data searching, data
correlation, and all-source analytic aids to provide IAIP advanced
analytic capabilities integrated with vulnerability information.
Advanced Algorithms for Biodetectors
Researchers funded by the S & T Directorate's Advanced Scientific
Computing Research and Development program achieved an important
milestone in the speed acceleration of software used to develop
advanced biodetectors. Scientists have made a pair of related
algorithmic advances that will speed the creation of DNA signatures for
pathogen detection at considerably reduced cost. These discoveries will
result in cheaper, faster, and more reliable bio-detectors for homeland
security.
Threat-Vulnerability Mapper
Part of the Threat-Vulnerability Information System, the Threat-
Vulnerability Mapper (or TVM), was installed in the analysis center of
the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate in
December 2003 and is already in constant use. Developed by the S & T
Directorate, the TVM provides counterterrorism analysts with a simple,
straightforward way to not only depict the geographic distribution of
threats across the United States, but also to search the underlying
databases for information on the possible actors, agents, potential
severity of attacks, and extent of the vulnerabilities to and effects
of such attacks. A second TVIS component was delivered to IAIP in
January 2003 and should be installed and operational by the end of
February 2004.
Critical Infrastructure Protection Decision Support System
On December 24, 2003, S & T's Critical Infrastructure Protection
Decision Support System (CIP/DSS) team was asked to conduct a rapid
analysis of potential consequences following discovery of a cow in
Washington State with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), commonly
known as Mad Cow disease. An analysis was developed within hours using
available open literature, past historical data, and the results from
an early stage, Dynamic Simulation agriculture model.
Cybersecurity
Experimental Infrastructure Network for Cyber Defense
Led by the S & T Directorate, DHS is co-funding with the National
Science Foundation a $5.45M, three-year research project to create an
experimental infrastructure network to support development and
demonstration of next generation information security technologies for
cyber defense. This project supports national-scale experimentation on
emerging security research and advanced development
technologies. Called Cyber Defense Technology Experimental Research
(``DETER'') Network, this is a multi-university project led by the
University of California, Berkley.
Evaluation Methods in Internet Security Technology
DHS is co-funding with the National Science Foundation, a second
cyber security project called Evaluation Methods in Internet Security
Technology (EMIST). EMIST is a testing framework that can be adapted to
simulators, emulation facilities, other testbeds, and hardware testing
facilities. The framework will include attack scenarios, attack
simulators, generators for topology and background traffic, data sets
derived from live traffic, and tools to monitor and summarize results.
EMSIT is a three-year, $5.6M, multi-university research project that
includes Penn State; University of California, Davis; Purdue; and the
International Computer Science Institute.
United States Coast Guard
Maritime Surveillance Testbed Prototype
In September 2003, S & T's Homeland Security Advanced Research
Projects Agency and the United States Coast Guard planned and funded
the South Florida Coastal Surveillance Prototype Testbed, a port and
coastal surveillance prototype in Port Everglades, Miami, and Key West
areas. The prototype is an evolutionary testbed that:
Provides an initial immediate coastal surveillance
capability in a high priority area
Offers the Coast Guard and other DHS agencies the
means to develop and evaluate CONOPS (Concept of Operations) in
a real world environment
Implements and tests interoperability among DHS and
DoD systems and networks such as the US Navy/Coast Guard Joint
Harbor Operations Center (JHOC).
Tests and evaluates systems and operational procedures
Becomes the design standard for follow-on systems in
other areas and integration with wider area surveillance
systems.
The program has two phases; an initial prototype development phase,
and an improvements and update phase. The program is expected to begin
operations in June 2004 and is funded at $2.4M for fiscal year 2003 and
$5M for fiscal year 2004 .
Partnerships
Workshop on Scientific Computing in Support of Homeland Security
The Science and Technology Directorate brought together experts
from academia, private industry and the national laboratories with
staff from various organizations within the Department to understand
how the S & T Directorate's advanced scientific computing (ASC)
capabilities, centered at the national laboratories, can help address
needs across the Department. This workshop, held October 8-9, 2003, has
resulted in identifying several areas of potential high payoff for the
use of these unique capabilities; two examples are advanced research in
data management and information extraction, and research and
development of computational simulation tools. The workshop will
produce a formal report identifying relevant ASC capabilities and
matching them up with identified needs within the Department of
Homeland Security for improved operational capabilities.
Infrastructure Subcommittee of the National Science and Technology
Council
Staff members of the Science and Technology Directorate had a major
role in drafting the first charter for the National Science and
Technology Council's (NSTC's) Infrastructure Subcommittee; the
Subcommittee's first Co-Chairs are from the S & T Directorate and the
Office of Science and Technology Policy. The Subcommittee serves as a
forum within the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) for
developing consensus and resolving issues associated with coordinating
R & D agendas, policy, and programs to develop and protect the nation's
infrastructure. The Subcommittee will also be the vehicle used by the
Department of Homeland Security and the White House Office of Science
and Technology Policy to develop the National R & D Plan for Critical
Infrastructure Protection.
Homeland Security Standards Panel
The S & T Directorate worked with the American National Standards
Institute (ANSI) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) to establish a Homeland Security Standards Panel (HSSP) that
would coordinate the development of consensus standards among the 280
different standards development organizations. On June 9-10, 2003, the
inaugural meeting of the ANSI Homeland Security Standards Panel was
held at NIST. Plenary session presentations were given by four S & T
Directorate staff members to outline the needs in Department for
standards. The panel selected a small list of topics to address with
focus workshops. The first of these occurred in September 2003 with a
focus on needs for standards in biometrics.
Joint DHS/USDA National Strategy for Foreign Animal Disease
At the request of the Congressional Appropriations Committees for
both DHS and the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the two departments
have coordinated a report on a national strategy for foreign animal
disease. Participants in the joint study included DHS (S & T), USDA
(the Agricultural Research Service and the Agriculture and Plant Health
Inspection Service), and stakeholder groups. The joint study has
prompted an end-to-end review of the national response strategy
following the identification of a case of foot-and-mouth disease,
including the R & D requirements and gaps for assays, diagnostics,
vaccines, and antivirals. Comprehensive roadmaps have been developed
for these research areas, in one-, three-, and five-year timeframes.
These roadmaps are important elements of program planning for S & T.
National Security Council Attribution Working Group
The S & T Directorate initiated and leads the National Security
Council Attribution Working Group, which is revisiting national
capabilities to rapidly perform forensic analysis in cases of nuclear
and radiological events of any size. This effort is expected to lead to
a robust and completely coordinated forensic capability for
attribution.
Workshops on Comparative Analysis
S & T's Office of Comparative Studies has sponsored two workshops
on identifying analysis techniques and information sources crucial for
analyzing the interaction of the terrorist threat with S & T
activities. These workshops brought together participants from two DHS
directorates, other government entities, academia and private industry
and have helped to improve communication between these groups.
Important analytical techniques and sources of information were
identified and have been utilized. The workshops were also used to
establish a set of topics which the office could profitably study. A
proposal is being prepared which will solicit work on several of these
topics.
Homeland Security Institute, and Homeland Security Science and
Technology Advisory Committee
Homeland Security Institute
A formal solicitation was issued in December for the Homeland
Security Institute (HSI), and proposals were received in January 2004.
Those proposals currently are being evaluated with an expected five-
year award by early May 2004. However, current legislation states that
the Institute's operation will terminate in November 2005; this issue
is of concern to the bidders.
The HSI was mandated by the Homeland Security Act to assist the
Secretary and the Department in addressing important homeland security
issues that require scientific, technical, and analytical expertise.
The Institute will provide a dedicated, high-quality technical and
analytical support capability for informing homeland security decision
making at all levels. This capability will consist of an extensive
program of operational assessments, systems evaluations, technical
assessments, and resource analyses comparable to the capability
developed and used for decades by the Defense establishment. The
Institute will also provide analytical and technical evaluations that
support DHS implementation of the SAFETY Act. Finally, the Institute
will create and maintain a field operations program that will help
further introduce real-world needs and experiences into homeland
security is a disciplined and rigorous way.
Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee
The Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee
(HSSTAC) was formally established in December 2003 and holds its first
meeting in February 2004.
The HSSTAC was mandated by the Homeland Security Act to be a source
of independent, scientific and technical planning advice for the Under
Secretary for Science and Technology.
The committee will (1) advise the Undersecretary on the mission
goals for the future; (2) provide advice on whether the policies,
actions, management processes, and organization constructs of the
Science and Technology Directorate are optimally focused on mission
objectives; (3) provide advice on whether the research, development,
test, evaluation, and systems engineering activities are properly
resourced (capital, financial, and human) to accomplish the objectives;
(4) identify outreach activities (particularly in accessing and
developing, where necessary, the industrial base of the Nation); and
(5) review the technical quality and relevance of the Directorate's
programs.
Countermeasures to Man-Portable Air Defense Systems
The S & T Directorate has selected three firms to provide analyses
of the economic, manufacturing and maintenance issues needed to support
a system to address the potential threat of MAN-Portable Air Defense
Systems (MANPADS) to commercial aircraft. The next phase of the program
will include development of prototypes using existing technology which
will be subjected to a rigorous test and evaluation process. This
initiative is not intended to develop new technology, but rather to re-
engineer existing technology from military to commercial aviation use.
University and Fellowship Programs
Fellowships and Scholarships
In September 2003, the S & T Directorate named 100 students to the
inaugural class of the Department of Homeland Security's Scholars and
Fellows Program. The program, which received more than 2,400
applications, supports United States students who choose to pursue
scientific careers and perform research in fields that are essential to
the homeland security mission. The first class consists of 50
undergraduate students and 50 graduate students who are attending
universities across the country majoring in the physical, biological,
and social and behavioral sciences including science policy,
engineering, mathematics, or computer science. The Directorate has
already issued a notice inviting applications from students for the
2004-2005 academic year. The website is http://www.orau.gov/dhsed/.
University Centers of Excellence
The Science and Technology division has created the Homeland
Security Centers Program that supports university-based centers of
excellence dedicated to fostering homeland security mission critical
research and education. The program has established the first Center of
Excellence focused on risk analysis and modeling related to the
economic consequences of terrorism at the University of Southern
California, partnering with the University of Wisconsin at Madison, New
York University and the University of California at Berkeley. A request
for proposals has been issued for the second and third Centers of
Excellence, which will focus on animal-related and post-harvest food
agro-terrorism.
Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency
Near-Term Technologies
In May 2003, the Science and Technology Directorate's Homeland
Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) released a Broad
Agency Announcement through the Technical Support Working Group for
near-term technologies that can be rapidly prototyped and deployed to
the field. A total of 3,344 responses as received in the following
broad categories: chemical, biological, radiation and nuclear
countermeasures; personnel protection; explosives detection;
infrastructure protection; physical security; improvised device defeat;
and investigative support and forensics. The first contract award went
to North Carolina State University for the development of the next-
generation of structural fire fighting personal protective equipment.
Detection Systems
The S & T Directorate reviewed and selected proposals for funding
in response to its Research Announcement for Detection Systems for
Biological and Chemical Countermeasures, which was published through
the Technical Support Working Group. In September 2003, the Homeland
Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) held its first
Bidders Conference in Washington, DC. Approximately 420 private sector
and university representatives attended the event and over 500 white
papers were submitted. Finalists have been selected for negotiation,
and work has already begun in a number of the more important areas.
Virtual Cyber Security Center
On December 13, 2003, a Request for Proposals and Statement of Work
for technical and administrative support for the virtual Cyber R & D
Center was published to seven capable performers listed on the GSA
schedule. The deadline for response was December 15, 2003, and two
responsive proposals were received. A three million dollar technical,
management, and administrative contract was awarded to SRI
International on February 2, 2004, to support the functions of the
HSARPA Cyber R & D Center. The Cyber R & D Center will be the primary S
& T interface with the academic and industrial cyber security research
communities.
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program Solicitation
On November 13, 2003, the Homeland Security Advanced Research
Projects Agency (HSARPA) issued a Small Business Innovation Research
(SBIR) Program
Solicitation. The purpose of this solicitation was to invite small
businesses to submit innovative research proposals that address eight
high-priority DHS requirements:
New system/ technologies to detect low vapor pressure
chemicals (e.g., Toxic Industrial Chemicals)
Chemical and biological sensors employing novel
receptor scaffolds
Advanced low cost aerosol collectors for surveillance
sensors and personnel monitoring
Computer modeling tool for vulnerability assessment of
U.S. infrastructure
Ship compartment inspection device
Marine Asset Tag Tracking System
Automatic Identification System tracking and collision
avoidance equipment for small boats
Advanced Secure Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) and related distributed control systems.
By the December 15, 2003, deadline 374 proposals had been received.
The evaluation is complete and 66 proposers entered negotiation for
Phase I contracts beginning February 11, 2004.
SAFECOM Vendor Demonstration Day
SAFECOM held a Vendor Demonstration Day on January 30, 2004.
SAFECOM's Vendor Day allows several communications equipment and
service providers to present their products and/or technologies for
SAFECOM. Responses from the SAFECOM Request for Information in November
2003 were used to select vendors for this event. Each vendor selected
represents a different approach to solving the communications and
interoperability problems facing first responders.
International Programs
Agreement with Canada on Border and Infrastructure Security
On October 3, 2002, Secretary Tom Ridge and Canadian Deputy Prime
Minister John Manley initialed an agreement on Science and Technology
Cooperation for protecting shared critical infrastructure and enhancing
border security. The S & T Directorate is participating in a Working
Group to develop near-term deliverables and projects to protect shared
critical infrastructure such as bridges, dams, pipelines,
communications and power grids; to develop surveillance and monitoring
technologies to enhance the ability to disrupt and interdict
terrorists; and to develop technologies for detecting the illicit
transportation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
weapons.
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Incident Management
Between March and December of 2003, the Office of Weapons of Mass
Destruction Operations and Incident Management (WMDO-IM) provided
surveillance and operational incident response to the Homeland Security
Operations Center and law enforcement officials on 24 separate
occasions. In addition, the WMDO-IM provided operational support to the
Homeland Security Operations Center during Hurricane Isabel and the
Northeast blackout.
The WMDO-IM established a scientific reach-back and rapid decision
support capability through the Scientific and Technical Analysis and
Response Teams (START). In addition to activating the START teams
during the Code Orange time period in December 2003, WMDO-IM provided
technical expert consultations on threats to the nation's water
resources and responded to concerns about impacts of solar flares
WMDO-IM helped develop the Initial National Response Plan (INRP)
and its National Incident Management System; the INRP represents a
significant first step towards an overall goal of integrating the
current family of Federal domestic prevention, preparedness, response,
and recovery plans into a single all-discipline, all-hazards plan.
WMDO-IM provided technical support to the Homeland Security
Operations Center (HSOC), assessing vulnerabilities and actions the
HSOC can take to improve the ability to resist a chemical or biological
terrorist attack.
WMDO-IM, with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, developed curriculum for a week-long training
workshop on weapons of mass destruction for the Central Intelligence
Agency University. Also in the area of education and training, WMDO-IM
established a homeland security medical executive training course.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Dr. McQueary, and let me take a
second to compliment you and your folks on the full statement
that you have submitted for the record.
I--you may not answer every question, but you, I think, do
a very good job of going through the different areas that you
all are working in, and also setting goals for 2005, and we can
have this hearing again next year, and we can, as the
gentlelady from California wants to ask, I know, about what you
said last year, we can do it again next year, and see whether
those goals have been made. And so I appreciate the work that
you and your folks have done. It does help give us all
confidence in what you are doing.
I am going to reserve my time at this point and yield to
the gentlelady from California for any questions she might like
to ask at this point.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a few
questions relative to the budget, I suppose, and the first
thing I want to raise has to do with the academic--university
centers.
Now, I think we all thought that was a pretty good idea
last year when we went through it, and--but in the budget, if I
am correct, there is only $30 million allocated for this
activity, and I don't think that is enough to do the centers
that we--the number of centers that we talked about. I think it
was appropriated $70 million, and I don't think that was all
spent, so I guess that is a question. Was it all spent, and how
are we going to award the 10 centers, and--that we had
originally planned on, and if we are not going to do that,
well, why not, and in particular, I will be a little parochial
if I may, we have, in San Jose, a university center on
transportation that I have heard from--not just from them, but
I heard from the Navy and I also heard from Lawrence Livermore
National Lab that they are doing very important work in terms
of security, and--on transportation issues, and I know we have
looked at ag, and we are looking at some other things, but we
have infrastructure issues that are huge that I am not sure we
are really dealing with in any department, and I was hoping
that either with them, or--we might be able to do that. So can
you address that whole issue, the university centers, for us,
please?
Mr. McQueary. Well, you have raised several important
issues, and certainly, the request that we have in is $30
million, with $30 million for this year, or--and if one had the
same amount for outgoing years, that would support
approximately 3 Centers of Excellence. These are approximately
$5 million, minus the--our expenses. And then, the remaining 15
will--$15 million would support another 100 Scholars and
Fellows there. One of the things I have learned in this job is
that we all work for someone, and it is my job--we had the
adequate opportunity to debate the issue about what the size of
the budget should be for the Fellows and Scholars program. At
this point, I view my responsibility as one of trying to make
the best performance that we can get out of the budget that has
been requested, and that is what I can assure you I will do.
Ms. Lofgren. So, without putting words in your mouth, it
sounds like the 3 was a budget decision more than a policy
decision that you made from your shop.
Mr. McQueary. I didn't say--it is a consequence of a budget
decision, yes. Okay.
Ms. Lofgren. Okay. Was the $70 million appropriated
actually spent?
Mr. McQueary. No, ma'am. The--we have not spent all of the
70. In fact, without going through the rigorous details of the
arithmetic, an approach that we could use, and we--I am not
proposing we do this, we have enough money so that we could
actually create five--a total of five centers, but the problem
would be at the end of the three year period, would be--we have
been allocating these for three years, there would be at least
two of them that would have to be stopped, because $30 million
would not be sufficient to sustain five units at that--.
Ms. Lofgren. Well, I don't know what the Chairman thinks,
but it seems to me that you can get a lot of pretty good
research done in three years, especially if you are honing in
to assessments, not just solutions, and as we know from the
Senate hearing and the hearings we have had, we are way behind
in our threat assessment activity everywhere, in cyber and in
critical infrastructure, and without good assessments, you
really don't have a work plan for expenditures, so I would tend
to favor doing something rather
than--.
Mr. McQueary. Okay.
Ms. Lofgren. I mean, that is just one person's opinion,
obviously, but maybe we can get into that discussion at some
point. I am also concerned about the Department of Energy labs,
and I am interested in hearing about this designation of--I was
surprised by intramural, extramural, what does this mean, and
why was this done, and what are the implications for the
various labs. I think that the feedback I have gotten from the
scientific community is that those who have been designated
extramural are grumpy, because they weren't good enough to be
intramural. Those who have been designated intramural are
grumpy, because they can't compete for funding, and nobody is
happy, and so when you--so I am interested why we did this and
whether we are going to continue to do this.
Mr. McQueary. This has been quite a remarkable experience
for me personally, to find the--what I will call the firestorm
that we have been able to develop with something in which we
actually thought--we truly thought and discussed this in great
detail internally, and also with 9 of the labs, that we are
trying to use the approach that would maximize the
opportunities for the labs to participate in what we are doing,
and so the logic in our thinking was as follows. Because of the
charter, the--or the mission that we have, chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear, and high explosives,
some labs have more to offer in these areas than do other labs,
and therefore, what we concluded is that there was a small
number of the labs in which we expected to be using more than
the others, and we would--and we needed to have those, we felt
we needed to have those labs be participants in what I will
call our internal planning and so forth, and so our conclusion
was that it would not be appropriate to let those labs also
compete externally, if they have insider information, so we
concluded that what we should do is designate the five that we
chose as the intramural labs, and with that goes the
responsibility of--or the requirement that they not compete on
any business or university teams for any of the work we do.
The others, what we believed we were doing was providing an
opportunity for them to either compete directly for--in other
areas, such as through HSARPA, where we will be spending money,
or to team with private industry and/or to have a larger
possibility, because had we gone down a path, quite frankly, of
choosing, let us say we chose all 9 or chose all 22 and made
them all intramural, meaning that we gave them full access to
all of our internal information, there would be some of those
labs that would get virtually no money, because they just don't
have the skills and expertise that we find that we need at this
time. Now, that could change later on, but at least as we look
at it right now.
So we thought we were doing something that would be
beneficial, but obviously, it has not been perceived that way,
although one thing you did say that I have not personally
encountered, those that have been designated as the intramural
labs, I have not had any complaints from them. I have had a
fair share from those who were designated as the extramural
labs--.
Ms. Lofgren. Well, I think their concern is that they will
not be able to compete--I mean--.
Mr. McQueary. Well, they will not be able to. That is
the--.
Ms. Lofgren. If--for example, I mean, you have got--without
naming names, some labs where, I mean, the depth of the
scientific experience is just breathtaking. I mean it is
awesome.
Mr. McQueary. In many cases, yes.
Ms. Lofgren. And so they are the intramurals, but we are
going to deny the best scientists in their field, maybe in the
world, the opportunity to actually do work for us later.
Mr. McQueary. Well, at the same time we have these views
coming from the private labs, we also have a university and a
private sector who looks at the labs as their competition.
Ms. Lofgren. Right.
Mr. McQueary. And a view that the labs have, well the
insight into what the government wants to do, and therefore,
they have the added advantage, and so we have been trying to do
a--what I will call a balancing act--.
Ms. Lofgren. Right. But--.
Mr. McQueary. --to work something out, but excuse me.
Ms. Lofgren. But our job is to get a job done, not to be a
jobs program, right?
Mr. McQueary. Absolutely right. And I completely agree with
that, and in fact, you raise a point, if I may make it here,
the amount of money that Science and Technology will spend in
all of the labs on what I see as an ongoing basis, is about
$200 million. DOE spends almost $9 billion, or they have a
total budget on those labs of almost $9 billion. The Department
of Homeland Security has about another $100 million, the
balance being spent primarily in other directorates, Borders,
and Transportations, so there is about $300 million out of $9
billion, so we represent 3 percent of the total budgets they
have got.
And had we gone down a path of let us just put some of this
in all the labs, it is my professional view that we would have
such a small amount of money in any lab that it would be
difficult to get the needed attention that we have to have on
ours, other than through, you know, Congressional direction or
something of that sort, and that is not the way to get
scientists to perform.
Ms. Lofgren. So, I will stop, because I--we will have a
second round, but--.
Mr. McQueary. Okay.
Ms. Lofgren. You are not planning to change this
intramural, extramural--.
Mr. McQueary. Oh, at the--I had testimony before
Congressman Boehlert's Committee the last week or week before,
time runs together for me.
Ms. Lofgren. Yes, it does.
Mr. McQueary. And what we agreed to do is have an
independent review team. I volunteered to have an independent
review team to look at the methodology we had used to make the
selection, because there was nothing magical about it, or
intended to be surreptitious, and so I would be have it
examined, and we will see where we go from there. Another--and
we will look at options. We could make them all--as a
possibility, although I would rather not do that today. I
wouldn't do it today. It could all be intramural, but with that
goes the requirement that they not be, as they get access to
inside information, then they cannot compete, as I would see it
today, because I view--that would be against fair competition
with private industry and not something--a direction we should
go in.
Ms. Lofgren. We will have greater discussion on this.
Mr. McQueary. Okay.
Ms. Lofgren. And I--.
Mr. McQueary. Sure.
Ms. Lofgren. I am a big fan of the private sector, as you
know, but I also think that you would be hard pressed to find
the depth of science, and anybody in industry will tell you the
same thing, in the private sector that you will find at some of
these labs in some of these specialized subjects. I mean, it is
just--.
Mr. McQueary. In some areas, you are absolutely right.
Ms. Lofgren. That is why we have the arrangements that we
do to roll their science out into the private sector. I mean,
there are really gems, national gems.
Mr. Thornberry. Completely agree. Sometimes, I think if
nobody is happy, that you have hit on a pretty good mean, but I
don't know if that is completely true. The gentleman--.
Mr. McQueary. That was not my intent, but--.
Mr. Thornberry. The gentleman from New Jersey.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Secretary
McQueary, for an excellent job testifying and for the written
materials as well. I too appreciate the establishment of
benchmarks and measurement parameters, so we can see how you
are doing, and so you can see how you are doing. I have three
questions.
The first is about biowatching. To the extent that you can
tell us without breaching any classified information, was a
Biowatch facility used in the Senate Office Building when the
ricin incident occurred?
Mr. McQueary. No, sir. It was not.
Mr. Andrews. Was there a reason?
Mr. McQueary. We did not--ricin is not something that would
be detected by Biowatch, and I would rather not go into much
more detail, but we could certainly have a classified
discussion
about--.
Mr. Andrews. Is it one of our goals to develop technology
that would make ricin identifiable?
Mr. McQueary. Ricin is readily identifiable if you begin to
look for it, as I am told. I mean, my understanding of the
details of the science, but the difficulty isn't--is not in
identifying it, as we saw when the first indication, whether we
have a scientific method of being able to determine,
independent of human intervention, I can't answer that
question, but I will be happy to--.
Mr. Andrews. I understand.
Mr. McQueary. --determine whether there is something and
provide an answer for it.
Mr. Andrews. The second issue is about standards. I think
among the most important tasks among many important tasks that
your agency has is to develop good, clear, high standards, and
here is the measurement parameter I, in my own common sense,
would have used to measure that. No doubt, somewhere in America
today, some Port Authority executive is being approached by a
vendor who wants to sell her or him a radiologic dirty bomb
detection device, and the vendor will do a PowerPoint
presentation and have a slideshow and a CD-ROM they could leave
behind that says how well it works.
Two questions. Does the Port Authority executive, under the
law that we are working under, have the obligation to refer to
standards that you have created, and second, have you created
standards to which the Port Authority executive could refer to
determine whether the product is workable or junk?
Mr. McQueary. It is very difficult to tell whether it is
junk, because junk is sometimes in the eye of the beholder.
The--we do have standards that we are considering--.
Mr. Andrews. Shouldn't you be the--we want you to be the
beholder.
Mr. McQueary. Okay. All right. Fair enough. We do, indeed,
have standards for radiological detection devices. We have
issued those standards, and they are available. The methodology
that we propose to use for states and locals that would buy
things for which we do provide standards, and we have many that
we have to do, would be in the grant program that we have, we
will specify, that is administered by Office of Domestic
Preparedness, we would specify the types of equipment that
should be purchased with that, and we believe that that will be
motivation, because I can assure you at least in our
interaction with state and locals, they are anxious to have
standards from us. They are anxious to have equipment be
interoperable.
Mr. Andrews. Are we at the point where those standards are
now being included in the contracts for the grant agreements to
these local recipients?
Mr. McQueary. Yes, sir.
Mr. Andrews. That is great.
Mr. McQueary. We have included--for the radiation
detectors,
and--.
Mr. Andrews. And I assume that that is on a continuously
upgraded basis, as we learn more about these detectors, the
standards will rise.
Mr. McQueary. That is correct.
Mr. Andrews. So something that meets the standards in 2003
may not meet it in 2006, because we can do a better job in
2006.
Mr. McQueary. Right. And that is the very nature of
standards, but you have a body. We of course use the National
Institute of Standards and Technology as well as ANSI and other
standard agencies. We are--we have not become a standards
agency. What we have become is a stimulator--.
Mr. Andrews. Right.
Mr. McQueary. --of other organizations to help us prepare
standards for areas that are technologically--.
Mr. Andrews. I cannot emphasize enough how important it is
that we broaden the substantive reach of those standards, and
then increase the depth to which the standards reach, so that
certainly no federal dollar is spent on unworkable technology.
Mr. McQueary. Very important.
Mr. Andrews. And hopefully, eventually, no dollar, private,
public, federal, or local, is spent on such technology. The
world, as Congresswoman Lofgren said, is just filled with
charlatans right now. You know, two guys who can string
together two soup cans and some fishing wire and call it a
telecommunications system, and it is very important for reasons
of protecting the public and protecting the public's wallet
that we not secede to that wish. The third question is about
standards in cybersecurity. What is a realistic expectation for
a year from now for us to expect from your agency in
stimulating standards in the area of cybersecurity. What would
be a successful 2004 for your agency?
Mr. McQueary. The--excuse me, the area of cybersecurity, as
we all know, is a very complex one, because of the high degree
of complexity of the Internet and all the interactions that
that entails. Whether we can actually develop standards that
will be--that we can point to in a year's time, I could not
answer that question, and it would be inappropriate for me to
even try to do that, because I don't think we are far enough
into this. We do have the National Standards--the National
Cybersecurity Division that has been formed as a part of the
information analysis infrastructure protection, actually
particularly reporting into--to the Assistant Secretary
Liscouski. I believe that is the right place for it. We have a
close relationship with the Director of that organization. In
fact, I have a person dedicated full-time to working with that
organization, so that we can help them from a scientific
perspective understand the kinds of things that we need to do.
We do have a couple of programs underway with the National
Science Foundation, and the National Institute for Science and
Technology that deals with cybersecurity, but I think it is
premature for me to try to speculate on what we can actually do
in a year's time, because of the complexity.''
Mr. Andrews. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentleman for his questions.
The Subcommittee has been joined by the full Committee
Chairman, the gentleman from California. Does the Chairman wish
to be recognized at this point?
Mr. Cox. I thank the Chairman. I would like to also thank
Dr. McQueary for joining us today, and before I put just one
question, I would like to acknowledge that this is the one year
anniversary of the Department, and in particular, I would like
to acknowledge the progress that you have made in your area of
responsibility. You haven't even been there for a full year, if
I am not mistaken.
Mr. McQueary. That is correct.
Mr. Cox. And so, the amount of territory that we have
covered in a very short period of time is just absolutely
extraordinary, particularly when we think that your
responsibility, unlike some of what comprises Homeland
Security, the merger of preexisting agencies, your
responsibility is to create this S & T Directorate from whole
cloth, and so it is truly formidable. I want to congratulate
you on your successful implementation of Biowatch in 30 cities.
I want to thank you for getting the SAFECOM program online, so
that we can help our first responders with interoperability. I
want to thank you for generally improving the flow of
technology to our first responders, and finally, I want to
thank you for your contribution to a metrics based strategic
plan, the top line abstract of which we received here in
Congress yesterday.
Second, I want to let you know that there is significant
support on both sides of the aisle on this Committee for the
President's budget for R & D investment for S & T within the
Department. The President's fiscal year 2005 budget proposal,
across all of our Federal partners, is increasing R & D
investment by 44 percent over 2001 levels, and that is going to
take us to $132 billion next year alone.
The commitment to Homeland Security, I think, is very
clear, because your Homeland R & D budget is the largest
increase of any executive branch agency or department. You are
going to get--if the President's budget actually becomes
authorized and appropriated, 15.5 percent, in Fiscal 2005, so I
think that reflects the properly--support, not just in the
legislative branch, but throughout the executive branch and at
the White House as well, the strong support for your mission.
The question I want to put to you concerns the Safety Act.
The Safety Act, of course, which was part of the Homeland
Security Act, is meant to provide some legal certainty for
people who are developing and then deploying technology that
can protect us from terrorism. It puts them in the crosshairs
from a liability standpoint, because by definition, if this
equipment is ever going to be useful, it is going to be useful
in an event of mass catastrophe or mass murder or some really
awful calamitous event, and when bad things happen, lawyers are
sure to follow. We want to make sure that, you know, to the
extent that people are following all the rules in the law that
they are getting the protections of the Safety Act, which
doesn't immunize them from lawsuit, but at least gives them
some certainty, and that received, as you know, bipartisan
support when we put it into the law.
One of the responsibilities of your Directorate is that you
are going to prioritize the applications under the Safety Act.
We have got a website that is up, and the data that I am
looking at here indicate that you are getting about 2,000 hits
a week on this website, but we have only had 9 full
applications under the Safety Act, and 5 of those antedate the
website being up. We have only had 31 pre-applications, and
there is some indication that part of the reason that this is
so underutilized, and we are not bringing anything through to
fruition, because nobody has been approved, is that there might
be some undue burden, or we have got some barriers to entry
here.
There have been some expressions of concern about
speculative questions, particularly regarding potential
liabilities surrounding events in which these technologies
might be used, and I know that it is your interest in avoiding
any unintended burdens on applicants. So I am wondering what
the Directorate can do, and what you have in mind to do, so
that we can be a little more aggressive in implementing this
part of the Act, and get some leverage so we can realize the
Act's intended benefits.
Mr. McQueary. The--well, the points you raise are very
important ones, and as you well know, we issued the Act on an
interim basis. It is still an interim Act at this point, and I
believe it is March or April before we would expect the final
version, and the intent of that all along has been to get as
much feedback from industry and people who have an interest in
this to try to make it be as--not have it be onerous in any
way. Now--and we--the inputs that we primarily had, so far,
some people still believe that it takes more time to fill out
than the others, we have asked in each instance where people
have submitted full applications, to give us their estimates as
to how much time was spent, so that we can get a sense of what
it is. That is one thing, and as I understand it, we have not
had anyone coming back in a formal sense and telling us what
they have actually spent on that.
The other thing that we have asked to do is to visit--have
some of our professional people out of the SAFETY Act Group
visit with each one of those who have submitted a formal
application, and review in detail what their issues are, so
that we can try to move in a direction for making this be as
simple as possible, because we--I completely agree with you. It
needs--I think it needs to be thorough and professional, but it
does not need to--we should not have it be overly burdensome
and complex. We do have a difference in point of view within
our people who put together the--request the information as to
how complex it is, versus what some have said, and I think we
need to reach closure on that, so we have a common
understanding, and that is the path we are on right now.
Mr. Cox. Well, I thank you, Dr. McQueary, and I thank you,
Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Thornberry. I thank the Chairman. The Chair recognizes
the gentleman from Texas, the Ranking Member.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was just thinking,
as Chairman Cox was complimenting you on your progress, which
we are all pleased with, that he probably didn't understand
that as a graduate of the University of Texas, that should be
expected.
Mr. McQueary. Thank you.
Mr. Turner. One of the areas that I have had some concern
about, Dr. McQueary, is the fact that when we look at your
budget as a whole, the lion's share of it is directed toward
bio-countermeasures. We all know this is an area of great
threat and need, so I don't mean to be critical of the
commitment that we have made there, but as I look at some of
the other areas, I am not sure that we are doing as much in
some of these other areas as we need to be. We all know that we
haven't yet completed this task within the Department of having
this comprehensive threat and vulnerability assessment, and I
think the head of that Directorate, a few months ago, said it
might take 5 years. I talked to Admiral Loy the other day. He
said no, that wasn't the date. That was unacceptable. It needed
to be a lot shorter, and I urged him to continue to pursue that
aggressively.
In your written testimony, you set forth nine factors that
your Directorate considers in prioritizing research and
development activities. The sixth factor is a current threat
assessment, as understood by the Intelligence Committee. The
eighth factor is an expert understanding of enemy capabilities
that exist today, or that can be expected to appear in the
future. Both, obviously, are very critical and important
factors, but in the absence of a completed, comprehensive
threat assessment, please give us some feel as to how you
interact with the IAIP Directorate in trying to discern those
two factors, and make decisions with regard to allocation of
budget requests.
Mr. McQueary. The--that, of course, is one of several
factors, as indicated in the testimony, that we use, and
ultimately, we have professional people who--that are on the S
& T staff, that take all of these inputs, and then render a
judgment based upon their experiences and knowledge about the
science involved, as to ultimately where we should be spending
our money. The interaction with the IAIP group, I mentioned
earlier, we have an individual in the cybersecurity area as the
lead Director for our interaction in that area, dedicated full-
time to working with them. We have another group of people that
work in the critical infrastructure protection area, and at
least one of whom is in residence virtually full-time at the
Naval facility on Nebraska Avenue there with the IAIP people.
So, it is very much a--what I will call a human-to-human
interaction and discussions among professional people, to help
us render those judgments that we have to make, because we
don't have any--I don't have a matrix, for example, of--I
weight the nine different areas I mentioned, 1 through 10, and
somehow end up with a numerical figure, and say, well, this
tells me what to do. Ultimately, scientific judgment, and this
is true no matter whether it is government or private industry.
Smart people have to look at the circumstances and render
judgments, and what you--we expect is to have them be right
most of the time, and in this case, they need to be right all
of the time, so--.
Mr. Turner. What concerns me is that without that
comprehensive threat and vulnerability assessment, in many
ways, we are kind of operating ad hoc with regard to where we
ought to spend our dollars. I know the bulk of the increase in
your budget this year, the budget request, is in the bio-
countermeasure area. In fact, I guess if you took that out,
your budget would probably be about level funding from 2004.
So, if I am looking at the right line here, there is $407
million in the bio-countermeasures area.
Mr. McQueary. Yes.
Mr. Turner. But when you look at cybersecurity, which we
all know is another critical vulnerability, if I am reading
your budget request correctly, it is $18 million.
Mr. McQueary. Yes.
Mr. Turner. And I am just not certain that I feel very
comfortable with the process that leads us to the conclusion
that $18 million is sufficient to deal with the threat in the
cybersecurity area. Tell me how you feel comfortable with that.
Mr. McQueary. Well, as you probably recall, we had $8
million in there, and the first time I came before this group,
and I certainly--I remember Chairman Cox and I am sure many
others, pointed out that was inadequate. At that time, we did
not have the National Cybersecurity Division in existence, and
the Infrastructure Protection Group. We now have that. I
believe they have a target. I have forgotten what he--I
actually do not remember the budget that he has. So I view our
$18 million as a supplement to the primary focus that is in the
National Cybersecurity Division, and our job is to provide the
R & D support for them, and based upon where we are right now,
I am comfortable with that. Should we conclude that that was
not the right amount, I would have no hesitancy to come back
before this committee or any other that I deemed appropriate to
ask for reprogramming if that were the case.
If I may address the biologic area, would you--if I could
just give you the--.
Mr. Turner. Certainly.
Mr. McQueary. --thinking on that. The way we--the biologic
threat is what we refer to as a temporal threat. The other
threats that we deal with are spatial threats, and what I
specifically mean by that, the criticality for the biological
threat is to be able to determine that something has occurred,
and do that quickly, so that one can implement the necessary
measures in order to try to deal with whatever that might be.
In all the other threats, we know when that event has
happened, whether--all the way from a nuclear bomb to some kind
of dirty bomb, if you will. So you know where--and you know
pretty much what the containment areas are, and so we
understand what we have to do there. The way we determine where
the money should be spent is by considering two critical
factors. One is what is the magnitude--how severe is the
threat, and certainly nuclear, in terms of the devastation it
can cause, is very, very high--has a very high ``number''
associated with it, but there is also the factor of what is the
probability or likelihood that that event will occur. And you--
when you look at the biological threat, the devastation that
can be caused in the biological area is extremely high. The
ease with which someone can inflict devastation upon this
country is very easy, and therefore, from the standpoint of the
place where I believe with all my heart and soul, where we need
to spend a great deal of our effort and focus our attention is
in that one. We don't do it at the exclusion of everything
else, but I truly believe that the vulnerability in this
country lies in the biological area as much as any, in terms of
devastation of the country.
Mr. Turner. When we heard that the Department was going to
create a DARPA-like entity, most of us had in our minds that it
would be for longer-term or advanced research kind of efforts.
As I understand it, HSARPA, within your umbrella, has evolved
more to deal with shorter term projects. I can understand the
need for it, but I do regret that we still haven't been able to
see a full advanced research agency similar to DARPA arise
within the Department. Could you share with me your thoughts on
that subject and what hope we might have for moving to the more
advanced research kind of concept that we all thought we were
creating initially?
Mr. McQueary. Okay. I certainly will, because I view that I
am responsible for the path that we are going down. As I got
into this job, I--when I first took it, and probably, when I
met with you in May of last year, if you had asked me what do
you think your job is really going to be, I probably would have
said I think setting the scientific direction that we need to
go so we can determine what research areas we need to go into
in order to make this country safer.
After I once got into the job, and we began to see all of
these interactions with companies and universities, and the
labs, as Congresswoman Lofgren mentioned earlier, it became
readily apparent to me that there is far more technological
capability that exists in this country than we are taking
advantage of, and so for us to launch onto a path of why don't
we do more research before we determine how effectively we can
use that which already exists, in my judgment, would not have
been a proper course of action, number one.
Number two, I think in view of the vulnerabilities that we
have, it behooves us to spend money to try to make corrections
today, if you will, today, tomorrow, short term, near term, in
areas, and that is why I--that is the reason we have gone down
that path. I believe over time that what we will do is evolve
into more fundamental research, and so you will see a different
balance. We are at about 10 percent in that range, 8 percent, I
believe, fundamental research proposed in fiscal year 2005, and
I would expect, over time, that will move in the direction that
you have suggested, and appropriately so.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Doctor.
Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentleman. Dr. McQueary, just a
stray thought that occurred to me. I am interested in your
distinction between temporal and spatial. It may be that cyber
has elements of both. They don't call them viruses for nothing,
and it is interesting, because it may be a hybrid of some of
the things, and we can talk about that later. The gentleman
from North Carolina is recognized.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Okay. I want to
make sure we are on the same--Dr. McQueary, thank you for being
here today, and thank you for your testimony, and as a former
resident of the state of North Carolina, you probably, as well
as anyone in this room, know that our state has had an awful
lot of experience with natural disasters, especially floods and
hurricanes that have been particularly devastating to our
agricultural sector in North Carolina, and consequently, the
state has developed a great deal of expertise, really, in this
whole field of agricultural disaster planning, response, and
recovery. And last year, the Association of Food and Drug
Professionals, with the support of a number of Federal
agencies, for officials, strongly encouraged the North Carolina
Department of Agriculture and the Consumer Services area of
that, along with the--a number of other agencies, to develop a
national model for food safety and security systems. In
response, the Governor easily established the North Carolina
Food Safety and Security Taskforce, headed by Dr. Tom McGinn,
the state veterinarian, who I am sure you are familiar with.
This multi-agency group worked together for months, and worked
to provide a comprehensive planning and response initiative,
and it is entitled the North Carolina Food and Safety Security
Project.
It is now ready for implementation, and I am told by folks
at the state level, because it is in this form, they didn't
have the money to finish the work, but what they have done is
shared it with a lot of other states, that are now looking at
it. It is developed so that it can be implemented, and I am
informed that they can't afford to shoulder an entire $6.8
million cost of the Federally requested program, and I
understand that they have--they are not eligible, apparently,
for any DHS grant funding, in the definition of DHS grant
funding, but it is obviously a project that was asked to be
done, and it would be of benefit to every state in this
country,
because as you well know, agriculture now is a $1 trillion
industry--.
Mr. McQueary. Sure.
Mr. Etheridge. --in this country, and the safety of it is
very important. And I guess I am asking, and you might not want
to answer today, but maybe have someone on your staff, is there
any opportunity of assistance from S & T Directorate for some
funding that could be used, that we could identify, because it
is a piece that was asked to be done, and we could use it to
share with other states, because I think it--this is the kind
of thing that we ought to be working together to get done.
Mr. McQueary. One thought that comes immediately to mind is
that we--and I hope that the group has been--has submitted a
proposal to be considered for our--I guess our third Center of
Excellence, because that is an area in which we specifically
are dealing with post-harvest food safety, is the purpose of
that third Center of Excellence, and we have been out--we have
been on the street with the RFP, so I have not seen the names
of the participants, because I have tried to stay away from--.
Mr. Etheridge. Sure.
Mr. McQueary. --knowing the name, but I think we--.
Mr. Etheridge. But I think this is at the university level,
where they are pulling together--.
Mr. McQueary. Well, it is at the university level--.
Mr. Etheridge. But this is a little different, in that it
was agency generated at the request of the Federal Government,
and I hope we have someone in your Department we can talk with
about that.
Mr. McQueary. I would be happy to--.
Mr. Etheridge. Because I think that is something that we
could use right away to make a difference, so let me move on--.
Mr. McQueary. You can have them contact--.
Mr. Etheridge. --to another one.
Mr. McQueary. Have them contact me, and I will be happy
to--.
Mr. Etheridge. Okay.
Mr. McQueary. --make sure that we take--.
Mr. Etheridge. Fine. Thank you.
Mr. McQueary. --a hard look at it.
Mr. Etheridge. Let me get to know, is it in your written
testimony, you say in 2005, the Emergency Preparedness and
Response Portfolio will continue its focus on technological
developments, and technical guidance for states and local first
responders, one of the areas that has been alluded to earlier.
Would you be kind enough to discuss the kind of focus you are
talking about here, and give us some examples, if you have
them, of the technology and guidance the S & T Directorate
plans to offer to our first responders in this country?
Mr. McQueary. In the area that we are currently working--in
fact, we expect to make announcements, I believe it is on--that
would be tomorrow, on some protective clothing standards,
specifically geared towards first responders, and so that is a
first step and something we are beginning, because that is very
important. As you may or may not know, we--one of our first
contracts that we let out of the Technical Support Working
Group was to North Carolina State--.
Mr. Etheridge. Right.
Mr. McQueary. --to look at protective material, and so
those are two examples of things that we have done. There is
more to be done, but those are two that come to mind, and I
could--I would be happy to take a look in more detail and
provide more detail for you in the--.
Mr. Etheridge. Let me thank you for that, because I have
visited that site, seen that material, and for those who
haven't on this committee, it is amazing what it does for
protecting our first responders, and--not only in the fire
area, but in--where equipment gets snagged and others, and I
have another one. I hope when they get a second round and we
will--thank you very much.
Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentleman. The Chair recognizes
the distinguished gentlelady from Texas.
Ms. Granger. Thank you, and thank you for being here. I
have perhaps a statement more than a question. Some of us
attended the National Defense University Tuesday morning for an
exercise on cybersecurity, which is probably why you are
getting these questions, and we left there, of course, with
more attention to cybersecurity and the threat of cybersecurity
and what it can mean to us. As we should be concerned, this
is--what we should--be focused on, but when I heard you say, a
question that said what can we expect in one year, and
essentially, you said I don't know, and then the question was,
well, if you don't know, then how do you arrive at $18 million,
which is what we are seeing, the $18 million for cybersecurity
R & D, and then some others, and the answer was well, if I need
more, I can come back. That leaves me more concerned than I was
when I walked in here, so I am going to say to you that that is
there anything you can do to relieve that concern, and say
``here is what we are doing in cybersecurity, and here is how
we are going about it, setting the standards.''
Mr. McQueary. That is fair enough. We specifically have two
programs that are being funded jointly with the National
Science Foundation and the National Institute of Health--or
National Institute of Health--National Institute of Science and
Technology, and in those programs, if I can find my notes here,
I--actually, what I would prefer to do, if I could, could I
send to you a detailed response to your question there, because
it is quite a drawn-out number of different things that we are
doing. I have got some 18 different--I think it is 17 different
things that are listed here that are involved, and I would be
happy to provide you great detail what we are doing, and--.
Ms. Granger. If you would.
Mr. McQueary. --welcome the response--.
Ms. Granger. And then also, more specifically, about how
you arrived at the $18 million figure.
Mr. McQueary. Sure. That is fair enough.
Mr. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. McQueary. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry. Gentlelady, yield back.
Ms. Granger. I do.
Mr. Thornberry. Just wasn't sure if she was finished or
not. And Dr. McQueary, I think the whole Subcommittee, of
course, would be interested in those answers.
Mr. McQueary. Of course.
Mr. Thornberry. Because we have jurisdiction in both areas,
and--.
Mr. McQueary. Of course.
Mr. Thornberry. --are particularly interested in that. The
gentleman from Texas, has a question?
Mr. Sessions. Yes, I am, and I thank the Chairman. Dr.
McQueary, over the last few months and really years, we have
heard a good bit about intelligence that has been gained as a
result of our combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq about
the threat that existed within those countries. I am
interested, and this is perhaps much like Congresswoman
Granger's, this is a statement, not a question, but perhaps at
some point, I am interested in the Department of Homeland
Security utilizing what I think has been a very effective way
to identify targets and people that are our enemy as it relates
to cybersecurity.
We got to see the flashcards or the playing cards with
their pictures and names on them, but from my bit of serving on
this Committee, I have not gotten a sense or a feel that we
really know a lot about exactly who, where, and what those
people are who are our enemies, as they relate to
cyberterrorism. And it is my hope that in the coming year, and
if I am wrong, feel free to tell me, but I believe that we need
to make sure that we know more about who the specific targets
are, aimed at the United States, who these people are, and what
we are doing to combat them, and I have found myself, find
myself today in a position of seeing each one of you put
together a new department that is amazingly, and I think
credibly, full of substance of what you are doing, but I hope
you are aiming downstream at some things that we may have
learned from the military about how to know who and where and
what to expect and done some intel on that, so really it is an
observation, that you are going to take the money and tinker
and learn and, you know, the chalk and the marbles, and learn
who people are. But this person on this on this Cyber--Science
and Research Development Subcommittee would be interested at
some point, if that is developed during the year. We learned
the name Al-Qa`eda after the war, not before the war. We
learned the name bin Laden--I think I heard about it first when
the British Prime Minister talked about the Taliban and bin
Laden, because they supply drugs, 80 percent of the heroin that
is on the streets of Great Britain. I would like to become more
cogent with the threat that is out there, who the people are,
what they do, how they operate, even if it is on a privacy
basis, because I want to know you know, too.
I thank the gentleman, and I yield back.
Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentleman from Texas. Dr.
McQueary, let me ask a couple questions about this coordination
issue that I mentioned early on, and in your statement, you
talked about, as is obvious, there are a number of Federal
departments that have some work going on on, say, biodefense
and biosurveillance, and in answer to one of the previous
questions, I understood basically your answer to be we are
working on coordination to--in getting our arms around what
everybody is doing, and how they relate to one another, but the
inference I took is we are not quite there yet. Is that a fair
inference, as far as understanding what is going on and being
sure that we are not overlapping, but also that there are not
gaps?
Mr. McQueary. Well, as you know, there is a substantial
amount of R & D work that goes on in many different government
agencies, so I don't know if it is ever possible to be
completely current. Although--however, with that said, I do
believe that we have established the relationships. We have a
close relationship with Assistant Secretary Paul McHale's
Department of Homeland Defense. We have quarterly scheduled
meetings with his group, which I believe I talked about last
time when I was here, something we started early on. We deal,
of course, with the National Institute of Health, the
Department of Energy, all of these.
Now, in terms of could you--if you said to me, show me your
calendar and let me see all of these formally scheduled
meetings, many of these are not in that nature, because the
more important thing is to have the scientific people in the
various organizations interacting, and I truly believe that
that is the way that most information truly gets transmitted,
not through formal documentation, and so when you find an area,
when we find an area, our people find an area, in which it is
apparent that we need to interact, that interaction is taking
place, and that comes back to a point that I made in earlier in
testimony, choosing good people who are committed to the work
that has to be done, so that you can have confidence that they
will do those, assure that we have those kinds of interactions,
and I am confident that we have the people in the science and
technology organization.
I am also confident that within the Federal Government,
there is a huge support for the Department of Homeland Security
and what it is trying to do, because the importance of the
mission that we have to do. And we find that wherever we go.
Mr. Thornberry. I have no doubt that that is also the case.
It just seems to me it is a pretty big challenge, considering
how many different agencies are involved, to know--and as you
said, it doesn't mean that there needs to be a lot of meetings
and pieces of paper floating around, but you have to have some
sort of idea what people are working on to--.
Mr. McQueary. And we do have various technical working
groups that are there, and I work closely with Jack Marburger,
for example, at OSTP, and of course, he has the vision of
across the government, of the scientific portfolios that we
have.
Mr. Thornberry. The Homeland Security Advisory Council has
recently been formed. Will they have a role in helping to set S
& T's priorities, and where you put money, and so on.
Mr. McQueary. The--I believe--the answer is yes, and I
think the issue where the discussion comes about is on what is
that role, as opposed to whether they should have a role,
because I--if we weren't going to let them have a role in what
we are doing, what is the point in engaging these people and
using their time? We--I actually will be meeting that group the
first time tomorrow. We had the individuals selected. We have
18 of the 20 selected, membership, and so I will be meeting
with them tomorrow to get that kicked off, and so, I am very
anxious to have them review, you know, what we are doing, how
we are doing it, and offer their professional views, because we
have people from all walks of the scientific life, if you will,
that are on that Committee, and I would welcome the input.
General Welch is the Chair of the Committee, as you probably
know, and so I am looking forward to the interaction. I think
it is also important that that group have a connection back
into Secretary Ridge's Homeland Security Advisory Council, too,
and that will be conducted through Drs. Jared Cohen and Ruth
David will be the point of contact we will have back into the
Homeland Security Advisory Council.
Mr. Thornberry. So they will go up to that other Council,
but also, they will have direct access to you and can raise an
issue if they think you are shorting cybersecurity, or whatever
it is, they will be able to talk to you directly about that.
Mr. McQueary. Yes, and we owe you a report at the end of
each January on--their report on what their views are on what
we are doing. We, obviously, do not do one this January,
because the Committee did not exist at that time, but we will
have a report next year.
Mr. Thornberry. And let me ask one other thing in this
round. Are there R & D programs you know of now that have not
yet been brought into the S & T Directorate which will be, at
some point?
Mr. McQueary. We identify three in the testimony, that--
where we have made the transition, and that is included in our
budget. We are not quite through with that process, with--and I
am talking internal to DHS. We are not quite through with the
process. I believe we know where those programs are. We have a
draft recommendation to Secretary Ridge, since he ultimately
makes the decision as to what would be transferred in. I do
know that we have his full support on making that transition,
and he has made it clear to the operational units that is the
case, so I would expect within probably three months, we can
give you a much more profound answer to your question.
Mr. Thornberry. Something in addition to the three that are
contained in--.
Mr. McQueary. Yes, very definitely.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. Okay.
Mr. McQueary. In addition to the three.
Mr. Thornberry. I see. Thank you. The gentlelady from
California.
Ms. Lofgren. Just a few additional questions. They really
mostly relate to how we amass the information that is
available. First, that we find out what is out there, and then
make use of it in a way that helps us. You, in your testimony,
talk on page 10 about the standards for development of
biometrics for precise identification of individuals, which I--
is great. That is something I have been wanting somebody to
take the lead on for quite some time. However--and you also
mention some place that you are working in coordination with
US-VISIT. However, I am aware that US-VISIT is proceeding with
their own biometric standard, that I guess has not been
developed by you, and certainly, the FBI is doing their own
thing, and I guess the concern I have is that all of this stuff
is moving ahead, and I understand it needs to, but we are going
to end up with different biometric standards that don't have
the benefit of what you were planning to do. So, how are you--
what is your intention on getting your presumably excellent
work that is yet to be done, actually adopted by the various
segments of the government that need biometrics?
Mr. McQueary. It has been an interesting prospect to create
a new Science and Technology Division that is a service
organization for--organization that has been in existence for
many, many years, and are already underway with the programs.
The approach that we chose to take in the beginning, in the
formation of the Science and Technology group, was in those
scientific endeavors that are--were already underway, to not
try to take those over, because we were in a mode of trying to
grow our staff. At the same time, we were trying to get our
operational procedures in place, so what we did is choose to
focus in the areas more in detectors and standards and things
of that sort, that was not intrusive on existing programs. We
did, however, have a role to play in the US-VISIT program, in
that the Science and Technology organization contracted to have
a systems engineer--a system engineering company, take over and
provide some inputs into what was ultimately put out in the RFP
for the development of that. We did not have great influence on
it, but it was something that I felt very strongly. US-VISIT
will have to evolve over time. It now uses two fingers, as you
know, for that biometric. At some point, the data system
becomes overloaded and two fingerprints are not adequate to be
able to provide a full biometric identification, and so I see
us needing to move towards more--certainly more fingerprints
over time, and that will--and I am confident that will be done,
and as we make those evolution, I think we will be having
more--I am confident we will have more Science and Technology
involvement in that program.
Ms. Lofgren. So, basically you are thinking that that
proceeds, but when you are finished, you might, for example--
they might want to add on an iris scan. There is a smaller data
load there, and the reliability is at least as high, maybe a
little bit higher than fingerprints, and it would be
duplicative, but with the duplication, it would have a higher
level of reliability.
Mr. McQueary. And if we have done our job, they should be
getting their scientific view on whether that is a good idea
from the Science and Technology Directorate.
Ms. Lofgren. And how do you plan to have them listen to
you? Since they don't listen to us.
Mr. McQueary. I can't comment upon that. The manner in
which we try to make sure that we have close relationships. I
have one of my--we have portfolios, which you probably read in
the testimony. One of the portfolio managers is responsible for
the direct interaction with the Borders and Transportation
Organization. In fact, she came out of the Borders and
Transportation--she came out of the old Customs organization to
join us, because our plan all along was for the portfolio
managers that represented the operational units, we wanted to
get a person that came out of those units, so that one, that
person knew the interoperations of that unit from which they
came, and two, we would hope that they could be a trusted
person to contact within Science and Technology by virtue of
having come out of it.
Ms. Lofgren. Let me ask about another sort of consolidation
issue, and that is in the whole cybersecurity testing issue. I
am aware that--well, let me ask you this. How many on-staff
people do we have in that function, as compared to contractors?
Do you know?
Mr. McQueary. I do not know how many the Director of the
National Cybersecurity Division has. I spoke with him recently
and asked him--.
Ms. Lofgren. Okay.
Mr. McQueary. --the question, but I simply cannot recall--.
Ms. Lofgren. All right.
Mr. McQueary. --the answer he gave me.
Ms. Lofgren. Well, they are doing some things, and we have
got universities. I know that the University of California San
Diego--.
Mr. McQueary. That is--and Berkeley, also.
Ms. Lofgren. --and Berkeley, and Carnegie-Mellon are doing
some things. Some of them are under contract with us. Some of
them, they are just doing on their own. They have come with--up
with different analyses of what might happen in various
scenarios. It looks to me that we are primarily--in your
testimony on page 36 on the Internet Security Technology,
focusing in on cyberspace, but there is a physical
infrastructure element of vulnerability that I am concerned has
just not been attended to by--because it has not been assigned
to anybody, and that that is maybe not being integrated into
the diverse analysis that is going forward, some by the
government, some funded by the government, some just
independent. How do we get our arms around all of this good
science information and integrate it into what you are doing?
Mr. McQueary. Well, I--my view is that the appropriate
thing to do is to look to the science--the National
Cybersecurity Division that is in the Infrastructure Protection
Directorate. That is their established responsibility. People
like myself have a responsibility to provide the scientific
support that they might need in order to do that.
Ms. Lofgren. So we ask, I mean, not you.
Mr. McQueary. Yeah, I am not saying ask them and not me. I
am just saying that is the area of responsibilities as they
have been currently divided.
Ms. Lofgren. Okay. That is fine. If I could indulge the
Chairman for just one final question. The RFP for the Homeland
Security Institute requires that the contract management and
all the full-time staff have to be in Washington, D.C., and my
question is why are we limiting the universe that can respond
to that RFP just to inside the Beltway. Is there a reason for
that?
Mr. McQueary. I wouldn't view it as limiting it at all. I
view it as--I mean, many companies set up operations here in
Washington when there is a need to have--.
Ms. Lofgren. Well, but--.
Mr. McQueary. --the interaction. It does not--.
Ms. Lofgren. My understanding is that all contractor
management and all full-time staff are to be located in the
Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.
Mr. McQueary. That is intended to be for the people that
would be working in that Homeland Security Institute. That does
not mean--it could be a larger company, it could be a
university or a national lab or something of that sort, that
had the--.
Ms. Lofgren. What is the rationale for that?
Mr. McQueary. Because the--we will have some classified
material to deal with over time. We have a small amount right
now, but the important thing is having that group, they will be
involved heavily in systems engineering work for us. It is
very, very important to have them close, so that our people can
interact with them on an easy basis. Having somebody on the
West Coast or Northeast or wherever, and where you have always
got to travel in order to have a meaningful interaction, in my
judgment, is simply not the most effective way to get the most
out of them.
Ms. Lofgren. So it is not that you have already decided who
is going to get the--.
Mr. McQueary. We have not decided who is--we have
absolutely not decided who is going to get that.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. The gentleman from North Carolina have
additional questions?
Mr. Etheridge. I do. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
again. We have, and I am sure other members have, too, is have
several companies who--certainly in our district, because of
the technologies you can appreciate, in the Triangle, and have
some ideas that they want to share with the Department of
Homeland Security, and in past hearings, we have been told that
there is an email address that companies should use to submit
those technology proposals. Although I hear from some of my
constituents, number one, it is hard to find, and number two,
even if they do send emails, they say they aren't getting
responses. I don't know whether it is true, but that is what
they tell me.
Mr. McQueary. Okay.
Mr. Etheridge. And I also note that from the DHS website,
that you will be hosting an industrial forum here in March that
will include discussions on how to apply for funding and for
contracts.
Mr. McQueary. Right.
Mr. Etheridge. And the forum is here in Washington, D.C.
Mr. McQueary. Right.
Mr. Etheridge. And many of the small business owners, as
you can appreciate, that will be a huge imposition, because
they neither have the resources, in a lot of cases, don't have
the staff, even though they may have some technical expertise.
So my question is this. Do you plan, in addition to asking my
first one, I hope you will respond to, do you plan to put this
information on the website so it is easily accessible and
understood by some of these small businesses?
Mr. McQueary. The answer is yes. In fact, we are trying to
make our website be the place for unclassified information, and
most of what we do is unclassified at this point, so that
people can go to it. My recommendation to you is to encourage
them to go to dhs.gov, at that website, drill down on the
Science and Technology area, and that--and you can find, I
believe, everything that we are doing in terms of RFPs we are
putting out, broad Agency announcements and so forth, because
our intent is to try to make that be so that people could
electronically get access to what we are doing. In the case of
those that said you have submitted things, if you will give me
the names of them, I will be happy to personally find out where
those--why we have not responded, because I thought we had a
process that assured that people would get a response, if it
was nothing more than saying we have your proposal. We are
looking at it, just so that people know that a human being has
actually intercepted the correspondence.
Mr. Etheridge. I promise you in the future we will keep a
list, if they call. Are there any plans to--.
Mr. McQueary. We have had an enormous number of
inputs--.
Mr. Etheridge. I know.
Mr. McQueary. --as you might guess.
Mr. Etheridge. And I understand that. Are there any plans
to change the way the Directorate deals with unsolicited
proposals from small technology companies? I assume you are
getting a lot of those, and are there full-time staff devoted
to the outreach to companies and societies, because there are a
lot out there that do have ideas, and it seems to me that is an
area if we aren't doing it, we ought to be giving some serious
consideration to.
Mr. McQueary. Well, of course, we have just started the
SBIR program, as you know about, and that will have, I think it
is $19 million or so, whatever 2.5 percent of our budget is.
Associated with that program, we have gotten very good response
from that solicitation we put in, I believe, we have about 66
that are going to be selected out of the I think 300 or so that
we had submitted to us for that, so I think that is a good
outreach. The unsolicited proposals, while we encourage
unsolicited proposals, because you never know when you might
get it, the--I would frankly say, the likelihood of someone
sending in an unsolicited proposal about something that we had
simply never thought of is not particularly high, and so many
of the unsolicited proposals do not get the response that--
because it may not be an area that we are truly interested in
right now, and so the better approach is to look for how
unsolicited proposals can map into the areas that we have
publicly identified that we do have funding established for and
we are going forward in, but at the same time, I don't want to
discourage people who had submitted unsolicited proposals,
because you can't be sure that you are never going to get sort
of the Rosetta Stone that comes in from that.
Mr. Etheridge. I realize you get a lot of them, but if
someone could just let them know you have gotten it sometimes
on the unsolicited ones--.
Mr. McQueary. That is--and my intent is to have--.
Mr. Etheridge. --they would be very helpful.
Mr. McQueary. --us do that.
Mr. Etheridge. Okay.
Mr. McQueary. Because there is nothing more frustrating
than to not get any get of response there.
Mr. Etheridge. And we lose the opportunity for some pretty
creative people in the future may continue to participate.
Mr. McQueary. Sure.
Mr. Etheridge. Let me ask the final one, if I may. In the
little time I have got left. The elimination of EPA Homeland
Security Building Decontamination research funding, because in
the budget, in the 2005 budget request, the elimination of $8
million in current year funding for work focused on the
improvement of methods and setting standards for
decontaminating buildings following a potential chemical,
biological, or radiological attack, and the budget language is
the complete elimination of Homeland Security Building
Decontamination research. EPA will not complete its core
responsibilities to provide scientific, defensible, and cost-
effective decontamination methods, and forces it to disband the
technical and engineering expertise that will be needed to
address the known and emerging biological and chemical threats.
If that is true, Mr. Secretary, if the EPA is no longer to
carry out this research, will Homeland Security be continuing
these activities within the Directorate, and if not, is it your
belief and that of the Administration that issues regarding
building decontamination research and that of the technical and
engineering expertise that will be needed to address these
known and emerging threats in the future, no longer will be
needed?
Mr. McQueary. I only recently saw that language, and I
simply do not know what the thinking was that went into the
change you have there. I would be happy to look into it and
see--.
Mr. Etheridge. Would you. Okay.
Mr. McQueary. --what we can find out.
Mr. Etheridge. I would appreciate that.
Mr. McQueary. And provide that information back to you--.
Mr. Etheridge. Because I think this is one of those areas
that somebody--.
Mr. McQueary. The EPA does have the statutorial
responsibility--.
Mr. Etheridge. Sure.
Mr. McQueary. --for cleanup. That is certainly true, and so
I would assume that it is somehow embedded in that. We do not,
for example, in Science and Technology, have any money that we
are spending on cleanup--.
Mr. Etheridge. Right.
Mr. McQueary. --issues right now.
Mr. Etheridge. But this is on preparing for what to do in
the future, if you would look at that, I would appreciate it.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. McQueary. Yes, sir.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. Dr. McQueary, it occurs to me
one of the first things that this Subcommittee did last year
was to try to have a workshop for members and staff about
dealing with the Department, you know, we have developed--you
have developed a lot since then. It may be a useful thing to do
again at some point, and maybe you need to have the conference
in a couple weeks first, and--but we might set up some sort of
an informal briefing, because the better we can help guide our
constituents, and inform them, the better--the less hassle, I
think, you all will have to deal with, and the more informed
they are about how to deal with the Department, or access the
Department, I think it would be easier on everybody. We might
think about that. It is not all your Directorate. There are,
you know, it cuts across a number of directorates, but it just
occurs to me with some of the questions that we have had, that
we may want to think about doing that.
Mr. McQueary. We would be happy to take that on as a--to
look and--if you maybe some of your staff members contact us,
and we could work with them to see what--in more detail, what
your interest is, and we could help work it.
Mr. Thornberry. Great. Thank you. The gentleman from Texas
have additional questions?
Mr. Sessions. I do not, Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Thornberry. Let me ask, I don't want to put you on the
spot, because this is an unclassified setting, but I wonder, I
think it would be helpful for me to kind of have the view from
30,000 feet of where we are in certain key areas where we are
trying to develop technologies that help make us safer. For
example, patrolling, guarding our borders. And the kinds of--I
guess what I am interested in, or--do we think there are some
technologies out there that we just need to get fielded and we
can make substantial improvements? Are the technologies not
developed enough yet? Do we need to do a lot more research
before we are ever in the ballpark? You know, kind of where we
are with--in some of these areas, and I will throw that out to
you, guarding the border as one. From your standpoint, without
being too specific, where do you think we are?
Mr. McQueary. Well, there is certainly plenty of work to be
done, because we know there are people crossing our borders
every day, illegally crossing the borders at places. The one
area where I believe there is great promise is in the area of
unmanned aerial
vehicles. We do have some testing that has gone on already. We
are beginning to do more. In fact, I--the lady who manages my
Borders and Transportation portfolio that I touched upon
earlier has the responsibility from a Science and Technology
organization to--and interfacing with the BTS organization and
planning and executing that. Where we go with that, there are
some--it is not clear yet. There are issues associated with
aircraft flying and safety issues when you are around aircraft
that has people on board and things, and all of that has to be
worked out. However, I am confident that is an issue that can
be worked. It is not--but it is something where you have a
number of factors to consider, so it is--it would be my view
that unmanned aerial vehicles and associated sensors, whether
they be video sensors, or whether they be infrared, things of
that sort, really offer the greatest opportunity for being able
to provide information. The other thing would be if we can look
farther into the other country, things are coming, so that you
can anticipate. That sort of goes in the same category of what
we are talking about. That is where I think there is a great
emphasis, and I think also the President's proposal on how we
deal with immigrants that are in this country now has a great
deal of merit in helping move in the direction of solving some
of those issues.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. That is exactly the sort of view
that is helpful to me. Let me throw out another area. What
about technology at border crossings? And obviously, there are
a number of things that you are working on, but it looks to me
like that we are pretty far along with the technology. It is
just a question of making decisions, getting it deployed, and
that sort of thing.
Mr. McQueary. I think we are. I think the greatest
challenge at the borders, as you probably know, is doing things
that do not slow things down. I mean, there--we already have
``congested borders,'' and I don't mean that a pejorative
sense, but it is factually true, so if you slow something down
a minute, well, a minute doesn't sound very much, but I am told
that what you do is in effect cause the cars and trucks to
begin backing up into Mexico or wherever it might be, where
they are trying to come across. So whatever we do has to have
an element, we need to do it reliably, and we need to do it
quickly, and so that, I think, provides the--is where the great
challenge is, because you can think of lots of things. I mean,
you could say why don't we just take every truck and inspect
every bit of it, and obviously, we couldn't live with that, so
it is--whatever we do has got to be focused on doing it
quickly, I believe. There are sensor technologies that are
available, and how we implement those, I think, is a
contribution that the Science and Technology group can make in
concert with the Borders and Transportation people.
Mr. Thornberry. What about port security, particularly
cargo shipments and trying to screen our cargo?
Mr. McQueary. I mentioned the radiation detection work that
we are doing in New York, and the Port Authority in New York
and New Jersey. I believe that that work is going to provide a
direction that we can go in to provide greater capability at
the ports. I have also seen some interesting technologies that
I don't have a scientific view yet as to whether they can be
made to work, but I have seen some interesting technologies in
what you could--conceive of doing a complete X-ray of a
container as it is being taken off the ship, with the equipment
on the crane that is lifting it, telemetry, the information
from that scan over to a remote place, have someone looking at
it, and essentially in the time period it takes to be able to
get it off. Now, this is the view of the contractor who has
this offer. I have not rendered a complete view as to whether I
think this could be made to work in a manner that could be
afforded by the country. But it is an interesting concept, and
there are others like that, too.
The key thing, though, I believe, is that we must do
everything we can to try to know what is in the containers
before they show up at our shores, and that is where it is very
important to play the emphasis, because in your--if you wait
until it shows up to shore, we are in a defensive mode then,
and when you are in a defensive mode, it is difficult to always
be right.
Mr. Thornberry. Where do you see us technologically at this
point on the--in the biosurveillance area? It--you know, you
have explained earlier its importance, and I think most people
agree with you, it is, in some ways, the area of, I guess,
greatest--I don't want to say greatest vulnerability, but when
you put all the things together about the impact and the
dangers and--it is on most people's--top of their priority
list. Where are we in--.
Mr. McQueary. I believe we know where we need to get to. I
am very pleased with the manner in which Biowatch--we have had
well over a half a million samples that have been taken by
those sensors. We have yet to have our first false alarm in
that, and that false alarms are a huge issue for anything in
which you are dealing with the general public. It is very
important not to continue to blow the whistle and say there is
something there, when it isn't. We have had some detections
that were made in Houston, which you probably know about, that
were made on those Biowatch sensors. We actually picked up
tularemia in the Houston area. It was not a terrorist attack.
It was naturally occurring, as many of these pathogens are, and
so I am pleased with what we are seeing in the performance.
The issue, though, is one of, I mentioned earlier,
biological threats are temporal in nature, and therefore, we--
right now, we go out once a day, sample these, take the
samples. We then have to go and do the analysis on the samples,
and so you could be talking 48 hours before you know that
something actually happened. So, the ultimate detector that we
need is one that makes a detection, does the assay in place,
and sends a radio signal of some sort to wherever you might
like to have it saying we have a detection. We have got a
problem. And then you have got the measurement being made close
to the event. And I believe--I don't believe that we are there
scientifically yet. I do believe that it is an engineering
problem, not a scientific breakthrough problem, and therefore,
that is where the emphasis needs to be placed.
Mr. Thornberry. That is very helpful. Let me ask you about
one other, interoperable communications, particularly of the
first responders. We have had--the Subcommittee held a briefing
on that last year, and it is a far more complex issue than one
sees on the surface.
Mr. McQueary. Yes, it is.
Mr. Thornberry. But where do you think the technology is on
that?
Mr. McQueary. Well, the--for--first of all, interoperable
is a word that means many things. If you had 10 people in the
room, and said please write down what you think interoperable
means, it is very likely you would have maybe 9 or 8 different
views on what it means. So it is really important, I think, to
construct the language around what one means. The ultimate in
interoperability would be where you and I are emergency
responders. You have got your phone, I have got mine. We pick
up and we can have an immediate conversation. We have got
established protocols or overrides that might be there, so that
because we are working in a threat condition, that we can
assure that we are going to be able to have that communication.
We do not have that right now. As we know, the--as in the south
of New York, policemen, firemen can't even communicate among
themselves. There are technologies that exist today, and if you
read or heard Secretary Ridge's speech, he laid out what our
plans are in dealing with interoperable communications. There
are technologies where you can literally have an electronic
box, if you will, and you have one phone, the simplest example,
one phone communicates with a box, and then it can send out a--
it can convert the signal into whatever format some other phone
needs to have in order to have a conversation.
However, that means you have got this concentrator, if you
will, which is not as efficient, nor will it be as cost-
effective, but I do believe it is an important first step that
we can take, and we can--and we do intend to provide standards
associated with that. We are not quite through with where we
want to be, but we will be providing standards that will be
helpful to state and locals as they look at how they may want
to spend grant money or--money. If you have not been to
Chicago, and you get a chance to go, I would encourage you and
other members of the Committee to take a look at what Chicago
has done for its interoperable communications for the city.
They have really solved the problem of how to communicate among
all of their policemen, emergency responders, firemen, and they
have a central control station, where people know what is going
on throughout the city at all times among all of those, and so
it is first-rate, but it is for Chicago only, and so there is
more to it than just one city, but it is obviously a large
area.
Mr. Thornberry. Great. Thank you. The staff has helped to
remind me of one other area. I want to just see if you can tell
us anything about in this setting, and that is the MANPADS
issue, missiles which could be launched against airplanes. Do
you--can you tell us anything about where the technology stands
for dealing with that concern?
Mr. McQueary. We--based upon what we have seen, as you
know, we have awarded three contracts to three different views.
We have--and each one of those contractors has an airline
participant as a part of it, and I think that is a really
important thing in order to give credibility to what gets done,
because if the airline industry doesn't believe it, it becomes
a very difficult thing to sell. I am confident that we are
going to be able to identify a solution reasonably quickly. I
know there are views that why don't we just take what is--some
views, and why don't we take what the Defense Department has
done and apply it on commercial aircraft. It is not that simple
of a problem at all. I believe that within the time
period we have laid out, which is aggressive, within the two-
year period, we can make a firm recommendation to the
Administration and the Congress as to what the technical
solution can be, and then a decision can be jointly made as to
where the country wants to place the burden of that cost for
making it happen, and I think that our job, I view, is not to
make the decision as to whether to do it, but rather, to
provide the technical wherewithal on which a decision can be
made.
Mr. Thornberry. Great. I agree. Thank you. Ms. Lofgren.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I--as you were
talking, I was remembering the other questions that I forgot to
ask. And really, there is just three, and they all really
relate to the same subject, which is information that is out
there in other parts of the Federal Government in some cases,
that may or may not be known to you, because there is no good
source. For example, as you were talking about the detection of
bio-agents, I was recalling that the Post Office actually has
deployed, and I know this, because one of the component parts
is manufactured not in my district, but nearby, and I visited,
where they do air samplings 24/7, and the component that is
made in California actually does the testing for DNA of the
biohazard. It produces a result that is 99.9 percent accurate,
according to the Army--you know, they did a competition at the
testing ground in under 35 minutes. So, I don't know whether
that is the right--I mean, it was good enough for the Post
Offices. They are just a component. It is a major defense
contractor has got the prime contract, because they are testing
for other things, but we don't need to invent that, because it
has already been done, and I am--just one example, NASA is
doing all kinds of interesting things, not for homeland
security, for space, but they have, for examples, Ames has come
up with a piece of equipment, at NASA Ames, where they can
detect life, you know, in very dense rubble, and they were
thinking it wasn't devised for rescuers, but that it would have
an application for rescuers, but there is really nothing in
place for the NASA Ames scientists to funnel that in to you, or
the CIA, and they got so frustrated or alarmed about what was
going on in Silicon Valley in terms of invention, I am sure you
are aware that they hired Gilman Louie to be a venture
capitalist, to go out and find out about this stuff. I don't
know if Gilman gives reports to your department or not.
Mr. McQueary. We have met with Gilman. I have not
personally met him, but we have had people--.
Ms. Lofgren. I see him on the airplane all the time, but
he--you know, I mean, there is just--there is--but there is no
real way to funnel this information into you, and I guess I am
thinking. I don't know that I have the solution either, but
there needs to be some thought given to how we harness the
brainpower and diverse elements of the Federal Government,
things funded by the Federal Government, so we don't end up
reinventing what has already been invented.
Mr. McQueary. I completely agree with you, completely agree
with you.
Ms. Lofgren. So what are your thoughts on how to do that?
Mr. McQueary. Well, the--I certainly, at the top level, I
think Jack Marburger, Dr. Marburger, is in the best position to
have the view of what is going on scientifically throughout the
government. Now, he is one individual, and he has a relatively
small staff, and so how much detail he can get into--.
Ms. Lofgren. I don't think it is possible--.
Mr. McQueary. --in order to be able to provide that, so--.
Ms. Lofgren. --for him to play that ball.
Mr. McQueary. --probably not. But other than that, I--the
only way I know of is through working groups. By the way, we
have had contact with NASA. I don't recall whether it was Ames,
but early on, when I was reading all of the emails, I got an
email from someone at NASA that had some ideas that I can't
reconstruct at this point, as to what they might be able to do
to help us. But that is informal, and it would be--I share your
view that if we had a more formalized way of stimulating the
interaction, we all could be better served by the money the
Federal Government is spending, and I will take it on to try to
see if I can come up with a better thing than saying why
doesn't Jack Marburger help me.
Ms. Lofgren. I would be very interested if you would give
some thought to that, and maybe--.
Mr. McQueary. Okay.
Ms. Lofgren. --that is one of the questions we should pose
to our Advisory Council as well. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. Is the TSWG going to continue, or what is
its role as you develop and move forward?
Mr. McQueary. The TSWG has done a wonderful job for us, and
I can't say enough, because we could not have launched our
activity in May of this past year without their help, and so it
has been really important for us to do that, and as you may
recall, we had 3,344 white papers that were submitted at that
very first TSWG announcement, and so enormous support there. We
have support--we have funded them another $30 million in fiscal
year 2004. The one area where I am looking for some change, and
we are having a discussion back and forth. They are not able to
move as quickly, for whatever reasons, as I would like to see
us move. I think it is very important that we make our
decisions, and get on with it, and MANPADS took us about three
and a half months from start to issuance of contracts. We have
been able to do similarly in chem-bio detectors, because of the
OTA authority that was given by the Congress to be able to move
quickly. So, I--it is an open question as to whether we will
continue with the TSWG or not. Ultimately, I think it would be
beneficial for us to have the capability, whether we have it
indigenous into Science and Technology, or whether we have
someone, some other agency manage it for us, it could be good,
but I am--I would rather not give you a yes or no answer.
Mr. Thornberry. I appreciate it. I do think the ability to
move quickly is just one of the essential elements for the
military of the future, or for protecting our homeland.
Mr. McQueary. Right. Absolutely.
Mr. Thornberry. I have got two or three more questions, but
I would prefer to submit those for the record, and ask for a
written response, and ask unanimous consent that all members
have five days to submit written questions for the record, and
to revise and extend their remarks. And if my colleagues have
nothing else, let me thank you again, Dr. McQueary, for being
here with us today, for answering our questions, and for all of
the work that you and your colleagues are doing to get this
Department up and running and to make us safer day by day. We
appreciate you.
Mr. McQueary. We appreciate the support we receive from
you, too, I assure you. And your staff does a great job in
working with us.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, now, don't say that. They are going
to ask for raises. But I appreciate you being here, and the
hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:43 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Material Submitted for the Record
Questions for the Record From the Hon. Mac Thornberry
1. Developing meaningful metrics to measure progress in making the
nation safer is difficult yet it must be done. What do you think are
the most important indicators of your Department's success and what is
the status of your efforts to develop a formal set of metrics?
Answer: In compliance with GPRA, the DHS has established
performance goals and supporting performance measures for each of its
programs. These measures are the most important indicator as they
provide both macro and individual program status of success. For a
macro view the DHS Strategic Plan provides the framework for carrying
out the Department's Mission. Each program, and its associated
performance goals and measures are linked to the DHS strategic plan
goals they support. This linkage enables the department to collect
information on progress in achieving goals and accomplishing the
Mission of DHS. . . . lead the unified national effort to secure
America. At the program level, the program performance goal and ensuing
supporting performance measures provide consistent critical insight
into the achievement of programs achieving their intended results.
During fiscal year 2004 we began collecting quarterly performance
results information on all our programs to monitor success at both the
strategic goal and program level.
Although much has been accomplished, we recognize the need for
continual improvement of performance measures. We have therefore
planned further agency-wide training in developing better measures to
be completed this year. This year performance information will further
be refined by linking each program to DHS strategic objectives under
each strategic goal, and development of additional performance measures
as needed to reveal how each program explicitly supports each DHS
strategic objective.
2. We know that the budget and planning is broken out by countermeasure
portfolio. However, the implementation of the work is done by your four
offices
Office of Plans, Programs, and Budgets
Office of Research and Development
Office of HSARPA
Office of Systems Engineering and Development
What are the budget breakouts for these Offices and how do they work
together especially in getting technologies transferred to the end-
user?
Answer: The fiscal year 2004 funds allocation by managing office is
as follows:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Managing Office FY 2004 Funds Allocation ($M)*
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Office of Plans, Programs, and Budgets 118.6
Office of Research and Development 400.2**
Office of HSARPA (Includes SBIR) 246.5
Office of Systems Engineering and ....................................
Development 108.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 874.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Does not reflect fiscal year 2004 general rescission of $5.2 million.
**This amount includes $88 million for construction.
The Offices of the Science and Technology (S & T) Directorate work
together through Integrated Product Teams (IPT). Membership from all of
our Offices--Office of Plans, Programs, and Budgets (PPB), Office of
Research and Development (ORD), Homeland Security Advanced Research
Projects Agency (HSARPA) and the Office of Systems Engineering and
Development (SED)--participates actively in the planning and budgeting
process through these IPTs. The IPTs for each portfolio work as a team
to determine their mission space, their strategic goals for the next
five years, and a list of prioritized deliverables. The executing
Offices--ORD, HSARPA and SED--then respond to the prioritization
process with programs that are subsequently executed.
The primary executors of the Technology Transfer function are the
Offices of HSARPA and SED. When HSARPA or SED are assigned a project
for demonstration and deployment by the IPT, that Office takes on full
responsibility to ensure that all end-user requirements are met and
that the technology delivered is affordable, manufacturable,
interoperable, sustainable and easy to use.
3. The HSARPA has put out several Broad Area Announcements. Have
the proposals received from these calls been reviewed, selected and
funded by the HSARPA? What percent of the HSARPA budget is obligated at
this time? What is the projected budget obligation by the end of fiscal
year 2005? Is this process moving fast enough?
Answer: The Science and Technology Directorate is committed to
ensuring technologies to secure the Nation are developed using the
extensive resources, assets and experience of the private sector.
Through the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency
(HSARPA), the Directorate has already completed the selection process
for two solicitations. Forty teams or individual companies were
selected to enter negotiations from HSARPA's first research
announcement (RA03-01, Detection Systems for Biological and Chemical
Countermeasures) issued in September 2003. To date, eight teams are at
work through an awarded agreement and all others were allowed to begin
work through pre-award costs authorization. HSARPA issued its first
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program Solicitation on
November 13, 2003. All 66 winners are currently under contract.
Currently, HSARPA has four Broad Agency Announcements (BAAs) active
and has publicly announced that in the next three months an additional
five BAAs will be released. Additional solicitations are in preparation
for late summer and fall of2004.
As of April 28, 2004, HSARPA has committed 84 percent of its
allocated fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 budgets. HSARPA plans
to have all fiscal year 2004 funds obligated by the end of the first
quarter of fiscal year 2005.
The HSARPA solicitation process is moving at a rate commensurate
with its allocated funding and staffing. As noted above, our process is
accelerating.
4. As you know, this Committee has strongly supported the enactment
of the Project Bioshield, which is unfortunately still pending in the
Senate. However, as you also know, Congress has already appropriated
hundreds of millions of dollars to develop and procure medical
countermeasures for a variety of potential terrorist threats, whether
nuclear, radiological, biological or chemical. Notably, this includes
the $127 million for ``nuclear and radiological countermeasures,'' $266
million for ``biological countermeasures,'' $874 million for ``general
research and acquisition,'' and $890 million for drug development
projects under Project Bioshield. These funds were intended to create a
guaranteed funding stream to encourage the development of WMD medical
countermeasures in cases where there is not likely to be any other
commercial market for these drugs.
While we all would like to see the Project Bioshield legislation
enacted tomorrow, can you please reassure the Committee that your
Department, in conjunction with the Department of Health and Human
Services, is moving forward to utilize these funds to get needed drugs
for anti-radiation?
Answer: The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) National
Science and Technology Council, Weapons of Mass Destruction
Countermeasures Subcommittee, Radiological and Nuclear Threat
Countermeasures Subgroup is the advisory committee that is providing
priorities and guidance to Project Bioshield in the area of anti-
radiation drugs. Efforts through licensure of these drugs may be
provided by Project Biosheild funds. The funds available for the
purchase of anti-radiation drugs are provided by the Strategic National
Stockpile which is managed by an interagency group lead by the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) participates on this interagency group, which
is currently developing a national acquisition strategy. Additionally,
coordination of research and development (R & D) in the areas of both
radioprotectants and radiation treatment drugs occurs on many levels
including the Counterproliferation Technologies Coordinating Committee
(CTCC) and the development of the National Plan for Homeland Security S
& T currently underway.
Questions for the Record from the Hon. Jim Turner
1. We understand that the Directorate is doing a strategic plan for
fiscal years 2006 through 2010. How will you prioritize resources over
that period, and do you expect the distribution among the portfolios of
biological, chemical, nuclear, and other countermeasures to remain the
same as in the current budget?
Answer: The S & T Directorate is currently conducting its fiscal
year 2006 through 2010 Strategic Planning Process. Our planning process
is centered around the use of Integrated Product Teams (IPTs). As
mentioned above, IPTs are composed of representatives from each of our
Offices, including the Office of Plans, Programs, and Budgets (PPB),
the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA), the
Office of Research and Development (ORD) and the Office of Systems
Engineering and Development (SED). The IPTs for each portfolio work as
a team to determine their mission space, their strategic goals for the
next five years, and a list of prioritized deliverables. The
Directorate's strategic planning and prioritization will be influenced
by statutory requirements, national guidance, and user needs as well as
subject matter expertise of our portfolio managers.
S & T's Corporate Review Board, composed of the Office Directors,
reviews each Portfolio Plan and provides final S & T portfolio guidance
regarding resource and program adjustments through a Decision
Memorandum from the Under Secretary for Science and Technology. This
Decision Memorandum, which may include shifts in budgetary priorities
for the Directorate, will be issued in May, 2004.
2. Does the Directorate have a long-term list of the most important
scientific innovations for homeland security? For example, are you
looking down the road at handheld detectors that can identify all
biological and chemical weapons? If so, how are research and
development efforts being focused on these specific needs, as opposed
to general work in their larger portfolios?
Answer: The Science and Technology Directorate recognizes that many
organizations across the U.S. Government are contributing to the
science and technology base needed to enhance the Nation's capabilities
to thwart terrorist acts and to fully support the conventional missions
of the operational components of the Department. Congress recognized
the importance of the research and development being conducted by
numerous Federal departments and agencies, and in the Homeland Security
Act of 2002, directed that ``The Secretary, acting through the Under
Secretary for Science and Technology, shall have the responsibility
for. . . developing, in consultation with other appropriate executive
agencies, a national policy and strategic plan for, identifying
priorities, goals, objectives and policies for, and coordinating the
Federal Government's civilian efforts to identify and develop
countermeasures to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
other emerging terrorist threats, including the development of
comprehensive, research-based definable goals for such efforts and
development of annual measurable objectives and specific targets to
accomplish and evaluate the goals for such efforts.''
The development of this National Plan for Homeland Security Science
and Technology is now underway. This National Plan will highlight the
high priority areas and scientific innovations for homeland security in
the short-, mid- and long-term time periods. The National Plan will
incorporate much of the strategic planning described in the preceding
answer.
3. Please provide additional information as discussed during the
hearing on the plans to finish consolidating all Departmental research
and development into the S & T Directorate.
Answer: The S & T Directorate is in the process of administrative
actions and agreements that will establish management relationships
with the following R & D activities within DHS:
Transportation Security Laboratory (Border &
Transportation Security Directorate, Transportation Security
Administration);
Customs Applied Technology Division (Border &
Transportation Security Directorate, Bureau of Customs & Border
Protection);
Customs Laboratory System's Laboratories & Scientific
Services Research Facility (Border & Transportation Security
Directorate, Bureau of Customs & Border Protection);
Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) Forensic
Document Laboratory (Border & Transportation Security
Directorate, Bureau of Immigration & Customs Enforcement);
In addition, S & T will establish management
relationships with the U.S. Coast Guard R & D Center and with
U.S. Secret Service Laboratory R & D activities that will take
into consideration the traditional and protective missions
respectively of these entities.
We will complete the administrative requirements to establish
management relationships between these R & D activities and S & T by
September 30, 2004. Our intent is to develop and expand collaborative
relationships as these new management relationships are established.
To accomplish administrative actions to establish these management
relationships, S & T is taking the following steps:
The proposed management relationship between S & T and
each R & D activity is being determined;
Second, Memoranda of Agreement will be promulgated
between S & T and each R & D activity; and
Third, mutually agreed-to transition plans will be
developed.
Forthcoming administrative actions will result in the formation of
official management relationships between the S & T Directorate and
each R & D activity in the Department and will address responsibilities
for coordination and oversight of R & D activities as appropriate.
Details of actions required to establish new management relationships
and integrate R & D activities in the Department will be finalized by
the Secretary.
4. How has the Directorate determined what areas are appropriate
for university centers? After the next center on behavioral and social
science studies on terrorism, what is planned for additional centers?
Answer: To date, DHS has established three university-based
homeland security centers of excellence (HS Centers). The first HS
Center awarded was the University of Southern California's Homeland
Security Center for Risk-Based and Economic Analysis of Terrorist
Events. DHS purposely focused the first HS Center in this area to
validate models that may provide direct input on the risk and economic
impacts of terrorism, which in turn help prioritize S & T's research
agenda. This topic was also included in the National Academies of
Sciences report, Making the Nation Safer.
On April 27, 2004, the Department announced awards to Texas A & M
University and the University of Minnesota to lead two new Homeland
Security Centers of Excellence (HS Centers) on agro-security. Texas A &
M will lead the HS Center dedicated to the study of high-consequence
foreign animal and zoonotic diseases; the University of Minnesota will
lead the Center for Post-Harvest Food Protection and Defense. Both
institutions have solidified partnerships with supporting academic
institutions. Private industry will also be a partner with the
University of Minnesota for post-harvest food protection and defense.
DHS has solicited input from the National Academies of Science, and
considered Section 308, as amended, of the Homeland Security Act of
2002, to determine appropriate topics and prioritized areas for future
university-based Homeland Security Centers. Having addressed
countermeasures and cross-cutting portfolio needs in its first three HS
Center awards and the forthcoming competition for a center in the
social and behavioral sciences, an emphasis on research to support
operational response is a likely direction for a future competition.
5. I am very concerned over the increasing use of security
classifications and other labels (such as ``Sensitive Security
Information'' or ``Sensitive But Unclassified'') to prevent
dissemination of information that may not truly need to be kept from
the public. Some in the academic community have found it so difficult
to deal with these secrecy provisions that they give up on trying to
work on homeland security issues. Do you share this concern? What is
the S & T Directorate doing to make sure that areas of research that
don't need to be classified are kept open? Is it possible to have
portions of contract work be done under secrecy agreements without
classifying the entire work?
Answer: The Science and Technology Directorate is committed to
harnessing the vast resources our Nation's universities offer in the
difficult challenge of protecting our homeland. To this end, the
Department is committed to keeping as much research in the academic
arena open to the public as possible. The S & T Directorate currently
functions under the direction established by the 1985 National Security
Decision Directive 189 (NSDD 189). NSDD 189 states that to the maximum
extent possible, the products of fundamental research remain
unrestricted. While future research supported by DHS S & T may require
classification, the Directorate remains committed to the tenets of NSDD
189 and will work to ensure that the portions of research activities
that are fundamental in nature remain unrestricted.
6. I have heard from the academic community that there has been a
fairly successful effort, called the Federal Demonstration Partnership,
to standardize the process for applying for and administering grants
and contracts. This process makes it much easier for individual
researchers and universities to work collaboratively with the federal
government. Will DHS be using the standard FDP mechanism for university
centers and HSARPA work conducted at universities?
Answer: The Department of Homeland Security is not currently a
member of the Federal Demonstration Partnership (FDP). DHS Office of
Procurement is currently reviewing the FDP mechanism to determine if it
will be a process that should be incorporated for university grants and
cooperative agreements.
The S & T Directorate considers universities as an important part
of the technical community available to work on DHS problems. The
Directorate held a public workshop in December, 2003, specifically to
understand the needs and outlook of the academic community.
Participants from more than 100 universities and educational
institutions attended the workshop. S & T solicitations have received
good participation from universities at workshops, bidder's
conferences, and at the white paper and proposal stages.
7. Under Project Biowatch, sensors are placed in cities across the
country for the purposes of detecting airborne release of biological
agents. This is a much-needed and profoundly locally-based federal
program. Outside of the science, it seems the main challenge will be in
coordinating with so many jurisdictions, the EPA as the owner of many
of the detector platforms, and the CDC who arranges for the sensor
testing. Does your Directorate have ultimate budget responsibility for
the systems? And does that budget responsibility include the day-to-day
operations incurred at the local level, or is that not covered by the
federal government?
Answer: Yes, the DHS S & T Directorate has ultimate budget
responsibility for the Bio Watch Program. The day-to-day operations and
local expenses are funded by the DHS S & T Directorate as part of the
BioWatch day-to-day operations. The BioWatch program currently does not
fund local response activities related to a Bio Watch initiated event.
8. What will the activities and responsibilities of the National
Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center will be? How will its
role differ from and interact with the activities of DOD and NIH? Does
it have a role in Project Bioshield? What is the timeline for the
facility's completion?
Answer: The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center
(NBACC) provides an integrated land responsive biosecurity enterprise
that facilitates homeland security, law enforcement, and medical and
veterinary communities' ability to understand, respond, deter and
recover from the biological threats to the United States. This mission
is critical to government policy and decision makers who manage
national resources and programs to minimize human casualties and
infrastructure damage associated with a deliberate attack with a
biothreat agent.
NBACC directs and coordinates scientific efforts to improve our
defenses against biological agents by gaining better information about
current and future threats, understanding the risks associated with
these threats, evaluating methods that may be used to deliver the
threats, and conducting forensic analysis on threats to determine
attribution. NBACC will develop a knowledge management system that
integrates science, technology and intelligence.
Efforts undertaken through the NBACC will advance DHS S & T's close
working relationship with the BioShield Program Office (Office of
Emergency Preparedness, Department of Health and Human Services) to
determine, validate, and prioritize biothreats as well as identify
countermeasure gaps and guide biothreat countermeasure acquisition
decisions. A coordinated decision process has been established whereby
the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Health and Human Services make
certifications and forward the purchase decision to the President
through the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
The NBACC concept is already being implemented through interim
capabilities in science-based threat characterization and bioforensics
operations and research, leveraging the U.S. Army Medical Research
Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID)'s aerosol biocontainment
laboratories and scientific expertise to accomplish near-term threat
characterization objectives. Additional capabilities are currently
being established through the Department of Energy National
Laboratories' research and development in information management,
sensors, surveillance, and related areas; and through ongoing research
and diagnostics work in the area of foreign animal diseases, a
capability of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC). The
current estimated timeline for completion of the NBACC facility is mid-
year of fiscal year 2008.
9. The budget request includes $129 million for ``nuclear and
radiological countermeasures,'' which I assume covers detection and
treatment. Can you discuss the balance between detection and treatment?
Also, how much is requested in the budget for antidotes for radiation
exposure, which are generally quite close to market, compared to
treatments for biological agents?
Answer: The budget for radiological and nuclear countermeasures
includes all areas that must be addressed in conducting national
research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT & E) to (1) prevent
the importation of radiological and nuclear weapons and materials; and
to (2) detect, prevent, protect against and respond to terrorist
attacks. The balance between detection and treatment is critical and
evolving. At present, the Science and Technology Directorate is in the
early stages of executing programs and has sought to emphasize
prevention. Hence, detection RDT & E is currently receiving the largest
portion of funding. Under the Incident Management portion of S & T's
Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures Portfolio, assessment efforts
for identifying the needed RDT & E for relevant technologies and
treatments of radiation exposure is included and will soon receive
funding. In the next few years, the balance between detection and
treatment will change to put a greater emphasis on the Incident
Management portion of the portfolio.
10. I commend you on the inclusion of 21 performance metrics in 12
categories in your written testimony, but there are no metrics on how
well the Directorate is reaching out to the private sector to identify
new technologies--the unsolicited proposals that are often the most
innovative ideas.
There is, however, a metric for the numbers of new ``technologies
prototyped or commercialized.'' The goal for fiscal year 2005 is three.
Can you describe what it means to have three new technologies
prototyped and commercialized? Is this the same as saying that three
HSARPA contracts are successful?
Answer: The DHS S & T Directorate, in coordination with the DHS
Private Sector Liaison Office, has several sustained outreach efforts
with industry. These efforts include multiple forums that provide for
the exchange of dialogue between DHS S & T program managers and our
industrial partners. These forums allow industry to better understand
the future programmatic direction of the Directorate and provide an
opportunity for DHS S & T Program Managers to learn about unique
technical capabilities of industry and small business. Some of these
conferences are focused on particular program areas, others cover many
areas. The next of these broad conferences will be held July 12-15,
2004, in San Diego, CA. In addition, DHS sponsors a website for all
businesses interested in submitting unsolicited proposals to the
Department (www.dhs.gov/openforbusiness).
Among its first public gatherings, HSARPA hosted a Best Practices/
Worst Practices workshop for industry and the participation was
enthusiastic: 172 industry representatives attended. This event gave
industry a face-to-face chance to explain their preferences for
solicitations, awards, contract types, time schedules, and other
administrative details, when working with the Science and Technology
Directorate.
Complicated or extensive HSARPA solicitations are published first
in draft form. This allows any potential bidder's comments to be read
and reviewed before the actual solicitation is published. In this way,
new areas of research can be identified and covered, recent commercial
developments may be included, and realistic, understandable goals can
be set in the formal solicitation.
Well before the first deadline for white papers, it is standard
HSARPA practice to hold either a technical workshop or a bidders
conference, or both. These public meetings establish common technical
foundations, provide general and technical directions, and introduce
the published solicitation in detail.
In addition, S & T solicitations executed by HSARPA provide a
teaming website for the convenience of the smaller bidders who may not
have the breadth of technical expertise in-house to compete for a full
technical topic. This site facilitates discussion among potential
bidders and promotes collaboration to achieve the challenging goals set
by the solicitation.
Finally, the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program
Manager not only manages the mechanics of the program, he is also the
small business advocate for HSARPA research. An important part of his
mission is traveling the country explaining the S & T Directorate's RDT
& E program and providing hands-on help to small business. He explains
to small companies with new ideas and concepts how to interact most
effectively with the S & T Directorate. HSARPA has already awarded 66
Phase I (feasibility study) contracts to small businesses for research
efforts in eight important areas. The next small business solicitation
will be issued in May, 2004.
A successful prototype or commercialization is not the same as a
successful HSARPA contract.
Typically, a new technology is developed and prototyped, then
commercialized.
HSARP A contracts with the private sector for research that
explores discoveries, expands original scientific work, or shows
evidence of development potential. HSARPA also contracts for multiple
technology development efforts. As development continues, prototypes
are created in a laboratory to prove that the idea or concept can be
physically constructed and made to work. The goal of development is to
make prototypes that perform satisfactorily in operating environments.
Commercialization is bringing a capable prototype out of the
laboratory into the commercial market for retail sale. There are many
steps in commercialization. Systems Engineering and Development
entrains mature prototypes and contracts for full scale engineering
development and manufacturing engineering development activities
necessary for commercial production. Development, proto typing, and
especially commercialization take a long time, and multiple serial,
parallel, and supporting contracts to do successfully.
Our stated goal is to have three technologies prototyped or
commercialized in fiscal year 2005.
Question from the Hon. Kendrick B. Meek
1. Mr. Secretary, how do you plan to execute the mandate given by
Congress in the Fiscal Year 2004 Homeland Security Conference report
regarding the participation of minority serving institutions (MSI) for
DHS's University-based Homeland Security Centers program?
HBCU's have not historically received the sustained funding other
institutions have received for infrastructure for research,
particularly in the formula funding used to allocate federal and state
dollars to land grant institutions. Currently, the federal funding
disparity at the federal level has been estimated to be approximately
10 to 1 ratio or more between the 1862 and 1890 land grant
institutions.
In the Fiscal Year 2004 Homeland Security Conference Report it
stated ``The Conferees encourage the Department to consider all
colleges and universities that meet the requirements of U.S.C. 188 in
the selection of university-based centers, including historically black
colleges and universities, tribal colleges, Hispanic-serving
institutions, and Alaskan Native-serving institutions.''
It appears this language was implicitly suggesting that due
consideration be given to minority-serving institutions or at least
suggests that DHS should be sensitive to the historical significance of
these institutions when designating centers.
Answer: DHS University Based Homeland Security Centers are selected
through a peer-review merit-based competition, in which DHS openly
solicits proposals to meet mission and technical criteria contained in
a Broad Agency Announcement. DHS S & T invited representatives of
minority-serving institutions (MSIs) to participate in the external
peer review process, leading to the selection of an institution to lead
a given Center. In addition, DHS S & T encourages institutions hosting
Centers to establish collaborative relationships with other
institutions, including MSIs.