[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
PROPOSED INFORMATION ANALYSIS
BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005
=======================================================================
HEARING
of the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
AND COUNTERRORISM
before the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 10, 2004
__________
Serial No. 108-40
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
house
__________
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Christopher Cox, California, Chairman
Jennifer Dunn, Washington Jim Turner, Texas, Ranking Member
C.W. Bill Young, Florida Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Don Young, Alaska Loretta Sanchez, California
F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Wisconsin Norman D. Dicks, Washington
W.J. (Billy) Tauzin, Louisiana Barney Frank, Massachusetts
David Dreier, California Jane Harman, California
Duncan Hunter, California Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland
Harold Rogers, Kentucky Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New
Sherwood Boehlert, New York York
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Nita M. Lowey, New York
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey
Porter J. Goss, Florida Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Dave Camp, Michigan Columbia
Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida Zoe Lofgren, California
Bob Goodlatte, Virginia Karen McCarthy, Missouri
Ernest J. Istook, Jr., Oklahoma Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Peter T. King, New York Bill Pascrell, Jr., North Carolina
John Linder, Georgia Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
John B. Shadegg, Arizona Islands
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Mac Thornberry, Texas Ken Lucas, Kentucky
Jim Gibbons, Nevada James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Kay Granger, Texas Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Pete Sessions, Texas
John E. Sweeney, New York
John Gannon, Chief of Staff
Stephen DeVine, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel
Thomas Dilenge, Chief Counsel and Policy Director
David H. Schanzer, Democrat Staff Director
Mark T. Magee, Democrat Deputy Staff Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
______
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism
Jim Gibbons, Nevada, Chairman
John Sweeney, New York, Vice Karen McCarthy, Missouri
Chairman Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Jennifer Dunn, Washington Norman D. Dicks, Washington
C.W. Bill Young, Florida Barney Frank, Massachusetts
Harold Rogers, Kentucky Jane Harman, California
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Nita M. Lowey, New York
Lamar Smith, Texas Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey
Porter Goss, Florida Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Peter King, New York Columbia
John Linder, Georgia James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
John Shadegg, Arizona Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Mac Thornberry, Texas Jim Turner, Texas, Ex Officio
Christopher Cox, California, Ex
Officio
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Jim Gibbons, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Nevada, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence and
Counterrorism.................................................. 1
The Honorable Karen McCarthy, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Missouri, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Intelligence and Counterrorism
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Chairman, Select Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 15
The Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas, Ranking Member, Select Committee on Homeland
Security
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Delegate in Congress From
the U.S. Virgin Islands........................................ 17
The Honorable Jennifer Dunn, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington........................................ 11
The Honorable Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Massachusetts..................................... 21
The Honorable Kendrick B. Meek, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida........................................... 25
The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, a Delegate in Congress From
the District of Columbia....................................... 27
The Honorable Christopher Shays, a Representative in Congress
From the State Connecticut..................................... 19
The Honorable John E. Sweeney, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York.......................................... 23
WITNESS
General Patrick Hughes, Assistant Secretary for Information
Analysis,
Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
APPENDIX
Material Submitted for the Record
Questions from The Honorable Jim Turner for General Patrick
Hughes......................................................... 33
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY PROPOSED INFORMATION
ANALYSIS BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005
----------
Wednesday, March 10, 2004
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism,
Select Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:55 a.m., in
Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Gibbons
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Gibbons, Sweeney, Dunn, Shays,
King, Thornberry, Cox (ex officio), McCarthy, Markey, (Del.)
Norton, Meek, and Turner (ex officio).
Also Present: Delegate Christensen.
Mr. Gibbons. The Subcommittee on Intelligence and
Counterterrorism will come to order. The subcommittee is
meeting today to hear testimony on the Department of Homeland
Security's proposed information analysis budget for fiscal year
2005.
General Patrick Hughes, Assistant Secretary For Information
Analysis, is with us today. Thank you, General, for being here.
We look forward to your testimony. I ask unanimous consent that
members' statements be included in the hearing record and
encourage members of the subcommittee to submit their opening
statements for the record.
I also ask unanimous consent that Ms. Christensen, who is
not a member of this subcommittee, be allowed to sit and ask
questions. Without objection so ordered.
Pursuant to the committee's rules, any member waiving their
opening statement will have an additional 3 minutes for
questions. The members of the committee may also have some
additional questions, and we will ask you to respond to these
in writing. The hearing record will be held open for 10 days.
I want also to let members know that we plan to proceed in
open session this morning for taking testimony and questioning,
and it is further my hope that we will be able to explore
issues of concern without the need to close the hearing to the
public.
However, if it becomes necessary to discuss classified
information, we will at an appropriate time take all necessary
steps to close the hearing and proceed in executive session.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
General Hughes, once again, thank you for being here today.
Your role in the Department is critical for the success of
our homeland security efforts over the last few years. We have
heard a lot about connecting the dots so that, we are sure that
all of the intelligence information that we process is brought
together in one big picture.
The Office of Information Analysis has a difficult task of
ensuring that relevant information about terrorist threats to
the homeland gets where it needs to go and gets there quickly.
Without intelligence, and the talented men and women who make
intelligence their business, we are blind to the intentions of
our enemies. However, knowing your enemy is simply not enough.
he information that we process must be brought together,
analyzed and disseminated to the people on the front lines
protecting our Nation from harm.
Because protection is so highly dependent on intelligence,
I find it appropriate that in your budget submission it is
difficult to determine where information analysis ends and
infrastructure protection begins.
While this level of interdependence is appropriate, I hope
you will be able to draw some lines for us here today so that
we may more clearly see how your office fits into the big
picture.
I look forward to your testimony and to hearing how we can
help you accomplish your goals for the coming year.
When Ms. McCarthy arrives, we will offer her an opportunity
for an opening statement. Until that point in time, is there
any other member who wishes to make an opening statement?
Seeing none.
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Karen McCarthy, a Representative in
Congress From the State of Missouri, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Intelligence and Counterterrorism
Thank you Mr. Chairman, thank you Assistant Secretary Hughes for
taking us through the Fiscal Year 2005 budget submission for the
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate Budget
(IAIP).
Last week, Under Secretary Libutti testified before a joint hearing
of the Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism and the
Subcommittee on Infrastructure Protection and Border Security. I raised
a number of issues with him that I would also like you to address
today, hopefully in more detail, concerning the Department's real-time
ability to assess threats to the homeland. This morning, we are
interested in hearing about ongoing efforts to improve the depth and
breadth of intelligence analysis at the Directorate, as well as the
connectivity among all key units across government doing similar
analysis.
Where are the existing gaps and weaknesses and what can our
Committee do to help your office solve these problems rapidly in
authorizing legislation that we expect to pass and enact later in the
year? Also, what is the time frame within the coming fiscal year for
showing results? Hopefully you can cover all this ground this morning.
Mr. Secretary, it would also be my hope that you will cast light on
what is being done to speed the issuing of information warnings and
advisories to state and local officials, and to improve the quality of
those communications so that businesses, schools, churches and families
across America have the best guidance in hand from the federal
government when the threat level rises.
Secretary Ridge's announcement on March 1 of a new initiative, the
Homeland Security Information Network, heads us in the right direction
by creating a comprehensive, computer based counterterrorism
communications system to all 50 states and 50 major urban centers. The
Department has the right idea to strengthen the quality and flow of
threat information. Now we'll need to assure that there is sufficient
follow through.
If there is one universal cry from constituent groups, it is the
need for DHS to provide timely and actionable information sharing
between the federal agencies and state and local agencies, who look to
the Department for reliable and accurate information concerning
terrorist threats in local communities all across America.
Tim Daniel, the Director of the State of Missouri Office of
Homeland Security, tells me that information sharing needs to go both
ways. When Missouri state and local officials have information
concerning possible terrorist activities, they need to know not only
who to contact at the federal level, but also that state information
will be considered in a timely way. The feedback loop is still under
construction. Mr. Secretary, I would welcome your wisdom on how best to
complete this information loop.
Since we're primarily focused today on the dissecting the
Directorate budget, it would be helpful to have a clearer understanding
of how many dollars are dedicated toward information sharing with
localities and communities. The Homeland Security Operations Center is
receiving a big plus up of funds, $10 million, in part to undergird the
``implementation of national systems for information sharing'' and I
would appreciate your sharing with the committee a Directorate-wide
breakdown on how funds are actually expended for information sharing
purposes.
It would be useful to hear a broader explanation, too, of where and
how time is lost in the process of forwarding important real-time
intelligence threat information to first responders. The First
Responders in the Fifth District of Missouri and all around the U.S.
need timely and actionable information from the federal government now.
Mr. Secretary, please share your plans for enhancing communication at
all levels and working to provide our local communities with the
resources they need to respond to emergency situations. I hope you will
provide more information on this topic so our Committee has a better
sense of how to fix this nationwide dilemma.
A separate policy matter slow to develop involves IAIP completing a
comprehensive threat and vulnerability assessment to guide spending
priorities. In releasing our one year anniversary report last week, the
Committee emphasized the need to have this blueprint in place,
regardless of the cost, by October 1, 2004, and I'd simply like to
reiterate that point with our distinguished panelists. Mr. Secretary,
how realistic is our goal?
Let me close by saying that I have a deep appreciation I have for
the work you are doing. Obtaining usable intelligence in order to
protect the homeland is a mammoth responsibility given the many
different avenues that exist for attacking our infrastructure. We are
supportive of your intentions, efforts and long-term goals, and will
continue, in a bipartisan way, to be a good faith partner in helping
you close the security gaps facing our nation.
Thank you.
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in
Congress From the State of Texas
Good morning, General Hughes.
We are pleased to have you with us today. Your mission of
identifying, assessing and mapping threats to the homeland is crucial,
and we thank you for agreeing to lay aside the comforts of semi-retired
life, after 37 years of distinguished military service, to serve our
country once again.
We had a good give and take with your boss last week, General
Libutti. Today we would like to pick right up with you and talk about
the relevance and effectiveness of the Directorate's intelligence
analysis given the existence of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center
and other units doing similar work. The Directorate has faced criticism
from Congress, the Century Foundation, the Heritage Foundation and
others that it is just a junior partner in the analysis process given
the emphasis and focus on TTIC, the CIA's existing Directorate of
Intelligence and the military intelligence agencies. We would like to
hear you clarify the roles, responsibilities and authorities of your
unit and how it differs from the others.
In addition, two and one half years after 9/11, it is a good time
to take stock of the government's efforts to do a better job of
``connecting the dots'' in our intelligence analysis. We have seen the
rapid creation of numerous new organizations--TTIC, IAIP, DoD's
Northern Command, the FBI's Terrorist Tracking Task Force--to name a
few.
To avoid repeating bureaucratic mistakes of the past, though, there
ought to be a clear delineation of what your office is doing and the
formal analytic interplay between IAIP, TTIC and other related
organizations. The left hand needs to know what the right hand is
doing, and that begins with a formal, clear, understandable structure
to government-wide intelligence analysis. The plan ought to be in
writing so there is a common understanding and so organizations can be
held accountable. Right now we simply don't have that in place.
Now let me offer some constructive criticism in a number of other
areas.
First, I am concerned that the practice of not sharing information
within the Intelligence Community continues to be a problem. For
example, 1 would be interested to know whether your office receives
intelligence from DoD Special Access Programs relating to the terrorist
threat? And with this new, hard push underway to locate Osama Bin
Laden, I can only assume that sensitive covert operations are part of
the effort. Are you regularly provided intelligence information
attained through worldwide covert operations? In short we need
assurance that you have access to absolutely all information the U.S.
government has related to terrorism. If you have any doubt about that,
we need to hear about it today.
Second, an important part of IAIP's mission is to receive the same
intelligence data as TTIC and other organizations but to review and
analyze it in a different way to ensure that we are thinking ``outside
of the box''. Al-Qa`eda and others are considering creative and new
means for attacking us, so IAIP is responsible for doing that cutting
edge analysis that keeps us one step ahead of Osama bin Laden.
My questions is how vigorously is the Department pursuing this
competitive intelligence analysis? If you could note some concrete
examples of how your analysts have seen things differently than others
in the Intelligence Community, that would assure us that this work is
underway.
And on the same subject a Department organizational chart indicates
that the JAIP Under Secretary's Chief of Staff is in charge of the
Competitive Analysis and Evaluation Office. I would have thought that
your office, General Hughes, particularly since you're the individual
with the most senior intelligence experience in the Directorate,
handled these matters. So I'm concerned that poor organization with the
Directorate could be hampering this critical function.
Third, in closed session we'd appreciate hearing your thoughts on
the extent and effectiveness of Al-Qa`eda operatives working inside the
United States. We know they're actively recruiting individuals of non
Middle Eastern extraction to blend into U.S. crowds. What about their
logistics, financing, training, and attack planning--how boldly are
they moving ahead?
Finally, let me comment about your responsibility to map threats
against our vulnerabilities. Part of the Directorate's mission, as you
know, is to identify threats as they relate to vital U.S.
infrastructure, sites and potential targets. But General Libutti
indicated last week that the Directorate is some time away from
completing a national risk assessment. Since the vulnerabilities have
not been determined, then it obviously prevents you and others from
mapping threats against those key targets. I would submit that we have
a long way to go in fulfilling this basic mission and ought to pick up
the pace to complete it.
Let me end by saying thank you, again, General, for appearing
before the Committee today. I look forward to hearing your testimony on
these issues and fully recognize that you are working hard to defend
and secure our homeland. We deeply appreciate your service and want to
help you succeed in your mission in any way that we can.
All right. We will turn now to General Hughes. I want to
thank you again for being here today, and I look forward to
your testimony. And the floor is now yours.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL PATRICK HUGHES, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR INFORMATION ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
General Hughes. Well, thank you. Good morning, Mr.
Chairman and members of the committee. I would like to read
just a very brief summary of my statement for the record and
for your knowledge and then turn over to the remainder of the
time to your questions.
I am privileged to appear before you today to discuss the
role of the Office of Information Analysis within the
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate
of the Department of Homeland Security as well as the IA effort
at intelligence coordination and information sharing. IAIP, and
specifically IA, are moving forward in our statutory
responsibilities, which include providing the full range of
intelligence support to senior Department of Homeland Security
leadership and component organizations and to State, local,
tribal and private sector respondents; mapping terrorist
threats to the homeland against assessed vulnerabilities to
drive our efforts to protect against terrorist attack;
conducting independent analysis and assessments; assessing the
vulnerabilities of key resources, and critical infrastructure;
merging relevant analyses and vulnerability assessments to
identify priorities for protective, defensive and supportive
measures; partnering with the Intelligence Community, notably
the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, law enforcement
agencies, notably the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
State, local and tribal partners and the private sector, as
well as all of DHS's components to manage the collection and
processing of information involving threats to the homeland;
and finally disseminating time sensitive warnings, alerts and
advisories.
I have been the Assistant Secretary of Information Analysis
now for less than 4 months. We have accomplished much in a
short period of time, and we continue to press forward to
strengthen this vital office in our ability to support the
overall Department of Homeland Security mission to secure our
homeland.
As I aim for this, we will achieve robust connectivity to
all respondents. Indeed we have robust connectivity now. We
will develop a world class information technology support
system for the work of intelligence. We will bring on fully
trained and cleared staff that will form direct relationships
with intelligence persons at the State and local, tribal, major
city, private sector levels, and with our partners in the
Intelligence Community, and we will develop a full capability
to engage in all source fusion and production.
We are and will continue to be a full partner in the U.S.
Intelligence Community. Together we will help you and others in
the government to protect the people of this Nation.
Thank you very much for your time and, Ms. McCarthy, it is
nice to see you this morning, too.
[The statement of General Hughes follows:]
Statement of The Honorable Patrick M. Hughes, Assistant Secretary
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate,
Department of Homeland Security
Good morning Mr. Chairman, Representative McCarthy, and
distinguished members of the Committee. I am privileged to appear
before you today to discuss the role of the Office of Information
Analysis (IA), within the Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection Directorate (IAIP) of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), as well as IA's intelligence, coordination, and information
sharing efforts to date.
Through the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, and consequently, the Office
of Information Analysis, is charged with ``integrating relevant
information, intelligence analyses, and vulnerability assessments
(whether such information, analyses, or assessments are provided or
produced by the Department or others) to identify protective priorities
and support protective measures by the Department, by other executive
agencies, by State and local government personnel, agencies, and
authorities, by the private sector, and by other entities.''
The philosophical underpinning of IA as an integral part of the
IAIP Under-Secretariat of DHS is to provide the connectivity, the
integration, the communication, the coordination, the collaboration,
and the professional intelligence work necessary to accomplish the
missions of, and the products and capability necessary for the
customers and the leadership of DHS. Simply put, we perform the
intelligence work of Department of Homeland Security.
IAIP is moving forward in carrying out our statutory
responsibilities which include:
Providing the full range of intelligence support to
senior DHS leadership and component organizations and to state
and local and private sector respondents.
Mapping terrorist threats to the homeland against
assessed vulnerabilities to drive our efforts to protect
against terrorist attacks
Conducting independent analysis and assessments of
terrorist threats, including competitive analysis, tailored
analysis, and ``red teaming''
Assessing the vulnerabilities of key resources and
critical infrastructure of the United States
Merging the relevant analyses and vulnerability
assessments to identify priorities for protective and support
measures by the Department, other government agencies, and the
private sector
Partnering with the intelligence community, TTIC, law
enforcement agencies, state and local partners, and the private
sector, as well as DHS' components to manage the collection and
processing of information involving threats to the Homeland
into usable, comprehensive, and actionable information.
Disseminating time sensitive warnings, alerts and
advisories to federal, state, local governments and private
sector infrastructure owners and operators
It is the mandate to independently analyze, coordinate, and
disseminate the entire spectrum of threat information affecting the
homeland that makes IA unique among its Intelligence Community
partners. The analysts within Information Analysis are talented
individuals who draw on intelligence from other components within DHS,
IA's fellow Intelligence Community members, the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center (TTIC), and federal, state and local law enforcement
and private sector entities. The comprehensive threat picture produced
is coordinated with the vulnerability assessment and consequence
predictions identified by the Infrastructure Protection half of the
IAIP Directorate.
The Office of Information Analysis is also unique in its ability to
communicate timely and valuable threat products to state and local
officials, federal sector specific agencies (as indicated in HSPD-7),
and the private sector as is appropriate. The relationship IA and
indeed the entire Department of Homeland Security has with these
contacts results in the IAIP Directorate being in the position to
effectively manage information requirements from the state and local
governments and private sector entities that are vital to protecting
the homeland. DHS will continue to work in close communication with
these officials, as well as with the other organizations it receives
inputs from, to maintain the effective relationships that have been
established.
IA is the heart of the intelligence effort at DHS. It is
responsible for accessing and analyzing the entire array of
intelligence relating to threats against the homeland, and making that
information useful to those first responders, state and local
governments, and private sector. As such, IA provides the full-range of
intelligence support to the Secretary, DHS leadership, the
Undersecretary for IAIP, and DHS components. Additionally, IA ensures
that best intelligence information informs the administration of the
Homeland Security Advisory System.
Central to the success of the DHS mission is the close working
relationship among components, the Office of Information Analysis
(``IA'') and the Office of Infrastructure Protection (``IP''), and the
Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), to ensure that threat
information and situational awareness are correlated with critical
infrastructure vulnerabilities and protective programs. Together, the
three offices provide real time monitoring of threat information and
critical infrastructure to support the Department of Homeland
Security's overall mission. This permits us to immediately respond to
and monitor emerging potential threat information and events, and to
take issues or information for more detailed analysis and
recommendations for preventive and protective measures. The integration
of information access and analysis on the one hand, and vulnerabilities
analysis and protective measures on the other, is the fundamental
mission of the IAIP Directorate.
IA and TTIC
The Office of Information Analysis and the Department of Homeland
Security are fully committed to the mission driving the Terrorist
Threat Integration Center. From a personal standpoint, I believe both
organizations are fulfilling their missions and enriching both each
other and the wider Intelligence Community. This opinion is backed by
the tremendous track record of success TTIC has in supporting the
Department of Homeland Security and its needs. As partners, IA and TTIC
spend much time communicating, both through the DHS representatives
located at TTIC and through direct communication of leadership.
Personally, my relationship with TTIC Director John Brennan could not
be better. At present, we talk at least daily and as specific threats
pertinent to the homeland arise. The close professional associations
that have been forged between the two offices will allow both
organizations to work on complimenting each other in the best interest
of the nation's security. For example, IA is responsible for
translating the analysis done at the TTIC into actionable data for law
enforcement officials.
IA and TSC
The Office of Information Analysis has a similarly productive
relationship with the Terrorist Screening Center. While both perform
duties that result in information being passed to local first
responders and state and local officials, both entities have separate
missions. IA provides the full spectrum of information support
necessary for the operation of the Department of Homeland Security and
for the benefit of Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector officials
throughout the United States, to secure the homeland, defend the
citizenry and protect our critical infrastructure. In contrast, the TSC
is in the process of developing a fully integrated watch list database
which will provide immediate responses to federal border-screening and
law-enforcement authorities to identify suspected terrorists trying to
enter or operate within the United States.
Just as TTIC plays a vital role in supplying its federal partners
with the broad threat picture, the TSC has quickly become an essential
resource for local law enforcement, its federal government
contributors, and other users. Already, over 1,000 calls have been made
to the center, with over 500 positive identity matches. Through the
matching and cross-referencing of lists, the TSC is allowing those
first responders on the front lines of the fight against terrorism to
access the information they need to identify and detain suspicious
individuals.
DHS, IAIP, and especially IA will continue to work with the TSC to
coordinate information sharing efforts and to establish requirements
for accessing information. IA and the TSC will grow together in their
effort to serve the people and guardians of this nation.
In Conclusion
I have been the Assistant Secretary of Information Analysis now for
less than four months. Building up the IA office, increasing our
information capabilities, and coordinating information sharing across
the entire federal government has been a monumental task. And, while we
have accomplished much in a short period of time, we continue to press
forward to strengthen this vital office and our ability to support the
overall DHS mission of securing our homeland. In order for the Office
of Information Analysis to accomplish its unique mission, we need the
right organizational structure, qualified and cleared personnel,
resources, and technical capabilities.
As IA matures, we will complete a robust connectivity to all
respondents. We will develop a world-class IT support system for the
work of intelligence. We will bring on a fully trained and cleared
staff that will form direct relationships with intelligence persons at
the State and Local, Tribal, Major City, and Private Sector levels. We
will develop full capability to engage in all-source fusion and
production. We are and will continue to be a full partner in the
Intelligence Community. Together, we will protect the people of this
nation.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, General Hughes. We
appreciate the information that you provided us. It is very
helpful. And I want to remind the members of the panel again we
limit our questions to 5 minutes, unless you have had an
opportunity to make an opening statement, at which point you,
if you have intended to put that in the record, then we will
make it an 8-minute questioning period.
So let me recognize myself for the first 5 minutes. General
there is always this question in everybody's mind about
connecting the dots, but the real question is not so much
connecting the dots as it is collecting the dots.
We have to have a robust Intelligence Community, a robust
intelligence capability in order to get enough dots to be able
to connect them so that we know we are looking at the right
picture.
As I always say, if you have got only four dots you can
make four dots look like anything you want. But if you have 24
dots that makes a big difference in the picture you are looking
at. How do you know you are getting everything you need in your
office in the way of information from the Intelligence
Community so that you are able to do your job?
And let me ask, is there a need for an information
technology system that automatically shares intelligence or
will that add some potential to overload, say, the DHS analysts
that you have?
General Hughes. The first part of the question, sir, I
think is a very interesting issue for me, because I am living
through that part of the process now of determining whether I
do get everything that is available.
My view to the answer is yes, I do, although, sometimes I
have to work hard to get it. It would be better, and I hope to
achieve this goal to have it come to me somewhat automatically,
so that I don't have to reach out quite as much or to intercede
on occasion and gain information.
But I would say that right now my direct answer to your
question is that I am fully engaged, involved, and informed in
the U.S. Intelligence Community, to include with the Central
Intelligence Agency, some of their most sensitive information
and operations, somewhat less so with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, somewhat less so with the Department of Defense
and others.
But to be honest, that is probably the evolving form of
this arrangement; in my view, the FBI and the TTIC as my prime
two conduits for information, and then many others. Looking at
the--away from the Federal family to the State, local, major
city, tribal and private sectors, there are shades of gray and
green there. Depends on the place and the connectivity that
they have and the circumstances they find themselves in.
But especially in the major cities, the interaction is
fairly good. When there is a reason for that interaction, my
goal is to make that interaction rather autonomous and
continuous. We have not yet achieved that connectivity. The
interaction there isn't present for that yet, but I hope it
will be soon, and the initiative by the Department to put in
place an interactive system of communications and connectivity
is part of that effort.
Mr. Gibbons. Okay. I didn't mean to interrupt you.
General Hughes. I was going to say with regard to the last
part of the question it is my goal, and it is the Department's
goal, to make this autonomous, to make it somewhat automatic,
although we still want a human to make judgments about the
information and whether or not it is sending the information or
receiving the information. We must have human beings in this
loop to make good judgments. So I am pressing for and hope to
achieve within this year a very large degree of autonomy and
automatic delivery and receipt of information. But I would like
to emphasize that we want to make sure we exercise deliberate
judgment by human beings at appropriate points along the way,
especially at points that do not impede the flow of
information, but actually assist in placing the information in
context.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, General. Let me ask in the very
brief time remaining, I know that DHS is working with both
State leaders and DHS personnel in identifying and getting
proper clearances for handling classified information. But how
is DHS working with other agencies to identify those other
people who may need access to this information in order to
identify a sharing mechanism capability and assure that they
have the proper clearances?
General Hughes. In the Federal family that does not seem to
be a problem. By the person's specific positions with specific
responsibilities, they are fairly clear, and I don't view that
as an issue. Outside of the Federal family, at the State,
local, through private, that is an issue, and we have to come
to grips with it. We are requesting that persons who do not
have security clearances get them at the Secret level, so that
they are authorized under U.S. Federal policy and law to be
allowed to have U.S. Federal Government information to at least
the Secret level.
In some cases there is a fairly robust capability for that,
and others there is less capability. So we have to proceed as
rapidly as we can to build the capability out in the State
through local, and to some perhaps lesser degree in the private
sector we have to build that capability in.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, General. My time has
expired. I turn now to my colleague, the gentlelady from
Missouri, Ms. McCarthy, who has agreed to enter her opening
statement in the record. It will be offered. She has 8 minutes
for opening questions. Thank you.
Ms. McCarthy. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Secretary,
it is a delight to have you with us today. I appreciate very
much your testimony that you shared, particularly the bullets
on partnering with State and local partners and private sectors
so that the message, the material is usable, comprehensive and
actionable information.
The time sensitivity of this is still problematic out in
the heart of America with some of our State and local
responders, and also a concern about closing the information
loop to see that when State and local responders send word up
to the agency at the Federal level about some time sensitive
information they have, whether or not it is acted upon in--that
the information loop doesn't seem to be quite complete.
Although the budget is recommending $10 million more to
undergird the implementation of these national systems for
information sharing, could you be a little more specific with
us today about your vision of how best to make all of that
information come together and complete the loop so it is
actually a very effective system as you envision it?
General Hughes. Of course. We are trying to use the--any
preexisting structure that already exists for the passage of
classified information, and right now out to the State and
local and other respondents away from the Federal family the
prime conduit is the JTTF structure, operated by the FBI, which
terminates in the State and major city level. And we do pass
information via that conduit. We also pass it over secure
telephones. We have an effort underway, and it is largely
finished, to provide STU, STE, secure telephone capability out
to at least the State and major city homeland security
providers. And we also have similar capability, although we are
not sponsoring much of it, it already exists in the private
sector. So right now, today, I can get on the telephone to all
of the 50 States, secure, and talk to them about information,
and I have done that in a number of cases.
I can also pass classified information via the JTTF
connection system, or in some cases we have used a preexisting
military system where there is a coincidence between the
National Guard office or some military office that has secure
communications.
Our intent, our hope, and my vision, is to put in place a
system which is actually called JRIES. It is really--a name is
not really that important. The idea here is to put in place a
Secret level connectivity to the State and major city to begin
with, and then follow on with a broader fielding later to the
State and major city homeland security advisers, a capability
to communicate with them directly that is controlled by and
supported by the Department of Homeland Security, yet would be
in parallel with preexisting law enforcement connectivity and
preexisting other Federal Government connectivity.
It is an issue, I believe, to manage that properly, and we
have to manage that here at the Federal Government level by
making sure that we don't unnecessarily duplicate or
unnecessarily be redundant or unnecessarily flood the system
with information.
Back to Chairman Gibbon's question here, we don't want to
overload not only the Department of Homeland Security, but we
certainly don't want to overload the responders out at the
State and local, major city and private sector and tribal
levels. So we have a management responsibility that goes along
with this that is not part of the technical component
necessarily, but it is probably more important in my view.
The last thing that I would like to tell you is that the
vision that I have to be able to do this, and that the
Department has, indeed is on the way to fruition. We have
rolled out the information system to produce a Secret level
connectivity, but we are only fielding it now at the
unclassified level. We hope to encipher it later on and make it
Secret.
Ms. McCarthy. If I might, General, thank you for that
information. It is heartening to those of us concerned about
our communities out there where we know that they are
partnering and they are working together. But I am not sure
they always are confident that they know what to do.
Prior to 9/11, for example, in my community there were a
lot of individuals, immigrants wanting to learn how to fly crop
dusters. In retrospect, we now understand why. But what I want
to pursue in the limited time left to us is how do you perceive
getting the knowledge out to the State and locals about what
you are really looking for, based on your intelligence, so that
they can be better prepared to respond to you with things that
are insightful and timely?
General Hughes. We are doing that now by publishing and
disseminating in a variety of different ways information about
terrorist tactics, techniques and procedures. We are doing that
largely at the unclassified level. So we take classified
information into our system, we develop--and we do this by
way--as well as the FBI and the Terrorism Threat Integration
Center, we do it sometimes together and sometimes separately.
But the net result is the same, an informed citizenry away from
the Federal Government. And all of this information I guess
that has come to us, and we have disseminated out, has greatly
aided in an understanding out in the communities of our
country, an understanding of how terrorists might act and what
to look for, which was the kind of the construct of your
question.
We hope to continue that in a more robust way with this
enhanced communications system. I will also mention that we
have an initiative to bring three or four, or however many can
be supported, persons from each State and from a number of the
major cities here to Washington this summer, to gather them
here and teach them or train them about some of the information
handling mechanisms that they are going to have to implement
now that we are moving them into this classified environment.
Ms. McCarthy. Will the $10 million in the budget for
security operations cover that, not just that training but the
States' capacity or the--.
General Hughes. We hope to cover parts of it. I don't think
$10 million will cover all of it. But in some cases,
interestingly enough, the States have taken their own
initiatives with their own money or their own resources, and
once again, in some places this is extremely robust, like New
York, Los Angeles, for example, and other places it is less
robust. But we will help where we need to help and where it is
appropriate to help in the best way that we can.
Ms. McCarthy. Thank you. I know that States like Missouri
are broke. So I am sure that they will welcome that opportunity
for your help.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you. We will turn to the gentlelady from
Washington, Ms. Dunn, for 8 minutes.
Ms. Dunn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to
our committee, General. It is good to have you here. I am very
curious about TTIC, and I am not sure how it ended up under the
aegis of the CIA in the beginning. I know that you are on that
board.
I was a little concerned a couple of weekends ago, as we
went to SOUTHCOM and had a session with them, that the
Department of Homeland Security wasn't even on their chart for
people who are receiving information from the task forces, and
so forth, that are controlled by them.
I am wondering what your take is on TTIC. Many of us
believe it should be under your aegis. Could you give me a read
on that, tell me how it is working, whether you believe that
you have adequate input and how it might work if it were under
the Department of Homeland Security?
General Hughes. Sure. My view is that--and I should tell
you, by the way, that before coming to this job I was a member
of the Kerr Commission, which was put in place by the Director
of Central Intelligence to study the Terrorism Threat
Interrogation Center and to come up with some viewpoints about
this issue by living and working in the Terrorism Threat
Interrogation Center for about 2-1/2 months.
So I am pretty familiar with what they do and how they do
it and why the decision was made to place them where they are.
My view is that that decision to place them under the umbrella
of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence was a
very good decision for a couple of reasons. They formed this
organization rapidly and brought it on line very rapidly within
the support system, the structure of the Central Intelligence
Agency. Without that structure or something similar to that, I
think it would been a very slow start and much more difficult.
They are a very robust organization now and getting more so all
of the time. And I am directly connected to them, and I would
say that they are today, as we speak this morning, the most
robust information source for the Department of Homeland
Security. We are a direct customer of theirs, and John Brennan
and I directly communicate several times a day whenever he is
here. He is right now traveling. But when he is here, we are
very close and very much interacting.
My view, which has not changed, is that at some point we
need to consider the Terrorism Threat Interrogation Center
coming under a different kind of management structure, perhaps
under DHS, perhaps under an association of structures of some
kind, because it is a very broad organization in its charter.
It is very connected to so many different kinds of
organizations, which is a very interesting feature to have an
organization like this when you build a kind of, let's call it
a joint organizational or combined organization, in the context
of the Department of Homeland Security. That means that it is
connected virtually to every other correspondent in the
environment of counterterrorism and securing the homeland.
The same thing is true at the TTIC. One should not view it
as a central intelligence agency or just as an intelligence
agency organizational entity. It is very interactive with law
enforcement, with others in the Federal Government. I think it
has an important place. I think we ought to let things evolve
for a little bit.
With regard to your comments on--not your comments but Ms.
McCarthy's comments perhaps on the way this information passage
works, it is a very difficult kind of thing. The TTIC right now
at the all-source Top Secret special compartment intelligence
level acts as a hub for international and domestic terrorism.
To the degree that international terrorism affects the United
States I am interested, and that information comes to me. To
the degree that I am connected to the TTIC all of the
information on the domestic environment comes to me. And we
work together in a very, what I would call synergistic way.
They do first the line analysis, prepare products, put the
information in context in a lot of ways and deliver it to us.
My organization does more detailed analysis in some cases, or
we work together to do it. My organization has an independent
assessment of it. My organization deals with it with regard to
the State through private sector entities very directly, and
that is what we should do. I think it is working very well.
I do think, and I personally think that the Director of
Central Intelligence would agree with this, at some point in
time the placement of the organization and its roles, missions
and functions with regard to central authority needs to be
reconsidered. We might, by the way, in that reconsideration
decide it is fine where it is. I don't know. But I do think
that that should be done sometime after a little longer
evolution.
Ms. Dunn. I appreciate your answer. I would think that
since your department, the Department of Homeland Security,
really is charged with the very responsibilities that TTIC is
doing, I think the sooner rather than later that critique takes
place and that analysis takes place of where it should be
located, that would be good, because we may have to change the
act, since it specifies that you do the very things that TTIC
does yet they are housed in a completely different department.
But I appreciate your flexibility on it.
General Hughes. Please keep in mind, ma'am, that--I wanted
to make a point, and we don't do everything that TTIC does.
With regard to international terrorism, we are not directly
involved in the broadest scope of the Terrorism Threat
Integration Center. The focus that we have is on the United
States. Where international terrorism touches the United
States, of course we are interested. Where it does not or where
it seems apart from the security of our homeland, that is the
business of others and TTIC serves them all; it broadly is
serving the United States Government.
Ms. Dunn. Thank you, General. Let me ask you a couple of
budget oriented questions quickly. Does the IA Directorate have
an integrated cross-cutting budget or management focus that
pulls together other intelligence components within the
Department, such as those that are run by the Coast Guard and
TSA, and if this is true, how is it being coordinated?
General Hughes. We do not have such a cross-cutting budget
process. We have an interaction between the component parts of
the Department of Homeland Security, of which there are some
important organizations like the Coast Guard, the Secret
Service, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Customs
and Border Protection, the Transportation Security
Administration, the Emergency Preparedness and Response,
formerly the FEMA organization and the Federal Protective
Service.
We are beginning the process of amalgamating the
intelligence elements of those organizations in some ways. One
of them will be better knowledge and oversight of the budgets
that they have and the resources that they apply.
Ms. Dunn. Thank you.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, Ms. Dunn, and I will now recognize
the ranking member of the full committee for 5 minutes. Mr.
Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Hughes, thank
you for being with us today. I have just put a chart before you
there that I wanted to direct your attention to. I think that
you have a copy of it already.
Submitted for the Record from the Hon. Jim Turner
United States Government Intelligence
Analysis Organization
Pre 9/11
CIA & FBI Counterterrorism Center (CTC)
DOD Intelligence Agencies
FBI's Counterterrorism Division
CIA Directorate for Intelligence
State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Post 9/11
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC)
DHS Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
(IAIP) Directorate
FBI National Joint Terrorism Task Force
DOD Undersecretary for Intelligence
Northern Command Combined Intelligence Fusion Center
(CIFC)
The Associate Director of Central Intelligence for
Homeland Security
FBI Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF)
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2641.001
What it shows us is the intelligence analysis organizations
that existed before September 11th. Do you see, five of them
there? And then the new organizations that have been added
since
September 11th, and of course all of the pre-9/11
organizations are still in existence.
So it does give us some concern as to whether or not with
this proliferation of new agencies we are going to be able to
connect the dots, so to speak, with all of this information
available coming from new sources. I guess in looking at that
total picture, there was a National Journal article that came
out this week. I don't know if you have seen it. It made a
couple of comments that I suspect I should read to you and let
you respond to it.
In that article it says, TTIC now produces a Top Secret
daily report on threats to the Nation, but isn't required to
share with Ridge and his key lieutenants the intelligence on
which its conclusions are based. Is that a true statement?
General Hughes. That is false. Indeed, I receive that
document every day directly on my desktop computer first thing
in the morning in a very timely fashion, and the Secretary and
Deputy Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
also receive it.
Mr. Turner. Well, the comment was not about you receiving
the daily report. The comment that I read you said that you are
not able to access the intelligence upon which the conclusions
in that daily report are based.
General Hughes. That is false.
Mr. Turner. So you are telling me you can get any
information you want to out of the CIA or these other agencies
that are listed on this chart?
General Hughes. During my opening comments, and first line
of questioning from Mr. Gibbons, I did relate that there are
shades of autonomy or automatic mechanisms here. Sometimes I
have to work a little harder to get that information, depending
upon its compartmentalization and depending upon the nature of
the information source. But to date I am not aware of
information from the Central Intelligence Agency that has been
directly withheld from me. There isn't any as far as I know.
Mr. Turner. But you are in the same position that we often
find ourselves; you can't get behind some of that information
because some of that is very well protected by the CIA and some
of these other agencies?
General Hughes. Interestingly enough, sir, because of my
previous position and my experience I am badged at the CIA, I
have had direct working access at the CIA. I am invited to join
the DCI's afternoon/evening meeting on the topic of countering
terrorism, and I indeed do have very robust access personally.
Mr. Turner. In your division right now I understand that
you have 60 employees. Is that a correct statement?
General Hughes. There are more employees than that at this
time, but it is not as robust as we would certainly wish, and
the total number of employees that you just quoted counts not
only Federal full-time persons who are employees of the
Department of Homeland Security, but indeed are detailees and
are government contractors and IPAs from the laboratory and
other government organizations.
Right now I am told by my staff that the total number this
morning--by the way, it is changing every day--is 97.
Mr. Turner. When you said a minute ago that you have access
to all information based on your previous work, do you have
access to all covert action programs that the CIA conducts?
General Hughes. No, I do not. But--certainly not all, by
any means.
Mr. Turner. You made mention a minute ago that you have
access to information relating and are provided information
relating to domestic terrorist activities and threats but not
foreign?
General Hughes. I hope--I tried to say that if the foreign
events or the foreign information touches on the security of
the homeland, then I do have an interest in it and I get access
to it.
Mr. Turner. But it is not routinely provided?
General Hughes. It is. There is an issue here of
definition. Much of it does flow routinely. But there is some
of it that is a little bit nebulous, maybe something that
happens in a place like Afghanistan. The context of the
conflict may not seem in the due course of events to touch upon
the security of our homeland, but occasionally it does. And so
when it does it is kind of the burden to decide that is placed
on a number of intelligence organizations and officers along
the way as to whether I need to know about it as the Department
of Homeland Security intelligence chief.
So that is the kind of thing that we need to evolve into
and have greater understanding than we do now.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, General. I see my time has expired.
Thank you.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, Mr. Turner. We will turn now to the
chairman of the full committee, Mr. Cox, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Secretary. As
you know, your responsibilities are very near and dear to the
oversight aims of this committee. We are very, very keen on not
only the Department succeeding, but specifically your
directorate succeeding and specifically IA, because it is the
heartbeat of prevention. It is the best means that we will have
to find these terrorists and stop them before it is too late.
And it is for that reason that IA exists within the Department
of Homeland Security, because the focus being the United States
territory itself, there are great concerns about CIA taking on
this new domestic responsibility.
The CIA, which houses TTIC, is of course ahead of IA in its
development, and as the ranking member was just inquiring, we
want to make sure not only that you have access to everything
at TTIC and in fact access to everything else on the chart that
was up there a moment ago, but that it is routinely provided as
the statute requires and you don't have to pry it out like a
dentist doing a root canal, that it is provided in real-time
and that the purpose for which it is provided is your own
analysis.
And beyond doing your own analysis, we want to make sure
that you and your troops are the front line for the United
States Government in analyzing this intelligence as necessary
and providing it to U.S. domestic actors, particularly in the
private sector. I am not entirely certain that at least thus
far we have got DHS out in that lead role, and it needs to
happen.
Likewise, we want to make sure that you are out in front
and DHS is out in front using what you know and what you have
learned to train people within the domestic hemisphere so that
they can handle this information as well.
And so I wonder if you could talk to me about IA's role,
first, in sanitizing intelligence and providing it to the U.S.
domestic actors, and, second, training U.S. domestic actors on
their part of this intelligence sharing network?
General Hughes. I am going to be duplicating a couple of
things that I said earlier, especially in response to Ms.
Dunn's question.
Mr. Cox. Well, you don't need to do that. If you want to
refer me to that answer, that is sufficient.
General Hughes. Let me just make two replies to you, sir.
First, we have not achieved the kind of connectivity yet that
we need to achieve. We are working hard to do it, and this is
both a technical issue and a policy issue, and it also
encompasses the issues of training that you brought up.
One of the efforts we have ongoing is to try to figure out
how to train a rather large number of persons who are in the
State, local, tribal and private sector, and major cities,
offices that have charged homeland security as a kind of a
large topic area out there in the country. And we have a plan
to bring some of them in here to the United States Capital this
summer and train them over a 3-day period or so, both train
them and inform them, by the way, and also get to know them
better and make them part of this larger extended family of
homeland security.
So we do have efforts that I think you will applaud, and I
hope you will be part of in fact to do this activity. I want to
make sure though and leave with you this final thought. This is
an evolving thing. It is something that we are going to have to
build over some period of time. It is not something that you
can do very rapidly overnight.
I would say--I would give ourselves a B-plus right now for
effort. We are trying hard to get this done. Where there is
truly a piece of critical information I will do anything, and I
have done a few things, to call, to communicate, to get it out
there in some way.
One of the issues I covered earlier is that sanitizing it
at the unclassified level does take away a good deal of the
detail and some of the vital information that must be
communicated at times. So my vision, my effort, is to put it
out there at the unclassified level when we can, but when we
can't, to have the option to put it out there at the Secret
level, which seems to be the right working level generally. In
some cases we might go beyond that, but in most cases that is
the goal.
Mr. Cox. Well, you have nothing but support on this
committee for what you are trying to do, and at least for my
part I want you to understand that I fully appreciate the fact
that this is an evolutionary undertaking and that no one here,
1 year into the existence of the Department, expects that this
is going to be a completed edifice. What we are interested in
is the blueprint. We want to make sure that we know where we
are heading and some day we can expect to reach these
destinations, and I am particularly in agreement with you that
our sharing, which I hope that DHS and you and particularly
General Hughes will take the lead on, be not exclusively
unclassified information. Part of the reason for wanting you in
the forefront of training in fact is so that we will have
people with experience and knowledge across the country who can
instantly receive this information at the State and local level
and at the private sector.
So you are to be commended for what you are doing. I am
very, very appreciative that the President and the Secretary
have selected you given your background, your experience, and I
think the country is very well served by your being there. I am
very pleased that you are using your background and experience
in a muscular way to make sure that the blueprint in the
statute is what is realized, and also that the good policy aims
that are better than that statute which you share are realized.
So thank you very much.
General Hughes. Well, thank you, sir.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, Mr. Cox. We will turn now to Mrs.
Christensen for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
welcome, General. I also share the concerns about TTIC and your
agency, but I am not going to ask those questions again, but
just to let you know that I think many of us on the committee
share those concerns. And I realize that you have only been in
your office for about 4 months, but many of us are also
concerned about the slowness with which the Department has
moved to get up to speed. And so my question is really a very
basic one. Are you now in a permanent home, is your directorate
now--.
General Hughes. Yes. I believe we are in a permanent home
for the foreseeable future, I would say for 5 years or longer.
I believe that I am in a permanent place, and the building that
I am in, we are proceeding to finish it and make it more
effective and capable, because we believe we are in a permanent
place.
Mrs. Christensen. And your staffing level, with respect to
the staffing level that has been set for you, where are you?
General Hughes. Staffing level is not yet at 50 percent of
our hope. In fact, we are far short of it, but we are trying to
hire people as rapidly as we can. If I may just elaborate on
that for a moment.
We have to have people in the section that I am responsible
for, intelligence, who are cleared for Top Secret, special
intelligence or willing to take a polygraph examination, and
persons who come into that office immediately get access to
information that bears great responsibility personally. So we
have to do this right. It is not simple or easy to go out and
hire these kind of people. We are doing it as fast as the
system can kind of bear, and we are doing it as well as we can
right now.
However, I will tell you, this is one of my areas of
greatest frustration. We have had a fairly large number of
people apply for jobs. Some of them have had background issues
that we found to be unsuitable. Some of them have not been
willing to wait for background investigations of this nature to
take place, and some of them frankly just haven't been suited
to the work. But we are hiring people.
Mrs. Christensen. Well, not only am I concerned that you
are not fully staffed for the very critical function of your
office, but how are you set up to do the housekeeping, getting
the offices set up, the staffing set up and still not have that
detract from your statutory responsibilities?
General Hughes. Well, please keep in mind, ma'am, that we
have used contractors to great effect, and we are continuing to
do that. They are indeed responsible in many ways for the
development of our information technology structure. They have
built out the facilities that we now live in. We have fell in
on a Navy facility, and some of that Navy infrastructure is
still in place and supporting us. There is a transition period
here where much of the support requirements will now begin to
fall on the Department of Homeland Security, and we have to put
in place our own infrastructure support mechanisms to do that.
Mrs. Christensen. It is not taking away from your direct
staff's responsibilities on the intelligence side?
General Hughes. The way you phrased the question, ma'am, it
is not talking away from it. It is something of a competitive
issue at times. Information technology, as an example, has been
a struggle, but we are now seeing a light at the end of this
tunnel. We have gone to a new building. We now have computers
that operate in the U.S. Intelligence Community structure in a
pretty robust way and things are very rapidly improving, and we
hope that that improvement will continue as it has.
Mrs. Christensen. Okay. Among the statutory
responsibilities are of course assessing vulnerability of key
resources and critical infrastructure and merging relevant
analyses and vulnerabilities assessments, identify priorities.
I am reading from your statement.
Where are we in that, assessing vulnerabilities of key
resources and critical infrastructure, and doing those
assessments to identify the priorities for protective and
support measures?
General Hughes. In the structure that I am placed in, I
don't think this is necessarily easy to understand without some
kind of a diagram. But IAIP, Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection, is two parts. I am the IA guy, the
intelligence person. I provide the threat, and I provide
assessments, judgment.
Mrs. Christensen. So do you have then the key resources and
critical infrastructure--do you have the IP side information on
which to do your IA side?
General Hughes. Yes. The other side of this organizational
entity, infrastructure protection, is described in considerable
detail, what is referred to as the critical infrastructure of
the United States sometimes by way of excruciating detail. And
I think over the months and perhaps a couple of years to now,
that will be a continuing effort, to describe it more fully and
in more detail. But as that description begins to occur and is
occurring, that is then mapped against, or another way to put
it, is threat information is mapped against it so that the two
are kind of interactive against the infrastructure. And where
there are vulnerabilities, where there is targeting ongoing
against part of our infrastructure, where there are concerns
and gaps and issues, those are being identified and they are
being acted upon. But the action is left to others. We are the
organization that characterizes the problem.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will give you
back the balance of my time.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Mrs. Christensen. We turn
now to the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Shays, for 8
minutes.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and, General
thank you very much for your very important work.
One of the things that I am very convinced about is that as
we set up this new Department of Homeland Security we have a
wonderful reservation of very experienced people to draw on. We
appreciate your experience.
I do want to say to you that I know that the Department is
wrestling with a lot of issues and there will always be things
that we don't like that it is doing, just by the nature of it.
But when we wrote this bill and created you, you are now
implementing that. We are trying to see if it is being
implemented in the way that we thought. I view your effort as
the receptacle of information. I didn't view that you sent
people out and you did the work. And one reason we didn't want
you to have a part in the Intelligence Community where you were
directing their activities was that frankly a lot of us felt
that this whole effort needs to be improved. And while we are
doing the Department of Homeland Security, do we have the
capability to also kind of rework intelligence?
Having said that, however, I believe that you should be
privy to all information and that you shouldn't have to cajole,
you should haven't to use charm, you shouldn't have to use your
past experience. It is just part of the law and they should
have to perform, and I would hope that one of the things that
you will do is if you are not getting cooperation you will let
the chairman of the full committee and the chairman of this
subcommittee know, however you choose to, that it could be
better.
I chair the National Security Subcommittee, and before 9/
11, even though I have theoretical jurisdiction over some
aspects of the Intelligence Community, they always gave us a
permission slip not to show up for our full intelligence
committee.
What I am interested in knowing is the following. I am
interested to know what your role is in determining the
terrorist threat level, whether it is low, green; guarded,
blue; elevated, yellow; high, orange; or severe, red. What is
your role in determining that?
General Hughes. Well, sir, I am happy to report to you, and
kind of proud of this, that during the recent period when we
did raise the threat level to orange, and even within that
orange level perhaps raised some parts of it to a level of
pretty intense defensive and protective activity, and then
reduced the threat level back to the yellow elevated level that
we remain at today, that I was the person who was directly
turned to and asked by the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security--both inside the Department's own
deliberative group and externally in the security consultive
body of our government, I was the person that he turned to and
asked for the intelligence assessment about whether to raise,
and which I actually advised him to raise, and whether to
lower, and I advised him to lower and moderate.
Mr. Shays. Well, I appreciate knowing that you had this
level of impact. I would love to then--it is comforting to know
that I am finally speaking to someone who is taking some
ownership.
What concerns me is I have heard Mr. Turner suggest that
given how it works, we may not even want this warning system. I
tend to view, given how it works, I think it needs to be
improved. It is not a criticism of you in terms of knowing that
we need to raise it, but it is a criticism of the
implementation of it.
For instance, I am having a rough time understanding why we
are at elevated when we are all acting like we are at guarded,
and I am concerned that we only have one level to really go up
to. I view red as basically under attack. And so we are at
elevated, which is significant, but we are acting as a
populace, and I think even our first responders back home, that
they are under a general risk right now, and that they are
under a guarded condition. I think you have a sense of what I
mean here. I would love you to have some impact over maybe
getting us to allow for another gradient.
The other thing I am interested to know is what is the
benefit of having a yellow alert, which is elevated, around the
country when we knew for a fact that the threat was not
national, it was fairly geographical and urban in many cases.
General Hughes. It is--those are very complex questions.
I think I will answer it in two ways, two thrusts if you
will.
First, I personally like the system as it is, and I think
there is room for flexibility within each color zone. We have
chosen to be at elevated for what I think are the reasons that
I am going to explain in the second part of this answer.
General Hughes. But let us suppose for a minute that there
are gradations, and I believe there are, and there are actually
ways inside this threat advisory system for the Secretary of
Homeland Security and others in the Federal Government to
include the President to give directions that are very specific
within the color codes and combinations; and those colors
especially, but also the gradations within the colors, are
meant to allow both for a national alerting mechanism, kind of
a national view of the condition we are under and for some more
specific, focused efforts to be delivered to particular people,
particular groups, particular sectors, particular locales
within our country that, for reasons of threat and perhaps for
vulnerability, require a different sort of approach than merely
the color and verbal or wordage definitions that are in the
Homeland advisory system now.
I think it is okay, but others besides me--and this is not
really my policy issue. I think that others will be able to
decide whether or not changes are required. Whatever they are,
I will honor them, but I need to give you the second part of
this answer just briefly.
Mr. Shays. And then I am going to want to make a quick
response.
General Hughes. Okay. I am an old soldier, and I am very
familiar with war, and we are characterizing this as a war. But
in the war that conventionally is thought of and understood,
there is a time of development of the nature of the conflict
and the conflict itself and the war that takes place and the
post-conflict environment, and it is relatively slow, in many
cases. In some few cases, it might be days to weeks, but in
most cases it is weeks to months to years even that these
approaches to the conflict, the conflict itself and the post-
conflict environment takes shape.
We are dealing in a much different environment where,
literally, my timeline for action with regard to information is
one hour. That is what I tell people.
Mr. Shays. Let me say I am going to be having a hearing in
my own committee on this issue and get in greater depth, but I
still am concerned that we need a system that the public also
understands and knows what to do. It cannot be that the public
just does what it normally does when you are at yellow alert.
It needs to be a geographic, I believe. I do think the system
is worth using, but I think we need to improve it.
Thank you.
General Hughes. Sir, I am in favor of making sure that the
citizenry understands what we are doing.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, Mr. Shays.
I turn now to the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Markey,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
At yesterday's hearing before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, CIA Director Tenet revealed that he has spoken to
Bush administration officials when he felt inaccurate
statements were being made about the threats posed by Iraq.
Specifically, CIA Director Tenet acknowledged yesterday that on
more than one occasion he has noted questionable statements in
defense of the Iraq war by Vice President Dick Cheney. As we
all know, these private corrections did not prevent the Vice
President from continuing to make assertions about the imminent
threat posed by Iraq, statements which we know now were
exaggerated and inaccurate.
Since you began serving as Assistant Secretary, have you or
the information analysis group disagreed with intelligence
assessments or statements about terrorist threats made by the
Department, the White House, the CIA, the FBI or other members
of the intelligence community?
General Hughes. Yes, we have had differing views and
different view points at times. We have discussed them in the
appropriate setting.
Mr. Markey. So please indicate in which instances you
disagreed, the process you followed to register your
disagreement, and whether your disagreement resulted in any
adjustment in the intelligence assessment.
General Hughes. In most cases these disagreements are at
the analytic level, where an analyst will have a different view
and the analysts in IA may have one view of the importance of
or the meaning of information and I will share their view or
not, as the case may be. This is a very individual sort of
thing. But at some point I need to make the difference mine,
and then I will represent that to my associates, the heads of
intelligence at the CIA, at the TTIC, at the FBI, and the
Department of Defense, the appropriate people that I interact
with. Quite often, it never reaches that level.
Mr. Markey. What about when it does?
General Hughes. When it does, then I am certainly very
capable of expressing my view, and I do.
Mr. Markey. What happens when there is a disagreement with
the intelligence assessment which the intelligence officer,
you, is making?
General Hughes. To the best of my knowledge, there has
never been an agreement--or disagreement, rather, that has
risen to the level where I felt I had to take a note or make a
public declaration of difference. That has not happened. We
have been able to iron out our views.
Mr. Markey. Well, obviously, CIA Director Tenet felt the
same way, that he never had to publicly criticize, but it is
obvious now that CIA Director Tenet had not let the public know
that he did not believe that there was no uranium found in
Niger and that there were issues that were being completely
distorted by the President and Vice President in terms of items
that were dangerous that were inside of Iraq. It is obvious
that he just kept quiet and never made it public.
General Hughes. Without my commenting on your statement
there--I mean, there are so many issues there I don't know
whether that is what Mr. Tenet did or did not do. I would
rather not agree with your premise. I would rather just say
that in my case I can assure you I can look you and anyone else
in the eye and tell you that I am very capable of expressing my
independent views. I have and I will in the future.
Mr. Markey. Well, you told Mr. Turner that sometimes you
have to work a little harder to get the information which you
need.
General Hughes. That is true.
Mr. Markey. Well, that doesn't make me feel comfortable
that you have to work hard. My mother always said that you
should always work smarter, not harder. That is the point of
having you there. But what you are telling us is that you have
to work harder than other intelligence agencies in order to get
the information. That is a dangerous situation.
General Hughes. If I thought it was dangerous, I would tell
you. At times I have certainly been frustrated by it, but it is
not dangerous yet. It hasn't been dangerous, but I will have to
tell you that it is very much a concern of mine. But please
keep in mind, sir, I am giving you a characterization of many
events over the 4 months that I have been at this job,
approximately. My view is that we are improving this each and
every day.
Mr. Markey. I understand that. But what you said was that
your own past professional experience has helped you to gain
access to information collected by the intelligence community.
That doesn't make us feel good. Anyone who sits in your
position, even if you are not an old war horse, should be able
to get the information.
General Hughes. I agree with you.
Mr. Markey. The very fact that you are there and not
someone else, that makes it possible for you to get specific
types of information, then that is a very dangerous situation
for the homeland security of our country.
General Hughes. I disagree completely, and I will tell you
why. I think the reason I am there is because I am an old war
horse. I was brought in to kind of know how things work in this
large amalgam we call the U.S. intelligence community. What I
am doing, sir, and I think you ought to be not only happy but I
hope you will help me to do this, I am building the foundation
that others can come in and then--.
Mr. Markey. Describe a situation where the old war horse
was able to get information as someone else wouldn't. Could you
do that for us?
General Hughes. As I answered Mr. Turner, I am
knowledgeable of the U.S. intelligence community in a broad way
because of my previous position. I am also invited specifically
by the CIA and by others to come into their organization where
others may not be invited or indeed might not be as
knowledgeable as I am. There could be others that are just as
knowledgeable. I think some of my predecessors in this job
were, in the case of CIA. But if you will look over at my
background and my record, I have been able to fill for about 3-
1/2 years a position of the 1Director of Defense Intelligence
Agency and before that the J-2 of the Joint Staff.
Mr. Markey. I understand.
I will just finish in 10 seconds and just say, if I may,
Mr. Chairman, that it shouldn't take an old war horse. You used
the word others might not be given access. All of that
conditionality goes to the core of whether or not there has
been a seamless information flow which has been put in place.
Every time you use the word ``might'' during your testimony,
you actually raise questions about whether or not this
administration has come to grips with the necessity to connect
the dots in a way that gets all the people who need the
information into the flow as quickly as possible to prevent
another 9/11, and that is very dangerous.
General Hughes. Just a brief rejoinder. I think that the
last few words you stated, sir, are right. I am laying the
groundwork, and it just happens to be me and my personality, my
background, for this work. It has to be laid. It doesn't matter
if I am a completely new person, but it helps if I am not, and
that is the advantage I have, and I am taking full advantage of
it. Someone, hopefully far younger and far less experienced,
frankly, than me, is going to come into this job, and their
foundation is going to be very, very good.
Mr. Markey. My only point is, when you walk into the room,
you should walk in as though you are the President of the
United States with his direct orders to give every piece of
information to you; and what you are telling me is that they do
not see you as a direct extension of the White House in
ensuring that all information is given to you to prevent
another 9/11. Unless the White House takes that step, I am
afraid that you are playing a valuable role but in substitution
for something which should be coming from a much higher level.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gibbons. Mr. Sweeney from New York is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Sweeney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General welcome. I don't consider you an old war horse. I
consider you a patriot. Young or old, I thank you for what you
are doing.
As you can tell by the questioning, there is a great deal
of concern. We are in a new phase of developing the Department
of Homeland Security, and I think some of this is natural, and
you have made the point in reoccurring themes that is all
revolutionary. The concern is, in merging these entities and
creating what Mr. Turner referred to as a proliferation of
agencies or certainly an expansion of agencies, it all seems to
be centering on at this point in time TTIC. Whether this is
normal response to bureaucracies or not, we are all concerned,
as the chairman pointed out, that you need to be relevant and
at the table and involved.
We had this line of questioning last week with General
Lebutti. In fact, I know the chairman has asked and I have
asked for some specific information back on staffing, et
cetera; and we were told it was coming soon. If you could
ensure that it comes today, for example, because it has been a
week, that would be greatly appreciated.
This all really gets to the core of what you said, the
issue of definition between the sharing of information and
intelligence and defining between the domestic versus the
international and its application. I understand that, but I
have some real practical concerns.
For example, our view I believe when we passed this
process, it is not that you necessarily had the ground forces
to gather and collect, because that would duplicate something
that already existed, but that you were right there in the
filtering of that information. You were right there at the
evolutionary parts of that process.
My simple question is, if you are 25 minutes away from
TTIC, how are you going to do that? Really, I think it is at
the core of questions on both sides of the aisle of this issue.
We are very concerned that you are essentially being in some
ways pushed aside and having to fight when Congress has already
determined your role. Could you address that issue more
specifically than you have thus far?
General Hughes. Well, I don't know if you were here when I
did take up that issue at the beginning a little bit. My view
is that we are about one millisecond away from TTIC. We are
directly connected to them with regard to automation and
communications.
One of the earlier questions was about the primary
intelligence that is produced by TTIC for the national
leadership and I receive that now on my computer desktop.
Mr. Sweeney. Do you need a physical presence there?
General Hughes. We do have a physical presence there. We
have a representative there, and we are just changing that
person out from one to another person. So our intent--my intent
personally--is to sustain that relationship there. We also have
a personnel bill which we are finding it very tough to honor,
but we are doing our best to try to honor it, to put some
fairly large number of persons in the TTIC, about 30.
Mr. Sweeney. I would like to work with you in this
committee and the approps on that.
On the personnel end of it, you mentioned you have some
frustrations in finding the right people, qualified people,
etcetera, et cetera. We are hearing that you are losing people
to TTIC because either the perception or the reality is they
are really in the game and you are not, and I have heard this
from a number of sources. Is there any truth to that?
General Hughes. Boy, I can give you the most--.
Mr. Sweeney. Your staff is nodding yes.
General Hughes. I can give you the most recent issue. I am
not aware of anybody that has gone to TTIC. Is there someone?
I think there might be a huge misunderstanding here. Not
only--I feel kind of funny giving you this answer. Not only
have we not lost anybody to TTIC, to the best of our collective
knowledge, but it is not really possible for us to lose anybody
to TTIC because it is an amalgam of intelligence professionals.
It is not a competitive environment.
Mr. Sweeney. Okay, I have some executive session questions.
The last one involves the need for a comprehensive, all-hazard
Federal emergency warning system. Currently, there are eight
separate systems that exist to provide cognitive notification
of imminent and potentially catastrophic threats to health and
safety. What are we doing to integrate those systems and do you
agree we need to integrate those systems, I guess I should have
asked first.
General Hughes. The honest truth is, sir, I don't know what
we are doing. This is out of my area of responsibility a little
bit, and it is also something I just am not well informed on,
but I would like to get back to you about that question, and I
will. Do I think there should be a coherent warning system in
the United States? Absolutely.
Mr. Sweeney. Okay. Thank you, General.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, Mr. Sweeney.
We turn to Mr. Meek for 5 minutes.
Mr. Meek. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate your service to the country and also your
coming before the committee today. I guess I want to ask a
couple of questions that you have already heard, but I think
that it is important enough to ask not the same question, but
similar questions.
You are the gateway to information not only to the Federal
law enforcement agencies but also State and local agencies, am
I correct?
General Hughes. I don't think I am the only gateway. I am
one.
Mr. Meek. Yes, but you are the gateway as it relates to
real intelligence.
General Hughes. For the homeland security effort, yes.
Mr. Meek. That is correct. I think it is important--and I
am sorry. I didn't hear your opening statement. I am a member
on the Armed Services Committee, and we had a similar meeting
going on.
I guess I want to pretty much address, from what I have
read of your statement, your involvement not only with TTIC but
with also the TSC, your personal involvement. I am glad that
you have the CIA badge, I am glad you have the relationship
with many others, but I am afraid that if you catch a cold, we
are in trouble. I know that you are trying to build the
infrastructure that is needed, and I think Mr. Sweeney--and I
am glad that he is well-read and studied on this issue. I mean,
I am concerned about this whole issue of physically not being
with the rest of the team that is kind of moving in your
direction, doing some of the same things--I think there is some
value in having a cup of coffee with those folks. I think there
is some value in running into them in the parking lot so they
are thinking of not only you but your office. I know that you
are building onto that, but I am very concerned about who is
the number two and who is the number three person, since you
are switching them out now--we know that attrition happens
everywhere. How is that going to work towards the security of
the country?
I think also, as we start looking at your testimony, and I
am so glad that you broke it down so that people can understand
the role of your office and other offices, but pulling from
your testimony. It provides a full spectrum of information
support necessary for the operation of Homeland Security for
the benefit of Federal, State, local and private sector
officials throughout the United States to secure the homeland
and defend the citizenry and protect our crucial
infrastructure.
Now that is important, and that is a very profound
statement on your behalf. As we look at that in that mindset,
the one hour, the human intelligence--the right here, right now
--is so very, very important. I know, being someone who has
been in law enforcement and sharing information--Ranking Member
Turner talked about the pre-9/11 versus the post-9/11. We are
looking at a lot more post-9/11. But is the information sharing
really working? Are you getting the information that you need?
You feel that you are, but what happens if you have to go on a
trip or a conference or what have you?
That same automation as it relates to being secure, I don't
know if that is real-time with you. They have the relation with
you. So I would urge if you could possibly reevaluate your
location, where you stand physically every day, even the time
that you are here in the committee, and while you have been
here over an hour and a half, who is sitting at the wheel? It
may seem elementary, but it is very important if you can give
us some response.
General Hughes. Well, first of all, a one-way pager from
the Homeland Security Operations Center and from my staff,
which is manned 24 hours a day, the intelligence analysis
element of the Homeland Security Center. The people work
directly for me.
They are in constant communication with me wherever I am.
I would like to introduce Mr. John Rollins behind me. If
you will stand up, John.
John is my Chief of Staff, essentially my deputy. He does
not have all of the same access that I do. In fact, just last
night we had a conversation about that very issue. I know that
what you are saying, the issues that you are pointing out, are
important to solve; and I have to get that done.
Mr. Meek. Yes, General, that is important; and that is work
that needs to be done.
You are fully aware of the 9/11 Commission and what they
are doing. The whole issue on 9/11 was intelligence and sharing
of information, and we have so many--and I am not saying that
you or anyone in this building or in the Department devalues
the importance of making sure that State, local, the frontline
people that are putting their lives on the line every day, that
they have good information right here, right now. Your office
is responsible for that.
If something was to, unfortunately, take place or about to
take place in this country, there is always going to be an
evaluation of what took place; and I would say that in closed
session that you really drive home the importance of pushing
from the Hill of letting the intelligence agencies know that
they must--if they like it or not, if it is a fraternity or
sorority or whatever you want to call it, that your office has
to be at the forefront. If not, they are at the table, when
they get real information, to pass that on to those individuals
that are on the front lines.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the extra additional time I
took myself.
But, General, I want to thank you. I believe that you are
committed, from what I can see. I have read your background.
You have been a patriot your entire life. But it is vitally
important that we do that, and I don't care if other folks get
upset about, oh, the Secretary went to the Hill and the next
thing you know, we have all these Members of Congress that are
barkingdown--I would rather barkdown their back. I would rather
make them upset of your presence here today versus the latter.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, Mr. Meek. We will turn now to Ms.
Norton for 5 minutes.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; and thank
you, General Hughes, for your testimony and, of course, for
this vital service you are rendering to our country.
I am interested in the fact that we may have gone from
having too little intelligence to having your analysts
bombarded with intelligence. I suppose that is better than if
we had only those two choices. That would be the better choice.
This past weekend or the weekend before last, I was with a
congressional delegation that went to Guantanamo. Actually, I
was very impressed with Guantanamo. I was impressed with the
kind of intelligence that our folks, most of them, Reserves,
public school teachers who are now interrogators--I was
particularly impressed with their methods which do not involve
the kind of coercion you see in movies but very sophisticated
rewards, harmless rewards, that are apparently getting real
intelligence, according to all we heard from those who briefed
us and from what we saw with our own eyes. We actually saw
people being interrogated, some very dangerous Al-Qa`eda being
interrogated.
At the same time, I represent the District of Columbia; and
I saw the effect of what must have been good intelligence when
at Dulles we had planes that were turned back or not allowed to
leave from Europe. What I am interested is, given this
intelligence from so many sources, how your analysts are able,
given the load of intelligence the likes to which they have
never seen before, to distinguish, for example, disinformation
from credible information. Here you have it coming at you from
all sources. We cannot tell whether some of what, for example,
we see here is just a case of people covering their you-know-
what just in case something happens could be disinformation--
but even if it is, better to stop everything--or whether you
are able, given intelligence and an intelligence load the like
of which our analysts never had before, to decide whether or
not anybody could decide what was credible and what is
actionable.
Can you tell me how, given the fact that you are getting it
now, not just as the CIA used to get it, as the FBI used to get
it, but from any number of sources, how in the world you are
able to tell whether we are dealing with something that ought
to be acted on and particularly how you are able to distinguish
disinformation from credible information?
General Hughes. It is hard for me to answer that question,
and it is really a good topic for discussion. It might be a
better thing to come out and visit anytime you wish. I am happy
to have you and discuss that, or any member from this
committee, and have you discuss that in person. But I will give
you a brief answer.
The issues that you raised, whether or not we are getting
too much or a lot of information in a very complicated
information environment is accurate. We are getting a lot of
information, and some of it has a different kind of weight.
Some of it from law enforcement channels or from the local,
State, private sector is different than the information flow
that we normally were used to working with in the past. We are
coming to grips with that issue.
If I may draw a picture in the air for you for just a
moment, we are receiving foreign intelligence from the
traditional sources. We are receiving law enforcement
information from the law enforcement community. We are
receiving domestic information from a whole variety of
information sources, and we are also receiving information from
other sources like academia, the Internet, that sort of thing.
Bringing these four vectors together--foreign intelligence, law
enforcement, domestic information, and other sources of
information--together and associating them in the body of
knowledge is something new. I do not believe it has ever been
done before here in the United States.
So we are having to design a system--and that, actually, in
my view, is something I--maybe I should have said earlier.
Part of this evolutionary process is good, in my view,
because this is new and it is different. It is something that
has to be carefully done to avoid impinging upon the civil
rights and the constitutional rights of our citizenry while at
the same time meeting the needs of our government to defend
ourselves against people who will attack unwarned and
unprotected citizens. There are many features and facets of
this which I would have to tell you we have to defer to another
time and place for discussion.
But the last point I would like to make to you is the
information itself at times does seem to be faulty or flawed.
In fact, I have kind of a saying that some of my staff make fun
of me about. The first 12 reports are always wrong. The last
report, the 13th report, might be an approximation of truth.
That is kind of the way this is working. Because we are
bombarded by initial information of various kinds. Some of it
is truly intelligence about intentions and activities, some of
it about events that are happening and ongoing, much different
kinds of information realms; and when the information comes to
us, frankly, it is quite often flawed. Sometimes it might seem
to us to be disinformation, especially with regard to
intelligence. That is a judgment, experience, cross-checking,
cross-cutting kind of issue; and it is not easy to do,
especially in a very timely manner.
Ms. Norton. I appreciate your candor. When you say that,
essentially, one has to build a new system and you face that
fact, it seems to me very important, given the new
complications that have been now merged into intelligence
activity.
If the chairman will indulge me with a brief additional
question, there is, of course, and continues to be concern that
much of our intelligence from Iraq and places like that does
not come from the ground. We have difficulties that we are
trying now to overcome with language and the rest of it so that
on-the-ground intelligence, which means some kind of
infiltration into groups, is difficult abroad.
Well, here in the United State we would expect to be
further along with intelligence on the ground. I would like to
ask you how much of your intelligence comes--I mean, in the
United States, does a significant amount of your intelligence
within the United States come from infiltration, on-the-ground
intelligence that you are able to receive? I recognize that
there are language problems even there, but clearly people in
this country speak English. Is there yet a significant amount
of intelligence that you can derive from on-the-ground here in
the United States?
General Hughes. I think I understand your question. I would
say that that is a growing body of knowledge. It is not fully
developed yet. It is not being reported fully yet, in many
cases, but it is certainly the effort that we are putting forth
to try to get information from, actually, the people we serve.
I have addressed a number of forums now of State, local,
major city, tribal and private sector groups and asked them to
become part of our system; and to date all of them have been
very happy to accept that challenge.
Ms. Norton. I am sorry. What kind of groups did you say?
General Hughes. From State--all different kinds of people,
frankly--from local, tribal, major city, and private sector. So
that is kind of the spectrum--.
Ms. Norton. I am talking about, for example, we are told
over and over again there are cells across the United States.
Fine. Are we now part of those cells so we know what is going
on in those cells?
General Hughes. Yes, to the degree that we know about it.
I mean, there may be some things that I don't know, but I
would say that I am pretty well informed where it counts.
Ms. Norton. That, of course, would be of great importance
to us, given 9/11 and the fact that these men were on the
ground all that time talking to everybody but, of course, with
no intelligence coming back to us.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Hughes. I don't want to leave with you the thought
this is perfect. It is not. We need to work on it with great
effort.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you Ms. Norton.
General Hughes, I have known you for a number of years,
especially in your previous occupation as Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, and you have been before our
Intelligence Committee many times. I understand why you were
chosen to lead this newly created organization; and I have the
greatest respect for your background, your abilities, and look
forward to your leadership as you lead this from its inception
to its ultimate and hopefully effective utilization of this new
body.
I did want to make sure that we get a firm commitment from
you for an ultimate return to our committee for a classified
session. We are not going to do that today simply because you
have been very generous with your time. We have to be out of
this room, and it would take an enormous amount of time to
clear the room and make it right for a classified briefing.
Getting back to some of the things that I wanted to sort of
wrap up with, it is normal in the analysis function of
intelligence for people to disagree, because it is literally a
form of art. It is not a science. People tend to expect that
intelligence coming to us, raw intelligence, should lead a
course of one and only one conclusion. Sometimes that works;
sometimes that doesn't work. So a disagreement between educated
individuals, knowledgeable people about the meaning of raw
intelligence and sometimes disparate pieces of evidence can
lead to differing conclusions, differing estimates. That is, of
course, the part of the intelligence community that is one of
art rather than science; and I am sure that you understand
that.
With regard to your clearance and being where you are, as I
said, your previous life as the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, you are the right person at the right time
for the right job. If someone else were sitting in your chair
without your experience, without your background, they would
have to go through a clearance and security process even though
they were the Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis
under the Department of Homeland Security. If they had not
previously acquired a classified background check, they would
have to go through that process.
So to say simply that you and your previous military
experience were immaterial to the process is wrong. I mean, the
reason you are in the position you are in is to expedite the
ability for the Department that you have to function
effectively. So I wanted to bring those out.
I again want to thank not just all the members of the
committee who have participated today but, most importantly, I
wanted to thank you, General Hughes. I don't know if I should
call you Secretary Hughes or General Hughes. You are very well
respected in your position, but I did want to thank you for
your candid assessment today.
We will have some questions that will be submitted to you.
We would appreciate your responding to them.
The record will be held open for 10 days; and with your
commitment, as I said earlier, to return for a classified
briefing at which time we can get into some finer granularity
on some of these intelligence issues, that would be great. Just
to get your commitment on the record, General Hughes, if you
could respond to that.
General Hughes. Mr. Chairman, I will certainly come before
this committee anytime you desire for any reason. You can rest
assured of that.
I would just like to say that I share a very positive
view--I mean, my experience with you has just been great over
these years and with some of the staff here. I hope you
appreciate, too, this personal relationship between a person
like me and some of the members here. It is a wonderful thing.
I am looking forward to serving the country with you, sir.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, General; and we, too, are looking
forward to your service again. It is always a pleasure to have
you before this committee.
With that, since we have kept you here the requisite time,
which has been 2 hours--and we know that you want to stay
longer, but we are going to let you go--this subcommittee
hearing is closed.
[Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions Submitted for the Record
Questions for the Record From The Hon. Jim Turner for General Patrick
Hughes
Issue #1
During the hearing, when you were asked whether you have immediate
access to relevant threat information from the Intelligence Community,
you responded:
``My view to the answer is yes, I do, although, sometimes I
have to work hard to get it. It would be better. . .that I
don't have to reach out quite as much or to intercede on
occasion and gain information.''Later in the hearing, you
noted:
``. . .there are shades of autonomy or automatic mechanisms
here. Sometimes I have to work a little harder to get that
information, depending upon the nature of the information
source.'' You confirmed the point again stating that ``At times
I have certainly been frustrated by it. . .I will have to tell
you that it is very much a concern of mine.''
The fact that you are able to secure certain information because of
your ``old war horse'' status is reassuring on the one hand but
troubling in other respects. As you know, the Homeland Security Act
requires that ``Except as otherwise directed by the President, the
Secretary [ Homeland Security) shall have such access as the Secretary
considers necessary to all information, including reports, assessments,
analyses, and unevaluated intelligence relating to threats of terrorism
against the United States. . .''.
Thus, I would appreciate hearing from you what information sharing
mechanisms you believe ought to be in place right now to ensure that
all relevant threat information is delivered to the IA Office,
regardless of an Assistant Secretary's prior employment history
handling these issues or ability to secure information from past
colleagues still working in the Intelligence Community.
My questions are as follows:
(1) What intelligence information is immediately accessible to the IA
Office?
(2) What intelligence information is accessible to the IA Office only
through TTIC?
(3) What intelligence information is accessible to the IA Office by
request?
(4) Can you provide examples of intelligence information that was
accessible only through your own direct and personal efforts by the
Assistant Secretary?
(5) What steps ought to be taken to improve the intelligence
information sharing process so that the IA Office Assistant Secretary
is no longer ``frustrated'' by having to ``work hard'' to receive all
related threat information, regardless of the ``nature of the
information source''?
Issue #2
I understand that the IA Office's ability to access information
from law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community depends,
in part, on the Homeland Security Information Sharing Memorandum of
Understanding which was signed on March 4, 2003 by Attorney General
Jolm Ashcroft, CIA Director George Tenet, and DHS Secretary Ridge. My
great concern, of course, is that the most sensitive intelligence
collected by the U.S. government, which I believe is more likely to
provide you timely and useful information on terrorist motivations,
strategy and actions, is too closely held and not always being
disseminated to you and your colleagues serving at the Department of
Homeland Security.
There is an element of arbitrariness, I would submit, about what
information is shared with the IA Office and what is excluded from your
review. Any light that you could cast on this subject, such as the
basis under which sensitive raw and finished intelligence is
disseminated to the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) and the
IA Office, would be helpful in my understanding whether legislative
action could improve the process and ought to be pursued.
Specifically, my questions are as follows:
(1) Does it make sense for you to be briefed on covert action programs
and terrorism--related DoD Special Access Programs so that you can
determine whether information derived from those activities are
relevant to securing the homeland?
(2) Should you have authority to review any other Intelligence
Community compartmented programs to determine, on an independent basis,
what should be shared with Secretary Ridge?
(3) Are there aspects to the MOU that require expansion or updating?
(4) Does the MOU give the IA Office sufficient leverage to secure
intelligence or law enforcement information that is highly classified?
(5) Who is the official responsible within the Intelligence Community
for deciding what intelligence threat information is shared with TTIC
and the IA Office, and how does the process unfold for making those
decisions?
Issue #3
I concurred with your testimony about where TTIC ultimately
resides.
``My view. . .is that at some point we need to consider the
Terrorist Threat Integration Center coming under a different
kind of management structure, perhaps under DHS, perhaps under
an association of structures of some kind . . .''.
Further, you noted:
I do think, and I personally think the Director of Central
Intelligence would agree with this, at some point in time the
placement of the organization and its roles, missions and
functions with regard to central authority needs to be
reconsidered.''
I am persuaded, too, that TTIC should be moved under the DHS
umbrella in order to improve and refine overall intelligence sharing
and am puzzled why, if you believe the DCI would view such action
favorably, there is not more active consideration of this matter within
the Administration.
Recognizing that DHS is a newly created organization and that
bureaucratic obstacles continue to affect the Department's overall
development, I would strongly urge you to press this issue with your
senior colleagues within the Intelligence Community. I believe TTIC's
separate operations from DHS hinders the level of connectivity
necessary to allow the government to effectively, and on a real-time
basis, integrate intelligence and disseminate threat analysis to our
local, community and state responders.
My question is as follows:
(1) Would the connectivity between the DHS and TTIC be improved
if TTIC were moved to the Department? Short of moving TTIC,
what other steps should be taken to improve connectivity
between the two organizations?
Issue #4
I would welcome continuing updates from your staff to mine about
the IA Office's efforts to hire qualified personnel as quickly and
efficiently as possible. I share your substantial concern about
administrative delays inherent in the security clearance process and am
prepared to do everything I can to improve the current system. Your
testimony that the ``staffing level is not yet 50 percent of our hope''
two and a half years after 9/11 leaves me discouraged and wondering why
DFIS is unable to expedite the hiring process to ensure that we have
sufficient intelligence and policy personnel onboard to help prevent
terrorists from striking our homeland all over again.
Specifically, my questions are as follows:
(1) How many Full Time Equivalent (FTE5) employees currently work in
the IA Office?
(2) How many FTE slots have been authorized for FY 2004?
(3) How many FTE slots have been filled as of April 1, 2004?
(4) How many individuals are ready to be hired once they obtain
security clearances?
(5) Besides security clearance issues, what are the other key
administrative issues delaying the full staffing of the IA office?
Issue #5
It would be useful to better understand the different kinds of
analysis being conducted by your office on a daily basis. A February
2004 DHS Office of Inspector General Report (Survey of IAIP
Directorate--OIG-04-13) notes that intelligence information is
``analyzed and processed into a usable format for distribution.'' The
only documents that we receive directly from the IA Office are the
occasional threat warnings distributed to local law enforcement. In
furtherance of our oversight responsibilities, I would like to be
provided example copies of bulletins, threat analysis assessments,
competitive analysis documents, warnings and any other formats being
used to inform relevant partners both internal and external to DHS in
your return reply.
Moreover, I would like to receive an explanation regarding the
primary means of disseminating your classified and unclassified
analytic findings to entities within DHS and other federal, state,
local, and private sector partners. The OJG report notes ``the lack of
an agreed upon Information Technology (IT) infrastructure to
communicate with these partners inhibits the exchange of information.''
That being the case, a key concern I have is how we ensure that
existing IT weaknesses are not the reason that we fail to detect
another attack against the homeland.
Issue #6
Since the IAIP Chief of Staff is responsible for managing the
Competitive Analysis and Evaluation Office (CAEO), I would like to hear
your views regarding why strategic red cell sessions and red teaming
does not fall under the purview of the IA Office. The bulk of
intelligence analysis is being conducted by your qualified staff, and I
am not convinced that the small number of full time equivalent
employees in CAEO (10 FTEs were authorized in this office in FY03) is
sufficient to accomplish this critical task. More generally, I am
concerned about the IA Office, and the Directorate as a whole, relying
too heavily on detailees and outside contractors instead of Full Time
Equivalent (FTEs) personnel, and would seek your views on the optimal
mix of workers to carry out the threat analysis mission.
My specific questions, then, are as follows:
(1) How many detailees, and from which other agencies, does the IA
Office employ? How many outside contractor employees work in the IA
office?
(2)What role do you have in overseeing red cell sessions and red
teaming, if any?
(3)And should the functions of the CAEO fall under the jurisdiction of
your office?
In closing, let me thank you again for your testimony last month. I
look forward to learning more about your efforts to build an excellent
foundation for the IA Office.