[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PROTECTING THE HOMELAND: BUILDING A
LAYERED AND COORDINATED APPROACH TO BORDER SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFRASTRUCTURE AND BORDER SECURITY
of the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 15, 2004
__________
Serial No. 108-51
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Christopher Cox, California, Chairman
Jennifer Dunn, Washington Jim Turner, Texas, Ranking Member
C.W. Bill Young, Florida Bennie G. Thompson, MississPpi
Don Young, Alaska Loretta Sanchez, California
F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Wisconsin Norman D. Dicks, Washington
David Dreier, California Barney Frank, Massachusetts
Duncan Hunter, California Jane Harman, California
Harold Rogers, Kentucky Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland
Sherwood Boehlert, New York Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New
Joe Barton, Texas York
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Nita M. Lowey, New York
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey
Porter J. Goss, Florida Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Dave Camp, Michigan Columbia
Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida Zoe Lofgren, California
Bob Goodlatte, Virginia Karen McCarthy, Missouri
Ernest J. Istook, Jr., Oklahoma Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Peter T. King, New York Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
John Linder, Georgia Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
John B. Shadegg, Arizona Islands
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Mac Thornberry, Texas Ken Lucas, Kentucky
Jim Gibbons, Nevada James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Kay Granger, Texas Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Pete Sessions, Texas Ben Chandler, Kentucky
John E. Sweeney, New York
John Gannon, Chief of Staff
Stephen DeVine, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel
Thomas Dilenge, Chief Counsel and Policy Director
David H. Schanzer, Democrat Staff Director
Mark T. Magee, Democrat Deputy Staff Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
______
Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security
Dave Camp, Michigan, Chairman
Kay Granger, Texas, Vice Chairwoman Loretta Sanchez, California
Jennifer Dunn, Washington Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Don Young, Alaska Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Duncan Hunter, California Barney Frank, Massachusetts
Lamar Smith, Texas Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland
Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New
Robert W. Goodlatte, Virginia York
Ernest Istook, Oklahoma Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
John Shadegg, Arizona Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
John Sweeney, New York Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Christopher Cox, California, ex Jim Turner, Texas, ex officio
officio
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Dave Camp, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Michigan, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Infrastructure
and Border Security............................................ 1
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Infrastructure and Border Security............................. 11
The Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Select Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 20
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington........................................ 16
The Honorable Jennifer Dunn, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington........................................ 21
The Honorable Kay Granger, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas................................................. 13
The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas........................................ 22
The Honorable John B. Shadegg, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Arizona........................................... 18
The Honorable Mark E. Souder, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Indiana........................................... 15
WITNESSES
Panel I
Chief David Aguilar, Tucson Sector Border Patrol Chief, Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. Victor X. Cerda, Acting Director of Detention and Removal
Operations, Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement................................................. 2
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
Panel II
Mr. T.J. Bonner, President, National Border Control Council
Oral Statement................................................. 43
Prepared Statement............................................. 45
Dr. James Carafano, Senior Research Fellow, Defense and Homeland
Security, Heritage Foundation
Oral Statement................................................. 24
Prepared Statement............................................. 26
Mr. Randel K. Johnson, The United States Chamber of Commerce and
Americans for Better Borders
Oral Statement................................................. 32
Prepared Statement............................................. 34
Mr. Sergio Ugazio, Secretary, Local 1944 National INC Council,
American Federation of Government Employees
Oral Statement................................................. 46
Prepared Statement............................................. 48
HEARING ON PROTECTING THE HOMELAND: BUILDING A LAYERED AND COORDINATED
APPROACH TO BORDER SECURITY.
----------
Tuesday, June 15, 2004
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Infrastructure
and Border Security,
Select Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:35 a.m., in
Room 2318, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dave Camp
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Camp, Dunn, Smith, Diaz-Balart,
Shadegg, Souder, Sanchez, Dicks, Slaughter, Jackson-Lee, and
Turner.
Mr. Camp. [Presiding.] The Subcommittee on Infrastructure
and Border Security hearing will come to order. Today's hearing
is on Protecting the Homeland: Building a Layered and
Coordinated Approach to Border Security. This hearing will
examine the level of cooperation within the Department of
Homeland Security in preventing terrorists and others from
entering the United States illegally.
Today, we will hear from two panels. Panel I is Mr. Victor
Cerda, Senior Adviser to the Assistant Secretary, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland
Security; and Mr. David Aguilar, Tucson Sector Border Patrol
Chief, Bureau of Customers and Border Protection, Department of
Homeland Security. Panel II is Dr. James Carafano, Senior
Research Fellow for Defense and Homeland Security at the
Heritage Foundation; Mr. Randel K. Johnson, Vice President for
Labor, Immigration and Employee Benefits at the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce; Mr. T.J. Bonner, President of the National Border
Patrol Council, AFL-CIO; and Mr. Sergio Ugazio, Secretary for
the National INS Council Local 1944 of the American Federation
of Government Employees.
Thank you all for your participation. We have agreed at
this meeting among the members to waive all opening statements
in order to provide sufficient time for both panels and for
questions. Members may submit their opening statements for the
record. The record will remain open for 10 days after the close
of the hearing. We will divide the hearing time with 1 hour for
each panel.
I would now recognize Ms. Sanchez to offer her welcome to
the witnesses.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning.
Thank you again to all of our witnesses for coming before us
today. I think this is one of the most important topics that we
have on our subcommittee to explore. Once again, in the
interests of time because I know we have a long agenda, I
welcome and I look forward to your testimony.
Thank you.
Mr. Camp. Thank you.
We will begin with panel I. I want to again welcome Mr.
Victor Cerda and Mr. David Aguilar. We will ask you to briefly
summarize your statement in 5 minutes or less. You may begin.
STATEMENT OF VICTOR X. CERDA, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Cerda. Good morning, Chairman Camp and distinguished
members of the subcommittee. My name is Victor Cerda.
Currently, I am the Senior Adviser to the Assistant Secretary
of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. It is my
privilege to appear before you to discuss our agency's
immigration enforcement efforts.
ICE is the largest investigative arm of the Department of
Homeland Security, charged with the mission of preventing
terrorist and criminal activity by targeting the people, money
and materials that support terrorists and criminal
organizations. In that mission, U.S. immigration and customs
laws are among our most important enforcement tools. Our goal
in enforcing these laws is to restore integrity to our nation's
immigration system. The key to this effort is prioritization.
We attack the most critical threats first.
Our first order of business is to address the serious
threats to our communities and our nation posed by violent
criminal aliens, individuals with possible terrorist
associations, fugitive alien absconders, and sexual predators.
We are getting results. Since March 2003, ICE has removed more
than 85,000 criminal aliens and we expect to exceed last year's
numbers. Similarly, ICE has been involved in several cases
regarding foreign nationals who posed a threat to our national
security, such as the case announced yesterday regarding Mr.
Abdi.
Under DHS, ICE combines the once separate legal authorities
and law enforcement resources of the former INS and the U.S.
Customs Service to create a more powerful enforcement agency.
For example, we have combined resources from both agencies to
develop a unified smuggling division, enabling us to hit
smuggling organizations of all kinds much more effectively.
Likewise, the financial investigation capabilities we gained
from Customs, housed in Cornerstone, our comprehensive economic
security initiative, allows us to more effectively follow the
money trails that support smuggling, criminal and terrorist
organizations.
All of these tools were brought together in Operation ICE
Storm, an ICE interagency task force we launched last year in
Phoenix, Arizona in response to a violent crime wave led by
rival smuggling gangs. ICE brought our expertise in human
smuggling, weapons and drug trafficking, and money laundering
investigations into a partnership with other stakeholders at
the Arizona border, including Customs and Border Protection, to
disrupt and dismantle these smuggling organizations. Since we
launched ICE Storm, we prosecuted more than 190 defendants for
human smuggling, kidnapping, money laundering and weapons and
drug violations, and we have seized over $5.2 million.
This is just one example of how we work with other agencies
to better coordinate our efforts in this new homeland security
mission. We are also working with our counterparts at CBP,
Custom and Border Protection, in efforts to construct a unified
enforcement front at the Arizona border, for example. We are
strengthening relationships with state and local law
enforcement through a variety of innovative initiatives. We
have developed groundbreaking agreements with law enforcement
agencies in Florida and Alabama to delegate immigration
enforcement authorities to state officers, providing us with a
valuable force multiplier on the frontlines of law enforcement.
ICE is also deploying our information-sharing assets such
as the Law Enforcement Support Center, to provide our partners
at the federal, state and local levels with timely and accurate
immigration information to aid in enforcement. In March alone,
for example, the LESC fielded over 60,000 calls from law
enforcement and placed over 2,100 detainers on aliens. Finally,
our Compliance Enforcement Unit is a valuable tool for
gathering, analyzing, and disseminating information on
immigration violations, drawing on the data from national
databases.
With each of these initiatives, we are working towards
restoring and maintaining integrity in our immigration system,
ensuring that a potential vulnerability is sealed from those
who would do us harm. Mr. Chairman, today I focused on only a
small part of what ICE contributes to the coordinated effort to
secure our borders and homeland. With the enforcement and
investigative capabilities of ICE it has brought together, and
by working with our colleagues at the federal, state and local
levels, we have developed an effective new approach to border
security and immigration enforcement.
In conclusion, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman and
members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify
today. I look forward to answering your questions.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Cerda follows:]
Prepared Statement of Victor X. Cerda
I. INTRODUCTION
Good morning, Chairman Camp and distinguished Members of the
Subcommittee. My name is Victor Cerda, currently I am the Acting
Director for Detention and Removal Operations (DRO) at U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement. It is my privilege to appear before you to
discuss the immigration enforcement mission of U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE). I am here today to testify you because of my
knowledge and professional role both with the former INS and currently
with ICE. Over the course of the last year, I have been in several
different leadership positions including the Acting Chief of Staff,
Principal Legal Advisor, Special Counsel to the Assistant Secretary and
currently, the Acting Director of Detention and Removal Operations.
These positions have provided me with the Operational and
Administrative knowledge needed to testify before you today. As the
largest investigative arm of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
ICE is charged with the mission of preventing terrorist and criminal
activity by targeting the people, money, and materials that support
terrorist and criminal organizations. One of our key objectives within
that larger mission is to detect and address vulnerabilities in our
border security.
We know that criminal and terrorist organizations have exploited--
or attempted to exploit--gaps and vulnerabilities in our border and our
immigration systems to gain entry to our country. With ICE's enhanced
ability to investigate both immigration and customs violations, we are
uniquely positioned to enforce our homeland security missions in ways
never before possible. Our nation's immigration laws are among our most
important law enforcement tools in that effort.
II. ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES
ICE's goal in enforcing these laws is to restore integrity to our
nation's immigration system. The key to this effort is prioritization--
systematically attacking the most serious threats first. Specifically,
ICE has made the apprehension and removal of dangerous criminal aliens
and national security threats our top enforcement priority. This is not
to suggest that ICE does not fully and consistently enforce the law in
other situations. It is simply to suggest that our first order of
business is to address the serious threats that individuals with
possible terrorist associations, fugitive alien absconders, violent
criminal aliens, sexual predators, and others pose to our communities,
our families, and our nation. Our objective is to strategically target
our resources and authorities on the most dangerous aliens in order to
remove them from the streets before they can do harm.
It's a strategy that is getting results. Since March 1, 2003, ICE's
Detention and Removal Office (DRO) has removed more than 85,730
criminal aliens and we expect to exceed last year's numbers. The DRO
has more than 18 fugitive absconder teams across the nation and has
created a ``Most Wanted'' list of the most dangerous criminal aliens,
which has been a valuable tool for generating tips and leads. From the
original list, nine of the ten were captured within a few weeks, and
the tenth was determined to have already left the country. Under ICE's
``Operation Predator,'' which targets pedophiles, child sex tourists,
and child pornographers we have arrested 3,023 child sex predators who
exploit children for pleasure or profit. Approximately 40 percent of
the predators we've arrested under this program have entered the United
States illegally, while an additional 20 percent have been visitors who
have violated the terms of their visa by either overstaying or
violating the terms of their visas.
III. BACKGROUND
ICE was formed on March 1, 2003, by combining the investigative,
detention and removal, and intelligence arms of the former Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) and the former U.S. Customs Service,
including Customs' Air and Marine Operations (AMO), along with the
Federal Protective Service (FPS) and the Federal Air Marshal Service
(FAMS). Prior to being restructured as part of the Department of
Homeland Security, the INS was a ``dual mission'' agency, responsible
for granting citizenship services and benefits to new arrivals to our
country while being simultaneously responsible for enforcing
immigration law. This dual mission resulted in difficulties for the
agency, which often struggled with the challenge of how to best execute
two missions that did not always complement one another. The
reorganization into DHS, which split the dual INS missions into
separate agencies, was a commitment on the part of our government to
help our people better execute the missions with which they have been
charged.
While our sister agency, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS), focuses its attention on providing immigration services, ICE
is a law enforcement agency. By combining the once separate legal
authorities and law enforcement resources of the former INS and former
Customs, we have created a more powerful enforcement agency better
capable of dealing with ICE's legacy agencies' jurisdictions.
Consider, for example, ICE's creation of a unified smuggling
division. Prior to our reorganization into DHS, enforcement authorities
for drug and contraband smuggling were the province of the Customs
Service, while enforcement authorities for human smuggling were the
exclusive province of INS. Unfortunately, criminal smuggling
organizations are less fastidious in their division of labor. Motivated
by profit and profit alone, they might move drugs one day and human
``cargo'' the next--shifting their tactics in response to demand,
profit margins, and enforcement patterns. By combining these two units,
we can now hit these organizations much more effectively, whether they
are trafficking in drugs, weapons, or illegal aliens.
Moreover, with the financial investigations capabilities we gained
from legacy Customs, ICE is now able to follow the money trails that
support these criminal smuggling organizations more effectively than
ever before. Under Cornerstone, our comprehensive financial
investigations initiative, ICE has the ability to follow the money
trails that support smuggling, criminal, and terrorist organizations.
We know that criminal and terrorist organizations must earn money to
fund their ongoing operations, and we also know that they move and
store that money through a variety of illicit schemes. With
Cornerstone, we bring to bear one of the most sophisticated financial
investigations shops in law enforcement to detect these financial
schemes, disrupt the flow of money, and put these organizations out of
business. These enforcement abilities help disrupt the illegal aliens
ability to access the United States by using these criminal smuggling
organizations.
IV. COORDINATED/COOPERATIVE EFFORTS
All of these tools were brought to bear in one of our agency's most
striking successes: ``Operation ICE Storm,'' an initiative we launched
last year in Arizona. Over the course of several months, our agents and
their state and local counterparts in the Phoenix area began to track
increasing and alarming levels of violence related to human smuggling
operations. Rival smuggling gangs were engaging in violent
confrontations and bloody shootouts in and around the metropolitan
area. The victims were not only gang members. In some cases, the human
beings who were the smugglers' ``cargo'' were kidnapped and held for
ransom, sexually assaulted, or simply executed outright in order to
deny profit to rival gangs.
In response to this violent crime wave, ICE assembled ``Operation
ICE Storm,'' an interagency task force to combat violent crime in the
Phoenix metropolitan area. We brought our expertise in human smuggling,
drugs, weapons smuggling, and money laundering investigations into a
comprehensive partnership with other stakeholders at the Arizona
border, with the specific goal of disrupting and dismantling the
operations of these smuggling organizations. We saw rapid results.
Since we launched ``ICE Storm,'' we've prosecuted more than 190
defendants for human smuggling, kidnapping, money laundering, and
weapons and drug violations. We've seized over 100 weapons and over
$5.2 million. Every time we confiscate an assault weapon or a bundle of
cash from these criminal organizations, and every time we trace back
and shut down one of their funding streams, we make it harder for these
criminals to conduct business. Furthermore, our efforts are producing
additional positive results. For example, the Phoenix Police Department
credits ICE Storm with a 17 percent decline in homicides and an 82
percent decline in migrant-related kidnappings in the final quarter of
2003. These decreases are a direct result of ICE's ability to
coordinate resources and combined authorities to disrupt the alien
smuggling organizations along the border to improve immigration
enforcement.
Moreover, in this new homeland security mission we are working more
effectively with our counterparts in the federal government--notably
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), our partners at DHS--as well as
with state and local law enforcement agencies in a coordinated effort
to leverage our law enforcement capabilities. The Department of
Homeland Security's recently introduced Arizona Border Control (ABC)
initiative, for example, builds upon the success of Operation ICE
Storm. In this new initiative, ICE, working in conjunction with CBP and
other federal, state, and local agencies, is aggressively applying the
pressure of immigration laws, anti-money laundering laws, and other
federal and state statutes to deprive smuggling organizations of their
funding, disrupt their operations, and dismantle their organizations,
both in the United States and abroad. We are working closely with our
partners at CBP, combining our investigative and detention resources,
expertise, and authorities to construct a unified enforcement front at
the Arizona border, to fight illegal immigration and its associated
criminal activity.
V. COORDINATION WITH STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
ICE is also committed to working more effectively with our
counterparts at the state and local levels, particularly in tracking
down alien absconders. ICE is acutely aware of the critical role state
and local law enforcement plays in the broad homeland security mission.
Officers at the state and local level are not only the first responders
when there is an incident or attack against the United States, but,
also, during the course of their daily duties they may encounter
foreign-born criminals and immigration violators who pose a threat to
our national security or to public safety. Recognizing that critical
role, ICE partners with state and local law enforcement agencies
nationally and locally through a variety of arrangements to enhance the
overall effectiveness of our collective law enforcement efforts and our
joint ability to protect the homeland.
For example, ICE's Institutional Removal Program targets criminal
aliens who are serving sentenced in federal and state jails, to ensure
that, upon their release, these aliens are taken directly into ICE
custody for deportation from the United States--before they can be
released into the community. Obviously, the success of this program
depends upon communication, coordination, and cooperation with other
agencies, to ensure that criminal aliens cannot exploit this potential
gap. This fiscal year alone, ICE has removed 28,109 criminal aliens
through this program.
ICE is also fostering innovative new relationships through our
287(g) program, which recognizes a role in immigration enforcement for
state and local law enforcement. Under the terms of Section 287(g) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act, sec. 113, Sept. 30, 1996), Congress has
authorized ICE to enter into written agreements with state and local
authorities to define the full extent of this partnership. A state or
local law enforcement agency works with ICE to develop a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU), which details each party's specific
responsibilities under the agreement. Once this agreement is in place,
ICE provides officers with a five-week training program in immigration
issues, and provides supervision and support for state and local
officers engaged in immigration enforcement. We see this as a valuable
``force multiplier'' program for more effective immigration
enforcement. These authorities, which are initiated by the states or
local jurisdictions, are currently in effect in Florida and Alabama.
VI. INFORMATION-SHARING
ICE also maintains a number of powerful information-sharing tools
that we use to provide critical feedback to our federal, state, and
local counterparts in the field. Our Forensic Documents Laboratory
(FDL), for example, is a critical investigative tool in the battle
against immigration fraud, the only federal crime laboratory dedicated
almost exclusively to the forensic examination of documents. The lab is
staffed 365 days a year to provide a full range of services to law
enforcement agencies, including handwriting analysis, foreign and
domestic document examinations, fingerprint analysis, and training in
the detection of fraudulent documents. Another key ICE asset, the Law
Enforcement Support Center (LESC), maintains a vast store of
information related to immigration, which we provide to state and local
law enforcement when appropriate. In fiscal year 2003, the LESC
responded to nearly 600,000 queries, an increase of over 175,000 from
the previous fiscal year. These phone queries allow ICE to place
detainers or detention holds on illegal aliens who may be in the
custody of local law enforcement based on information that they may
receive from the phone query. The FDL and LESC are just two examples of
how ICE is providing critical information and training services to our
state and local law enforcement partners, contributing to officer
safety, community safety, and national security.
Finally, ICE's Compliance Enforcement Unit (CEU) is a valuable tool
for collecting, gathering, and disseminating information on immigration
violators. The CEU examines data from several databases--the Student
and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), the National Security
Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), and the U.S. Visitor and
Immigrant Status and Indicator Technology program (US-VISIT). Through
analysis of the databases, the CEU identifies possible immigration
violators and assigns these cases to ICE investigators for action.
Since its creation in June 2003, the CEU has vetted tens of thousands
of leads compiled from these databases. Many of these leads have
resulted in the arrest of individuals with egregious criminal
convictions.
VII. CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, today I have focused on just a few of the immigration
enforcement capabilities that ICE contributes to the DHS effort to
secure our borders and homeland. The United States has always welcomed
with open arms those who would enter our nation by legal means. Our
nation's great diversity, and our willingness to accept newcomers from
all around the world, strengthens our freedoms and our prosperity. At
the same time, ours is a nation of laws and we are responsible for
targeting those who would exploit vulnerabilities in the border and
immigration systems to illegally enter the United States. By
aggressively enforcing our immigration laws and targeting criminal
aliens, we seek to deter criminal and terrorist organizations who
threaten our way of life, and we seek to strengthen the legal
immigration process for worthy applicants. With the expansive
enforcement capabilities and innovative investigative techniques that
ICE has brought together, our agency is uniquely positioned to protect
our homeland. By working with our colleagues at the Federal, state, and
local levels, we have developed an effective new approach to border
security and immigration enforcement. By taking a proactive approach to
preventing future terrorist attacks and criminal activity, ICE will
continue to align our investigative priorities with the critical role
of protecting our homeland.
In conclusion, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members
of the Subcommittee, for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of
the men and women of ICE, and I look forward to answering any questions
you may have.
Mr. Camp. Thank you very much.
Mr. Aguilar, you have 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DAVID AGUILAR, TUCSON SECTOR BORDER PATROL CHIEF,
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Aguilar. Thank you and good morning. Chairman Camp,
Ranking Member Sanchez and distinguished subcommittee members,
it is an honor to have the opportunity to appear before you to
discuss the level of cooperation within the Department of
Homeland Security, specifically through the operations and law
enforcement initiatives of the United States Border Patrol in
preventing terrorists from entering and remaining in the United
States.
My name is David Aguilar and I am currently the Chief of
the Tucson Sector Border Patrol. It has now been over a year
that immigration inspectors and U.S. Border Patrol agents from
INS, agricultural inspectors from the Animal Plant Health
Inspection Service, and customs inspectors from the U.S.
Customs Service merged to form the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection within the Border and Transportation Security
Directorate at DHS. With a unified presence, focus and
determination, we have combined our skills and resources to be
far more effective than as separate agencies.
The mission of CBP's Border Patrol is to provide homeland
security along our nation's borders between our ports of entry,
patrolling and securing over 4,000 miles of international land
and water border with Canada, and 2,000 miles of international
border with Mexico. We also patrol roughly 2,000 miles of
coastal waterways surrounding the Florida Peninsula and Puerto
Rico.
We work hand in hand with CBP officers to inspect people
and cargo entering the country through ports of entry. While
the priority mission of the Border Patrol is to detect and
prevent terrorist weapons, including weapons of mass
destruction, from entering the United States, we still take on
our traditional missions of interdicting illegal immigrants,
drugs, currency and other contraband. Historically, major
Border Patrol initiatives such as Operation Hold the Line in El
Paso, Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego, and Operation Rio
Grande in our McAllen Sector have had great border enforcement
impact on illegal migration patterns along our nation's
southwest border.
Today, new DHS initiatives such as the Arizona Border
Control Initiative will continue to have a significant affect
on illegal migration. These initiatives have sought to bring
the proper balance of personnel, equipment, technology and
infrastructure into areas experiencing the greatest level of
cross-border illegal activity on the southwest border. Efforts
have been established and are being improved upon to build
better liaison with agencies across the southwest and northern
borders of the United States.
One example is our participation with the Integrated Border
Enforcement Team with Canada. Another, similarly, along the
southwest border with Mexico, are our Border Patrol-Mexico
Liaison Units, which have worked to achieve the same goals. The
program has already achieved successes with the cooperation
between the two countries on issues such as information-
sharing, cooperative enforcement efforts, and border safety
initiatives, to name a few.
Shortly after the transfer of the Border Patrol into CBP in
March of 2003, it was recognized that CBP, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement's Office of Investigations would need to
coordinate closely on transferring the Border Patrol's anti-
smuggling units to ICE's Office of Investigations in order to
properly address various administrative and operational issues.
A working group consisting of CBP and ICE representatives
undertook efforts to transfer the administrative functions of
our anti-smuggling units to ICE's Office of Investigations. It
also addressed operational issues related to roles and
responsibilities between the Border Patrol and ASUs. This was a
critical step in organizing the relationship between the Office
of Investigations and the Office of Border Patrol in that it
ensured coordination of operations, as well as the sharing of
information and intelligence, by clearly outlining roles and
responsibilities.
A resulting joint CBP and ICE memorandum accomplished the
goals. It was signed by Commissioner Bonner and ICE Assistant
Secretary Michael Garcia on April 14, 2003 and was immediately
disseminated to respective field offices. This effort is but
one major component of a mutual, ongoing and very comprehensive
effort to appropriately link and create what we call a
synergistic foundation for enforcement between DHS interdiction
and investigations agencies.
Another important area is the area of detention issues. On
the southern border, detention of illegal aliens from Mexico is
short in duration, as a majority are given the opportunity to
voluntarily return to Mexico. Long-term detention is required
of aliens that fall into specific types of categories. These
categories include criminal aliens other than Mexicans, other
than Canadians, asylum seekers, and since 9-11, special
interest aliens. If an alien requires long-term detention, it
is standard operating procedure to turn the alien over to ICE's
detention and removal operations branch after the alien has
been initially processed by Border Patrol.
As the chief patrol agent of the Tucson Sector, I can offer
a fresh perspective about collaborative efforts by DHS, non-
DHS, and state and local and tribal agencies under the Arizona
Border Patrol Initiative. This initiative began on March
16,2004 and brought together an unprecedented working
relationship among various federal, state and local agencies to
include the tribal Tohono O'Odham Nation. There are a number of
operations that are happening out there where our people are
working very closely together.
Mr. Chairman, the Border Patrol is tasked with a very
complex, sensitive and difficult job, which historically has
presented immense challenges. The challenge is huge, but one
which the men and women of the United States Border Patrol face
every day with vigilance, dedication to service and integrity.
I would like to thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and the entire
subcommittee for the opportunity to present this testimony, and
for your past support of CBP and the Department of Homeland
Security.
I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you
might have at this time.
[The statement of Mr. Aguilar follows:]
Prepared Statement of David Aguilar
Chairman Camp, Ranking Member Sanchez, and Distinguished
Subcomittee Members, it is my honor to have the opportunity to appear
before you to discuss the level of cooperation within the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), specifically through the operations and law
enforcement initiatives of the United States Border Patrol, now a
component of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), in
preventing terrorists from entering and remaining in the United States.
My name is David Aguilar, and I am currently the Chief of the Tucson,
Arizona Sector, CBP Office of the United States Border Patrol (OBP). I
would like to begin by giving you a brief overview of our agency and
mission.
It has been over a year now that Immigration Inspectors and the
U.S. Border Patrol from the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS), Agricultural Inspectors from the Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (APHIS), and Customs Inspectors from the U.S.
Customs Service merged to form the U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) within the Border and Transportation Security (BTS) Directorate
of the Department of Homeland Security. With a unified presence, focus
and determination, we have combined our skills and resources to be far
more effective than as separate agencies.
The mission of CBP's Border Patrol is to provide Homeland Security
along our Nation's borders, between ports of entry, patrolling and
securing 4,000 miles of international land and water border with Canada
and 2,000 miles of international border with Mexico. We also patrol
roughly 2,000 miles of coastal waters surrounding the Florida Peninsula
and Puerto Rico. We work hand in hand with CBP Officers, who inspect
people and cargo entering the country through ports of entry. While the
priority mission of the Border Patrol is to detect and prevent
terrorist weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, from entering
the United States, we also interdict illegal immigrants, drugs,
currency and other contraband.
Historically, major Border Patrol initiatives such as Operation
Hold the Line, in our El Paso Sector, Operation Gatekeeper in our San
Diego Sector, and Operation Rio Grande in our McAllen Sector have had
great border enforcement impact on illegal migration patterns along the
Southwest Border. Today, newer DHS initiatives, such as the Arizona
Border Control Initiative (ABC) will continue to have a significant
effect on illegal migration. These initiatives have sought to bring the
proper balance of personnel, equipment, technology and infrastructure
into areas experiencing the greatest level of cross border illegal
activity on the southwest border.
Efforts have been established and are being improved upon to build
better liaison with agencies across the southwest and northern borders
of the United States. One example is our participation with the
Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) with Canada, whose mission
is to enhance border integrity and security at our shared border by
identifying, investigating, and interdicting persons and organizations
that pose a threat to national security or are engaged in other
organized criminal activity. Some of our northern border IBET resources
are collocated with Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), ICE and other
law enforcement agencies.
Similarly, along the southwest border with Mexico, Border Patrol
Mexican Liaison Units have worked to achieve the same goals. The
program has already achieved successes with cooperation between the two
countries on issues such as information sharing, cooperative
enforcement efforts, and border safety initiatives to name a few.
Shortly after the transfer of the Border Patrol into CBP in March
of 2003, it was recognized that CBP and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement's Office of Investigations (ICE/OI) would need to
coordinate closely on transferring the Border Patrol's Anti-Smuggling
Units (ASUs) to ICE/OI in order to properly address various
administrative and operational issues. A working group consisting of
CBP and ICE representatives undertook efforts to transfer the
administrative functions of ASU to ICE OI, but it also addressed
operational issues related to roles and responsibilities between the
Border Patrol and the ASU. This was a critical step in organizing the
relationship between ICE/OI and CBP/OBP in that it ensured coordination
of operations, as well as the sharing of information and intelligence--
by clearly outlining roles and responsibilities.
The resulting joint CBP and ICE memorandum accomplished these
goals. It was signed by CBP Commissioner Robert Bonner and ICE
Assistant Secretary Michael Garcia on April 14, 2003, and was
immediately disseminated to respective field offices. It will optimally
enhance the security of our nation's borders. This effort is but one
major component of a mutual, ongoing comprehensive effort to
appropriately link and create a synergistic foundation for enforcement
between DHS interdiction and investigations agencies.
Another important area is on detention issues. On the Southern
Border, detention of illegal aliens from Mexico is short in duration,
as the majority are given the opportunity to voluntarily return to
Mexico. Long-term detention is required of aliens that fall into
specific types of categories. These categories include criminal aliens,
Other Than Mexican (OTM) or Canadian, Asylum Seekers, and since 9/11,
``Special Interest Aliens'' (SIA's).
If an alien requires long-term detention, it is standard operating
procedure to turn the alien over to ICE's Detention and Removal
Operations (DRO) Branch, after the alien has been initially processed
by OBP. The long term detention of SIA's is critical due to the fact
that these aliens are from countries that have been deemed by the
Department of Homeland Security as countries of interest since 9/11 due
to the possibility of links to terrorist activities from a particular
SIA country. Both CBP and ICE are continuously working together to
ensure that no SIA, or aliens identified as a danger to the American
public are released.
As the Chief Patrol Agent of the Tucson Sector, and I can offer a
perspective of our collaborative efforts by DHS, non-DHS, and state,
local, and tribal agencies under the Arizona Border Control Initiative
(ABC). This initiative began on March 16, 2004, and brought together an
unprecedented working relationship among various federal, state, and
local agencies to include cooperation with the Tohono O'Odham Nation.
This effort includes co-locating ICE and CBP units to expedite the
transition from interdiction to investigations. Through the
coordination center of the Arizona Partnership of the Southwest Border
HIDTA, other law enforcement agencies will support the ABC targeted
areas with upcoming collaborative enforcement operations, targeting
criminal enterprises involved in cross border incursions.
Transportation hubs at Tucson and Phoenix airports are being
staffed by personnel from the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA), ICE, and CBP. Information and intelligence gathered at these
hubs is fed into the ABC intelligence task force and made available to
all appropriate BTS and law enforcement partners.
ICE/Air and Marine Operations (AMO), and CBP/OBP Air Operations are
cooperatively scheduling flights to maximize available air assets in
targeted areas. Members of the Border Patrol Search and Rescue Team
(BORSTAR) and the Border Patrol Tactical Team have been assigned to AMO
flights for interdiction and rescue operations.
Increased cooperation for access to public lands has been
coordinated with Department of the Interior and Department of
Agriculture entities. This cooperation ensures that the best interest
of enforcement and the protection of our natural resources are
maintained. Joint enforcement efforts are also being conducted with the
National Park Service.
Nationally, the Border Patrol is tasked with a very complex,
sensitive and difficult job, which historically has presented immense
challenges. The challenge is huge, but one which we face everyday with
vigilance, dedication to service, and integrity. I would like to thank
you again, Mr. Chairman, and the entire Subcommittee, for the
opportunity to present this testimony today, and for your past support
of CBP and the Department of Homeland Security. I would be pleased to
respond to any questions that you might have at this time.
Mr. Camp. Thank you very much. Thank you both for your
statements. We will now go to questioning. Members will be
recognized and the 5-minute rule will apply.
As you are aware, Mr. Cerda, there was more disturbing news
yesterday involving Al-Qa`ida operatives living in the United
States and their plan to attack an Ohio shopping mall. I think
it is important to point out the indictment involved in that
came out as a result of an arrest some months ago on basic
immigration and document fraud charges. Could you describe how
the day-to-day investigative and enforcement functions of the
Immigration and Customs enforcement unit impact our ability to
fight terrorism here at home?
Mr. Cerda. Yes. The arrest which was announced yesterday I
think first demonstrates the important partnership the
Department of Homeland Security has with the Department of
Justice. I also think it highlights the importance of the
unique immigration enforcement authorities which are
encompassed in DHS in our efforts to thwart potential acts of
terrorism.
ICE investigators form the largest partnership with the FBI
in our national joint terrorist task forces and serve as a
critical component in ongoing investigations throughout the
country day to day. As part of that membership, we are
constantly looking, whether it is criminals using the customs
enforcement authorities we inherited, or again as in the
abdicates, utilizing immigration enforcement authorities to
remove a potential threat from the streets of America. That is
exactly what happened.
It is a good example, where based on information of a
potential threat in Thanksgiving weekend, ICE agents working
through the JTTF took action, apprehended the individual,
detained him and placed him into removal proceedings, during
which time as we proceeded with the administrative procedures,
the JTTF was also able to continue working its criminal
investigation which was announced yesterday. So again, it is a
day-to-day effort that we have using the important immigration
enforcement authorities, using our customs enforcement
authorities, and partnering with the Department of Justice.
Mr. Camp. Could you both comment on the structure in DHS
and the division of responsibilities in the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate and how that either helps
or hurts our ability to apprehend and prosecute terrorists in
the United States?
Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, I think one of the
things that has come about as we became DHS and that
strengthens the ability of all the enforcement entities within
DHS is the ability to integrate intelligence, interdiction
efforts and investigative efforts. By that, I mean the
following, in that we are now able to integrate a lot of the
intelligence databases that in the past were not necessarily
shared in the most effective and efficient means possible.
Today, there is not only the integration of databases, but
there is also the collaborative effort. There are co-location
of offices of say for example Border Patrol and investigative
assets. As an example, in Tucson, Arizona we have ICE
investigators co-located and working side-by-side with Border
Patrol agents, side-by-side with TSA assets at the airports.
Then of course we have opportunities to work with the FBI
through JTTF and other agencies that are heavily involved in
the defense of our nation. It is this collaborative effort,
these integrated databases that are built into the structure
that have facilitated, and in fact I believe have greatly
enhanced our opportunities to thwart any kind of terrorist
activity against our country.
Mr. Camp. Mr. Aguilar, can you discuss the status of the
geospatial tracking program on the southern border that is
being developed in El Paso and how that is linked to the larger
integrated border intelligence system?
Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir. At the present time, as I said, I am
the Chief over in Tucson so I am not totally familiar with the
geospatial program that is being worked on in El Paso, but I
have been briefed on it. Basically what that geospatial program
will be doing for us is give us a situational awareness of what
is happening on the border close to real time. In addition to
that, it will of course be able to articulate where the
resources are and actually define the threat based on threat
assessments done by a multiple agency picture that will be
drawn up as a part of this program out there.
Mr. Camp. Okay, thank you. Thank you very much.
Ms. Sanchez may inquire.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thank you both
for being here.
I have a question about the way your agencies work together
now that you are under the same agency. Let's say that ICE
knows that there is a direct shipment coming across Nogales or
someplace like that, and you want to have a controlled
delivery, where you allow the shipment to go through so that
you see where it ends up and maybe you catch the big fish,
rather than just the person bringing the drugs over. How do you
coordinate with the Border Patrol?
I have been told by a lot of guys down on the border that,
especially from ICE, that when you are trying to work together,
that that is not happening, that things are being caught at the
border instead or the delivery is being stopped, rather than
this ability to let it go through and control it and figure out
where it goes. I want to find out from both of you, do you
think that you are actually working together in those kind of
situations or that you are actually impeding each other from
getting that kind of work done?
Mr. Cerda. As Chief Aguilar here noted, one of the key
elements that we have at the border with the presence of the
Border Patrol there, but in addition the alien smuggling units
that work hand-in-hand with the Border Patrol, we have taken
the transition, and given the importance of this integration,
of that mission and of the situations he noted, to be able to
control the deliveries of individuals to come in and try to
determine whether there is a large organization behind that.
We have worked and focused on the transition of the ASU
units that previously were with the Border Patrol stations.
That involves working and looking at the logistical aspects of
it, too, to include the controlled deliveries, the staging at
the border. We will continue to be working on that until it is
perfected. We believe we are on the right track there. While
you may have occasionally a situation of communication, locally
we are working together; nationally, again, we have these
working groups up here to ensure that such situations do not
occur so that our law enforcement mission is not impeded.
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Cerda, your answer was a little
complicated, I did not really did not get a ``yes, we are
working well together, and most often when we ask for a
controlled delivery it actually gets past the border and we are
able to try to track it down,'' or ``no, we have instances
where this is being impeded.'' What is the answer to that?
Mr. Cerda. The answer is yes, we are working together.
Ms. Sanchez. So you would say the majority of when you call
for controlled deliveries, it is happening.
Mr. Cerda. Yes.
Ms. Sanchez. When you call for controlled delivery, can the
Border Patrol say no to you? How is it that you are working
with that?
Mr. Cerda. It is a mutual understanding because the Border
Patrol has an important mission at the border. Both of our
missions need to be in sync. Clearly, if there is a situation
that arises that may impede effective enforcement at the
border, it is an issue that needs to be discussed. We have to
prioritize among ourselves, among the DHS mission, which one
takes priority. It is case by case. If that situation does
arise, it does arise and it is handled at a high level out
there at the local sectors with the SAC offices in ICE, their
counterparts, or if necessary elevated to the national. But
frankly, I have not seen that point arise to that point of
bringing a case up at the national level.
Ms. Sanchez. And then for the Chief I have a question,
because your Border Patrol works 24 hours a day.
Mr. Aguilar. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Sanchez. I think ICE works 9 to 5.
Mr. Cerda. I would correct that. We are available.
Ms. Sanchez. You are 24 hours now?
Mr. Cerda. ICE is 24/7. The law enforcement mission exists
24/7 and we respond.
Ms. Sanchez. Because I hear a lot from the Border Patrol
that they get some of these people that have no documents to be
in our country and they have to release them because your
people are not around. Can you both comment on that? Is that
happening?
Mr. Aguilar. Let me speak for Tucson. First of all, as the
Chief of the Tucson Sector, which as you probably know?
Ms. Sanchez. A great city. My family is from there.
Mr. Aguilar. Yes, a great city. I completely agree, a great
state, but it is the most active area that we have in the
country right now, specifically the cross-border illegal
incursions out there. In Tucson, we work very closely with ICE.
We do not have a major problem in any kind of response from ICE
to Border Patrol requirements for any kind of support, whether
in the area of detention or removal, or response to
apprehensions or working collaboratively with some of the other
law enforcement agencies out there.
There are situations where we will mutually support each
other. If ICE cannot respond to a call out, for example, from a
police department, they will in fact call us and we will
respond for them, and vice versa. In fact, there will be times
when we do not have units available say, for example, in
Phoenix or in that area to respond for a law enforcement call
out. Then, we will call upon them and they will typically get
out there. It is a good working relationship. It has worked
tremendously in Tucson and we are still continuing to build on
that.
I would like to get back to the issue of cross-border pass-
throughs, if you will. In Tucson, again, as the Chief in
Tucson, as the most active sector in the nation for narcotics
trafficking, we work very closely with ICE and the DEA on those
situations when there is a request and/or requirement from ICE
investigators to run a load like that through the border. We
work closely with SAC. The special agent in charge and the
Chief have joint agreements at the local level that facilitates
any of those situations when that type of request comes
through, in collaboration of course with DEA and the U.S.
Attorney's Office also.
Mr. Camp. Thank you very much. Your time has expired.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Camp. Ms. Granger may inquire.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Cerda, you have in your remarks that since March 1,
2003 ICE has removed more than 85,730 criminal aliens, and you
expect to exceed that this year. Give me an idea of how that
number compares to before ICE was created. Also, give me a
profile of who these people are, where they are found, how long
they have been there, and that sort of thing.
Mr. Cerda. The numbers historically have been increasing. I
believe you will see a continuing increase under DHS in terms
of our focus on criminal aliens. The criminal aliens are
identified whether it is at the POE at the borders or in the
interior through the Criminal Apprehension Program, through the
Fugitive Absconder Program, or through again the Institutional
Removal Program.
One of the key changes we are making in ICE is to refocus
the Institutional Removal Program which is a program that works
at the state facilities, the penal institutions there,
identifying people, criminal aliens who are amenable to removal
while they are serving their sentence, so that at the point of
their completion of that criminal sentence, they are amenable
and already available for removal. It is a way of identifying
them early in the process and ensuring that any threats to the
community are avoided by taking action immediately upon their
release and taking them into ICE custody, and then effectuating
their order of removal.
Again, by this refocus over here, elevating the program,
the Institutional Removal Program in detention and removals, I
believe you are going to be seeing increased numbers, increased
efficiencies in our capability of identifying criminal aliens.
Ms. Granger. When you said ``they are amenable,'' do you
mean they agree to it? I do not understand that process.
Mr. Cerda. Sometimes we have to go through an immigration
proceeding where they can seek some forms of relief before the
immigration judge, notwithstanding their criminal convictions.
So if they are granted relief, they would not be removed. They
would be subject to release at that point in time. So we still
have a burden to prove under the Immigration Act, to establish
the grounds of removability, as well as have an order issued by
a judge.
Ms. Granger. Recently, I was able to get some funding for
the APHIS fingerprinting system for some smaller towns in the
metroplex. They showed a demonstration of it, and I was so
impressed. In one case, literally in a matter of about 5
seconds, they went through all the database which would have
taken, they said, 2 1/2 weeks doing it by hand. Are you part of
the APHIS system?
Mr. Cerda. Biometrics is essential throughout the
Department of Homeland Security. That is one of the changes
that has been implemented, is the focus on IDENT-APHIS and the
use of data not only internally within DHS, but also connecting
to the Bureau, their wants and warrants system, too, so that
again at the POEs or when we apprehend an individual, we have
the capability of running the biometrics and at the same time
not only identifying immigration violations, but seeing that
they are wanted in so-and-so state or wanted by the U.S.
Marshall Service. We are all part of that, and biometrics is
going to be a bigger part of our enforcement efforts.
Ms. Granger. Do I still have some time? Mr. Aguilar,
recently, I think it was in April, there was a town hall
meeting in Houston. I got some reports of it. There, there
seemed to be a question about rounding up illegal aliens. The
statement was made that, no, we are not going to do that; we do
not round up illegal aliens; there is no problem here. Can you
give me some more information about what happened at that
meeting? Are you familiar with it?
Mr. Aguilar. Unfortunately, I am not familiar with that
meeting. As I said, I am the Chief over in Tucson. But I can
tell you that these roundups or sweeps, as some people refer to
them, are not occurring. The Border Patrol focuses its efforts
very specifically on cross-border illegal incursions in what we
refer to in Tucson, for example, as a compressed zone of
enforcement, where our interdiction efforts are on the
immediate border and the primary purpose is not only to
apprehend what does get across, but also to present a high-
visibility, high-profile deterrence presence to keep these
people from crossing. That is our main focus.
Ms. Granger. Thank you. I understand. Thank you.
Mr. Camp. Thank you.
Mr. Souder may inquire.
Mr. Souder. I have a couple of questions. From testimony
that we have had on the border, in Arizona often it is the
seventh time that somebody has picked up before they are
detained longer-term. In El Paso, Texas, I think the testimony
was twelve. At what point when a person commits an illegal
activity coming into the United States as an illegal alien is
it considered a criminal offense?
Mr. Aguilar. The question is for me? Yes, a criminal
offense basically occurs when the individual crosses into the
United States for the first time. The criminal prosecution of
that individual for illegally coming into the United States
without inspection has certain thresholds that vary in
different parts of the country. They vary due to the U.S.
Attorney's capacity to actually handle that workload out there.
They do work closely with us. And then we have in certain areas
of the country geographic focuses or focuses on criminal
activity, for example, that endangers people, not only the
immigrants, but also the communities where they are crossing.
Those thresholds, we work hand-in-hand with the U.S.
Attorney's Office. In Tucson right now, it will vary anywhere
from nine to twelve times for prosecution purposes. Of course,
anytime that a criminal alien is apprehended, then prosecution
thresholds drop tremendously.
Mr. Souder. I think it is important for both this
subcommittee, the United States Congress and the American
people to realize that we can talk about border enforcement and
making secure borders, but your agents are going to be so
discouraged if we do not provide the law enforcement to back
that up, because what you just said, nine to twelve times, and
that is assuming we catch them, which most people are not
caught. That is very demoralizing to the agents on the border
who work, who take risks, who get shot at, as the ranger was
killed in Oregon, and then find that it takes nine to twelve
times to find somebody prosecuted means that we do not have
enough resources to adequately address this problem in numerous
ways. That is very significant testimony.
Let me ask another thing. Every single state along the
southwest border, California, New Mexico, Arizona and Texas, I
have heard from agents of both of your agencies saying that it
ranges anywhere from $4,000 to $12,000, you can get a package
that in 7 days will guarantee you in the United States if you
are a Central American or Mexican citizen; anywhere from
$25,000 to $40,000 if you are Middle Eastern. It will guarantee
you safe passage or you get your money back.
What are we doing to address those networks? Would that be
primarily an ICE function? Why isn't that a particular heavy
focus, particularly if we are watching in the homeland security
question the terrorism question? Are we looking for flyers, for
advertising? Is the Mexican government helping us? Are the
Caribbean islands, if they are coming from that direction into
the networks? Because this is a huge, almost openly defiant
challenge to our border security.
Mr. Cerda. We share the concerns that the smuggling
organizations do pose to our national security. Clearly, by the
amounts of fees that you cited, which are pretty accurate,
smuggling is now more of a criminal organization endeavor,
given the profits that are there. One thing we are doing now
under DHS, now not only do you have the traditional alien
smuggling expertise and authorities that we had under INS, but
we are also utilizing our Customs enforcement authorities,
particularly the money laundering aspects, the money laundering
authorities that we have inherited.
ICE Storm, for example again, there are not only using our
traditional alien smuggling approaches, the intelligence, but
we are also going after the organizations and their resources.
We are going after them and trying to identify them through
their exchange of funds across the border internationally. Once
we go across the border, that is where we work internationally
with the governments. We also have our international attaches
out there. But that is a new focus, a new approach, not only
going after the individuals being smuggled, but going after the
organizations, in particular their resources, their funding, to
try to dismantle them not only locally here in the United
States, but also as well as overseas.
Mr. Souder. Will we do a deprogramming as we pick up people
to ask them how they are coming in? What context, the
advertising, to try to get access to the flyers or the packages
and the networks?
Mr. Cerda. Yes. That, again, is not only within ICE, but
that is something we share closely with the Border Patrol. They
are the eyes and ears out there at the border. They have the
interactions. We also do similar debriefings in our detention
and removal operations offices to identify potential, again,
third country national risks that are going across the border
that we have apprehended interior; or also looking at the
intelligence that we gain from our own investigations, sharing
that, setting up systems so that there is more communication
within ICE as well as across the Bureau.
Mr. Camp. Thank you very much.
And now Mr. Dicks may inquire.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chief Aguilar, what is the legal authority for Border
Patrol to conduct interior enforcement of civil immigration
law?
Mr. Aguilar. The Border Patrol can operate anywhere within
the United States under Section 287 and 235 of the INA. We have
the authority to approach any individual who we believe to be
in the country illegally.
Mr. Dicks. I raise this point just because 2 weeks ago the
Border Patrol engaged in street sweeps and checkpoints in
Ontario, California, a city which is east of Los Angeles, well
away from the U.S.-Mexican border. The Border Patrol has also
been helping ICE with some interior arrests that involve a
large number of aliens on the southwest border. We were under
the impression that you had said that the Border Patrol was not
involved in sweeps.
Mr. Aguilar. Right. The Border Patrol, again sir,
concentrates its efforts along the nation's borders, but we can
operate by statute anywhere within the United States. In
working with either ICE or any other law enforcement agencies,
in collaboration with them in the interior, there are occasions
when we will unify with them. For example, in Phoenix right
now, we operate at the Phoenix Sky Harbor Airport in a high-
visibility, high-profile deterrence posture out there, and we
will make arrests out there. We do not conduct sweeps,
residential or anything of that nature.
Referring to the operations that you mentioned of about a
week ago, there were no checkpoints conducted. The only other
thing that I would add to that, again this happened within San
Diego Sector. I am not completely familiar or intimate with
those operations. But we do not conduct sweeps. We do work
hand-in-hand with state and local law enforcement agencies in
conducting operations relative to the criminal aspects of
either human smuggling, narcotics smuggling or any other type
of quality of life issues that a police department will
concentrate on.
Mr. Dicks. Who would you say is in charge of interior
immigration enforcement?
Mr. Aguilar. That is one of the issues that are being
worked out right now between CBP and ICE. The interior
enforcement as it stands now is actually in the purview of ICE,
with collaborative efforts with CBP when it is necessary.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Cerda, would you agree with that?
Mr. Cerda. I would agree with that. I also note that there
are collaborative efforts. Clearly, we are one Department and
where there are major enforcement initiatives, we use all
Department resources to include, again, ICE supporting CBP at
the border or conversely CBP supporting ICE in the interior.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield to the Ranking
Member.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Dicks very much.
I have a question because going back to this issue of the
Ontario sweep, and I realize that you are over in the Arizona
area, but that did occur. It not only occurred there, but it
occurred in my area of Santa Ana, California just last
Thursday. So we are trying to figure out, many members, where
we see these sweeps going on. What do you mean when you say you
do not conduct a sweep? I do not know if you know the details
of the Ontario situation, but what would you say that was, and
who would you say has jurisdiction over doing something where
Border Patrol and others come into a neighborhood, a shopping
area, let's say, and start to ask people for their papers? What
is that called if that is not a sweep?
Mr. Aguilar. First of all, let me begin by saying the
operation last week was in fact an intelligence-based operation
that was conducted due to numerous telephone contacts and phone
calls from the local police departments on quality of life
issues that were occurring within those areas of operation.
Ms. Sanchez. So you are telling me that local law
enforcement in Ontario called you and said, hey, we have
problems over here?
Mr. Aguilar. Yes. In the areas that the Border Patrol
presence was at, yes, ma'am. That is my understanding of it.
Ms. Sanchez. Are you telling you that my Santa Ana police
chief, in order for you all to come into Santa Ana and do what
you did on Thursday, my Santa Ana police chief, Chief Walters,
who does not even want you guys in town, called you up and said
please come?
Mr. Aguilar. I cannot speak to Santa Ana. I am not familiar
with that one. The one I was referring to was the one that I
was briefed on. That was Ontario, I believe, was one of the
locations. That is the only one that I am familiar with.
Ms. Sanchez. Do you know of any other reason why your
Border Patrol or anybody else would come and do this type of
thing, other than local law enforcement calling and saying
please come in?
Mr. Aguilar. Intelligence-based operations where there is
intelligence that criminal activity is occurring, that there is
a need for us to respond out there.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Chief.
Mr. Dicks. I was under the impression that ICE was doing
intelligence work? Do you still do intelligence work? I thought
that was moved from you over to ICE. That is not true?
Mr. Aguilar. The intelligence responsibility was moved over
to ICE, but intelligence-gathering, analysis?
Mr. Dicks. It is part of the deal.
Mr. Aguilar. Everybody does it. Every law enforcement
department does intelligence, especially the operations.
Mr. Dicks. Are you rebuilding your intelligence capability
now that it was transferred over to ICE?
Mr. Camp. I will let you answer that question, and the time
is expired, and we will go on to another.
Mr. Aguilar. By intelligence, I am referring to tactical
intelligence.
Mr. Dicks. My time is up. Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Camp. Thank you. Mr. Shadegg may inquire.
Mr. Shadegg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to welcome Chief Aguilar. We have worked with him a
lot in Arizona. I have been down to the border with him a
number of times. I appreciate your being here.
Mr. Cerda, today both of you are putting forward a very
happy face. Things are going well. The agencies are working
well together. Quite frankly, I understand that, but it seems
to me the purpose of this hearing is for us to figure out how
we can help the situation. By dint of my experience on the
border in the past and my experience on the border since the
creation of the new Department, I am disinclined to believe
that everything is hunky-dory and that the agencies are working
well together.
What can you tell me, as concrete examples of things that
are working well, and can you give me some examples of things
that are not working well with the new integrated Department?
Mr. Cerda. The concrete examples, again, and paramount is
the focus on immigration enforcement that previously did not
exist under INS. It was a split mission there. So that is
definitely working and I think we are seeing the results. Focus
at the border, on border enforcement, extending the border, and
at the same time in terms of investigations, focus on
immigration enforcement, plus the additional use of the tools
that Customs enforcement now brings to us, the customs
investigations, the money laundering aspects. That is going to
be a new positive aspect that we have under DHS that I believe
will continue to produce better results.
Clearly, as we transition, and it is still in early
transition, I will be the first to say, at DHS, that we will
continue to identify issues that previously under one umbrella
at INS were coordinated through internal policies, revisitation
of those policies, identifying where we can enhance them, the
fact that they existed in the past, we are still taking a new
eye to everything to see whether in fact this does now go in
accord with the DHS mission, does it fit the BTS's overall
enforcement picture strategic goals.
That is where we are going. We identify issues. As we have
mentioned, the ASU issue, we are working towards that because
previously under one umbrella, it was with the Border Patrol
station. Now, with the different roles that we have here, we
add the focus, consolidate the expertise, but clearly there are
going to be some instances where there are going to be
coordination issues that arise. Frankly, the answer to that is
coordination and leadership within DHS, communication
consistently. We are seeing the benefits of the cross-sharing
of intelligence that is being gathered. It is not only within
BTS, but also as part of DHS's IAIP Office, and hopefully we
will gain really effective intelligence that will assist us in
targeting our limited resources towards those critical missions
that exist.
Mr. Shadegg. With regard to your relationship with Border
Patrol, are there any areas that are not going as well as you
think? Or is there anything that this Congress could do to
facilitate the relationship and coordination between ICE and
BCDS?
Mr. Cerda. On that point, clearly, as was mentioned, there
is some frustration at times with respect to the inability to
get a prosecution, similarly, with respect to the ability to
continuously detain everyone that is apprehended. We have
resources that we have to manage and prioritize. That requires
constant communication at the local level. We continue to do
that. One of my hats that I wear as Acting Director of
Detention and Removals, and I have heard at times locally some
frustration with the inability to detain everyone, but at the
same time I think nationally, as well as locally, it is
understood we are an enforcement mission. Clearly, we want to
be as effective as possible, but we also have to manage within
our resources.
Mr. Shadegg. Chief Aguilar, what would you cite?
Mr. Aguilar. I would say that things are working very well,
again speaking from the perspective of Arizona, Tucson
specifically. One of the great successes we have had out there
is in fact the Arizona Border Control Initiative, which takes
in the ICE's ICE Storm operation in Phoenix. The mutually
supportive effort of all the BTS entities of the state, local
and tribal law enforcement agencies, are working together out
there, working collaboratively from all aspects of the
enforcement field, primarily intelligence, interdiction and
investigation. All of those agencies coming together, sharing
the information, and applying their resources in a very focused
manner has made some tremendous impacts out there.
Mr. Shadegg. There were some pay-grade issues that existed
when the two were melded together. ICE had a different set of
pay-grades and steps and how you move through the steps, versus
Border Patrol. Can you describe what those issues were and have
they been resolved, or are they being resolved?
Mr. Aguilar. Within the Border Patrol, all of our
journeyman agents are now GS-11s, which was one of the points
that you refer to. That has been resolved. All of our Border
Patrol agents are now GS-11s. The investigators that used to be
under Border Patrol have now changed over to ICE, and I
believe, and I will let Mr. Cerda speak to that, but I believe
that has also been addressed.
Mr. Cerda. We did have a disparity with respect to the
Customs investigator journeyman level and the former INS
journeyman level, and that has been now consolidated. They have
journeymen level 13 and that addressed that issue.
Mr. Shadegg. And the line agents are happy with that?
Mr. Cerda. I believe so, yes.
Mr. Shadegg. Is that your understanding?
Mr. Aguilar. GS-11s across the board, yes, sir.
Mr. Camp. Thank you very much. Mr. Turner may inquire.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate both of
you being with us today.
I wanted to take this opportunity to mention an item that I
do not expect either of you to respond to, but I wanted to
mention that as I think we are all aware, ICE has had some
budget and financial problems. As you recall, there was a
suggestion that there was $1.2 billion shortfall which led to a
hiring freeze in the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement. Although I think it was later explained to be an
accounting error, but our staff, the Democratic staff, has
received numerous reports regarding efficiencies in the
financial management of the Bureau. I have requested by letter
dated yesterday that the Inspector General of the Department
conduct an audit of the financial management of the Bureau.
Specifically, some of the reports indicate that there may
be potential violations of the Anti-Deficiency Act, which is
the federal law that prevents an agency from over-obligating
appropriated funds. So I have requested that the Inspector
General conduct an audit of the federal financial management
system at ICE, as well as to look at the larger budget issues,
particularly any potential violations of the Anti-Deficiency
Act. I wanted our witnesses to be aware of that, that that
request had been made.
One of the issues that I think I heard raised earlier in
some of the questions was this issue of how are you making
progress in integrating a lot of these databases. I believe
Chief Aguilar made reference to that. More specifically, one of
the reports that we have received on our staff as we visited
the southwest border and talked to some of the folks at ICE and
at Border Patrol, what we find is that Border Patrol, ICE and
CBP are using different country of interest lists. As you know,
those are the lists that identify citizens from countries that
present a possible terrorist threat. It seems to me that this
was something that long ago should have been harmonized.
So I would like to ask perhaps Mr. Cerda, are you aware
that your agencies's work off different countries of interest
lists? And if so, how many countries are on each of the lists
and where do we get the lists from? Are we taking any steps to
make sure that all of our DHS agencies are working off the same
country of interest list? It seems like a very basic
fundamental effort that should have been long since
coordinated.
Mr. Cerda. I am not aware of us working off of different
types of lists here. Our intelligence is coordinated,
particularly when it comes to intelligence regarding potential
threats arising from certain countries, through the Department,
through the Administration, through T-TEC, and also in
coordination with the Bureau. I am not aware of separate
disparate country lists out there. I can tell you that we do at
the POEs and in the interior, queries off the same databases,
particularly the IBIS checks that we fun, which serves as a
feed. We do those queries. We also look at the basic data that
we have where we can enter any terms of watch areas of concern.
Again, the intelligence units within ICE, the intelligence-
gathering at CBP, and again in coordination with IAIP is aimed
at producing intelligence that is uniform across the board,
based on what is available out there. But my short answer is
that I am not aware of?
Mr. Turner. If you do not mind, follow-up on that, because
that information was provided to us in our visits to the
southwest border. If that is occurring, obviously it needs to
be fixed. I would appreciate if you would follow up and finding
out if we are correct on that, or did we get bad information.
Mr. Cerda. I will do that.
Mr. Camp. Thank you. Ms. Dunn may inquire.
Ms. Dunn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen,
thank you for being with us today.
I wanted to ask you a question about the Arizona Border
Control Initiative. It is being referred to as a model actually
for the coordination among agencies. I am wondering how this is
working; how we can encourage and create incentives for this
sort of partnership in other parts of the country. I am from
Washington State and we have the Canadian border that we share
with other states. I am wondering how much the success of ABC
depends on the priorities of the leadership who are involved. I
am wondering also how you work with the communities, the
farmers for example, or the ranchers down there, and how they
feel about our progress. Could you talk a bit about ABC please?
Mr. Aguilar. Yes, ma'am. Again, I am the Chief down there
in Tucson, and as the Chief, Under Secretary Hutchinson also
named me as the integrator for the BTS entities within Arizona
out there. As the integrator, the rest of the special agents in
charge and BTS entity heads work collaboratively in order to
primarily have a mission focus. In our case, it is kind of
broad, and that is cross-border interdiction of anything coming
across that border illegally.
One of the things that we do in support of that is focus
our resources, our finite resources. As an example, AMO, air
and marine interdiction units now, for example, have Border
Patrol agents as back-seaters, as we call it, in those air and
marine helicopters to augment our Border Patrol flights across
that border, both for an interdiction and deterrence posture
out there. In addition to that, we work very closely with the
Department of Interior, the Department of Agriculture, to
broaden our ability to operate on publicly managed lands,
something that in the past posed a real challenge. We work
hand-in-hand with the tribal nation out there, with their
police departments. Some of the main players out there are the
state, local and other federal non-BTS entities that now focus
their enforcement efforts under their own statutes and
jurisdictions, on the criminal organized smuggling groups that
are working in that area.
So taking everything from intelligence, interdiction and
investigation and cohesively applying those enforcement
efforts, we have made some tremendous impacts out there. As an
example, if you would allow me to quote just one. In the Tohono
O'Odham Nation, for example, there has been a reduction of over
83 percent of abandoned vehicles since the Arizona Border
Control Initiative began. That is a tremendous number, because
abandoned vehicles translate to smuggling capacity for
narcotics and aliens out there.
One other of them that I will quote very quickly is that
prior to the commencement of the Arizona Border Control
Initiative, there was an average of two to five high-speed
pursuits within that area of operation. Since we began, we are
now down to one or two a week. So again, those are some of the
impacts that have been made by that collaborative effort.
Outreach to the community out there is constant. That is
one of the major things that we do, to the Native American
Nations out there, to the ranchers out there, so that they know
how we are operating, what the rationale is, what the
deployments are, and especially the impacts. And they have seen
the benefits of that collaborative efforts among all the BTS
and other federal agencies out there also.
Ms. Dunn. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Camp. Thank you. Ms. Jackson-Lee may inquire.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. I thank the Chairman very much.
It is interesting, to the gentlemen that are here, one
thing that we noted in the Homeland Security Committee is the
overlapping jurisdiction of a number of committees, and the
ability of the Homeland Security Committee to focus. I serve on
the Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Immigration and
Claims, and I have had the opportunity to have Mr. Garcia
before me. The interest that I think we all have is how do we
collaboratively and cooperatively secure our borders, both
north and southern border. An issue that I am working on, and I
would pose this question to you, the backdrop of the issue is
that on the southern border, from where I come from, Texas,
many of the individuals coming into the United States are
obviously economic opportunists, if you will, or people who are
seeking greater opportunity from what they consider a
devastating economy. So it is a difference in what I would
perceive to be the threat, though we know that the borders
being open, opens the doors to many different types of threats.
Would you be kind enough to elaborate on what you think the
distinction is in terms of securing the border when you are
dealing mostly with economic entrants? What kind of resources
are needed in that vein?
The other question that I would offer is that I have
authored legislation dealing with helping stem the tide of
smuggling. One aspect of it is a law enforcement tool that has
been very effective, and that is a rewards program in order to
get the large smugglers and to encourage those who may be
victims to provide information. Any experience that you may
have with that concept? I would appreciate your answers on both
of those.
Mr. Aguilar. I will take the one on the border, northern
and southern. As the Border Patrol deploys its resources out
there on the southern border, one of the things that we
concentrate on is because of the element of flows of illegal
immigration into the country through there, is what we call in
Tucson basically reducing the flow, reducing the flow in those
areas so that the real criminal, the terrorist, the potential
weapons of mass destruction can be addressed by those
enforcement assets once they are deployed and that flow is
reduced out there.
Essential to reducing that flow out there, of course, and
key, are going to be the Border Patrol agents that are being
deployed out there. In addition to that is the force-multiplier
effect of the infrastructure and technology that is being
deployed out there literally as we speak. The continual
building of accessibility to the border, mobility upon the
border, the remote video surveillance cameras we are deploying
out there, the sensors, the aerial platforms, all of those
things combined bring together the components that will reduce
that clutter and give us greater operational control of that
border. By operational control, I am talking about knowing what
is coming at our border and within a reasonable amount of time
being able to interdict, confront, interview, detain, arrest or
turn back that threat that has just crossed that border.
On the northern border, the threat remains the same, that
potential incursion by people coming into this country with
either a means or a desire to do harm to our country. The
fortunate thing on our northern border is we do not have the
elevated flow. That is where the technology and the
infrastructure plays a much bigger part on that northern
border. Our ability to have eyes and ears out there, not
necessarily human, but electronic or technology-wise to again
have that operational control.
So the means by which we are looking to gain that
operational control remains the same. It is just the flow that
is different out there, again, reducing that flow.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. What happens when we have new initiatives
and new programs, and we take intelligence officers and experts
away from one area and put them in another area. Does that
maybe increase the enforcement in one area, but decrease it in
another? Would you suggest that we need more resources to
balance out the needs, particularly in intelligence-gathering,
which is part of what my smuggling legislation focuses on; that
when you are able to pierce a smuggling operation, the more
information you get to talk about what others exist, the more
helpful you are. And if you can get it for those who are
victims, it is very helpful. What happens when you move one
from the other? It is like borrowing from Peter to pay Paul.
Isn't it necessary to provide more resources in order to gather
the intelligence and enforce evenly, not only on the southern
border, but on the northern border, which is very large as
well?
Mr. Aguilar. Absolutely. Intelligence-gathering
capabilities, analytical capabilities and evaluative
capabilities are absolutely essential to any enforcement
operation out there. The force-multiplier effect that we got
when we came together as DHS is that all of those agencies that
before literally stovepiped a lot of the intelligence, that
intelligence is now melding out there. It is melding because
all these agencies have access to all of these databases that
we spoke about previously. So we have magnified our
intelligence capabilities, both gathering, analytic and
evaluative. More work needs to be done in that area, and of
course the human aspect, the personnel is a big part of that,
yes, ma'am.
Mr. Camp. Thank you very much. The time has expired and the
time for this panel has concluded. I want to thank you, Chief
Aguilar and Mr. Cerda, for your testimony today. I appreciate
your being here.
Now we would call panel II: Dr. James Carafano, Mr. Randel
Johnson, Mr. Bonner and Mr. Ugazio. Please come forward.
Welcome and thank you for being here. We will begin each of
you on 5 minutes to summarize your testimony. Why don't I start
with Dr. Carafano? Thank you.
STATEMENT JAMES JAY CARAFANO, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, DEFENSE
AND HOMELAND SECURITY, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATINO
Mr. Carafano. I will submit a statement for the record. I
would like to just make a few opening comments to briefly put
those in context. I will use my best New York speed to get
through that.
Mr. Camp. Thank you.
Mr. Carafano. The Heritage Foundation has taken a strategic
approach to looking at the area of homeland security. My
particular background is in the area of strategy and history,
and that is how I approach this issue. I think there are a lot
of lessons in that respect that we can learn from the Cold War.
The Cold War was a long, protracted conflict. I think this will
be a long, protracted conflict. I think when Eisenhower became
President, he really kind of set the strategy for the entire
Cold War. I think that there is a lot we can learn from that.
He really said we need three things. He said you have to
have some security. You have to have some combination of
offense and defense. That is exactly right. The Homeland
Security Department is an important part of the defense. You
also have to have continued economic growth. The whole notion
of protracted strategies is you want to grow and flourish while
you hound the enemy into history. You want to be strong and
then have the resources to provide the security.
The third thing is you have to protect civil liberties and
privacy, because that is really the foundation that allows you
to function and allows you to compete. You really need to do
all three simultaneously. It is not really a question of
tradeoffs. I think that is a very appropriate strategy for this
war. I think it is a great measure to look at what we are doing
in all our areas of homeland security. If you do not have
solutions that provide all three, security, economic growth and
privacy, you really have the wrong answer.
I think no issue is more appropriate than the issue of
border security. I think that you cannot have a border security
strategy that also does not incorporate just border control,
but it also have to be holistic in looking at it, maritime
security, immigration, transnational transportation security,
and the transnational supply train. The victory of border
security is not just on the border. I think no issue is more
important than that, than immigration. I do not think there is
a solution to immigration that looks specifically at border
control. If you do not have a comprehensive answer that
includes immigration enforcement, workplace enforcement
addressed as quotas, economic development in Latin America,
international cooperation, respect for the rule of law, and
really look at the economic consequences of all these programs,
I simply do not think you can address this in a strategic way.
In my opening statement, I have suggestions for a number of
initiatives, but in a sense what they all are is helping
contribute, I hope, to a more holistic approach to this. I
think, for example, if you notice a lot of my recommendations
do not deal with border security per se, but they are more in
areas that in the strategy talk about critical missions of
domestic counterterrorism and intelligence and early warning. I
think in some respects, you get a lot bigger bang for the buck
in terms of enhancing border security by looking at those
areas.
I would just like to point out very quickly that I have
great respect for what the Department of Homeland Security has
done. I think it is an enormous challenge that they face. I
think the Congress in many respects has provided the right
legislative foundation for addressing border security issues. I
think that DHS has been responsible in the sense that a lot of
things that they have done is really trying to take a crawl,
walk, run approach to these things, and look at the
implications in terms of security, economic development, civil
liberties, as they look at programs. Things like the Arizona
Border Initiative, the way they have approached looking at UAVs
on the border, I think these are the right approach to test
things out, to experiment, do trial and error. And then from
them, broaden, because I think that is the only way you develop
programs that are going to be sustainable over the long term.
Just the final point I would like to make, very briefly. I
looked at this issue for 2 years now in some depth, and I just
do not know how you really adapt a strategic approach to this
problem unless you can create within the Congress oversight in
a central committee that can really look across the board at
these issues. My background is in defense. Could you imagine if
we had a Department of Defense that was being supervised by 88
committees? What kind of defense structure or national security
strategy would we have?
I think, particularly in the area of border security, I do
not think we are ever going to achieve a holistic approach,
which I think is the only way we are ever going to see quantum
improvements in border security, unless we can consolidate
oversight in the committees in the House and the Senate. I
think, for example, the committee's effort in drafting an
authorization is a great example of that. Some of the
suggestions that I have, that is just a perfect approach for
implementing some of those things, is through a well-crafted
authorization bill. I do not know how you get a good
authorization bill for the Department of Homeland Security by
having it authored in multiple committees.
With that, I will end my statement.
[The statement of Mr. Carafano follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. James Jay Carafano
Mr. Chairman and other distinguished Members, I am honored to
testify before the committee today.\1\ National efforts to enhance the
security of the goods, people, and services that everyday cross the
thousands of miles of land borders and tens of thousands of miles of
coastline ringing the United States are a vital component of protecting
the homeland. In my testimony, I would like to reaffirm the importance
of this task as an essential component of the national homeland
security strategy, assess the progress that has been made so far, make
the case for further initiatives that will help create a more
sustainable and integrated approach to protecting the flow of human and
material capital transiting America's borders, and suggest some
additional building blocks for creating a national system of systems
for protecting the nation from transnational terrorist threats as well
as other criminal and environmental dangers that may be carried through
the crossroads of global commerce and travel.
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\1\ The Heritage Foundation is a public policy, research, and
educational organization operating under Section 501(C)(3). It is
privately supported, and receives no funds from any government at any
level, nor does it perform any government or other contract work.
The Heritage Foundation is the most broadly supported think tank in
the United States. During 2003, it had more than 200,000 individual,
foundation, and corporate supporters representing every state in the
U.S. Its 2003 income came from the following sources:
Individuals 52%
Foundations 19%
Corporations 8%
Investment Income 18%
Publication Sales and Other 3%
The top five corporate givers provided The Heritage Foundation with
5% of its 2003 income. The Heritage Foundation's books are audited
annually by the national accounting firm of Deloitte & Touche. A list
of major donors is available from The Heritage Foundation upon request.
Members of The Heritage Foundation staff testify as individuals
discussing their own independent research. The views expressed are
their own, and do not reflect an institutional position for The
Heritage Foundation or its board of trustees.
The Terror War's Front Line
There are four reasons why border security must remain an essential
element of national security.
First, in the global war waged by terrorists, visas
can be deadly weapons. One ready means available to enemies
wishing to enter the United States is the nonimmigrant visa,
which can be obtained from any of the 211 American consulates
around the world.\2\ Travelers holding nonimmigrant visas
represent the overwhelming majority of individuals entering the
U.S. Nonimmigrant visas are ideal for supporting attacks that
require brief or repeated trips to the United States. In fact,
all of the September 11 hijackers entered the United States in
this manner. The 19 terrorists received a total of 23 visas
from five different consular posts over a four-year period.\3\
Terrorists can also enter the United States through the
permanent immigration system, obtaining a ``green card'' to
live in the country or become a naturalized citizen. One study
of 28 known militant Islamic terrorists found that 17 of them
were in the country legally, either as permanent residents or
as naturalized citizens.\4\ The prevalent use of identity theft
and false travel documents makes the current system
particularly vulnerable to abuse. In 2001, officials at border
crossing points seized over 100,000 falsified documents. Over
50 percent of these documents were border crossing cards, alien
registration cards, and fraudulent visas and passports.\5\ Such
materials have been used by terrorists. For example, one of the
perpetrators of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing entered the
country with a doctored passport.\6\ Thus, intelligence is
critical not only to keep suspected terrorists from
legitimately obtaining and using passports, but also to prevent
them from easily using falsified documents to travel into the
United States.
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\2\ In addition, 28 countries are part of the U.S. Visa Waiver
Program, allowing their citizens to enter the U.S. for 90 days without
a visa. For a list of countries and program details, see U.S.
Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, ``Visa Waiver Program
(VWP),'' attravel.state.gov/vwp.html (October 16, 2003).
\3\ U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: Visa Process
Should be Strengthened as an Antiterrorism Tool, GAO-03-132NI, October
2002, p. 6.
\4\ Steven A. Camarote, The Open Door: How Militant Terrorists
Entered and Remained in the United States, 1993-2001 (Washington, D.C.:
Center for Immigration Studies, 2001), p. 19.
\5\ U.S. General Accounting Office, Identity Theft: Prevalence and
Links to Alien Illegal Activity, GAO-02-830T, June 25, 2002, p. 7.
\6\ U.S. Department of Justice, The Potential for Fraud and INS's
Efforts to Reduce the Risks of the Visa Waiver Program, Inspection
Report I-99-10, March 1999.
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Second, infectious diseases,\7\ invasive species,
other environmental threats pose Health risks and could cause
environmental degradation, and economic damage by the
inadvertent or intentional introduction of diseases; non-
indigenous species, including animals, plants, insects, and
single-cell organisms; or other environmental hazards. One
study estimated that damages and efforts to control invasive
non-indigenous species already cost the United States $137
billion per year, more than the cost of recovery from the 9/11
attacks.\8\
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\7\ The potential for diseases to spread rapidly is increasing.
There are number of factors driving this trend including the growth of
global trade that spreads diseases, the rise of pathogens resistant to
antibiotics and other antimicrobial drugs, demographic changes,
population growth and migration, and deteriorating public health
infrastructure worldwide. Executive Office of the President, Office of
Science and Technology, National Science and Technology Council, Global
Microbial Threats in the 1990s (September 13, 2000) p. 2, at
www.ostp.gov/CISET/html/3.html. See also George Fidas remarks before
the International Disease Surveillance and Global Security Conference,
Stanford University, Stanford, California, May 11-12, 2001, p. 8; David
F. Gordon, et al., The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its
Implications for the United States (Washington, DC: National
Intelligence Council, 2000), passim.
\8\ David Pimentel, et al., ``Environmental and Economic Costs
Associated with Non-Indigenous Species in the United States,'' June 12,
1999, np, at www.news.cornell.edu/releases/Jan99/species_costs.html.
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Third, as a component of America's borders, we cannot
over estimate the importance and vulnerability of the maritime
domain. About 95 percent by volume of U.S. overseas trade
transits the waterways and the exclusive economic zone bounding
the United States. In addition, many major population centers
and critical infrastructure are in close proximity to U.S.
ports or are accessible by waterways. Equally troubling are the
prospects for criminals and terrorists to use the maritime
domain for the conveyance of illicit goods and services. Nor
are just the hundreds of ports of entry into the United States
a concern. Coastal areas between the ports are perhaps even
more vulnerable to exploitation.\9\ Finally, as land borders
and commercial air transport become more secure, criminals and
terrorists will increasing look to the maritime domain as an
attractive means to bring bad things to America's shores.
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\9\ The maritime sector is a preferred option for drug smugglers,
as well as the smuggling and trafficking of people. The voluntary or
involuntary movement of people across national boundaries has become
the world's fastest growing criminal activity and its continued growth
will ensure its prominence in the future maritime environment. U.S.
National Intelligence Council, Growing Global Migration and its
Implications for the United States (Washington, D.C.: National
Intelligence Council, March 2001). In addition, drug smuggling
frequently employs noncommercial vehicles such as small, fast, private
boats with concealed compartments capable of storing 30-70 kilograms of
material and delivers payloads over the shore rather than using
conventional port facilities. Office of National Drug Control Policy,
Measuring the Deterrent Effect of Enforcement Operations on Drug
Smuggling, 1991-1999 (August 2001), p. 1.
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Fourth, securing the transport of material goods,
services, and people across the border is not only important
for keeping out terrorists and the instruments of terror.
Equally vital to national security is maintaining the free-flow
of legitimate commerce. Many American industries, for example,
rely on ``just in time'' movement of goods and services. Quick
and responsive delivery lessens the need to have large
stockpiles on hand, thus reducing operating costs.\10\
Increased security that delays the delivery of products can
negate the advantages of inventories that are managed by the
speed that orders are filled rather the size of a company's
warehouse. For instance, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks
security at the borders and Canada was significantly upgraded.
As a result, many truckers were delayed at border crossings for
several hours. Since many truckers are only permitted to drive
10 hours per day, significant delays at the border can add an
extra day to delivery time. After the attacks on the World
Trade Center, Ford Motor Company idled five U.S. manufacturing
plants because of slow delivery from parts suppliers in
Canada.\11\ The increased cost of transporting or stockpiling
goods is not the only concern. Many commercial enterprises,
such as farming and tourism, rely on the import of foreign
nationals for seasonal work. Any screening process that slows
the flow of people and material will add to the cost that
threats impose on the United States.
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\10\ For an introduction to just-in-time supply management, see B.
Modarress and Abdolhossein Ansari, Just-in-Time Purchasing (New York:
The Free Press, 1990).
\11\ Joseph Martha, ``Just-in-Case Operations,'' Warehouse Forum,
Vol. 17, No. 2 (January 2002), np, at www.warehousing-forum.com/news/
2002_01.pdf.
Moving in the Right Direction
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, Congress and the
Administration have made significant efforts to enhancing the security
of commerce and travel across U.S. borders. The following initiatives
are particularly noteworthy:
First, the USA PATRIOT Act required the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) to share information in its National
Crime Information Center with immigration services and the U.S.
Department of State.\12\ It also instructs the Attorney General
and the Secretary of State to develop a biometric \13\ standard
for verifying the identity of visa applicants and bearers of
visas and passports, as well as querying law enforcement
databases.\14\
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\12\ The National Criminal Investigation Center (NCIC) is a
computerized index of criminal justice information that is maintained
by the FBI and available to federal, state, and local law enforcement
and other criminal justice agencies. The database includes the agency's
Interstate Identification Index (criminal history information); Wanted
Persons File; Missing Persons File; Unidentified Persons File (to
cross-reference unidentified bodies against records in the Missing
Persons File); Foreign Fugitive File; and Violent Gang/Terrorist File
(used to identify criminal gangs and their members to local, state, and
federal law enforcement). The database also includes the U.S. Secret
Service (now part of the Department of Homeland Security) Protective
File, which maintains names and other information on individuals who
are believed to pose a threat to the President. The law directs the
agency to share information in the Interstate Identification Index and
the Wanted Persons File as well as other files as agreed to by the
Attorney General and the agency.
\13\ Biometrics are methods of identifying a person based on a
physiological or behavioral characteristics, including the person's
face, fingerprints, hand geometry, handwriting, iris, retina, veins,
and voice.
\14\ The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act of 2002
reduces from two years (as enacted in the USA PATRIOT Act) to 15 months
the period after which the President must certify biometric standards
for identifying aliens seeking admission into the U.S. and from 18
months to one year the period after which the President must first
report to Congress on the progress in implementing the use of
biometrics.
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Second, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The act places the
responsibility for providing immigration-related services and
benefits under the DHS's Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
Services (BCIS) while the DHS's Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection has assumed the border security functions of the
INS. The act also established an integrated investigative
force, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
Third, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry
Reform Act called for intelligence sharing and visa issuance
and monitoring through several important measures including
requiring law enforcement and intelligence agencies to share
relevant information with State and the BCIS; directing BCIS to
integrate its data systems into an interoperable, interagency
system; assigning the DHS the primary responsibility for
developing an overarching information architecture to share
immigration and intelligence data; and requiring the
implementation of an integrated entry and exit database.
Fourth, the Maritime Transportation and Security Act
(MTSA) required the establishment of maritime security
committees and security plans for facilities and vessels, and
strengthened and standardized security measures for domestic
port security teams including federal, state, local, and
private authorities.
Fifth, the Administration's establishment of two
intelligence integration centers--the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center (TTIC) and the Terrorist Screening Center
(TSC)--will help to consolidate terrorist information into
centralized databases so that the information can be accessed
by local, state, and federal authorities.
Among all the ongoing activities to improve border security these
initiatives are particularly important because they recognize that
border security means much more than securing the border. They provide
the foundation for building a layered and coordinated approach to the
challenge of protecting the border.
The Bush Administration's approach to homeland security rightly
eschews the notion that there is a single, ``silver bullet'' solution
to stopping terrorism. Rather, the President has adopted a multi-
layered system that assumes no one security initiative will suffice.
This strategy provides multiple opportunities to thwart or mitigate
terrorist acts. Security is not provided by a single initiative, but by
the cumulative effect of all the homeland security programs. For
example, a terrorist might be discovered by an overseas intelligence
operation while applying for a visa, by screening an international
flight manifest, during inspection at a port of entry, or during a
domestic counterterrorism investigation. Thus, improving security
requires ensuring that each layer of the system is sufficient to do its
part of the job and that efforts are complementary.
The Next Steps
Great strides in improving the security of the border will only be
made when the components supporting border security are wedded into a
``system of systems'' or network-centric approach to homeland security.
Network-centric operations generate increased operational effectiveness
by networking activities, decision makers, and field officers to
achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of
operations, greater efficiency, increased security, and a degree of
self-synchronization. In essence, it means linking knowledgeable
entities in an effort to coordinate a comprehensive national border
security plan. Such a system might produce significant efficiencies in
terms of sharing skills, knowledge, and scarce high-value assets;
building capacity and redundancy in the national border security
system; and gaining the synergy of providing a common operating picture
to all involved and being able to readily share information.
In building a ``system of systems'' approach to border security,
both Congress and the Administration must work toward integrating
border control functions, immigration enforcement, transnational supply
chain security, and maritime domain awareness into a more seamless web
of homeland security activities.
There are measures that Congress and Administration should consider
now for building toward a ``systems of systems'' approach to border
security. Our research at The Heritage Foundation suggests some
initiatives that should be considered as building blocks toward a more
integrated system for protecting the homeland. They include the
following:
Rethink Responsibilities for Visa Services. Congress should
consolidate all visa activities in a single government organization.
While the Homeland Security Act of 2002 gave the Secretary of the DHS
exclusive authority to issue regulations and administer the visa
program, consular officers remained part of the Department of State.
This was a mistake. For the DHS to fulfill its responsibilities in the
visa process and because of the national security aspect of visa
approvals, the Bureau of Consular Affairs Office of Visa Services
should be placed under the DHS. Moving the Visa Office to the DHS would
enable the DHS to focus on tightening, improving, and more broadly
utilizing the visa function to meet the exigencies of homeland
security.\15\
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\15\ James Jay Carafano and Ha Nguyen, ``Better Intelligence
Sharing for Visa Issuance and Monitoring: An Imperative for Homeland
Security,'' Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1699, October 27,
2003, at www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/BG1699.cfm.
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Improving Innovations in Intelligence Sharing. The Administration
should consolidate the TTIC and the TSC under the DHS. Since May 2003,
two intelligence-sharing centers have been established by the
Administration. The TTIC is designed to be a central location where all
terrorist-related intelligence--both foreign and domestic--is gathered,
coordinated, and assessed. It is composed of elements of the FBI, CIA,
Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, Department of
State, and other intelligence agencies. The TSC has responsibility for
coordinating information from all terrorist watch lists and provide
around-the-clock access to local, state, and federal authorities.
Although the establishment of the TTIC and the TSC are significant
steps in the integration of intelligence data, these centers have been
placed under the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the FBI
respectively. This locates the centers away from the agency that is
most in need of the information they provide--the DHS.
The structure for intelligence sharing between agencies should be
based on a consumer-driven model. The DHS was designed as the biggest
consumer of intelligence information and has the most at stake in terms
of intelligence sharing and dissemination, particularly in the areas of
visa issuance and monitoring. The current arrangement leaves the DHS as
little more than just another intelligence end user, competing with
other members of the national security community to ensure that its
priority requirements are met. Thus, the TTIC and the TSC should be
placed under the DHS both to ensure the best possible establishment and
operation of these centers and to make certain that the DHS has the
tools and ability to fulfill its responsibilities.\16\
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\16\ James Jay Carafano, ``Terrorist Intelligence Centers Need
Reform Now,'' Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum No. 930, May 10,
2004, at www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/em930.cfm.
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Improving State and Local Support for Counterterrorism Immigration
Investigations. The DHS and the states should pursue, and Congress
should support, the use of Section 287 of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act (INA) as a mechanism for state and local law
enforcement to enforce the immigration aspect of border security.
Section Sec. 287(g) of the INA provides authority for state and local
enforcement to investigate, detain, and arrest aliens on civil and
criminal grounds. Officers governed by a Sec. 287(g) agreement must
receive adequate training and operate under the direction of federal
authorities. In addition, in a civil lawsuit, the state law enforcement
officers would be considered to have been acting under federal
authority, thereby shifting liability to the federal government and
providing additional immunity for the state law enforcement officers
enforcing federal laws.\17\
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\17\ James Jay Carafano, ``No Need for the CLEAR Act: Building
Capacity for Immigration Counterterrorism Investigations,'' Heritage
Foundation Executive Memorandum No. 925, April 21, 2004, at
www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/em925.cfm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The existing Sec. 287(g) pilot program with the State of Florida
could serve as a national model. Under Sec. 287(g), Florida signed a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) in 2002 to allow a small group of
Florida law enforcement officers to conduct federal immigration
investigations. Florida specifically limits its officers' civil
immigration enforcement to situations in which they are part of a
security or counterterrorism operation that is supervised by ICE. As
the Florida MOU demonstrates, Sec. 287(g) provides adequate protection
to states and their law officers while requiring that well-trained
officers conduct immigration investigations. It also allows states to
tailor the use of their officers to essential domestic counterterrorism
missions.
Three initiatives would further enhance state and federal
counterterrorism efforts through Sec. 287(g) programs:
1. The DHS should encourage other states to adopt programs
based on the Florida model,
2. Congress should appropriate funds for the DHS to expand
Sec. 287(g) initiatives, and
3. States should use the Florida initiatives as a model for
expanding their own domestic counterterrorism programs and
improving cooperation with federal authorities.
Expanding the DHS Law Enforcement Capacity. The DHS needs more
aggressive programs to expand law enforcement capacity within the
agency, establish closer coordination within the components of ICE, and
expand the Coast Guard's law enforcement capabilities. In the end,
investments in domestic counterterrorism programs and intelligence and
early warning may provide much greater security for value than physical
security at the border or additional critical infrastructure protection
at ports-of-entry. Key to enhancing the DHS capability to performing
these functions will be growing its capacity to perform law enforcement
operations.
It is not clear that Coast Guard and ICE law enforcements programs
are being developed in tandem to create the objective law enforcement
corps needed for border security. In fact, it is not apparent that the
DHS has defined its long-term strategic needs in this area or that they
dovetail with other ongoing federal and state efforts to expand the
national capacity to conduct domestic counterterrorism.
One area that warrants particular attention is the future plans for
the Coast Guard's marine investigative services and its sea marshall
assets. Since 9/11, many of the local investigation and inspections
arms of the Coast Guard's Marine Safety Offices have significantly
shifted their focus to supporting domestic counterterrorism efforts. In
addition, the Coast Guard created the sea marshals program to create a
cadre of specially trained law enforcement officers to escort high-risk
vessels into port. While the Coast Guard law enforcement initiatives
are a positive effort, there is little sign that the service is
creating a comprehensive human capital plan, including the leader
development training and education that are needed to fully exploit the
potential of these programs.
Consolidate and Integrate DHS Aviation Support Activities. To
achieve greater efficiency, flexibility, and coordination for domestic
airspace security and support operations, ICE's Office of Air and
Marine Interdiction (OAMI) should be merged with Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) aviation assets. Additionally, the aviation
support requirements and acquisition for the OAMI and the U.S. Coast
Guard should be integrated to the maximum extent possible. Building
greater aviation support capacity and flexibility into the DHS is
critical to the border security missions, as well as supporting other
federal law enforcement activities, and lessening Defense Department
requirements for reserving air defense assets of missions related to
homeland defense protection.
The OAMI and the CBP already work closely together in a number of
aviation missions. The OAMI currently has a Northern Border Initiative
that established five OAMI air unites at strategic locations along the
Northern Border. This initiative melds assets and operations with the
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and will provide a law
enforcement presence within one hour of being notified, 24x7, of
suspected incursions along the Northern Border. Integrating OAMI with
other CBP assets would only further enhance the DHS's capabilities to
conduct these kinds of operations.
Over the long term, fiscal concerns will no doubt play the
significant role in determining the extent to which the DHS aviation
component can be expanded to meet a range of mission requirements.
Aviation support and acquisition requirements invariably consume a
significant portion of operations and maintenance budgets. Here, the
department can profitably learn a lesson from the Department of Defense
(DOD), which maintains four air forces optimized for different tasks at
great expense. As a result, today the lion's share of defense
procurement will be for modernizing its air fleet of combat, transport,
and support craft.\18\ In addition to the cost of developing and
maintaining separate air arms, the DOD has had to invest considerable
resources in creating the capacity to integrate these arms effectively.
Effective consolidation now will enable the DHS to avoid similar
challenges in the coming years.
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\18\ Richard L. Kugler, ``The Defense Budget: Meeting Requirements
with Constrained Resources,'' in QDR 2001: Strategy-Driven Choices for
America's Security, ed. Michele A. Flournoy (Washington, D.C.: National
Defense University Press, 2001), pp. 125-129.
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Place Greater Emphasis on Private-Sector Solutions for Supply Chain
Security. The DHS should pursue additional initiatives to encourage the
private sector to improve security in transnational supply chains. As
much as possible, the DHS needs to move away from making the border a
bottleneck by using passage of the border as the place to screen the
vast amounts of commerce entering and leaving the United States.
Current efforts to achieve this goal rely heavily on two programs, the
Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Customs-Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism (CTPAT). It may not, however, be strategically
prudent to pursue the current combination of measures alone. Layered
security, after all requires not placing all the eggs in ``one security
basket.''
The MTSA required the Secretary of Transportation to establish a
program to evaluate and certify secure systems of intermodal
transportation. It did not direct that these programs would have to
necessarily be conceived or implemented by the federal government. In
order to reduce risk, as well as exploit the capacity of the
marketplace to create innovative and effective solutions, the DHS might
consider establishing mechanisms to allow the private sector to develop
and implement its own alternatives to the CSI/CTPAT regime.
Improving Congressional Oversight. Congress should create permanent
committees in both houses to provide oversight for the Department of
Homeland Security. While security remains a cooperative government
effort, we needed a dedicated Homeland Security Department. The
rationale for the initiative paralleled the thinking behind the
formulation of the 1947 National Security Act, consolidating key assets
into one big, powerful organization and creating the means to
orchestrate that department's efforts with other federal activities.
Large, centralized organizations have drawbacks, the most obvious being
the problems encountered in managing a vast bureaucracy. But big
organizations can also have great strengths, providing unity of
purpose, a wealth of capabilities, and economies of scale, and
fostering a common institutional culture and practices that build trust
and confidence and facilitate coordinated action.
The department now also faces the same challenges that confronted
the Pentagon in 1947. In terms of efficiencies and improved
coordination, the low-hanging fruit of corralling over 180,000
employees into one agency has been picked. What is left to be done is
the hard work, the nuts and bolts of building a real department--
implementing human capital, acquisition, and information technology
programs; building security systems that match the national strategy;
and standing watch every day against terrorist attacks. Oversight of
these activities requires standing committees with the expertise and
experience to see the big picture and dig into the details. No area
demands more attention to ensuring that disparate programs work
together than the complex challenges of border security.
The House Select Committee on Homeland Security has already
demonstrated that there could be value added in consolidating oversight
in a single committee. They've held productive hearings and rapidly
assembled a capable staff with the energy, expertise, and dedication
that make for good congressional oversight. The global war against
terrorism will be a long, protracted conflict. We need a Department of
Homeland Security that is built and run to protect Americans today,
tomorrow, and 10 and 20 years from now. We need a Congress that is
properly organized to support this effort. Leaving jurisdiction for the
department's homeland security programs fragmented among a dozen
committees runs counter to the intent behind the Homeland Security Act
of 2002: Either merge functions, change cultures, and focus the federal
government on homeland security or turn the initiative over to the
terrorists.
Both houses of Congress should establish permanent homeland
security committees.
Conclusion
A layered and coordinated approach is the only strategic solution
that promises long-term success for protecting the U.S. borders.
Congress and the Administration must work together to turn a number of
promising initiatives into a comprehensive system of systems that will
serve to deter, disrupt, and prevent acts of transnational terrorism
upon the United States. I believe several of the building blocks
suggested here could be important contributions to that effort.
Ms. Granger. [Presiding.] Thank you very much.
Mr. Johnson?
STATEMENT OF RANDEL JOHNSON, THE UNITED STATES CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE AND AMERICANS FOR BETTER BORDERS
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I would like to
thank the subcommittee for this opportunity to talk about a
wide range of issues, of which there are many in this area. Let
me simply note with regard to my background that I am Vice
President at the U.S. Chamber for Immigration, Labor and
Employee Benefits, but more particularly I did represent the
Chamber on the Data Management Improvement Act Task Force which
studied issues at the borders for over 2 years. We did submit
two separate reports to Congress. Unfortunately, they were
probably longer than most people would care to look at, but
they do hold a lot of interesting data there for the
subcommittee.
My written testimony is quite lengthy. It covers issues
ranging from cargo processing to the need for low-risk
prescreened traveler programs such as SENTRI and NEXUS, to
problems that the business community is encountering in visa
processing, to frankly concerns that we have over the upcoming
land port deadlines under US-VISIT in December, 200. I do also
wish to note our strong support for the legislation that just
passed the House, which would extend the October deadline under
the visa waiver program for biometric encoded passports.
With regard to low-risk, prescreened traveler programs, I
just want to emphasize that obviously these have to be part of
any solution to our border security, if that solution is also
going to take into consideration our need to keep commerce
moving. The volume of our traffic at our borders, which I think
astounds people who have not been there before, I think on its
face indicates that this is really an unquestionable element of
any program. We strongly support the committee's efforts to
expand and implement things like NEXUS and SENTRI.
Obviously, technology must play a part, but I think we are
kidding ourselves if we are going to look at it as a magic
panacea. There is always going to be human error involved, and
I think we are a long ways off from any kind of technology
which will allow us to thoroughly check every traveler equally.
Therefore, we have to have some kind of low-risk, prescreened
traveler program to separate out the stream of most travelers
from those who have to be looked at more carefully than others.
Technology is great, but it is not going to be a solution, and
we should not kid ourselves.
With regard to visa delays in US-VISIT, I just want to say
that we have tried to document the problems the business
community is having with visa delays. We are very encouraged by
the fact that both Secretary Powell and Secretary Ridge
recently have acknowledged that there are glitches in the
system. Secretary Ridge has kicked off a system of review to
try and see where those glitches are and see where they can be
resolved without impairing security.
Considering US-VISIT, let me just say that with regard to
our border communities, there is a lot of concern out there
still with regard to the December deadline. Things are going
fairly well at the airports. There are some complaints, but
they are going fairly well. But at the land ports, as the
December 2004 deadline approaches, there is just a skepticism
out there when they hear officials from DHS talking about how
the system will work and there will be no impact on traffic. It
sounds great, but when it comes to thinking through how that
reality is going to be translated to each port, and which lanes
are going to have to be torn up, how are dedicated lanes going
to be established, there is a lot of skepticism out there. I
think the DHS just simply has to get out there community by
community and explain how they are going to get this done 6
months from now.
I want to emphasize, as you well know, that there is more
than dollars and cents here involved. If you talk to these
border communities, as many of you have, it is a way of life
that is involved. It is the community structure that is so
intertwined with border commerce back and forth that if this is
not done right, a lot of these communities are going to go down
the drain. So the stakes are very high, and US-VISIT has to be
done right. There is no room for error. In that regard, we hope
DHS specifically moves beyond the rhetoric quickly and moves to
pilot projects to test under realistic conditions what they
intend to implement in December of 2004.
Let me just note finally that I know the Chamber and other
people in the business community will be unfairly criticized at
times, and inaccurately, for elevating profits, jobs and
commerce over national security. That is not the case. We
acknowledge we have to all work together to get this system
done right. Of course, the enabling statute that established
the Department of Homeland Security, which we strongly
supported, recognizes that the Department in achieving national
security also must look at economic security. It must keep
border commerce moving. I believe the word is in a ``speedy
fashion.'' I am not sure who put the ``speedy'' in, but in a
speedy fashion. That is the concept. I think that we all sort
of have to move together and get the job done. We are willing
to work with DHS to do that, and the Department of State.
Finally, I just hope that as these issues come rolling out,
that the Congress can try to treat them in a bipartisan manner,
because the stakes are really too high to do otherwise. With
that, Mr. Chairman, I have 17 seconds left.
[The statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]
Prapered Statement of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce by Randel K. Johnson
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I would like to thank you
for the opportunity to testify today on border security and economic
issues. I am Randel K. Johnson, Vice President for Labor, Immigration
and Employee Benefits at the United States Chamber of Commerce.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is the world's largest business
federation, representing more than 3 million businesses. The Chamber's
federation includes state and local chambers throughout the United
States and also includes 98 American Chambers of Commerce abroad
(AMCHAMs) located in 86 countries, which represent American companies
and individuals doing business overseas as well as foreign companies
with significant business interests in the United States. Because of
their role at the crossroads of international business, we believe the
AMCHAMs are excellent barometers of the strength of our international
relationships.
Chamber members with interest in the secure and efficient movement
of legitimate travel and trade at our borders include companies and
organizations in the travel and tourism industries, companies that
import or export goods and services through our ports of entry,
companies that do business with international customers and clients,
and companies that employ an international workforce. Chamber members
on both the U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Canada borders, including local
chambers of commerce and American Chambers of Commerce abroad that
conduct business between the United States and other countries, also
have a great interest in the implementation and efficiency of our
border security.
I would also like to note that I am the chair of the Americans for
Better Borders (ABB) coalition, which unites regional business
organizations and a wide array of companies and national trade
associations representing manufacturing, hospitality, tourism,
transportation, recreation and other industry sectors to work to ensure
that the efficient flow of commerce and tourism across our borders
while addressing national security concerns.
The Chamber and ABB coalition were instrumental in the creation and
passage of the Data Management Improvement Act (DMIA) of 2000, which
set the current deadlines for implementation of the US-VISIT entry-exit
program and established the DMIA Task Force, a public-private group
chartered in 2001 by the Attorney General to evaluate and make
recommendations on how the flow of traffic at United States airports,
seaports, and land border ports of entry (POE) can be improved while
enhancing security. I was privileged to be named by the Attorney
General to represent the U.S. Chamber on the Task Force in 2002 and to
serve on the Task Force and sign its two reports to Congress, one in
2002 and one in 2003.
We are all aware of the new environment in which not only business,
but all of us must live. The need for security to protect us from
another horror such as September 11 is very real. The U.S. Chamber has
pledged its support for the broad ranging efforts to secure our
homeland, was involved in the shaping of the legislation which created
the Department of Homeland Security, and ``key voted'' in support of
the legislation in both the House and the Senate.
The U.S. Chamber agrees with the Committee's theme for this
hearing, that there must be a layered and coordinated approach to our
nation's security to be truly successful. Border security must start
before the traveler arrives at our ports of entry, and we must use
technology to make the best use of our security resources to focus on
high-risk or unknown travelers and expedite legitimate, low-risk and
frequent trade and visitors. We need to have both secure borders and an
efficient and predictable visa and entry process. The Chamber strongly
supports these policies; I only wish to emphasize that we are concerned
by the way these policies are currently being implemented and by the
uncertainty of what they will look like in the future.
When Congress created the Department of Homeland Security in 2002,
it saw fit to include two provisions we strongly supported: creating a
special office in charge of reaching out to the private sector (a
particularly important function as the Department got up and running)
and making clear that part of the Department's mission is to include
consideration of America's economic security as the Department strives
also to protect our national security. These provisions, along with
those in Title IV of the implementing legislation relating to borders
and transportation which reflect the need, consistent with national
security, to ``ensure the speedy, orderly, and efficient flow of lawful
traffic and commerce,'' I believe went a long way in addressing
concerns at the time that the new Department would pursue a ``fortress
America.'' That is, many were concerned that the new Department would
pursue aggressive security measures without weighing the negative
economic impact on the country as a whole that could result from
significant increases in barriers and delays at our borders. As Chamber
President and CEO Tom Donohue has said, we need to ensure ``that in the
pursuit of security we don't lose our mobility and our economic
freedom. Mobility and security must go hand-in-hand. Sacrifice one for
the other and we'll pay a horrific price.''
And, indeed, Secretary Ridge at the Department of Homeland
Security, Secretary Powell at the Department of State and even
President Bush, have repeatedly reassured those of us outside that the
government will continue to search for ways to both improve security
and to expedite, or at least not significantly hinder, legitimate
international commerce, travel and immigration.
On the cargo side, we must say that the government has made a great
start on meeting the dual goals of security and efficiency, through
programs such as the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
TPAT), the Free and Secure Trade program (FAST), and the Container
Security Initiative (CSI). C-TPAT is a voluntary program by which
businesses (including importers, carriers, brokers, warehouse operators
and manufacturers) can work with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to
ensure the integrity of their security practices and receive the
benefit of reduced border processing. The FAST program is a bilateral
initiative between the United States and Canada that builds on the C-
TPAT model and Canada's similar program, the Partners in Protection
(PIP). C-TPAT and PIP carriers, drivers and importers can receive
expedited processing at the U.S.-Canada border. The CSI is a program in
which teams of CBP officers are deployed to participating foreign sea
ports to work with officials of the host government to target cargo
containers bound for the U.S. that might pose a threat. These programs
have successfully ``pushed out the border,'' engaged the cooperation of
the private sector, and added to the risk-based, layered approach that
is the topic of this hearing and we commend CBP for their
implementation.
However, not nearly as much progress has been made on the travel
side. Only a few programs, such as the NEXUS and SENTRI programs, use
the same risk-based pre-clearance strategies that have been implemented
in the cargo area. NEXUS and SENTRI successfully enroll thousands of
border crossers, who voluntarily undergo pre-clearance and background
checks--in the case of NEXUS by both the United States and Canada--and
prove themselves to be low-risk crossers.\1\ By doing so, they are able
to use dedicated lanes at certain border crossings and speed their
travel. These two programs are successful models of meeting the dual
missions of security and efficiency. By identifying these individuals
as low-risk, placing them through thorough security checks prior to
their arrival at the border, and then allowing briefer inspections at
the ports of entry, these programs model the layered approach that we
support.
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\1\ The NEXUS program issues individual passenger radio frequency
(RF)-enabled proximity cards for frequent travelers on the northern
border. The SENTRI program operates on the southern border and provides
an RF-enabled vehicle tag with associated data for all passengers
registered within the vehicle. Over the next couple of years, the two
programs will be merged and the NEXUS individual passenger-based
technology will replace SENTRI on the southern border. Source:
Department of Homeland Security, Request for Proposals for US-VISIT
Program Prime Contractor Acquisition, RFP No. HSSCHQ-04-R-0096,
November 28, 2003, p. 23.
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In fact, the DMIA Task Force in its 2002 report emphasized the
expansion of these programs as integral to the eventual success of any
entry-exit system at the land borders. We understand that a similar
program for air travel from Canada (NEXUS Air) is in development, and
we strongly encourage CBP to speed such a program to the traveling
public. We also encourage the Committee, as it is considering the first
ever authorization legislation for the Department of Homeland Security,
to not only encourage these types of programs through specific
authorizing language, but also provide resources for their expansion,
maintenance and improvement to encourage as many as possible to enroll.
CBP Commissioner Bonner in March 2004 announced a new initiative
that will also build on this layered approach, the Immigration Security
Initiative (ISI). Based on reports from CBP, the ISI will post teams of
CBP officers at major international airports around the world from
which travelers embark to the United States. Much like their
counterparts in the Container Security Initiative, the ISI teams will
work with foreign governments and law enforcement, as well as use its
own resources to target inadmissible persons and prevent them from
boarding planes to the U.S. As a ``middle layer'' of security between
the consular post and the port of entry, this program has the promise
to further ``push out our borders'' for passengers.\2\
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\2\ ``Immigration Security Initiative: New Layer in Homeland
Defense,'' Customs and Border Protection Today, May 2004, found at
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2004/May/isi.xml.
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We support the concepts underpinning the ISI; however, the success
of this program to facilitate legitimate travelers and reduce
unnecessary inspections and screening at the ports of entry will depend
heavily on the validity and detail of the targeting information, data
and intelligence used to flag inadmissible persons. We would want to be
sure that travelers will have an expedited means of clearing up any
``false'' negatives, to ensure their continued travel to the United
States as quickly as possible. As important as such partnerships and
targeting may be, the best assurance of stopping inadmissible persons
is full pre-inspection, where actual U.S. inspections and admissions
are recorded at foreign airports prior to departure. These programs are
currently in place in several airports in Canada, Ireland, the
Caribbean and elsewhere, and we would encourage CBP to evaluate
expansion of these programs as well.
However, in spite of these successes and new initiatives for
travelers, they are still quite limited. For the majority of travelers,
there is a ``one-size-fits-all'' approach to screening and security.
That is, everyone is seen as a risk. I believe there is concern among
those of us in the private sector, the traveling public and border
communities, that we are not much closer to finding the right balance
between security and facilitation. Constantly tightening policy
responses and approaching deadlines for still greater changes only
increase the concern. These changes include: increased visa referrals
for security checks, requirements for in-person visa interviews,
upcoming deadlines in October of this year for Machine Readable
Passports and biometrics for Visa Waiver Program (VWP) visitors, the
inclusion of these visitors in September in the US-VISIT system at air
and seaports, which includes fingerprinting more than 13 million
visitors annually from countries around the world, and full
implementation of US-VISIT at the 50 busiest land borders in December
2004 and the remaining land ports in 2005.\3\
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\3\ For a useful overview of various deadlines, see GAO Report 03-
563, ``Homeland Security Needs to Improve Entry Exit System Expenditure
Planning,'' pages 48-50.
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Indeed, there is a growing perception abroad and in border
communities that, in spite of the rhetoric, America is turning into a
fortress. And this perception, based on reality, is hurting American
businesses. A recent study by eight business organizations estimated
that visa problems alone have cost more than $30 billion to the economy
in lost revenues and other indirect costs.\4\ And recent Department of
Commerce data shows a drop of more than $17 billion in services trade
surplus from 2000 to 2002, with a drop of $17.3 billion in travel
exports between 2000 and 2003, and a more than $5 billion drop in
passenger fares.\5\ Cross border visits along our land borders are also
down. According to Department of Transportation data, inbound passenger
vehicle crossings were down almost 20 million between 2000 and 2002 on
the Canadian border, and down over 40 million across the U.S.-Mexico
border. Between 2000 and 2002 inbound truck crossings at the U.S.-
Mexico border decreased almost 100,000, with a decrease of more than
220,000 between 2000 and 2001. On the Canadian border, inbound truck
crossings decreased almost 300,000 between 2000 and 2001, and are down
100,000 from 2000 to 2002.\6\ And, as anyone in these border
communities can tell you, fewer crossings means less business and heavy
impacts to the economy.
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\4\ Do Visa Delays Hurt U.S. Businesses, Prepared by the Santangelo
Group for the Aerospace Industries Association, the American Council on
International Personnel, the Association for Manufacturing Technology,
the Coalition for Employment through Exports, the National Foreign
Trade Council, the U.S.-China Business Council, U.S.-Russia Business
Council, and the U.S.-Vietnam Business Council, June 2, 2004, available
at www.nftc.org.
\5\ Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis,
Balance of Payments (International Transactions) data, 1960-present at
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/di/home/bop.htm.
\6\ Source: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Department of
Transportation, available at http://www.bts.gov/programs/international/
border_crossing_entry_data/.
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We have met in the last year, and continue to meet with
representatives from many stakeholders in border communities, including
local chambers of commerce, businesses and community representatives
both as part of my work on the DMIA Task Force and on behalf of the
Chamber. As the December 2004 deadline for US-VISIT land border
implementation approaches, there is a very strong feeling that the
local communities and businesses have made their serious concerns about
entry-exit procedures known to various people in the government (and
us) but are wondering if there is a real understanding of the challenge
and stakes involved. Although recent official descriptions of how the
US-VISIT system will be implemented at land borders does indicate that
the Department of Homeland Security is at least listening to these
concerns, the border communities are still skeptical that the entry-
exit procedures embodied by US-VISIT can be put in place by December
without a significant and negative impact on cross border traffic.
This adverse impact is already being felt on the visa front. Our
American Chambers of Commerce around the world report they are actually
losing business to European and other competitors because of the
difficulties in obtaining visas for their customers and clients,
supporting the results of the study mentioned above. Impending changes
to the VWP will disproportionately affect key American allies and
trading partners such as the United Kingdom and Japan, both of whose
governments have stated that, in spite of their best efforts, they will
not be able to meet the October 26, 2004, deadline which will require
VWP countries to begin issuing passports with biometric identifiers. In
fact, the Department of State has stated it will not be able to issue
U.S.-biometric passports until next year. We strongly support
legislation to be voted on in the House this week that would extend the
VWP deadline. This is an issue of the highest importance for U.S.
companies doing business in the 27 countries in the VWP.
Turning back to the borders, the DMIA Task Force submitted two
reports to Congress, one in 2002 and one in 2003. The 2002 report
focused on what was then the entry-exit system and detailed numerous
challenges to implementing such a system, including the differentiation
required for the modes of entry (land, sea, and air) and differences
between the northern and southern land border environments. In 2003,
the Task Force report detailed the significant challenges facing our
ports of entry in terms of infrastructure and technology and the need
for greater cooperation and coordination among federal agencies with
border responsibilities, with state and local governments, and the
private sector. Significantly, in reviewing the progress to date on the
US-VISIT system in 2003, the Task Force report included the following
recommendation:
That the first phase at air and sea [Ports of Entry] be
reviewed and evaluated no later than 6 months after
implementation by an independent body. This evaluation must
consider the program's effect on national and economic security
and international trade and travel. Congress should consider
any recommendations from the independent review and evaluation
and also reconsider deadlines for all other entry-exit
statutory requirements. It is further recommended that any
mandates in this area receive appropriate funding.\7\
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\7\ Data Management Improvement Act Task Force Second Annual Report
to Congress, Department of Homeland Security, December 2003.
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We note that no thorough evaluation of the air and sea
implementation of US-VISIT has yet been done to our knowledge--and the
deadlines for land implementation are fast approaching.
The Chamber, its members, and the ABB coalition fully support the
efforts of the Department of Homeland Security to improve the security
at our ports of entry and borders and we recognize that the Department
faces many difficult challenges. We do not oppose the US-VISIT system;
the Department has worked hard over the last year to listen to the
concerns of business and has made significant strides in adopting
systems that attempt to balance the need for security and the continued
facilitation of legitimate travel at our ports of entry. However, the
U.S. Chamber and its members remain very concerned that, if the US-
VISIT system is implemented improperly, we risk serious economic harm
by impeding the billions of dollars in cross-border trade (particularly
at our land borders) and deterring the millions of legitimate visitors
to our country, who also spend billions of dollars within our borders.
Frankly, there is a concern that the government may be acting
without sufficient planning and testing to ensure the systems will not
adversely impact commerce and travel. And it is not an overstatement,
given the enormity of our cross-border traffic, to say that there is
literally no room for error. In fact, the recent GAO report on the US-
VISIT expenditure plan noted the lack of sufficient testing plans or
structures.
DHS has not employed rigorous, disciplined management controls
typically associated with successful programs, such as test
management, and its plans for implementing other controls, such
as independent verification and validation, may not prove
effective. More specifically, testing of the initial phase of
the implemented system was not well managed and was completed
after the system became operational. In addition, multiple test
plans were developed during testing, and only the final test
plan, completed after testing, included all required content,
such as describing tests to be performed. Such controls, while
significant for the initial phases of US-VISIT, are even more
critical for the later phases, as the size and complexity of
the program will only increase.\8\
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\8\ ``First Phase of Visitor and Immigration Status Program
Operating, but Improvements Needed,'' General Accounting Office Report
GAO-04-586, May 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We submitted comments to the Department of Homeland Security on its
interim final rule implementing the US-VISIT requirements for visa
travelers at air and seaports on February 4, 2004. Some of these
comments have been echoed in the recent GAO report just cited. I would
briefly like to highlight some of our concerns regarding the air
implementation here today.
First, although major delays in international arrivals have not
been reported from the implementation at US-VISIT at airports so far
(we do not have information about the sea port implementation), we are
extremely concerned about the capacity of the system to absorb
additional travelers and additional data, as we enter the peak travel
season, particularly with the inclusion of Visa Waiver travelers by the
end of September.\9\ This concern arises on the technology, personnel,
and infrastructure level. The US-VISIT program has so far been
operational only during the lowest period for international travel to
the United States during the year. As travel season picks up this
summer, we expect additional travelers to arrive requiring enrollment
in US-VISIT.
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\9\ Approximately 13 million Visa Waiver Program entries would be
included in the system, according to DHS data.
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We also noted that CBP, as an insurance against delays, deployed
additional personnel to airports in the initial days of the US-VISIT
implementation. Yet GAO further noted that the US-VISIT office does not
project any increased personnel requirements for the US-VISIT
program.\10\ If additional travelers during peak season or additional
classes of travelers are required to be enrolled in the US-VISIT
system, it is hard to imagine that additional staff will not be
necessary to avoid delays. We would strongly urge CBP to devote
adequate staff to ensure expeditious processing of all international
travelers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ ``Finally, DHS's plans for future US-VISIT resource needs at
the land ports of entry, such as staff and facilities, are based on
questionable assumptions, making future resource needs uncertain.''
Ibid.
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We also have concerns about the proposed exit system for airports,
which is still in the development phases. The current system of exit
confirmation is the testing of self-service kiosks located near the
passenger security checkpoints at airports. While the concept of a
self-service checkout is appealing, and certainly is the least likely
to cause disruption or additional backups for departing travelers, the
lack of information provided to travelers and the seeming
``voluntariness'' of the system may, in fact, reduce the effectiveness
of the exit system in actually recording departures. The self-service
kiosk also provides the traveler with no documentary evidence that he
or she has complied with the exit verification, and, therefore, should
any discrepancy arise, the traveler will be at a loss to prove
compliance.
Given these discrepancies, any method of exit verification must
include clear directions to the traveler upon entry as to the need to
``check out'' upon departure and the means by which to do so. Since
initially the exit capability will not be available at all airports, we
predict a great deal of confusion by travelers as to the exit
requirement. We have already received questions via our American
Chambers of Commerce overseas regarding whether travelers must exit
from designated airports, and if they do not, how their exit will be
registered and whether it will impact their ability to return to the
United States in the future. A great deal of outreach to travelers (in
multiple languages) must be made to avoid inadvertent noncompliance
with any requirements for exit verification. We would strongly urge a
period of time during which any negative impacts from failure to
register are waived until it is clear that most travelers understand
and are able to comply with the exit requirements.
Of course, the largest challenge to the US-VISIT program remains
the land borders. The circumstances of travel at land borders are
monumentally different than at air and seaports and the hurdles are
immeasurably higher. The unique situation of the land borders was
discussed extensively in the 2002 DMIA Task Force Report to Congress.
The report stated:
There is a marked difference between an inspection conducted at
an air or sea POE [port of entry] and one conducted at a land
border. Because of their varied status, divergent points of
origin, unfamiliarity with requirements and regulations, and
the increased risk to the U.S., most applicants for admission
at seaports and airports receive a comprehensive inspection
that includes mandatory data systems checks. In contrast, the
great majority of persons arriving at land border POEs are
residents of the border area who cross frequently and are
familiar with requirements concerning their entry into the U.S.
and receive an inspection that may include data systems checks.
The vast majority of all border crossings into the U.S. occur
at land border POEs. . . . Border traffic includes U.S.
citizens who leave and reenter the U.S. multiple times daily,
permanent residents who make multiple entries, and aliens who
hold non-immigrant visas or border crossing cards and commute
back and forth daily or weekly from Canada or Mexico.
Individuals can cross land borders as pedestrians, on bicycles,
in cars, rails, buses, trucks, or other vehicles.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Data Management Improvement Act Task Force First Annual Report
to Congress, December 2002, p. 11.
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In fact 80% of all inspections take place at the land borders; over
358 million inspections in 2002 were conducted at land borders,
compared to 78 million at airports and 12 million at seaports.\12\ The
land borders also see the crossing of $540 billion in surface trade
between the United States, Canada and Mexico.\13\ As these facts and
statistics reveal, the land borders represent a significantly larger
challenge for the Department in order to ensure that the implementation
of US-VISIT does not impede legitimate commerce and travel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Source: PAS G-22.1 INS Statistics, cited in Data Management
Improvement Act Second Annual Report to Congress, December 2003, p. 15.
\13\ Bureau of Transportation Statistics, U.S. Department of
Transportation, North American Merchandise Trade by U.S. State and All
Land Modes, 2002, www.bts.gov/ntda/tbscd/reports/annual02/state/
us_trade_2002_all.html.
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I do wish to emphasize that there is more at stake here than
dollars and cents. The way we go about securing our nation has a
profound impact on how other countries view us. It is also about a way
of life that is intrinsic at our borders. These communities are so
intertwined with those across the border that not just jobs, but whole
lives, could be changed along with the fabric and social underpinnings
of these communities if we are not careful about our approach.\14\
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\14\ We have attached to this testimony the results of a recent
survey we conducted of local chambers of commerce in communities along
the borders with Canada and Mexico which give detail regarding the
economic and social impact of border changes on their communities. The
results include economic impact studies, resolutions of concern by
local chambers of commerce, and other statements regarding the border.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Therefore we also urge that as the US-VISIT program is developed it
be coordinated with other programs at the land borders, including
NEXUS, SENTRI and the FAST clearance for truck operators. But
especially we urge that DHS actively, and quickly, provide the border
communities with a detailed description of the programs to be
implemented and how, so that inaccuracies, rumors and fears may be
quelled. The time for generalities has passed and communities need a
detailed explanation, port-by-port as to how US-VISIT will be up and
running by December 2004. These communities, which know the day-to-day
realities, should be given the chance to comment both formally and
informally on the proposed implementation, and provide input and
feedback to ensure that their, and our, worst fears are not realized.
In conclusion, we know that our borders and ports of entry cannot
be our first line of defense, but the last in a series of layers, that
begins when a foreign traveler decides to visit the U.S. at our
embassies and consulates abroad. Many necessary changes have already
been made in our visa process, but not without impact.
America's trade relationships, our diplomatic relationships, our
cultural relationships and our academic relationships with the rest of
the world depend a great deal on the ability of people to travel to the
United States. The ability of any of these transactions to happen
depends on the timeliness, predictability and efficiency of our visa
and immigration system. Unfortunately, these qualities have been sorely
lacking. Specifically, the changes to the visa system over the last
year have strained many of our business and international
relationships, and have created problems and costs for our economy, as
described above. We need to be pro-active in quickly correcting these
negative perceptions, and further refining our necessary procedures.
Once patterns of travel, trade and educational and cultural exchange
are reestablished with other nations, it will be difficult for the
United States to get them back. We understand that the Department of
Homeland Security is currently undertaking a thorough review of the
visa system, with an eye toward these goals of security, efficiency and
timeliness and we welcome that review, and hope we will have an
opportunity to participate with the Department in reengineering this
process.\15\
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\15\ Tom Donohue, the President and CEO of the U.S. Chamber, has
written to both Secretaries Ridge and Powell regarding visa processing
and has suggested that a private sector advisory committee be created
on this issue. The Chamber will soon be submitting detailed suggestions
to the Department of Homeland Security to improve visa processing.
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Let me reiterate that we understand the concern for security, and
the Chamber fully supports efforts to improve our screening of persons
who wish to come to this country. However, as stated above, we must
look for those processes that can achieve that objective without
sacrificing the efficiency and timeliness of our system. Our largest
concern is that new policies seem to have been put in place with
inadequate consideration of the need for coordination and communication
with the private sector, or the real resource needs to efficiently
carry out these changes.
We are also aware that many of these changes are being prompted by
Congressional mandates, with tight deadlines. We believe that Congress
must take a realistic look at what it hopes to accomplish in such a
short time, and the costs, to the taxpayers, to our economy and our
foreign relations of moving forward without adequately gauging the
impacts. While deadlines may impart the seriousness of the imperative,
deadlines that cannot be met provide a false sense of security.
None of this is to discourage efforts within the government
agencies to deal with the very difficult questions of how to ensure
that the next terrorist cannot penetrate our border protections--
whether at the consulates overseas or at the ports of entry. In the
end, it is the quintessential job of government to protect its
citizens, and progress has been made. But we urge those with this
responsibility to listen to the very real concerns of those who must
live with the decisions they make.
I wish to thank you for this opportunity to share the views of the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce and I look forward to your questions.
U.S. Chamber of Commerce Border Survey March 2004
The following represents a sampling of the responses we received to
an informal survey of local chambers of commerce on the Canadian and
Mexican borders in March 2004 regarding the potential impact of border
security measures, including the proposed US-VISIT system, on their
communities and economies.
Texas
The Laredo Port of Entry is the busiest commercial crossing on the
U.S.-Mexico border, handling more than 9,000 trucks and over 900 rail
cars each day. The Port of Laredo processed more than $32 million in
exports and almost $47 million in imports from Mexico in 2002. In
addition, the crossings in Laredo process almost 25,000 pedestrians and
more than 43,000 passenger cars daily. According to the Laredo Chamber,
``[A]ny delay, no matter how small per entry, multiplies into major
congestion.''\16\ The Laredo Chamber estimates that at least 50% of
local business is directly or indirectly tied to cross-border trade and
traffic.
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\16\ Response to survey by Miguel A. Conchas, President and CEO of
the Laredo Chamber of Commerce, February 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A recent study by Dr. Michael Patrick, Director for the Texas
Center for Border Economic and Enterprise Development at Texas A&M
University concluded that a 1% decrease in border crossings would cost
the Laredo economy $19 million in annual sales, and increase local
unemployment by 7.2%. Sales taxes alone would decline by $133,000.
Across all of the major Texas ports, Brownsville, McAllen, Laredo, and
El Paso a 1% decline in crossings would cost the border region $76
million in sales and 1,500 jobs, and decrease the Gross State Product
by $1.2 billion.\17\
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\17\ Patrick, Dr. Michael, ``The Price of Security,'' Inlandport:
The Laredo Chamber's Business and Trade Magazine, January/February
2004.
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The Brownsville, Texas Chamber of Commerce reported an additional
concern: Mexican citizens own approximately 50% of the resort
condominiums at South Padre Island. Because the majority of Mexican
border crossers hold so-called ``laser visas,'' Border Crossing Cards
that also serve as visitor (``B-1/B-2'') visas that generally restrict
their period of stay to 72 hours, the Chamber is extremely concerned
that if border crossings become more difficult, many of these owners
will divest of their real estate, costing the local economy millions of
dollars. If the period of stay for ``laser visas'' is not extended,
long border delays will limit the time that these vacationers can use
their homes, making these investments less attractive.
The El Paso international bridges handle almost one-fifth of all
trade along the U.S.-Mexico border, more than $38 million in 2002.
Local economists estimate between 15% and 20% of the city's retail
sales are derived from Mexican nationals.
According to the Greater San Antonio Chamber of Commerce, Mexican
nationals purchased approximately $170 million in retail goods in San
Antonio last year. Two major malls in the area report that as much as
35% of all sales go to Mexican nationals. Further, according to Visa
International, San Antonio has the second largest usage of their credit
cards by Mexican nationals in the United States (second to McAllen),
with 8.29% of total U.S. purchases.
The Free Trade Alliance of San Antonio, the Greater San Antonio
Chamber of Commerce and the communities of Brownsville, McAllen,
Laredo, Del Rio, and El Paso have agreed to work together to address
these issues. One common goal is to obtain a change to the limitation
on the ``laser visa'' to allow Mexican nationals to stay for longer
periods of time and to be exempt from US-VISIT enrollment, since they
have already submitted to extensive background checks to obtain the
cards, which contain the biometric identifiers required under the US-
VISIT system.
Washington
Whatcom County, Washington has four border crossings, Peace Arch,
Pacific Highway, Lynden, and Sumas, accounting for more than 2 million
crossings per quarter. The region had almost a one-third drop in
crossings since the fall of 2002. While some of this continued the
downward trend since the Canadian dollar weakened in the 1990s, it is
worth noting that border activity has not increased in recent years as
the Canadian dollar has strengthened.
A survey conducted by Western Washington University in the summer
of 2003 revealed that Canadian shoppers make approximately 10% of all
retail sales in Whatcom County, estimated at over $35 million. In 2002
the total trading relationship between Washington and Canada was nearly
$11.3 billion. The Blaine, Washington border crossings are the sixth
largest crossing in value of trade on the Canadian border at $9.9
billion.
According to Department of Homeland Security estimates, an
additional nine seconds of inspection time will result in over 700
additional minutes of cumulative vehicle wait time at the Blaine
crossing.\18\ Delays at the border after September 11 and during
periods of heightened security alert have caused Canadian residents,
particularly in the Vancouver metropolitan area, to believe that border
crossing is a hassle. There is discussion in British Columbia of
running commercials on Vancouver area television encouraging Canadians
to return north. Canadian press has reported stories about US-VISIT
expressing great concern that it will cause additional delays when
implemented. The local chamber of commerce in Bellingham, Washington
reports hearing very little about how the Department is intending to
implement US-VISIT and is very eager for local community outreach.
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\18\ Department of Homeland Security, US-VISIT Industry Day
Briefing, July 2003, http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/
USVISIT_IndustryConfBrief.pdf.
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Arizona
The Yuma County, Arizona chamber has concerns about the impact of
US-VISIT on the more than 20,000 agricultural workers that visit daily
at the San Luis Port of Entry during the agricultural season. Yuma is a
county of 170,000 people in the southwest of the state called ``the
lettuce capital of the country'' and depends on this agricultural
workforce for its more than $500 million agricultural industry.
According to Ken Rosevear, Executive Director of the Yuma Chamber of
Commerce:
It is extremely important that [these workers] are able to
cross within a short window of time to be able to coordinate
with the busses that transport them to their work areas. These
areas may be as far as 50 miles and require another two hours
of travel. Waiting times at the border during the season can
reach 2+ hours and that delay can cause shortages for that
day's labor force in the fields. . . .[T]hese delays can cost
millions of dollars in lost revenue per day.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Response to survey of border chambers, February 2004.
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According to the Yuma chamber, a new port of entry at San Luis East
is in the early stages of development because of existing congestion at
the port of entry, including a new highway to run from the port to
Interstate 8. According to Mr. Rosevear, ``As far as ability to absorb
any further delay in either commercial, auto, or pedestrian traffic,
absolutely NONE. This will bring total gridlock to our current port.''
\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Douglas, Arizona Chamber of Commerce reports similar concerns.
Douglas estimates that more than 60% of its retail volume is from
Mexican customers, and it underpins the entire local economy. Currently
crossing times coming into the United States range from 20 minutes to 2
hours, with lines backing up more than 10 blocks into the town. This
traffic backup creates air pollution problems. The regular crossers
include employees of the more than 26 maquiladora plants across the
border, and farm workers. These workers regularly cross the border each
way daily, and sometimes several times.
The Nogales Chamber of Commerce reports that 80% to 90% of business
in the town is tied to the border. The largest employers include the
more than 300 maquiladora plants, produce companies, government
agencies (most tied to the border) and merchants, who estimate that 80%
of their revenue is from Mexican customers. Crossing times at the
Nogales Port of Entry range from 20 to 40 minutes on average with
longer waits during morning and afternoon commute times. According to
Department estimates, a nine second increase in inspection times at the
Nogales Port of Entry would result in an additional 500 minutes of
vehicle wait time.\21\ Of significance is the fact that the Nogales
Chamber was not aware of US-VISIT or its pending implementation until
informed by the U.S. Chamber. Apparently, there had been no outreach by
the border agencies to the local Nogales business community.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Department of Homeland Security, US-VISIT Industry Day
Briefing, July 2003, http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/
USVISIT_IndustryConfBrief.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
New York
The Watertown Chamber of Commerce recently conducted a study of the
Thousand Islands bridge crossing. The Thousand Islands crossing, which
connects Interstate 81 to Highway 404 in Ontario is one of the fastest
growing travel routes between Ontario, Quebec and the U.S. southern and
mid-Atlantic states and cities, handling more than 2 million passenger
cars per year, and forecasting 80% increase in traffic in the next 30
years. What makes this crossing unusual is that almost two-thirds of
crossings are for recreation, and 63% of the visits are for more than
two nights. Commuter crossings dominate the other major ports of entry
on the U.S.-Canada border. As a major gateway between the recreational
areas of upstate New York and the ``cottage'' areas of Ontario and
Quebec, Thousand Islands is potentially more susceptible to declines in
crossings due to delays, as vacationers may choose to spend their
holidays on their own side of the border. The crossing also
accommodates more than 1,500 commercial vehicles daily, comprising $29
million in trade per day, with more than 165,000 jobs in the U.S. and
Canada dependent on this trade.
According to the Plattsburgh-North Country Chamber of Commerce, the
total economic impact of Canada on the Clinton County, New York area,
surrounding the Champlain/LaColle border crossing, is more than $1.3
billion, including more than 14% of all county jobs, almost $300
million in annual visitor spending on tourism and retail, and $8.7
million in county sales tax generated. The Champlain/LaColle border
crossing is the only crossing in the eastern half of the continent that
does not cross water, and is currently undergoing a major expansion.
Yet, still, at the height of the summer vacation season, backups at
this crossing can be over two hours.
California
The San Ysidro Port of Entry in California is the busiest border
crossing in the world, processing over 40 million passengers and 15
million trucks and busses annually over the past three years. Its
sister port at Otay Mesa, primarily a commercial port, handles more
than $20 billion in two-way surface trade annually, averaging more than
5 million vehicles and 11 million people crossing annually in the last
five years.
According to the San Ysidro Chamber of Commerce, more than 60,000
people cross the border daily, and two-thirds of this volume are
regular crossers, presumably workers. Inbound waits for crossing are
often more than two hours, and the chamber estimates that if each car
is stopped only 10 seconds longer more than nine hours of delay could
result. In the days following September 11, businesses along Main
Street in San Ysidro reported more than 90% lost business. Further,
there is no infrastructure in place for exit inspections, and no room
for expansion; the town of Tijuana starts literally adjacent to the
port of entry. Even so, outbound traffic is often backed up more than
one hour, even though Mexican customs usually waives most traffic
through.
At Otay Mesa, the local chamber of commerce estimates that 95% of
business in the town is generated by cross-border trade, both directly
and indirectly, much of it the maquila industries that operate
facilities on both sides of the border, including Sanyo, Honeywell,
Hitachi, Parker Hannifin, and others. One of the main appeals of the
area is the availability of a skilled, legal workforce that enters from
Tijuana daily.
The El Centro Chamber of Commerce, located just north of the
Calexico border crossing, is concerned with the impact on its retail
economy. El Centro has a population of about 150,000, but the adjoining
town of Mexicali has more than 500,000 ``laser visa'' holders. The
local Costco and Wal-Mart retail outlets depend on this cross-border
shopping, and ground has recently been broken on a large new regional
mall with numerous national retailers to serve this Mexican market.
Further, businesses in El Centro and farms throughout the Imperial
Valley depend on Mexican labor. The El Centro chamber expressed
concerns similar to the Yuma chamber of the impact of US-VISIT on the
entry of agricultural workers to this vibrant growing center in
California.
The Greater San Diego Chamber of Commerce reports that total sales
to Mexican citizens represented $3 billion in retail sales for San
Diego in 2000 and 2001. After 9/11, increased border security resulted
in decreases in sales of up to 80% for several months.
The Greater San Diego Chamber of Commerce, along with the City of
Chula Vista, the City of San Diego, the San Diego Association of
Governments (SANDAG), San Diego Dialogue, Sand Diego Regional Economic
Development Corporation, the San Diego World Trade Center, San Ysidro
Business Association, San Ysidro Chamber of Commerce, and the South San
Diego Economic Development Council, has formed the San Diego Alliance
for Border Efficiency. One of its goals is to mitigate the impact of
US-VISIT on southbound border congestion by ensuring the development of
necessary infrastructure prior to implementation.
Michigan
The Detroit/Windsor border crossings account for more than 27
million inspections annually and almost $100 billion in trade. These
crossings account for almost 40% of all U.S.-Canada trade, with the
Ambassador Bridge being the single busiest border crossing along the
northern border, handling 25% of U.S.-Canada trade itself. The
automotive industry alone accounts for more than $300 million of this
daily trade. More than 160,000 jobs in Michigan and 1.8 million jobs
nationwide are tied to the export of manufactured goods to Canada.
Thirty-eight states and Puerto Rico have Canada as their primary
trading partner, and half of U.S. exports to Canada are produced in 14
states. Of the passenger crossings, the majority of noncommercial
crossings are locals. More than 10,000 people cross the border in
Michigan to work, including more than 1,600 nurses in the city of
Detroit. One hospital estimates that 15% of its nursing staff, and 20%
of its critical care nursing staff, cross the border from Canada.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Testimony of Dan Cherrin, former Director of Federal Public
Policy of the Detroit Regional Chamber before the Standing Committee on
Industry, Science and Technology of the Parliament of Canada, November
1, 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The efficiency of these border crossings is extremely fragile.
Following the September 11 attacks, additional security at the Detroit
border crossings resulted in 20 mile delays on the Canadian side,
taking five hours to enter the U.S. However, delays as little as 20
minutes for just-in-time parts deliveries can result in assembly line
shutdowns, increased costs to reroute trucks or ship cargo by rail,
barge, or air, and create emergency inventory stockpiles (the exact
costs that just-in-time was supposed to replace).
In a June 1998 Senate Judiciary Report on the original entry-exit
system proposed by Section 110 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Dan Stamper of the Detroit
International Bridge Company is cited as estimating that additional
entry and exit procedures that would add only 30 seconds per vehicle
(for only half of the daily crossings) would still add 3,750 minutes of
extra processing time per day. Since there are only 1,440 minutes in a
day, this effect would essentially shut down the border. In a February
26, 2004, letter to the Detroit Regional Chamber, Neal Belitsky,
Executive Vice President of the Detroit & Canada Tunnel Corporation
(which operates the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel), stated:
Our facility is typical of those at the other major crossings
between Michigan or New York and Ontario. The Bridge & Tunnel
Operator's Association (BTOA) represents these crossings.
Plazas were not designed for today's traffic volumes or the
post 9-11 environment. . . .We are concerned that the system
may not be fully field tested prior to installation. This could
lead to significant disruptions in cross border traffic and
trade. Has an assessment been completed that will indicate both
anticipated volumes and risk?''\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Letter to Claudia Berry, Public Affairs Group, Detroit
Regional Chamber of Commerce, from Neal Belitsky, Executive Vice
President, Detroit and Canada Tunnel Corporation, February 26, 2004..
Mr. Camp. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Bonner, you have 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF T.J. BONNER, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL BORDER CONTROL
COUNCIL
Mr. Bonner. Thank you. It is a pleasure to present the
views and concerns of 10,000 front-line Border Patrol employees
regarding the level of coordination and cooperation between the
various agencies responsible for different aspects of homeland
security, as well as to make specific recommendations for
improving these important interactions.
Prior to the creation of the Department of Homeland
Security, coordination within the agencies with primary
jurisdiction for enforcing immigration, customs and agriculture
laws was generally very good. Unfortunately, this same level of
cooperation did not extend beyond each branch. The Homeland
Security Act of 2002 attempted to improve coordination by
placing the agencies responsible for enforcing these laws under
one umbrella and creating two separate components: the Bureau
of Border Security for enforcement, and the Bureau of
Citizenship and Immigration Services for service.
A subsequent political compromise, however, replaced the
Bureau of Border Security with two separate enforcement
entities, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and the
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. In retrospect,
this was a mistake. This artificial bifurcation of the
enforcement functions of the Department has created needless
barriers to the cooperation and coordination that is so
essential in law enforcement, replicating and exacerbating some
of the very problems that led to the call for a consolidated
agency.
The merger also created another set of challenges relating
to the effective enforcement of the various laws under the
jurisdiction of the new Department. Instead of the relatively
narrow focus of the previous entities, the two new bureaus are
both responsible for enforcing customs, immigration and
agriculture laws. Each of these areas of law are extremely
complex and require a great deal of training and experience to
master. It is unrealistic to expect employees to be fully
competent in these three complex areas of law. In the war
against terrorism, mediocrity is simply not an acceptable
standard.
To remedy these deficiencies, the following solutions are
recommended. One, consolidate the Bureaus of Customs and Border
Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement into a
single Bureau of Border Security, as envisioned by the Homeland
Security Act, ensuring that the Border Patrol remains a
separate entity within that Bureau. Two, ensure that the three
main areas of law within the jurisdiction of the consolidated
bureau are administered and enforced by specialists who are
comprehensively trained in a single discipline. Finally, ensure
that all of the components within the consolidated bureau,
including the Border Patrol, have their own investigative
branches that report directly up the chain of command to the
head of their respective division.
While the need for these reforms is obvious to everyone who
regularly deals with these issues, managers and other employees
without collective bargaining rights and protections are
constrained from publicly acknowledging it. The recent decision
to remove such protections from all the criminal investigators
in the Department will deprive Congress and the public of their
invaluable perspective. Likewise, the new human resources
management system currently being developed will have the same
chilling effect on the ability of the Department's remaining
employees to speak out on issues of public concern.
Deliberately stifling the voice of those who can warn us of
problems and recommend solutions is not only counterproductive,
it is an open invitation to disaster.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Bonner follows:]
Prepared Statement of T.J. Bonner,
On behalf of the 10,000 Border Patrol employees that it represents,
the National Border Patrol Council thanks you for the opportunity to
present our views and concerns regarding the level of coordination and
cooperation between the various agencies responsible for different
aspects of homeland security, as well as our recommendations for
improving these important interactions.
Prior to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, all
of the agencies with primary jurisdiction for enforcing immigration,
customs, and agriculture laws employed various classifications of
enforcement personnel, including criminal investigators, responsible
for those matters within their areas of jurisdiction. Coordination
within these agencies was generally very good. For example, the
criminal investigators in the Border Patrol's Anti-Smuggling Unit
worked very closely with uniformed Border Patrol Agents to uncover and
break up alien smuggling rings. This close internal coordination was a
result of all of the various operations being overseen by the same
management structure and sharing the same organizational culture and
values. Unfortunately, this same level of cooperation did not extend
beyond each branch.
The lack of cooperation and coordination between the agencies
responsible for enforcing the laws at our Nation's borders and beyond
was understandably a matter of concern even before the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks. Additionally, there was a great deal of support
for the concept of separating the enforcement and service functions of
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (I&NS). In fact, the
National Border Patrol Council endorsed that idea.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 embodied those principles,
authorizing the creation of separate components for enforcement and
service, the Bureau of Border Security and the Bureau of Citizenship
and Immigration Services. For reasons that are not entirely clear, a
subsequent political compromise replaced the Bureau of Border Security
with two separate enforcement entities, the Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement.
In an attempt to appease those who supported the existing
bureaucracies, inspections and patrol functions were placed into one
bureau, and investigation, detention, and removal functions in another.
Although proponents claimed that this new structure would create a
clear demarcation between border enforcement and interior enforcement,
this naive perspective is at odds with reality. By definition, every
case involving the smuggling of people or goods into the United States
originates at the border. This artificial bifurcation of the
enforcement functions of the Department has created needless barriers
to the cooperation and coordination that is so essential in law
enforcement, replicating and exacerbating some of the very problems
that led to the call for a consolidated agency.
The merger also created another set of challenges relating to the
effective enforcement of the various laws under the jurisdiction of the
new Department. Instead of the relatively narrow focus of the previous
entities, the two new bureaus are both responsible for enforcing
customs, immigration, and agriculture laws. Each of these areas of law
are extremely complex, and require a great deal of training and
experience to master.
Although the creation of the Department of Homeland Security has
been compared to a corporate merger, a more apt analogy would be that
of a hostile takeover. While it certainly would have been unwise to
incorporate the mistakes of the beleaguered I&NS into the new
Department, it was equally inadvisable to ignore the vast amount of
knowledge and wisdom possessed by countless individuals who had
dedicated their careers to enforcing immigration laws. The dominance of
a single program in managing and setting the priorities of the bureaus
that are now responsible for enforcing these three broad areas of law
has resulted in a decreased emphasis on the enforcement of immigration
and agriculture laws. This is not so much a conscious decision at the
highest levels of the organization, but rather a normal subconscious
predilection on the part of field managers who are primarily familiar
with customs laws. Training and directives will not cure this problem;
a revised structure is necessary. The new structure must recognize that
it is unrealistic to expect employees to be fully competent in three
complex areas of law. In the war against terrorism, mediocrity is
simply not an acceptable standard.
The implementation of the following recommendations would correct
these deficiencies:
(1)Consolidate the bureaus of Customs and Border Protection and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement into a single bureau of Border
Security, ensuring that the Border Patrol remains a separate entity
within that bureau.
(2)Ensure that the three main areas of law within the jurisdiction
of the consolidated bureau are administered and enforced by specialists
who are comprehensively trained in a single discipline.
(3)Ensure that all of the components within the consolidated
bureau, including the Border Patrol, have their own investigative
branches that report directly up the chain of command to the head of
their respective division.
While the need for these reforms is obvious to everyone who
regularly deals with these issues, managers and other employees without
collective bargaining rights and protections are constrained from
publicly acknowledging it. The recent decision to remove such
protections from all of the criminal investigators in the Department
will deprive Congress and the public of their invaluable perspective.
Likewise, the new human resources management system currently being
developed will have the same chilling effect on the ability of the
Department's remaining employees to speak out on issues of public
concern. Deliberately stifling the voice of those who can warn us of
problems and recommend solutions is not only counter-productive, it is
an open invitation to disaster.
Mr. Camp. Thank you, Mr. Bonner.
Mr. Ugazio, you have 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF SERGIO UGAZIO, SECRETARY, NATIONAL INS COUNCIL
LOCAL 1944, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
Mr. Ugazio. Good morning, members, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Sanchez, distinguished members of this committee. My
name is Sergio Ugazio. I am Secretary of Local 1944, National
Immigration and Naturalization Service Council. I am also an
immigration enforcement agent with the Bureau of Immigration's
Custom Enforcement within the newly formed Department of
Homeland Security. I have been an immigration agent for almost
10 years, and prior to that I was a corrections officer at a
maximum security penitentiary within the Federal Bureau of
Prisons. I am a former United States Marine and veteran of
Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
This morning, I will touch on three points of interest
within the Department of Homeland Security. They are as
follows: the relationship between the Bureau of Customs and
Border Protections and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, specifically the way that special agents, Border
Patrol agents, and detention personnel interact; a widespread
morale problems in both bureaus; and finally, everyone's
favorite topic, pay banding and pay-for-performance systems.
First, with regard to staffing, while it is true DHS has
increased the number of Border Patrol agents, like my colleague
here, and inspectors to put on the borders since the events of
September 11, 2001, in my line of work, detention and
deportation, there have not been enough new hires to ensure
proper execution of deportation procedures, nor to ensure
adequate personnel for immigration court and final disposition.
There is also a lack of detention space.
What this means is CBP officers, special agents and other
law enforcement agencies are making arrests, but no one is
taking care of these criminals. I am talking about criminals.
Who is going to deport these people? And most importantly, how
and where are these illegal aliens going to be housed? You can
catch all of the illegal immigrants you want, but please
consider what is to be done with them once they are caught and
in custody.
Illegal aliens apprehended in the U.S. have to be processed
for immigration court and final disposition procedures, and
reviewed for possible criminal activity, or most importantly,
terror connections. If the number of arresting agents
increases, then the number of agents preparing cases for final
disposition must be increased as well, which is me. If you have
a lot of these guys here, I am the guy that has to deal with
what they do. I am the one that clean up everything that they
do and makes sure that the rules and regulations of this
Congress are followed.
In fact, it is on a daily basis in this country, aliens are
caught crossing the border illegally and released and paroled
in because of the lack of detention bed space. Where are you
going to put these people once they are captured? Okay? They
have to go somewhere. Once an alien is in custody, he must be
offered due process. In South Texas, we have hundreds of agents
and inspectors arresting people, but only 22 deportation
officers oversee thousands of cases while ensuring an alien's
rights are not violated, and the agency is protected from
Habeas actions and lawsuits. This is an enormous undertaking
and responsibility. The bottom line is clear: We need more
detention and removal staff, which is what I do, not what he
does. He catches them. I deal with the end result.
As to the second point, there is a morale problem within
the DHS. A minute ago, a gentleman sitting over there says, how
is the pay. The Chief said, hey, it is great; we all got GS-
11s. But that is a temporary fix. We are going to go to a
situation called pay banding. We had the largest budget in the
history of the INS, Border Patrol, U.S. Customs, U.S.
Agriculture, and yet we are under a hiring freeze. How are you
going to catch these terror connections if you are under a
hiring freeze? If the U.S. faces the threats it does, why are
we not hiring more personnel? Why isn't there any money for
overtime? There are people who want to do the job, but there is
no money for overtime.
These are the kinds of questions being asked and this is
why a morale problem exits. Also, the proposed new personnel
system for the Department shifts the balance of power from
unions to management so dramatically that it is causing great
fear among employees. Pay banding, for instance, is part of the
new system. This system has not worked for federal air
marshals. What makes you all think it is going to work for us?
This is demoralizing, and under this plan supervisors can
unfairly reward their friends, and less-favored agents better
not complain.
In closing, I know the agency and its executive staffs have
a daunting task in making this successful, and I know it is a
difficult deal. I know that many people at all levels are doing
their best. All I ask is that you keep the concerns expressed
by the agents and officers and administrative support staff and
all others about the proposed personnel system. All of these
people that responded to the crumbling towers in New York on 9-
11, they were all union members, every single one of them. They
never complained about the working conditions that day, because
I do not think there were any working conditions.
That is it. My time ran out.
[The statement of Mr. Ugazio follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sergio Ugazio
Good morning Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sanchez and distinguished
Members of this Committee. My name is Sergio A. Ugazio and I am the
Secretary for Local 1944 of the National Immigration and Naturalization
Service Council. I am also an Immigration Enforcement Agent with the
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE) within the newly
formed Department of Homeland Security (DHS). I have been an
Immigration Agent for almost 10 years and prior to that I was a
Corrections Officer at a maximum security prison within the Federal
Bureau of Prisons. I am also a former U.S. Marine and veteran of Desert
Shield/Desert Storm.
This morning I am going to discuss three points of interest
concerning the Department of Homeland Security. They are as follows:
(1.) The relationship between the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection (BCBP) and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(BICE) and specifically the way that Special Agents, Border Patrol
Agents, and the Detention personnel interact;
(2.) The widespread morale problem in both Bureaus;
(3.) And finally everybody's favorite topic, Pay Banding and Pay
for Performance systems.
First, with regard to the Border Patrol. While it is true that DHS
has increased the number of agents deployed along the borders since the
events of September 11, 2001, in my line of work--deportation--there
have not been enough new hires to to ensure proper execution of
deportation procedures, nor to endusre adequate personnel for
immigration court and final disposition, and there is a lack of
detention space. . What this means is CBP, Special Agents and other law
enforcement agencies are making arrests but no one is taking care of
the criminals. Who is going to deport these people? And most
importantly, how and where are these illegal aliens going to be housed?
You can catch all of these folks you want, but please, consider what is
to be done with them once they in custody.
Illegal aliens apprehended in the U.S. have to be processed for
immigration court and final deportation procedures and interviewed for
possible criminal activity and terror connections. If the number of
arresting agents increases, then the number of agents preparing cases
for final disposition must be increased as well. The fact is that on a
daily basis in this country, aliens are caught crossing the border
illegally and released (paroled in) because of the lack of detention
bed space. Once an alien is in custody he or she must be afforded due
process. In South Texas, we have hundreds of Agents and Inspectors
arresting people but only 22 Deportation Officers who must oversee
thousands of cases while ensuring aliens rights are not violated and
the agency is protected from Habeas actions and lawsuits. This is an
enormous undertaking and responsibility. The bottom line is clear: We
need more detention and removal staff.
As to the second point, there is a morale problem within DHS. We
have the largest budget in the history of legacy INS, Border Patrol, US
Customs, US Agriculture and yet we under a hiring freeze. With the U.S.
facing the threats it does, why are we not hiring more personnel? Why
isn't there any money for overtime? These are questions the kinds of
questions being asked and why a morale problem exists. Also, the
proposed new personnel system for the Department shifts the balance of
power from unions to management so dramatically that it is causing
great fear among employees.
Pay banding, for instance, is a part of the new system. If this
system of has not worked for the Federal Air Marshals, what makes the
Department believe that it will work for us? I cannot find one agent
that wants this pay system. NOT ONE! I have read about the proposed
system, and to be quite honest, it's demoralizing! Under the plan,
supervisors can unfairly reward their friends, and less favored agents
better not complain. THIS IS NOT FAIR! I am against it, and it is my
opinion that DHS will lose a lot of highly skilled professionals
because of the pay banding system. Just read the comments from
employees; the overwhelming number oppose this system. Let the numbers
speak for themselves
In closing, I know the agency and its executive staff have a
daunting task in making DHS successful. I know that many people at all
levels are doing their best. All I ask is that you hear the concerns
expressed by Agents, Officers, administrative and support staff, and
others about the proposed new personnel system. All of those first
responders, firemen, NYPD, FEMA, and all the other law enforcement
officers that put aside their personal well-being and ran into those
burning and crumbling towers on that infamous day. . . THEY WERE ALL
UNION MEMBERS!
When President Bush went to ground zero and grabbed the loud
speaker, he was addressing union workers. Please don't attack the very
people that defend this nation with union busting and personnel
procedures that eliminate so many important employee rights. Instead,
support us in our effort to be the dedicated, committed and vigilant
employees so many of us want to be. Help us attack terrorism, identify
sleeper cells in the U.S. and work to keep America great. Thank you
Mr. Camp. Thank you very much. Thank you all for your
testimony.
Ms. Sanchez may inquire.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all the
witnesses before us today.
I want to direct just a couple of questions to Mr. Ugazio
and to T. J. Bonner. In the earlier panel, I am sure you heard
all the rosy testimony from our DHS people. I want to find out.
I asked them a couple of questions. I want to find out about
the controlled delivery situation, or even broader than that,
how are the different pieces working together? Do your people
feel that there is the cooperation in between ICE and the
Border Patrol, for example?
Secondly, the other question is about the issue of having
an immigration specialist around when the Border Patrol does
get people, and whether they can be processed, or what you do
with them. So I would ask both of you to speak to that. They
told me there was no problem. They were working together; that
everything was great. What do your people feel? You are
representing the on-the-ground troops there, if you will.
Mr. Ugazio. Basically, ma'am, the way the situation works
is an alien is captured. They are processed by the Border
Patrol. There is a 24-hour situation. They are interviewed by
the Border Patrol personnel for criminal activity, to be
categorized into a situation where they are just border
crossers or if they are criminals or if they have terrorist
connections. Once that is established, then they give a call to
where I am stationed at the facilities. They talk to the
supervisors. It is more like on a case-by-case basis. There
really is not a situation where there is a policy, this is the
way it will be done. It is just the Border Patrol supervisor at
that time calls us and says, do you have bed space; we have
this situation here; can you come pick this up. And a guy like
me will go get them. I will apprehend this individual and he
will come into my custody and he will be held with us.
Ms. Sanchez. What if you do not have bed space?
Mr. Ugazio. If I do not have bed space, ma'am, that
individual is going to be paroled. Once it has been established
that he is just, let's say, a border-crosser, the individual is
paroled into the U.S. which means he is still actually in
custody, but he has to report back to the immigration court for
final disposition. They do or do not. I do not know. Sometimes
they do.
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Bonner?
Mr. Bonner. It is interesting that they chose to put Mr.
Aguilar up here because the Tucson Sector is the only one that
has embarked on a so-called integrated effort between ICE and
CBP. And even at that, it is not working nearly as well as it
could be.
On the issue of controlled loads, we simply do not have
that many occurring now because the level of cooperation is
much less than it used to be when we had our own internal anti-
smuggling unit. Typically on drug loads, we interface with the
Drug Enforcement Agency, which is still part of the Department
of Justice. So that level of cooperation never was really
great, and that aspect has not changed.
What has changed is the emphasis has shifted from
immigration violations to customs violations, because most of
the people who are running the ICE agency are former Customs
people. I cannot really blame them for wanting to not repeat
the mistakes made in the INS and not to bring over poor
managers from that area, but there were a lot of good people
who had a lot of knowledge about immigration, and they have
been pushed out of the picture. So all of the emphasis, or the
majority of it is now on customs violations. So we do not get
those calls anymore, because most customs violations are coming
through the ports of entry, not around the ports of entry.
Ms. Sanchez. The last question I have is on the
performance-based pay system. It seems to me if we are asking
people to cooperate, like in the controlled situation for
example, doesn't the performance-based system maybe not make
you want to cooperate as much? Maybe you want to do a drug
bust, if you are in charge of doing a drug bust at the actual
border, wouldn't you rather do that if it was going to be
performance-based, than let it go through and get somebody else
further up in the system to go after that drug bust, for
example?
Mr. Bonner. Absolutely. If you are being paid based on your
performance, which is rated by your first-line supervisor,
there is absolutely no incentive for you to cooperate outside
that chain of command, because you will not be recognized and
rewarded for it. Another problem that would come up is if you
get intelligence about something happening, you are going to
hang on to that because you will be rewarded if you are the
agent who makes the big bust. So why on earth would you give
the information to the next agent to let them take money out of
your pocket?
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Camp. Thank you. Your time has expired.
Ms. Granger may inquire?
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Ugaziao, you said there is a hiring freeze. When was
that hiring freeze instituted?
Mr. Ugazio. Ma'am, it is currently ongoing. It has been
going on for quite some time. I can provide you that
information. I do not have it with me. I have e-mails from
headquarters stating so. I have that information.
Ms. Granger. Good. Thank you. You talked about pay banding.
I am sorry. I do not know what pay banding is.
Mr. Ugazio. This is exactly the situation that we are
talking about. If there are not people like us, you are never
going to know about that. Union personnel, we are not against
the system. We want to work with you. We want to do the job.
Ms. Granger. What is pay banding?
Mr. Ugazio. Pay banding is a pay-for-performance system
that rewards people that supposedly do a good job and do the
right thing on a daily basis.
Ms. Granger. Fine.
Mr. Ugazio. Here I am addressing Congress, but last month I
got a fully successful, which is a middle rating, for my
interpersonal skills. And I am a union representative. People
come to me with their problems and I deal with them. I am the
liaison between the managers and the problem. It is a buffering
system and I am the guy that does it, and I get a fully
successful, which is a minimum rating. I should be getting
outstanding.
Ms. Granger. Okay. I was not familiar with that term.
Mr. Johnson, you talked about US-VISIT. My question is, is
your question, can it be done? Your concern is, can it be done
at all or can it be done in that time frame?
Mr. Johnson. US-VISIT, I think DHS has recognized they have
to phase-in the system over time, rather than plop it into
place in December 2004. Frankly, I share the skepticism of
border communities, at least the ones we hear from, like
Laredo, which is, are they going to be able to get out there in
December, only 6 months out, and do it in time.
Ms. Granger. Your concern is the time, the deadline.
Mr. Johnson. It is. If they can do it, our hat is off to
them, but we are talking about ripping up streets and
installing equipment, without hopefully delaying traffic while
it is all being done. We are talking about installing radio
frequency responders, where the idea is that people will be
exiting the country, and that when they exit, that will be
picked up by the radio frequency responder with no errors, and
then the next time that person comes back into the country, it
will be faithfully recorded that they in fact exited on time.
What if that is not recorded and what happens when they come
back? There is a big question. Did you exit on time? Did you
exit illegally?
Ms. Granger. You question the deadline, and also whether it
will even work. Right?
Mr. Johnson. Well, they all go together. It is just that we
are skeptical as to whether they can meet it. We are not
questioning the need for US-VISIT and the fact a system has to
be put in place, but there are lots of pieces to this puzzle.
What DHS at a minimum needs to do is get down there to the
border communities, each one individually, and say, this is
what we plan to install, and how to do it, and here is our
timeline at your port of entry. Right now, there are a lot of
generalities at the top, and reassurances that we will get it
done, do not worry. But we have to reflect the concerns of our
local Chambers and that is what I am trying to do.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Camp. Mr. Dicks may inquire.
Mr. Dicks. Let me ask you, Mr. Bonner, does the Border
Patrol have the same problems, morale-wise, as does Mr.
Ugazio's people?
Mr. Bonner. Absolutely. I have been a Border Patrol agent
for 26 years and I can tell you that I have never seen morale
lower.
Mr. Dicks. Again, is it pay banding? Is it the anti-union
approach of the Administration?
Mr. Bonner. I think that is a significant part of the
problem. I think another part, in addition to the pay-for-
performance, is the whole notion that collective bargaining is
going to go away; that employees will lose a meaningful voice.
But another aspect that is very troubling to the agents and is
very demoralizing, is this strategy of deterrence, the notion
that you can sit there for 10 hours and your mere presence will
deter people from coming into the country. The agents see
people streaming by on either side, and they are thinking to
themselves, I signed up for this, to sit here? This is even
worse because they see these recruiting videos where agents you
are on horseback, and there are helicopters, et cetera.
Mr. Dicks. So none of that is occurring? Is that what you
are saying?
Mr. Bonner. I am saying, depending on the part of the
country and depending on your work assignment, you might be
told you are going to sit here all week, 10 hours a day, and
you will do nothing but be a mannequin. That is very
demoralizing.
Mr. Dicks. That is more on the northern border, right?
Mr. Bonner. No, that is on both borders.
Mr. Dicks. Both borders?
Mr. Bonner. Absolutely.
Mr. Dicks. And nobody else is going out to stop these
people from coming in?
Mr. Bonner. That is the reason that we have a minimum of
eight million people in the country illegally.
Mr. Dicks. What is the explanation for that? What is the
strategy?
Mr. Bonner. The explanation is that if you leave your
position, then other people can come in through the void that
you have created. The philosophy behind the strategy is that if
you have a lot of high-visibility positions, that this will
somehow deter people from coming into the country. Well, you
have people in Mexico where for example, the average wage is $4
a day, and in the United States it is at least 10 times that
much, and they have the choice between living in abject poverty
or making a better life for themselves and coming across. Of
course, they are going to do that. I would do that if I were in
their situation.
Mr. Dicks. So you personally disagree with the strategy.
You do not think the deterrent policy is working and that we
ought to be out trying to stop these people from coming in.
Mr. Bonner. Absolutely. We should be out there enforcing
laws the way we did for the first 70 years of the Border
Patrol.
Mr. Dicks. This has all changed since the Department of
Homeland Security was created?
Mr. Bonner. No, this dates back to about 1994 when they
launched Operation Hold the Line. Actually, Hold the Line I
believe was initiated in 1992. It was a gradual transition, but
it swept across the whole Border Patrol by the mid-1990s. It
has had a very demoralizing effect. I think that strategically
it has been a mistake. It has resulted in higher numbers of
people eluding apprehension.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Johnson, go back to US-VISIT. I understand
the part of it dealing with the airlines. Tell us what this
actually means? What is required at the ports of entry?
Mr. Johnson. Well, right now if you hold a visa, and you
come into a port of entry, either airports or come December at
land ports, you have to come into primary, and then you will be
referred to what they call secondaries, as these gentlemen know
better than I, and your index fingerprints will be taken and
you will be photographed, and that information will be put into
a database.
Of course, you are also checked at that same time, as
everyone else is, against INS's databases like IDENT and NAILS.
Now, the visa waiver program, individual travelers are going to
be added come September, and that is an estimated 13 million
additional travelers to the program. So obviously, that is a
huge chunk of a number of people who are going to be now under
US-VISIT. Can the government handle that additional volume and
still get the lines processed quickly? We think it is a big
question. Obviously, if they poured the resources needed there,
then they can, but I think the government is going to have to
acknowledge that additional resources are going to be needed in
this case.
Mr. Dicks. Does the hiring freeze affect this as well, Mr.
Bonner? Mr. Ugazio?
Mr. Bonner. It is going to affect every program out there
because we are simply not allowed to bring new people on board.
While the Border Patrol claims that it is not operating under a
hiring freeze, it has not hired anybody since March. They claim
that they have reached their hiring goals for the year. Well,
given the fact that we are so hopelessly outnumbered?
Mr. Dicks. How many Border Patrol people are you short?
Mr. Bonner. We have 11,000 uniformed Border Patrol agents
to cover 6,000 miles of land border, 24 hours a day, 7 days a
week, 365 1/4 days a year.
Mr. Dicks. There is no way.
Mr. Bonner. There is no way we can do that, especially up
along the northern border where we have 1,000 agents to cover
4,000 miles of border 24/7.
Mr. Dicks. We are aware of that in the State of Washington.
We certainly are.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Camp. Thank you.
Ms. Dunn may inquire.
Ms. Dunn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me ask a couple of questions. Mr. Carafano, in your
written testimony you advocated expanded use of Section 287 of
the Immigration and Nationality Act which provides authority
for state and local law enforcement to investigate, detain and
arrest aliens on civil and criminal grounds. Is this because
you believe that state and local law enforcement should play a
greater role in counterterrorism immigration investigations?
How do you envision expansion of the involvement of state and
local law enforcement? What problems such as jurisdiction do
you think might be encountered by increasing the role of non-
federal law enforcement?
Mr. Carafano. Most of my experience is with looking at the
pilot program in the State of Florida. There, what you had was
a case where you had very few, I cannot remember the exact
number, but a handful of immigration investigative agents to
cover a very large area. They have a very large immigration
problem. What they developed in the State of Florida was a
series of state-local counterterrorism task forces. Some of
those eventually merged with a state joint terrorism task
force.
What they did was they wanted to expand the capacity of the
federal agents to do counterterrrorism investigations related
to immigration in the State of Florida. So the program that
they adapted under Section 287(g) guidelines is that state and
local officers who are serving on the state counterterrorism
task forces can receive training from the ICE investigators.
They are certified by the ICE investigators and then they can
conduct, and they have certain federal arrest jurisdictions and
federal authorities as part of that, and then they can conduct
investigations under the supervision of an ICE agent.
So what it allows you to do is significantly expand the
federal capacity to conduct counterterrorism investigations in
the immigration area, and leverage the knowledge of the state
and local areas where they no better and they operate. The
advantage to the state and local guys is that not only are they
receiving the federal authorities, but also access to the
federal databases. That knowledge enhances their capacity to do
their own counterterrorism investigations. So it benefits both
sides. It is a very appropriate way. There are no question sin
terms of liability. It is a very low-cost program. It is a very
controlled way.
I think one of the great successes in the State of Florida
is, as you know there is always a lot of reticence on the part
of local communities when state and local investigators are
involved in immigration law. Now, they went out to each of the
communities and they briefed them on the scope of the program
and how they are going to enforce it. I think they did receive
a lot of support from the communities because it was limited in
focus.
Ms. Dunn. Thank you.
Let me ask you, too, Mr. Carafano, you suggested in your
testimony that securing our nation's maritime borders is
becoming more and more of a concern, actually relatively,
because we spend so much time and energy on our ports and on
our land borders. We all appreciate that the layered security
system can be very effective. We currently have the Container
Security Initiative. We have C-TPAT. We have the Maritime
Transportation Security Act to talk about ports. Is that enough
to get us the layered security system that we are concerned
about? I speak specifically because I am from a state with 120
maritime miles that borders with Canada.
Mr. Carafano. Ma'am, my greatest concern is really in the
future of the Coast Guard, because I think all of those are
good layers. The Coast Guard is significant in virtually every
single one of the layers in one aspect or another, whether it
is an investigative or monitoring commerce or providing domain
awareness. As you look to the future, and if you want to expand
maritime security, which I think there is broad consensus we
need to do, there are simply not resources to do that. Their
modernization program simply not get them there from here. To
me, it is the real linchpin that is risking falling apart.
This is the hard thing. It is just like the border. You do
not enhance maritime security by fortifying ports. You enhance
maritime security by improving maritime security. So you look
where can you get the biggest bang for the buck? Where can you
increase security among all the layers? You always come back
to, if you ramp up the Coast Guard's capabilities and
sustainability to do the multiple missions over the long term,
I really think at the end of the day in terms of enhancing
maritime security and its linkages with border security, that
is where the biggest bang for the buck is always going to be.
Ms. Dunn. Thank you.
Do I have a little more time? I cannot tell.
Mr. Camp. Fifteen seconds.
Ms. Dunn. Great. I will ask it quick.
I would like to know from you about your comments on having
a specific focused committee both in the House and the Senate
to oversee the Department of Homeland Security? Could you tell
us a little of your thinking behind your recommendation?
Mr. Carafano. A lot of this is based on my experience of
growing up in the Department of Defense and looking at how the
Department of Defense has evolved. There is a critical period
in the history between when it was created in 1947 and the
early 1950s. The real issues are really kind of in the
unglorious nuts and bolts kinds of things. Some of the programs
we have talked about here, like personnel programs,
organization, administrative programs. You have to get that
right, and to get that right, you have to get the mission set
right, and all these multiple different requirements right.
So unless you can look at it in a holistic way, and make
sure you have the right strategy and the right programmatics,
you are going to wind up with a very flawed agency which, like
when we did not get the Department of Defense right, it took us
another 40 years to break down fundamental flaws. I think
without oversight now in a holistic way, from a single
committee in each Congress, we are going to find up with a
Department of Defense, which will have similar flaws and
stovepipes which will take years to break, because once they
get set, then they never disappear.
Mr. Camp. Thank you. Your time has expired.
Mr. Bonner, I just have a question. I appreciate much of
your testimony. We authorized 1,000 new agents at the border,
which I understand have been implemented. DHS tells us that
they are there, that they were hired. Is that your
understanding, that the 1,000 new agents did come into the
Department?
Mr. Bonner. In this past year? I think that dates back
several years.
Mr. Camp. Within the last 2 years.
Mr. Bonner. I believe that over the last 2 years, maybe it
approaches that much, but I believe it is closer to about 600.
I think they are at the level that they are authorized, but I
do not believe that that level is high enough.
Mr. Camp. I understand that, but we authorized 1,000 and
the 1,000 have been there. I appreciate that.
The other issue that they are telling us, and I wanted your
comment on that, is that the attrition rates have not been as
high as were anticipated or were assumed when the authorization
went through, so that people are not leaving the agency as
rapidly as they thought. So therefore the staffing levels have
not declined as they thought they would. What is your comment
on that?
Mr. Bonner. That is the information that I have been given
from them, and I have no reason to doubt it. I think that there
are a couple of reasons that attrition has fallen off, and the
primary one is the fact that state and local jurisdictions are
facing some of the same financial shortfalls that the federal
government is, and that is where most of our agents are
gravitating towards, law enforcement careers in the state and
local jurisdictions. They tend to pay more and offer more job
satisfaction. I think once they start hiring again, you will
see a mass exodus of employees.
Mr. Camp. Lastly, I just wanted your comment, we have had a
lot of testimony, not necessarily today, but over the last
couple of years, on new technology at the border and the help
that that may give. I did not hear much from you about that,
and I just wanted to hear your comment on the developing new
technologies and the help or lack of help they may give at the
border.
Mr. Bonner. I think in certain areas they can be very
useful tools, but I do not think that you replace hands with
electronic eyes and ears because ultimately it is those hands
that apprehend people. For example, in the President's Budget
request for the upcoming fiscal year budget, they want to
reallocate a total of about $75 million out of the budget for
sensors and unmanned aerial vehicles. I think it is a mistake
to take away from the ability to outfit the agents on the
border and to staff the border, because at the same time they
are calling for reductions in the number of Border Patrol
agents.
Mr. Camp. All right. Thank you.
Ms. Jackson-Lee may inquire.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Thank you very much. Bells are ringing,
but I thank you gentlemen very much for your testimony.
I would like to go first immediately to Mr. Ugazio and
thank you for your service as well. My understanding is that
you have cited the numbers of immigration arresting agents and
inspectors who arrest people, but that there are only 22
deportation officers who must oversee thousands of cases, while
ensuring obviously that rights are protected. Are you
suggesting that we are imbalanced in the resources and that we
need additional resources to make that more even-handed?
Mr. Ugazio. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question. The
situation is, if I can just use a quick analogy, if you have a
small town and you have 15 officers arresting all the bad guys,
but you have one guy at the end processing and the jailer, and
he is out catching 15 bad guys are even more, they are going to
come to that jail, and immigration where I am at is that jail.
So basically, the situation is you are going to have one guy
doing the work of all these different people and it is going to
be a difficult situation if you do not have an even number of
people on my end interacting with these guys.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. In actuality, what you are saying is we
need to have a greater input from the local community as to the
need of resources. Might I just say this in addition to
overburdening you, I think a lot of times it eliminates your
ability to use discretion in some of the cases that we have
dealing with deportation. For example, two cases I am dealing
with in Houston, an individual whose baby is dying is not a
threat, not a terrorist, and would probably be able to be
handled on supervised leave, if you will, from the detention
center, but because of I guess some issues dealing with being
overworked, it does not allow you to make a decision on these
individual cases. Would you suggest that?
Mr. Ugazio. Yes, ma'am, I would. It is difficult for the
deportation officers in my section to properly analyze every
case and understand exactly. They do what they can. They do a
great job, but it is difficult to look at every case and say
this is a situation that needs attention ASAP.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Mr. Bonner, why don't you respond to that,
about getting local input? Then I also just would follow up
with my last question, which I am very concerned about, is the
deaths that are occurring out in the Arizona desert, and
particularly how that is impacted by the Arizona initiative. We
have not seen any response, as I understand it, from those
tragic deaths that are occurring, and being able to give relief
both in terms of the victims who are coming in, who I know may
be coming in illegally, but they are human beings and should be
treated as such. So Mr. Bonner, what about taking in local
input and balancing those resources between what Mr. Ugazio has
said and what we are doing here in Washington.
Mr. Bonner. I agree with him wholeheartedly. You absolutely
have to have enough resources to accomplish, all aspects of the
job. You cannot just hire a lot of enforcement agents and then
neglect the support functions such as detention and removal.
As far as the Arizona Border Control Initiative, back when
they launched the initiatives, such as Operation Hold the Line
and Operation Gatekeeper, they should have foreseen that it was
going to result in desperate people taking desperate measures.
They made a serious miscalculation believing that people would
stay away from the deserts and the mountains, and that if they
just enforced the law with a great concentration of agents in
the heavily populated areas that that would solve the problem.
As we have seen, it is simply not the case. These people
are very desperate and they will cross in 120-degree weather
carrying two jugs of water. It becomes very deadly for them.
And the smugglers do not tell them any differently. They say,
oh, this is a piece of cake. You are going to walk for a couple
of hours and then you are going to be at a place where you are
going to be picked up, when in fact they know that it is going
to be a 12-hour walk and you cannot possibly humanly carry
enough water with you to survive that journey.
It is a tragedy and it is something that we need to address
by getting more personnel out there to stop people from coming
through those areas. It is a large border. It is going to take
a lot of personnel.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. I think this committee and our
subcommittee should really look to that issue, because people
are still dying. Officers are in jeopardy, and even with the
Initiative, it probably has not reached the point where we are
seeing a difference. So I am very interested in that.
Let me finish by just simply saying I indicated that we
have put forward a smuggling legislative initiative that
includes a reward component to it in order to break some of
these large smuggling operations. We have seen it work in other
law enforcement efforts. What would be your thought about that
sort of legislative initiative?
Mr. Camp. The gentlewoman's time has expired. We do have a
vote on.
I want to thank the panel for their testimony. I want to
thank both panels. I note that with additional questions,
members may wish to submit them in writing. Without objection,
the hearing record will remain open for 10 days.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Mr. Chairman, would you just yield for a
moment?
Mr. Camp. I am going to conclude the hearing now.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Let me just make sure that Mr. Bonner
would be happy to provide me that in writing, and I would
appreciate it.
Mr. Bonner. Absolutely.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Bonner.
Mr. Camp. There being no further business, I again thank
the subcommittee members and our witnesses today. The panel is
dismissed and the hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]