[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SUDAN AT THE CROSSROADS
=======================================================================
BRIEFING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JANUARY 18, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-1
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
RON PAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
CONNIE MACK, Florida GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
TED POE, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
DAVID RIVERA, Florida KAREN BASS, California
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania VACANT
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
VACANT
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
BRIEFERS
The Honorable Princeton Lyman, special advisor for Sudan, U.S.
Department of State............................................ 10
The Honorable Richard S. Williamson, partner, Salisbury
Strategies, LLC (former Special Envoy to Sudan and Ambassador
to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights)........................ 33
Mr. Omer Ismail, advisor, The Enough Project..................... 42
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE BRIEFING
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Florida, and chairman, Committee on Foreign
Affairs: Prepared statement.................................... 4
The Honorable Princeton Lyman: Prepared statement................ 15
The Honorable Richard S. Williamson: Prepared statement.......... 35
Mr. Omer Ismail: Prepared statement.............................. 44
APPENDIX
Briefing notice.................................................. 58
Briefing minutes................................................. 59
The Honorable Donald M. Payne, a Representative in Congress from
the State of New Jersey: Prepared statement.................... 61
SUDAN AT THE CROSSROADS
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TUESDAY, JANUARY 18, 2011
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:30 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. The briefing will come to order.
Good afternoon. After my opening remarks and those of my
good friend, Mr. Berman, the ranking member of the committee, I
will recognize the chairman-designate and the ranking member-
designate of the Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights
Subcommittee, Mr. Smith, on our side, and Mr. Payne, for 3
minutes each.
We will then move to our panelists' presentations, followed
by questioning by the members-designate on the Committee on
Foreign Affairs--and I use that phrase because we are not
formally organized yet--for 5 minutes each, followed by 5
minutes each for any other member who would like to ask
questions of our panelists.
I appreciate the understanding and cooperation of our
colleagues and look forward to today's discussion.
Before we begin, I would like to express what an honor is
it to assume the responsibilities of chairman of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs.
For the Members who will be joining the committee upon
organization, please know that I do not take those
responsibilities lightly. During the 112th Congress, this
committee will be confronted with some of the most pressing
national security and foreign policy challenges of our time,
from ensuring rigorous enforcement of sanctions against Iran,
to providing effective stewardship of American taxpayer dollars
in foreign aid and State Department programs, to instituting
systems for accountability at the United Nations. I fully
intend to work with all members of the committee and the
American people to confront these challenges directly,
responsibly and effectively.
It is therefore fitting that the first Members' briefing
hosted by this committee would be focused on Sudan. Today,
Sudan is truly at the crossroads. Beginning on January 9th,
millions of South Sudanese participated in a historic
referendum to determine whether Africa's largest country would
remain united or split in two. Given the countless delays,
manipulations and violent eruptions that have imperiled
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan
over these past 6 years, many doubted that this day would come.
Yet the vote proceeded peacefully and credibly.
After decades of repression by a genocidal regime in
Khartoum and a war that left over 2 million people dead and 4
million people displaced, the people of South Sudan may at last
have realized their right to self-determination.
Unfortunately, the hardest work is yet to come. First, the
results must be certified and accepted. Though Khartoum has
pledged to accept the outcome, it has a long history of
reneging on its commitments. The stakes are high, and both
sides have spent the past 6 years preparing for war.
Second, outstanding issues relating to the implementation
of the CPA must be resolved prior to conclusion of the
transition period in July 2011, including the demarcation of
the border; citizenship and nationality; wealth sharing and
resource management, including for oil and water; division of
assets and debt; currency; and security arrangements.
Third, the future status of the oil-rich Abyei region must
be resolved fairly and in a transparent manner. Abyei is a lit
match in a pool of gasoline, and continued failure to resolve
its status all but guarantees war.
Likewise, the popular consultations in Southern Kordofan
and Blue Nile must proceed in a manner that legitimately
addresses longstanding grievances. These areas are awash with
weapons, and tensions are high. A single security incident
could set the entire region ablaze.
Finally, we must not trade peace in Darfur for independence
in the South. Regrettably, it appears the administration may
have forgotten key lessons from the past. Prior U.S. efforts to
reward the Sudanese regime for signing peace agreements and
acceding to the deployment of peacekeepers while the regime
simultaneously supported genocide in Darfur, blocked
humanitarian access, and stalled implementation of the CPA were
broadly condemned.
In the words of then-Senator Barack Obama in April 2008,
and I quote,
``I am deeply concerned by reports that the Bush
administration is negotiating a normalization of
relations with the Government of Sudan. This reckless
and cynical initiative would reward a regime in
Khartoum that has a record of failing to live up to its
commitments.''
Yet the Obama administration is following the same
misguided concessions-driven path. I do not intend to minimize
what has been accomplished inside Sudan. Delivering a timely
credible referendum was an incredibly hard task. But, again,
the referendum is just the start.
The true test of the regime's commitment will extend far
beyond the July 2011 date, and far beyond South Sudan. Thus, I
am deeply troubled by the premature efforts to advance
normalization, sanctions relief, and debt relief. The bulk of
sanctions mandated by Congress are linked to peace in South
Sudan and in Darfur. Given recent developments in Darfur, the
certification requirements for easing sanctions cannot be met.
I am particularly concerned by suggestions that the
administration may remove Sudan from the State Sponsors of
Terrorism List by July 2011. Removal from this list is not a
``gold star'' that can be offered to advance an unrelated
political objective. This is a serious matter with
repercussions that directly impact our most vital national
security interests.
Recall that the previous administration delisted North
Korea in exchange for nominal concessions relating to one
nuclear facility. Almost immediately upon winning this prize,
North Korea reneged on its promise to implement a transparent
verification regime, withdrew from the Six-Party Talks, and
brazenly resumed its proliferation activities. Today, North
Korea reportedly possesses one or more highly sophisticated
uranium enrichment facilities and, according to the United
Nations, is supplying Iran, Syria, and Burma with nuclear and
ballistic missile related equipment. The U.S. must proceed with
extreme caution in our dealings with the Sudanese regime.
The potential birth of a new nation in South Sudan is truly
momentous and will have significant ramifications beyond the
region. The United States has played a major role in bringing
the parties to this point, and it is in our national interest
to see that the process advances peacefully.
The risks are high. The challenges are daunting. But the
achievement of peace in a region ravaged by war is an honorable
endeavor. I welcome the opportunity to work with the
administration and responsible partners for peace in Sudan
toward this end.
I now turn to our ranking member, Mr. Berman, for his
opening remarks.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Ros-Lehtinen follows:]
Mr. Berman. Well, thank you, Madam Chairman. And thank you
very much for calling this timely briefing.
I want to begin by congratulating you on your new position
as chairman.
I would also like to congratulate the new subcommittee
chairs.
And I really do look forward to working with all of you in
the 112th Congress.
And at the outset, I would also like to commend the Africa
Subcommittee Ranking Member Donald Payne and other members on
both sides of the aisle for their leadership on Sudan,
especially their efforts to focus the world's attention on the
unspeakable atrocities committed by the Khartoum regime against
the people of South Sudan and Darfur.
Their work on these critical issues inspired two major
pieces of legislation, the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of
2004 and the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006, along
with a number of resolutions condemning the regime for crimes
against humanity.
Madam Chairman, this past week marked a historic moment for
the people of South Sudan who fought a 22-year civil war to
arrive at this moment of self-determination. While we do not
know the official results of the referendum, it is clear that
the vote will almost certainly result in independence for the
South.
And as we consider this milestone, it is important that we
remember the late President John Garang Mabior, who led the
Sudan People's Liberation Movement and Army through the long
civil war, a terrible conflict that resulted in the deaths of
over 2 million South Sudanese and the displacement of millions
more. Before his tragic death in a helicopter crash in July
2005, Garang negotiated the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with
Khartoum. That agreement provided for the referendum and other
events we will examine today.
After his election in 2008, President Obama undertook a
bolder view of U.S. policy toward Sudan and set out a new
vision focused on intensive diplomacy. This new strategy
required significant changes in behavior by the Khartoum
government. It demanded verifiable progress toward a settlement
between the North and South, as well as progress in Darfur.
The President's new approach was met with great skepticism
by many of us in Congress and the advocacy community in part
because it required direct engagement with a Sudanese
Government that had committed genocide and other gross
violations of human rights.
To carry out the new policy, President Obama appointed
retired Air Force General Gration as special envoy to Sudan.
Gration, the son of missionaries who was raised in Congo,
assembled a team and developed a diplomatic strategy to realize
the President's vision.
Our first witness today, Ambassador Princeton Lyman, also
deserves great credit for his diplomatic efforts to complete
the roadmap that helped deliver Khartoum's final cooperation on
the CPA and the referendum.
Today we can see the results of the Obama administration's
hard work. The voting for the referendum has taken place
peacefully, and a major goal of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement has been achieved.
There are, of course, many, as the chairman said earlier,
many outstanding issues to resolve before independence is
finalized in July. A referendum on the status of the oil
producing Abyei region has yet to take place. An agreement
needs to be reached on the sharing of oil revenue, the division
of national debt, the delineation of borders.
There is also the thorny issue of citizenship. Should the
South vote to form a new independent state, there are fears
that southerners in the North and northerners in the South
could be left stateless and vulnerable to political violence.
Finally, there is the crucial issue of peace in Darfur
which still eludes us today. We must not forget the enumerable
atrocities that have taken place in that region of Sudan. In
2004, Congress and the Bush administration declared that the
events in Darfur constituted genocide. And in 2008, the
International Criminal Court indicted Sudanese President Omar
Hassan al-Bashir on three counts of genocide, five counts of
crimes against humanity, and two counts of murder.
I am encouraged that President Obama has remained focused
on Darfur and intends to revive the stalled negotiations
between Khartoum and the rebel groups in Darfur.
The people of South Sudan have taken a major step toward
self-determination, but there are many difficulties ahead. The
new nation will face a large number of challenges, from
building the basic institutions of statehood to economic
development to the reintegration of the returnees. And by all
accounts, there is very little capacity in South Sudan to meet
these daunting challenges. If South Sudan is to flourish, then
the United States, the United Nations and other members of the
international community must continue to assist the people of
that nation in their transition to independence and democratic
rule.
In this context, it is important to recognize the Herculean
efforts of the United Nations Development Programme to help
make the referendum a reality. The UNDP supported voter
education, delivered ballots for more than 4 million voters on
schedule and helped to establish and equip nearly 3,000
registration centers and trained over 8,000 staff to manage
those centers. These efforts and the efforts of U.N.
peacekeepers in South Sudan underscore the extent to which the
U.N.'s work can support U.S. foreign policy interests and
contribute to international peace and security.
Madam Chairman, we would not be where we are today in South
Sudan without hard-nosed American diplomacy, the active
involvement of the United Nations, and targeted U.S. foreign
assistance programs. I look forward to the testimony of our
witnesses.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Berman.
I would like to recognize for 3 minutes the chairman-
designate of the Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights
Subcommittee, Mr. Smith of New Jersey.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Madam Chair, thank you very much.
And I want to begin by joining the ranking member, Mr.
Berman, in congratulating you on assuming the chairmanship of
this very important committee, particularly at this very
difficult time around the world.
There are crises everywhere, and we look forward to, all of
us on this side of the aisle and I am sure on the other side of
the aisle as well, in working with you and finding tangible
solutions to the many vexing problems we face.
So congratulations, Madam Chair.
I also want to thank you for calling this extremely timely
and important briefing to examine the historic events occurring
in Sudan. I congratulate the Southern Sudanese people and join
in in celebrating the completion of the referendum on the
future status of their country. The U.N. monitoring panel of
the referendum's assessment that the process was well organized
and credible is particularly commendable given the serious time
and resource constraints that preceded it.
However, the voting last week marked over the beginning of
what promises to be a long process fraught with peril. It will
take several weeks for the votes to be transmitted from the
nearly 3,000 referendum centers to county and state levels and
on to Juba and Khartoum before the official results are
announced.
If the South has voted for secession, as is widely
believed, then numerous complicated and potentially volatile
issues remain to be resolved. Among the most prominent of these
issues is the demarcation of the border, including the division
of the Abyei region with its oil reserves and fertile land. The
sharing of oil reserves as well as debt and the question of
citizenship are some of the other major challenges still to be
addressed. And the establishment of a permanent peace in Darfur
remains a critical but elusive goal as violence intensifies
despite the current talks in Doha.
I personally am concerned about the return of reportedly
large numbers of southerners residing in the North to the
South. I was informed during a hearing in September that
humanitarian agencies at that time were not prepared to handle
mass movements in Sudan. Unless this assessment has changed,
such movements could lead to a severe humanitarian crisis and
have a destabilizing security impact on the South.
Those southerners who remain in the North against their
will is another deeply troubling concern. Beginning in the
1980s, Arab militias armed by the Khartoum regime conducted
slave raids in the South, taking mostly women and children to
the North to serve as labor and sex slaves. The 2005
Comprehensive Peace Agreement failed to address this issue, and
an estimated 35,000 southerners remain in the North in a state
of forced servitude. This grave human rights issue must be
acknowledged as a priority and the freedom of all slaves
immediately secured.
Finally, I look forward to hearing the briefers' views as
to what the impact the referendum will have on the North, again
assuming a vote for independence. The Government of Sudan, to
its credit, allowed the referendum to proceed and has publicly
stated that it will respect the outcome. But given its abysmal
track record, it is not a basis for optimism.
I thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Smith.
I would like to recognize for 3 minutes the ranking member-
designate of the Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights
Subcommittee, Mr. Payne.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much.
And let me commend you for your ascension to the chair of
this committee.
Mr. Berman.
And let me thank you for holding this very critical meeting
on Sudan being the first hearing, and I think it is
appropriate.
Let me also express my deep appreciation to the witnesses,
who are certainly among the most knowledgeable people on Sudan:
Ambassador Lyman, who did a great job in Nigeria and South
Africa during critical times; Special Envoy Williamson with the
State Department and U.N. posts, who was a great envoy to
Sudan; and Mr. Ismail, who fled from Darfur and has been a
great advocate for justice.
Let me thank all of you for your commitment and self-
determination to make this day a reality. Today Sudan is indeed
at the crossroads. A week-long referendum has just concluded.
And by all accounts, the outcome is clear that the people of
South Sudan have chosen independence.
My friends on the ground during the voting process have
relayed stories of remarkable moments that illustrate the hope
and excitement that lies in the heart of the South Sudanese. A
policeman, after voting, looked around and told people in line,
``I crossed the river, come join me.'' A pregnant woman while
in line to vote gave birth and was later able to cast her vote
for the sake of her new baby.
As I reflect on the 20 years that I have been working with
Sudan, I remember many pivotal moments, moments of my own and
the Congress' struggle to see the people of South Sudan
exercise their right of self-determination. I recall my first
visit in 1993 to Nimule, a town near the Ugandan border, which
was the frontline of the struggle back then, helped mediate
negotiations between two factions of the SPLM. It was then that
I first met Dr. John Garang in the bush, father of South
Sudan's quest for autonomy, as well as a young military
commander, Salva Kiir, who was there at his side, who is now
the President of the Government of South Sudan. Upon returning
from that trip, I, along with other members, introduced a
resolution in the House calling for the right of self-
determination for the people of South Sudan, and it passed this
body.
I recall over a dozen visits to South Sudan and the Darfur
refugee camps in Chad and with Representatives Lee and Wolf and
Tancredo, along with Senator Feingold, Senator Frist, Senator
Brownback, all dedicated members of this institution at the
time. After one such visit in 2004, I sponsored a resolution to
call the world's attention to the atrocities in Darfur which
passed the House overwhelmingly, the first time that the
Congress recognized ongoing genocide while it was going on.
I recall visits to Nairobi and Naivasha in 2004 and 2005
with IGAD and a negotiation that culminated in the signing of
the CPA on January 9, 2005, in Nairobi where I witnessed that.
I will ask that the rest of my statement be added to the
record since the gavel has been hit.
But I do agree that the Abyei, I believe, should be solved
before sanctions are released. We see what has happened in
India with Kashmir still a question. We don't want Abyei to be
a question 20 years from now with fighting going on. Thank you,
and I yield.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
As the new members will know, it is embarrassing to gavel
down the gentlemen from New Jersey--and both gentlemen from New
Jersey, because they are the leading experts when it comes to
Africa.
So we are well-served by having Chairman and Ranking Member
Smith and Payne with us.
I am sorry, gentlemen, for the time restraints.
As Mr. Payne said, we are very privileged to have two
distinguished panels before us today. I know everyone is
anxious to hear what they have to say. They are the experts. So
I will only offer brief introductions and encourage members to
read their biographies in full in your packet.
We will begin with Ambassador Princeton Lyman, who has just
returned from observing the referendum process in Sudan. The
Ambassador was appointed by Secretary Clinton in August 2010 to
lead the U.S. Negotiation Support Unit in Sudan. Prior to his
appointment, he was serving as an adjunct senior fellow for
Africa Policy Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and
as an adjunct professor at Georgetown. He has a long,
distinguished career in government service, including postings
as deputy assistant secretary of state for Africa, U.S.
Ambassador to Nigeria and South Africa, and assistant secretary
of state for international organization affairs.
The Ambassador has a Ph.D. in political science from
Harvard University and has published numerous books and
articles on foreign policy, African affairs, economic
development, HIV/AIDS, U.N. reform and peacekeeping.
Ambassador Lyman, the floor is yours. Thank you, sir.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PRINCETON LYMAN, SPECIAL ADVISOR FOR
SUDAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Lyman. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
Thank you and the members, ranking member, Congressman
Berman, and all the members here for holding this hearing and
making this one of the very first issues of your chairmanship
and of the committee this year.
As you said, this is a terribly important issue. I recall
Prime Minister Meles at the U.N. meeting on Sudan in September
saying--and here is a man who faces a lot of crises in his
neighborhood--saying that the peace process in the Sudan was
the most important in all of Africa. And it is an indication of
how widespread the implications are of having peace in that
area.
Thank you also for the work that Congress has done on this
issue, all the members, the legislation, et cetera. It has made
an extraordinary difference to send a message to the people of
Sudan how much the United States cares, not just about the
politics and the strategic aspects of it, but the welfare of
the people who have suffered from war during this long period
of time.
We had a good week, Madam Chairman. We had, as you
described and Congressman Berman and others have, a referendum
that even a month or 2 ago we doubted could come off this well.
And it came off peacefully, and all the observer missions,
whether the Arab League, the Africa Union, the U.N., the NDI or
others, all saying this was a credible, fair, effective
referendum.
It took a lot of work, a lot of diplomatic work, a lot of
wonderful work by the United Nations. And USAID assembled an
extraordinary team of IFES, NDI, IRI, the Carter Center, all
working together to give the Southern Sudan Referendum
Commission the technical support it needed against all the odds
to be ready on January 9th to pull this off.
So there was a lot involved here, and a lot of people
deserve credit. But as you said in your opening statement, this
is just one step there is a lot of hard work left to go.
One of the issues, and Congressman Payne emphasized this
and others have as well, is Abyei. Abyei is a deeply difficult
emotional issue in Sudanese politics and in its history. Even
during the referendum, we had instances of violence in that
area that was finally brought under control with the help of
the U.N. and the meeting of the parties, and there was an
agreement signed this past weekend that should permit the
beginning of the migration security for it and other
arrangements should contain the situation. But the underlying
issue of the future of Abyei remains a very critical one.
It is an issue that probably can only be solved at the
level of the Presidents, of President Bashir and President
Kiir, and we hope that action will resume on those negotiations
very shortly after the referendum. There are other processes.
There are the popular consultations that are very important in
Blue Nile and South Kordofan. I am happy to say that the
consultations have started in Blue Nile. I will be visiting
that area next week to witness some of those consultations. And
we hope South Kordofan will be able to start soon after the
elections in that state.
And as you have all said, there are a whole range of issues
that the two parties now have to get down to work and solve by
July. The relationships between what looks like now two
independent countries, but who share so much interdependence.
As you know, much of the oil is in the South; much of the
infrastructure for exporting it and refining it is in the
North. People live along that border, some 30 percent of the
population, and they go back and forth all the time.
There needs to be a solution to the oil sector, to
citizenship issues, to what those parties have called soft
borders and how they will operate, security arrangements,
currency, et cetera. A lot of work has been done. A lot of
technical work has been done. But now the political work has to
start on bringing these issues to a head.
Now, you have mentioned the question of our relationship to
Sudan and particularly to the Government of Northern Sudan, and
it is a very important issue. Part of the discussions that have
been going on for the last month is how the U.S. relationship
with Northern Sudan played into the negotiations. There was a
very strong feeling that until there was some sense of our own
relationships with the Sudan and the future of Sudan, there
would be an obstacle there to the negotiations themselves.
But something equally important that I have discovered in
my time there--I have met with leaders of the opposition in the
North. I have met with women's groups and youth groups, and
what I find is that the people of Northern Sudan are terribly
worried about the outcome of the CPA. They feel that they are
going to be abandoned. They feel that it will lead to war. They
feel that it will lead to economic deprivation, and they want
to know what the future is for them once the South is gone. And
that is an important concern, because instability in the North
or chaos in the North is not going to be any more in our
interest than chaos in the South.
There also has to be political transformation of the North.
That is part of the dream, if you will, the objective of the
CPA, and it hasn't really happened. So we want to be engaged in
the North. We want it to be successful and strategically
stable, and we want to see prosperity for the people there.
We have put down a roadmap for normalization with Northern
Sudan after the CPA. And I can assure you that it is based on
actions; it is not based on promises. The first step only comes
after the government accepts the results of the referendum. And
the step there, as the President said in his letter to Senator
Kerry, which Kerry--Senator Kerry presented to the Sudanese,
was that the President would begin the process of withdrawing
Sudan from the list of States Sponsoring Terrorism. But they
would have to meet all of the conditions under that law, and
they would also have to complete the negotiations which you
have all well described for the remaining balance of the CPA.
And there has to be progress toward peace in Darfur.
So before we can even complete that process and certainly
before we would come to Congress and discuss the possible
lifting of sanctions, steps would have to be taken, concrete
steps by the North. In the meanwhile, a great deal has to be
done on helping Southern Sudan. It is an area, as all of you
know, devastated by war, extraordinarily poor with almost no
infrastructure to speak of. You fly over Southern Sudan, you
see very little agricultural activity. You see almost no roads.
You have a very low educational base and a thin administrative
structure.
A lot of donors are working on that problem. We are the
major donor. Our technical assistance this past year to the
Government of Southern Sudan is about $430 million. Other
donors are contributing just under $700 million to developing
the capacity of the South. A lot of countries are involved.
Kenya is the biggest trainer of technical personnel. The U.K.,
the European Union, Norway and others and China has begun a
development program in the South. It is going to be a long,
hard struggle for the South to meet the expectations of its
people.
We have done a lot and we will continue to do a lot to
build up their capacity, their ability for conflict resolution
within the South, their ability to deliver in education, health
and the other areas of which their people expect.
Now, Darfur is not my brief. General Gration, and he
apologizes for not being able to within you today. He was just
in Darfur this past week and he is joined now by another
colleague of mine, Dane Smith, who will be working on Darfur in
the same way that I have been working on the North-South. But I
don't want anybody to get the impression that the
administration is either forgetting Darfur or sacrificing
Darfur to the CPA. In fact, there is a good deal of interaction
in Sudan between the two. There has to be peace in both places
for Sudan, North and South, to succeed.
I am not the expert on Darfur, but I know that work is
underway to try and bring peace to strengthen UNAMID, to
increase access for the humanitarian organizations and, above
all, to get a credible peace process. And I am sure General
Gration would be happy to brief you on all of that.
Let me just conclude on one issue raised by Congressman
Smith, a very important one about which we were very concerned,
and that is the condition and the future for the southerners
living in Northern Sudan. There are quite a few, as you know,
estimates of as many as 1.5 million. Since the beginning of the
CPA in 2005, 330,000 people have returned to South Sudan. Just
since last August, 150,000 have returned and more are returning
all of the time.
What we found was that the process was erratic, not very
well planned and the states in the southern part of Sudan not
prepared to receive them or get them to places where they could
earn a livelihood. So we have worked now, we and the U.N., to
try and regularize that process. We went to Government of
Sudan, and we said, we need access to all the places where the
southerners live in the North. We didn't have that access
before. We have it now. We and the U.N. and international
agencies can now go visit the southern population in the North,
find out what they are planning. UNHCR is going to begin a
registration process and try to make more orderly the process
of departure.
Second, we are working with the government in the South to
come up with more realistic timetables and plans for absorbing
that many people in what is a very poor area. So I just wanted
to assure you that this is an issue high on our list. And we
have been given assurances, but we will monitor it very
closely, that there will be no reprisals against those people.
But it does raise one final issue that you all have
mentioned, and that is the citizenship issue. Because the
question is what happens when the South becomes independent to
southerners living in the North or northerners living in the
South. The Government of Sudan, the Northern government, the
NCP, has said they will not support dual citizenship for
everyone, and that is a right of a government to say that. But
what we and others have argued is--and both sides have agreed
in principle--that you cannot create a situation of
statelessness for anyone.
Therefore, there has to be a period of transition during
which Southern Sudan develops its own rules, regulations and
procedures for citizenship and then southerners who so wish can
access that citizenship if they choose. This is a very
important issue both for the stability of the country and in
terms of basic human rights. And it is one of the critical
issues still to be negotiated.
I will stop there, Madam Chairman. I am happy to answer
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lyman follows:]
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so very much.
Excellent testimony. We will begin our question and answers
now.
But I just want to remind our members, pursuant to
longstanding committee practice, I will be recognizing you by
seniority for those who are here when I make the sound of the
gavel, and then by order of arrival for those who arrive after
the gavel. So there is an incentive to get here on time, boys
and girls.
And I am pleased as punch to have so many members of our
freshman class on our committee. To make a public declaration
of how pleased I am, I randomly chose among the wonderful
freshmen members of our committee Mr. Duncan's name. So I will
yield my time, my question-and-answer time, to Mr. Duncan from
South Carolina.
Mr. Duncan is recognized.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ambassador Lyman, thank you for coming to address the
committee today about Sudan, and I just have a few questions
because we are concerned about terrorism in the world. We are
concerned about national security. And can the administration
credibly certify to Congress that Sudan has permanently ceased
support for fellow State Sponsors of Terrorism, including Iran
and Syria, and designated foreign terrorist organizations,
including Hamas?
Ambassador Lyman. Excuse me. First, Madam Chairman, I
forgot. I submitted a fuller statement for the record if that
is okay.
Congressman, that will be part----
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Without objection. Thank you.
Ambassador Lyman. Thank you very much.
That will be a part of this process that would begin, and
it is a process whereby the relevant agencies and the United
States Government would be examining that.
I think the requirement is to look at it over a 6-month
period to make sure that Sudan would meet all of the criteria
under the law regarding counterterrorism.
That process hasn't yet begun because the President hasn't
announced it, because it is conditional to even begin that
process based on the acceptance of the results of the
referendum.
But I assure you that that will be done and that the
administration will then consult with Congress on the results
of that review.
Mr. Duncan. Just a follow-up. What do you make of the
independent or open-sourced reports that Iranian arms transited
Sudan en route to Hamas and the Gaza strip? Can you help with
that?
Ambassador Lyman. I cannot comment on that, Congressman.
But I can assure you that those are the kinds of issues that
will be looked at in this review process.
Mr. Duncan. Are open-source reports of Bashir's strong
relationship with Hamas leadership inaccurate?
Ambassador Lyman. I am afraid I am not in a position to
comment on that. I, again, say that the agencies in the U.S.
Government are going to examine all of that as a part of this
process. I apologize that I am not in a position to comment on
that information which our agencies will have to determine and
verify.
Mr. Duncan. We look forward to the time that you can
comment on that. Thank you.
I yield back my time, Madam Chair.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Thank you for
that maiden voyage.
Welcome to all of our wonderful freshmen.
I would like to yield 5 minutes to our wonderful ranking
member, Mr. Berman.
Mr. Berman. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I will follow
your lead, and I am going to yield my 5 minutes to the
tentative and I think soon-to-be ranking member of the Africa
Subcommittee, the long-time chair of that subcommittee and, to
a great extent, one of my key mentors on the issue of Sudan,
Mr. Payne.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Payne is recognized.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for yielding.
Ambassador Lyman, the AU was very involved in this IGAD,
which is, as most of us know, the East African
Intergovernmental Authority on Development, which has several
East African countries, about six or seven, Kenya, Uganda, et
cetera. And they were very involved, as you know, actually in
the negotiations in Naivasha. How strong do you believe that
the AU and IGAD will remain in Sudan as they move forward to
the more difficult times?
Ambassador Lyman. I think the roles are going to be
different. The Africa Union is now charged with overseeing the
post-referendum negotiations over the issues we talked about.
And the high-level panel that the AU has created to do this is
headed by former South African President Thabo Mbeki and then
with former Burundian President Buyoya and former Nigerian
President Abubakar. And they have a staff and have overseen the
structure of the negotiations. I am happy to say that we in the
U.N. worked very, very closely with them. We are official
observers in those discussions and worked very closely with
them on the negotiations.
IGAD now plays I think a different and more political role.
The IGAD summit some weeks ago was a very important step in
confirming assurances from the Government of Sudan about the
referendum and proceeding with the CPA. They are not as active
as they used to be in Naivasha and elsewhere in the actual
negotiations.
Mr. Payne. How do you see the--as we know, Abyei is
certainly a very difficult issue to confront. But also, as you
know, the Blue Nile and the Southern Kordofan states have also
some question about where they really belong. What is your take
on those two states?
Ambassador Lyman. Well, the CPA did not see the popular
consultations as the same as for Abyei. Abyei was accorded the
right of self-determination to see whether they wanted to be
part of the North or the South. That is not included in the
terms of reference for the popular consultations. What the
popular consultations are supposed to do for those two states
is to determine how the CPA has affected them and how their
relationships, both internally in the state and with Khartoum,
should take place. They are more like if--if I can describe it,
good governance consultations, rather than self-determination
consultations.
And what we are pleased about with Blue Nile is the
tremendous amount of interest taking place as those
consultations get underway. People are coming forward. Civil
society is coming forward, and they will look very carefully at
both the governance of the state and the way the central
government impacts on their lives.
As you know, elements in those states fought on the side of
the SPLM, but they live in the North. And they are part of the
North. So the question really that is being posed is, what kind
of political structure will we be seeing in the North that
accommodates their interests and the interests of everyone else
in the North?
Mr. Payne. And the final question about Egypt and the Nile,
Egypt can be very, very constructive, or they can be very
destructive. And they have changed roles during this whole
conflict. The Nile is something that Egypt feels concerned
about. How do you think the negotiations regarding Egypt and
the North and other countries will go on the Nile?
Ambassador Lyman. I think it is not a secret that Egypt was
very concerned about the whole self-determination vote and the
implications of it. But toward the latter part of the year,
Egypt became very supportive. And just prior to the referendum,
President Mubarak, along with President Gaddafi, came and urged
the government to go ahead and go through with the referendum
and follow the dictates of the CPA. And I think the attitude of
Egypt is that they are going to work with the new Government of
Southern Sudan.
Now, water, as the chairwoman said, is one of the issues to
be negotiated, how the water is managed, the Nile, which cuts
through both Southern and Northern Sudan, are going to be
managed, access to water, amounts of water. Those negotiations
have not gotten very far, and they will be important, and
clearly Egypt will be watching them very closely.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. The chairman-designate of the
Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights Subcommittee, Mr. Smith
from New Jersey, is recognized.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Thank you.
And, Mr. Ambassador, thank you for your extraordinary
service and your leadership. Let me ask a couple of questions.
First, you mentioned the first step beginning the process
of removing Sudan from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List.
Ambassador Williamson and I--we were serving with him at the
U.N. Human Rights Commission when it was a commission in
Geneva. And he led the effort on getting the focus on genocide
being committed in Darfur, did an outstanding job doing it. He
makes a point in his testimony that the--you must make that
determination purely on the merits, not tilted to some other
political considerations. And based on what you said, it sounds
like that is the process you are going to pursue, but I would
just like to hear you say it in your own words or further
elaboration.
Secondly, churches play a key role, perhaps even a central
role in the provision of humanitarian and development aid and
in promoting dialogue and mediating crises. Will the faith-
based sector in the new Republic of Southern Sudan, if that is
what emerges here, receive a significant amount of money to
immediately have a high impact on health care delivery and the
like?
Thirdly, the ICC chief prosecutor said that Bashir may have
skimmed upwards of $9 billion. Is that true? What do we know
about that?
And finally, I mentioned in my opening about the 35,000
southerners who remain in the North in forced servitude. In the
mid-1990s, I held a hearing on slavery in Sudan, was roundly
criticized when I had it. And I can tell you by whom if you
ask. Roundly criticized. But we brought out the point--and I
even had a woman, a mother who told the harrowing story of how
they broke into her home, stole her son, kidnapped her son,
gave him an Islamic name, and then he became part of a slavery
regime. What are we doing about that?
Ambassador Lyman. Thank you very much, Congressman. On the
first question, with regard to the State Sponsors of Terrorism,
first and foremost, they have to meet all of the conditions
under that law. So it has to be on the merits of that.
But secondarily, we have also said that the final step has
to be in the context of they are also meeting the conditions of
the CPA.
So it is, first and foremost, they have to meet those
criteria. And then, second, when we would take the step would
be when they have also--if they meet all those criteria, that
they would also have to meet the criteria under the CPA.
On churches, I don't know of the exact plans on USAID, but
I will say this, they play an extraordinarily important role in
Southern Sudan, as you know. And they have been very important
in conflict resolution, and I think they will play a major role
in the development side. There is no question it is one of the
elements of society.
I will just take a second to say something that has
bothered me about the peace process; it has not been terribly
transparent. That is, it has been carried on--and we are part
of this, too--between two parties, but civil society hasn't
been brought in very much. I think now, as we move forward,
there must be much broader transparency and involvement of
civil society in what comes next, and that very much includes
the churches.
On the $9 billion, I have seen the accusation. I haven't
seen the proof, so I cannot say.
On slavery, it is a very, very bitter memory for people who
suffered that. That includes some people in the Abyei area.
Clearly, the independence of the Southern Sudan, if that is
what the vote will show, may alleviate that problem and other
security steps, but clearly, that has to go if it exists
anymore. But the memory is there, and I know people who have
spoken to me about the bitterness that they feel about it.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Finally, let me ask one final
question with my time. Are there sufficient resources available
at the UNHCR, as well as within our own Government as well as
other contributors, to assist the southerners in the North to
register them, as you said, to mitigate the incidents of
retaliation? And what kind of numbers are we talking about in
terms of funds?
Ambassador Lyman. The Southern Sudan Government talks about
another--or up to 500,000 people coming. So that would be
another 350,000. We have made it a very, very strong part of
our diplomacy with the North that no retaliation or violence
takes place against the southerners in the North. We have been
back to them on this over and over and over again. And so far,
that has been--they have respected that. And they claim they
will respect it.
But the future of those people in terms of citizenship and
economics, et cetera, is still an important consideration. Now,
UNHCR is just beginning, really, now that it has access to
start to register people, et cetera. There is sufficient
international stocks of emergency supplies to handle people
when they come south, let's say to get 3-month supply of food,
et cetera.
The problem is how well these people can be integrated for
long-term development because some of them aren't farmers; they
haven't been farmers, et cetera. And this is something we have
under discussion now with the Government of Southern Sudan and
how our development programs can help in that regard. That, to
me, is becoming the most serious challenge. So far, we have
been able to work in the North without any retaliation against
those people.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
I am pleased to yield to the gentleman from New Jersey, my
good friend, Congressman Sires.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Madam Chair, and congratulations.
Ambassador Lyman, as I listen to you, I sense hope in your
voice that this is going to succeed.
But as I listen carefully to what you say to me--excuse me,
to the committee, I am not as optimistic. I mean, there is no
infrastructure, no help, no way of feeding. There is a
referendum governing one end of the country. What can we--what
steps can we take to continue to encourage the peace?
And I worry, when you split these countries--we don't have
a good experience in Korea still. The tensions are still there.
And I worry when all this money comes in to try to help, I look
at Haiti and the lack of infrastructure. Sorry, but you sound
optimistic, but I am not as optimistic as you are, and I do
hope that we can continue--we have so many years of war, that I
do hope that this leads to a peaceful future. Can you just tell
us what we can do?
Ambassador Lyman. You caught me on a good week. A couple of
months ago, I was much less optimistic, and I am very
encouraged that this referendum has come off and what I think
it signifies for the future.
But I wouldn't underestimate the problems ahead. Look,
there are several different peace problems. One is peace in the
South itself, where there have been clashes in the past,
proxies supported by the North, et cetera. Now, we are working
hard to build up their security capability. By that I mean
their ability to manage conflict, to manage local issues,
communicate better, coordinate better, et cetera.
Lots of people--lots of countries along with us are
training people, et cetera. President Kiir has promised a very
inclusive political process in the future for a new
constitution in the South. He must follow that path. Otherwise,
there will be dissension, and there will be trouble.
I am reasonably optimistic that they will rise to the
challenge. But I think it is going to be a good long struggle.
The other danger is in the continuing tensions that will
exist from time to time between the North and the South. One of
the points we have emphasized so much to both sides in the last
few months is, don't support proxies; that is, that the North
doesn't support proxies in the South and vice versa, that the
South doesn't support proxies in Darfur or someplace else. It
is a very important part of keeping peace, and they have got to
resolve their tensions in other ways.
I think that the hope for peace in the area comes from
their inevitable interdependence, whether it is in the oil
sector, it is the trade sector, et cetera. Both sides need each
other right now, and both sides now are not interested in going
back to war. And we can build on that, and they can build on
that. It is not going to be perfect, and there are going to be
crises, and there are going to be threats. But I guess I am
more optimistic now than I was a few months ago.
Mr. Sires. And the other issue that I have a concern of is,
you talked about the oil. Obviously, the oil is in the South,
and the North is going to feel that they have been excluded of
its wealth. I just don't see them sitting back and saying,
well, you had this referendum; you keep the oil, and I will
stop the water from going South.
Ambassador Lyman. Actually, their leverage is greater
because all the pipelines to export the oil are in the North.
So what they have had to do--and the Norwegians have been
extremely helpful in this regard, in laying out all of the
complexities of how two countries with shared resources can
work out a fair compensation. During the CPA, they split the
oil revenues 50/50. But that was temporary. Now there is a
question of whether the South will keep that ratio, whether
they will pay a fee for the use of the pipelines, et cetera.
Those are the details they have got to work out now. But they
kind of need each other on the oil.
And the other thing which is very important--and, again, we
are grateful to the Norwegians for this analysis--that oil
isn't that great. Over the next 5 years, it will decline
substantially in output. Both sides have to develop an economy
that is less dependent on oil. And that is an important reason
for them to turn their attention away from war.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. The chairman-designate of the
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Mr. Rohrabacher of
California.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
And, Mr. Ambassador, what is the population of Sudan, both
North and South?
Ambassador Lyman. Oh, I was afraid you were going to ask me
that. It is about 8 million in the South.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And what is it in the North?
Mr. Lyman. 38 million overall, thanks to Rich.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I see.
Ambassador Lyman. 38 million overall, about less than a
third in the South.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And I will tell you, when I worked in the
White House, he had all the answers, as well. I just want you
to know that.
Ambassador Lyman. Yeah.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So 38 million all together. And how much
have we spent in Sudan?
Ambassador Lyman. Since the CPA, overall, for all
expenditures, peacekeeping and everything else, we have spent
$10 billion.
Mr. Rohrabacher. How much?
Ambassador Lyman. $10 billion.
Mr. Rohrabacher. We have spent $10 billion.
Ambassador Lyman. Much of that for peacekeeping and relief
because of the wars and the displacement, et cetera.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
Ambassador Lyman. But that is the figure over----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Now, is that just us or is that the
overall spending? We have spent $10 billion or----
Ambassador Lyman. No, we, the U.S.
Mr. Rohrabacher. We. And how much has been spent then? We
have spent $10 billion. How much have the other philanthropists
of the world spent?
Ambassador Lyman. They have contributed--of course, the
peacekeeping, they contribute toward a formula in the U.N.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
Ambassador Lyman. There is a formula that they always
contribute to.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay.
Ambassador Lyman. On the economic side, I know, for
example, that other donors have been doing about $700 million a
year in the South.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Uh-huh.
Ambassador Lyman. I don't have the figures for what they
are doing in Darfur. I can try and get those for you.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. But your guesstimate would be that
we are the biggest contributor and almost 50 percent, maybe, of
what has been spent has been from us?
Ambassador Lyman. We are clearly the largest donor, and I
will try to get you more accurate percentages.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Now, what a fortuitous day for you
to be testifying because President Hu from China has just
arrived. And I was wondering how much the Chinese have actually
contributed to this effort.
Ambassador Lyman. Well, the Chinese, of course, as members
of the Security Council, pay whatever their share is of
peacekeeping costs as permanent members of the Security
Council. They also have begun a development program in the
South. They also contribute a fair number of peacekeepers to
the U.N. peacekeeping force. We don't contribute soldiers; they
do.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
Ambassador Lyman. They have some engineering companies, et
cetera, in the peacekeeping operation.
They are, of course, as you know, big investors in the oil
industry in Sudan.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right. But you don't know what they have
spent. And I think that is significant because it is my
understanding that the Chinese perhaps are benefiting greatly
by their association with the government in the North and et
cetera.
Ambassador Lyman. There is no question that oil has been a
successful investment for them. But now that the oil lies
largely in the South, they understand that they have to develop
relationships in the South, as well. And they are beginning
development programs, road programs, health programs, et
cetera, in the South.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let me just note that--now, first of all,
do you believe that the Chinese have played a positive role in
Sudan? Is that what you would tell us today, that, by and
large, the Chinese have played a positive role there over the
years?
Ambassador Lyman. I think they are playing a more positive
role now than they played before, to be perfectly candid. I
think they were very resistant, as you well know, in the U.N.
to sanctions on Sudan. And so there is a history there.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And they were opposed to the sanctions----
Ambassador Lyman. They don't participate----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Excuse me one moment, but they were
opposed to those sanctions because they had a direct
relationship with the tough guys who were running the country.
Isn't that right?
Ambassador Lyman. Yeah.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And the guys who signed contracts for who
gets to benefit from the oil.
Ambassador Lyman. Right. There is no question about that.
Now, more recently--and they do most of their diplomacy behind
the scenes. They don't work in concert with the rest of us
envoys who meet all the time.
They have done some facilitation on the peacekeeping side.
They contributed peacekeepers. And they have been supportive
now of the referendum process. They have been openly supportive
of that and, as I said, starting to do more in the South.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. I only have about 30 seconds left,
and let me just note that we are entering a new era in
government. We can no longer afford to have a trillion-and-a-
half-dollar deficit. We figured that will destroy our country.
And especially if we are going to be investing $10 billion in a
country with 38 million people--$10 billion for 38 million
people--and then see that another country, perhaps our economic
adversary, like China, is benefiting greatly from our
investment. Those are the things we need to pay attention to,
and we will be.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
And because the ranking member had given his time to Mr.
Payne, now Mr. Payne is recognized, as the ranking member-
designate of the Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights
Subcommittee, for his questions.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. I am doing better under
this new setup than I did under my own.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, let's discuss that later.
Mr. Payne. Let me continue, I think, on the China
discussion. As you indicated, China was very, very noninvolved,
as you know. And there were several meetings that were held
with the Chinese. The Congressional Black Caucus actually met
with the Ambassador and, kind of, had a pretty tough meeting
with them, and they asked for a second meeting. They had never
been to Darfur. They were still selling weapons. They just had
no interest in the problems of Sudan.
I had the opportunity to go to Beijing, and the second-in-
command of the Government of China asked the question in the
Great Hall, once again, about what were they going to do. Since
then, as you have mentioned, they have sent people to Darfur,
they have started participating in U.N. peacekeeping.
How do you think China will react and do you think they
will be a true neutral party as this process moves forward?
Ambassador Lyman. I think the Chinese will have--you know,
I don't want to speak for them really, but they have a stake in
the oil sector. They have a stake that those are Chinese
companies that own a good deal of the infrastructure, as well
as their share in the oil industry. They are very concerned
about that. They want to make sure that whatever is worked out
between the two entities on oil protects those interests. And,
of course, they import oil from Sudan, so they want the
stability of supply.
I am pleased that they have begun development programs in
the South. I think that is very important. I think we need
every donor we can to help in the South.
How they will progress in their relationship between the
two it is a little hard for me to predict. Obviously, they will
want to have relations in both countries to pursue their
interests.
Mr. Payne. Now, in the South, the South has the potential
of a great agricultural program if they get going. At one time,
Sudan was the breadbasket of all of Africa--and with the oil.
Are we looking at developing, helping them develop that
agricultural sector as we move forward?
And, secondly, what does Khartoum have left? What will
their major resources be? Are they industrializing and
manufacturing?
Ambassador Lyman. There was a conference in Nairobi some
months ago in which the U.S. was a major participant--General
Gration was there and others--just on agricultural development
in the South.
It will have to be a major focus of their development
efforts. They have this potential, but it is just not being
realized at all. So that has to be a major part of their
economic development, no question about it. You go to Juba now,
and all the fruits and vegetables are coming from Uganda. You
know that the potential isn't being realized.
In the North, they, too, have to develop the agriculture
sector. They import a lot of food, which they shouldn't. And
they are now turning more attention and investment to the food
sector, knowing their oil revenues are going to go down, that
they have extraordinary economic potential. They are getting
investment from Arab countries in the agriculture sector. And I
think that is going to be one of the major areas they look to,
as well.
Mr. Payne. Yeah. There is a lot of new technology on
getting water out of the desert now.
I have agreed to yield the balance of my time back to the
ranking member, who I think has a question he would like to
ask, Mr. Berman.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. The ranking member is recognized.
Mr. Berman. I thank you, Mr. Payne, and you, Madam
Chairman.
And I just wanted to thank you, Ambassador. I was sitting
here, thinking. I came to Congress 28 years ago. You were a key
figure in the Africa Bureau at that time, during some
incredible times--the fight against apartheid, the other
conflicts in Africa going on--the role you played there; and,
later on, Ambassador to South Africa and the new South Africa;
the leader of our refugee programs during some of the most--I
am sure Mr. Smith remembers those years in Southeast Asia and
in Africa, former Soviet Union, the places--you worked there;
your role before that at USAID, assistant secretary for IO,
serving both Republican and Democratic Presidents.
You really do give the term ``diplomat'' a great name with
your stellar service. That you would come out of the academic
world--I don't know if that is retirement--but to take this on
is a great tribute to you. Thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Berman.
Ambassador Lyman. You are very kind, Congressman. Thank you
so much.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Now I am pleased to yield to the chairman-designate of the
Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee, Mr. Royce
of California.
Mr. Royce. Ambassador Lyman, you have a long association
with these problems on the continent of Africa. And we have
many NGOs who are here today, as well.
One of the things that comes with that experience of long
being engaged with these types of regimes is that it gives you
an important historical check on your assumptions going forward
and, in particular, in dealing with Khartoum, which has broken
promise after promise.
When dealing with somebody like Bashir, who is in power not
because he is a peacemaker, but because he is the most
ruthless; when looking at that situation--and I have seen
firsthand the result of that ruthlessness in Sudan, in Darfur,
Sudan. I remember we had a ``Nightline'' camera crew we took in
to interview some of the survivors of an attack. And I remember
a town, Tina, that had been bombed from the air. That was not
an attack by the Janjaweed. Those were Antonovs that bombed
that town. I remember interviewing a young man who had lost his
hand. He had lost his hand to the Janjaweed, but with his other
hand he was able to draw pictures, as other kids did, of these
Antonovs that had bombed their village, and of mechanized armor
that was from the Khartoum government there to support the
Janjaweed in the attack.
So, in looking at this, the NGO community, I think, is very
hesitant to reach assumptions that all is going to end well.
And, in one particular regard, there is an issue that all of us
are concerned about, and it has to do with that issue of the
state sponsor of terrorism list. Joseph Kony of the Lord's
Resistance Army could not have abducted 10,000 children and
abused so many over the last 20 years and made child soldiers
out of them without the armaments he got from Khartoum, and
without being able to send his fighters up to Khartoum to be
patched up without the support that he had. And they didn't
allow people to go into South Sudan to take him out when we had
the opportunity to do it.
So the question I have is, have you made it very clear to
Khartoum that any support for the LRA would prevent them from
being taken off the terrorism list and, basically, that for
you, this is a red line? That is my question.
Ambassador Lyman. I would say categorically we have said
that. Any support of them by proxies or other such entities
would preclude our following through on that.
Mr. Royce. Very good.
Ambassador Lyman. And, in general, I would say, in dealing
with the regime, the way forward is for them to understand that
this is the way for them to go forward because it is worse for
them if they don't, in terms of peace, in terms of any thoughts
of prosperity.
Mr. Royce. And that is logical. But then we have the
historical record, and we have the fact that, for 10 years,
between 1994 and 2005, Sudan is the only documented supporter
for the LRA. And we have a U.N. report last November that LRA
commanders reached out to Sudan's military in Darfur for
support. Now, we don't know much more than that, other than
that that happened.
Would the State Department certify to Congress that there
are no links between the government in Khartoum and the LRA
before taking them off the terrorism list? I guess that is a
little harder question.
Ambassador Lyman. It is a harder question, and I will get
you a definitive answer because I have to talk to the people
who do that kind of analysis.
But I can tell you this. I have discussed personally--and I
know General Gration has--the LRA with the government and made
it very clear that any support to the LRA would be an obstacle
to normalization of relations with us. That is a terrible
group. That is a horrific group.
Mr. Royce. Yeah, it is the most horrific group, probably,
on the planet.
Ambassador Lyman. Right.
Mr. Royce. And the fact that the Khartoum government would
support--Ambassador Lyman, thank you for your service.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
The gentleman from Florida, my good friend, Mr. Rivera.
Mr. Rivera. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
Ambassador, in our administration's enthusiasm to engage
local authorities and roll out basic materials and services as
a conflict-mitigation strategy, have appropriate safeguards to
prevent waste, fraud, and abuse been implemented?
Ambassador Lyman. One of the things we are working on most
intensely with the government in the South, which is where most
of our development assistance is going, is exactly that--that
is, to get good financial controls, good budget controls, et
cetera. And we don't put money through the government without
those kinds of assurances. So we are watching that very
closely. This is a young government in the South, and getting
better controls, better financial controls is one of the top
priorities.
We are also doing that at the state level, because
resources have to be sent down to the state level. So we are
working with the state governments in the South to make sure
they have those controls in place. And we will continue to do
that.
Mr. Rivera. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.
A couple of other questions. What is the status of the S/
CRS flyaway teams that have been deployed to South Sudan? And
what are they doing exactly?
Ambassador Lyman. Those teams are out visiting and staying
in areas throughout the South to be able to get an
understanding of whether there are conflicts developing in the
South, whether the state governments are capable of dealing
with them, so that proper assistance and responses can be made.
It is kind of an extended outreach for the United States to
know what is happening out there, to make sure that the
potentials for conflict in the South, which are serious, are
being addressed, that we know what is happening, that we have
good information. And they have been effective over these last
couple months.
Mr. Rivera. If you could drill down on that just a little
bit further, what types of program funds are they
administering? To what end? Are they implementing directly? Are
they employing contractors or providing budget support to local
institutions?
Ambassador Lyman. They are only providing information. It
is up to USAID and other programs to then help with those
states and help in their security. The flyaway teams are
information-gathering teams.
Mr. Rivera. A few governance questions. Is the
administration planning to certify that an elected government
has taken office to justify removing restrictions on U.S.
assistance to Sudan under section 7008 of the State Foreign
Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2010 as
carried forward?
Ambassador Lyman. Assuming that they voted for secession,
they will not become fully independent under the CPA until
July. And then, of course, we would have to have legislation
with the Congress that would authorize assistance to that
entity. We don't have to do it right away because independence
becomes official at the end of the CPA.
Mr. Rivera. Will the Secretary of the Treasury also be
moving to make such a certification to provide debt relief to
the regime?
Ambassador Lyman. Debt relief is--there are sanctions
against our supporting debt relief. And it depends on how the
debt is divided, also, between the North and the South. If some
of the debt is assumed by the South and they become an
independent entity--and I would want to consult with the
Congress closely on this--we could support the South in doing
that.
But any general debt relief, assuming that the North
carries much of that debt--there are sanctions. And they would
have to be removed for us to support action on debt relief for
the North.
Mr. Rivera. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back the
balance of my time.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. The gentleman's
time has expired.
And now I would like to yield for our last--no, we still
have one more--the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Chabot, who is the
chairman-designate of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and
South Asia.
And thanks for subbing for me this weekend, Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Chabot. Happy to do it, Madam Chairwoman. I appreciate
the opportunity to do that. And you are loved down there, there
is no question about that. So we appreciated filling in for
you.
Mr. Ambassador, thank you for your time here this
afternoon. And I know you have answered a lot of questions, so
just a couple that I have.
Relative to the referendum, and assuming that it goes the
way that virtually everyone believes that it will and that the
vote in the South is to essentially secede, could you--and I
know you have already talked about this to some degree, but
could you discuss again what mechanisms are expected to take
place relative to the oil revenues and wealth sharing and that
sort of thing in the disputed areas?
Ambassador Lyman. The two entities face some choices on how
to handle the management of the oil sector. One is to create a
joint management of the sector. I don't think that is going to
happen, but that is one option out there.
Another is to have the South take an equity position in the
infrastructure in the North so they are part owner, as well,
and the economics works out that way.
A third option is simply for the South to pay a fee for
transporting the oil through the pipelines. And there are a
number of variations on this, all of which--I owe what limited
knowledge I have of this to the Norwegians, who have laid this
out in great detail for the two parties.
So they will choose among these potential ways of
cooperating, and then the political decision is, how much does
the South pay to the North? Is there a premium for peace, to
put it bluntly, in what they pay? And that is going to be the
political side of the negotiation.
On the other issues, there are working groups on all the
other issues looking at them technically. For example, on
currency, if both countries move to a new currency, how do they
do it very carefully, not to destabilize the other? Because you
could do that. And they have agreed in principle that they
won't destabilize each other, but then the question is, what is
the timing? How do they do it in the proper way? So there is a
working group on that.
And similarly on borders, there is a working group,
although, again, the decisions there are very political,
because there are five disputed border areas. Most of the
border is agreed, but five areas are disputed, and they haven't
agreed on how to solve the dispute. And that is now a major
issue to be resolved.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
And then on another area, Mr. Ambassador, I was here for 14
years and then gone the last 2, and so I have gotten a little
behind in some of these things over the last 2 years. But I
have been to the Darfur region on two different trips, one to
the refugee camps in Sudan and then to the refugee camps in
Chad. And, at the time, things seemed to be simmering down
somewhat, to the extent that the Janjaweed attacks had been,
shall we say, limited compared to the way they had been
previously, although many people were still in the camps.
Has there been any progress in the people moving out of the
camps and back to their villages, or is it too dangerous in
most places for that to occur?
Ambassador Lyman. Again, I have to apologize because Darfur
isn't in my brief. I don't have the up-to-date details.
I don't think there has been a lot of movement in that
regard. There was some violence very recently between the South
African--Sudan Armed Forces and one of the rebel groups that
displaced a lot of people additionally.
But I would defer to General Gration when he is here and my
colleague Dane Smith to give you a more accurate up-to-date. I
apologize that Darfur I am not as sharp on.
Mr. Chabot. That is quite all right, Mr. Ambassador. Thank
you very much for your time.
I yield back the balance of my time, Madam Chair.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chabot.
And the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Marino, which is a
much revered name in Miami, yields his time. And we thank you
so much because we are so short of time.
So we are going to say, thank you very much, Mr.
Ambassador, for your time. Get back to work. We are going to
shoo you out of there.
I am going to welcome Ambassador Richard Williamson and
Omer Ismail to our panelist table. And I am going to give you
the briefest of introduction. Gentlemen, I am going to be
ruthless with my gavel because we want to get to the question-
and-answer period. So, as you settle in, let me introduce you.
Ambassador Williamson has served as the President's special
envoy for Sudan and as the U.S. Representative to the United
Nations Human Rights Commission, where he pressed for the
adoption of a resolution condemning the atrocities in Darfur,
in conjunction with the United Nations commemorations of the
10th anniversary of genocide in Rwanda.
Welcome, Mr. Ambassador. And I know that your book is here
floating about.
And Omer Ismail--thank you so much, Omer. You are so loved.
A humanitarian, human rights activist, working with numerous
organizations to stop genocide and mass atrocities. Mr. Ismail
was born in Darfur but was forced to flee Sudan in 1989.
Thank you gentlemen both for being here. I will gavel you
down in 5 minutes so we can get to our question-and-answers
because we have votes on the floor in a little bit. Thank you.
Ambassador Williamson, if you could start.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD S. WILLIAMSON, PARTNER,
SALISBURY STRATEGIES, LLC (FORMER SPECIAL ENVOY TO SUDAN AND
AMBASSADOR TO THE U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS)
Ambassador Williamson. Thank you very much, Madam
Chairperson, and congratulations on that. Good to see Ranking
Member Berman again. And I have to note, Don Payne has spent
more time working on Sudan than any other American leader, and
we are all in his debt. And, as Congressman Smith said, we have
worked together in the past. It is good to be good with you
again.
I think in Sudan you have to first start with the fact that
there has been marginalization for 200 years that has resulted
in discrimination--discrimination economically, educationally,
health, politically, injustice. And that permeates the country,
and that creates instability. And the South is only a small
part of the story.
Second, we have to recognize that, unfortunately, in Sudan,
it is too common that the political leaders feel comfortable
resorting to violence as a legitimate way to pursue their
political objectives and engage in their atrocities.
And, thirdly, we have to recognize the nature of the
regime. The vote is a shining moment. The Sudan people deserve
most of the credit. The international community--U.S. brokered
the CPA, President Bush. And while I have criticized President
Obama and his administration, they deserve credit for their
initiative over the last 4 months, the diplomatic surge, which
was extremely helpful.
But the vote is not the end of the story. It may not even
be the beginning of the end of the story. The contested border
areas, Abyei, oil revenue sharing, and citizenship are not just
the headlines of issues. It is the fundamental dispute which,
over 6 years, have been known. For 6 years, Khartoum has
blocked progress on those issues. And for the last 6 months, 4
months notwithstanding, the initiative, little substantive,
particularized progress has been made.
Fourth, my experiences of the CPA, the regime in Khartoum
breaches commitments. Look at just the CPA. They agreed to
abide by the Abyei Border Commission. It made its
determination. The South accepted it; the North refused. They
agreed to abide by the permanent arbitration court in The Hague
in its determination of the border. That process went forward.
The South accepted it; the North refused. In the CPA, the North
agreed to disarm and demobilize their militias; they did not.
They committed to transparency in oil revenue sharing and
accounting; they did not.
It is important to recognize that incentives alone are
inadequate, promises are illusory, and incentives without
steel, without some threat of coercion, have proven a failure
in the past, and they will let down the Sudanese people again.
Underlying all this, what is the U.S. goal? In 2005, it was
in part the separation, and we paid for that. It would be
overpaying now to say that because haltingly, imperfectly, in a
delayed manner and having cost many lives, that we should now
be overly generous for the performance of commitments made. The
marginalization continues, the injustices continue, atrocities
continue.
The week before the vote began in the referendum, 18 bombs
dropped in the South. The U.N. certified that they were from
the Sudan Armed Forces. And the South is not the only area
subjected to this. Darfur and the Nuba Mountains cannot be
separated. We should not rush to give benefits.
The nine neighbors and China have not been helpful, but we
have reached a tipping point where they see that separation is
going to happen, so they have been, on the margins, helpful.
They can do more. The administration has tried to encourage it.
They should. There is an enormous development challenge, but it
has to have burden sharing, and the European Union and others
have to increase their participation.
I am concerned about a process that begins in a litany of
incentives before performance, before specific agreements,
before verification mechanisms are put in place, before there
is monitored results. As Ronald Reagan used to say, ``Trust but
verify.'' I am concerned about it, and I fear, once again, the
Sudanese people will be denied what they need.
Thank you, Madam Chairperson.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Williamson follows:]
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. Thank you.
Mr. Ismail?
STATEMENT OF MR. OMER ISMAIL, ADVISOR, THE ENOUGH PROJECT
Mr. Ismail. Congratulations and thank you, Madam Chair. And
thanks to the esteemed members of your committee. I will get
down to it.
The United States has a crucial role to play in laying the
groundwork for peace and stability in Sudan from this moment
forward. The Southerners have come out. They cast their vote.
They are going to decide their destiny, which is going to be
the separation from the mother country of Sudan. But, as
everybody agrees, including President Obama in his op-ed in the
New York Times, that the work is just beginning.
So the United States should capitalize on this current
momentum in Sudan to address three crucial issues that will
establish peace and stability in all of Sudan and the
neighboring countries in the region.
First, the relationship between North and South Sudan must
be clarified before secession formally takes place in July.
This involves detailing the economic arrangements between North
and South after separation, the legal status of populations in
both the North and the South, as well as resolving the status
of contentious border areas. Without agreement on these issues,
anxieties on the ground and among the leadership of both
governments have the potential to spark violence.
Second, the conflict in Darfur must be reprioritized. An
inadequate peace process has trickled along for years while
violence has intensified in recent weeks. Now is the time to
revitalize the Darfur peace process, one that has inched along
for years with very limited effect on the ground in Darfur.
Number three, at a time when political changes will be
underfoot in both the North and the South, the U.S. should
press both governments toward inclusive governance and
pluralism to ensure that peace endures in Sudan, both in the
North and the South.
Sharing oil revenues, the currency, citizenship, border,
and the issue of Abyei are very crucial, but until now, the
international community has been content to let the Sudanese
parties delay making the difficult and necessary decisions to
ensure a peaceful transition. In place of this unassertive
mediation, the U.S. should jump-start a far more proactive
international mediation, modeled upon the Naivasha peace
process that produced the CPA.
The Sudanese Government in August unveiled its own Darfur
strategy that would nationalize or domesticate the political
forces, and focus on the return of IDPs, development and
implementation of justice locally. We believe that this plan is
not only problematic but that it hides the government's true
intention of seeking a military solution in Darfur.
We believe the way forward is for the U.S. to have a
decisive roadmap to secure peace in Darfur based on a sound
diagnosis on why efforts to date have fallen short of the mark.
This will require robust engagement with the mediation team,
significant diplomatic and technical support, and securing
constructive participation by the Europeans, China, and the
regional actors.
Finally, the U.S. should capitalize on the opportunity for
political reform that South Sudan's secession presents for both
the North and South.
In the North, several of the processes that the United
States should strongly support are specifically mandated under
the CPA, including a constitutional review that involves public
participation as well as popular consultation in the border
states of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. Investing in civil
society groups, independent voices, political party
development, and other building blocks to a more democratic
future are fundamentally steps that the U.S. can take toward
preventing future conflict in Sudan.
In the South, we see a fragile new state that is filled
with potential. It is in the interest of the United States to
help lay the foundation for good governance and invest in real
institution and capacity building. The development of a strong
Parliament and judiciary, as well as executive institutions
that deliver services, share power, and transparently
administer tax on oil revenue will be key to the peace in
Southern Sudan.
As the United States moves forward to urgently ensure that
the two Sudans separate amicably but find the common ground
necessary to sustain peace in a tumultuous corner of the world,
we must do what we can to help deliver on the promises to all
Sudanese.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ismail follows:]
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, gentlemen. You have
proven that you can be brilliant and succinct. Thank you.
I will yield my time to the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Rivera.
Mr. Rivera. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Ambassador Williamson, thank you very much for being here.
By the way, what years were you at the United Nations Human
Rights Commission?
Ambassador Williamson. Oh, it was 2004, I think it was.
Mr. Rivera. I was there in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
working for one of your predecessors, U.S. Ambassador Armando
Valladares.
Ambassador Williamson. I was assistant secretary for IO at
the time, and Armando was working for me. He did a great job,
pushed an important issue, and we should continue to put
pressure on the island prison.
Mr. Rivera. Thank you. And thank you not only for those
words, thank you for your service.
With respect to the roadmap, Ambassador, pursuant to the
roadmap presented, the administration is poised to remove Sudan
from the state sponsors of terrorism list, facilitate high-
level visits, exchange ambassadors, ease sanctions, and advance
negotiations for debt relief in exchange for Khartoum meeting
its own obligations under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
United States leverage with regard to Darfur would be
reserved to lifting sanctions that cannot be removed without
legislative relief. In your opinion, does Khartoum care about
the remaining sanctions? And, realistically, what leverage
would the United States have, with regard to Darfur, if the
United States pursues this course?
Ambassador Williamson. First, a generic observation,
Congressman: The less a regime deserves the mantle of
legitimacy, the more they desire it. And those actions all
raise into question the legitimacy of the government of
Khartoum. So it is beyond whatever economic benefit or other
benefits; it goes to their legitimacy within Sudan and outside.
Second, as I noted earlier, I am concerned about being too
anxious to provide incentives. Remember, the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement was agreed to 6 years ago. When I was special
envoy, it was my view, after meeting with the leaders often in
Khartoum, meetings that drew the criticism from Senators Obama,
Biden, and Clinton, that they had already made a decision at
the time they signed CPA that they may be having to give up the
South.
I have noted that all the difficult issues that matter have
not been resolved. We have a long way to go beyond the 6-month
period when separation will become official before we know if
those commitments will be made. And I also know, from my
various positions in government, there is a bureaucratic
momentum once you start the process. Again, to cite President
Reagan, ``Trust but verify.'' We have to see more.
Mr. Rivera. Thank you, Ambassador.
In November 2008, Ambassador Lyman participated in a
conference hosted by the Embassy of Sweden and the United
Nations Association on the ``responsibility to protect.'' And
according to a meeting summary, he suggested that Darfur would
be excluded from obligations inferred from the responsibility
to protect because the crimes were committed prior to adoption
of the world summit outcome document in 2005.
What is your position on this? And does the United Nations
have a responsibility to protect marginalized populations in
Sudan in the event that the regime in Khartoum decides to crush
all remaining opposition following a vote for independence in
Southern Sudan?
Ambassador Williamson. I think the general responsibility
to protect preceded the millennium summit outcomes document
adopted in September 2005. Furthermore, I think when you look
at the genocide in slow motion that continued after the
adoption of that document, it is important for the United
States and the international community to step up to its
responsibility.
Let me note, I am loathe to ever disagree with Ambassador
Princeton Lyman, who I have the greatest respect for. But, in
this case, I do think we have a responsibility. I have noted
that as recently as 2 weeks ago Khartoum was involved in
bombings in the South. They have been involved in bombings in
Darfur. They continue to engage in coordinated attacks. It is
less intense only because there are fewer targets of
opportunity. This should be a concern. It is not delinked from
the North/South nor the difficulties in the Nuba Mountains. We
have to be more robust.
And one of the disappointments has been that those
violations of past agreements have occurred, innocent lives
have died, and there has been a reluctance from the
administration to hold to account and publicly criticize the
perpetrators of these atrocities.
Mr. Rivera. Thank you very much. Appreciate your service,
again. Nice seeing you after 20 years.
And I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
I am pleased to yield to the ranking member-designate of
Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights, Mr. Payne of New
Jersey.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much.
Let me ask you, Mr. Ismail, what do you think of the
prospects of a right to return for the people of Darfur? Has
the government thought of any plan? Is it safe for some areas
to have a right to return?
For people to live in refugee camps for now until the next
generation is wrong. So I would even like to see sanctions held
until the government comes up with a plan of the right of
people to return to their properties.
Mr. Ismail. I am in agreement, Mr. Payne, because the
Government of Sudan has put every obstacle in the way of peace
in Darfur, and the refugees and the IDPs cannot return today to
their regions, to their place of origin because, A, there is
nothing there, after they have been burned and all the
infrastructure that were there support to life was destroyed
during the attacks. And, again, there is another reason,
because most of these areas were occupied by people who, in
some reports, we have seen that they don't even belong to
Sudan, let alone belonging to Darfur and being citizens of
Darfur.
Number three, the violence still continues. And until
today, contrary to the SOFA agreement, the agreement of the
deployment of the U.N. troops, the Government of Sudan is still
putting the obstacles in front of UNAMID and the U.N. troops
that are supposed to protect those people and supposed to
provide safe havens for those people who are willing to
voluntarily return to the areas.
Yes, the sanctions should remain until that issue is
addressed in Darfur.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Williamson, I remember meeting you in Abyei. The
flames were still smoldering.
What is your take on the East? We heard very little about
the East, and, as we know, there are problems there. How do you
see the government in Khartoum moving forward with the problem
in the East, with the separation from the South? Will there be
panicking? Will the East decide that they should have some
protest against the government and do something perhaps that
happened in Darfur when that began? What do you think about
that part?
Ambassador Williamson. Thank you, Congressman Payne.
I think relevant to that is what has been the U.S. policy
goal, a bipartisan policy goal in Sudan. And it is to bring
sustainable peace, stability, and justice--justice that has
been denied due to marginalization.
And you are correct, in the East, in the Nuba Mountains, as
well as Darfur, as well as in the South, they have been victims
of those injustices. And if there is dismemberment of Sudan and
the South is independent next July, you still have the root
cause of injustices that will not be addressed. And I am loathe
to be too generous until those issues are dealt with for those
who have been subjected to violence as well as the injustice.
And I think the instability and traumas will continue both in
the East as well as in the West.
Secondly, Congressman, there is a lot of talk about the
stress that is going to be on the North after separation if it
comes. And I acknowledge that that is true. There will be
people that say the government has lost its legitimacy. The
opposition will try to unite. The rebel movements may move more
aggressively in Darfur or overreach. But there also will be
stress in the South.
Political competition has been suppressed because of a
unity to try to move to CPA implementation. And I would suggest
to you that the competition that will be unleashed in the next
6 months, in the next 12 months, also will be severe in Juba,
that it will be difficult for the Government of Southern Sudan
to be excessive in its concessions, especially those that are
aren't meritorious, and that the negotiators have to be mindful
of that, as well.
Thank you.
Mr. Payne. In the seconds I have, Luis Ocampo said that
Bashir should still be indicted. Where do you think that is
going?
Ambassador Williamson. I am very concerned. It is ironic
that President George Bush, who opposed the ICC, was a stronger
supporter for international accountability of the regime in
Khartoum than this administration has been.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Chairman-Designate Smith of the Africa, Global Health, and
Human Rights Subcommittee.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Gentlemen, thank you very much for
your testimony and for your leadership.
New York Times reporter Jeffrey Gettleman wrote a piece,
``Roots of Bitterness in a Region Threaten Sudan's Future.'' It
was in the New York Times on January 15th. And he talks about
how most people in Abyei are armed to the teeth.
My question, first, is, where have all those AK-47s gone
that we believe the Chinese Government helped to facilitate,
well in excess of 100,000? Are they there? Are we perhaps being
a little too optimistic about the prospects of a peaceful
transition here or what?
Ambassador Williamson. I think, Congressman, if you are
dealing with Sudan, you have to have a fault of optimism to be
able to deal with such a difficult issue. So I have no fault
there.
But, as you know, if it is Human Rights First, if it is the
small-arms commission of the U.N., the documentation of Chinese
small arms has been irrefutable. And we can assume--there have
been credible reports of the flow of those arms down into
regions near the border, directed by Khartoum. It is a matter
of great concern.
I think, as Congressman Payne said, we were together in
Abyei when the smoke was still coming up where the charred bed
remains, where there were no homes as far as you can see. And
then in the Gok, where 50,000 people were living under torn
sheets during the rainy season when you couldn't walk without
mud up to your ankles.
The tragedy of Abyei goes on. It goes on because of the
oil. The vote was good, but the tough issues lie ahead.
Mr. Ismail. May I add, there is information that is coming
from Abyei that the weapons are there and the violence can
spark at any moment. You might have heard of this project that
The Enough Project, with Harvard University and others, have
launched. And these are the eyes in the sky that are going to
show us what is happening in Abyei, so stay tuned.
And, also, the small arms are there, and other open sources
that are saying 55,000 of the 105,000 standing army of Sudan
are in or around the area of Abyei. If that is not a spark that
is going to start something, I don't know what it is. So we
have to be vigilant, we have to work hard to avoid that clash
from happening.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Let me ask about the Sudanese
slaves. I mentioned earlier about the 35,000. Do you have any
recommendations on how to liberate them from the bondage that
they live in in the North?
Also, on debt, $35 billion to $40 billion of indebtedness,
mostly to other countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, but
also, if my understanding is correct, about $2 billion to the
U.S.
When the administration talks about the roadmap, could you
again say whether or not you believe--because debt is certainly
a part of that--lifting the designation as a state sponsor of
terror--and other issues, obviously, are in there, as well--
could you speak to that roadmap, if you would, how comfortable
you are with it, either of you.
And finally--I will run out of time. Why don't you go on
those issues?
Mr. Ismail. I will start with the roadmap in Darfur, as
well in the South, because, as you know, all these issues that
we are talking about are real issues, the border and the Abyei
issue, as far as the South is concerned, the debt and currency
and the citizenship.
If you listen to the rhetoric coming out of Khartoum, that
the Southern Sudanese are going to be stripped of their
citizenship the day after announcing the secession--and I don't
know how they are going to define a Southern Sudanese from
another Sudanese that are living in the North today. And how
about dual citizenship, something that the government gives to
itself. Some ministers in the Government of Sudan today, they
hold other passports from different countries, including this
country. And they are not going to allow the Southerners who
were born and raised in Sudan as such to have dual citizenship.
I don't understand that. We have to work hard on these issues.
And the roadmap for Darfur, we have to revitalize the peace
process. We have to support the mediation. And we have to have
to some high-level people who are involved in this, because the
alternative of that is going to be violence in Darfur.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Thank you.
Ambassador Williamson. Quickly, Congressman, the most
important thing with the slave tragedy is being very vigorous
to push the rule of law, which doesn't exist. It is still the
rule of position and power. And, second, shining light on it.
That is the best disinfectant to human rights abuses. The
United States and others should both engage in speaking out
more aggressively.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Carnahan.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And let me first
just say congratulations again. We are looking forward to
working with you in this new Congress and with your leadership.
And thank you for holding this timely and important hearing.
I really wanted to focus my time and again acknowledge this
referendum. I think it is cause for hope. The international
community, especially the African Union, the U.N., have played
important roles in implementing the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement and were key facilitators of the referendum.
I guess, with multilateral engagement, these efforts have
been met with some criticism. But I would like to ask our two
panelists here why it is important for the U.S. to continue to
engage in these international organizations to leverage the
work in Sudan. What have been some of the tangible benefits so
far? And how might we, going forward, maximize these
collaborative efforts?
And if we could start with Ambassador Williamson, please.
Ambassador Williamson. Thank you, Congressman.
I think if we look at Sudan, we see a long history of
various multilateral mechanisms making a contribution. The IGAD
process itself, where it has seven Eastern African countries,
the troika of the United States, Britain, and Norway, were
instrumental in being the midwife of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement.
Since then, there has been significant multilateral efforts
with respect to peacekeeping, first, the African Union forces,
then the U.N. forces, both in the South and in the West. They
have not stopped violence. They can't. They don't have the
capacity. The areas are too big. But they have crowded out the
space for violence, and they have given some window for peace
negotiations and discussions.
I think you can also look at the assistance where it has
been an international effort through the Sudan Consortium. I
think that Congressman Rohrabacher--and he will probably raise
it, about the burden sharing. The U.S. clearly has made a
disproportionate contribution. Nonetheless, the Sudan
Consortium has involved other countries, many other countries.
Norway has taken the lead in coordination of the consortium,
and there has been that assistance.
But, finally, sir, if I could, let me note that, to the
degree there has been humanitarian success in Sudan, whether it
is in Darfur or in the South, the unsung heroes are the
humanitarian NGO organizations, their workers, who are Sudanese
as well as from countries all over the world, and the Sudanese
nationals who also participated in that, some risking their own
lives.
So it has been a collective effort. I do think the U.S.
deserves note not only for its lead on the humanitarian
assistance and its pivotal role in the political process, but
this is a victory for the Sudanese people. But there have many
who have helped it along through international organizations
and other mechanisms.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you, Ambassador.
Mr. Ismail?
Mr. Ismail. Thank you, Mr. Congressman.
And I think the United States is standing to benefit a lot
from the subject in Sudan. It is a huge country, as it stands
today, 1 million square miles, bordering nine countries. If you
just consider the western country of Chad there and its natural
extension of Sudan in the Sahel and you put Nigeria into the
equation, you will find about 520 million people living in and
around Sudan. If Sudan unravels, then this whole population is
going to be thrown in a tailspin.
We have seen the spillover of the LRA into Sudan and the
spillover of Darfur into Chad and the destabilization that has
created. This is very important. Besides the $10 billion that
we just talked about here that the United States is spending in
the South, there are today over $1 billion that the United
States is spending in Darfur to keep about 3\1/2\ million
displaced alive. That is a huge burden.
If the Sudan was left to its own devices--and we have seen
violence of the scale that we have seen before in Darfur and
the South--only God knows how much we are going to spend to
keep some of these people alive in refugee camps, not in their
homes.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Carnahan.
Mr. Rohrabacher?
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
And Ambassador Williamson was right. I would like to focus
a little bit on the disproportionate contribution that the
United States is making, not only in Sudan, but this, I think,
exemplifies many of the crises, humanitarian crises, that we
find around the world.
If there is anything the last election should have told the
rest of the world, it is that the United States can no longer
afford to do this. We are going broke. And once our economy is
broken by this irresponsibility that we have had, then we will
be able to help no one--not our own people, not other people in
crisis. The world needs to take that into consideration, notice
it, and plan their futures proportionally.
I would suggest that we--that is not to say that in Sudan
and other places that we have seen these horrible tragedies
take place, the heartrending murder of innocent people--we care
about that. But we can no longer afford to carry as big a
burden as we have.
And what makes it worse, perhaps--and, Ambassador
Williamson, you seem a bit pessimistic that, after this $10
billion of investment that we have made, that we will actually
succeed. It is a rough road to go.
Let me ask you, is the roadmap that has been set down--do
you consider that to be adequate? And if it is adequate, has it
been enforced and followed? Or the roadmap will not succeed
because it does not address the issues that need to be
addressed?
Ambassador Williamson. Congressman Rohrabacher, if I could
make a few points that I think are relevant.
First, it is noteworthy that when the regime came to power
in 1989, total exports were $500 million. They grew to $9.5
billion by 2008, almost all from oil, which is why the oil
revenue sharing is crucial.
Second, with that sort of money coming in, the Government
of Sudan, who designed the genocide in Darfur, as of the end of
2008 their total contribution to the humanitarian needs of the
people in Darfur was $30 million. I think that is not
irrelevant to the considerations of how much faith we should
have.
Secondly, China gets 6 percent of its imported oil from
Sudan. They have now tipped, where they understand it is in
their interest to have stability. They should step up more for
humanitarian assistance.
The larger question you raised on humanitarian assistance
is beyond my purview. It is up to the 435 of you and the
hundred across the way to make those decisions, ultimately.
But I do think there is an impulse in America that is
worthy, that is part of our mission, that recognizes whether it
is human rights, humanitarian assistance, we have an obligation
to step up. But we should be tough-minded about it, get others
to step up too, especially in these times of economic peril.
And, finally, let me just say on the roadmap, on good days
I am optimistic, but my experience teaches me to maybe be a
little skeptical and cynical. And I think the talk of
incentives without the talk of coercion, without the talk of
steel, without the talk of being tough, is a matter of great
concern. As Bismarck said, diplomacy without coercion is like
sheets of music without instruments.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And no amount of humanitarian, you know,
assistance is going to increase the standard of living of
anybody for any length of time unless it is accompanied by a
democratization and a change in character of a regime that is
capable of the type of violence that you have just described.
Isn't that correct?
Ambassador Williamson. Yes, Congressman. I think it is
important to note, in the South, not only do they have 80
percent of this oil revenue, but they have other mineral
resources, and they have among the richest agricultural land
anywhere, outside of Illinois, which of course has the best.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let me note before my time runs out, which
is one moment, and that is, Madam Chairman, if we are going to
help people in the future and they have this potential wealth
that exists, it is not wrong for us to suggest we are going to
help you in this crisis but we expect to be paid back one way
or the other.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Just a couple of questions briefly.
Could you discuss the roles of both the African Union and
the Arab League in all of the things that we are talking about
here this afternoon, and what do you anticipate it will be in
the near future?
Ambassador Williamson. Quickly, my experience is it has
been uneven. The African Union, understandably, is worried
about countries being split. There are only two African
countries that have just two ethnic groups. Most of them have
multiple ethnic groups. They are concerned about a contagion,
as are the nine neighbors. But I think, now that they have
understood the inevitability of this, they have played a more
constructive role. The Arab League was unhelpful, as was the
African Union, on questions of accountability, but they have
been helpful on some of the development issues.
And Qatar, in particular, should be singled out and the
minister of state for foreign affairs, Al Mahmoud, for their
extraordinary leadership in trying to get constructive
discussions going on Darfur.
So, could they have done more? Yes. Should they have done
more? In my opinion, yes. Do we wish they had done more?
Absolutely. But they have made contributions and more lately
than they did a few years ago.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
And then, finally, what can we do to ensure that the
corruption, which is endemic in much of Africa, doesn't take
root--although, certainly, there is already corruption in
Southern Sudan--but doesn't thrive in what may soon be Africa's
newest country.
Ambassador Williamson. Transparency, transparency,
transparency are your first three priorities. Second, good
governance will require helping train a larger coterie of
people to run the agencies and departments of a newly
independent Southern Sudan. And, third, some good green
eyeshades from outside donors and others to try to monitor it.
And, ultimately, as Congressman Rohrabacher indicated, if
there is, in fact, a democratic process of accountability, that
is a useful and often determinative aspect in corruption
fighting.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
Thank you. Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my
time.
Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Thank you to the presenters. Thank you to our panelists,
and great members.
Tomorrow, at 10:30, in this room, we will be having a
briefing on China.
And, with that, this briefing is adjourned.
Thank you, gentlemen.
[Whereupon, at 6:32 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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